

## Sub-national Report for Western Sahara: Events, Forecasting and Analysis

### **FINAL REPORT**

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*Events are accurate as of April 30, 2006*

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## Part A: Overview

### 1. Note

#### About this Report

This sub-national report has been produced by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) for use by non-governmental organizations, businesses, academics, Canadian policy-makers, and other parties concerned with the current and future state of sub-national regions. This Events Monitoring Profile is based on a fusion of CIFP Risk Assessment and Events Monitoring methodologies.<sup>1</sup>

#### About the Author

Liz St. Jean is a research analyst for CIFP. Her area of study is international conflict management, with a focus on humanitarian intervention. Her current research examines the factors involved in decisions regarding the use of force in peace operations. She has studied economics as well as international relations at the University of British Columbia. She spent a year working on an independent research project that involved three months in Northern Uganda, and a month in Rwanda.

#### About CIFP

CIFP has its origins in a prototype geopolitical database developed by the Canadian Department of National Defence in 1991. The prototype project called GEOPOL covered a wide range of political, economic, social, military, and environmental indicators through the medium of a rating system. In 1997, under the guidance of Andre Ouellete, John Patterson, Tony Kellett and Paul Sutherland, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

decided to adopt some elements of GEOPOL to meet the needs of policy makers, the academic community and the private sector. The CIFP project as it became known has since then operated under the guidance of principal investigator David Carment of Carleton University and has received funding from DFAIT, IDRC and CIDA. The project represents an on-going effort to identify and assemble statistical information conveying the key features of the political, economic, social and cultural environments of countries around the world.

The cross-national data generated through CIFP was intended to have a variety of applications in government departments, NGOs, and by users in the private sector. The data set provides at-a-glance global overviews, issue-based perspectives and country performance measures. Currently, the data set includes measures of domestic armed conflict, governance and political instability, militarisation, religious and ethnic diversity, demographic stress, economic performance, human development, environmental stress, and international linkages.

The CIFP database currently includes statistical data in the above issue areas, in the form of over one hundred performance indicators for 196 countries, spanning fifteen years (1985 to 2000) for most indicators. These indicators are drawn from a variety of open sources, including the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the Minorities at Risk and POLITY IV data sets from the University of Maryland.

<sup>1</sup> For information on the structural risk assessment, see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2001) *Risk Assessment Template*, Available: <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/docs/studra1101.pdf>.

## 2. Executive Summary

### Profile

- Western Sahara is a disputed territory that was the cause of a fifteen year war between Morocco and the Frente Polisario, in support of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). The dispute is currently without violence, but has existed as a stalemate since a peace plan was brokered in 1991.
- The stalemate exists because the two sides have not yet been able to agree to a format for the referendum that the plan calls for. This situation has led to both sides issuing a multitude of inflammatory statements as well as jockeying for support among the international community.
- Morocco has been widely criticized due to the poor living conditions and human rights standards for Saharawis. Conversely, Morocco denounces the Frente Polisario as a terrorist organization.
- The friction between Morocco and the Saharawi people, particularly the Frente Polisario, has remained constant, and

the future of the territory continues to be the focus of all political events.

### Baseline analysis

- Western Sahara is a medium-risk region with a score of 6.09. The main source of risk for the Western Sahara region is largely due to the ongoing political stalemate between Morocco and the SADR regarding control over Western Sahara, resulting in governance and militarization problems. The region also has a development, and there tensions between Moroccans and Saharawis.

### Event Trends

- Events were monitored between 10 October 2005 and 30 April 2006.
- The baseline analysis shows that the underlying structure is destabilizing, but the trend analysis concluded there is a moderately positive trend, belying the common belief that Western Sahara exists in stalemate. The improving trend is mainly caused by a fall in the magnitude of destabilizing events.




Figure 1. Chart of trend lines for all events and the count of events by week

*Primary drivers of event trends*

- Governance and Political Stability witnessed mass demonstrations accompanied by brutal dispersions in the first portion of the monitoring period. This, however, subsided towards the latter half and was accompanied by a rise in stabilizing events in the form of conciliatory statements and gestures by both Morocco and SADR;
- International Linkages was balanced between a moderately positive trend among destabilizing events and a moderately negative trend among stabilizing events. This corresponds to the events over the past six months: typically destabilizing incidents between internal and external Western Sahara stakeholders accompanied by stabilizing actions at the broader international level.

*Scenarios*

- Most likely case: the situation appears to be a stalemate, but tensions and outright violence slowly lessen.
- Best case: The international community gives renewed attention to the conflict just as Morocco, its neighbours and the SADR engage in conciliatory gestures
- Worst case: the political stalemate continues amidst inflammatory rhetoric, although the conflict does not ratchet up violently.

*Conclusion*

- The moderate improvement in Western Sahara is subtle, owing to a lessening of tensions rather than an intensification of confidence-building measures
- While the situation may appear to remain as a 'stalemate', the situation is improving and could in fact be taken advantage of by the international community.

### 3. Event Trends Summary

#### Overall

##### **General Trend**



- There was a general fall in the magnitude of destabilizing events.
- The main source of the trend lies in the Governance and Political Stability and International Linkages clusters, as the majority of activity occurred around local and international political stakeholders.

- International Linkages is an area of concern as it is currently balanced between two moderate trends, one negative and one positive. This could be taken advantage of by reversing the negative trend among stabilizing events. However, should the moderately positive trend among destabilizing events instead be reversed, it could damage the overall positive trend.

#### Primary Drivers

*Primary drivers are those clusters that contain more than twenty-five events. These clusters are the main areas of activity in the region, with the greatest contribution to the overall trend.*

##### **Governance and Political Instability**

##### **General Trend**



- Protests and complaints against Morocco on human rights issues.
- Morocco extends some conciliatory measures towards Saharawi human rights groups
- Mass demonstrations across Western Sahara against Morocco
- Lessening of destabilizing rhetoric and mass protests

##### **International Linkages**

##### **General Trend**



- General international encouragement of talks between SADR and Morocco
- MINURSO presence continues
- International criticism by human rights groups levelled against Morocco's record in Western Sahara
- Tensions over international oil companies drilling off-shore with a Moroccan license

## **Secondary Drivers**

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*Secondary drivers are those clusters with less than twenty-five monitored events. These clusters provide supplementary information to the overall analysis.*

### **Armed Conflict**

- Tensions continue, although they do not result in any major confrontation between SADR and Morocco

### **Militarization**

- Frente Polisario commits to reducing landmines in the region

### **Population Heterogeneity**

- Continuation of low risk, but simmering tensions between the Saharawi people and Moroccan settlers

### **Economic Performance**

- Despite some positive events, such as initiation of oil contracts, there is still an overall poor performance.

### **Environmental Stress**

- Torrential rains on two occasions with highly negative repercussions for refugees and regional movement

### **Demographic Stress**

- Continuation of high growth rate and high urban population, and youth bulge combined with lack of educational, economic or leisure opportunities for youth.

### **Human Development**

- A number of donor pledges to assist Saharwis, but the low human development indicators persist.

*Events are accurate as of April 30, 2006*

## 4. Forecasting

### **Most Likely Case**

***In the most likely case Western Sahara will experience moderate improvement but it is unlikely to fall to a lower risk category.***

Morocco continues to have stable (if poor) relations with SADR, Frente Polisario, and Algeria. However, confidence-building measures are taken under the auspices of international agencies, and there is no recurrence of an overtly destructive relationship. Demonstrations continue, but there are fewer incidents of police brutality. Morocco releases some human rights activists, though more remain jailed. International actors continue to apply only small degrees of pressure on the parties, and pro-SADR actors continue their weakly destabilizing statements. Although agencies struggle, they obtain the minimal amount necessary to aid Saharawis. Violent incidences dwindle and the overall situation is marked by the absence of mass violence.

### **Best Case**

***In the best case, Western Sahara will experience moderate improvement and will move towards a lower risk score and category.***

Moroccan, SADR, and Frente Polisario officials dampen their inflammatory language, and Morocco achieves a rapprochement with Algeria. Renewed international attention, particularly from the U.S. and EU pressures both sides to enter new talks, and demonstrations

subside long enough for talks to begin. Although neither side is willing to concede, neither side walks away, and Morocco makes a conciliatory gesture by releasing a number of political prisoners. There is a renewed effort to provide economic opportunities for Saharawi citizens, and humanitarian assistance increases.

### **Worst Case**

***In the worst case, Western Sahara will deteriorate slightly, but it will remain in the medium-risk category.***

The stalemate between Morocco and SADR and Frente Polisario continues, with both sides expressing inflammatory opinions, but neither side resorts to all out violence, though it may be threatened. The cycle of demonstrations and violent police response continues, contributing to the deteriorating relationship between the Saharawi population and Moroccan authorities. Morocco increases the number of security personnel in the region, and hampers MINURSO's ability to observe events. International attention continues to wane, and SADR grows increasingly anxious to gain international sympathy, pressuring allies to make supportive, but destabilizing, statements. The EU agrees to take up the Morocco fishing license, leading to demonstrations in Western Sahara, and the Frente Polisario issue veiled threats against EU fishing boats. Humanitarian assistance continues to diminish, and there is a drought in the region, worsening the food security of Saharawis.



## Part B: Detail

### 5. Profile

Western Sahara is a disputed territory in Northern Africa. Originally a Spanish colony, it was promised self-determination in 1966, but this did not materialize. Consequently, the paramilitary group Frente Polisario formed in 1973 in an attempt to gain independence by force. Following two years of conflict with the Frente Polisario, Spain withdrew in 1975; however, Moroccan King Hassan II led what became known as the “Green March”, where he brought 350,000 Moroccan citizens to resettle in Western Sahara, claiming the territory as a legitimate part of Morocco. A few months later, Moroccan troops joined the settlers. Mauritania also laid claim to a portion of Western Sahara, and despite a ruling by the International Court of Justice that supported self-rule for Western Sahara, in 1976 the Madrid Accords were signed by Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania, which divided Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania. The Frente Polisario responded violently, claiming they were fighting on behalf of an independent Western Sahara state, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). A civil war ensued, causing Mauritania to withdraw in 1979. Moroccan forces continued to clash with the Frente Polisario, who successfully engaged in guerrilla warfare tactics, causing Morocco to consolidate its power within the ‘useful triangle’, an area that includes major towns and phosphate deposits. Fighting continued until 1989 when the two sides fell into an informal ceasefire, and the United Nations (UN), with the assistance of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was able to broker a peace plan, which came into force in 1991.

The UN peace plan called for a formal ceasefire, a prisoner exchange, and an independence referendum among Western Saharans. The target date of the referendum was set for 1992, and in 1991

the UN dispatched a peacekeeping mission (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara or MINURSO) to monitor the referendum. However, the referendum did not transpire due to contention between Morocco and Saharawi officials over voter registration lists. Morocco has pushed for voter lists that include Moroccan citizens who reside in Western Sahara, and Saharawis have resisted the inclusion of the settlers. This political stalemate has led to both sides issuing a multitude of inflammatory statements as well as jockeying for support among the international community. The SADR, considered the political arm of Frente Polisario, runs Western Sahara and enjoys strong support from the Saharawi Diaspora, particularly within Italy and Spain. In 1984 SADR became a member of the OAU, now the African Union (AU), and the UN has consistently supported SADR’s request for a referendum, although it does not officially recognize it as a state. SADR has also increasingly found support from states outside of Africa, and is recognized as a legitimate state by approximately forty countries. Morocco has tense relations with the AU, as it withdrew in 1984 over the AU’s inclusion of SADR, and the relationship between Morocco and Algeria is particularly strained, due to Algeria’s support for the Frente Polisario. Beyond Africa, Morocco enjoys general, if subdued, support from the US, France, UK and Spain, none of which wish to see Morocco engage in another civil war to gain Western Sahara. Morocco has also been a key African ally to the U.S. ‘war on terror’ and has thus gained political capital among U.S. decision makers.

Morocco has been widely criticized due to the poor living conditions and human rights standards for Saharawis. The Western Sahara conflict has produced a

large number of refugees who reside in Algeria, and Morocco restricts resettlement to those Saharawis who do not have a nationalistic background and formally agree that Western Sahara should be part of Morocco.<sup>2</sup> Morocco also attempts to control Western Sahara through military occupation, repression of demonstrations, detention of activists and movement restrictions. Morocco has justified this activity by arguing that the Frente Polisario is a terrorist organization, which SADR vehemently denies. In general, the friction between Morocco and the Saharawi people, particularly the Frente Polisario, has remained constant, and the future of the territory continues to be the focus of all political events.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Minorities at Risk (2004) *Assessment for Saharawis in Morocco*

<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=60003> 2.

<sup>3</sup> For a more detailed background, see especially Minorities at Risk (2004); Freedom House (2005)

*Country Report: Western Sahara*

[http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc\\_country\\_detail.cfm?country=6886&pf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/content/pubs/fiw/inc_country_detail.cfm?country=6886&pf); United

Nations Department of Peacekeeping (2005) *Western Sahara – MINURSO – Background*

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurso/background.html>. Hereafter referred to as UNDPKO;

Uppsala Peace and Conflict Data Project (2005)

*Conflict Summary*

<http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php?bcID=67>; and Middle East Report Online (2004)

*Stubborn Stalemate in Western Sahara*

<http://www.merip.org/mero/mero062604.html>.

## 6. Stakeholders

There are eight main stakeholders that are affected by changes in the Western Sahara political environment. Each stakeholder is composed of a variety of actors that have their own grievances and interests. The four internal stakeholders include the SADR leadership, the Moroccan government, the Frente Polisario, and the Saharawi people. In addition, there are four external stakeholder groups: international missions and agencies that are working within Western Sahara, Diaspora, refugees and other sympathetic groups, regional actors such as Spain and the AU, and international agencies that have a political stake in Western Sahara.

The main source of tension exists between the Moroccan government and the SADR, the Frente Polisario and the Saharawi people, although Morocco also has tense relations with neighbouring Algeria. The SADR-Moroccan hostility is reinforced by each side seeking international backing for its position regarding the referendum. SADR constantly strives to achieve new and strengthened recognition from states in the international system, and Morocco works to find support for its stringent

activities against Saharawis and its stance on the referendum. It is difficult for the international community to be neutral, and statements that support – or at least seem to support – one side over the other have a destabilizing effect. There is also an emerging friction due to SADR's opposition to the EUs agreement with Morocco that allows the EU to fish off Western Saharan shores. Diaspora, refugees and other sympathetic groups have also worked to raise international awareness of the situation in Western Sahara. Their efforts have so far largely been ignored by Moroccan officials, but also contribute to the tense relationship between Morocco and SADR. International agencies with field operations have attempted to provide humanitarian aid and/or monitor the security situation. However, MINURSO has a small number of personnel, and there is little funding for development and humanitarian assistance due to a lack of international attention. Overall, despite the ongoing ceasefire, tensions are simmering; inflammatory comments have become commonplace, but they could also provide a source for a trigger event causing a resumption of active hostilities.

**Table 1. Internal Stakeholders**

1. SADR leadership	- President Mohamed Abdelaziz	- Working to achieve independence from Morocco
	- Prime Minister Abdelkader Taleb Oumar	
	- Saharawi Coordinator with the United Nations – Mr. Khadad	
2. Moroccan Government	- King Mohamed VI	- Working to keep Western Sahara within Morocco, likely due to the large phosphate deposit <sup>4</sup> - Not as focused on Western Sahara as King Hassan II
	- Royal Armed Forces - Moroccan police	- Known to forcibly disperse demonstrations - Allegedly arrest, beat and torture civilians, particularly human rights

<sup>4</sup> Uppsala Peace and Conflict Data Project 1.

		activists
3. Frente Polisario (Frente Popular Para la Liberación de Sakiet el Hamra y Rio de Oro or Polisario Front)	- Paramilitary group in Western Sahara, Saharawi refugee camps in Algeria	- Working to achieve independence from Morocco - Previously used violent methods to target Moroccan security forces
4. Saharawi People	- Ethnic group in SADR	- Majority strongly in favour of independence from Morocco

**Table 2. External Stakeholders**

5. International missions, agencies (field level)	- MINURSO: UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; currently includes 227 personnel	- Has monitored the situation in Western Sahara since 1991
	- Aid agencies such as UN High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Program	- Provide humanitarian aid for Saharawi population, refugees
6. Diaspora, refugees and other sympathetic groups	- Algerian National Committee of solidarity with the Saharawi people (CNASPS)	- Active in their support for SADR, often staging demonstrations outside of Moroccan embassies
	- Diaspora, particularly within Spain and Italy	
	- Saharawi refugees, largely located in refugee camps in Algeria	- Estimated 165, 000 refugees <sup>5</sup> - Desire to return, largely supportive of an independent Western Sahara
7. Regional actors	- Spain - Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	- Implicit support for Morocco
	- Algeria (President Bouteflika)	- Actively supports Polisario Front
	- African Union	- SADR represented in AU - Tense relations with Morocco
8. International agencies (political level)	- United Nations (Peter van Walsum, personal envoy of the Secretary General)	- Pressure on Morocco to allow independence
	- European Union	- Has pursued a fishing agreement with Morocco; SADR wants the agreement revoked

<sup>5</sup> War on Want.

## 7. Sub-National Risk Indicators

### 7.1. Summary

**Medium risk (6.09)**

According to CIFP risk analysis, Western Sahara is a medium risk region with an assessment of 6.09.<sup>6</sup> This analysis is based on an assessment of nine clusters that affect a country's risk for future conflict: History of Armed Conflict, Governance and Political Instability, Militarization, Population Heterogeneity, Economic Performance, International Linkages, Environment, Demographic Stress, and Human Development.<sup>7</sup>

The following sections look at the risk assessment for each cluster, including stabilizing factors, destabilizing factors and potential spoilers for each cluster area. The analysis finds that each area poses some measure of problem to the region, though the main areas of concern for Western Sahara are History of Armed Conflict, Governance and Political Instability, Militarization and International Linkages.

History of Armed Conflict is an area of concern for Western Sahara because of the destabilizing role that the Morocco-Frente Polisario conflict had upon the region. There are still large numbers of Saharawi refugees living in camps in Algeria, the territory is divided between Morocco and Frente Polisario control, and the ongoing tensions between the parties has led to mass demonstrations, which is labelled as an intifadah against Morocco. Security forces frequently use violent measures to put down the

demonstrations, and Morocco and the Frente Polisario both claim that the other is in violation of the peace agreement.

The second cluster that is worrisome is Governance and Political Stability. The cluster has a high risk rating overall, which is due to the widespread human rights abuses, restricted freedoms, inability to resolve the territorial dispute, and widespread discontent with Moroccan control of the territory. Militarization likewise scores a high risk rating, due to the large amount of military spending by Morocco and the high degree of military tensions between Morocco and Frente Polisario.

International Linkages is a final source of risk, due to the fact that both parties continually seek support from international actors. The result has been tension between Morocco and Algeria in particular, but also the broader AU. The international community has thus far been unable to come to any consensus over the best approach to resolving the conflict, and some actors are hesitant to apply too much pressure on Morocco, especially since it has become an ally in the 'war on terror'. Although grassroots solidarity movements may eventually prove stabilizing by pressuring Morocco towards a more conciliatory approach, in the meantime they are a destabilizing force in terms of the friction between the internal Saharan stakeholders.

Overall, these structural indicators point to a region fraught with tensions and destabilizing factors. The single strongest stabilizing factor, the fact that the ceasefire has generally been maintained since 1991, could be reversed given the right combination of destabilizing events.

<sup>6</sup> This is based on a thirteen point scale and by comparing available data to the risk assessment of Morocco, which is 5.11. For Morocco's risk assessment, see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2006) *Conflict risk assessment report*, forthcoming.

<sup>7</sup> For more information about the clusters and their application to risk analysis see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (2001) *Risk Assessment Template*

## 7.2. Risk indicators by cluster

### 7.2.1. History of Armed Conflict

**Medium risk (3.60)**

#### *Stabilizing Factors*

- Implementation of confidence building measures<sup>8</sup>
  - Visitation program between families in Western Sahara and refugee camps
  - Frente Polisario releases prisoners of war<sup>9</sup>
- General maintenance of ceasefire<sup>10</sup>

#### *Destabilizing Factors*

- The civil war resulted in a number of problematic issues between Morocco and Saharawis, including refugees and prisoners of war<sup>11</sup>
- Intifada characterized by mass demonstrations against Morocco begin in May 2005<sup>12</sup>
  - Moroccan police and/or military frequently respond to anti-Moroccan demonstrations with overwhelming force and arrests<sup>13</sup>
  - Prisoners have staged hunger strikes<sup>14</sup>
- Morocco has worked to resettle Moroccan citizens in Western Sahara and Saharawis in Morocco<sup>15</sup>
- Western Sahara is divided into regions controlled by Morocco and those

controlled by SADR; regions are divided by Moroccan built walls, or 'berms'<sup>16</sup>

- Both sides claim the other violates the military agreement<sup>17</sup>

#### *Potential spoilers*

- Frente Polisario returns to violent methods to achieve independence
- Surge in violent police and military repression of demonstrations

### 7.2.2. Governance and Political Instability

**High risk (7.15)**

#### *Stabilizing Factors*

- Some conciliatory gestures by King Mohamed<sup>18</sup>
  - Has allowed limited activity by Saharawi human rights groups
  - Formed Equity and Reconciliation Commission to resolve the question of the hundreds of "disappeared" Saharawis
  - Has pardoned some political prisoners
- King Mohamed beginning to place negotiations within a political context instead of security<sup>19</sup>

#### *Destabilizing Factors*

- Inability to resolve territorial status, disagreements over voter registration lists for the referendum<sup>20</sup>
- Morocco viewed as rebuffing attempts to hold referendum<sup>21</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Freedom House 1.

<sup>9</sup> War on Want.

<sup>10</sup> UNDPKO 2.

<sup>11</sup> Frente Polisario claims that Morocco holds 150 prisoners, although Morocco denies having any Saharawi combatants. Freedom House 1-2.

<sup>12</sup> Amnesty International. (2005) *Morocco and Western Sahara*. Available: [http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/morocco\\_and\\_western\\_sahara/document.do?id=ar&yr=2005](http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/morocco_and_western_sahara/document.do?id=ar&yr=2005) (Accessed 8 May 2006).

<sup>1</sup> and The Economist. (22 Sept 2005) *Give it Another Try*. Available:

[http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story\\_id=4432949](http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4432949) (Accessed 10 May 2006). 1.

<sup>13</sup> Freedom House 2 and Amnesty International 1.

<sup>14</sup> War on Want.

<sup>15</sup> Freedom House 1.

<sup>16</sup> International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2003) *Western Sahara Landmine Report*. Available: [http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/western\\_sahara.html](http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/western_sahara.html) (Accessed 12 May 2006) 1. (Hereafter referred to as ICBL)

<sup>17</sup> Note that this complaint is doubly listed under the Militarization cluster. United Nations Secretary General (2005) *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara*. S/2005/254, 2. Hereafter referred to as UNSG (2005).

<sup>18</sup> Freedom House, 1-3 and Amnesty International 1.

<sup>19</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit. (2006) *Country Report Morocco*. np.

<sup>20</sup> UNDPKO 2.

<sup>21</sup> War on Want.

- Wide variety of Saharawian grievances, largely due to Morocco's repressive measures, including<sup>22</sup>
  - Intimidation of Saharawi people
  - Illegal movement
  - Demonstrations repressed, often violently
  - Military occupation
  - Occasional use of air power
  - Banning of the SADR flag<sup>23</sup>
- Highly restricted freedom of expression, association and assembly; frequent politically motivated arrests by Moroccan authorities<sup>24</sup>
  - Reports that human rights activists are targeted for beatings, arrest and torture by Moroccan security forces<sup>25</sup>
- Reports of Polisario restrictions in and near Algerian Tindouf refugee camps<sup>26</sup>
- Morocco controls local elections; only those with pro-Moroccan views are elected<sup>27</sup>
- Frequent anti-Moroccan demonstrations<sup>28</sup>
- Trial of demonstrators viewed as unfair<sup>29</sup>

#### *Potential spoilers*

- Moroccan refusal to accept a pro-independence referendum result

### **7.2.3. Militarization**

**High risk (8.74)**

#### *Stabilizing Factors*

- Both sides have agreed to cooperate with MINURSO on landmine problem<sup>30</sup>

#### *Destabilizing Factors*

- High degree of spending on military<sup>31</sup>

- Tensions between Morocco and Frente Polisario, each side claims the other has violated the military agreement<sup>32</sup>
- Landmine problem<sup>33</sup>
  - Occasional landmine victim
  - Moroccan and Polisario forces have used landmines extensively in the past
- Frente Polisario denies current use and accuses Morocco of deploying landmines

#### *Potential spoilers*

- Frente Polisario increases its military capability
- Morocco pours a multitude of soldiers into the region

### **7.2.4. Population Heterogeneity**

**Low risk (2.67)**

#### *Stabilizing Factors*

- Low ethnic diversity<sup>34</sup>

#### *Destabilizing Factors*

- Tensions between Saharawis and Moroccan settlers<sup>35</sup>

#### *Potential spoilers*

- Upsurge in hostility between Saharawi and Moroccan citizens

### **7.2.5. Economic Performance**

**High risk (6.56)**

#### *Stabilizing Factors*

- Large phosphate deposits, rich fishing areas, offshore oil deposits<sup>36</sup>
- Subsidies, development assistance from Morocco<sup>37</sup>

#### *Destabilizing Factors*

<sup>22</sup> List taken from Minorities at Risk (2004) 1.

<sup>23</sup> War on Want.

<sup>24</sup> Freedom House 2.

<sup>25</sup> Amnesty International 1.

<sup>26</sup> United States Department of State. (2005) *Western Sahara Human Rights Report*. Available: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61702.htm> (Accessed 12 May 2006).3.

<sup>27</sup> Freedom House 2.

<sup>28</sup> Freedom House 2.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Department of State (2005) 2.

<sup>30</sup> ICBL 1.

<sup>31</sup> Terry Bell and John J. Gazo (2006) *Conflict risk assessment report*.

<sup>32</sup> Note that this complaint is doubly listed under the History of Armed Conflict cluster. UNSG (2005).

<sup>33</sup> ICBL 1-3.

<sup>34</sup> Minorities at Risk (2004) 1.

<sup>35</sup> United Nations Secretary General (2006) 2.

<sup>36</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. (2006) *World Factbook: Western Sahara*. Available: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/wi.html> (Accessed 10 May 2006).

<sup>37</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit and U.S. Department of State (2005) 1.



- Poor labour laws and lack of activity<sup>38</sup>
- Poor economic conditions (lower than Morocco's); economic activities regulated by Morocco; dispute over Morocco's signed agreements over international oil exploration off Saharan shores<sup>39</sup>
- Refugees in Algeria rely entirely on humanitarian assistance<sup>40</sup>

*Potential spoilers*

- Economic crisis

**7.2.6. International Linkages**

**Medium risk (6.24)**

*Stabilizing Factors*

- Continuance of MINURSO mandate
- Morocco and Frente Polisario agree to UNHCR and MINURSO package of confidence building measures<sup>41</sup>
- U.S. may be prepared to intervene diplomatically to resolve the issue<sup>42</sup>

*Destabilizing Factors*

- Resignation of UN Special Envoy Baker in 2004 due to inability to broker peace<sup>43</sup>
- Secretary General Kofi Annan regularly expresses concern about the region<sup>44</sup>
- UN General Assembly special committee unable to agree over "Baker Plan II"<sup>45</sup>
- Journalists activists have been expelled for meeting Saharawi activists<sup>46</sup>
- Further international recognition of SADR as a legitimate state, including South

<sup>38</sup> Freedom House 3.

<sup>39</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. (2006).

<sup>40</sup> United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). *Western Sahara*. [http://www.womenwarpeace.org/western\\_s/western\\_sahara.htm](http://www.womenwarpeace.org/western_s/western_sahara.htm) 2. Hereafter UNIFEM.

<sup>41</sup> Freedom House 2. See History of Armed Conflict for details.

<sup>42</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit.

<sup>43</sup> Freedom House 1.

<sup>44</sup> Freedom House 2.

<sup>45</sup> The Baker Plan would have made Western Sahara a semi-autonomous region within Morocco for a "four or five year transition period. After that, a referendum would let residents choose independence, continued semiautonomy, or integration with Morocco." Freedom House 2.

<sup>46</sup> Freedom House 2.

Africa in 2004, causing a flare in tensions between Morocco and Algeria<sup>47</sup>

- Growing international campaign of solidarity, especially within Europe<sup>48</sup>
  - Increasing international criticism over Morocco's human rights record<sup>49</sup>
- Low international interest in the conflict<sup>50</sup>

*Potential spoilers*

- Rapid, heavy-handed and/or clumsy attempts by international actors to pressure one or both sides to submit to the other's demands

**7.2.7. Environmental Stress**

**High risk (7.00)**

*Stabilizing Factors*

- Lack of ongoing environmental crises

*Destabilizing Factors*

- Lack of arable land combined with water scarcity; not party to any environmental agreement<sup>51</sup>

*Potential spoilers*

- Natural disaster, drought

**7.2.8. Demographic Stress**

**Medium risk (6.33)**

*Stabilizing Factors*

- Low population density<sup>52</sup>

*Destabilizing Factors*

- High population growth rate (2.9%)<sup>53</sup>

*Potential spoilers*

- Population explosion, including a surge in the youth bulge

<sup>47</sup> Amnesty International 1.

<sup>48</sup> War on Want.

<sup>49</sup> See for instance Amnesty International.

<sup>50</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit.

<sup>51</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. (2006).

<sup>52</sup> Population and Development Database (2006) Western Sahara.

[http://www.alsagerschool.co.uk/subjects/sub\\_content/GEOgraphy/Gpop/HTML/ENH/COUNTRY/eh.htm](http://www.alsagerschool.co.uk/subjects/sub_content/GEOgraphy/Gpop/HTML/ENH/COUNTRY/eh.htm)

<sup>53</sup> Population and Development Database.



### **7.2.9. Human Development**

**High risk (7.66)**

#### *Stabilizing Factors*

- Initiation of women's peace building activities<sup>54</sup>

#### *Destabilizing Factors*

- Poor human development indicators, such as birth rate of 47 per thousand<sup>55</sup>
- High gender inequality<sup>56</sup>
- Limited access to medical facilities<sup>57</sup>
- Refugees live in conditions characterized by poor health and sanitation, food insecurity and family separation<sup>58</sup>

#### *Potential spoilers*

- Major problems with service provision

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<sup>54</sup> UNIFEM 3.

<sup>55</sup> Population and Development Database.

<sup>56</sup> Freedom House 3.

<sup>57</sup> ICBL 2.

<sup>58</sup> UNIFEM 2.




## 8. Events Data: Trends and Analysis

### 8.1. Summary

**Table 3. Overall statistics**

	Total number of events	Average event score	Average score as a percent of total possible (9)
All	400	-1.8	-20%
Stabilizing	102	3.6	40%
Destabilizing	298	-3.6	-40%

**Table 4. Overall event trends**

	<b>All events</b>	<b>Stabilizing events</b>	<b>Destabilizing events</b>
<b>Weekly aggregate</b>	Moderately positive 	Status Quo 	Moderately positive 

Between 7 October 2005 and 3 May 2006, 400 events were recorded for the Western Sahara region. The overall statistics from this period confirm that Western Sahara remains a risky region, as the average is a substantial -1.8 (-20%). This shows that on average events tend to be destabilizing and at a moderate level. Yet despite this highly negative environment, the same events indicate overall improvement; the trend shows that there has been some reduction in the potential for the outbreak of conflict and possible movement towards an environment conducive to peace-building efforts.

The primary drivers of events in Western Sahara are within the Governance and Political Stability and International Linkages clusters.

Governance and Political Instability was a key source of destabilizing events for Western Sahara, owing to the ongoing tensions between Morocco and the SADR, Frente Polisario and general Saharawi population. It thus demonstrated a negative overall average score. The trends, however, were moderately positive, pointing towards an improving situation.

International Linkages possessed the largest number of events. It too displayed the relatively negative average event score, but the trend rested at a status quo level. This occurred because despite the worsening relations in the region and between Morocco and human rights groups, there was an offsetting positive trend at the broader international level.

Overall, it would appear that Western Sahara continues to be a destabilized region with a moderately positive trend. Because this trend is caused by a decrease in destabilizing events, it may appear to exist in stalemate. However, an increase in the number or magnitude of stabilizing events with a further decrease in the number and magnitude of destabilizing events could possibly lead to an improved situation. With proper support, the international community could assist Western Sahara achieve such a situation.

*Events are accurate as of April 30, 2006*

## 8.2. Primary Drivers




*Primary drivers are those clusters that contain more than twenty-five events. These clusters are the main areas of activity in the region, with the greatest contribution to the overall trend.*

### 8.2.1. Governance and Political Instability

**Table 5. Governance and Political Instability statistics**

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	176	-3	-29%
Stabilizing	24	3.7	41%
Destabilizing	152	-3.8	-40%

**Table 6. Governance and Political Instability event trends**

	All events	Stabilizing events	Destabilizing events
<b>Weekly aggregate</b>	Moderately positive 	Moderately positive 	Moderately positive 

Events in Western Sahara continue to demonstrate that the region has quite a risky political environment, as the average conflict indicator statistics demonstrate. However, the events also show that despite the overall problems, the situation has weakly-to-moderately improved over the past six months. This is largely due to a fall in the number and magnitude of destabilizing events; demonstrations were initially widespread, but over the past few months have tended to decrease in numbers. If stabilizing events were to rise as well, this cluster would likely see significant improvement.

#### Overview of Stabilizing Events

- Body for Equity and Reconciliation find burial locations of some disappeared Saharawis
- Some action against police officers accused of killing a Saharawi
- Release of human rights activist Aminetou Haidar
- Morocco offers conciliatory measure to end one hunger strike
- Peaceful commemoration of SADR's 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary
- King Mohammed offers discussion

#### Overview of Destabilizing Events




- Body for Equity and Reconciliation find burial locations of some disappeared Saharawis
- Mass independence demonstrations across Western Sahara
- Accusations against Morocco for taking illegal immigrants and leaving them in the Western Sahara desert
- Political prisoners stage hunger strikes
- Frente Polisario and SADR both reject Moroccan offer of autonomy
- Saharawi property damaged
- Widespread arrests, particularly of human rights activists and in response to demonstrations
- Complaints over judicial treatment of Saharawis arrested during demonstrations
- Morocco prevents Saharawi from entering Saharan town
- Saharawis lose jobs
- King Mohamed visits Western Sahara, stirring tensions and discontent
- Morocco and SADR continue to voice their opposing views of the future status of Western Sahara
- Frente Polisario rejects UN calls for negotiating with Morocco

### 8.2.2. International Linkages

**Table 7. International Linkages statistics**

	Total number of events	Average score	Average score % of possible 9
All	180	-1.2	-13%
Stabilizing	58	3.4	38%
Destabilizing	122	-3.4	-37%

**Table 8. International Linkages event trends**

	All events	Stabilizing events	Destabilizing events
<b>Weekly aggregate</b>	Status Quo 	Moderately negative 	Moderately positive 

The relatively average strong negative value for events in International Linkages demonstrates the cluster's poor performance in Western Sahara. According to the trend statistics, however,

the situation sits at the status quo, balanced between a moderately positive trend among destabilizing events and a moderately negative trend among stabilizing events. This corresponds to the events over the past six months; they were largely indicative of the typically destabilizing incidents that occur between internal and external stakeholders accompanied by stabilizing actions at the broader international level.

*Overview of Stabilizing Events*

- UN GA expresses need to resolve Western Sahara issue
- Regional actors claim need to find solution to the dispute
- MINURSO mandate continues
- Some attempts to improve relations between Morocco and Algeria
- International observers allowed at Saharawi trial
- Kofi Annan encourages talks between the two parties
- Controversial oil firm withdraws its Morocco-authorized bid

*Overview of Destabilizing Events*

- Multiple international states, parliaments, NGOs express solidarity with SADR
- Accusations between Morocco and Algeria as to who left the migrants in the Western Sahara desert
- International criticism of Morocco's human rights record, treatment of Saharawis
  - International demonstrations
  - Frente Polisario pushes for more international denunciations of Morocco's actions
- Frente Polisario threatens oil company that received licences from Morocco
- Morocco pushes for international community, Algeria to support Western Sahara within Morocco
  - Calls Baker Plan "dead"
- Diplomats, journalists denied access to Saharawi towns
- SADR, Frente Polisario requests the UN expand MINURSO's mandate to include protection of civilians, intervention
- Emerging split in AU over Western Sahara
  - Sudan supports Morocco's sovereignty
- Disagreement among EU members regarding the fishing agreement with Morocco
- Frente Polisario rejects Kofi Annan's proposal on restarting the peace process

### **8.3. Secondary Drivers**

*Secondary drivers are those clusters with less than twenty-five monitored events. These clusters provide supplementary information to the overall analysis.*

#### **8.3.1. Armed Conflict**

The Armed Conflict cluster exhibited a highly negative overall average, consistent with the tensions that exist between Morocco and the Saharawis. There were only a handful of events, however, so unless renewed conflict breaks out, this cluster is more likely to provide trigger events rather than become a future source of major destabilization.

#### **8.3.2. Economic Performance**

Economic Performance in Western Sahara tended to experience stabilizing events. This was due to the SADR's initiation of oil licensing negotiations with international firms, which is likely to bring about increased economic activity in the region. Yet the region continues to demonstrate overall poor performance, as per the structural assessment, and so this cluster is unlikely to be a contributor to any major improvement in the Western Sahara. It could, however, produce a trigger event through growing popular dissatisfaction with the economic conditions.

#### **8.3.3. Militarization**

The Militarization events possessed highly positive values, and so it appears as though an increase in events in this cluster could offer Western Sahara some stabilization. These events come in the form of Frente Polisario's increased work to reduce the number of landmines in Western Sahara.

#### **8.3.4. Population Heterogeneity**

Population heterogeneity continues to be a cluster of low importance to the structural risk factor. This is indicative of the high degree of cohesiveness among Saharawins. It also shows that although there may be tensions between Saharawis and Moroccans in Western Sahara, this tension has not yet caused destabilizing events. However, this area should continue to be monitored, given that the tensions do exist.

#### **8.3.5. Environmental Stress**

On average, this cluster demonstrated a somewhat high magnitude of destabilizing events. This was caused by the two incidents of torrential rains that had negative repercussions for refugees and movement in the region.

#### **8.3.6. Demographic Stress**

Demographic stress continues to be a significant structural risk factor due to the continued problems of a high growth rate in conjunction with a lack of educational, economic or leisure opportunities for youth.

#### **8.3.7. Human Development**

Human development events were generally positive and relatively high, due to the fact that reported events included a number of donor pledges and arrival of humanitarian aid deliveries.

## Part C: Annex

### 9. Summary of Data

**Table 9. Overall data**

Risk indicator			All events		Stabilizing events		Destabilizing events	
			Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.
	<b>Medium risk</b>	<b>(6.09)</b>	.4	-1.9	.06	3.6	.35	-3.8

**Table 10. Data for primary drivers**

Cluster	Risk indicator	All events		Stabilizing events		Destabilizing events	
		Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.	Trend	Avg.
Governance and Political Instability	<b>High risk</b> <b>(7.15)</b>	.30	-2.8	.12	3.7	.23	-3.8
International Linkages	<b>Medium risk</b> <b>(6.24)</b>	.08	-1.2	-.11	3.4	.16	-3.4

**Table 11. Data for Secondary Drivers**

Cluster	Risk indicator		
Armed Conflict	<b>Medium risk</b>	<b>(3.60)</b>	
Economic Performance	<b>High risk</b>	<b>(6.56)</b>	
Militarization	<b>High risk</b>	<b>(8.74)</b>	
Population Heterogeneity	<b>Low risk</b>	<b>(2.67)</b>	
Environmental Stress	<b>High risk</b>	<b>(7.00)</b>	
Demographic Stress	<b>Medium risk</b>	<b>(6.33)</b>	
Human Development	<b>High risk</b>	<b>(7.66)</b>	

## 10. Trend Line Charts

### 10.1. All events




Figure 2. Chart of trend lines for all events and the count of events by week

## 10.2. Stabilizing events




Figure 3. Chart of trend lines for stabilizing events and the count of events by week



### 10.3. Destabilizing events




Figure 4. Chart of trend lines for destabilizing events and the count of events by week



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Events were obtained using Google Alerts (<http://www.google.com/alerts>), which provided a daily summary of news reports for the search term 'Western Sahara'. The news reports originated from a wide variety of local and international sources, including:

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- African News Dimension - Johannesburg
- Afrol News - Oslo, Norway
- Agenzia Giornalistica Italia
- AKI - Rome
- Al Jazeera
- AllAfrica.com
- Amnesty International
- ArmyTimes.com
- BBC monitoring
- China Post
- Cleveland Plain Dealer - Cleveland, OH, USA
- CNN.com
- Committee to Protect Journalists
- CRI - Beijing, China
- Czech news agency
- Daily Star, Lebanon - Google alert
- EiTB - Spain
- Expatica - Netherlands
- Financial times
- FishUpdate.com
- Forbes
- Gulf Times - Qatar
- Hinesberg Journal
- Institute for War and Peace Reporting - London
- International Herald Tribune
- Islamic Republic News Agency - Tehran
- ISN
- Middle East Online
- Morocco Times
- NBC
- New York Times
- NewKerala.com - Ernakulam, Kerala, India
- News24
- Noticias - Spain
- Oil & Gas
- Oilonline
- OilVoice
- Opendemocracy
- People's Daily Online
- Prague daily monitor
- Pravda
- Press Gazette - UK
- Radio Free Europe
- Reliefweb
- Reporters without borders
- Reuters
- Sahara Press Service
- Scotsman UK
- Seattle Post Intelligencer
- Spain Herald
- Special Broadcasting Service - Australia
- Stuff.co.nz - New Zealand
- Swissinfo
- Telecom Paper
- Thanh Nien Daily
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## 13. Methodology

### 13.1. Description of Events Monitoring

Event trends are assessed using the slope of time-series trend lines that are provided by plotting event data over a given period of time. First, based on the context of the region as described by the Background, Stakeholders and Risk Indicators sections, events are identified as being generally stabilizing or destabilizing<sup>59</sup> and given a sign of either +1 (stabilizing) or -1 (destabilizing). Events are then coded on a scale of 1 to 3 for three dimensions: the degree to which they can be linked to the risk of future peace or conflict – Causality (Ca); whether the event is typical or constitutes an acceleration of events – Escalation (Es); and the degree to which the event affects relevant stakeholders– Centrality (Ce). Causality and Escalation are coded based on a qualitative analysis of the event considered within the context of the region's risk indicators. Centrality is coded using a quantitative analysis of the proportion of stakeholders affected by the event.

A conflict indicator statistic is then calculated by summing the three dimensions of an event (Ca+Es+Ce), and multiplying it by the sign to provide a stabilizing indicator of +3 to +9 and a destabilizing indicator of -3 to -9. The analyst can use this conflict indicator to explore summary statistics as well as trend lines of the region's events.

Summary statistics provide the analyst with an overview of the average event scores. The total number of events and the average conflict indicator statistics are calculated, including sub-calculations by sign. For the average scores, a percentage

is calculated based on the highest score for that conflict indicator statistic. For instance, an average Ca+Es+Ce can score as high (or low) as +/- 9, so a score of +/- 2 achieves a percentage of +/- 22%. Positive percentages are indicative of an environment that on average experiences stabilizing events, as there are either more stabilizing events or more strongly valued stabilizing events. Negative percentages indicate the opposite, an environment characterized by destabilizing events. The closer the percentage comes to +/- 100% the better (or worse) events tend to be.

The second avenue of analysis is via trend lines to observe whether the events demonstrate any positive or negative trend over time. The conflict indicators are plotted against time – usually six months – and trend lines are generated, based on ordinary least squares regression, and compared in two different ways. The first comparison, the individual event trend line, plots the conflict indicators of each event over time. This is useful in that it indicates whether and to what degree the individual event conflict indicators have a positive or negative trend over time. However, it does not account for an increase or decrease in the total *number* of events, so the second trend analysis is that of the weekly aggregate. To attain this trend line, the conflict indicators are first summed by week; for instance, if one week has four events with the conflict indicators of +2, +2, -2 and -2, the overall weekly aggregate would be 0, the stabilizing weekly aggregate would be +4 and the destabilizing weekly aggregate would be -4. The weekly aggregate is then plotted over time to produce a trend line that incorporates the theory that an increase or decrease in total number of

<sup>59</sup> Note that in some unique cases an event will be coded as both stabilizing and destabilizing.








events should matter in addition to their changing value. That is, one would presume that a rapid increase in the number of stabilizing events would indicate an improving trend, even if the conflict indicators for the individual events remain largely unchanged.

Taken together, these two trend analyses provide an overview of the general event developments over the previous months.

In the analysis, both stabilizing and destabilizing trend lines reflect improvements through positive slopes, indicating the reduction in conflict vulnerability. On the other hand, negative slopes denote a deteriorating situation – an increase in conflict vulnerability. The degree of improvement or deterioration is identified as status quo, moderate, or strong, based on the slope and according to the following chart:

**Table 12. Matrix of Trend Magnitudes and associated symbols**

<b>Trend Magnitude</b>	Strongly Negative	Moderately Negative	Status quo	Moderately Positive	Strongly Positive
<b>Slope size</b>	Below -1	Between -1 and -.1	Between -.1 and .1	Between +.1 and +1	Over +1
<b>Symbol</b>					

Finally, scenarios are created for best case, worst case and status quo situations, based on an analysis of overall and cluster summary statistics and trends. The best and worst cases consider the trends among stabilizing and destabilizing events. The best case assumes that the strongest of the positive trends will hold for the future time period, and the worst case assumes that the strongest of the negative trends will occur. This holds regardless of whether the positive (or negative) trend occurs among destabilizing (or stabilizing) events. For instance, if there is strongly positive trend among destabilizing events, this trend would be used to extrapolate events for the best case scenario. If there is a strongly negative trend among stabilizing events, this trend would be used for the worst case. The status quo, on the other hand, will extrapolate future tendencies based on the overall trend. For instance, if there is moderate overall improvement, then the status quo assumes that this is

the trend for the future. Events are then surmised based on these trends in order to provide a conjectured future case.

Each case concludes by estimating the region's future capacity to absorb damaging events and take advantage of peace-building opportunities by forecasting the best, worst or status quo trends. The conclusion will also state the likelihood that the region will approach a higher or lower risk level; this analysis is based on whether the current risk level is already near a lower or higher category and the magnitude of the trend under consideration. For example, a medium-risk region of 3.6 with a strongly positive trend line is likely to move into the low risk level. Alternatively, a medium-risk region of 6.4 with a weak trend line is unlikely to move into the low risk level, but it could move into a high risk level with a moderately deteriorating trend.

### 13.2. Description of Events Data Collection

Events were collected in one of two methods for this study.

In most cases, the news-parsing technology of Google-Alerts ([www.google.com/alerts](http://www.google.com/alerts)) was employed to scan and collect daily reports of events data reported by the international press about the particular sub-national region of interest. Search terms were identified by the sub-national region itself and as a result of the stakeholder analysis (if one actor or group tended to garner a significant amount of press but not necessarily reported in the same news stories as the name of the sub-national region); in some cases, alternate spellings and transliterations were used as search terms to ensure a more robust set of data. News reports were then delivered to

analysts as daily emails (if news events were found for that day) which were then coded into a Microsoft Access Database using the methodology described above.

The other method by which data was gathered for this study was to collect the data post-facto. Some sub-national regions' data was collected only partially using Google-Alerts so a more robust reassessment of the monitoring time period was required. To do this, analysts employed a LexisNexis search for the monitoring period and using the same search parameters as had been used with Google-Alerts. The events collected using this methodology are identical in type to the daily digest-type – the only difference is the timing in which the analysts coded the events was not continuous.