The Effectiveness of Mediation to

End Internal Conflict: Some Preliminary Results

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1. Introduction

Struggles involving civil wars, local insurrections or ethnic violence far outnumber those stemming from external aggression or conflict between states, especially in recent years. These internal conflicts, over identity, government or territory, are arguably more difficult to resolve through peaceful negotiation than their interstate counterparts (Licklider 1995, Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1997). Groups with a tendency to solve their political and ethnic differences through military means pose a danger to international order and to other groups in a number of important ways (Vayrynen 1997). Non-combatants are at risk of large-scale violence, armed militias generally operate outside the purview of authority structures, and many internal conflicts spillover into the international domain adding complexity to overburdened management strategies.

Considerable progress has been made in illuminating the causes and manifestations of violent internal conflicts. The conditions necessary for their termination are less well understood. (Lund 1996, Licklider 1995). The purpose of this chapter is to develop basic knowledge on the effectiveness of third parties in the ending of internal conflicts. More specifically, the paper has three interrelated objectives. The first is to identify the conditions associated with the ending of different types of internal conflicts. A second goal is to relate this knowledge to those strategies of third-party intervention that are thought to result in a stable and long lasting peace. Third, and perhaps most challenging, is the search for conditions under which pacific forms of termination are likely to succeed.

The chapter unfolds in five sections. Sections two and three present general hypotheses relating to the characteristics of internal conflicts and third party effectiveness, respectively. In the fourth section, the hypotheses are weighed against the evidence. In the fifth and final

section, conclusions and directions for further research are presented.

2. Understanding the Internationalisation of Internal Conflict

It is difficult to determine when and if an internal conflict will remain so. The reality is that there are few conflicts that are not international in scope. Some internal conflicts have only a mild tendency to internationalize, while others slip easily from local conflict to full-scale interstate war.

For Vayrynen (1997) the identification of an "internal" conflict is made not by the actors involved or by their behaviour but by the level of risk. An internally risky state is that which reflects a high degree of domestic disorder that "enhances its proneness to opposition and rebellion." The degree to which disorder fosters "non-compliance with the prevailing norms of international relations" is a measure of the risk to the international environment (Vayrynen 1997: 38).

Externally risky states are those whose internal conflicts spillover more directly into the international environment. Their internal behaviour places them in a situation of repeated conflict with their neighbours. Consider, for example, the movement of displaced ethnic groups (through refugee flows or ethnic cleansing) to a neighbouring state. Changes of demography, can drastically alter the ethnic balance in a neighbouring state thereby adding to regional instability.

Viewed as high politics, internal conflicts, specifically ethnic ones, carry serious risks of internationalisation through diffusion and vertical escalation. Diffusion can occur in four non-mutually exclusive ways: contagion, demonstration effects, information flows, and material and ideological support for diaspora. Under such conditions a perceived higher threat to core values would be anticipated (Carment & James 1997a). Escalation is distinguished from diffusion along a number of dimensions. The most important dimension is their level of intensity. Whereas diffusion is a process that can persist in the absence of state-directed involvement, this is not the case for

escalation. In other words, diffusion refers to the process by which ethnic conflict influences the behaviour of neighbouring ethnic groups in unpredictable and spontaneous ways (such as refugee flows and demonstration effects).Theoretically, any one dimension of diffusion could be a precondition to escalation.

Escalation, refers to a set of deliberate strategic interactions and processes. The behaviour of one state creates a crisis for one or more state actors who perceive a core threat to values. Escalation in this context is interstate conflict leading to crisis, intervention and possibly war.

Sources of diffusion and escalation include:

* the mobilization of political and ideological support from kindred groups in third countries, foreign governments and international or non-governmental organizations;

* the establishment of sanctuaries in neighbouring countries, particularly common where insurgent minorities are dispersed over two or more contiguous states (Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq);

* the spillover of violence into neighbouring countries (Rwanda/Zaire; Sri Lanka/India; Afghanistan/Pakistan, among other examples;)

* the spillover of terrorist violence into countries that are geographically distant from the initial locus of conflict (Irish terrorist operations on the European continent, Sikh terrorist operations in Europe and North America).

* flights of refugees now numbering in the tens of millions, the vast majority of whom are displaced by ethnic conflicts.

Most internationalised conflicts are high stake situations where the consequences are far-reaching and long lasting. The essential problem is an "emerging anarchy" where groups that lack many of the attributes of statehood must pay attention to the primary problem of their security

(Posen 1993). The terms security dilemma and conflict spiral apply equally to situations where the pursuit of security by one group serves only to antagonise the other (Kaufman 1997, Posen 1993, Lake and Rothchild 1996). A general lack of trust in the other's intentions, compels belligerents to pursue conflict through gradual escalation. The behaviour of each of the belligerents inhibits them from making conciliatory concessions, since each expects the other to exploit any conciliatory gesture.

Issues involving threats to culture, language, religion and territory are strong motivating factors for violence and internationalisation (Leatherman and Vayrynen 1996). Ethnic disputes, in particular, are prone to conflict over abstract values that serve as basic organizing principles for other political activity. Collective identities are thought to be conflict prone because they are derived from fundamental, incontrovertible and non-negotiable values such as language, territory, history and religion (Licklider 1995).

The argument that ethnic conflicts weaken state structures, leading to civil war is self evident. According to the Minorities at Risk Project at least twenty new states were experimenting with democratic institutions at the end of the Cold War. Much of the upsurge in internal ethnic conflict has occurred precisely in these states, and as a direct consequence of the fact that institutional change has opened up opportunities so that groups can more openly pursue their objectives. There are compelling reasons for concern over ethnic competition within states. In essence, the debate focuses on the relative importance of "bad environment" and "bad governance" as causes of internal conflict. One of the most difficult problems is recurrence. States that have come to the brink of failure before are more likely to fail again.

Power transition states are particularly susceptible to inter-elite competition and rivalries

and spillover effects. For example, under conditions of simultaneous economic and political change political parties are more likely to emerge along ethnic lines. This process of ethnic restructuring could lead elites to externalize internal conflict. Decision-making theories and theories about preference formation would argue that discrepancies between preferences are more likely to inhibit aggressive domestic policies. Alternative perspectives might argue that any risky strategy could mobilize a counter-elite (of a different ethnic group) or alternatively lead to an uncontrollable situation of "out-bidding." When social mobilisation is high and political participation is high but there is institutional incompleteness then the capacity for the state to manage the demands made upon it are diminished. Weakened regimes lack the political capacity to carry out reforms peacefully and will rely extensively on coercive means to bring about economic and political change.

Ethnic appeals to mobilize and rebel are derived from a blend of structural factors, (the relative size and location of ethnic groups) instrumental factors (the role of elites who have a vested interest in advancing particularist agendas) and normative determinants (an appreciation for institutionalised forms of conflict resolution as opposed to coercive measures).

An important consideration when weighing these contributing factors is the whether they impede or enhance the prospects for a negotiated solution. Consider the size and number of groups as a potential impediment to conflict settlement. It is not unrealistic for as many as five or more "multiple sovereignties" to be engaged in a conflict at any given time. In some instances these groups may be insurgent movements, representatives of legitimate political parties, factions within ethnic groups or clans, allied on some issues and divided on others.[1] For example, Brecher (1993: 164) and Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997) found that crises are more likely to escalate to violence when (a) three or more actors are involved and (b) they take place within a protracted conflict.

Third-party involvement in an ethnic conflict is likely to stimulate interest among more actors (and further complications) and the presence of an intermediary may signal that the events are unfolding within some larger process, such as a protracted conflict.

The fact that most internal conflicts involve both state and non-state actors adds even greater complexity to the mix. As Ryan has argued, non-state actors, such as ethnic minorities, lack the legal personality of states and therefore have difficulty relating to international norms and procedures that were designed exclusively for states. Beyond, mediation and fact finding, traditional diplomacy generally lacks mechanisms that give representatives of communal groups incentives to enter into internationally brokered negotiations and arrangements.[2]

The strategic attractiveness of violence is a third mitigating factor. In essence, the inherent problem in negotiating any internal conflict is the clear lack of enforcement of any solution and the lack of restraints on violence (Lund 1996). Commitment to a negotiated solution as opposed to continued violence is highly dependent on "agency." In ethnic disputes in particular, leaders must be convinced of a settlement's long term viability and they must also convince their followers of its merits.

Some recent evidence on internal conflicts indicates that groups generally resort to violence when they believe that the costs of holding out are relatively small or the costs of giving in are too high. There is an assumption that such strategies are a poor choice for any group to pursue. From the perspective of an ethnic militia leader, the long term gains from a dispute (such as territorial consolidation, enhancement of political power and increased ethnic homogeneity) can be dramatically improved if a conflict can be controlled within limits. On occasion, leaders may not even be interested in resolving a violent dispute. Since representing an ethnic group can provide

specific benefits (such as prestige and military power) leaders may be more interested in prolongation and future escalation. For example, in his assessment of civil war termination, Licklider found that instances of genocide towards a group generally increase after that group was defeated in an identity civil war. The problem, as Licklider has shown, is that despite the possibility of genocide, internal conflicts ending with a military victory are generally more stable than those that are negotiated (1995).[3]

Failed states occupy a special place in the pantheon of intransigence strategies. These are situations where each side is unwilling to compromise. Since, these quasi-states are incapable of providing basic control over political and economic space (Zartman 1995) they are prone to shifting power coalitions. Whenever the internal balance of power shifts, questions of control become preeminent. Mutually preferable settlements are unattainable because large well armed groups are aware that they can make greater gains by holding out (Grant 1997).[4] The mistrust that develops increases the advantage for weaker groups to pre-emptively attack (Hardin 1995, 143).[5]

A final impediment to peaceful termination is the inevitable power imbalance between groups. It is usually the weaker side who is least likely to be convinced of the virtues of a negotiated solution. Without some significant act of good faith from the stronger side, the weaker side is unlikely to commit to a negotiated solution. There are several reasons for this. First, getting to an agreed solution is a two step process consisting of a series of "nested political games". If a less powerful group is to agree voluntarily to abide by a dominant group's rules, its interests also must be assured, including safeguards that the more powerful group cannot exploit it. Indeed, it is the minority, distrustful of the interests of the majority, that ultimately determines the viability of any agreement between majority and minority. Unfortunately, the contractual agreements between

minority and majorities in many new states is so weak that minorities cannot be convinced that their interests are best served through accommodation (Lake and Rothchild 1996).

> Disunity and lack of cohesion within the ranks of the adversaries makes it difficult for the adversaries and the third party to engage in any meaningful form of conflict settlement, because the leader's lack the power or authority to take decisions or make concessions. Groups that are prone to this kind of defection lack either information that would signal the true intent of their adversaries or they lack a sufficient commitment from a third party who will credibly support their cause (Lake and Rothchild 1996).

Given the range of impediments to conflict termination, it would be reasonable to argue that internationalised internal conflicts do not end effortlessly. More specifically, ethnic conflicts, should be more difficult to resolve through peaceful formal negotiations than their non-ethnic counterparts.[6] This perspective does not have universal support in the literature. On the one hand, Licklider concludes that civil wars over political or economic issues are not distinct from ethnic disputes in their termination or intensity (Licklider 1995). On the other hand, Regan (1996), and Brecher & Wilkenfeld (1997) among others note that ethnic conflicts are more likely to be protracted and more intense. As Brecher and Wilkenfeld argue:

> Whatever value is at stake in a particular crisis, ethnic adversaries do not identify its outcome in decisive terms: regardless of the outcome, the underlying conflict remains...In this respect, as in many others, the impact of ethnicity is similar to that of protracted conflict. (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997: 172).

Given the dearth of data on how internal conflicts end, a reasonable assessment of their termination

should include consideration of how the belligerents perceive the termination of the conflict as well the form of that settlement. Measures of stable and long lasting outcomes are important for several reasons. Outcomes provide a reasonable indication of how "solid" a settlement is from the perspective of the belligerents. It tells us about the possibility of recurrence and the degree to which the conflict's underlying issues have been resolved. A decisive outcome is one in which the starting and end points are more autonomous. Crises are discrete and outcomes are clearer. Victory and defeat may be more readily identifiable and accepted as such (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997). Stable outcomes are those with definitive end points.

It is also important to measure an outcome by its content. More specifically, was the settlement formalised through negotiation? Did one party impose a unilateral solution? Did the third party impose a solution? Did the crisis simply fade away only to recur again? If the substance of an outcome tells us about the risks of re-escalation, the form of the outcome refers specifically to the way in which the conflict was terminated.

It is anticipated that outcomes of ethnic conflicts are generally ambiguous if not in form than in substance. This does not imply that formal negotiated outcomes are less likely to occur within ethnic conflict settings. It does mean that the belligerents are less likely to associate a formal settlement with full termination of the conflict. Ambiguous terminations, in substance, as opposed to form, are those resulting in indecisive results, like stalemate and compromise symbolizing an unresolved conflict. Subsequent crises and violence are anticipated by all adversaries. For a settlement to hold the outcomes of a conflict must be perceived by the opposing leaders as decisive. For peace to be durable, the participants must perceive that their agreement is capable of maintaining a stable environment. The problem is that if belligerents are asked to compromise too much (either in perception or in reality) they may hold back for a second round of confrontation.

. As a preliminary point of investigation into the termination of internal conflicts, it is anticipated that there are basic differences in both the form and substance of termination by conflict

type, such that:

H_1 Internal Ethnic Conflicts are more likely to:

a) result in fewer definitive outcomes;

b) result in fewer formal outcomes.

3. The Effectiveness of Third Parties

The title of this chapter is deceptive, given that its purpose is to assess the effectiveness of different types of third party strategies in terminating internal conflicts. Intervention is not just about mediating civil wars. So it is important to understand how pacific forms of third party intervention, mediation included, compare with other more coercive strategies.

In theory, the primary role of a third party is to prevent destructive conflict through a variety of non-coercive political channels and actions (Vayrynen and Leatherman 1996). This view is consistent with the principles of "preventive diplomacy" wherein the key strategic goal is the active participation of a third party to de-escalate an internal conflict before it becomes violent and to prevent the recurrence of such violence. Preventive diplomacy may prove less effective after hostilities have broken out and violence is widespread.

In reality, there is little agreement within the discipline on the strategies necessary for the termination of internal conflicts. Some critics have suggested that coercive and unilateral forms of intervention serve only to erode international norms of mutual restraint among states. Others, more provocatively, have argued that the quickest way to terminate an internal conflict with fewest casualties is to favour the stronger side in any conflict (more often than not the state-centre) (Regan 1996, Licklider 1995). Indeed, some ethnic conflicts produce unilateral intervention that appears to be motivated by internal struggles for power, while others appear to be driven by humanitarian concerns .

In sum, there is a significant conceptual and theoretical problem in identifying the independent effects of individual strategies. For the purposes of this investigation, third parties whether they are states or multilateral actors have an interest in stopping the killing, creating a stable environment in which peace can be nurtured and developing a durable framework for a lasting negotiated settlement. These strategies are designed to contain and reverse the spread of internal unrest. These strategies are not mutually exclusive. For example, in the post- Cold War era it is not uncommon for mediation to be complemented by peacekeeping and other peace support activities.[7]

Given the limited knowledge on the effectiveness of third parties, hypotheses are developed with respect to the **type of intervener, its range of techniques** and **its objectives**. Each is considered in turn.

The **type** of intervener refers to either an international organization or group of states on the one hand or an intermediary who is a representative of a state or an institution on the other. Third party interventions are not limited to international organizations. They may also include *ad hoc* coalitions of states, regional organizations, one or both of the superpowers and even neighbouring states. Unilateral and multilateral forms of intervention can take place contemporaneously.

The fundamental question of whether third party states or organizations are more effective in terminating internal conflicts is open to debate. The key question is whether either would want to absorb the high costs of implementing a broad range of strategies before a conflict becomes internationalised. There are several reasons to believe that a combination of state and organizational strategies would prove more effective in the termination of internationalised internal conflict.

In confronting an internal conflict security threat, Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter states that the UN should not intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. However, "the charter shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." That is, if a domestic conflict is construed as a threat to international peace and

security then the United Nations Security Council may sanction a mandate to intervene. However, sovereignty only confers a primary competence upon a nation; it is not, and never was, exclusive. This primary competence presumably would include whatever is essentially domestic, as opposed to what might affect another state. The latter entails situations where states lose their ability to regulate a conflict due to events that occur outside their control (like famine brought on by environmental change) or through spillover effects (such as refugee flows).

Faced with such challenges, third parties are likely to be extremely hesitant in engaging in costly strategies at the outset because they lack the sufficient "political will" and resources to fulfill their commitments.[8] Slow de-escalation of violent conflict may evolve as a result of exhaustion. However, quick terminations require the military backing and political support of the major powers. Third party interventions at this stage demand close coordination of military, diplomatic and non-governmental assets, a coordinated campaign plan and considerable resources to foster development, inter-communal interdependence and attitude change over a long time -- perhaps generations. Few states other than the major powers are capable of providing this long-term support.

Settlements also require the stamp of institutional legitimacy upon which long term measures depend. As Haas (1983) and Diehl (1996) have shown, in areas where their interests converge, states have generally provided strong support for the application of institutionalised forms of conflict management. In the absence of cooperation among states, institutions, especially the United Nations, have proved far less effective. The most notable aspect of Haas' analysis is UN ineffectiveness when "metaissues" (where state interests coalesce, eg. post-war decolonisation and self-determination in Asia and Africa) are absent.

Turning now to the **range of techniques,** it is important to point out that intervention does not refer simply to the physical presence of a "managing agent" intent on using coercion to dissuade belligerents from using force to solve their differences (Dixon 1996:358). Nor has intervention been confined to involvement by states or organizations through military means. Third party intervention

encompasses a broad range of techniques, although it is hard to find agreement on what these might be (Bercovitch 1996). For example, in his assessment of the United Nation's conflict management record, Esman (1995) defines intervention to include good offices, mediation, peacemaking, peacekeeping, protection of human rights, humanitarian assistance and stigmatization of rogue governments. Esman's typology is analytically useful but far too broad in scope for the comparison of effective strategies. For example, calls for condemnation by the General Assembly would fall under the rubric of intervention even though the UN need not take any follow-up action. Intervention into internal conflicts involves at least some level of active engagement and is not simply a passive response to an issue at hand.

In the context of internal conflicts, rare is the intervention where third parties have not relied on some form of coercive diplomacy to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table. It is extremely unusual for a single strategy to be implemented over the life of a civil war. Thus it is important to understand when coercive and non-coercive strategies of third party intervention are mutually complementary and when they are not.

In their evaluations of a range of cases, Regan (1996) Bercovitch (1996) Dixon (1996) Haas (1993) and Carment & James (1997b) conclude that, in any given conflict, third parties will generally employ as many different strategies as possible, including economic and military initiatives.[9] These findings suggest that intervention into internal conflicts encompasses both pacific and coercive strategies.[10] There is a clear dividing line between those strategies that require the show and use of force and those that do not (Ruggie 1994).

On the other hand, the appreciation for pacific but not necessarily impartial, forms of third party intervention is consistent with contingency approaches to conflict management. Fisher (1995) for example, draws a line between those strategies that are clearly pacific (such as conventional peacekeeping, track two diplomacy and consultation) and those that are not (such as peace enforcement). He argues that the choice of third party strategy is dependant on the nature of the

strategies with which it must interact, and therefore there is no single best approach. If we are to properly understand the role of third parties techniques in the ending of internal conflicts it is important to understand their relative effectiveness.

Dixon provides a fairly comprehensive typology of conflict management principles based on different types of disputes. These principles range from public appeals, communication, observation, physical intervention, pure mediation, humanitarian aid and adjudication. Dixon's typology is useful because of its comprehensiveness and for its important finding that pure mediation is the strategy most likely to succeed.[11] However the inclusion of humanitarian assistance as a form of conflict management is somewhat problematic given that there are only a handful of cases that fit cleanly into this category. Using a similar set of assumptions, Haas (1983) distinguishes between large and small third party interventions with conciliation, supervision, peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the former category and investigation, fact finding and pure mediation in the latter.

In their assessment of third party effectiveness to terminate internal conflicts, Regan (1996) Vayrynen (1996) Lund (1996) and (1996) argue that coalitional third parties will generally begin with lower cost non-coercive tactics such as mediation and condemnation. If those fail then the coalition may choose to escalate the intervention. Thus, intervention "progresses" in the following way: reassurance and preventive diplomacy; verbal appeals to not use force; inducements; deterrence; compellance and pre-emption. Ultimately actions taken early on in the life cycle of a conflict are positive strategies (persuasion and rewards) whereas later negative strategies are more coercive in nature.

It is useful to think of intervention to end internal conflicts as a continuum or "spectrum of techniques". Different third party techniques are set in motion at different points within a conflict (Lund 1996). At one end of the interventionist spectrum is pure mediation; the facilitation of a negotiated settlement through persuasion, control of information and identification of alternatives by a party who is perceived to be impartial.[12] Key elements in pacific forms of third party intervention,

such as mediation, are the nature and level of consent, and the level of coercion required to reach a settlement (Durch 1993).

> Mediation is a voluntary, ad hoc, non-coercive, flexible, usually secretive mechanism for reducing uncertainty and risks between adversaries and whenever possible in managing a conflict (Bercovitch and Regan 1997: 188).

Half-way up the spectrum is "mediation with muscle" or the deliberate and strategic use of rewards and punishments to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table.[13] Bercovitch for example, distinguishes between third party strategies such as communication, formulation and manipulation on the one hand and tactics that are a function of those strategies on the other. Zartman uses a similar approach; third party strategies fall under the categories of communication, facilitation, formulation and directive. All of these comprise the range of techniques by third parties short of the use of force.[14] Focussing specifically on destructive conflicts Bercovitch and Regan observe:

> in the context of a detrimental relationship between long-standing rivals, directive strategies will not only be more frequently resorted to, but also more positively associated with a settlement (1997: 192).

Finally, where consent is absent, violence is widespread and groups are at risk, force comes into play. Under such conditions, third parties are likely to be required to take on a multiplicity of functions, including peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and possibly peace enforcement. Missions that involve goals clearly beyond those of traditional peacekeeping, such as seeking to neutralize local forces and push belligerent parties towards the negotiating table, require different strategies and tactics. Using force entails a different kind of bargaining strategy with hostile militias.[15] Such strategies are suited to relatively narrow time frames within each phase of a conflict (Lund 1996). The receiving end needs to reflect on the action being undertaken and the costs associated with challenging that action.[16] A belligerent's decision to resort to violence during the onset phase (that is, before intervention takes place) varies from the slightly different set of decisions

likely to be made by the belligerent once an intervention takes place and during the peak or crisis phase of a conflict.

Zartman argues that third parties can, in theory, induce negotiated settlements through the creation of hurting stalemates. With the prospect that one party might be eliminated (or at least have its power sufficiently reduced) by a third party, belligerents might be more open to a negotiated solution. Third parties can speed up the movement toward a settlement through the imposition of deadlines and other crisis-related strategies in order to decrease the perceived attractiveness of military options. Thus, the emergence of a resolving formula follows on a readjustment of the belligerents power relations and the elimination of alternative strategies through concerted effort by third parties.

Presumably, under such circumstances third party success would be expected if intervention takes place after the belligerents have reached a hurting stalemate and not before. More specifically there should be a relationship between de-escalation, the point at which ripeness appears imminent, and more definitive outcomes. makes a similar but qualified point when he argues that in some cases the failure of peace accords to 'stick" is due to a lack of "ripeness" (1996). The settlement task is made easier, argues, if the groups have reached their own self-imposed "hurting stalemate". Absent a hurting stalemate and the tasks of the third party are simplified but less likely to prove fruitful. If no ripe moment exists then the purpose of the intervention can only be to separate the combatants.[17]

On an abstract level, the **objectives** of the third party intervention are very complex, ranging from the strengthening of international norms (Vayrynen 1997, 1996) and reducing and eliminating armed violence (Licklider 1995) to the pursuit of larger geostrategic goals (Heraclides 1991). On the one hand, Regan (1996a: 17) makes a compelling case for the cessation of violence as an appropriate indication of success or failure. Stopping the violence usually is a key motivating factor for most interveners; decisions to intervene are often based on some perceived political need for immediate

results. Most declarations and public statements tend to focus on stopping the violence, so we can assume that this is a common goal; and the cessation of hostilities is usually required in order to:

> initiate meaningful dialogue in an effort to resolve the dispute...t]he key to any intervention strategy is to alter the calculations by which the antagonists arrive at particular outcomes...[t]he goal is to make it too costly for the combatants to continue fighting" (Regan 1996: 341).

On the other hand, it is important to measure the effectiveness of third parties in formally settling a conflict. Both decisiveness and formality are important indicators of effective conflict termination. Given the tentative and preliminary nature of this investigation, third party effectiveness is measured by the type of intervention (understood here as pacific, non pacific or a combination of both); the kind of intervener (ranging from IO to states) and; by the phases of the crisis (ranging from onset to de-escalation). The following hypotheses are offered:

H_2 Third parties are more likely to achieve definitive outcomes when there is:

a) a combination of pacific and nonpacific third party techniques;

b) a combination of state and IO involvement;

c) a de-escalation of the conflict.

H_3 Third parties are more likely to achieve formal outcomes when there is:

a) a combination of pacific and nonpacific third party techniques;

b) a combination of state and IO involvement;

c) a de-escalation of the conflict.

4. Gathering the Evidence and Measuring Effectiveness

This assessment of third party effectiveness uses actor level data from the International Crisis Behaviour project for the period 1945-1994. There are several reasons for using crisis data. The data

are very good for assessing the proposed relationships because they provide a range of internationalised internal conflicts as well as dependent and control variables far in excess of data that focus exclusively on war. Although crises are by definition conflicts, not all conflicts necessarily lead to war. Indeed, many crises are managed successfully without recourse to violence. Therefore the data capture a broad range of behaviour, including that which falls short of war, but nevertheless reveal a significant level of conflict.

The crisis data focus specifically on both interstate and intrastate conflicts which have produced an international crisis. Similar to Vayrynen's definition of external riskiness noted above, ICB defines an international crisis as a disruption in process and a challenge in the structure of the international system. Cases which have yet to produce an international crisis are not included. Many prominent domestic conflicts are by definition excluded (Northern Ireland and Quebec separatism for example).

Each case must fulfil the definition of a foreign policy crisis. A foreign policy crisis is defined as:

> A situation with three individually and collectively sufficient conditions, deriving from changes in a state's internal or external environment. All three perceptions are held by the highest-level decision-makers of the actor concerned: a threat to basic values, awareness of finite time for response to the value threat and a high probability of involvement in military hostilities (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1988).

A two-stage content analysis for each crisis was carried out to distinguish internal conflicts from interstate conflicts. In Crises, Conflict and Instability Michael Brecher and Patrick James have argued that internal conflicts are defined by political, economic and social upheavals at the domestic level. In other cases "external crises have fuelled the fires of internal disruption" (1988:91). A

conflict was deemed internal if: a) it involved a single crisis actor and the trigger to the conflict came from within that state or; b) it involved multiple crisis actors and the trigger to the conflict came from a single state. Of the 630 actor levels crises roughly 1/3 or 220 crises were coded as internal conflicts for the period 1945-1994.

Each crisis was then coded on the basis of whether ethnicity was deemed to be a salient factor in the conflict. For the purposes of this paper ethnic conflicts were identified as one of three kinds, secessionist, distributional or irredentist. A secessionist conflict is the formal and informal aspects of political alienation in which one or more ethnic groups seek a reduction of control or autonomy from a central authority. A distributional conflict is one where a group or groups seek redistribution of resources through political and military means. Such conflicts may or may not involve (1) the use of force and (2) politically mobilized, well organized, ethnic insurgency movements. An irredentist conflict is one which triggers a foreign policy crisis for a through an internal challenge supported by the redeeming state.

The non-ethnic conflict category consists of both political and ideological wars. There is some consistency in recent research to justify this separate category. For example, Licklider (1995) equates all internal conflicts with civil wars and includes in that category both identity civil wars and political/economic wars. Similarly Regan (1996) using three categories separates religious wars from ethnic wars and ideological wars. Of course some ideological conflicts carry with them a heavy ethnic component and similarly not all ethnic conflicts are always about differences in identity.

For the purposes of this paper political and ideological conflicts are those where groups refuse to recognize the existing political authorities, which can trigger a foreign policy crisis for the state in question. The result is an internal challenge leading to potential conflict, crisis and war. Of the cases,

slightly less than half (98) were identified as political or ideological internal conflicts with the remainder being ethnic conflicts.

There are two dependent variables used to explain how a conflict terminated. Termination represents a decline in the intensity of threat perception and hostility and is measured by the type of outcome in substance and form. The form of the outcome is measured in four ways - formal agreements, unilateral acts, an other category which includes imposed solutions and tacit understandings and faded (no formal agreement or recognized termination point). The substance of the outcome refers to either ambiguous or decisive terminations (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).

In the most optimistic of scenarios the substance of conflict termination is understood as the extent to which violence has subsided as indicated by the acceptance of a "Peace Accord" and by the return to stable and peaceful relations among belligerents (1996, Licklider 1995). Recognizing that there is never a guarantee against recurrence most analysts ascribe a certain minium period in which hostilities have ended in order to determine whether a peace has been restored. For most analysts, success or failure is equated with a lasting outcome. A power sharing agreement in combination with an absence of hostilities over a five year period is thought to be a good indicator of effective termination (Licklider 1995).

The type of third party intervener was identified as either an intermediary state or an international organization which actively participated in the management of the crisis. A category, accounting for both states and IOs, was created to account for those cases in which both types of interveners were involved in the management and termination of the conflict. As part of the testing, each crisis management strategy was assessed for its content and dichotomized by pacific and non-pacific strategies.[18]

In order to assess the timing of a crisis, 3 distinct phases for each crisis were identified. Each crisis is measured by its duration from onset to termination. The first twenty per cent of the crisis period from onset to peak point was allocated to an escalation phase, 60% to the middle or peak period phase and 20% to the de-escalation period.

The results from testing are provided in Tables, 1, 2 and 3.

Hypothesis 1 tests for differences in outcome by type of conflict, the results of which are reported in Table 1. The results provide tentative support for H_{1a} with respect to the substance of outcomes in internal conflicts. Slightly more than 57% of the political/ideological conflicts resulted in definitive outcomes. Slightly less than half (46.6%) of all ethnic conflicts, on the other hand, resulted in outcomes that could be called definitive. This makes intuitive sense, since many ethnic conflicts are protracted disputes encompassing more than one crisis. For these preliminary runs I rely on **gamma** and **tau** statistics, both commonly used inferential statistics for ordinal variables. The gamma statistic is strong implying that the "type of conflict" is related to outcome, although the numbers are more impressive for substance than form. Gamma measures the proportion (percentage) of errors we can reduce when predicting values on the dependent variable, given information on the independent variable. A gamma of .208 means we can reduce about 20% of the error when predicting values on the dependent variable. In the context of this study, for example, a Gamma of 1.00 (or -1.00) means we would always be correct when predicting outcomes in a crisis if the type of conflict was known.

Turning to H_{1b} the results, as reported in Table 1, are clearly counter-intuitive. It had been anticipated that ethnic conflicts would involve fewer negotiated outcomes. The results show that a relatively large (55.2%) number of ethnic conflicts were terminated in a formal agreement as compared to political or ideological disputes (37.1%). (The original tables - not shown here- from

which the data for these graphs were taken, indicate that were a greater number of political/ideological disputes resulting in unilateral acts than there were ethnic disputes resulting in unilateral acts (almost 20% more)).

On the one hand, the number of conflicts resulting in formal agreements is inconsistent with Licklider's results. He found that ethnic conflicts and political/economic wars are equally likely to end in a negotiated settlement. On the other hand, the differences in the number of definitive outcomes is consistent with Licklider's results. He found ethnic conflict settlements are less stable. We can conclude from these mixed results, again consistent with Licklider, that although ethnic conflicts are more likely to end in a negotiated settlement they are also more likely to be unstable outcomes. In so far as negotiated outcomes involve a combination of power-balancing, political tradeoffs and compromise this conclusion make makes intuitive sense: parties to a conflict that are not eliminated through unilateral solutions are more likely to challenge again. However, I did not, at this stage, examine in detail the differences between those negotiated ethnic conflicts that ended in renewed conflict and those unilateral conflicts that did, but it seems reasonable to assume that ethnic conflicts that are formally terminated are no more likely to be single crises.

Insert Table 1 Here

Table 2 reports the results in testing Hypothesis 2a. The general hypothesis is concerned with identifying those factors that result in definitive outcomes (regardless of conflict type). It was argued that more definitive outcomes should be associated with combinations of pacific and coercive strategies, mixed state/IO interventions and points after which the crisis has "ripened" and

approaching termination.

Table 2 indicates that definitive outcomes are more likely when pacific strategies are applied, a result that is not unappealing, but nevertheless inconsistent with H_{2a}. It is important to note, however that violent third party techniques are least likely to result in definitive outcomes. Only 44% of those cases where violent third party techniques were applied, resulted in definitive outcomes as compared to 68% under pacific techniques.

For H_{2b} the results, reported in Table 3, are surprisingly strong. Definitive outcomes occur in more than 75% of the cases in which both states and IOs are involved as managers. This number compares to 45% of cases where either a state or an IO intervened alone and 59% of cases where no third party was present.

Table 4 reports the results for testing $H_{2c.}$ The argument that third parties are more likely to achieve definitive outcomes at the de-escalation phase is supported. Definitive outcomes (more than 60% of these cases) are most clearly associated with the latter stages of a conflict.

Insert Tables 2, 3 and 4 Here

Tables 5, 6 and 7 present the results for testing General Hypothesis 3. Here the concern is identifying those factors associated with formal third party assisted negotiated outcomes. Some of the results are counter to those hypothesised.

Tables 5, 6 and 7 provide a break down of the form of outcome by technique, type of intervener and phase, respectively. The findings reported in Table 5 provide mild support for H_{3a}. Formal agreements are more likely when a combination of pacific and non-pacific techniques are

attempted. Violent strategies appear to fare somewhat better than pacific strategies. Overall third party techniques appear to have an average success rate of about 50%.

Table 6 reports the results for H_{3b}. Formal agreements in the termination of internal conflicts are more likely to arise as the result of either state or IO involvement but not both. Over 50% of crises involving either states or IOs resulted in formal agreements, 17% of those cases in which no third party was involved resulted in a formal agreement and 35% of those in which both states and IOs were both involved led to formal agreement.

There are many intervening factors which could account for the findings reported in Table 6. One possibility is that the type of conflict is having a confounding effect on the original relationship. It would be worthwhile in the future to examine the effects of ethnic conflict on third party intervention. A second possibility is that when states (and also IOs) are engaged independently of one another, they may have greater latitude in preventing the imposition of unilateral solutions by the stronger on the weaker. This relationship may be strongest in those ethnic conflicts where third parties intervene not only to mediate but to prevent the destruction of their ethnic brethren (India in Bangladesh or Sri Lanka for example). While these results are clearly mixed, it is clear that formal outcomes are more likely under the direction of third party intervention than when the disputants are left to negotiate on their own. Indeed unilateral solutions are most likely when no third party is present; which suggests that regardless of type, third parties do have a moderating and positive influence on the outcome.

The results in Table 7 (H_{3c}) show that when a third party is present, more formal agreements arise at the escalation stage and at the peak points of a crisis (51.5% and 54.2% respectively). This finding in itself is a little surprising. It had been anticipated that formal agreements would come about only after the belligerents had reached a hurting stalemate which presumably would come in the latter

stages of a conflict. Since hurting stalemates are by definition those situations where neither party is capable of imposing a unilateral solution, the fact that so many unilateral solutions (74.1%) come at the latter stages of a crisis is important. It may mean, as Licklider points out, that even after the parties are exhausted, at least one belligerent is capable of imposing its will regardless of the third party's best intentions.

In surveying these results, it important to consider varying levels of intensity among the crises examined. Not all of the conflicts in this analysis are violent nor are all equivalent to civil wars with a threshold of 1,000 battlefield fatalities. Many crises are resolved amicably and diffused at an early stage without recourse to violence. Taken together these and other threats to validity suggest that more research and testing of a more complete set of interactions between type of conflict, the type of intervener, the timing and the outcome is required.

A final observation on these findings relates to the differences between how a crisis termination is perceived in substance and in form. Third parties may be effective in reaching formal agreements but this furnishes no guarantee that the parties to a conflict will perceive that settlement as definitive. Nor does third party involvement furnish any guarantee against recurrence.

Insert Table 5,6, 7 Here

5. Conclusions and Directions for Further Research

Given the presumption that internal conflicts are inherently difficult to bring to an end, policymakers have been led to re-examine the various international instruments at their disposal. This re-examination culminated in the consensus - most clearly expressed in the 1992 document Agenda

for Peace - that a forward looking proactive approach would ensure that internal conflicts would be prevented from becoming violent. In the simplest of terms it was argued that with sufficient and accurate forewarning, many internal conflicts could be ameliorated and transformed into more peaceful forms of constructive behaviour before they became unmanageable.

Until such policies are widely integrated into the foreign policies of influential states, it will fall on their shoulders to intervene and pick up the pieces after conflicts become violent. Thus far, the biggest impediment in strengthening the peaceful winding down of conflicts is a basic incongruity in today's international system. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War has made the possibility of the peaceful management of disputes seem more realistic. On the other hand, there has been a decided shift in conflict management approaches away from sponsoring proxy wars and toward the accommodation of contending interests. This approach has ramifications for the peaceful management of internal conflicts in three ways.

First, if the results from this research are taken at face value, it may not always be in the best interests of third parties to pursue formal agreements between belligerents. At a minimum, formal agreements do not signal the end of a conflict. In particular ethnic conflicts ending in formal agreements are prone to recurrence. While there are important reasons to believe that compromise is good, it may also lead to unresolved issues and renewed tensions. States and international organizations may have to be more discriminating about the sites and types of intervention they choose. Perhaps effectiveness should be defined not as resolution of conflict per se, but instead as the cessation of violence and the initiation of a very long process whereby adversaries can address underlying sources of hostility.

Second, while the United Nations continues to be the dispute resolution mechanism of choice

within the international community, the amount of conflict in today's world is simply too much but for the military forces of a few states to effectively manage. The results of this paper suggest that states are as well equipped to wind down internal conflicts as are their institutional counterparts. A combination of pacific and non pacific strategies by IOs and states may also be more effective.

Finally, can we assume that it is in the interests of a third party to intervene early, in order to obtain a negotiated settlement and to prevent unilateral action by an aggressor? Several alternatives should be considered before answering this question. Although more conflict terminations in this analysis may result in formal agreements at the early stages of a crisis it must be kept in mind that these agreements are rarely perceived as "definitive." More ethnic disputes resulted in formal outcomes than did their non-ethnic counterparts but their outcomes were also decidedly ambiguous. Thus while there is a greater chance for formal settlements within the early stages of a conflict there is also a greater chance of their recurrence even if a third party is present. If Licklider is correct in assuming that identity-based negotiated settlements are more likely to result in future conflict (1995:687) then there is a basic dilemma for third parties. Early intervention may result in formal agreements but these are not all likely to "stick". On the other hand, late interventions may result in unilateral solutions with the attendant dangers of genocide, state failure, refugee flows and ethnic cleansing.

Table 1

Type of Conflict:	Number of Crises	*Percentage of Crises Resulting in:* Definitive Outcomes	Negotiated
Ethnic	118	47	55
Political/Ideological	98	57	37

Measures of Statistical Association:

Somer's D	0.10491
Gamma	0.20863
Tau-b	0.10491

Table 2

Crisis Management Technique:	Number of Crises	*Substance of Outcome:* Definitive	Ambiguous
Pacific	59	68	32
Mixed	19	58	42
Violent Military	141	44	56

Measures of Statistical Association:

Somer's D	0.20306
Gamma	0.39515
Tau-b	0.20306

Table 3

Third Party Intervener:	*Number of Crises*	***Substance of Crisis Outcome:*** Definitive	Ambiguous
Both States & IOs	29	76	24
Either States or IOs	148	45	55
No Third Party	39	59	41

Measures of Statistical Association:

Somer's D	0.06153
Gamma	0.12288
Tau-b	0.06154

Table 4

Crisis Phase:	***Number of Crises***	***Substance of Outcome:*** Definitive	Ambiguous
Onset	135	53	47
Middle	49	41	59.
Deescalation	28	61	39

Measures of Statistical Association:

Somer's D	-0.02401
Gamma	-0.04659
Tau-b	-0.02401

Table 5

Third Party	*Number*	*Form of Outcome:*			
Technique:	***of Crises***	**Agreement**	**Unilateral Act**	**Other**	**Faded**
Pacific	54	44.4	46.3	7.4	1.9
Mixed	19	52.6	36.8	5.3	5.3
Violent Military	140	47.1	41.4	7.1	4.3

Measures of Statistical Association:

Somer's D	-0.00065
Gamma	-0.00120
Tau-b	-0.00065

Table 6

Type of	*Number*	*Form of Outcome:*			
Third Party:	***of Crises***	**Agreement**	**Unilateral Act**	**Other**	**Faded**
Both States & IOs	29	34.5	62.1	0.0	3.4
Either States or IOs	148	56.8	32.4	8.1	2.7
No Third Party	36	16.7	66.7	8.3	8.3

Measures of Statistical Association:

Somer's D	0.13273
Gamma	0.23724
Tau-b	0.13365

Table 7

	Number	*Form of Outcome:*			
Crisis Phase:	***of Crises***	**Agreement**	**Unilateral Act**	**Other**	**Faded**
Onset	134	51.5	38.1	6.0	4.5
Middle	48	54.2	37.5	8.3	0.0
Deescalation	27	11.1	74.1	11.1	3.7

Measures of Statistical Association:

Somer's D	0.13876
Gamma	0.24438
Tau-b	0.13906

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Notes

1. Consider that during Sri Lanka's civil war no less than six insurgent movements were engaged in war with each other and the Sri Lankan state. In Somalia, 15 clan groups were engaged in the negotiation process with UN representative Sahnoun.

3 To understand this argument it is useful to identify those principles which have traditionally guided peacekeeping operations in the past. These are principles which have determined classical UN Charter Chapter VI operations including, impartiality, consent and the use of force only for self defence. Diehl, James and Roberts find that the application of these standards is most effective in the management of disputes between member states of the international system.

3. The dilemma for the third party in this situation is, as Regan has demonstrated, whether to quickly terminate a conflict by favouring the stronger side or to protect the weaker side but also potentially prolong the conflict in doing so?.

4. Some internal conflicts tend to be less protracted than conventional interstate wars precisely because they are more likely to end in a military victory by one side (Licklider 1995)

5. The inability of groups to uphold or negotiate ethnic "contracts" that would prevent a costly fight is higher when there is no external guarantor of security arrangements (Lake and Rothchild 1995). Under these circumstances, efforts to manage the conflict shift from the domestic to the international environment.

6. Dixon argues that interstate conflicts over territory are more amenable to resolution than internal conflicts over territory because there are legitimate international norms, rules and procedures for managing differences between states but not between states and secessionist or irredentist movements (Dixon 1996).

7. For example, consider that during the life cycle of the Bosnian conflict third party strategies included mediation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, observation and adjudication.

8. Adelman and Suhrke have suggested that one of the greatest problems in UN intervention is policy incoherence (Adelman and Suhrke 1996). Adelman suggests that within multilateral situations "...assignation of roles encourages waffling because a decision must be made and responsibilities accepted" (Adelman 1996: 34). The commensurate bureaucratic pulling and hauling within and between institutions stifles immediate response and leads to ambiguous half-measures.

9. Regan's typology provides insight into the impact that the status of the intervener and the party against whom action is directed have on successful outcomes. He concludes that mixed strategies by powerful interveners on behalf of a government are more likely to lead to a cessation of hostilities.

10. At crisis onset, several traits distinguish the strategy of the third party intervener. A third party coalition intervenes against a protagonist on behalf of either a group or a state-centre in order to suppress the internal challenge (Regan 1996). There are three possible strategies available: a) forceful intervention, b) efforts at mediation coupled with a low intensity conventional peacekeeping mission and; c) withdrawal. Each strategy involves risk. Doing nothing may precipitate undesirable outcomes as noted above in the Rwanda case. Forceful intervention may lead to further escalation and unnecessary costs for the intervener. Finally, low intensity missions may not only produce undesirable results for the third party but may also lead to further gains for the belligerent. In this instance the intervener may be better off by not getting involved at all (Diehl et. al. 1996).

11. There may be an important selection effect here in so far as some states may be more predisposed to certain techniques than others. See Raymond, (1994).

12. The term impartiality implies that the third party is acting in the interests of all of the parties. Where pure mediation may imply the absence of bias toward the interests of the parties it does not mean that the mediator is neutral or indifferent to outcome. Presumably mediators have an interest in seeing that a violent conflict end as quickly as possible.

13. In principle, any attempt to alter or disrupt the internal affairs of a state constitutes a form of intervention. It includes the calculated use of political, economic and military instruments by an external actor to influence the domestic and foreign policies of another country. It is also possible to have both multilateral and unilateral intervention occur within the same theatre of conflict. Bosnia illustrates this point with Serbian and Croatian intervention being unilateral, and UN and NATO intervention being multilateral.

14. The decision to pursue these goals through military escalation imposes costs on both the belligerents and third party coalitions. The escalating actor suffers the costs associated with expending resources and risking lives, whereas the receiving actor suffers the costs of lost territory and lives and also a reduced chances of obtaining specific benefits at the bargaining table (Carment & Rowlands 1997). According to Carment and Rowlands : the central problem for a third party in managing intrastate conflicts [is that] the benefit of a negotiated outcome decreases for both actors when one of them decides to escalate). The further apart the two sides are on a negotiated settlement, the higher the costs associated with disagreement (or the higher the value of a negotiated settlement).

15. Bargaining denotes an interdependent decision making process wherein each party acts to get the most for itself in a situation which depends on the choices of the other actors. Negotiation on the other hand refers to a joint decision making process.

16. Third party coalitions usually begin the bargaining process by articulating proposals for a negotiated solution coinciding with a low intensity mission. This proposal can be either accepted or rejected by the belligerent. This initial action requires no force on the part of the third party coalition. If one side accepts the terms for agreement, then both sides receive the benefits they associate with the

proposed outcome. If an offer is rejected, then the bargaining process continues and neither player receives any benefits until one of the sides concedes to a demand. The problem facing both actors is to provide the opponent with an incentive to make concessions with limited costs to themselves. In general, the negotiation process is begun by one or both actors to reconcile their positions over some issue in dispute. In the case of intrastate conflicts these consist of: a) control over territory; b) power sharing arrangements and: c) a ceasefire (Regan 1996. Diehl et. al. 1996).

17. Others following on Zartman's insight on the use of third parties as power balancers include Lake and Rothchild (1995), Fearon (1995) and Ruggie (1994). At this stage intervention requires territorial demarcation as well as some minimal agreement between enemies. Getting to the stage of a "hurting stalemate", however, requires third parties to wait on the sidelines of a conflict and endure the associated political and economic costs and risks (Carment & Rowlands 1997).

18. International organizations were included with regional organizations. For organizations these include: a) discussion without resolution; b) resolution without action; c) resolution with authorized members active and d) general assembly discussion only. a) fact finding mission; b) good offices resolution; c) mediation; d) sanctions; e) observer force; f) emergency military force. For third party states these include: negotiation, adjudication, mediation, multiple including violence, nonmilitary pressure, non-violent military pressure and violence only.