Following Through on the Promise and Performance of Conflict Prevention: Toward an Action Plan

A CIFP Contribution to the Country Preventive
Action Project (CPAP): Creating a "Watch List"

FINAL REPORT April 2004

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A. Project Goals

The goal of the project was to identify 3 countries at risk of violent armed conflict in the next 1-3 years in order for an appropriate intervention to be developed. This included:

1. A preliminary selection which identified 10 countries that are not yet at a level of significant violent conflict but which exhibit many of the indicators of potential serious violent conflict both in the immediate and medium term (2-3 years);

2. A second-stage selection that identified 3 countries in which it was determined that a third party conflict prevention response is appropriate. This second stage analysis used criteria for determining the *viability* of preventing the outbreak of violent conflict in countries specified in the preliminary selection round.

B. Process

1. Initial Identification Process:
The CIFP team met several times over the past five weeks, first to identify the 30 countries that are not yet at a level of significant violent conflict but which exhibit many of the indicators of potential serious violent conflict both in the immediate and medium term and were thus suitable to include in the short list. There were four people working with 8 separate sources each to compile individual lists of countries. The group amassed an initial collection of well over several hundred sources of risk assessment information (some political, some economic, some issue specific). There is an excess of 2000 databases with partial statistical data that were also reviewed (see appended examples. As well, a cross section of our sources is identified at the end of the report.)

The researchers worked independently of one another and created their own short lists before comparing notes in order to build in some reliability of measurement. In addition, the principal investigator and a co-investigator each developed a list based own their knowledge and expertise. The group together then identified 30 possible countries which appeared on multiple assessment lists. They are (in alphabetical order as opposed to any kind of ranking system):

- Angola
- Bolivia
- Colombia
- Equatorial Guinea
- Georgia
- Guinea-Bissau
- Guatemala
- Guyana
- Indonesia
- Iran
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Macedonia
- Myanmar

- Nepal
- Pakistan
- Papua New Guinea
- Philippines
- Saudi Arabia
- Somalia
- Solomon Islands
- Sri Lanka
- Sudan
- Swaziland
- Taiwan
- Tibet
- Turkmenistan
- Turkey
- Uganda
- Uzbekistan
- Venezuela
- Yemen
- Zimbabwe

At this stage no effort was made to distinguish between cases that would be amenable to outside preventive efforts and those that would not (e.g. Nepal vs Myanmar) nor did we distinguish between cases that were already receiving significant attention and those that were not (e.g. Macedonia vs Uganda). Finally we recognized that although some cases are "in the midst of violence", they warranted inclusion because the risk was likely to worsen in the next few years (e.g. Somalia). All 30 cases were selected because they appeared on multiple lists.

2. From 30 to 10:
The selection of 10 cases required that the CIFP team integrate findings from methodologically dissimilar risk assessment procedures, projects, frameworks and models. The assumption is that there are two kinds of reporting mechanisms currently available: risk assessment reports which precede and serve as a foundation for subsequent early-warning reports and early-warning reports which integrate the various data sources and analytical methods drawing on dynamic patterns of behaviour and local events. The former are risk assessment reports in the most general sense in that they do not provide a level of specificity required for precise policy response and early action. They cover for example:

- The Potential for State Failure; [1]
- Increasing Gross Human Rights Violations;
- Increasing Militarization;
- Regional Conflict Developments;
- Refugee Flows and Instability;
- History of Armed Conflict;
- Increased Economic or Environmental Stress;
- Health Epidemics;
- Globalization.

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[1] For a more comprehensive comparative analysis see Carment, D. "Assessing State Failure: Implications for Theory and Policy" in *Third World Quarterly* (June 2003).

From this list of 30, the CIFP team then selected 10 countries on the basis of consensus using the criteria proposed by the project itself: which countries were not already receiving substantial outside help or would likely receive significant attention if the situation unravelled for geo-political or economic reasons. For example, Pakistan was not short-listed because of American interests within the country and the region. Turkey was removed because of both NATO and EU engagement. Georgia recently held democratic elections and a reform minded President was elected. Those countries which were already in the midst of violence were also removed from the list (i.e. Sudan, Uganda) those countries where the potential for conflict was strong remained on the list. Based on this criteria, the 10 countries identified are (in alphabetical order):

- Bolivia
- (Equatorial Guinea – included because it required more information before it could be removed or retained)
- Guinea-Bissau
- Guyana
- Papua New Guinea
- Uzbekistan
- Venezuela
- Turkmenistan
- Yemen
- Zimbabwe

3. From 10 to 3:

At this point the group then moved to Stage Two of the methodology in order to identify countries in which a third party conflict prevention response would be appropriate. This second stage analysis used criteria for determining the viability of preventing the outbreak of violent conflict in countries specified in the preliminary selection round and drew on the most recent information available to narrow the list to 3 countries. This additional information ranged from specific events-based projects like FAST as well as other events sources such as Reuters, CNN as well as indigenous news sources.

The purpose was to generate greater specificity about when and how the country in question is likely to evolve into violence within the next 1-3 years. The group looked for key patterns of increasing organized violence, as well upcoming events that could serve as proximate causes of violence – i.e. elections, as well as the absence or presence of third party efforts to ameliorate/reduce tensions (such as fundamental aid to preventive diplomacy). The amount of research conducted and additional information collected were substantial. For example, upon further investigation it was determined that the likelihood of Bolivia erupting into violence over the next 1-3 years was less than Zimbabwe because of recent elections and because there were a lack of triggering factors that would see the violence move from the capital into the countryside. However, Zimbabwe was also removed from the list because of South African engagement in the country as the regional power.

Factors relating to the viability of conflict prevention such as the presence of locally engaged civil society as well as the presence of outside efforts such as UNDP or World Bank poverty reduction programmes became critical in determining the final 3

countries. In the end, it came down to a matter of expert opinion as interpretation of the information and research presented was required. The final 3 countries chosen are (in alphabetical order):

1. Guinea Bissau
2. Guyana
3. Papa New Guinea

The reasons for choosing these countries will be detailed in the findings section of the report.

As well, the countries listed below were slightly below the threshold for inclusion in our estimation but are included in order to provide an alternative to the top-tier countries (if for example there are problems in implementing conflict prevention responses in any of the 3 countries). These second-tier countries are (in alphabetical order):

1. Equatorial Guinea
2. Uzbekistan
3. Yemen

Information on these 3 countries is also included in the findings section of the report.

C. Methodology

The project acknowledges that many modern conflicts, even if they are inter-state, take place within the territory of only one state. If Canada and the United States were at the precipice of a conflict, would both states be on the list? Just the one in which life is expected to be most dangerous? Or would it be described as 'the Canada-US conflict' like Rwanda-Burundi was at its early stages?   Should the list be geographically representative or based purely on danger level in each place? Is the danger level to be measured per person, for military personnel, for civilians? Does violence have to be mortal? All of these questions were asked in order to determine the most salient list possible. Therefore, we decided the following: the states on the list would be all individual states, not geographically represented, in which any citizens, military or otherwise, were mathematically the most likely to be killed by organized acts of intentional violence. Although this determination was not based on any empirical methodology, we felt it captured the essence of what the project hopes to achieve.

It should be noted that there are certain countries that, using only our impressions and speculation, we might expect would populate this list. We know, for example that India and Pakistan are perpetually threatening one another with nuclear (and mutual) annihilation, but are those countries already involved in active, low-grade sectarian and territorial conflict? Conversely, we know that though it is heavily armed, brutally poor and has deep inequality, North Korea is unlikely to either attack or be attacked by any country in the world.

No simple measure/indicator will describe this list of conflict-prone countries. Military spending by dollar is both heavily weighted towards OECD states and is proven not to be a measure of conflict-proneness. Straightforward inequality indices

or proportion of GNP to military spending are not robust enough and represent conflict systems as far too static and one-dimensional.

Our approach was to impose a "meta-filter" in which we combined several organizations' and researchers' existing systems. We looked to organizations such as Project Ploughshares, FEWER, INCORE, International Crisis Group, etc. Knowing that it would be unlikely that these organizations would pick the same criteria and proscribe the same limitations as this exercise required, we therefore planned to accommodate those factors. One of the advantages of this system is that the more measures that were incorporated the more the individual propensities and inclinations of the developers would be muted down by the average. Gathering the top-10 lists of all groups and compiling a list would, in all likelihood, result in a master list of around 25 to 30 countries as predicted. It would be no great task to then extract the countries that did not meet the final requirements (not in active or imminent conflict, etc.) and measure out the 10 most-measured and ranked dangerous countries. The rationalization and justification of any list is subject to great amounts of criticism and debate and success is, unfortunately, told only when a country becomes dangerous.

1. Strengths of the methodology:

The CIFP team had a relatively tight deadline to work with. Yet we were able to create a short list that was methodologically sound and analytically rigorous. The process and outcome are testament to the ability to work successfully within and beyond the CIFP risk assessment framework in order to identify the most suitable countries in which to engage in conflict prevention activities (see appendix A).

The process was aided by several factors. They include the fact that there is a wealth of open source information on the internet through which to gather timely information. The information collected was then fed through several checks and balances (devil's advocate, cross referencing of information and multiple sources) which helped ensure the accuracy of the lists. First, the material gathered and the research assembled was combined with expert opinion (based within the limits of the team assembled by CIFP). Data-base "fact-finding" and expert opinion were complementary in nature and fed into each other in such a way as to guarantee fruitful searches rather than wasting a lot of time following up on dead ends.

There was also a complementarity of sources which helped the team "burrow down" for a more rigorous analysis of events and structure. For example, we used databases such as HIIC and CIFP to find a target country which appeared to have an historical propensity for violence. We then used a current-events based source such as CNN, Reuters and Alert Net to confirm the relevancy of the target.

Our sources were cross-checked against detailed country reports such as the UNDP's Common Country Assessments (CCA) which were very helpful in determining opportunity structures. As well, indicator specific information such as human rights abuses or major environmental disasters were compiled with overall conflict potential sources which provided a more complete picture and more accurate assessment of each of the countries.

Finally, the group meetings and analysis added yet another critical depth to the process as each country was examined and re-examined for its ability to meet the criteria. Pro and con discussions helped fine-tune the reasons why a country was

either kept on the list or taken off . Questions posed during discussions became a jumping-off point for further research whether through targeted information searches on the internet or reviews of expert analysis.

Individually each aspect of the methodology brought a new dimension and depth to the process. Together they show both the breadth and rigour of the framework that has been critically implemented in order to create a timely and effective "country watch list" for conflict prevention initiatives.

2. Limitations of the methodology:
The project had to overcome two fairly sizeable hurdles. The first was the initial lack of cross complementarity in country selection criteria between conflict risk assessment projects. The second was that some of the information we deemed crucial at the outset was available either for a fee or for in house use only. Both could be overcome with more time and a larger budget.

In the case of country selection criteria we would need to refine our own criteria for country selection, most likely using the CIFP template as a our starting point and use this as a bench mark against which we would compare the findings from other projects, CIFP has this criteria in broad general terms as specified in the proposal (and in Appendix A) but given the breadth of information available the criteria could be refined even more.

With regard to the second hurdle, access to special in-house projects and funds, we are making an effort to contact individuals within some organizations so that when the collection process is repeated down the road some shortcuts are already in place.

The other issues that hampered the process included a fairly narrow timeframe within which to determine the relevancy of certain data sources. More specifically, the process of exclusion or inclusion of specific target countries is based more upon the availability of events-based information, (i.e. countries that are more relevant to donor countries receive more press a Georgia as opposed to a Guinea Bissau). As well, few sources provided probabilities of serious conflict within the time range of interest to this project (e.g. 1-3 years). ICG for example is concerned primarily with the immediate future. To overcome this problem we paired our evaluations with task-specific current event sites such as IRIN, Relief Web, Reuters, Alert Net, etc.). This makes sense given what we know about the need to combine structure and events plus stakeholder agendas and positive negative intervening factors as specified in Appendix A.

However, the main issue was not necessarily a "collection problem", but rather a "linkage problem." If a CPAP Risk Assessment Template were to be developed it would also require a parallel training manual for researchers and web-based interface for sharing and disseminating information

Another issue was the degree of emphasis to place on a particular source: for example, should CNN be weighed equally with the BBC? As well, disparities and deficiencies in information and analysis proved restrictive. Latin America and frequently overlooked areas of Africa were rarely analyzed beyond basic historical backgrounds and economic or demographic statistics by many sites.

D. Findings

TOP 3 COUNTRIES	JUSTIFICATION

GUINEA-BISSAU
 	
STAKEHOLDERS:
 	
PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde):
  ➢ Leader Carlos Gomes Junior
 	
Social Renovation Party (PRS):
  ➢ Party of former and deposed president Kumba Yala
 	
United Social Democratic Party (PUSD):
  ➢ Leader Francisco Fadul
 	
Guinea's Armed Forces:
  ➢ General Verissimo Seabra Correia
 	
(spoilers)
  ➢ PRS and Kumba Yala
Possibly the Armed Forces
	EVENTS & INDICATORS:
	- History of Conflict: PAIGC waged a guerrilla war against Portuguese colonial rule who withdrew their forces from the country in 1974. The liberation movement turned political party ruled the country until 1998 until a very short but vicious civil war rocked the country. Regional involvement by neighboring countries ended the conflict and Kumba Yala and his PRS party was voted into power in internationally supervised elections. Yala's government became increasingly corrupt and ineffective in mitigating the worsening economic situation. He was removed from power by the army last year after he dissolved parliament and postponed holding elections 4 times.
	
	- Economic and Social Crisis: The social and economic situation remains grave. The non-payment of salaries for most of 2003 to the country's public sector workers, the inability of the majority of children to attend school during the past year, and reports of increased avoidable mortalities because of the Government's failure to pay for basic medicines continue to feed social tensions. It's estimated that unless there's an improved national response there will be a fivefold increase in the HIV infection rate in the next 5 years. According to UNDP Human Development Report, Guinea-Bissau ranks 169th with a human development index far below the regional average in terms per capita GDP, life expectancy, access to safe water, literacy rate, primary school enrolment rate, etc.
	
	- Current Elections: The results of the March 28th election for a new 12-seat parliament were initially delayed because many polling stations in the capital Bissau failed to receive ballot boxes and voting slips. Following complaints of voting irregularities by the PRS and Kumba Yala, General Verissimo Seabra Correia, the head of the armed forces who led last year's coup, asked the National Electoral Commission to delay the publication of results until their complaint had been settled. The delay in announcing results has led to rising tension leading to an exodus of residents fearing an onslaught of violence. Francisco Fadul, leader of the PUSD, another major contender in the election, has publicly conceded defeat to the PAIGC, which now appears set to form the next government. Carlos Gomes Junior claimed victory for his party at a press conference on Thursday and promised that he would form a broad-based government of national unity. However, while the military has promised to not interfere in the election process, its actions in September of 2003 set a dangerous precedent by ousting a democratically elected president. If the current government is not able to ameliorate socio-economic situation, and/or begins to show signs of corruption, it is likely that the military will involve itself. Moreover, the ousted Kumba Yala, is not content with the

election results and may use popular discontent and unrest over economic stagnation to fuel protest against newly elected government.

- <u>Military Fracturing and Reintegration</u>: There are reported tensions among the army rank and file over the longstanding backlog of salary arrears and poor conditions in the barracks. Moreover, representatives of the former combatants in the losing side of the civil war are demanding, inter alia, a full amnesty, their reinstatement into the army, and a formal agreement witnessed by the United Nations and the international community.

- <u>Regional Instability</u>: Situation along the border with Senegal remains calm although there are occasional reports of incidents, a recent one resulting in the death of 2 Guinean soldiers. The activities of the Casamançe militants in Guinea-Bissau, a minority rebel group from Senegal, continue to strain relations between both countries and threaten regional stability. Moreover, neighboring countries have experienced repeated coup attempts and conflict with rebel groups, reducing political, social, and economic stability in the region which threatens the fragile political process now underway in Guinea-Bissau, and is likely to present serious challenges to stimulating development for years to come.

ABSENCE/PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES:
- <u>Regional</u>:
  ➢ ECOWAS: Akuffo Ado, Ghanian foreign minister, quoted as saying that "ECOWAS will not allow another political and military crisis to erupt in Guinea-Bissau that could threaten stability in the sub-region." ECOWAS intervened in 1999 to end the civil war.
  ➢ African Development Bank
- <u>International:</u>
  ➢ Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), led by a team from Portugal monitoring and aiding in carrying out free and fair elections
  ➢ United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) in the country since 1999 offering the UN's good offices and assistance
  ➢ IMF, World Bank

RECOMMENDATION:
<u>Sources</u>: Reuters Alert Net, IRIN, ICG April 2004, MAR, CPLP, UNOGBIS Security Council Report 2003, HIIK, National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper GB, Radio Television Portugal, LUSA information agency, UNDP.

Despite ongoing international and regional engagement, the socio/economic and political situation in Guinea Bissau has remained precarious. Conflict prevention in Guinea-Bissau does not simply mean holding free and fair elections; it means creating the socio/economic conditions that guarantee a level of political stability. There is a role for a conflict prevention initiative to work with the UN mission, local government and donor community to address grievances with regards to social, public and health services so as to reduce the most direct causes of social discontent and unrest. Moreover, working with the CPLP, the presidential elections scheduled for 2005 could be organized so as to eliminate the irregularities that were, and may continue to be, a source of protest. Initiatives could work with Guinean government to reduce corruption and increase transparency. Well run elections, along with helping

	authorities address socio/economic grievances, and curbing corrupt practices while increasing transparency will give people a greater sense of confidence in their government, and enhance its legitimacy.
GUYANA **STAKEHOLDERS:** Indo-Guyanese: ➢ People's Progressive Party (PPP Civic) ➢ Pres. Bharrat Jagdeo Afro-Guyanese: ➢ People's National Congress (PNC Reform) ➢ Desmond Hoyter, former president (Spoilers) ➢ Each other Sources: ReliefWeb, Economist, Reuters, AlertNet, UNICEF, Freedom House	**EVENTS & INDICATORS:** - Ethnic Divisions: Imposed majority of Indo over Afro since 1834 by British. 51% East Indian over 30% black African descent. Racial Hostility Bill (2002) increased penalties for race-based crimes but long-standing animosity remains a concern. - History of Disputed Elections: rigged elections kept PNC in power from 1964-1992; 1997 and 2001 elections were monitored by third parties yet still deemed fraudulent - Regional and foreign mediators/monitors: Both parties are resistant to powersharing and prefer a "winner-takes-all" system, requiring mediation. - Civil Unrest: Very common, especially in protest of election results. Private sector launched total shut-down October 9-10 2002. - Environmental Degradation: frequent victim of natural disasters (i.e. floods). - Borders: borders are porous and unpatrolled. Increasingly attractive route for South American cocaine. - Economic Stagnation: One of the poorest countries in Western Hemisphere. **ABSENCE/PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES:** - Regional: ➢ Caricom negotiated political agreements in 1998. - International: ➢ Carter Centre helped broker the return to democracy in 1992 (victory of PPP) ➢ Sir Paul Reeves, special envoy of SG of Commonwealth attempted to resume talks in 2002 ➢ UNDP (country office) and USAID providing support for Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) ➢ **RECOMMENDATIONS:** Long standing animosity remains a concern between the Afro and Indo-Guyanese as the PNC and PPP continue to polarize. PNC opposition against President Jagdeo and the PPP is reportedly mounting and rumours of another labour strike, similar to that in October 2002, may again flare ethnic tensions and riots. Accusations of death squads, continue to fuel the fire. Apprehension also surrounds the next election, possibly as soon as 2006. While Guyana is an excellent candidate for conflict prevention initiatives given the above

	scenario, an investment in Guyana poses somewhat of a risk: Triggers are difficult to predict. As one of the poorest countries in the Western hemisphere Guyana is also in need of long-term development, a factor which may hinder preventive action. All the same, the PPP and PNC have shown that they are open to outside assistance and a powersharing approach would be suitable in this case, with or without an outbreak of severe violence. Also, jointly organised initiatives with such institutions as OAS, World Bank and other donors would be accepted by both government and citizens.
PAPA NEW GUINEA **STAKEHOLDERS:** ➢ National Alliance Party Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare. ➢ Political Parties; 43 as of 2002. ➢ Government of Australia; ECP ➢ Spoilers: Indonesian enclaves within Bougainville Island. Sources: CNN, UNICEF, World Bank, IRIN, CIDCM, U.S. State/ CIA –Factbook.	**EVENTS & INDICATORS:** Linguistic Divisions: 840 languages, many living in small tribes – therefore a high degree of autonomy from Government. Secessionist Movement: 1988-1997 Indonesian secessionist revolt on Bougainville Island, – 20,000 lives lost. A fragile peace has held since. Electoral Difficulties: June 17, 2002, even the Prime Minister was unable to vote due to 'missing' ballot box. No violence erupted, however latent dissatisfaction with system evident. Next election to be held no later than 2007. Internal Military Unrest: March 24, 2002 – mutiny occurred over low pay; no violence, thirteen charged. Economic Stagnation: Agriculture provides subsistence livelihood for 85% of population. Crime is rampant in more urban areas. Environmental Issues: Tsunamis and volcanic eruptions are an ever-present danger. **ABSENCE/PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES:** Regional: -December 2003, Enhanced Co-Operation Program (ECP) created between Australia and PNG; 230 Australian police, 64 government staff awaiting deployment. -UN agencies. -Spartan attention overall. **ENTRY POINTS:** ➢ Policing, elections monitoring, governmental capacity building, infrastructure enhancement, etc. ➢ Government appears to welcome assistance, expertise, etc. ➢ More robust engagement built upon ECP would appear appropriate. **RECOMMENDATIONS:** -Given that the situation is in flux (namely the recent presence of the ECP), the next few months will be a crucial period for observation. As a result, this analysis comes at the start of a peace-bolstering initiative, as opposed to during one. It would be good to re-evaluate the situation on the ground once the ECP has had time to take effect. -Possible partners include ECP, national government, donor agencies.

Second-Tier Countries:

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

This country has had a dictatorship since 1979. Although there was a sign of democratization in the 1990s, this has not been taken seriously since there is complete government control of the press as well as flagrant human rights abuses, mistreatment in prisons, policy brutality, etc. However, the greatest threat comes from the President's own family as there is a history of relatives violently usurping one another (a brother was recently implicated in a plot to topple the president). The economy is stagnant and offshore oil and natural gas deposits may be the only hope of economic recovery. Although 2004 economic growth is forecast at 23%, few have benefited from the new oil wealth, poverty is rampant and former dependent industries have deteriorated. Skilled and educated peoples have fled and the opposition boycotts electoral races.

Precipitators to violence include: Recently the President Nguema demanded from Spain that the exiled opposition leader be extradited to E-G. There was the arrest of 70 mercenaries in Zimbabwe and 15 in E-G, all accused of conspiracy to assassinate and overthrow Nguema (March 7th 2004). There has been mass fleeing of immigrants and Cameroonian and Ghanaian officials have authorized the evacuation of their respective nationals. There have been police killings, rapes and beatings from the recent crackdown.

Outside involvement includes: A South African ambassador has visited the country along with intelligence agents to 'quiz' South African mercenaries in Zimbabwe and E-G. Nigeria is considering providing military help to President Nguema. A UN Special Envoy is to investigate the situation on the ground.

UZBEKISTAN

Although independent groups increased their political activity in 2003, the government's attitude to political liberalisation has not changed. Opposition parties have been denied registration, their members face harassment and arrest, and there is increasing pressure on NGOs and civil society generally. It seems unlikely that independent candidates will be permitted to contest parliamentary elections in December 2004. Freedom of expression remains extremely limited: newspapers and broadcasting remain almost exclusively under state control, and journalists work under constant pressure from the authorities.

Reports suggest that torture is still widespread in places of detention. Human rights defenders and ordinary people who speak out against local or central authorities face harassment or arrest from law enforcement agencies.

Economic failure has provoked social discontent. Despite the state repression, factory workers staged rare strikes in 2003 over unpaid wages, and pensioners went out on the streets demanding their payments. The most active and well-educated citizens are moving to Russia or the West.

This deteriorating socio-economic environment is provoking a rising tide of popular frustration, which fosters support for radical Islamist groups. Expectations that increased Western engagement after 11 September 2001 would lead to regime liberalisation have not been met. Instead, there is growing disenchantment with the

U.S. military presence and increasing identification of Western institutions and governments with the repressive regime.

Experts compare the situation in Uzbekistan with that in Georgia before the fall of president Shevardnadze. The main interest of Western governments is to keep the status quo and to have a reliable security partner in Central Asia.

Most important has been the recent spate of terrorist bombings and other violence as an indication of the serious deterioration in the country: 2 suicide bombings at Tashkent market 29 March, and gun battle between police and militants in Tashkent 30 March. Another explosion in the capital reported 31 March. Government quick to blame Islamist extremists for attacks, which reportedly killed 42 over 3 days and targeted mainly Uzbek police.

YEMEN

The country has a history of Islamic militant groups and it is the ancestral home of Bin Laden. Numerous Islamic militant attacks over the years include 'targets' ranging from NGO's to the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, leaving 17 dead. In 2002 the intensity of the conflict between the Yemeni government and the Islamist Jihad increased. On December 28, 2002 a member of the Islamist Jihad murdered the deputy chairman of the Socialist Party of Yemen (YSP), Jarallah Omar. He had supported an alliance between the YSP and the Reform Party in what would have entailed an attenuation of the Reform Party's radical-Islamist wing. In June and July 2002 the government intensified its actions against the Islamists, who predominantly bide themselves in the mountainous South of the country. Most recently (March 21, 2004) two Islamic militants were arrested in connection with the Cole bombing and on March 4, 2004, 12 militants who had previously escaped in April 2003 were re-captured.

U.S. Special Forces arrived shortly after Cheney's visit to help train Yemen military in the catching of Islamic Militants. AU.S. Combined Joint Task Force exists in the region with a mission to battle terrorism.

There is reason to conclude (unless a new U.S. Administration takes office in November) that Yemen would likely have the intervention of American forces if violence were to increase.

E. Report Recommendations and Next Steps

Overall the project was highly successful and with some slight fine-tuning identified above, could be repeated indefinitely on a regular and ongoing basis. In fact, in order to develop the methodology to its fullest potential, it is recommended that this be the first step in an ongoing exercise to develop and implement a risk assessment model for creating a watchlist for the Country Preventive Action Project.

CIFP is well-placed to take on this task and refine the framework for use not only by CPAP but as a model for other clients, that might include private sector players and partners as well as NGOs and government donors. The meta-analysis approach offers the most comprehensive model to date. For example, ICG's watchlist is not very complete, in part because their timeline is extremely short. FAST focuses only on events and the news wire services, while providing timely information, offers no analysis of the events they are recording (see Appendix B).

Now that the process has been established, it can be done much more quickly. In order to develop an effective and efficient tool, it is recommended that a website for the model be established. The website could be a stand alone tool or build on CIFP's already well-established and well-known website as a separate but complementary component.

It is recognized that 100% accuracy is not possible and that built in error (statistical or judgemental) will always be with us. The approach we have provided is a way of reducing both kinds of errors. However, to reduce error even further it is recommended that fact finding missions be established in order to determine complex details that may not otherwise emerge from database research and expert consultations. Information to be collected includes: establishing stakeholder agendas, identifying possible areas for intervention, and assessing the strengths and weakness of existing programming "on the ground."

The value of a watchlist is that documenting such information and putting a country on a public list can itself bring about positive changes in behaviour both by external and internal actors. The style for such an analysis could be in the form of country diagnostics created by CIFP. These briefs provide an in-depth overview of the country's current situation as well as the entry points for conflict prevention programming (see Appendix B).

With respect to the current report it is recommended that the following steps be taken:
- A power point presentation be developed to explain and clarify the methodology to potential clients and users;
- A Roundtable Policy Forum be held to present the findings of the project and to collect input from donors and policy makers;
- Detailed briefs for the 3 countries in question should be produced and disseminated;
- Further funding should be sought in order to refine and apply the methodology.

Organizational Sources

Name	Description/Details/URL
BONN **(Bonn International Centre for Conversion)**	- think-tank that produces yearly Conversion Survey and publishes academic papers URL: http://www.bicc.de/
CountryWatch Forecasts	- semi-annual updated 5-year macroeconomic forecasts for each of the 192 countries - not listed according to ranking system, but information may be helpful in producing a ranking order URL: http://www.countrywatch.com/
COW **(Correlates of War)** **U. of Michigan**	- <u>Source</u> of data collection for major conflicts from 1815 to the 1990s - number of good indicators; size of conflict, countries involved, political interactions, etc. URL: http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/
CIDCM **(Centre for International Development and Conflict Management)** **U. of Maryland**	- contains coded annual information on regime and authority characteristics for all independent states (with greater than 500,000 total population) in the global state system and covers the years 1800-2002 **-** provides polity scores for each regime analyzed - provides its own indicators for democracy and autocracy - no country rankings, but may yield easily to producing a list URL: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
CIFP (Country Indicators for Foreign Policy) **Carleton U.**	- structural database of performance indicators for 190+ countries URL: http://carleton.ca/cifp/
CrisisWatch **(Compiled by International Crisis Group-ICG)**	- independent, non-profit, organisation, with 90 staff on 5 continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve conflict. -CrisisWatch provides a monthly calendar which: - *summarises* developments during the previous month in 60 situations of current or potential conflict, providing references and links to more detailed information sources; - *assesses* whether the overall situation in each case has, during the previous month, significantly deteriorated, significantly improved, or on balance remained more or less unchanged; - *alerts* readers to situations where there is a particular risk of new or significantly escalated conflict, or a conflict resolution opportunity; - *summarises* ICG reports and briefing papers that have been published in the last month. URL: http://www.crisisweb.org/
FAO **(Food and Agriculture Organization for the UN)**	- Gives general background information for countries as well as a list/map of Low-Income-Food-Deficit Countries URL: http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/default.asp?lang=en
FAST (Early Analysis of	- Monthly regional updates (somewhat limited)

Tension and Fact-finding) **Swisspeace**	URL: http://www.swisspeace.org/fast/
FEWER **(Forum on Early Warning and Early Response)**	-FEWER is a global coalition that provides early warning -network covers the Caucasus, Central Asia, West Africa, Central Africa, South East Asia, and Central and Latin America URL: http://www.fewer.org/
FIRST **(Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams)**	- think-tank URL: http://www.first.org/
Freedom House	- NGO which publishes an annual assessment of the state of freedom in all countries known as Freedom in the World. - Individual countries are evaluated based on a checklist of questions on political rights and civil liberties that are derived in large measure from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Each country is assigned a rating for political rights and a rating for civil liberties based on a scale of 1 to 7. The combined average of each country's political rights and civil liberties ratings determines an overall status of Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. - no rankings, but individual country scores on press freedom - Annual Press Review. URL: http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey.htm
GRA (Global Risk Assessment)	- Economically focused - data or current events collection not available to public URL: http://www.grai.com/
HEWS (Humanitarian Early Warning System)	-identifies potential crises with humanitarian implications - background profiles, analytic briefs, and reports on countries of concern -reports include an assessment of existing vulnerabilities, trends, and escalation potential. -distinguishes between root causes and triggering events -extensive database of country information-- quantitative and qualitative -- and includes reporting from the various early warning systems that exist (for example, in the food and agriculture sector). -UN information, from both the headquarters- and field-levels, is supplemented with outside sources URL: http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/programs/pad/hews.html
Human Rights Watch	- data related to the militarization of the country such as military expenditure, and expenditure relative to other countries in the region; the total number armed forces/paramilitaries/militia, small arms, heavy weapons etc; information on ethnic distribution, and religious diversity as well as reliable population data generally; - no country rankings, but country reports highlight humanitarian and conflict situations

	URL: www.hrw.org/reports/
ICB (International Crisis Behaviour) **U. of Maryland**	- information on 434 crises, 33 protracted conflicts and 956 state actors between 1918-2001 - data is not by country, although this is a considerable database URL: www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/
ICRG (International Country Risk Guide)	-ICRG's risk ratings cited by experts at the IMF, World Bank, United Nations, etc. as a standard against which other ratings can be measured -provides complete explanation of methodology used to arrive at risk ratings -produces one- and five-year forecasts using the same methodology that is used for the current risk forecasts. Two forecasts are produced for each time period: a Worst Case Forecast (WCF) and a Best Case Forecast (BCF) URL: http://www.icrgonline.com/
IDEA (Integrated Data for Events Analysis) **Harvard U.**	- compilation of news articles to discern week-to-week patterns URL:
IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies)	- Armed Conflict Database (ACD); - Source of background information and current situation of 70 current armed conflicts URL: http://www.iiss.org/databases.php?PHPSESSID=5629a891c48de663b2b5938036a7d868
IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Network)	- IRIN analyses and synthesizes information on developments in Africa, Central and Southern Asia, and Caucasus and Balkans regions. - issues daily reports as well as thematic studies for over 2,000 primary subscribers in more than 50 countries. URL: http://www.irinnews.org/
KOSIMO	- database from 1945-99 URL: http://www.hiik.de/en/kosimo/kosimo.htm
MAR (Minorities At Risk) **U. of Maryland**	- university-based research project that monitors and analyzes the status and conflicts of politically-active communal groups in all countries with a current population of at least 500,000 - materials on over 285 groups - project is designed to provide information in a standardized format that aids comparative research and contributes to the understanding of conflicts - not ranked by country, but by minority groups URL: www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/
OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)	- organizes information by country and emergency - <u>Early Warning Alerts</u>: provide reports on issues deemed to be of time sensitive concern. URL: http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/
Project Ploughshares	- annual Armed Conflict Reports detail conflicts around the globe

	URL: http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/ACR/acr.html
Relief Web	- compiles new articles from various sources - home page lists current conflict zones URL: http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf
SFTF (State Failure Task Force) **U. of Maryland**	- Internal wars and failure of governance 1955-2001 - methodologies to assess the risk of state failure - now known as Task Force on Political Instability (TFPI) URL: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/
The Fund for Peace **(Conflict Prevention and Recovery Program -** **C.A.S.T., The FFP Conflict Assessment System Tool)**	-methodology to anticipate, assess and manage conflict situations -develops analysts' capacity for both conflict early warning and assessment of recovery for informed decision-making URL: http://fundforpeace.org/programs/cpr/cpr.php
The PSR Group	-site includes more than 75 individual data variables and risk ratings covering more than 140 countries, including a complete historical set of ICRG risk ratings back to 1984. -briefings on the financial, economic and political state of affairs in 100 countries -Country Forecasts also provides 18-month and 5-year forecasts for business risks based on the three most likely political regimes URL: http://www.prsgroup.com/
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)	Military Expenditure Database URL: http://projects.sipri.se/milex/mex_database1.html
Transparency International	-The Internet Center for Corruption Research provides the Corruption Perceptions Index, a comparative assessment of country's integrity performance, alongside with related academic research on corruption - no country rankings, but assessments on levels of corruption with indexed scores based on specified frameworks and methodology. URL: http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html Archive (1995 to 2000): http://www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/

UNDP
(United Nations Development Program)
	- Four new composite indices for human development have been developed: the Human Development Index, the Gender-related Development Index, the Gender Empowerment Measure, and the Human Poverty Index. Each Report focuses on a topical theme in the current development debate, providing analysis and policy recommendations
	- provides a ranking list by country
	- topics covered all ranked by country:
	   ➢ Human Development Index,
	   ➢ Human Poverty Index,
	   ➢ GDP Per Capita,
	   ➢ Demographical Trends,
	   ➢ Commitment to Health: access, services and resources,
	   ➢ Leading Global Health Crises and Challenges,
	   ➢ Survival: Progress and Setbacks,
	   ➢ Commitment to Education: Public Spending, Literacy and

	Enrolment, ➢ Economic Performance, ➢ Inequality in Income or Consumption, ➢ Structure of Trade, ➢ Refugees and Armaments URL: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2001/en/indicator/indicator.cfm?File=index.html
(UNEP) United Nations Environment Programme	- Environmental watchlist URL: www.unep.org
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	- Refugee and IDP flows Statistical Overviews http://www.unhcr.ch/statist/main.htm
UNICEF	- basic indicators of infant mortality, literacy, etc. - Annual State of the World's Children report is regional URL: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/index.html
UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS)	Epidemic Updates and Reports URL: http://www.unaids.org/epidemic_update/
United Nations Statistical Division	- compiles statistics from many international sources and produces global updates and yearbooks in specialized fields of statistics - Fields include: Millennium Indicators; Demographic, Social &Housing Statistics; Energy Statistics; Environmental Statistics; National Accounts; and Trade Statistics - no country rankings but fields of indicators may aid in producing a list URL: http://esa.un.org/unsd/pubs/
Uppsala University	Conflict Data Project URL: http://www.pcr.uu.se/data.htm
C.I.A. (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency)	World Factbook Annuals URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
U.S. Department of State	- Country Profiles similar to CIA FACTBOOK - Ranking Reports available, however may be politically motivated URL: www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm
WHO (World Health Organization)	- Global Water and Sanitation Assessment Reports, - Monitoring of Epidemics, Diseases, - Assessments on Structural Violence Issues
World Bank	- Data Profile tables which are drawn from the World Development Indicators database. The profiles cover 208 countries (184 World Bank members and 24 other economies with populations of more than 30,000) - no country rankings, but wavering economies are highlighted URL: http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi/home.html

Other Sources
  ➢ BBC News Online
  ➢ Globe and Mail Online
  ➢ Inter Press Service
  ➢ CNN
  ➢ The Economist
  ➢ Reuters News Agency
  ➢ Alert Net
  ➢ Relief Web
  ➢ IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Network)

Appendix A

1. Early Warning / Risk Assessment Definitions

Risk Assessment
   • Identify situations in which the conditions for a particular kind of conflict are present. (Gurr and Marshall, 2000)

Early Warning
   • The systematic collection and analysis of information for the purposes of anticipating the escalation of violent conflict, developing strategic responses to these crises, and presenting options to critical actors for the purposes of decision-making and response. (FEWER)

2. Required Information

Macro or long-term processes associated with system-structure transformations and the associated problems of the emergence of weak states;

Intermediate mechanisms associated with institutional viability and state weakness; and

Micro or short term selection processes and mechanisms that account for preferences of violence over pacific forms of strategic interactions and the subsequent escalation and/or duration of ethnic hatreds, violence, repression, and war at specific points in time

   • Structural risk assessment reports are intended to precede and serve as a foundation for subsequent early-warning reports.

   • Early-warning reports integrate the various data sources and analytical methods.

   • Consequently, "risk assessment" and "early warning" are complementary but distinct modes of analysis that can be distinguished in several important respects.

3. Analytical Needs For Early Warning

   a) an understanding of three elements:

      (i) stakeholder agendas, (ii) grievances and (iii) behaviour;

   b) a range of data sources and analytical methods, such as:

      (i)   micro-level assessments;
      (ii)   intermediate and micro-level events; and
      (iii)   macro-level trends using structural data and leading indicators

Appendix B

CIFP Outputs

Regional Conflict Risk Assessment Reports

- Conflict Risk Assessment Report: Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines (01/01/2002)
-
- Conflict Risk Assessment Report: West Africa: Mano River Union and Senegambia (01/04/2002)
-
- Conflict Risk Assessment Report Sub-Sahara Africa (4/11/2002)
-
- Conflict Risk Assessment Report African Great Lakes (6/9/2003)
-
- Conflict Risk Assessment Report: Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine (8/11/2002)

Methodology

- Early Warning Methodology Report (01/07/2000)

- CIFP Needs Assessment Report (01/07/2000)

- Early Warning Methods: Background Report and Methodological Notes (Summer 2000)

- Early Warning Methodology Report (01/07/2000)

- Preliminary Selection of Indicators: Discussion Paper (10/12/2002)

- Assessing Country Risk: Creating an Index of Severity (01/05/2001)

- Risk Assessment Template (01/08/2001)

- Conflict Prevention, Gender and Early Warning: A Work in Progress (11/02/2002)

- CIFP Methodology, Data Descriptions, Data Sources

- CIFP Risk Assessment Indicator Definitions

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