Country Indicators for Foreign Policy

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FIELD REPORTS 1999

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With the generous support of the Canadian International Development Agency.

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November 2001.
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"[T]oday's human rights violations are the causes of tomorrow's conflicts."

- Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Oxford, England, 11 November 1997.

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INTRODUCTION

The rise of identity-based, protracted conflicts has altered the traditional means of responding to threats of violence within states.[1] In his 1992 report, "Agenda for Peace," former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called for an improved approach to responding to intra-state conflict. He concluded: "Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people."[2] Building on Boutros-Ghali's vision, current Secretary-General Kofi Annan has promised greater prominence to human rights and highlighted the emergence of field operations dealing specifically with human rights as an important focus for the United Nations.[3] This new approach to peace operations is rooted in the understanding that "human rights violations are a cause, and not merely a consequence of insecurity and instability,"[4] and that addressing them may serve to de-escalate conflict by instilling a sense of trust, confidence and justice within war-torn communities.

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[1] David Last defines "protracted social conflicts" as those contingent upon "underlying social, political and economic disparities. [In these conflicts] [u]nderdevelopment and the unequal distribution of resources is often exacerbated by multiethnic and communal cleavages." David M. Last, *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Cornwallis Park, NS: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 15.

[2] Boutros Boutros-Ghali. *An Agenda for Peace* (New York, NY: United Nations, 17 June 1992), para. 55.

[3] Kofi A. Annan, *Renewal amid Transition: Annual Report on the Work of the Organization*, (New York, NY: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1997), p. 14.

[4] Karen Kenny, "Introducing the Sustainability Principle to Human Rights Operations," *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 63.

Since 1945, more civilians have been killed as a consequence of gross human rights violations than as a result of international, colonial and civil wars.[5] Despite increased efforts to understand human rights violations (HRVs) and internal warfare following the Bosnian war and Rwandan genocide, minimal attention has been devoted to understanding the linkage between these two factors.[6] Accordingly, this research essay will examine the following questions:

1) *Is there a link between HRVs and conflict escalation?*

2) *How might efforts to respond to HRVs, through the presence of a Human Rights Field Operation (HRFO), serve to de-escalate conflict by building institutions to sustain human rights protection?*[7]

From these research questions, the following hypotheses will be tested:

H1: There is a link between HRVs and the escalation of conflict such that;

H2: Responding early[8] *to HRVs through HRFOs can prevent conflict from escalating to a high-intensity stage.*

[5] Harff and Gurr estimate that between 1945 and 1986, six million people died as a result of internal and international war compared with seven and sixteen million people who were killed as a consequence of gross human rights violations. See, A.P. Schmid, *Research on Gross Human Rights Violations,* 2nd. ed. (Leiden, The Netherlands: Centre for the Study of Social Conflicts, 1989), p. 8.

[6] The most recent study on the 1994 genocide in Rwanda is a 600-page report by Human Rights Watch. The study provides an extensive account of the events before, during and after the genocide and reveals how international actors failed to prevent it. Although the report briefly mentions human rights abuses that occurred prior to April 6, 1994, the report focuses on *how* these human rights abuses were transformed into genocide, rather than *why*. See, Human Rights Watch, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, March 1999) Source: www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda

[7] Since one of the prerequisites for deployment of HRFOs is the existence of human rights violations, the focus of this study is the prevention of escalation of conflict by addressing human rights abuses, not the prevention of such abuses.

[8] In this study, an "early" response will be defined as occurring *after* the emergence of a political crisis, but *prior* to the outbreak of low-intensity conflict.

Purpose and Goals

After examining the literature on conflict escalation and HRVs, it became apparent that although a link between the two is assumed in many instances, it is neither explained in the theoretical literature, nor is it empirically demonstrated in any of the current data sets for human rights and conflict intensity. Accordingly, the first goal of this research paper is to find out, through empirical and theoretical analysis, if a link does in fact exist between HRVs and conflict escalation. The second goal of this study is to understand *how* HRVs escalate conflict. When this link is understood, an effective policy response can be formulated. This point was made by the Carnegie Commission in its 1997 report, *Preventing Deadly Conflicts*:

> [I]n addition to the relatively easy identification of major hotspots and checklists of problem conditions, policymakers also need specific knowledge of the major elements of destabilization and the way in which they are likely to coalesce to precipitate an outbreak of violence.[9]

Therefore, in addition to having information on where HRVs are taking place, it is equally important to understand *how* HRVs, in combination with other variables such as relative deprivation, mass mobilization, political ideology and regime type, may escalate conflict.[10] It is in understanding these linkages that an effective response to conflict may be prescribed.

The third goal of this paper is to explore how a human rights-centered approach, such as a HRFO, may successfully de-escalate a conflict. Different approaches such as

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[9] Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict, Final Report* (New York, NY: Carnegie Commission, December 1998), p. 45.

[10] Although Schmid and Jongman argue that "[a]buses of human rights are precursor events to conflict escalation which, in turn, leads to humanitarian emergencies" they do not explain how HRVs are likely to precipitate an escalation of conflict. See, A.P. Schmid and A.J. Jongman, "Violent Conflict and Human Rights Violations in the mid-1990s," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter 1997), p. 166.

monitoring and institution-building are evaluated for their effectiveness using a comparative case study of El Salvador and Angola.

Methodology

To test the first hypothesis – that a link exists between HRVs and conflict escalation – a two-pronged approach involving empirical data and theoretical assessment will be employed as using either approach alone is problematic. Empirical data for conflict escalation and HRVs enables policy makers to process information quickly and use it to formulate a response, however, it does not provide policy makers with an understanding of *why* conflicts or HRVs occur. Conversely, while a theoretical analysis alone does not always permit policy analysts to make quick assessments, it does provide a basis for explaining why conflicts occur. The use of both empirical data and theoretical analysis enables policy makers to not only assess a situation, but also formulate an effective policy response to deal with the conflict. For these reasons, quantitative and qualitative testing are adopted in the first and second chapters of this paper to evaluate the first hypothesis.

To test the second hypothesis – that responding to HRVs early may limit conflict escalation – this paper will undertake a comparative-case study of El Salvador and Angola, where HRFOs were employed as efforts to de-escalate conflict through the minimization of human rights abuses. The El Salvadoran and Angolan case studies were chosen for their similarities, as well as their differences. In both countries, the HRFOs were part of larger multidisciplinary peace operations. This similarity allows the approaches of the two operations to be isolated for comparison. In El Salvador, the HRFO focused on institution-building, whereas in Angola, observing and monitoring

HRFO focused on institution-building, whereas in Angola, observing and monitoring were emphasized. While the Salvadoran HRFO has been heralded by organizations such as the Aspen Institute, Human Rights Watch and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, as one of the most successful operations to-date, the Angolan human rights field presence clearly exemplifies a failed operation.[11] It is hypothesized in this study that the success of the El Salvadoran operation in building institutions and developing local capacity to protect human rights over the long-term explain why HRVs were minimized and a durable peace was achieved. In contrast, in Angola hostilities resumed and conflict escalated. A stable peace was not achieved, in part, due to a short-sighted focus on ending the hostilities and failure to build confidence and trust in the institutions responsible for human rights protection. Therefore, the case studies provide an opportunity to explore how responding directly to HRVs – by building institutions to sustain the long-term protection of human rights – may serve to de-escalate conflict.

Outline of Chapters

In chapter one, a quantitative approach is used to determine whether a link between HRVs and conflict intensity exists, and if this link is one of causation or correlation. After highlighting some of the problems inherent in an empirical measurement of conflict and HRVs, data sets are selected based on set criteria. The specific data sets are then used to empirically test the correlation between HRVs and conflict intensity.

[11] See: The Aspen Institute, *Honoring Human Rights: from Peace to Justice* (Washington: The Aspen Institute, 1998), www.aspeninst.org/dir/polpro/jsp/hhrtoc.html; Human Rights Watch, *The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and UN Field Operations* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1993); Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Improvising History: A Critical Evaluation of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador* (December 1995).

In chapter two, it is argued that when perceived inequalities and grievances intensify and affect a greater portion of society, individuals may resort to protest or rebellion. When such actions are perceived by the state as a threat to its security and stability, HRVs are often committed in an effort to repress or eliminate opposition groups. These HRVs may incite such groups to commit violent acts for purposes of retaliation or self-defence. In turn, this violence may then provoke a more severe crackdown by the government. At this point HRVs may evolve into gross human rights violations (GHRVs).

Chapter three examines the recent emergence of HRFOs as an alternative approach for dealing with violent intra-state conflict. The different configurations of HRFOs are explained, as well as at which phase of the conflict they are deployed. The dual roles of HRFOs – monitoring and institution-building – are also examined. It is argued that HRFOs, if deployed early, may de-escalate violence by addressing past injustices and establishing local institutions to secure the long-term protection of human rights.

In chapter four, case studies of El Salvador and Angola are presented, where HRFOs were employed in an effort to de-escalate conflict by minimizing human rights abuses. In comparing the two case studies, three questions are addressed: 1) How was each HRFO used to mitigate the rise of widespread gross human rights violations and prevent high-intensity conflict? 2) What effect did the presence of human rights observers have on the conflict in Angola compared to El Salvador? 3) Did HRFOs in either country establish institutions to sustain the protection of human rights?

In the final chapter of this research paper, conclusions are drawn about the presence of a link between HRVs and conflict intensity and the effectiveness of HRFOs

as a tool for de-escalating conflict. The chapter ends with a discussion of the implications of these findings for theory and policy and an exploration of possible directions for further research.

Definitions

Human Rights

Throughout this research essay, the term 'human rights' refers to those rights enunciated in the 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)*. A distinction is made between the two types of human rights articulated in the UDHR: 1) human rights based on the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;* and 2) human rights based on the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.*[12] Although HRVs in this paper refer primarily to violations of civil and political rights, socio-economic violations resulting from relative deprivation are also discussed.

Civil rights (Articles I through XX of the UDHR) refer to "individual freedoms and rights such as 'classic' or 'natural' rights related to movement, behaviour, thinking and choice."[13] These rights include freedom from slavery and servitude, torture and inhuman punishment, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment; freedom of speech, faith, opinion and expression; and rights to life, security, justice, ownership, and assembly. Political rights (Articles XXI) include the right to vote and nominate for public office, and the right to form and join political parties. In addition to their focus on *individual* rights and freedoms, civil-political rights are also considered *negative rights* in that "they

[12] Although definitions of human rights in this research paper are restricted to these two categories, it is important to acknowledge the "third generation" or "human security" rights advocated by many countries. These rights (also referred to as "solidarity rights") include the right to development, to a healthy environment, to peace, to humanitarian aid, and to the benefits of an international common heritage; See Mahmood Monshipouri, *Democratization, Liberalization and Human Rights in the Third World* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 17.

forbid actions by governments"[14] such as extra-judicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and the prevention of political participation and limits on freedom of speech.

In contrast to civil-political rights, socio-economic and cultural rights are *positive rights*, "requiring action by governments."[15] In this regard, socio-economic and political rights (Articles XXII through XXVIII) refer to those rights which individuals expect to receive from the state, such as "adequate employment, health and educational facilities, and various other social requirements."[16] These rights are referred to as *group rights* in that they can only be maintained at the expense of individual civil-political rights.[17]

Given the challenges posed by cultural relativist scholars in defining human rights in a universally applicable way,[18] this research paper focuses on violations of basic and fundamental civil-political rights – such as the right to life and freedom from slavery, torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment – which are less disputed.[19] The gradual acceptance of these rights is articulated by Mahmood Monshipouri:

> A consensus is emerging on a set of universal standards. Genocide, racial discrimination, torture, and the denial of peoples' right to self-determination are breaches of this consensus. Increasingly, albeit

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[13] Charles Humana, *World Human Rights Guide* (London: Hutchinson & Co. Publishers, 1983), p. 8.
[14] Zehra F. Arat, *Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 3.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[16] Humana, p. 8.
[17] Arat, p. 4.
[18] The universal definition of human rights included in the UDHR has been disputed by relativist claims that such a definition is in fact not universal, but rather rooted in the values and institutions of the Western world. Although the data used in this paper adopts the same universalistic definition as the UDHR, it does so based on the understanding that in defining human rights, the uniqueness of humanity and the diversity of cultures must be considered simultaneously. Due to space limitations, however, this paper does not enter into this debate; nor does it attempt to reach a conclusion regarding which definition of human rights is most acceptable today. For a discussion of this debate see: Alison Dundes Renteln, "The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Fall 1985), pp. 514-540 and Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
[19] The exception to this is the brief discussion of relative deprivation as a violation of socio-economic rights in chapter two.

> gradually, points of convergence on a wide range of rights are developing.[20]

These points of convergence are based upon the increasing acceptance that certain core rights are inviolable. Andrew McNitt argues that "[t]he concept of core human rights is more universally acceptable than some of the legal and procedural definitions which have their origins in Western legal practices."[21] These core rights, often defined as those bestowed upon individuals by virtue of their being human, are also rooted in the notion of dignity which Rhoda Howard argues "includes recognition of a distinct personal identity, reflecting individual autonomy and responsibility [that] embraces a recognition that the individual self is part of larger collectivities."[22] Both Howard and Monshipouri argue that many non-Western states have conceptions of dignity, but lack concepts of human rights.[23]

For the purpose of empirical measurement in chapter one, the definition of HRVs is operationalized as: 1) extra-judicial killings; 2) torture and ill-treatment; 3) prisoners of conscience; 4) disappearances; 5) detention without trial; and 6) abuses committed by opposition groups.[24]

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[20] Monshipouri, p. 19. Similar to Monshipouri, David Gillies refers to these "core" rights as freedom from arbitrary or extrajudicial killing, freedom from torture and other forms of cruel and inhumane treatment, freedom from hunger, and freedom from discrimination; See David Gillies, *Between Principle and Practice: Human Rights in North-South Relations* (Montreal, PQ: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), p. 32.

[21] Andrew McNitt, "Some Thoughts on the Systematic Measurement of the Abuse of Human Rights" in David Louis Cingranelli (ed.) *Human Rights: Theory and Measurement* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p.93.

[22] Rhoda Howard, "Dignity, Community, and Human Rights," in Abdullahi An-Na'im (ed.), *Human Rights in Cross Cultural Perspectives 81* (1992), p. 225.

[23] Monshipouri, pp. 18-19 and Howard, p. 221.

Human Rights Field Operation (HRFO)

Many different terms have been adopted to refer to the recent phenomenon of field operations that are created to deal specifically with HRVs. Such terms include: "human rights monitoring missions," "human rights operations," "international civilian missions," "UN human rights missions." In this paper, the term "human rights field operation" will be used, as it has received the most widespread usage to-date.[25]

A HRFO is characterized by four features: 1) it is organized by an intergovernmental body such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); 2) it is based in a country for several months; 3) its central functions include observing, investigating, documenting and/or reporting HRVs and situations likely to lead to violations; and 4) it is staffed by at least a dozen monitors.[26] The different types of HRFOs, as well as the specific role of such operations, are outlined in chapter three.

Conflict Escalation

"Conflict escalation" is defined as the successive increase of tension, hostility and potential or actual violence.[27] David Last argues that "[e]scalation occurs when a conflict increases in intensity, or when the incidents associated with the conflict occur more

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[24] Although the focus of this study is HRVs, gross human rights violations (GHRVs) are also discussed. In chapter one, it is argued that GHRV are higher in both intensity and severity than HRVs.

[25] The term "Human Rights Field Operation" was used to refer to the most recent field operation in Rwanda, the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR). It was also the term of choice at the recent international Conference on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Acute Crisis in London, 11-13 February 1998. See, Kate MacKintosh, *International Responses to Acute Crisis: Supporting Human Rights through Protection and Assistance,"* Conference Discussion Paper.

[26] Karen Kenny, *Towards Effective Training for Field Human Rights Tasks* (Dublin: International Human Rights Trust, July 1996), p. 3. See also, Stephen Golub, "Strengthening Human Rights Monitoring Missions: An Options Paper prepared for the Office of Transitions Bureau for Humanitarian Response," (Washington, DC: USAID, Dec. 1995).

[27] This definition was adopted from David Last's definition of conflict de-escalation. See, Last, p. 7.

frequently."[28] In this paper, intensity levels draw upon the five-stages of conflict developed by A.P. Schmid and A.J. Jongman for the Interdisciplinary Research Project on the Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM), due to the fact that this framework includes levels of political violence where HRVs are also likely to occur. *Table 1* provides a breakdown and explanation of their five categories of conflict intensity:

Table 1: Five Stages of Conflict and Two Crises Thresholds

STAGE 1: PEACEFUL STABLE SITUATION High Degree of Political Stability and Regime Legitimacy
STAGE 2: POLITICAL TENSION SITUATION Growing Levels of Systemic Strain and Increasing Social And Political Cleavages, often along Factional Lines
POLITICAL CRISIS
STAGE 3: SERIOUS POLITICAL CONFLICT Erosion of Political Legitimacy of the National Government And/or Rising Acceptance of Factional Politics
STAGE 4: LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT Open Hostility and Armed Conflict among Factional Groups; Regime Repression and Insurgency
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS
STAGE 5: HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT Massacres or Open Warfare among Rival Groups and/or Mass Destruction and Displacement of the Civilian Population

Table cited in: PIOOM (1996)[29]

Throughout this paper, the terms 'conflict escalation' and 'conflict intensity' are used interchangeably. This is particularly the case in the quantitative section of this paper, due to the fact that many of the data sets discussed use the term 'conflict intensity' when referring to the escalation of conflict.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[29] Alex P. Schmid, "Monitoring Conflict Escalation," in *Prevention and Management of Conflicts: An International Directory* (Amsterdam: Dutch Centre for Conflict Resolution, 1996), p. 31.

CHAPTER I.
Quantitative Linkages Between HRVs and Conflict Escalation

The purpose of this chapter is to empirically test the hypothesis that a linkage exists between HRVs and the escalation of conflict, and to establish whether or not this linkage is one of causation or correlation. However, before engaging in quantitative analysis, it is important to justify why an empirical measurement of this linkage is necessary and important. Accordingly, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section of this chapter examines some of the challenges of quantitative analysis, particularly with human rights data collection, and suggests ways to overcome them. The second section outlines the criteria used to select data sets that are both accurate and compatible for testing the link between conflict escalation and HRVs. In the third section, the selected data sets are explained and justified based on the specific criteria. The fourth and final section of this chapter outlines how the selected data sets were used to test the hypothesized link between HRVs and conflict escalation. In this section, conclusions from the findings are made and analyses are offered.

1.1 The Importance of Quantifying Conflict Escalation and HRVs

It is difficult to understand the strength of the linkage between conflict escalation and HRVs without an empirical evaluation. Although data collection can be problematic, an empirical evaluation of the linkage between HRVs and conflict escalation has important policy implications because it enables decision-makers to identify trends in escalation based on HRVs. Without empirical evidence, it is difficult for policy makers to generate support for a response that is rooted in human rights protection. Richard

Claude and Thomas Jabine argue that "by producing statistics on any subject, we seek to set the record straight. This task is of primary importance in the human rights field because reliably produced data may supply the key to securing a remedy for violations."[30] In this chapter, a method for empirically monitoring the effects of HRVs on conflict escalation is offered. Although the findings from this research are limited to a region and time period, it is argued that an expansion of the research to include comparisons between separate regions for different consecutive time periods may serve as a mechanism for early detection of conflict escalation based on the existence of HRVs.

1.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of Empirical Research

The need to develop increased research for early warning of impending crises was strongly supported by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace.* The Secretary-General called for a strengthening of early warning systems and the development of "political indicators to assess whether or not a threat to peace exists and to analyze what action might be taken by the UN to alleviate it."[31] This call for increased research has triggered a proliferation of literature and data sets devoted specifically to the concept of "early warning." The efforts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international governmental organizations (IGOs) and the UN to develop data sets for empirical studies of risk assessment and early warning have generally been accepted

[30] Richard P. Claude and Thomas B. Jabine, "Exploring Human Rights Issues with Statistics" in Thomas B. Jabine and Richard P. Claude (eds.), *Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight*. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 7.
[31] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, para. 11.

without controversy; [32] however, the use of quantitative data to study human rights has encountered greater resistance.

One of the greatest challenges to the collection of human rights data is an ethical one, in that the people represented by the human rights statistics are often reduced to mere numbers. This view is shared by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR) in its claim that "[t]he true depiction of a country's human rights record depends on much more than a simple enumeration of violations. For the full picture to emerge, this must be supplemented by a full scrutiny of the overall legal, diplomatic and political framework within which rights are protected."[33] Therefore, a snapshot provided by numbers or statistics does not accurately depict the environment in which the HRVs are committed, nor does it represent long-term implications of such human rights abuses.

Many human rights organizations exclude statistical data from their reports for this particular reason; however, there remain important policy implications for the collection of statistical data on human rights. Scholars such as David Louis Cingranelli share this view:

> Although statistical measures of human rights practices may seem repugnant to some, measurement is the first step towards objective social science inquiry, towards the development of successful strategies of human rights activism by non-governmental organizations and towards

[32] The following individuals and organizations are actively involved in the development of data sets for empirical studies of risk assessment and conflict early warning: Ted Robert Gurr (Minorities at Risk Project, University of Maryland); Undo Janz (UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research); U.S. Government (State Failure Project, Science Applications International Corp); Barbara Harff (Accelerators of Genocide Project, University of Maryland), Craig Jenkins and Susanne Schmeidl (Refugee Early Warning Project, Ohio State University); Douglas Bond (PANDA Project, Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University); and Peter Brecke (Conflict Early Warning Project, Georgia Institute of Technology); See Ted Robert Gurr, "Early Warning Systems: From Surveillance to Assessment to Action," in Kevin M. Cahill, *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start,* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1996), pp. 128-9.

[33] Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Critique: Review of the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 1996* (New York, NY: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), p. 1.

> implementation of a well-conceived human rights policy by national governments and multinational agencies.[34]

Therefore, when using statistical data to depict HRVs, it is important to be aware and sensitive to the aforementioned ethical issues. However, it is also important that such issues do not deter researchers from using statistical analysis, particularly if it is used in tandem with qualitative analysis.

A second challenge of human rights data collection is the absence of empirical data, despite the presence of more than twenty-nine data sources.[35] Of the three worldwide and annual sources of human rights data, all reports use narrative quantifiers to record HRVs by adopting terms such as "thousands," "numerous," "scores," "dozens," rather than on employing specific numerical quantifiers. In this regard, data is based on general trends and observations, rather than accumulated empirical data. For example, Freedom House, which tabulates its data using a seven-category scale, "assigns countries to a particular category based on a response to the checklist and the *judgements* of the survey team at Freedom House" [emphasis added].[36] When such scoring is based on normative judgements rather than on a numerical inventory of human rights, it becomes increasingly difficult to derive accurate statistical data from these reports.

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[34] David Louis Cingranelli (ed.) *Human Rights: Theory and Measurement* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 1.

[35] In their survey of human rights data sources, Michael Cain, Richard Claude and Thomas Jabine examine twenty-nine data bases that differ in the following ways: 1) frequency of publication; 2) scope of coverage (worldwide, regional, multi-country or single-country); 3) type of measurement (statistical or narrative); and 4) analysis of data (score or rankings assigned to data); See Michael Cain, Richard P. Claude and Thomas B. Jabine, "A Guide to Human Rights Data Sources," in *Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight,* Thomas B. Jabine and Richard P. Claude (eds.), (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), pp. 392-442.

[36] Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1993-1994* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), p. 674.

A third challenge, which explains the absence of statistical data mentioned above, is the absence of standardization in data collection.[37] Consequently, several discrepancies and variations exist between many of the human rights reports, making it difficult to select and compare the most accurate data. Although the country reports issued by the U.S. Department of State, as well as those by Human Rights Watch (which is funded through numerous private donations) reflect comprehensive data collection, NGOs do not possess the resources to produce data of the same caliber.[38]

A fourth challenge to data collection of HRVs is the difficulty of obtaining data. The refusal of state authorities to allow human rights monitors access to both government sources and political prisoners often prevents human rights organizations from accurately assessing and estimating the number of HRVs in a given country.[39] Human rights data is also difficult to obtain when governments attempt to conceal or disguise abuses in order to shield themselves from international scrutiny or intervention. However, as noted by McNitt, certain abuses are more easily concealed than others. For example, despite the easy access to information on public executions, it is much more difficult to obtain estimates of extra-judicial killings and disappearances where "government forces, either with or without official sanction, murder individuals and hide their bodies" and cases of torture by state authorities where "victims of abuse are afraid to come forward."[40]

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[37] In their chapter, Randy B. Reiter, M.V. Zunzunegui and Jose Quiroga stress the need for a standardized protocol for collecting and reporting data on human rights violations in an effort to ameliorate the current problems of data collection and to eliminate many of the inconsistencies between data sources. See, Randy B. Reiter, M.V. Zunzunegui and Jose Quiroga, "Guidelines for Field Reporting of Basic Human Rights Violations," in Thomas B. Jabine and Richard P. Claude (eds.), *Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 91.

[38] Hilde Hey, *Gross Human Rights Violations: A Search for Causes - A Study of Guatemala and Costa Rica),* (The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1995), p. 49.

[39] Robert Justin Goldstein, "The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data in Studying Human Rights Abuses," in Thomas B. Jabine and Richard P. Claude (eds.), *Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 45.

[40] McNitt, p. 95.

A final challenge in the quantification of HRVs concerns the bias of many current publications of human rights data. Such bias has been evident in the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports, which have been criticized for "shielding friendly or strategically important countries from the full weight of criticism."[41] However, according to the LCHR, significant improvements to the data have been made to increase its accuracy as "the overt political bias that marred much of the State Department's reporting on human rights in the 1980s has largely disappeared, along with the bipolar conflict that engendered them."[42] The LCHR further notes that "the reports show welcome evidence that embassy officers are conferring closely with local independent human rights monitors and taking their findings seriously."[43]

The impact of these challenges on the accuracy and validity of human rights data is best summarized by Amnesty International in its statement of principles:

> Amnesty International is often asked to compare the human rights records of different countries. It does not and cannot do this. Government secrecy and censorship obstruct the flow of information from many countries and impede efforts to verify allegations. Statistical or other generalized comparisons can never measure the impact of human rights abuses on the victims, their families, and the societies of which they are a part. Comparisons of government's human rights practices can be manipulated and misused for political ends.[44]

Given these problems, it is evident that, until a better system of standardized and statistical data becomes available, any method for measuring HRVs based solely on narrative reports is likely to be imprecise. Therefore, until such data is readily available, alternative approaches for measuring human rights violations must be devised.

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[41] Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, p. vi.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. v.
[43] *Ibid.*
[44] *Amnesty International Reports (1987),* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1987), (Cited in: Cain, Claude, and Jabine, p. 401).

According to Andrew McNitt, one such approach is "to concentrate on a small subset of core rights…which are usually defined as freedom from torture, freedom from imprisonment for the mere expression of a belief and freedom from political execution."[45] Although the type of core rights included in a data sample may vary and include additional HRVs such as human rights abuses by armed opposition groups and disappearances, generally the core rights mentioned above are included in the most widely used and respected human rights data sources.[46]

A second approach for dealing with the challenges of data collection for HRVs, is to use two or three reports in combination in order to increase the accuracy of the data and to neutralize some of the bias.[47] Such an approach was employed by Cingranelli and Pasquarello in their use of U.S State Department Country Reports with Amnesty International's annual report to compare 100 randomly selected countries on the use of torture and arbitrary imprisonment. The authors found substantial agreement in the data – 81 per cent for comparisons of the use of torture and 77 per cent for the frequency of arbitrary imprisonment.[48] In their study of human rights and U.S foreign assistance, Stohl, Carlton and Johnson also found agreement in their comparison of human rights ratings for twenty-two Latin American states when using data from the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International and Freedom House.[49]

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[45] McNitt, p. 93.
[46] Amnesty International, U.S. Government of State, and Human Rights Watch reports all include data that categorizes violations of the core subset of rights described by McNitt, *Ibid.*
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 94.
[48] David Cingranelli and Thomas Pasquarello, "Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries," *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 29, No. 3 (August 1985), p. 5.
[49] Michael Stohl, David Carlton and Steven Johnson, "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance from Nixon to Carter" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 215-16. (Cited in: McNitt, p. 98).

In the next section, these two approaches – concentration on a small subset of core rights and using human rights reports in combination – are incorporated into the selection of a human rights data set.

1.3 Criteria for Data Set Selection

To ensure the compatibility of the data sets selected for this study, two basic criteria were established: all data sources needed to be global in scope and published annually. These limitations not only condensed the vast number of data sets available to a select few, but also facilitated the selection of data for cross-national and time-series analysis.

To further narrow the selection of data sets, it was decided that data sets measuring conflict escalation had to include lower intensity and violent political conflict when calculating changes in conflict intensity. This criterion was used for the reason that many data sets measuring conflict intensity rely solely on calculations of deaths resulting from armed conflict. [50] Such calculations do not measure the number of human rights abuses that are often committed in situations of political violence and lower intensity conflict. Therefore, based on this consideration, in addition to the two conditions previously outlined, the *World Conflict Map* issued by the Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM) was selected as the best data set for measuring conflict escalation.

[50] The data set developed by Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, which examines patterns of conflict in various geographical regions for five-year periods, focuses exclusively on armed conflict. This is problematic in the sense that, the data fails to consider lower intensity and violent political conflict when calculating conflict intensity and escalation. See, Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict and Regional Complexes, 1989-1997," *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 35, No. 5 (September 1998), pp. 621-634.

In narrowing down the number of human rights data sources available, it was decided that, in addition to recording violations of core human rights, the data sets needed to define human rights negatively by measuring the rights that were denied, rather than those available to groups and individuals within a state.[51] Based on these criteria, three data sets were selected: 1) Amnesty International reports; 2) The U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practice; and 3) Human Rights Watch Reports.

1.4 Description of Selected Data Sets

This section outlines the characteristics of the data set selected for measurement of conflict escalation – the *World Conflict Map* and the data sets selected for measurement of HRVs – Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the U.S. State Department.

The Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM)[52]

PIOOM, a research institute based at Leiden University in the Netherlands, produces an annual *World Conflict Map*.[53] It charts three levels of conflict intensity: 1) High-Intensity Conflict (large-scale armed conflict causing more than 1,000 deaths); 2) Low-Intensity Conflict (armed conflict causing 100 to 1,000 deaths); and 3) Violent

[51] Freedom House, a non-governmental organization based in New York, measures human rights positively by examining the presence of rights and freedoms provided by the State. See, Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1993-1994* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), pp. 672-3 and Freedom House Web Page: http://www.freedomhouse.org/.

[52] PIOOM *(Projecten Interdisciplinair Onderzoek naar Oorzaken van Mensenrechtenschendingen*) is a Dutch acronym translated as Interdisciplinary Research Projects on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations.

[53] PIOOM also produces an *Escalation Index* which measures not only the presence and absence of conflict, but also the escalation and de-escalation of conflict for thirty-one conflicts worldwide using thirteen (de)escalation indicators. Unfortunately, the most recent Escalation Index available is for the years

Political Conflict (armed conflict causing less than 100 deaths).[54] Although Schmid and Jongman only include the three forms of conflict, these types are a part of a larger five-stage model of escalation developed by PIOOM ranging from peace and political tension (less than 25 political killings per year), to the three aforementioned conflict intensities.[55] Accordingly, PIOOM's data includes cases of violent political conflicts and political tension. This distinction is particularly important as HRVs occur in both situations of armed conflict and political violence. This characteristic, in combination with the annual publication and worldwide scope of the Conflict Map, made it the most appropriate data set for this study.

Amnesty International

Published annually since 1962, Amnesty International reports have been accepted and utilized on a worldwide scale and, according to McNitt, the organization "has established a reputation for fairness and consistency in its reporting techniques."[56] Amnesty International's annual reports, which consist largely of narrative accounts of HRVs in more than 125 countries, document for each country: 1) the detention of political prisoners without a fair and open trial; 2) the frequency of torture and ill-treatment in detention centres, prisons, and military camps; and 3) state executions and political killings.[57] Amnesty International's data is compiled largely from information

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1994 to 1995. Therefore, because the Index is not annually published, it did not meet the criteria for this study and as a consequence was not included.

[54] A.J. Schmid and A.P. Jongman, "Contemporary Armed Conflicts – Trends and Events in 1997" in *Prevention and Management of Violent Conflicts: International Directory* (Utrecht, The Netherlands: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1998), pp. 43-44.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

[56] McNitt, p. 97.

[57] Amnesty International, 1997 Annual Report (London: 1998) www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar98/afr.htm

published in local newspapers, from data collected by local human rights NGOs and from information brought forward or collected from both relatives and victims themselves.[58]

Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch, an organization created in 1978 to monitor the persecutions of human rights monitors,[59] now investigates human rights abuses around the world. As a major source of information for 65 countries, Human Rights Watch claims that "[its] reputation for timely, reliable disclosures has made [it] an essential source of information for those concerned with human rights."[60] Data in Human Rights Watch reports is presented in a narrative format and organized into three main categories: 1) an annual overview of human rights developments; 2) the ability of local and international organizations to monitor HRVs within each country; and 3) the role played by the international community (especially the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States) in promoting human rights and inhibiting violations.[61] Using Human Rights Watch reports, data concerning HRVs was taken from the first category for each country report.

U.S. State Department Country Reports

The U.S. State Department Country Reports are the most extensive and detailed of the four reports. McNitt notes that "[o]f all the monitoring organizations, the State

[58] This data was obtained by Hilde Hey through various interviews she conducted with staff members of the International Secretariat of Amnesty International in London. See, Hilde Hey, *Gross Human Rights Violations: A Search for Causes - A Study of Guatemala and Costa Rica),* (The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1995), p. 60.
[59] Cain, Claude, and Jabine, p. 408.
[60] Human Rights Watch, *1998 Human Rights Watch World Report* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1997), p. 7.
[61] *Ibid.*

Department has the best resources for collecting information about human rights violations."[62] The reports, which are prepared by career foreign service officers for the U.S. Congress, include six categories of human rights: 1) respect for the integrity of the person; 2) respect for civil liberties; 3) respect for political rights; 4) government attitudes regarding international and non-governmental investigation of HRVs; 5) freedom from discrimination based on race, sex, disability, language or social status; and 6) respect for workers' rights. In her discussion of the reports, Judith Eleanor Innes argues that although the U.S Department of State has encountered criticism for its reluctance to embarrass friendly states, "even most critics who scrutinize [the reports] closely agree that on the whole the volume reflects a professional effort to report accurately and fairly."[63]

The three reports chosen as human rights data sets for this study – Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the U.S. Department of State were all chosen for their similarities, as well as their scope and accuracy. All three reports are global in scope, focus on core HRVs, measure human rights negatively, and are published annually.

1.5 Operationalizing HRVs and Conflict Escalation Data

In testing the existence of a link between HRVs and conflict escalation, several factors must be considered. First, the measurement of HRVs and conflict intensity must be standardized. Since conflict intensity is usually measured on a scale of intensity

[62] McNitt, p. 97.
[63] Judith Eleanor Innes, "Human Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool: An Examination of the State Department Country Reports" in Thomas B. Jabine and Richard P. Claude (eds.) *Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 235.

ranging from peace to war, it is also necessary to create a similar scale for HRVs. Such a scale has been proposed by Hilde Hey *(see Figure 1)* where HRVs are measured according to severity, ranging from "extremely severe" to "severe" to "less severe."

Figure 1: Severity Scale of Human Rights Violations



Within the first two categories, Hey qualifies extremely severe violations as genocide, and severe violations as gross human rights violations (GHRVs) and acts of state repression. Hey argues that whereas the victims of GHRVs "need not be a collectivity, but may be individuals," genocide involves "the killing of a collectivity, in whole or in part, thereby destroying the cultural identity of that collectivity."[64] This killing is often motivated by the deep-rooted perception that the continued existence of individuals belonging to certain groups may threaten the existence of their own collectivity. Robert Melson argues that ideology is a central theme for explaining genocide and that it is not the activities of the victims that cause genocide, but rather the perpetrator's perception of the victim.[65] Hey classifies GHRVs as massacres which "take place on a massive scale and are of a brutal nature, infringing on the right to life, physical and mental

[64] Hilde Hey, *Gross Human Rights Violations: A Search for Causes (A Study of Guatemala and Costa Rica),* (The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1995), p. 9.
[65] Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 6.

integrity and individual freedom.[66] In the category of "severe", Hey includes state repression, "involv[ing] pressure, which can be exerted either physically against the members of a class of subjects, or in a psychological form, affecting the emotional, mental or spiritual well-being of target groups."[67] Although "less severe" HRVs are not qualified by Hey, it is suggested that such violations include acts or policies of discrimination by a government that deprive individuals of basic political and civil rights.

To determine the link between conflict intensity and HRVs, Hey's qualitative scale of severity must be quantified. This was achieved by categorizing narrative accounts of HRVs recorded within the three human rights data sets according to their severity. Each account of HRVs was grouped into one of five categories: 1) thousands (1000+); 2) hundreds (100-999); 3) scores, numerous, dozens, tens (10-99); 4) less than ten (or where no quantifiable specification was available); and 5) no recorded HRVs. Each category was then rated on a scale from zero to four, where zero represented the absence of HRVs, and four represented thousands of HRV.

The next section presents, in greater detail, the process used to generate quantitative data examining the link between conflict intensity and HRVs. It also outlines the process used to develop statistical data, presents the findings of the research and provides an analysis of the data.

1.6 Evaluating the Link between HRVs and Conflict Intensity: Presentation of Findings

To effectively gauge the number of HRVs, three human rights reports – Amnesty International, U.S. Department of State and Human Rights Watch – are used

[66] Hey, p.1.

comparatively. Conflict intensity is measured using PIOOM's *1997 World Conflict Map*. In an effort to standardize the data, only 1997 reports are utilized.[68] The types of HRVs included in the research are limited to: 1) extra-judicial killings; 2) disappearances; 3) torture and ill-treatment; 4) prisoners of conscience; 5) detention without charge or trial; and 6) human rights abuses by armed opposition groups.[69] These six categories were selected because they were included in all three human rights reports. A four-point scale was then developed to measure the intensity of these six types of HRVs. Given the rigorous and time-consuming task of converting narrative accounts of HRVs into empirical data for each of the three human rights reports for every country, the data sample was limited to Africa. Of PIOOM's five regional complexes, Africa has the highest cumulative number of conflicts *(see Table 2)*.

Table 2 - Regional Distribution of HICs, LICs and VPCs for 1997[70]

	HIC	*LIC*	*VPC*	*TOTAL*
Americas	1	10	12	23
Europe	2	4	12	18
Africa	**5**	**34**	**14**	**53**
N.Africa-M.East	2	6	6	14
Central Asia	6	10	16	32
Far East	1	7	14	22

[67] A.P. Schmid, 'Repression, State Terrorism, and Genocide: Conceptual Clarifications,' in Bushnell, *et al.*, 1991, p. 24 (Cited in Hey, p. 11).
[68] Due to the unavailability of 1998 reports, 1997 reports were utilized for both the measurement of HRVs and conflict intensity.
[69] Although other HRVs such as the number of occurrences of unfair trials, death penalties, and arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence, were included in some of the human rights reports, only the six categories above were common to all three reports.
[70] Data extracted from Jongman and Schmid, (1998), pp. 41-45.

Based on the list of African countries in PIOOM's *1997 World Conflict Map*, 28 countries – experiencing intra-state conflict[71] – were included in this study. For all 28 countries, data for the six types of HRVs was taken from each of the three human rights reports (see *Appendix B* for a summary of the data compiled). Most of the data was in narrative form; therefore, it was quantified to allow measurement of the severity of the HRVs both comparatively and cross-sectionally. The narrative data was numerically quantified using a four-point scale where "four" represented 1,000 or more HRVs, and "three", represented HRVs fewer than 1,000 but more than 100. "Two" specified "scores, numerous, dozens and tens of HRVs and "one" for HRVs less than ten, or where there was no numerical specification. "Zero" was used to represent the absence of any HRVs. Once the data was compiled, severity calculations were made by adding up the points for each type of HRV, from each of the three human rights reports. An average was calculated for each country (see *Table 3*). These calculations of HRVs were then compared with the level of conflict intensity for each country using the *PIOOM World Conflict Map* (see *Chart 1*).

[71] Only intra-state armed conflicts were included in this study. Border conflicts and other territorial inter-state conflicts were excluded from the data set.

Table 3: Severity Calculations for Human Rights Violations in Africa

KEY:
4 = thousands (1000+)
3 = hundreds (100-999)
2 = scores/numerous/dozens/tens (10-99)
1 = <10/no numerical specification
0 = No data (N/D)

Countries (Average/Ranking)	Amnesty International	U.S. State Department	Human Rights Watch
Algeria AVERAGE = 14.7 (4)	3-2-4-3-4-3 = 19	2-2-2-2-2-3 = 13	2-2-N/D-3-2-3 = 12
Angola AVERAGE = 10.3 (9)	2-1-1-2-2-2 = 10	2-2-2-2-2-2 = 12	1-1-0-4-1-2 = 9
Burundi AVERAGE = 15.3 (2)	4-1-1-2-4-4 = 16	4-2-0-3-1-3 = 13	4-2-0-4-4-3 = 17
Cameroon AVERAGE = 8.0 (11)	0-0-2-2-3-0 = 7	2-2-2-0-3-0 = 9	N/D
Central African Rep. AVERAGE = 6.0 (14)	N/D	1-0-0-2-1-2 = 6	N/D
Chad AVERAGE = 11.5 (8)	2-1-2-3-2-2 = 12	2-1-N/D-2-2-2 = 6	N/D
Comoros AVERAGE = 5.5 (16)	2-0-0-2-0-1 = 5	2-0-0-2-0-2 = 6	N/D
Congo (Rep. of) AVERAGE = 15.0 (3)	4-2-1-3-2-4 = 16	4-1-0-3-2-4 = 14	N/D
Dem. Rep. of Congo (DRC) AVERAGE = 15.7 (1)	4-2-3-4-2-4 = 19	2-3-2-2-2-3- = 14	4-0-2-1-3-4 = 14
Djibouti AVERAGE = 5.0 (18)	0-0-1-2-2-0 = 5	1-0-1-1-2-0 = 5	N/D
Eritrea AVERAGE = 5.0 (18)	2-0-2-0-2-1 = 7	0-0-0-1-2-0 = 3	N/D
Ethiopia AVERAGE = 8.7 (10)	2-1-1-1-3-1 = 9	1-2-0-2-3-2 = 10	1-0-1-1-3-1 = 7
Ghana AVERAGE = 5.0 (18)	0-0-1-2-1-0 = 4	2-0-0-2-2-0 = 6	N/D
Kenya AVERAGE = 5.3 (17)	2-0-1-2-1-0 = 6	2-0-1-1-1-0 = 5	2-0-0-2-1-0 = 5
Liberia AVERAGE = 5.7 (15)	1-0-1-2-1-1 = 6	2-1-0-2-1-0 = 6	1-0-0-2-1-1 = 5
Mali AVERAGE = 2.0 (20)	0-0-1-1-1-0 = 3	0-0-1-0-0-0 = 1	N/D
Mozambique AVERAGE = 5.3 (17)	1-1-0-2-1-0 = 5	2-1-0-2-1-0 = 6	0-0-0-2-2-1 = 5
Niger AVERAGE = 4.0 (19)	1-0-1-1-2-1 = 6	0-0-0-2-0-0 = 2	N/D
Nigeria AVERAGE = 5.7 (15)	0-0-3-2-3-0 = 8	1-1-0-1-1-0 = 4	2-0-1-1-1-0 = 5
Rwanda AVERAGE = 14.7 (4)	4-2-1-3-4-3 = 17	4-2-0-2-3-3- = 14	4-1-0-2-3-3- = 13
Senegal AVERAGE = 13.0 (7)	2-2-2-2-3-2 = 13	2-2-N/D-2-3-2 = 11	N/D
Sierra Leone AVERAGE = 14.0 (6)	2-1-3-3-3-2 = 14	2-4-2-1-3-2 = 14	N/D
Somalia AVERAGE = 6.5 (12)	3-0-1-1-1-1 = 7	1-0-0-1-1-3 = 6	N/D
South Africa AVERAGE = 6.3 (13)	3-0-0-3-0-1 = 7	3-0-0-1-0-1 = 5	3-0-0-3-0-1 = 7
Sudan AVERAGE = 14.7 (4)	2-3-3-2-3-4 = 17	2-2-2-2-2-3 = 11	4-1-1-1-2-4 = 14
Uganda AVERAGE = 14.5 (5)	2-3-3-3-3-4 = 18	2-0-1-2-3-3 = 11	N/D
Zambia AVERAGE = 5.3 (17)	1-1-1-1-2-0 = 6	1-1-1-1-1-0 = 5	1-0-1-1-2-0 = 5
Zimbabwe AVERAGE = 1.0 (21)	0-0-0-1-0-0 = 1	0-0-0-2-0-0 = 2	N/D



Sources:

1. Conflict Intensity: World Conflict Map, Schmid and Jongman (1998), pp. 41-46.
2. Human Rights Violations: *Amnesty International 1997 Annual Report, U.S. Department of State's 1997 Country Reports* on Human Rights Practices and *1998 Human Rights Watch World Report.*

Notes:

1. DRC refers to Democratic Republic of Congo; CAR refers to Central African Republic
2. Due to the fact that PIOOM data breaks down many of the conflicts within countries, whereas the data within the human rights reports do not, only the following major conflicts were selected for inclusion in the chart:
    a) DRC: AFDL (*Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Kinshasa*), (conflicts in Kivu, Mai Mai and Beme were not included)
    b) Sudan: SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army), (Beja was not included)
    c) Kenya: Turkana, Samburu and Rift Valley (Mombasa was not included)
    d) Nigeria: Delta state and Osun state (Ogoni was not included)
    e) Uganda: ADF (Alliance of Democratic Forces) and NALU (Tabliqs was not included)

In the chart, the category (X) axis maps out 28 African countries while the value (Y) axis represents the increasing severity of HRVs for each country. Conflict intensity is denoted by colour: "red" for high-intensity conflict (HIC), "blue" for low-intensity conflict (LIC) and "yellow" for violent political conflict (VPC). Although PIOOM's data set records *all* conflicts in each country, the three human rights reports do not make the same distinction. Therefore, to achieve greater accuracy, only the major conflicts within each country were included in the chart (see notes 2a through 2e).

1.6 Analysis of Data and Conclusions

Although the findings summarized in the chart do not establish a direct *causation* between HRVs and conflict escalation, the data indicates a *correlation* between intensity levels of conflict and severity of HRVs. For example, in the first six countries where high-intensity conflict existed, HRVs range from extremely severe, characterized by cases of genocide, to severe, where cases of GHRVs were widespread. Cases of low-intensity conflict include those countries experiencing severe HRVs such as GHRVs and state repression, whereas cases of violent political conflict include countries where severe to less severe violations such as state repression and discrimination existed. In *Figure 3*, these findings are incorporated into Hilde Hey's Severity Scale of Human Rights Violations.

Figure 2: Severity Scale of Human Rights Violations and Conflict Intensity



Given the correlation between HRVs and conflict intensity, the next chapter offers theoretical explanations for the link between HRVs and conflict escalation. It is argued that it is highly problematic to isolate HRVs as a single, direct cause of conflict escalation for the reason that it ignores other intervening variables.[72] Therefore, the next chapter focuses on HRVs as systemic, proximate and triggering determinants for conflict escalation.

[72] McNitt argues that, when used as an independent variable, "there is a strong tendency to reduce measurement of the abuse of human rights to a single indicator variable. Although methodologically defensible, this practice runs the risk of oversimplifying a complex variable." (McNitt, p. 90)

CHAPTER II.
Qualitative Linkages Between HRVs and Conflict Escalation

In this chapter, theoretical explanations for the linkage between HRVs and conflict escalation are presented.[73] To accomplish this, the chapter is divided into three sections: 1) HRVs as *systemic* determinants of conflict (focusing on violations of social/economic human rights); 2) HRVs as *proximate* determinants of conflict (focusing on violations of social/economic and civil/political human rights); and 3) HRVs as *immediate* determinants (focusing on violations of civil/political human rights and gross human rights violations).[74] In his document, *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners*, Michael Lund categorizes the determinants of conflict as: 1) systemic (structural); 2) proximate (enabling); and 3) immediate (triggering).[75] This categorization will be used in this paper to examine the determinants of conflict escalation.

The first section examines how systemic and root causes of conflict, such as poverty, social exclusion, under-development and state failure, constitute HRVs and lead to a sense of relative deprivation. The second section looks at how relative deprivation is translated into protest or rebellion and how state authorities may employ repression and HRVs in response. HRVs are examined as a proximate or enabling determinant of

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73 Although a strong causal relationship between human rights and security at the international level can be made, the discussion below focuses largely on how human rights violations create cycles of reoccurring conflict *within* a state. Threats to international peace and security that often result from intra-state conflict, namely the flow of refugees and the spillage of violence across state boundaries will not be discussed in this paper. Rather, this section will focus its discussion specifically on the role of human rights as an integral factor in the escalation of conflict within states.

74 See, Michael Lund *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflict: A Guide for Practitioners.* (Washington, D.C.: Creative Associates International, 1997). Source: http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/outline.htm

[75] *Ibid.*

conflict escalation. The third section explores how repression and HRVs committed by the state may serve as an immediate or triggering determinant of conflict escalation by creating a security dilemma where opposition groups engage in retaliatory acts of violence as a means of self-defence. It is argued that continuation of this security dilemma or conflict spiral may also explain how HRVs may serve as a trigger for GHRVs. A summary of the linkages discussed in this chapter are summarized below in *Figure 3:*

Figure 3: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND CONFLICT ESCALATION



2.1 HRVs as a Systemic Determinant of Conflict

In his guide, *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts,* Michael Lund defines systemic determinants of conflict as variables which "cause objective changes in parties' material circumstances."[76] Accordingly, systemic determinants of conflict may include violations of socio-economic rights. Peter Leuprecht argues that "human rights violations, especially systematic and 'structural' ones (such as poverty, social exclusion, under-development), are often the root causes of violence and upheavals."[77] As individuals or groups in society are deprived of their needs because of inequalities, social exclusion and discrimination perpetuated by the governing authority, their basic human rights are violated.

The peace research school, associated with Scandinavian academics, equates "the denial of human rights *ipso facto* with the denial of peace. Peace is defined to mean the absence of psychic dissatisfaction. Denial of rights leads to perceived deprivation and hence to psychic anguish."[78] It is due to the continued denial of socio-economic rights – food, shelter, clothing, education and medical care – that groups are forced to defend their most basic right – life. Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights conveyed this argument at an international symposium in Bonn in May 1998:

> Human rights violations…are frequently the root causes of conflict and humanitarian crises. The deprivation of human rights takes from people an integral part of their lives, their sense of dignity and self-worth – a loss

[76] Michael Lund, Source: http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/understanding-htm#concepts-b
[77] Peter Leuprecht, "Conflict Prevention and Alternative Forms of Dispute Resolution: Looking Towards the Twenty-First Century" in Kathleen E. Mahoney and Paul Mahoney (eds.) *Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century* (Doldrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), p. 960.
[78] David Forsythe. *Human Rights and World Politics* (2nd. ed., Rev.), (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1989).

> which humans are deeply disposed to resist. And they do resist. They fight. They even take up arms and make war.[79]

Ted Robert Gurr refers to this perception of social and economic HRVs using theoretical arguments of relative deprivation. He contends that relative deprivation occurs when people perceive themselves to be bereft of fundamental social, economic, environmental, and cultural rights they expect and feel they deserve. This sense of deprivation or lack of access to a right, that they perceive to be of fundamental importance to their welfare, may lead to discontent and frustration. Consequently, this perceived sense of inequality or injustice leads to acts of insurgency. Gurr argues that in these situations, "peoples' discontent about unjust deprivation is the primary motivation for political action."[80]

Based on Gurr's insights, Janice Gross Stein explains how relative deprivation may lead to collective violence.[81] "As the gap grows between material [or social or political] expectations and assets, aggression toward those perceived as the cause of relative deprivation will grow and intensify."[82] Accordingly, it is not deprivation alone that leads to insurgency and protest, but how this deprivation is perceived by individuals *relative* to the rest of society. It is when individuals or groups feel they are being overly deprived in relation to the rest of society that they are led to protest or rebel against the source of deprivation, which in most cases, is the state.

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[79] Address by Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Symposium: "Strengthening Human Rights Field Operations" Bonn, 26-27 May 1998, p. 3.
[80] Ted Robert Gurr, "Minorities, Nationalists, and Ethnopolitical Conflict" in *Managing Global Chaos: Sources and Responses to International Conflict,* Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, (eds.) (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 63.
[81] See, Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton , NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).
[82] Janice Gross Stein. "Image and Identity, and Conflict ," *Managing Global Chaos: Sources and Responses to International Conflict*, Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, (eds.) (Washington, DC: United Sates Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 96.

Gurr argues that, because the perceptions underlying grievances are shaped largely by group leaders, explanations for communal protest and rebellion must consider theoretical arguments for *group mobilization*, along with theories of *relative deprivation*. Differentiating between the two theoretical explanations, Gurr argues that the former "emphasizes leaders' calculated mobilization of group resources in response to changing political opportunities," whereas the latter emphasizes "peoples' discontent about unjust deprivation [as] the primary motivation for political action."[83] Gurr asserts that it is when protest activities are organized and focused by group leaders who "give plausible expression to minority grievances' and aspirations," that conflict is most likely to escalate.[84] He argues that the ability of group leaders to mobilize grievances is contingent upon certain conditions, including: "unequal treatment by dominant groups, competition with other groups for access to power in new states, the contagion effect of ethnopolitical activism elsewhere, and patterns of state power and policy that channel communal energies into either protest or rebellion."[85]

The next section discusses how relative deprivation and mass mobilization are translated into protest or rebellion, and how repression and HRVs may be employed by state authorities in an effort to minimize opposition or insurgency.

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[83] Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel: Explaining Ethnopolitical Protest and Rebellion" in Ted Robert Gurr (ed.), *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, DC: United State Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 123.
[84] Gurr (1993), p. 124.

2.2 HRVs as a Proximate Determinant of Conflict Escalation

Although systemic causes of conflict such as social exclusion, discrimination, underdevelopment, and poverty often affect large numbers of people, "their influence on the probability of conflict operates slowly."[86] Conversely, proximate determinants of violent conflict, defined as "problems in the social, political, and communications processes and institutions that mediate the effect of systemic conditions on peoples' lives and behaviours,[87] may accelerate the intensity of conflict and give rise to HRVs.[88] It is argued that repression and HRVs committed by the state are determined by intensified oppositional behaviour and state regime-type and ideology.

2.2.1 Intensified Oppositional Behaviour

One explanation of HRVs as a proximate cause of conflict escalation is Robert Melson's 'provocation thesis,'[89] which cites oppositional behaviour as a determinant of HRVs. The 'provocation thesis' addresses the activities of those targeted by HRVs and views oppositional activities, such as protest and rebellion, as determinants of HRVs. In this regard, it is the actions of opposition groups that provoke governing authorities to crackdown on their behaviour using repression and HRVs.

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[85] *Ibid.,* p. 123.
[86] Michael Lund, Source: http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/outline.htm
[87] *Ibid.*
[88] These proximate determinants include components of political opportunity theory such as state strength and political institutionalization. See: Kurt Schock, "A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship Between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* Vol. 40, No.1 (March 1996), pp. 98-133.
[89] Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust,* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

The decision of state authorities to resort to repression and HRVs is contingent upon the intensity of oppositional behavior. Ted Robert Gurr argues that there are three different forms of political action by which communal groups may pursue their interests: 1) nonviolent protest; 2) violent protest; and 3) rebellion.[90] Gurr distinguishes between the three types of oppositional activities by the type of strategies they employ:

> The essential strategy of protest is to mobilize a show of support on behalf of reform; the essential strategy of rebellion is to mobilize enough coercive power that governments are forced to accept change. When protestors use violence it usually occurs in sporadic and unplanned ways often in reaction to coercive acts by the police and military. The use of violence by rebels, on the other hand, takes the form of concerted campaigns of armed attacks, ranging from political banditry and terrorism to all-out war.[91]

As oppositional activity increases, so does the likelihood of violence. Stuart Kaufman argues that this security dilemma occurs largely in cases of mass-led violence, where 'the crucial variable is mass hostility and fear. Those emotions trigger spontaneous outbreaks of violence, activating a security dilemma which in turn exacerbates the hostility and fear."[92]

In contrast to the 'provocation thesis,' where oppositional behaviour is regarded as a determinant for HRVs, the next section discusses alternative theories advanced by Herbert Kelman and Hilde Hey, which focus on the state as the major cause of HRVs by examining institutional and ideological causes of repression and HRVs.

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[90] Gurr (1993), p. 93.
[91] *Ibid.*
[92] Stuart Kaufman, "An 'International' Theory of 'Inter-Ethnic War," *Review of International Studies* Vol. 22 (1996), p. 157.

2.2.2 Institutional Determinants

A major determinant of whether mass protests will be accommodated or repressed by the governing authority, is regime-type. In his comparison of opportunities for ethnic mobilization in established democracies and democratizing autocracies, Gurr maintains that "institutionalized democracy facilitates nonviolent communal protest and inhibits communal rebellion."[93] This argument is based on the conclusion that, because institutionalized democracies generally possess participatory and responsive political systems, they are better equipped to respond to pluralist demands.

In democratizing autocracies, the opportunities for communal groups to mobilize are also substantial; however, "states usually lack the resources or institutional means to reach the kinds of accommodations that typify the established democracies."[94] Gurr argues that in democratizing autocracies, "democratization is likely to facilitate both protest and communal rebellion."[95] This is explained by the argument that because democratizing states are states in transition, they are more likely to be unstable. The potentially destabilizing effects of the consolidation process on democratizing states is articulated by Larry Diamond:

> The process of deepening democracy – democratizing political parties and local governments, strengthening the legislative and judicial branches, developing grassroots civic movements, empowering the poor, punishing corruption and human rights abuses, and subjecting the military to civilian control – typically involves heightened conflict.[96]

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[93] Gurr (1993), p. 138.
[94] *Ibid.*
[95] *Ibid.*
[96] Larry Diamond, "Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation" *in Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas,* Tom Farer (ed.), (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 54.

The stability of states is most threatened when this consolidation process is complicated by oppositional behaviour. It is after this point that protest activities by opposition groups will likely evolve into acts of rebellion.

In autocratic states, oppositional behaviour is determined largely by the strength of the state. Gurr argues that "communal action in the most powerful states is likely to be limited in scope and to take the form of protest, whereas protracted communal conflict will typify weak states that are attempting to extend their reach."[97] When opposition movements are present in weak states, ruling regimes are unlikely to adopt power-sharing measures for fear of losing their own power. Accordingly, weak states may employ violent and repressive measures to preserve their own security by eliminating opposition and resistance. However, because weak states often have limited resources, opposition groups are more likely to resist government aggression through violent rebellion.

In contrast, strong, resource-rich autocratic states are less likely to encounter the same resistance as weak autocracies for the reason that they have the capacity "both to accommodate and to suppress communal minorities at relatively low cost, depending on the preferences of their elites."[98] Thus, strong autocracies are generally equipped with a repressive military apparatus that plays a central role in the institutions of the state. Hey argues that this military presence gives security forces the capability to commit widespread human rights abuses and control the decision-making process.[99] It is for this reason that opposition groups in strong autocratic regimes tend to favour non-violent protest activities.

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[97] Gurr (1993), p. 136.
[98] *Ibid.*
[99] Hey, 166.

When acts of opposition or insurgency are directed towards a weak autocratic or democratizing state, they may be interpreted by the state as a threat to its security and stability. In his study on the sources of torture, Herbert Kelman argues that "recourse to repression is likely to occur in situations in which opposition – any opposition or opposition from a particular quarter – represents a challenge to the legitimacy of those in power and thus a fundamental threat to their continued ability to maintain power."[100] The more organized and cohesive the activities of opposition groups, the greater the threat to the government.[101] As this threat increases, so does the willingness of government forces to resort to increased repression and HRVs.

2.2.3 Ideological Beliefs of Perpetrators

The willingness of government or security forces to respond to oppositional behaviour with acts of repression and HRVs may also be influenced by the ideological beliefs of state authorities. Hilde Hey defines ideology as "a belief system on which those holding power base specific policies."[102] Ideology may be defined in terms of *inclusive* and *exclusive nationalism*. Whereas the former is characteristic of social democracies, the latter applies to states which are either semi-democracies or weak autocracies.

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[100] Herbert Kelman, "The Social Context of Torture: Policy Process and Authority," in R.D. Crelinsten and A.P. Schmid (eds.), *The Politics of Pain: Torturers and their Masters* (Leiden: Centre for the Study of Social Conflicts, 1993), p. 30.

[101] John L. Davies and Barbara Harff argue that regime insecurity may be accelerated by: 1) formation of coalitions among the regimes' opponents; 2) clashes between regime supporters for communal groups; 3) increase in external involvement; and 4) empty threats of external involvement. See, John L. Davies and Barbara Harff, with Anne L. Speca, "Dynamic Data for Conflict Early Warning", Paper presented at the Workshop on Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, at the University of Maryland, College Park, 14-16 November 1996 (Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, March 1997), p. 7.

In cases of *inclusive nationalism*, minority groups are integrated and accommodated to ensure their equal and fair treatment. Regardless of their ethnic, religious or political beliefs, all groups are given the same rights and privileges as the dominant group in society. The ideology of inclusive nationalism, which permeates all institutions of society, requires security and government personnel to respect the rights of all individuals.[103]

Conversely, *exclusive nationalism* embodies the perception that the inability of groups to integrate within society constitutes a threat to the cohesion of the state. Therefore, the greater the threat these groups are perceived to be, the greater their exclusion from society. Such exclusion ranges from denial of the same privileges and rights bestowed upon the dominant group, to orchestrated violations of human rights on a mass scale. Guiding the latter is the notion of the "enemy image." Minority groups within society are portrayed as direct threats to national security and stability, and therefore must be eliminated, it is reasoned. It is in these situations that exclusive nationalism is invoked to justify the use of terror.[104] For example, during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, policies for systematically killing Tutsis – who were regarded as enemies of the state – were implemented by the security and government forces. It is in these cases that ruling regimes may employ an ideology of national security to legitimize repression and GHRVs.

In her comparative case study of Guatemala and Costa Rica, conducted for PIOOM, Hey argues that both institutional and ideological factors must be present in

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[102] Hey, 163.
[103] *Ibid.*
[104] See George Lopez and Michael Stohl, *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research* (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 91.

order for communal protest to trigger violent state repression and human rights abuses. Although protests were present in both Guatemala and Costa Rica, Hey argues that GHRVs occurred only in Guatemala. She contends that the main reasons for this differentiation concerned Guatemala's repressive security apparatus and its ideology of exclusionary nationalism, qualities that did not characterize Costa Rica.

In Guatemala, the security forces, particularly the military, were the dominant institutions. Hey argues that such dominance stemmed largely from their central role in the decision-making process.[105] These characteristics of the military, Hey concludes, demonstrated 'that the security forces had the institutional capability to perpetuate gross human rights violations."[106] Conversely, in Costa Rica, the local police force played an insignificant role in dealing with political and social issues. When protest occurred, violence was not a natural reaction for the Costa Rican government in the same way that it was for the governing authorities in Guatemala. Instead of repressing resistance, the Costa Rican government, as a social democracy, often chose to accommodate political and social differences.

Ideology also determined reactions by the state and military to oppositional behaviour in both countries. Given Costa Rica's ideology of inclusive nationalism and social democracy, all citizens, regardless of racial or ethnic origin, were considered Costa Ricans. In Guatemala, however, the security forces perceived the lack of Indian integration into Guatemalan society as a threat to the security of the state. As a result of this perception, 'the Indian people were dehumanized and treated in a non-human way by

[105] Hey, 172.
[106] *Ibid.*

means of gross human rights violations."[107] The effect of repression and HRVs committed by the state in triggering such GHRVs is discussed in the next section.

2.3 HRVs as Triggers of Conflict Escalation

As the state engages in repression in response to increasing oppositional behaviour, civil and political human rights are frequently violated. David Gillies discusses these violations:

> Unconventional dissent, such as civil disobedience, is vigorously suppressed. State actors will resort to unconventional politics, principally repression. This may include manipulation of the electoral process, censorship, surveillance, harassment, misuse of emergency powers, and the suspension of the constitution and civil liberties. Opinion leaders from churches, universities, trade unions, the legal profession, and the media will be targets of vigilante groups and death squads.[108]

In response to these HRVs, individuals are often forced to resort to violence as a means of self-defence, thus provoking a recurring cycle of state repression and group insurgency. The 1993 report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) argues that 'protest about or resistance to human rights violations…may provoke violent retaliation, or take a violent form itself. An accumulation of abuses accompanied by violence…leads to further abuses and a generalized climate of fear."[109] This climate of mistrust and fear may then serve to escalate the conflict, thus perpetuating a cycle of violence. As articulated by Paul LaRose-Edwards, '[t]he increased ferocity of fighting and hate as human rights violations increase, lowers personal and group

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[107] *Ibid.*, pp. 173-174.
[108] Gillies, p. 43.
[109] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *The State of the World's Refugees 1993: The Challenge of Protection*, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 121.

inhibitions against using violence by appearing to legitimize such violence."[110] Within this environment, societal structures are destabilized and de-legitimized. In turn, this leads to increased violence and conflict escalation, creating a recurring cycle of conflict. During this cycle of reciprocated violence, elite-led and mass-driven aggressions, based on perceived or real threats, reinforce each other, thus creating a security dilemma. LaRose-Edwards describes this pattern:

> [H]uman rights violations worsen existing armed conflicts. There is a downward spiral of violations and reprisals which…exacerbate the day to day conflict…Silence on the part of the UN about past or ongoing violations merely serves to confirm the fear of the victims that the international community will not protect them. Fear of violations engenders self-defence and creates the security dilemma that drives escalation.[111]

Stuart Kaufman argues that, in this security dilemma "each group concludes that it must act to preserve the physical security of its members for example by creating vigilante groups, thereby provoking further insecurity in the other group."[112] Although Kaufman refers to inter-group conflict in his discussion of the security dilemma, the same arguments apply to intra-state conflict. According to Gillies, in response to this security dilemma, "a deteriorating human rights pattern develops against a backdrop of growing challenges to the state, widening suppression of all dissent, and declining respect for the rule of law."[113] It is at this point that HRVs may intensify into GHRVs.

To determine whether or not state repression and HRVs will translate into GHRVs, Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr have identified nine accelerators of genocide and politicide in their study of early warning in humanitarian emergencies.

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[110] Paul LaRose-Edwards, *UN Human Rights Operations: Principles and Practice in United Nations Field Operations* (Ottawa, ON: Human Rights and Justice Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996), p. 13.
[111] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[112] Kaufman, p. 151.

These accelerators "act together to rapidly increase the level or significance of the most volatile of the general conditions of genocide and politicide and thus, exponentially increase the likelihood that an episode will occur."[114] Although specific to genocide and politicide, these accelerators (particularly accelerators four through nine) may also be used to explain how HRVs trigger GHRVs. The nine accelerators are summarized below in *Table 4*:

Table 4: Accelerators of Genocide and Politicide

Accelerators	Categories of Events
1. Occurrence of Violent Opposition by Kindred Groups in Neighboring Countries	- Declarations against the government - Threats of physical action - Marches, demonstrations - Riots - Physical injury: bombings, assassination - Increase in refugee flows (numbers of displaced people)
2. Increase in External Support for Politically Active Groups	- Statements, speeches, reports issued in support of targeted group - Dispatch of peacekeepers - Transfer of non-military aid to targeted group - Transfer of arms or other military aid to targeted group
3. Threats of External Involvement Against Governing Elites	- Threat of sanctions - Threat of arms transfers to targeted group - Threat of military intervention
4. Increase in Size of, or Degree of Cohesion in, Opposition Group	- Emergence of uncontested leadership in political opposition movement - Agreements between factions of political opposition movement – Significant new members join political opposition movement
5. Aggressive Posturing or Actions by Opposition Group	- Declarations against the government - Threats of physical action - Marches, demonstrations - Riots - Physical destruction of property - Physical injury: bombings, assassinations
6. Physical or Verbal Clashes	- Exchange of verbal attacks by representatives of the regime and the targeted group - Physical clashes
7. New Discriminatory or Restrictive Policies by the Regime	- Threat of new restrictions or threat of violent action by regime - Restrictions on access to jobs in the civil service and military - Expropriation of property - Restrictions on political participation (e.g. free speech, free assembly) - Revocation of citizenship
8. Life Integrity Violations by Government or Government-Supported Against Targeted Groups	- Destruction of houses or property - Attacks involving physical injury - Mass arrests or detentions - Forcible resettlement - Torture - Assassination or execution of prominent leaders - Massacres, mass executions, pogroms

[113] Gillies, p. 43.
[114] Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, "Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies," *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 35, No. 5 (September 1998), p. 562.

These accelerators are referred to in the next chapter where HRFOs are examined as a mechanism for de-accelerating the rise of HRVs and genocide.

2.4 Linking HRVs and Conflict Escalation

As state-driven HRVs increase, the potential for opposition groups to also resort to violence (either for purposes of retaliation or self-defence), is also likely to increase. Conflict escalates as this cycle of backlash and rebellion by opposition groups provokes a more severe crackdown by the government. This combination of cyclical HRVs and rising conflict intensity creates a spiral of violence, which may then lead to GHRVs.

Based on this link between HRVs and conflict escalation, the next chapter examines how responding to proximate and immediate determinants of conflict escalation can mitigate the rise of high intensity conflict. It will be argued that HRFO which "operationalize and prioritize the link between human rights violations and deadly conflict"[115] may serve as a de-escalating tool by monitoring the accelerators that give rise to GHRVs and building the institutions to protect human rights.

[115] Kenny (1997), 63.