

Fragile States Country Report No. 4

Sudan

Released Oct 2007



Events analysis based
on monitoring from
September 2006 to
February 2007

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
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FRAGILITY IN BRIEF

Sudan is weak, with a government, economy and vulnerable populations at risk of instability. CIPF ranks Sudan as the most fragile state globally in terms of **Authority** due to extreme security threats posed by spoilers in both Western and Southern Sudan. Janjaweed rebels target civilians and civil infrastructure in the West, while South Sudan is recovering from a decades-long civil war, even as Ugandan rebels use the region for refuge. Low levels of development and vulnerability to seasonal, natural phenomena serve only to exacerbate already-limited state participation. State **Legitimacy** in Sudan is a medium fragility risk and listed as the 29th highest risk in the world. Economic growth in the resource and agricultural sectors may actually intensify overall fragility, as the Government of Sudan (GoS) sacrifices development and governance in favour of partnerships from China, Libya and Zimbabwe. Sudan ranked 141st out of 177 countries on the 2006 UNDP Human Development Index (UNDP – Human Development Report, 2006). Sudan also ranks among the highest in the world in terms of risk related to **Capacity**, giving Sudan the highest overall fragility rating in the 2007 CIPF Fragility Index.

Infrastructure and security provision are run by a patchwork of international actors. Economic growth, international linkages and low population density are among the very few stabilizing indicators for Sudan. These factors suggest that Sudan is unlikely to meet many of its Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets, and those that do appear within reach are significantly buttressed by international support (UNDP, 2006). Recent events, however, indicate improvement, and Sudan has experienced some stabilization in its security, economic and development environments.





Sudan Authority (A), Legitimacy (L), and Capacity (C) Triangle

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGs): LIKELIHOOD OF ATTAINMENT (UNICEF, 2007)

Extreme Poverty and Hunger	Education	Gender Equality	Child Mortality	Maternal Mortality	HIV/AIDS & Malaria	Environmental Sustainability
Medium	Low	Low	Medium	Low	Medium	Medium

STRUCTURAL BASELINE & EVENTS SUMMARY





"Sudan's structural performance has been influenced by the country's poor security environment for many years."

SUMMARY

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS Sudan's structural performance has been influenced by the country's poor security environment for many years. Janjaweed forces have terrorised civilians across the western half of the country. Though the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between forces in South Sudan and Khartoum has international support, the structural damage has taken a heavy toll. The demobilisation of the eastern rebels is a source of hope. Sudan is rated as the third highest risk country, driven by the country's multiple and lengthy conflicts and its extremely poor human rights environment. Although relatively high economic growth and low population density exemplify a few positive areas, Sudan's economy, demographic situation and environment are all areas of concern. Poor ratings for Human Development, including gender scores, and Governance round out the problematic areas and explain the high risk scores for **authority** and **capacity**. President Omar Al-Bashir has been in power since 1989 and has overseen the adoption of a state-wide Sharia-based legal system, created a national police force and effectively dissolved the existing executive and legislative body, the revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, and assumed its power. Sudan adopted a new constitution in 1998 while Khartoum continued intermittent missile attacks against Southern rebels. The end of the civil war came in 2004 and resulted in temporary semi-autonomy for the South. In spite of his power, Al-Bashir has struggled to maintain order in western Sudan and to fulfil many of the terms of the CPA. The resulting insecurity and tension explains the high fragility of Sudan.

EVENTS Events in Sudan were extremely volatile during the observation period; the country's gently stabilizing trend belies a tumultuous series of events. Positive developments in the economic sector have been offset by ongoing instability in the security sector and a generalized state inability to respond effectively to humanitarian needs. Although only events related to Governance demonstrated a tendency towards deterioration during the period observed, all primary drivers experienced high levels of volatility.

KEY ISSUES AND FACTS

Overall:

- ☒ Economy and Human Development spoiled by security problems
- ☒ Government lacks full territorial authority
- ☒ Eastern and South Sudan bastions of progress
- ☒ Political will/motives of GoS insurmountable barrier, in areas of concern

Security and Crime:

- ☒ Darfur conflict bleeds across borders to Chad, C.A.R.
- ☒ Government promises to disarm Janjaweed, negotiate with rebels
- ☒ GoS negotiates political solutions to Darfur with UN, AU, USA

Economics:

- ☒ International sanctions on GoS have a destructive effect on individual and business prosperity
- ☒ Security situation driving away investors and allies
- ☒ China encourages good practice and improved security

Governance:

- ☒ Government alternates between allowing an UN force into Darfur and denying having done so or changing parameters of deployment
- ☒ Conspicuously-timed promises to disarm Janjaweed
- ☒ National borders are permeable to political and security spoilers

Human Development:

- ☒ NGOs unable to continue operations
- ☒ Security and Peace agreement in Eastern Sudan allows for capacity-building initiatives
- ☒ International commitment to helping civilians in Sudan

Environment:

- ☒ Sudan detects bird flu
- ☒ Nile wetlands gain protection

Demography:

- ☒ Somalia, Sudan crises deepen rift between Arabs, Africans
- ☒ Limited refugee repatriation underway
- ☒ Pressures associated with hosting Ugandan peace process

PRIMARY DRIVERS

SECURITY AND CRIME

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

Security and Crime is the single most important driver in Sudan, as it affects every other cluster. It is also the single highest risk area in a country that ranks among the most fragile in the world. Conflict intensity, very poor respect for human rights and an immense number of refugees produced imply that Sudan is unlikely to see change until meaningful effort is applied to supporting the North-South peace and ending the irrefutable pillage of the Darfur provinces. Sudan also has a very high number of incidents of terrorism and a high reliance on external military support.

EVENTS

Events related to security were primarily destabilizing, though a few positive developments helped to offset the violence recorded throughout the country. A generally positive situation in South Sudan was punctuated by irregular, but deadly, violent attacks by spoiler factions. Eastern Sudan witnessed the profoundly positive demobilization of rebels from that region and the Eritrean/Ethiopian/Kenyan border was calm. Regular and brutal attacks were the norm in all three Darfur provinces, as well as in the capital. AU, UN and NGO staff were not immune to the violence, though most attacks targeted civilians. Smuggling, drug-abuse and crime are also widespread, though they may seem limited in comparison to the extensive violence.

KEY EVENTS

- **Violence in Darfur Threatens to Spread Beyond Sudan**
19 December 2006, VOA
Cross-border violence causes problems
- **Officials in Southern Sudan say North-South Agreement Threatened**
25 January 2007, VOA
The fragility of this agreement puts all activities in Sudan at risk
- **Sudan says it will accept scaled back U.N. peacekeeper involvement in Darfur region**
23 December 2006, Associated Press

GOVERNANCE

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

Sudan shows weakness regarding restrictions on civil and democratic processes and fares poorly in terms of its rule of law and corruption. However, these drivers of Sudan's fragility are moderated to some extent by the permanence of the regime and the government's emphasis on maintaining international linkages. Those linkages and the concomitant committed support of allies sustain Omar Al-Bashir's political capital in Khartoum. Limited access for groups that are not viewed favourably by the GoS raises questions about the long-term prospects for governance reform. Sudan is a very large country that shares borders with nine other countries; the delicate requirements of governance in this situation are beyond Sudan's current capabilities.

EVENTS


Governance in Sudan displayed a tendency towards instability, marked by high volatility. Al-Bashir in turn resisted, accepted, denied and denounced versions of an UN-mandated security force in Darfur. Spurning the threats of the US, Germany, and United Kingdom, Sudan denied access to the UN for anything larger than the observation force already monitoring the CPA. The AU mission presently active in Western Sudan lacks the training, the mandate and the equipment to ensure security. The government has a poor relationship with many of its neighbours and struggles to fully capitalize on the development assistance it does receive. A strong partnership with China, as affirmed in their January 2007 meeting, suggests that Sudan's interpretation of good governance and human rights is likely not to adhere to the values and expectations of contemporary Western stakeholders.

KEY EVENTS

- **GoS rejects UN Peacekeeping force**
16 September 2006, Associated Press
Replayed many times as the security situation fluctuated
- **Chad, Sudan End Government Support to Militias**
9 January 2007, VOA
Al-Bashir gained political capital and secured development promises as a result
- **Ugandan rebels violate truce, dispersing from designated zone in Southern Sudan**
27 September 2006, Xinhua
Threat to fragile truce in Southern Sudan

High-risk


Average Events Score and Tendency



⊗ Avg Score: -1.39
➡ Trend Score: 0.66

Medium-risk


Average Events Score and Tendency



⊗ Avg Score: .9
➡ Trend Score: -.61

PRIMARY DRIVERS

ECONOMICS



STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

Sudan has sought to capitalize on the effects of the Peace Agreement between the North and South, and early indications suggest modest growth. Better production and consumption and a boost in foreign direct investment have helped provide Sudan with a better economy than a year ago. Still, there remain several areas of concern from a regulatory perspective that should be addressed for Sudan to shift from its present high-risk rating. Debt, poor trade openness and a sprawling informal economy are among the more destructive indicators. The regulatory influence of Sudan's membership in several international financial institutions, reserve holdings and economic growth help moderate the negative aspects, and present fertile ground for more progress.

EVENTS

On average, economic events were the most stabilizing for Sudan. This positive finding suggests that Al-Bashir's policy, which eschews many of the wishes of OECD countries, still manages to be marginally profitable for certain sectors of the economy. During the reporting period, GoS representatives met with Zimbabwean, Libyan, Russian and Chinese contacts and inked trade deals with each. A number of firms, such as Siemens and Mobitel, eventually abandoned their efforts in light of security concerns, but on the whole Sudan profited. There is significant economic interest in Sudan from Gulf Arab states, possibly due to its economic policy being in line with Islamic principles. A speculative dialogue with OPEC was initiated by the GoS but failed to materialize.

KEY EVENTS

- Bush signs executive order strengthening Sudan sanctions**
 13 Oct 2006, Associated Press
 Enhanced sanctions collapse several sectors of Sudan economy
- China & Sudan boost ties at summit**
 2 Feb 2007, Agence France Presse
 Several economic and political deals at this meeting of state leaders
- Sudan's open doors to China pays off, oil economy booming** 2 Nov 2006, AFP
 China among few international supporters of Sudan's economy

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS


Ongoing violence hampers state efforts to provide for the basic needs of citizens. The rating in this cluster is the second worst for Sudan and an undeniable source of fragility. Sudan is particularly troubled by its poor education and literacy rates; health-related indicators are equally weak. Access to water and sanitation are effectively non-existent in entire districts (ICG, 2007). Sudan scores equally poorly on the Gender-related Development Index, rating among the 20 worst performers in the world for gender.

EVENTS

A low average score and few highly positive events further reinforce Sudan's high-risk rating in this cluster. A large number of international NGOs have effectively taken control of responding to humanitarian need in the country, particularly in the West and South, due to poor state capacity and a UN force without a mandate or sufficient resources to act effectively. However, during the reporting period, many agency directors warned of a humanitarian catastrophe, while others evacuated or operated from other countries due to security concerns for their personnel. Despite their traditional relationship, even China has exhibited concern; during a state visit, China's President Hu Jintao urged Sudan to do more to protect civilians. One bright spot was the UN assisted repatriation of South Sudan refugees in light of the CPA.

KEY EVENTS

- UN warns of humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan's Darfur**
 8 September 2006, Xinhua
 This in light of increasingly hard conditions
- UN, AU Take Humanitarian Political Steps to Solve Sudan's Darfur Crisis**
 31 January 2007, VOA
 Replaces state responsibility
- Sudan accuses U.N. of using 'fabricated' reports of rights abuses in Darfur**
 6 October 6, Associated Press
 Al-Bashir's attempts to neutralise the argument for intervention



SECONDARY DRIVERS

ENVIRONMENT

SUMMARY Sudan faces a problematic environmental situation, but this area cannot be a state priority in light of the dire security conditions. Being a large country, Sudan has a broad range of ecosystems, each presenting their own challenges. Flooding can affect the Blue Nile region while droughts are not uncommon in the West. Sudan is also home to several environmentally exploitative industries and has limited regulatory systems. The listing of the Sudd wetlands on the List of Wetlands of International Importance by UN Environment Programme (UNEP, 2006) stands out as one positive prospect for optimism in Sudan's environment.

DEMOGRAPHY

SUMMARY High urban growth rates and a poor overall life expectancy are predictable products of Sudan's decades-long conflict. Sudan has seen a 15% increase in urban population in the past 15 years. Combined with a growing unemployment rate, this bodes ill for Sudan's demographic conditions. Still, Sudan faces a positive situation with moderately low population diversity and growth, and low population density. The repatriation of refugees to South Sudan is promising, but continuing violence in the West may serve to shift the problem. Limited population diversity notwithstanding, entrenched xenophobia between Arabs and Africans in Sudan is a major area of concern, as it is both a cause and effect of ongoing violence.

CANADA AND SUDAN

CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS

- **Darfur Peace Agreement** *Canada provided financial, technical and diplomatic support to the African Union throughout the negotiation of this process*
Though weak and suffering, the CPA is the best hope for keeping infrastructure & governance initiatives on track.
- **Comprehensive Peace Agreement** *Canada works with others to provide support for the implementation of IGAD's CPA*
AU and IGAD rely on international support and resources to maintain legitimacy
- **Canada's START**
23 Million in 2007
Reducing Small Arms
Rule of Law support
Support to CPA Implementation
- **Canadian Forces/RCMP** *CF has 50 troops working with AU and UN missions in Sudan (Operation Safari, Military Observers – Khartoum & Op. Augural for AU equipment)*
RCMP Supporting training of Sudan police
- **Canadian NGOs** *supporting food, wells, sanitation, micro credit, medical support, education, etc.*


LINKS

- **Canadian exports to Sudan (2006):** CAD 90 million (0.02% of Canada's total) with agricultural products, machinery and equipment, and paper products
- **Canadian imports from Sudan (2006):** CAD 71.5 million (0.02% of Canada's total) Primarily in metals and precious stones
- **Canadian direct investment in Sudan:** N/A
- **Sudanese direct investment in Canada:** N/A
- **Development engagement:** Canada will provide over CAD 23 million in peacebuilding assistance to Sudan in 2007. Since May 2005, Canada has contributed \$190 million to the African Union for peacebuilding, conflict resolution and diplomatic support.

(Data from CIDA, DFAIT, and DND 2006)

Medium-risk


Average Events Score and Tendency



Avg Score: -.5
Trend Score: —

Medium-risk

Average Events Score and Tendency



Avg Score: .89
Trend Score: —

6—12 MONTH SCENARIOS

BASELINE LIKELY CASE

BASED ON BEST ASSUMPTIONS FOR EACH CLUSTER

Al-Bashir will continue to prevaricate on UN Security Force access to Darfur and will make token attempts to temper the Janjaweed's brutality. Emphasis will be on currying favour with the AU and regional allies, so the GoS can be expected to emphasize outreach and conciliation with Libya, Chad and possibly the C.A.R. Cultural and religious heterogeneity will continue to be a challenge to governance. Due to intense global efforts, the CPA between North and South will hold and East Sudan will continue to reap the benefits of peace while Darfur suffers. With economic support from China and the AU, Sudan's economic sector will maintain its weak growth. Relative calm in East and South will enable pioneering enterprises to take root, though only at the local level. The repatriation of refugees can be expected to be slow and racial conflict will remain the norm in Darfur. International support will continue to put emphasis on Human Development but actual change will remain modest.

ALTERNATIVE LIKELY CASE

BASED ON VARIATION IN WEAKEST ASSUMPTION, VIABILITY OF CURRENT PEACE PROCESSES

Should any individual stakeholder find reason to ignore the terms of the Peace Agreement, the modest security enjoyed in the centre of the country and in Khartoum will evaporate. International agencies will evacuate, and civilians will be at further risk. In the wake of increasingly damaged **authority**, state **capacity** and **legitimacy** will falter. Stability in Chad, CAR and Uganda - intimately tied to the status of Sudan - will deteriorate, requiring military and humanitarian assistance to cope with refugees, smuggling and cross-border violence.

BEST CASE

BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT AL BASHIR CARRIES THROUGH ON PROMISES TO DISARM THE JANJAWEEED

Sudan's best case scenario for the coming months hinges on the reliability of Al Bashir's promises to disarm the Janjaweed in Darfur. If Khartoum keeps its word, the disarmament would have a profound effect on the overwhelmingly disruptive effect the Janjaweed have on Sudan's security conditions. It is unlikely that the Janjaweed would demobilize in the short term, but the humanitarian space provided by a suspension of their activities would enable government and international actors to reach some of the weakest and most vulnerable populations in Sudan. International agencies and donors will remain crucial service providers; investors like China and Russia will see their speculative investments benefit from enhanced stability.

WORST CASE

BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT THE CPA COLLAPSES

The worst case for Sudan would be for the CPA to collapse. The reanimation of Sudan's North-South civil war would effectively confirm the government's inability to tend to the basic needs of the population outside of Khartoum. Aid and development would be suspended by all but the best-equipped agencies. The international community would deliberate about a Responsibility To Protect mandate for a military intervention force, and in the meantime, civilians will suffer. China has admonished Sudan for its conspicuous rights record; if China becomes a wary investor, even Sudan's economy will suffer. Finally, Sudan's neighbours may see a collapsed Peace Agreement as an opportune time to reassess unresolved territorial differences with Sudan.

POSSIBLE POLICY ENTRY POINTS FOR FOREIGN ACTORS

Security & Crime:

- Border support in coordination with Chad, C.A.R. or Uganda would enhance regional security
- DDR programs for ex-fighters in the East and near Eritrea and Ethiopia
- Programs focused on children affected by conflict

Economics:

- Community-based poverty reduction in rural areas and urban slums, with attention to women and girls

Governance:

- Strengthening local level government by providing resources and training

Human Development:


- Basic education and literacy can help rehabilitate children affected by conflict and serve to support Sudan's MDGs
- Job-training for new urban arrivals to reduce unemployment in slums

Demography:


- Support to indigenous peacebuilding and diversity programming

MAPS

MAP 1: SUDAN'S FUNDING GAPS BY REGION (HUMANITARIAN INFORMATION CENTRE, DARFUR, 2005)



MAP 2: REPORTED DESTROYED VILLAGES IN DARFUR (US STATE DEPARTMENT, 2004)



INDEX METHODOLOGY

Like its predecessor the CIFI conflict risk index, the fragility index employs a methodology of relative structural assessment. The analysis begins with a structural profile of the country, a composite index that measures overall country fragility along six dimensions or clusters: governance, economics, security, human development, demography and environment. Each of these clusters is based on a number of indicators; for example, indicators under the 'economics cluster' include economic growth, gross domestic product, inflation and unemployment, etc. The data is further analyzed to provide insight into relative state strength and weakness along three dimensions of 'stateness', namely authority, legitimacy, and capacity. This multidimensional assessment methodology is a direct response to the multi-causal nature of fragility and failure; states can weaken in any number of ways, such that any attempt to attribute fragility to a single deterministic set of causal variables inevitably remains underdetermined, capturing only a limited subset of all fragile states. Instead, CIFI adopts a more inductive approach, identifying areas of relative strength and weakness across all measures of state performance.

In ranking state performance on a given indicator, global scores are distributed across a nine-point index. The best performing state receives a score of one, the worst a score of nine, and the rest continuously distributed between these two extremes based on relative performance. As country performance for some types of data can vary significantly from year to year – as in the case of economic shocks, natural disasters, and other externalities – averages are taken for global rank scores over a five-year time frame. Once all indicators have been indexed using this method, the results for a given country are then averaged in each fragility cluster to produce the final scores for the country.

In general, a high score – 6.5 or higher – indicates that a country is performing poorly relative to other states. Such a score may be indicative of an arbitrary and autocratic government, a history of non-transparent government, the presence of significant barriers to political participation, the absence of a consistently enforced legal framework, or a poor human rights record.

Table 1: Fragility index scoring scale

Score	Description
1-3.5	Country performing well relative to others
3.5-6.5	Country performing at or around the median
6.5+	Country performing poorly relative to others

A low score – in the range of 1 to 3.5 – indicates that a country is performing well relative to others, or that a country's structural conditions present little cause for concern. Values in the moderate 3.5 to 6.5 range indicate performance approaching the global mean.

EVENTS MONITORING METHODOLOGY

SUMMARY

The purpose of CIFI event monitoring is to observe and report on events within a country to better understand the dynamic trends affecting democratic processes and governance in the country. This data, when combined with structural data, provides a more comprehensive analysis of both the underlying conditions and recent developments, thereby informing a more nuanced and ultimately policy-relevant analysis.

In CIFI event monitoring methodology, events are all coded using a number of criteria. First, each event is assigned to the specific cluster area to which it is *most directly* related, either governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography, or environment. Second, the event is coded as being either stabilizing or destabilizing to the state. The event score is then determined by answering the following three questions:

1. How direct is the impact of the event on state stability?
2. How broad is the impact of the event?
3. How intense is the event, in comparison with past events in the country?

Each question is answered quantitatively using a three-point scale.

EVENTS MONITORING METHODOLOGY

COMPONENTS OF THE COMPOSITE EVENT SCORE

CAUSAL RELEVANCE

1. Event is relevant, but with no clearly delineable direct causal linkage to state stability or fragility (e.g. an announcement of funding, or an international soccer friendly).
2. Event is relevant, with a delineable, though indirect causal linkage to state stability or fragility (e.g. New legislation enhancing minority rights is passed, or a bomb detonates within an ethnically divided region).
3. Event is relevant with a delineable and direct causal linkage to state fragility (e.g. Declaration of a ceasefire or the assassination of a government minister.)

CENTRALITY

1. Event affects less than 25% of political stakeholders.
2. Event affects 25% - 75% of political stakeholders.
3. Event affects more than 75% of political stakeholders.

INTENSITY/ESCALATION




1. Event is comparable to others experienced in the state in the previous six months.
2. Event is more intense than others experienced in the state in the previous six months.
3. Event is more intense than others experienced in the state in the previous five years.

STAKEHOLDERS

As part of the initial country profile, the analyst compiles a list of stakeholders. Stakeholders are those individuals or groups that possess an identifiable, broadly similar political agenda and either have an effect on or are affected by state stability or fragility. They often have an organizational structure in addition to sufficient resources to pursue explicitly or implicitly articulated goals.

EVENT ANALYSIS

The analysis occurs in both aggregate (all events) and disaggregate (events analysed by cluster) by using quantitative data in two ways. First, **summary statistics** provide the analyst with an overview of the average event scores. Positive average event scores are indicative of an environment that experiences more or more significant positive events than negative events. Negative average scores indicate the opposite.


Tendency Key	Negative Slope	Status quo Slope	Positive Slope
OLS Slope value	Below -0.1	Between -.1 and .1	Above +0.1
Symbol			

The second avenue of analysis is via **regression lines** to observe whether the events demonstrate any positive or negative tendency over time (left).

These two types of information — average event score and event tendency — are combined into a single graph (see right). The graph may be thought of as analogous to a thermometer and

barometer. The risk score given at the top of the graph — color-coded as green, yellow, or red — is based upon the structural analysis for a given cluster. The colour indicates the relative level of risk in the cluster, and may be thought of as the “thermometer,” providing an indication of the overall risk in the country. The arrow and bar below may be thought of as the “barometer”, providing both the average event score and the event tendency, which are akin to the level and direction of barometric pressure, respectively.

Example Summary Graph



SCENARIO GENERATION

The report includes scenarios for the country's fragility over the short term, normally 6-18 months. Normally, the analysis includes four scenarios: a baseline case, an alternative case, a best-case, and a worst-case. Each is based on an analysis of overall and cluster summary statistics and trends, as well as stakeholder interests. The best-case identifies the most positive outcome possible (most conducive to stable democratic governance and poverty reduction) in the near future. Conversely, the worst-case scenario identifies the opposite. These two scenarios are intended to highlight different facets of the situation for the reader, by considering the strongest trends among stabilizing and destabilizing events, drawing attention both to dominant threats and potential points of entry. Finally, the baseline and alternative scenarios extrapolate future tendencies based on analysts best assumptions for the state, again combined with likely stakeholder interaction. Dominant trends—those most likely to continue in each of the 6 dimensions of fragility over the next six to eighteen months—become underlying assumptions. These are then combined to form an overall portrait of the country for the near term, providing a baseline “likely” scenario. The alternative case simply considers what would happen if the weakest of these assumptions did not hold, thereby giving some indication of the scenarios' robustness. Taken together, the scenarios define both the probable and potential developments in the country over the near term. Such insights may inform contingency policy planning processes, and provide some basis for benchmarks with which to evaluate the success of initiatives intended to improve state fragility.

STRUCTURAL DATA (SOURCE AND SCALE OF RAW DATA IN PARENTHESES)	Cluster avg.	Fragility index score	Fragility index rank	Raw Data -- Five year avg	Last Year of Data	Trend Score
1. Governance	7.36					
Freedom of the Press (FH, index, 0-100)		8.6	7	85.4	2006	s.q.
Gov't Effectiveness (WB Governance Matters, index, Deviation from mean)		8.2	18	-1.2	2005	*
Level of Corruption (TI, index, 0-10)		8.3	19	2.2	2006	*
Level of Democracy (Polity IV, index, (-10 - 10))		8.1	24	-6.4	2004	pos
Level of participation in international political organizations (CIFP)		2.5	140	4.7	2005	*
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians, index, (WB WDI)		5.5	88	11.2	2005	*
Permanence of Regime Type (Polity IV, years since regime change)		4.5	91	13.0	2004	s.q.
Refugees hosted (UNHCR, total)		8.3	15	220878.4	2005	pos
Restrictions on Civil Liberties (FH, index, 1-7)		8.6	1	7.0	2005	s.q.
Restrictions on Political Rights (FH, index, 1-7)		8.3	1	7.0	2005	s.q.
Rule of Law (WB GM, Deviation from mean)		8.6	9	-1.5	2005	*
Voice and Accountability in Decision-making (WB GM, Dev. from mean)		8.7	7	-1.8	2005	*
2. Economics	6.46					
Economic growth — Percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		2.8	157	6.3	2005	s.q.
Economic Size — Relative (WB WDI, GDP per capita, constant 2000)		7.3	36	424.1	2005	s.q.
Economic Size — Total (WB WD, GDP, constant 2000 US\$)		4.4	104	1.48E+10	2005	s.q.
External Debt — percentage of GNI (WB WDI)		8.6	7	151.0	2004	*
FDI — percentage of GDP (WB WDI)		6.7	39	5.4	2004	neg
Foreign Aid — percent of Central Government Expenditures (WB WDI)	
Foreign Aid — Total per capita (WB WDI)		3.3	121	13.0	2004	s.q.
Inequality — GINI Coefficient (WB WDI)	
Inflation (WB WDI)		7.0	30	7.5	2004	s.q.
Informal Economy — Black Market (Heritage Fund, Index, 1-5)	
Informal Economy — Ratio of PPP to GDP (WB WDI)		7.5	30	4.2	2005	pos
Infrastructure — Reliability of Electricity Supply (WB, % output lost)		5.9	51	15.4	2003	s.q.
Infrastructure — Telephone mainlines per 1000 inhabitants (WB)		7.2	43	20.1	2004	s.q.
Infrastructure — Internet Usage per 1000 inhabitants (WB)		7.1	45	14.6	2004	s.q.
Investment Climate — Contract Regulation (Heritage Foundation, Index, 1-5)	
Level of participation in international economic organizations (CIFP)		3.7	125	6.0	2005	*
Paying Taxes (WB Doing Business, global rank)		6.1	62	112.0	2006	*
Regulatory Quality (WB GM, deviation from mean)		8.1	23	-1.2	2005	*
Remittances Received — percentage of GDP (WB)		7.4	30	0.1	2005	s.q.
Reserve Holdings — Total (WB)		5.9	69	1.10E+09	2005	s.q.
Trade Balance — percentage of GDP (WB)		6.6	43	-5.9	2005	s.q.
Trade Openness — percentage of GDP (WB)		8.5	13	36.9	2005	s.q.
Unemployment — Total (WB)	
Percentage of Women in the Labour Force (WB)		8.6	10	24.8	2005	s.q.
3. Security & Crime	8.04					
Conflict intensity (Uppasala PRIO, number of conflict-related deaths)		8.8	3	1843.3	2005	*
Dependence on External Military Support (FFP, Index, 1-10)		7.5	18	8.6	2006	*
Human Rights — Empowerment (CIRI, Index, 0-10)		8.9	9	0.2	2004	pos
Human Rights — Physical Integrity (CIRI, Index, 0-8)		8.9	4	0.4	2004	pos
Military Expenditure — percentage of GDP (WDI)		6.5	35	3.4	2003	pos
Political Stability (WB GM, deviation from mean)		8.8	6	-2.1	2005	*
Refugees Produced (WB, total)		8.9	3	566016.4	2004	neg
Risk of ethnic Rebellion (CIFP, based on MaR dataset)		6.0	44	4.5	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of fatalities (US NCTC, number of fatalities)		8.5	10	114.5	2005	*
Terrorism -- Number of Incidents (US NCTC, number of incidents)		7.7	26	19.0	2005	*

STRUCTURAL DATA (CONT'D)

4. Human Development	7.34				
Access to Improved Water (WB, percent of the population)	7.1	42	70.0	2004	*
Access to Sanitation (WB, percent of the population)	7.8	26	34.0	2004	*
Education — Primary Completion — female (WB, percent)	8.1	16	41.2	2004	*
Education — Primary Completion — total (WB, percent)	8.2	15	44.5	2004	*
Education — Primary Enrolment — total (WB, percent)	8.2	15	44.5	2004	*
Education — Primary Enrolment — Ratio Female to Male (WB)	7.9	23	85.7	2004	s.q.
Food Security — Aid as percentage of total consumption (FAO STAT)	6.4	45	2.1	2001	*
Gender Empowerment Measure (UNDP, index, 0-1)
Gender-related Development Index (UNDP, index, 0-1)	7.4	33	0.5	2004	s.q.
Health Infrastructure — Expenditures as a percentage of GDP (WB)	7.4	38	4.1	2003	s.q.
HIV/AIDS — New AIDS Cases Reported (UN, total)	7.0	23	488.4	2001	*
HIV/AIDS — Percent of Adult Females Infected (WB)	6.0	42	56.5	2005	*
HIV/AIDS — Percent of Adult population infected (WB)	6.7	42	1.6	2005	*
Human Development Index (UNDP, index 0-1)	7.4	38	0.5	2004	s.q.
Infant Mortality (WB, per 1000 live births)	6.7	54	63.8	2004	*
Literacy (WB, percent of population age 15 and above)	7.7	20	60.9	2004	*
Literacy — female (WB, percent of female population age 15 and above)	7.7	19	51.8	2004	*
5. Demography	6.43				
Life Expectancy — Female (WB)	7.0	46	57.8	2004	*
Life Expectancy — Total (WB)	7.0	46	56.3	2004	*
Migration — Estimated Net Rate (UN)	7.8	29	-3.0	2005	*
Population Density (WB, population per square km)	2.3	158	14.7	2005	s.q.
Population Diversity — Ethnic (CIFP)	6.7	43	0.6	2005	*
Population Diversity — Religious (CIFP)	5.5	69	0.4	2005	*
Population Growth (WB, annual percent)	6.4	63	1.9	2005	s.q.
Slum Population — proportion of population (WDI, UN)	6.9	27	0.3	2001	*
Urban Growth Rate — Annual percent (WB)	8.2	18	4.4	2005	s.q.
Youth Bulge — Percent aged 0-14 of total population (WB)	6.5	57	39.7	2005	s.q.
6. Environment	4.93				
Arable/fertile land availability (WB, hectares per person)	1.6	179	0.5	2002	neg
Consumption — Commercial energy consumption per capita (UN, kg of oil equivalent)	2.1	158	69.0	2003	s.q.
Consumption — Use of solid fuels (UN, percent of population using)	7.9	1	95.0	2003	*
Disaster Risk Index, (UNDP, average number of deaths per million)	8.9	4	275.4	2001	*
Ecological Footprint — Global hectares per capita (WWF, Global Footprint Network)	3.3	105	1.0	2003	*
Water — Annual withdrawal (FAO STAT, percent of total renewable)	8.1	19	57.9	2002	*
Water — Available renewable per capita (FAO STAT, m ³ /inhabitants/year)	6.8	50	1901.3	2006	*
Forest — Annual percent change in area (FAO)	6.9	39	-0.8	2005	*
Pollution — CO ₂ emissions per capita (WB, metric tons per capita)	2.0	157	0.2	2002	s.q.
Pollution — CO ₂ emissions per dollar PPP (WB, kg per 2000 US\$ PPP)	1.8	146	0.1	2002	neg
TOTAL	6.79				
For trend scores, (s.q.) indicates continuation of status quo, (pos) indicates a positive trend toward stability, and (neg) indicates a negative trend toward fragility. (*) indicates insufficient data for calculation of trend and volatility scores.					

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

SUDANESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

- President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, assumed office with the National Congress Party in 1989, re-elected president (87%) in unscrutinized elections in 1996 and 2000; in a Transitional government since 2005

Interests

- Maintaining control over the entire country, including South Sudan; this desire has probably succumbed to a more realistic understanding that the international community will support the eventual independence of the South
- Maintaining sufficient international ties to ensure economic and military support without having to bow to foreign values or pressure
- Maintaining political support from dominant political culture in Khartoum

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Has demonstrated varying evidence of the GoS's connection with/support for the Janjaweed – sometimes they are portrayed as a slippery opponent, others times as an element that can be reined in
- Supportive of uninhibited international economic development and speculation

UMMA AND OTHER PARTIES

- Imam Al Sadig Al Mahdi (Umma)
- Democratic Unionists
- Republican Brothers
- Sudanese Communist Party

Background

- Though not officially banned, opposition parties have traditionally not fared well in Sudan
- Reports of intimidation, illegal fees and harassment are commonplace
- Seeking expanded liberty to express their wishes of their constituents in Sudan

JANJAWEED

- No central leadership

Background

- Typically Arabic speaking Armed gunmen operating predominantly in Darfur
- Nomads mounted on horses or camels
- Aggressively targeting sedentary and established non-Arabs in West Sudan
- Widely believed to be supported either directly or tacitly by the GoS (US Dept. of State, 2007)

EUROPEAN UNION

Interests

- Reduction/elimination of ethnic violence
- Stabilization of Khartoum and institutional support for Southern Sudan
- Removal of Sudan as a safe place for international terrorists to arm and train

SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY/MOVEMENT (OPPOSITION)

- Salva Kiir Mayardit heads SPLM (political party); committed to the pursuit of legitimate political leadership in South Sudan although many elements of his organisation have been criminalized
- Formerly led by John Garang (killed in a helicopter accident in 2005)
- Riek Machar is presently Vice President of the Autonomous Government of Southern Sudan Formerly a militant leader of SPLA and leader of splinter group – returned as a result of the CPA

Background

- Waged war on behalf of Southern Sudan's independence from Khartoum throughout the 1980s and 90s.
- Contrasted in membership by being non-Arab and mostly non-Muslim.
- Seeking to support the terms of the CPA in order to preserve its autonomy and international support with the aim of eventually expanding that autonomy into statehood and governance
- Border integrity and support for the Ugandan peace process.
- Preservation of water and resource wealth of the region

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Some factions of the SPLA are dissatisfied with the terms of the CPA and are antagonizing Khartoum in hopes of provoking fresh violence and questions about Kiir's capacity to lead

NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (OPPOSITION)

- Led by Hassan al-Turabi

Background

- Has been linked to international terrorist organizations including Al-Qaeda but claims to have terminated those relationships (US Library of Congress, 2007)
- Elected as Speaker of Parliament in 1996 until he was jailed by Al-Bashir in 2004
- Supported the installation of a Sharia legal system in Sudan's north

SUDANESE POPULATION

Background

- Grievous negative effects from years of civil war and racially-motivated violence
- Wealth distribution inequality is high, even at a regional level

Interests

- Peace and security
- Economic development and distribution

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

UNITED NATIONS/AFRICAN UNION

Interests

- Reduction/elimination of ethnic violence
- Stabilization of Khartoum and institutional support for Southern Sudan
- Removal of Sudan as a safe place for international terrorists to arm and train
- Seeking to have Khartoum consent to a civilian protection mandate for a UN force to supplement AU force
- AU operate only in Central and Eastern districts, leaving Darfur as a hotbed of violence

CHINA

- President Hu Jintao

Interests

- Sudan is the source of 10% of China's petroleum (Washington Post, 2004)
- Seeking to promote a stable and safe business environment unencumbered by human rights or environmental oversight
- Seeking to not draw untoward attention to its extractive industry
- Accused of arming and supporting GoS troops and Janjaweed

EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY

- China National Petroleum Corp.
- Sinopec
- Talisman Energy
- Royal Dutch/Shell
- Total Fina Elf

Interests

- Seeking to advance business interests
- Aiming to be recognized for token peacebuilding or environmental activities they sponsor
- Reduced oversight and maximum profit

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- Ambassador: vacant
- Charge d'Affaires: Cameron Hume
- (US Dept. of State, 2007)

Interests

- Reduction/elimination of ethnic violence
- Stabilization of Khartoum and institutional support for Southern Sudan
- Removal of Sudan as a safe place for international terrorists to arm and train
- Promotion of trade

Recent Actions and Attitude

- The US has not had an Ambassador in Sudan since 1996
- Insistent in its support for the CPA and Khartoum's suspension of support for the Janjaweed
- Many US states have banned pensions and investment portfolios that invest in firms operating in Sudan

NEIGHBOURING STATES

- Chad
- Central African Republic
- Democratic Republic of Congo
- Uganda
- Kenya
- Ethiopia
- Eritrea
- Egypt
- Libya


Interests

- Border integrity/containment of Sudan's potentially destructive effect
- Regional security

Recent Actions and Attitude

- Egypt, Kenya and Ethiopia have ongoing territorial disputes with Sudan

TABLE 1: EVENTS CHART



READING THE EVENTS CHART

Red line (solid): Trend line for events; downward slope left to right is negative

Blue line (solid): Trend line for number of events

Purple line (dotted): This indicates the sum total scores of events (positive or negative), as coded in the event monitoring process; the red trend line is derived from these values.

Blue line (dotted): The total number of events; the blue trend line is derived from these values

A more detailed description of the methodology is provided as an annex to this report

EVENT GRAPHS

TABLE 2: SECURITY AND CRIME EVENTS CHART





TABLE 3: GOVERNANCE EVENTS CHART



EVENT GRAPHS

TABLE 4: ECONOMICS EVENTS CHART





TABLE 5: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT EVENTS CHART



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Agence France Presse (World Service)	NAN - Nigerian News Agency
Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (WNC)	Ndjamena Primature-Tchad (WNC)
Johannesburg SABC 3 Television	Paris Radio France Internationale
Johannesburg SAPA (WNC)	Sudan Tribune (WNC)
Johannesburg's Mail & Guardian	Sudan TV (WNC)
Khartoum Al-Sahafah	SUNA
www.sudanjem.com (WNC)	

ABOUT THE STATE FRAGILITY PROJECT

This project is intended to contribute to a better understanding of fragility in Sudan, thereby providing support to decision-making for Canadian foreign policy and development actors in the country. The project aims to support informed, evidence-based decision making for Canadian foreign policy and development assistance related to fragile states. The report is intended to communicate the preliminary findings of the project; its findings should not be considered definitive or final.

The report is based on three elements. First, structural indicators are grouped into six clusters capturing different facets of state fragility: Security and Crime, Governance, Economics, Human Development, Environment and Demography. The structural data includes more than 80 separate structural indicators providing a detailed quantitative baseline portrait of the country.

Second, the analysis draws on event monitoring data compiled by CFP researchers over a six month period extending from September 2006 to February 2007. Collected from a variety of web-based news aggregators, which include both international and domestic news sources, the events are evaluated and assigned quantitative scores to identify fragility trends. Third, the report includes a series of analytical exercises, including stakeholder analysis and scenario generation. This multi-source data structure enables more robust analysis than any single method of data collection and assessment.

ABOUT COUNTRY INDICATORS FOR FOREIGN POLICY

CIFP is a project located at Carleton University. Its core mandate is to develop analytical methodologies that will generate information on the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world, providing at-a-glance global overviews, issue-based perspectives and country performance measures. While the initial dataset focuses on measures of domestic armed conflict, as part of this project that database has been substantially revised to capture state fragility.

The CIFP database includes statistical data in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 197 countries. With its focus on policy relevance, the CIFP provides a rich information resource to policy officers across all government departments. By offering a detailed assessment methodology for evaluating individual country performance, the CIFP provides guidance to program officers working in complex and fragile environments, enabling them to focus their efforts and resources on the root structural causes rather than the outward symptoms of a problem.

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ABOUT FRAGILITY

CIFP employs fragility as the most effective lens through which to view state risk, broadly understood. Though the use of the concept of the concept remains controversial, when properly understood as a technical term of country analysis, it enables analysts to conduct a more thorough assessment of country risk than more specific concepts such as conflict or human development, both of which are effectively components of overall state fragility. Further, the concept allows the incorporation of environmental, demographic, political, and economic considerations, providing a more complete portrait of a state's overall risk than narrow examination of any one of those factors. In effect, the concept incorporates all such areas of study into a complete analysis of the risks present in a given state or region.

When understood in this sense, all states exhibit some elements of fragility, whether in the form of demographic stress, politicized ethnic divisions, high levels of pollution, the presence of internal conflict, or low levels of human development. Through the use of transparent and quantifiable data, CIFP strives to bring together all such phenomena into a coherent country narrative, thereby rendering the concept of fragility an objective aid to country analysis, rather than a divisive element of subjective political discourse.

www.carleton.ca/cifp

