



LEBANON AT THE CROSSROADS

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Executive Summary

Decades of sectarian politics, coupled with poor economic policies, have made it challenging for Lebanon to provide its population with basic services. The indicators are worrisome. The GDP growth rate is at -5.6% as of 2019 and the inflation rate is at 136%. Recent triggers such as the influx of Syrian refugees (1.5 million, the world's highest per capita refugee population), COVID-19 (126,000 cases in November 2020) and the Beirut explosion (that destroyed 120,000 tons of food) have exacerbated the already dire economic situation, leaving Lebanon at the crossroads of reforms or deterioration into fragility. While Lebanon's government authority is moderately stable and representative of its diversity, the poor service delivery has resulted in a legitimacy crises and limited capacity for change. This policy brief recommends immediate engagement in strategic economic reforms sanctioned by civil society, including women led organizations, improving service delivery by enhancing the capacity of national actors to deliver proper public services, and increasing the legitimacy of the government by reducing political gridlocks in Lebanon's political system.

Methods

This policy brief relied on a wide variety of qualitative and quantitative data obtained from various sources. For quantitative data, we consulted reports from the World Bank, Freedom House, Transparency International, Fragile States Index, Palma Ratio, UN reports, just to name a few. For qualitative data, we collected and analyzed numerous peer-reviewed journals, news articles, blogs, official statements, social media, institutional reports, and expert analysis in French, Arabic and English. Using available data and mapping trends over the past ten years, we presented our analysis, highlighting areas where Lebanon was stable, improving, or declining.

The indicators identified followed the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)¹ methodology and specifically the table of indicators for assessing Authority, Legitimacy and Capacity (ALC) by Carment and Samy (2019)². To delineate between Authority, Legitimacy, and Capacity, we used definitions from Calleja, R. , Carment, D., Tikuisis, P and Haichin, M. (2017)³ which states that state authority reflects the institutional ability of the government to enact binding legislation over its population and provide it with a stable and secure environment; while state legitimacy reflects leadership support of the population along with international recognition of that support; and state capacity reflects the state's resources that can be mobilized for developmental and defensive purposes. Key concepts guiding this brief include inclusive/extractive political and economic institutions, formal and informal power, and horizontal inequalities.

Background

Lebanon, formally known as the Republic of Lebanon, has a mountainous terrain, and is known for its scenic beauty.⁴ It is boarded by Syria, to the east and north and Israel to the south. The most recent population according to the World Bank is 6,855,713 people.⁵ The main cities in Lebanon are Beirut (the capital city), Tripoli, Sidon, Zahle, and Tyre. This state is a diverse nation

with a mosaic of religions and ethnic groups.⁶ Refer to Annex I for a map of Lebanon and its main cities, religions, and breakdown of proportional representation.

Lebanon gained its independence from France in 1943, and sectarian tensions exacerbated, as they were entering into a decolonization process which led to the 1975-1990 civil war⁷ involving the invasion of Syria and Israel. The amount of deaths that occurred from the war and two Israeli invasions were extremely high (more than 100,000 people).⁸ To note, the civil war caused severe damage to the educational system, as buildings and other infrastructures were affected, and schools were closed for long periods of time. The war tore the nation apart and destroyed the economy.⁹ On July 12, 2006 to August 14, 2006, Hezbollah forces in Lebanon fired thousands of air strikes into Israel, causing many civilian deaths and destruction to infrastructures in Israel.¹⁰

Upon multiple resurgences of conflict, and new regime changes, Lebanon's 2017 electoral law introduced proportional representation and preferential voting, which improved opportunities not only for diaspora voting,¹¹ but to provide an opportunity for independent candidates to earn a seat in parliament. It has been nine years since Lebanon ran an election, and in the year of 2018 was when citizens were back at the polls to vote in their new Prime Minister.¹² However, protests of social and economic reforms were on the rise, as the state has not been able to perform service delivery and financial stability due to corruption in government. Amid the protest, the Prime Minister at the time Saad Hariri resigned, and a new government had taken place by Prime Minister Hassan Diab in January 2020.

Lebanon experienced a devastating explosion on August 4, 2020 in Beirut, due to an unmonitored chemical (ammonium nitrate) stored unsafely in a warehouse for six years, and it caused many deaths and destruction to infrastructures to the port of the city.¹³ Prime Minister Hassan Diab blamed the explosion on corruption and therefore resigned to make a statement that the government needs to change.¹⁴ However later that month, Mustapha Adib was appointed Prime Minister to help rebuild the country. Following new political gridlocks, Mr. Adib stepped down from his position of Prime Minister, in September 2020, and has not been replaced by a new Prime Minister.¹⁵

The economic crisis, the pandemic, and the Beirut explosion have put Lebanon in a critical state of emergency. It is up to the sectarian government to push for reform to enhance the economic, political, and social system of Lebanon before it falls into the fragile state category.

Stakeholders

Primary Stakeholders

Michel Aoun is Lebanon's current president, founder of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and a Maronite Christian. He was elected in October 2016 for a six-year term, following a two-year vacancy. There have been 40 attempts to fill the position, but all have failed due to boycotts and political gridlocks.¹⁶ However, the president of Lebanon is always Christian.¹⁷

Lebanese Prime Ministers: At the time of the writing of this policy brief, Lebanon does not have a Prime Minister, exemplifying the difficulty in advancing state policies. President Aoun reappointed **Saad Hariri** as Prime Minister in 2016 for a third term, as he had previously served from 2009 to 2011 and from 2016 to 2018. During his third term, Prime Minister Hariri struggled to get endorsements to form a new cabinet and resigned in August 2020¹⁸ following the Beirut explosion and mass protests. Later that month, **Mustapha Adib** was appointed Prime Minister to help rebuild the country. However, following new political gridlocks, Mr. Adib stepped down from his position of Prime Minister in September 2020¹⁹.

Hezbollah is a dominant Lebanese Shia Muslim political party and militant group, and is supported and funded by Iran and seeks to establish a Shia Islamic state-based system, that remains loyal to Iran and its approach to create Islamic Lebanon.²⁰ The Shiite community became Hezbollah's foot soldiers. Although Hezbollah is working from within the existing Lebanese system, they remain loyal to the Iranian Islamic-based system, Wilayat al-Faqih-based system, not to Lebanon and Lebanese people, who represent the secular republic system. While Hezbollah has great ties with the Iranian government, as in turn it provides it influence in Lebanese government, Hezbollah has hostile relations with Israel and Western countries such as the US.²¹

The Amal Movement is the largest Shia party in parliament and is a conservative movement. Its support base comes from Shiite Muslims. It remains in alliance with Hezbollah, the progressive socialist political party, and Free Patriotic Movement (FPM).²² **The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)** is a centrist movement with a support base that comes from Lebanon's Christian community. It aims to build democracy as a system of government in Lebanon.²³ There are also a considerable number of other political parties in Lebanon. For example, **Marada Movement** is a liberal political party, its support base mainly comes from Maronite Christians. **The Dignity Movement** is a Lebanese political party, its members are mainly Sunni Muslims. **The Lebanese Democratic Party** is secular and has members from most Lebanese sects, however its largest support comes from the Druze.²⁴

The Central Bank of Lebanon, or Banque du Liban, is managed by a governor, who is always a Maronite Christian²⁵. Its main responsibility is to issue currency, regulate money transfers and maintain monetary stability.²⁶ The Lebanese economy has been struggling and in March 2020, Prime Minister Hassan Diab announced that Lebanon would not be able to make a bond payment of \$1.2bn (£900m), thereby defaulting on its obligations. Later this year, Lebanon also defaulted in additional payments, including \$2.7 billion of payments due in April and June²⁷. Refer to Annex 4 for information regarding civil society actors in Lebanon.

Secondary Stakeholders

Syria has a history of conflict with Lebanon²⁸. Syria occupied Lebanon for 30 years (1976-2005). However, the relations between Syria and Lebanon were quickly retreated after the Cedar revolution, where it ended the Syrian military occupation of Lebanon²⁹. The war in Syria produced over 1.5 million refugees hosted by Lebanon, causing economic and demographic strain. There have been reported growing tensions between Lebanese and Syrian communities. This is due to

the history of occupation and exploitation of Lebanon by Syria, and the division in Lebanon between those who support the Syrian regime and those who support the opposition groups³⁰. Therefore, any worsening in the situation of the Syria crisis would have a direct impact on Lebanon.

Iran: Hezbollah receives funding and resources from the Iranian government. Therefore, Hezbollah remains loyal to Iran and provides Iran influence in the Lebanese government.

End User

This policy brief and the corresponding policy options are directed to Global Affairs Canada (GAC). One of the key priorities of GAC is to support Middle East and North Africa Countries (MENA), through its Middle East engagement Strategy.³¹ This strategy enables GAC to develop economic structures and promote sustainable institutions and humanitarian practices in Lebanon.³² GAC implemented a number of projects addressing the capacity gap represented in the Lebanese government's performance, such as the CFLI program, the Country-Level Funding for the Middle East 2019-2021 project, and the Emergency -Country Specific Funding in the Middle East 2019-2021 program. In addition, GAC implemented the Daring to Shift: Young Women at the Center of Inclusive Growth 2019-2023 project, that addresses the legitimacy gap of the Lebanese government, through developing and supporting youth empowerment, leadership, and social entrepreneurship, and enabling them to take advantage of economic opportunities.³³ Refer to Annex 3 for more information regarding GAC's engagement plans in Lebanon.

Fragility Risk Assessment

The following assessment represents trends over the past ten years where available. Clusters are divided into primary and secondary drivers of potential fragility. The primary drivers in Lebanon include governance, economic and environment clusters as they have a high impact on potential fragility. The secondary driver's demography and population, crime and security, and human development. These drivers have a moderate impact on potential fragility. Refer to Annex 5 for additional information and analysis regarding clusters.

Legend			
Current impact on fragility	Low	Moderate	High
Trend over the last 10 years (or the most available data)	Improving ↑	Stable →	Deteriorating ↓

The above legend illustrates how the following clusters were categorized based on their current impact on fragility and trend over the last ten years. Current impact is determined by the effect of each cluster on fragility.

Primary drivers of potential fragility

Governance ↓	
Indicator	Value and Trend
Government Effectiveness ³⁴ Worldwide Governance indicator 0 (weak) to 100 (strong) performance	39% in 2009 and 17% in 2019 Low and decreasing trend
Rule of Law ³⁵ Worldwide Governance indicator 0 (weak) to 100 (strong) performance	28% in 2009 and 19% in 2019 Low and decreasing trend
Political stability/ Absence of violence ³⁶ Worldwide Governance indicator 0 (weak) to 100 (strong) performance	8% in 2009 and 7% in 2019 Very low and decreasing trend
Corruption ³⁷ Corruption Perceptions Index 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean)	2015 Score 28/100 and 2019 Score 28/100 Highly corrupt but stable score
Human Rights and Rule of Law ³⁸ Fragile State Index 10 (Worst score) to 0 (best score)	6.9 in 2009, 7.5 in 2015 and 6.9 in 2020 Poor and decreasing score
Political Rights ³⁹ Freedom House 0 (Worst score) to 40 (best score)	14/40 in 2017 and 14/40 in 2020 Moderate and stable trend
Civil Liberties ⁴⁰ Freedom House 0 (Worst score) to 60 (best score)	30/60 in 2017 and 30/60 in 2020 Moderate and stable trend
Bertelsmann Transformation Index 137 (Worst score) to 0 (best score)	2020 Political Transformation: #75 of 137 Economic Transformation: #72 of 137 Governance Index: #100 of 137

According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators⁴¹, governance relates to traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised, the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions. Lebanon has been facing a complex governance situation. Lebanon has an inclusive power-sharing arrangement between confessional communities, however, this inclusiveness also accounts for

numerous political gridlocks, such as disagreements over the size of shares allotted to individual communities - mainly Sunni, Shi'ite, and Druze Muslims, Orthodox and Maronite Christians⁴². Of note, only 3% of the elected parliamentarians are female, compared to over 20% averages in North African states like Libya and Morocco⁴³. Getting all parties to agree has been at the core of numerous delays in advancing policies. A concrete example is the stalemate regarding parliamentary elections. Parliamentary elections were cancelled in 2013 due to numerous disagreements, and were later postponed three times (2013, 2014 and 2017) due to additional disagreements⁴⁴. It was only in 2017 that the electoral law was finally adopted and parliamentary elections were finally held in 2018, conferring legitimacy to the parliament. These political gridlocks and vacuums point to the underlying reasons behind Lebanon's poor governance performance. Numerous sources, have pointed out that Lebanon's confessional power-sharing does not only create political gridlocks, but also fuels patronage networks and clientelism, creating room for widespread corruption, which further undermines the country's governance system⁴⁵. As of 2019, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Lebanon at 137 out of 180, where 180 is the most corrupt country in the world and also gave Lebanon a score of 28 over 100, where 100 is the highest score in transparency. In both cases, Lebanon performed badly, but this trend has remained constant between 2015 and 2020, hence pointing to the fact that corruption in Lebanon might not be a primary cause of fragility but a symptom.

Economic ↓	
Indicator	Value and Trend
Gross Domestic Product growth % ⁴⁶ World Bank economic indicators	10.2% in 2009, 0.2% in 2015 and -5.6% in 2019 Low and alarmingly deteriorating trend
Exports of goods (% of GDP) ⁴⁷ World Bank economic indicators	33.2% in 2009, 23.1% in 2015 and 21.7% in 2019 Decreasing trend
Imports of goods (% of GDP) ⁴⁸ World Bank economic indicators	57.2% in 2009, 48.7% in 2015 and 41.9% in 2019 Decreasing trend
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) ⁴⁹ World Bank economic indicators	4 billion in 2009, 2 billion in 2015 and 2 billion in 2019 Decreasing trend
Inflation rate ⁵⁰ Central Administration of Statistics Lebanon ⁵¹ /Trading Economics	7.87% in 2008, 136% in 2020 Dramatic increase in inflation rates

Informal economy⁵² International Labor Organization	55 % of all workers in Lebanon were informally employed in 2018–19, prior to the COVID-19 crisis, with a 55.4 %t informality rate among women and 54.8% among men
Personal remittance received - % of GDP⁵³ World Bank economic indicators	21% in 2009, 14% in 2015 and 13% in 2019 Decreasing trend
Unemployment⁵⁴ World Bank economic indicators	6% in 2009, 6% in 2015 and 6% in 2020 Low and stable

Lebanon is considered a small, upper-middle income, acutely fragile, open economy with a population of 4.5 million people⁵⁵. The Gross Domestic Product was US\$56 billion in 2018 and services and trade are the most important sectors, with tourism and financial services forming the backbone of the national economy⁵⁶. The Lebanese economy had been growing at a moderate pace over the past decades, however, according to many economists, the economic system in Lebanon had been failing and was artificially kept alive for years with financial engineering invented by Governor of the Banque of Lebanon (BDL), Riad Salamé⁵⁷. Some have called it a gigantic Ponzi scheme that gave very high interest rates for savings, inviting diaspora and private or institutional investors all over the world to save their money in Lebanese banks. This artificial inflow of money was not supported by real growth and hence not sustainable⁵⁸. As of 2019, Lebanon imported more than 80% of its needs amounting to 17 billion dollars and exported only 2.6 billion⁵⁹. By October 2019, banks began to ration withdrawals in foreign currency before stopping them permanently. GDP growth rate is at an alarming low of -5.6% as of 2019, and the inflation rate is at 136%. On 9 March 2020, Lebanon's government announced that it would not be paying \$1.2 billion in Eurobond payments, thus declaring the first sovereign default in the country's history⁶⁰. It is important to note that the size of the informal economy in Lebanon is estimated to be about 30 % of GDP⁶¹. These high levels of informality imply that many workers have little or no social protection or employment benefits. As the informal economy is not taxed, or monitored by any government institution, it implies lost revenue for the government.

Environment →	
Indicator	Value and Trend
Consumption - Energy use per capita (kg of oil equivalent) ⁶² World Bank environment indicators	1,219 (2011), 1,197 (2014) Slightly decreased, Recent data not available.
Energy intensity - Energy use per \$1,000 GDP (constant 2017 PPP) ⁶³ World Bank environment indicators	66 (2010), 70 (2014) Steadily increasing. Recent data not available.
Arable land - hectares per person ⁶⁴ World Bank environment indicators	0.02 (2016) Trend data not available
Environmental Performance ⁶⁵ Yale Environmental Performance Index ⁶⁶	Ranked 67 out of 180, with a score of 61.08 (2018) No clear trend
Pollution – CO ₂ Emissions per Dollar ⁶⁷ World Bank indicators	0.2 (2016) Decreasing slightly from 2011. Recent data not available.
Forest – % of land ⁶⁸ World Bank environment indicators	13.39% (2011), 13.43% (2016) Slowly but steadily improving
Pollution – CO ₂ Emissions per capita ⁶⁹ World Bank environment indicators	3.7 (2016) Decreased slightly from 2011. Recent data is not available

According to the World Bank data, people's access to safely managed drinking water score is 46.3 in 2010 and is 47.7 in 2017.⁷⁰ Although there is a slight increase in people's access to safe water, the country's supply of water remains poor compared to the increasing demand of water consumption. The growing population, especially in urban areas, are causing an increase in consumption rates, which leads to an increased demand for water for domestic use. Lebanon suffers from inadequate water supply, due to mismanagement of water resources, very low water storage capacity, a high amount of water lost to the sea and absence of an official management

plan for the water sector. The government's management of water supply is based on old regulations and procedures, which contradicts today's current legislation laws, leading to paralyzing daily management.⁷¹ As Werell et al. note that when a government mismanages natural resources, such as water, where socio-political grievances among populations exist, the state becomes more vulnerable to social unrest.⁷² Moreover, there is an increase in the volume of solid waste in urban areas. It is estimated that 1.57 million tons of waste generated in Lebanon per year, and that urban areas contribute with 65% of the total generated waste.⁷³ Adding to this, the influx of Syrian refugees has put extra pressure on the existing fragile infrastructure, which impacts the state's ability to provide basic water and wastewater services to the population.⁷⁴ Moreover, the Lebanese government lacks the ability to aid its population during natural crises. One example is its weak response to the 2020 Beirut port explosion. Refer to Annex 5 for more information regarding the environment cluster.

Secondary drivers of potential fragility

Demography and Population ↓	
Indicator	Value and Trend
Total population ⁷⁵ World Bank indicators	4,813,026 (2009), 6,855,713 (2019) Rapidly increasing
Population growth (annual %) ⁷⁶ World Bank indicators	6.568 (2013), 0.099 (2019) Sharply decreased
Population density (people per sq. km) ⁷⁷ World Bank indicators	669.494 (2018) Increased from 2008
Migration (Net migration per year) ⁷⁸ World Bank indicators	-150,060 (2017) Trend data not available
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) ⁷⁹ World Bank indicators	77,911 (2008), 78,875 (2018) Increased steadily
Urban population growth (annual %) ⁸⁰ Trending Economics indicators	Decreased rapidly from 2013 to 2020

Youth Bulge - Population ages 0-14 (% of total) World Bank indicators ⁸¹	27.338 (2015), 25.572 (2019) Decreased slightly
Rural population growth (annual %) ⁸² World Bank Indicators	5.315 (2013), -1.358 (2019) Sharply decreased

Lebanon's population density increased from 465.762 people per square km in 2008, to reach 669.494 people per square km in 2018, indicating a high concentration in urban areas.⁸³ This high concentration in urban areas leads to destabilization due to the increased competition for limited resources such as fresh water. The majority of Lebanese people reside in the coastal zone, metropolitan areas of Beirut, Tripoli Saida and Tyre, leading to an uncontrolled urban expansion. Syrian refugees are mostly concentrated in urban areas because there are no formal camps to shelter them. Because real estate, service industry and tourism are concentrated in urban areas, the cities, it is expected that more Syrian refugees will move to urban areas to seek work opportunities.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the high youth unemployment rate of 17.8%, of the total labor force ages 15-24, contributes to high demand for scarce services, which leads to unrest and instability.⁸⁵ Protests took place in Beirut streets against increasing unemployment, especially after the emergence of COVID-19 pandemic. Adding, Lebanon suffers from high rates of migration and emigration that negatively influence the youth population.⁸⁶ Lebanon hosts the largest number of refugees per capita. According to UNHCR, 1.5 million Syrian refugees are settling in Lebanon.⁸⁷ As a result, Lebanon, as a small country, is struggling to maintain its demographic balance and to regain growth after its economic crisis. According to the World Bank, the Syrian refugees' effects would double the unemployment rate in Lebanon and push 170,000 Lebanese into poverty.⁸⁸ Moreover, the government's lack of control of urban development led to; random urbanization along in the suburbs of large cities, negative impact on archeological sites, proliferation of unlicensed quarries, and infringes on agricultural lands and coastlines.⁸⁹ Refer to Annex 5 for more information about demography and population cluster.

Human Development →	
Indicator	Value and Trend
Human Development Index UNDP ⁹⁰ Score of 0.800 very high, 0.700-0.799 high, 0.550-0.699 medium and below 0.500 low	0.730 (2018) Rank 93 out of 189 countries Stable high trend: 0.751 in (2010) and 0.732 in (2014)
Health Expenditure (% of GDP) World Development Indicators ⁹¹	8.2 (2017) Increasing trend: 7.4 in (2010) and 7.8 in (2014)

Gender Inequality Index UNDP ⁹² The GII ranges between 0 and 1. Higher GII values indicate higher inequalities between women and men and thus higher loss to human development	0.362 (2018) Rank 79/166 High trend
Food Security Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population) FAOSTAT ⁹³ *Data showing as 5 may signify a prevalence of undernourishment below 5%.	5.7 (2019) Drastic decreasing trend: 12.4 in (2014) and 12.2 in (2010)
COVID-19 cases WHO ⁹⁴	142,187 (2020) From December 11, 2020
COVID-19 deaths WHO ⁹⁵	1,170 (2020) From December 11, 2020
Government Expenditure on education (% of GDP) World Development Indicators ⁹⁶	2.4 (2013) Low trend: 1.7 in (2010)
School enrollment, primary (% gross) UNDP ⁹⁷	93 (2018) Decreasing trend: 105 in (2010) and 94 in (2014)
Literacy rate, adult (% ages 15 and older) World Development Indicators ⁹⁸	95 (2018) Very high increasing trend: 91 in (2009) 2010 (no data available) and 2014 (no data available)

According to the World Development Indicators, the economic crisis has led citizens into poverty and may continue to get worse depending on how long this crisis withstands; this has caused income inequalities to the citizens which has inherently raised the unemployment rate.⁹⁹ The trigger that could exacerbate this crisis is the effect of COVID-19. Although the current impact on human development is moderate and stable, the effect of the economic crisis, combined with COVID-19 increases pressures on lower income families that specifically provide jobs for migrant domestic workers since they can no longer provide income to purchase basic needs such as food, clothing, and medicine.¹⁰⁰ The ongoing economic crisis alongside COVID-19, and food insecurity, has affected Lebanon's most marginalized groups, women. Lebanon has one of the highest gender gaps in the world ranking 145 out of 153 countries according to the World Economic Forum Gender Gap report 2020.¹⁰¹ This makes sense, as the Gender inequality index ranks remarkably high in our indicators. Globally, women labour market participation is quite low compared to men. For example, 29% for women and 76% for men.¹⁰² Women in Lebanon spousal violence rates are quite high. About 25%, even though they make up only 4.6% of parliament.¹⁰³ Although it seems

that there has been an increase in women participation in parliament during the 2018 election, there is still little progress as it has been nine years since then. The numbers only seem to be increasing because it has been a long time since elections were run in the country. Women who also have ran for political candidacy have faced discrimination due to their gender and are not taken seriously.¹⁰⁴

Security and Crime ↓	
Indicator	Value and Trend
Conflict Intensity Human Progress ¹⁰⁵ Measures social, ethnic, and religious conflicts *Scale of 10 is worst 1 is best	7.00 (2018) Rank 21 out of 129 countries 6.00 in (2006) and (7.00) in 2018 Stable high trend of 7.00 from (2010-2017)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism Worldwide Governance Indicators ¹⁰⁶ on a scale of -2.5 ~ +2.5, with +2.5 being the strongest governance out of 200 countries Percentile Rank (0-100) indicates rank of country among all countries in the world. 0 corresponds to lowest rank and 100 corresponds to highest rank.	Rank 7.62 (2019) -1.64 (2019) Decreasing trend: Rank 8.53 (2009) -1.56 (2009) and Rank 7.14 (2014) -1.70 (2014)
Intentional Homicides (per 100,00 people) World Development Indicators ¹⁰⁷	2.498 (2018) Drastic decrease trend: 3.607 in (2017) to 2.498 in (2018)
Security Apparatus Fragile States Index ¹⁰⁸ *score of 10 is worst	7.8 (2020) Rank 40th out of 178 countries Stable increasing trend to decrease in 2020: 8.7 in (2017) 8.1 in (2018) and 8.4 in (2019)
Presence of Peacekeepers (number of troops, police, and military observers in mandate) World Development Indicators ¹⁰⁹ *sum of Peacekeeping	10,518 (2017) Stable trend: 10,494 in (2015) and 10,541 (2016)
Refugees Produced World Development Indicators ¹¹⁰	5,801 (2019) Drastic decreasing trend: 4,262 (2014) and 15,864 (2010)
Global Peace Index Human Progress ¹¹¹	Rank 17 out of 152 countries 2.83 (2020)

Measures presence and absence of war. Also, absence of violence or the fear of violence across three domains: Safety and Security, Ongoing Conflict, and Militarization.

*Scores are from 1-5 (2008-2020), with 1 being the most peaceful and 5 the most violent.

Inconsistent, but low trend - 2.82 in (2017) 2.80 in (2018) and 2.88 in (2019)

According to the Internal Security Forces (ISF), crime rates in Lebanon have been on the rise since the devastating explosion in the capital on August 4th of this year, and in the “first half of 2020 alone, the ISF recorded 863 thefts and robberies compared to 650 in 2019.”¹¹² The recent explosion in Beirut was of an unmonitored chemical (ammonium nitrate) stored unsafely in a warehouse for six years, and it caused many deaths and destruction to infrastructures to the port of this city.¹¹³ On August 8th, 2020 the Lebanese Security Forces (LSF) and the army displayed an act of violence by the use of tear gas, rubber bullets and pellets fired recklessly which caused harm to many innocent people during their peaceful protest.¹¹⁴ The resulting protests also show that civilians are sending a message for reform in all areas of the state, and security reform is certainly on the list of change. According to the Security Apparatus indicator, as of 2020, Lebanon ranks 7.8 index points on a scale of 0(low)-10(high). The world average in 2020 based on 176 countries is 5.52 index points, which puts Lebanon at a high risk for threats in the state.¹¹⁵

ALC Analysis

Using the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) and drawing on the information from cluster analysis, the following section represents an examination of the authority (A), legitimacy (L) and capacity (C) dimensions within Lebanon that contribute to its potential structural fragility. Refer to Annex 7 for additional information and analysis regarding ALC assessment.

Authority: Rank Medium and Stable

Lebanon has a duly elected and representative government but struggles to enact legislation due to numerous gridlocks and divergent political interests. Lebanon’s confessional democracy ensures representation along ethnic and religious lines in the government’s legislative and executive branch, ensuring debate and negotiations to include a wide range of interests¹¹⁶. This has also resulted in significant gridlocks and delays in getting legislation passed. For example, in June 2009, Saad Hariri won legislative elections and was appointed Prime Minister, however, a stalemate with the Hezbollah-led camp followed, and a complete government was only able to be formed five months after¹¹⁷. In a similar but separate example, in January 2011, the unity government collapsed due to numerous gridlocks, and a new Hezbollah-dominated government was formed¹¹⁸. In October 2016, the Hezbollah-backed former general Michel Aoun became president, ending a 29-month political vacuum caused by disagreement in parliament¹¹⁹. In May 2018, Hezbollah and its allies dominated the first legislative elections but negotiations to form a new government dragged on until late January 2019¹²⁰. Following the Beirut explosions in August

2020, the Lebanese government resigned amid widespread anger over the blast and Mr. Mustapha Adib, Lebanon's former ambassador to Germany, was nominated to the post¹²¹. As of September 2020, Mr. Mustapha Adib stepped down creating a vacancy for the Prime Minister's position following continued gridlocks and difficulties to find consensus on numerous policies¹²². These are just some examples of constant gridlocks affecting the authority for policymaking and implementation in Lebanon. However, lengthy negotiations seem to have become the norm in Lebanon, posing minimal threat to the fundamental stability of the country in the immediate term.

Legitimacy: Rank Medium and Falling

Legitimacy remains weak in Lebanon due to several factors. The ongoing protests are due to corruption in politics, legitimacy gap protests, boycott of taxes, the Beirut explosion, and COVID-19. There is a lack of trust between citizens and national actors that continue to raise society concerns of their future and livelihoods. The legitimacy trap is highlighted in the poor consumer payment rates of water services, which hinders the covering operating costs of water supply management. Most of the Lebanese citizens boycott paying taxes due to the lack of water supply and the weak water services provided by the government. With Lebanon not being able to deliver basic security in all areas of the state, this has led to citizens to distrust their security forces.

There is a series and overhaul of human rights violations that have been occurring in Lebanon. Many vulnerable groups such as women and girls, migrant workers, refugees, and the LGBTQ+ community are facing discrimination. According to Human Rights Watch, women under 15 face discrimination based on their status and marriages. Not all women have fair access to passing their citizenship to their children and spouses who live abroad. It is also important to note that Lebanese authorities continue to prosecute individuals for peaceful speech; for example, post the Beirut explosion, citizens were attacked for speaking against the government's response to the Beirut explosion and absence of service delivery. In addition, detainees continue to report torture by security forces.¹²³ The resulting protests also show that civilians are sending a message to the state for full electoral and security reform in all regions of Lebanon. Distrusting the judicial apparatus gives opportunity for citizens to take matters into their own hands, undermining the legitimacy of the state, law enforcement, and the legal system. It is stated that "in recent years the country has seen an increase in privately owned – and politically affiliated – security firms, which enjoy a degree of liberty and immunity from the law."¹²⁴ Refer to Annex 7 for more information regarding the state-society relation in Lebanon.

Capacity: Rank Medium and Falling

Lebanon struggles in capacity due to its inability to deliver proper public services. For example, the government's inadequate supply of water and mismanagement of drinking water services in Lebanon are due to the lack of capacity. There are no systemized approaches adopted to monitoring water quality, nor laboratories to test water samples and it lacks water quality specialist capacity.¹²⁵ As a result, non-state actors and civil societies have been at the forefront to produce citizens basic needs and all vulnerable groups who are in need.¹²⁶ GDP per capita is slowly improving, as is overall performance on the World Bank data.¹²⁷ Life expectancy is currently increasing steadily, according to World Bank data.¹²⁸ Nonetheless, the Lebanese government

struggles to maintain a conducive environment for its citizens. It suffers from a capacity gap apparent in its operational performance of demography and population. It also struggles to manage the rapid urbanization problem that is emerging. Although the country has a taxation system,¹²⁹ enforcing this system remains problematic.¹³⁰ Furthermore, numerous political killings, and security incidents point to the fact that the government has limited capacity to protect its citizens. Nonetheless, the state has been able to produce a 5-year strategic plan to combat the dead relationship between civilians and law enforcement, and to better serve their communities. Refer to Annex 7 for more information regarding the social contract in Lebanon.

Scenarios

Baseline scenario over the next six months (December 2020 to June 2021):

Following sustained pressure from domestic constituents and the international community, the Lebanese government might be able to appoint a new Prime Minister. Forming a new government will take considerable time due to predictable efforts by political factions to protect their interests and appoint Ministers on sectarian lines. The new government will likely continue to find it challenging to provide basic services to civilians, leading to continuous boycotting of taxes by the population and additional protests. This could lead to violent reprisals by security forces towards civilians. The artificial propping of the economy will likely continue, with attractive interest rates bringing in some additional funds to maintain the economy alive even though not sustainable. There could be a manageable increase of COVID-19 cases especially in refugee camps, while the development of a vaccine is in progress.

Best Case scenario over the next six months (December 2020 to June 2021):

A new Prime Minister is appointed in a record time leading to the formation of a new government with minimal resistance from political parties. This new government will bring tangible reforms to the state, such as economic reforms, ending corruption and engaging social elites in government decisions and policies that increase transparency. The state will become more stable with less protests as citizens start to sense a change in the new government. Negotiations with the IMF will be fruitful and additional funds will be received to support Lebanese banks. Additional International aid will be received for refugees and lightening the burden on Lebanon resources. We will start to see a decline in vast violence within the civil society and stores will reopen due to their faith and trust restored towards the government. All internal security forces (police) will not be strapped with heavy duty weapons, and the strategic plan to reform the ISF will be implemented. We will see more women in law enforcement to provide equality for all genders in Lebanon and there will be more police dispersed to all territories of the country for security. COVID-19 cases have reduced due to better access to clean water and sanitation services in refugee camps, and international aid will intervene to help contain the coronavirus in all regions of Lebanon.

Worst Case scenario

No new government will be formed, and there will be no reforms. There will be further deterioration in basic services, such as water supply, and electricity, an increase in unemployment as a result of rapid urbanization in Lebanese cities, and a food crisis resulting from increase in food prices. There will be a growing influx of migration, as well as immigration from Lebanon, as youth will look for better life and job opportunities abroad. This will lead to escalation of public anger, and widen the legitimacy gap of the state, and lead to a state failure. As a result, international aid for Lebanon will be put on hold due to the state's ruling elite's failure to adopt reforms and create a new government. Moreover, the international community will apply pressure on Lebanese politicians abroad to push them for a real change. People will not be able to withdraw money from the banks, the value of the Lebanese pound will fall even more, and lose its worth, leading to the complete collapse of the banking system. Citizens will result in stealing from one another and will do all that they can to survive. Crime will only get worse and there will be a lot of bloodshed for scarce resources. Foreign military aid may intervene to support the state from this heightened crime and debt crisis. Lastly there will be a heightened number of cases and deaths due to COVID-19 and the limited access to healthcare to mitigate the pandemic.

Wild card scenarios

Uncontrollable outbreak of COVID-19: After the government alleviates lockdown restrictions of COVID-19, the number of new cases of COVID-19 spike due to the government's poor policies and measures to mitigate the spread of the virus, represented in the country's delicate health system.¹³¹ Hospitals and clinics in Beirut struggle to cope in the aftermath of the destructive 2020 Beirut port explosion.¹³² By the time COVID-19 vaccine arrives in Lebanon, by mid-2021, the outbreak of COVID-19 will be uncontrollable by the government, and therefore, lead to a collapse of the health system.¹³³

Food insecurity: The ongoing food crisis will worsen in Lebanon. The economic crisis, the global pandemic, COVID-19, and the 2020 Beirut port explosion negatively affect the state's ability to maintain food available with low prices for people. As a result of the country's damaged primary grain silo, the difficulty to obtain agricultural products, the rising import costs and the currency depreciation, food prices increase.¹³⁴ This fuels protests, as many people are unable to earn half their salaries or have lost their jobs and, therefore, unable to secure their basic day-to-day expenses.¹³⁵ People will rebel against political authorities; they have lost their jobs, their savings are frozen, unable to pay for their basic needs and afford buying food.¹³⁶

Policy Options

Policy Option 1: Engagement in immediate, revitalized, and strategic economic reforms sanctioned by the civil society, including women led organizations.

Policy: With the Lebanese economy extremely weakened, there is an urgent need for the Lebanese government to engage in key economic reforms sanctioned by financial experts and civil society, and Canada, under its Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), can play a role in supporting this endeavor to ensure increased legitimacy to the plan. Canada can provide support to civil society actors, especially women's organizations to oversee Lebanon's economic rescue plan announced in April 2020 to ensure transparency, accountability, and meaningful changes in the implementation.

Relevance: The Lebanese Prime Minister Hassan Diab announced in April 2020¹³⁷ a comprehensive financial plan to save the country from its financial and economic crisis. The plan is based on reforming six key sectors, notably: financial, economic, banking, monetary, social security, and development factors. The financial reforms will enable Lebanon to unlock 10 billion U.S. dollars in external support in addition to the funds pledged by the Conference for Economic Development and Reform through Enterprises (CEDRE) hosted by France in 2018 to help Lebanon raise funds to finance its plan to modernize its infrastructure and develop economy.

Cluster/ALC Targets: Governance and Economic development

Access Points: The Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform (CCER) is a coalition of 66 Lebanese civil society organizations and 2 coalitions of NGOs that advocate for the reform of electoral systems in Lebanon, particularly the parliamentary and municipal elections. The bottlenecks to government authority and capacity has been lengthy negotiations and gridlocks. By associating civils society direct oversight to the economic plan, there is a possibility for community pressure to unlock political gridlocks and advance reforms that benefit the economy.

Risks: This plan is already facing numerous challenges. The Prime Minister who initiated it has resigned, creating uncertainty around the plan's future. In addition, donors have expressed concerns regarding support for the plan, as it might result in funding for Hezbollah, considered as a terrorist group by some Western states. To mitigate this, funding human rights and civil society organizations, especially led by women, could ensure the perspective of the broader population is taken into consideration.

Evaluation: The anticipated outcome of involving civil society actors include (1) increased transparency (2) increased trust (3) increased ownership and (4) and increased pressure on leaders to reduce sectarian gridlocks. Some experts have assessed that if this economic plan is put in place, it will result in positive growth starting 2022 and the reduction of the debt to GDP ratio from 170 percent to less than 100 percent¹³⁸.

Desired outcome	Measurement	Method of verification
Increased accountability, transparency, and trust in the political process	Number of people surveyed reporting increased satisfaction in the transparency level for the response plan	Surveys and questionnaires collected annually and at the final evaluation of the project
Reduced political gridlocks	Number of weeks/months leading to the adoption of policies	Data collected annually and at the final evaluation from news and government sources
Increased local ownership	Number of people surveyed reporting awareness and participation in consultation on the response plan	Surveys and questionnaires collected annually and at the final evaluation of the project

Policy Option 2: Work with the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW), the four public Water Establishments (WE's), the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), and the Green Line Association to improve water supply reliability, drinking water quality and wastewater services, and increase the supply of safe drinking water.

Policy: GAC could provide Canadian expertise and fund the development of programming in liaison with the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW), the four public Water Establishments (WE's), and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) to increase the use of environmentally sustainable, and shock-resilient practices that develop sustainable access to water, and limit pollution resulting from mismanagement of wastewater and solid wastes.¹³⁹ The program should be strategically led and implemented by the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW), with strong partnerships with regional actors WE's, CDR and the civil society organization, the Green Line Association, to reinforce transparency and accountability in the Lebanese public sector and increase the legitimacy of the government by enabling it to exercise leadership and implement environmental policies that enhance community resilience and efforts toward environmental action.

Cluster/ ALC target: Environment and sustainability, Human development, Economic development, and Governance; Authority, Legitimacy and Capacity.

Relevance: This policy option aims to reduce underlying drivers of fragility by enhancing low state capacity that continues to undermine the management of drinking water and wastewater services. It is highly relevant to Lebanon, due to the weak performance of the government represented in the inadequate water supply, the growing population in urban areas and their increased

consumption of water, and the mismanagement of water resources resulting from the absence of an official integrated management plan for the water sector.

Access points, partners, and stakeholders: The Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) have proposed several major projects that are under preparation between 2018 and 2020. Examples of these water projects are; the Renovation of water systems in Minnieh – Danniye, the Expansion of Dbayeh drinking water treatment plant, and the Project to supply drinking water to Akkar Coastal Area – Lot II.¹⁴⁰ These proposed projects could serve as access points and complement this policy, where GAC can provide Canadian expertise and funding through the United Nations Development Program in Lebanon (UNDP).¹⁴¹ Moreover, under Canada's Middle East Engagement Strategy, GAC should be able to continue to provide longer-term support to build the capacity of the Lebanese government, and to support effective and accountable governance, by helping the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) to implement programs to enhance the management of natural resources, such as water.¹⁴² In addition, the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI),¹⁴³ could be a potential access point of GAC to increase transparency of the environmental regulatory and policy framework, through engaging the civil society actors, such as the Green Line Association along with the government actors in the environmental policy process.¹⁴⁴ GAC will support the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) to begin dialogue with civil society organizations and groups, and will follow up on the state-level partner and stakeholder conversations.

Risks: The new government is still not formed yet, and this could compromise the ability of the Ministry of Energy and Water to effectively lead this initiative.¹⁴⁵ The Ministry of Energy and Water call for water management and supply reforms and mistrust of the Lebanese government by citizens, may disrupt consensus on program activities between national and local actors. Another risk is that some of the national stakeholders who are in the position of power, may be tempted to manage and direct the funds of the program to serve their own best interests.

Evaluation: GAC should conduct an annual review to monitor the level of transparency and regulatory of the implemented programming framework. Below are key indicators to measure progress of the desired outcome.

Desired outcome	Measurement	Method of verification
Increased trust between local actors, the Lebanese population, and national actors including actors of the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW), the four public Water Establishments (WE's), and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Trust level percentage of local population towards the state and Ministry of Energy and Water actors -Percentage of collected taxation and generated revenue of water and wastewater services 	Monitor and report data collected annually and conduct final evaluation at the end of the programming
Improved technical capacity of national actors on key sustainable drinking water quality, and manageable wastewater services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Numbers of new established laboratories to test water samples Numbers of new hired employees in water public services -Numbers of new hired expertise in human resources -Percentage of households consuming improved quality of drinking water 	Monitor and report data collected annually and conduct final evaluation at the end of the programming
Increased water supply	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Rate of access to safe drinking water by households over the year 	Monitor and report data collected annually and conduct final evaluation at the end of the programming

Policy Option 3: Work with civil society groups to improve oversight on parliamentary negotiations.

Policy: Canada could provide support to civil societies including women's civil society organizations, who have implemented strategies on overseeing parliamentary negotiations. Lebanon's political gridlocks have made it difficult for policies and laws to pass in a timely manner especially during times of crisis. With the assistance of civil societies in parliament, it will strengthen the democratic governance structure when it comes to transparency, accountability, and eliminating the function of sectarian leaders being loyal to different regional states and

international states such as the Hezbollah groups loyalty to Iran.¹⁴⁶ Sectarian leaders whose interests are only for their initial sect, has caused the failure of public service delivery and development to buildings and infrastructures in Lebanon due to corruption.¹⁴⁷ This program should be strategically led and implemented by the Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace alongside international state actors who can help facilitate dialogue between civil societies and the government. This in return will grant legitimacy of the government and would allow for a legitimate process of laws to pass in legislature.

Relevance: This policy option aims to reduce the political gridlocks that occur within Lebanon's sectarian government, and is to ensure that laws can be passed effectively and in a safe manner eliminating tensions across sects. It is relevant, because Lebanon's economy has struggled as well, partly because of political gridlock and other political issues that have caused a strife towards Lebanon's economic crisis.¹⁴⁸

Cluster/ ALC target: Governance, Authority, Legitimacy and Capacity

Access points, partners, and stakeholders: The UNDP have proposed several projects to enhance the democratic practices and governance structures in Lebanon as well empowering woman and working in women lead organizations. For example, the Enhancing Decision-Making at the Office of the President of the Council of Ministers whose duration of the project has been from January 2, 2015 to December 31, 2020. This project's specific focus is to enhance decision making and to monitor what goes on in the PM's office for programs to be implemented.¹⁴⁹ The second project *Support Office for Consensus Building, Civil Peace, and Constitutional Strengthening II*, whose project duration was from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2019¹⁵⁰, remains active. Its purpose is to support "consensus building, sustainable civil peace, constitutional strengthening and stakeholders' dialogues in Lebanon and in the MENA region."¹⁵¹ With the UNDP already playing an active role to better serve the citizens of Lebanon through strategies for consensus building in parliament, the local organization *Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace* strategies are also of the same nature, and could potentially partner with the UNDP to execute their strategies on democratization, rule of law and supremacy of the principle of legality.¹⁵² The LFPCP project, *Parliamentary Research Services*, was implemented to provide well instructed and competent decision-making of the legislature in Lebanon; it is one of their current projects that lasted from March to July 2019.¹⁵³ These proposed projects can serve as access points and compliment this policy. GAC can provide Canadian expertise and funding through the UNDP in Lebanon.

Risks: The potential risks that could arise is the political instability in government and the lack of responsiveness and coordination within parliament. It may be difficult for GAC to convince the sects or when the Prime Minister is elected to agree to this policy. Currently Lebanon is running with no government and this is a crucial challenge for any form of assistance to start.

Evaluation: GAC should conduct an annual review to monitor the level of transparency and regulatory of the implemented programming framework. Below are key indicators to measure progress of the desired outcome.

Desired outcome	Measurement	Method of verification
To prevent further political gridlocks and create a consensus among all political parties in negotiations.	Number/percentage of laws/policies passed.	Monitor and report the consistency of consensus building and negotiations passed in parliament.
To include civil societies and to include women led civil society organizations in state relations and governance for transparency and accountability.	Number/ percentage of civil societies and women civil society organizations aligned with government relations in parliament.	Monitor and report civil societies involved with government relations in parliament for transparency and inclusivity.

Annexes

1. Acronyms

CIFP- Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
ALC- Authority, Legitimacy and Capacity
FPM- Free Patriotic Movement
UNHCR-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
IMF-International Monetary Fund
WHO-World Health Organization
UNICEF-United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNDP- United Nations Development Programme
GAC-Global Affairs Canada
MENA- Middle East and North Africa Countries
CFLI-Canada Fund for Local Initiatives
COVID-19-Coronavirus disease of 2019
EU-European Union
LSF- Lebanese Security Forces
LGBTQ+- lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and other sexual identities
FIAP- Feminist International Assistance Policy
CEDRE- Conference for Economic Development and Reform through Enterprises
CCER- Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform
NGOs-Nongovernmental organizations
MoEW- Ministry of Energy and Water
WE- Water Establishments
CDR- Council for Development and Reconstruction
MoPH- Ministry of Public Health
LFPCP-Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace

2. Definitions

Hybrid Regimes refer to “partially liberalized regimes that are neither clearly democratic nor conventionally authoritarian.”¹⁵⁴ They also “tend to be either unstable, or unpredictable, or both”,¹⁵⁵ as well as, “are driven by personalized interests, and public officials often act to further their own gains without much concern about a broader sense of the public good.”¹⁵⁶

Horizontal Inequality is defined as “inequalities in economic, social, or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups”,¹⁵⁷ and as “within-country differences in well-being across ethnic groups”.¹⁵⁸ As a multidimensional concept, socioeconomic horizontal inequalities increase the potential of conflict especially when it is accompanied by political horizontal inequalities. As such Lebanon faces the risk of conflict mobilization if inequalities, between political and economic elites and social elites, are not addressed. Acknowledging this risk, the introduced policy options are designed to address different dimensions of horizontal inequalities in Lebanon.

3. End User

GAC portfolio, represented in its investments and engagements in Lebanon, addresses reforms targeting the key drivers of potential fragility in the country:

- Under the Middle East engagement Strategy, Canada invests \$1.39 billion over two year (2019-2021) to build stability, governance, and long-term resilience in the Middle East region, including Lebanon.¹⁵⁹
- The CFLI program enables Canada to address the environmental problems that continue to face Lebanon. The program focuses its intervention on projects targeting the environment, where it supports bilateral relations between Lebanon and its civil society actors. In this context, GAC's program engagement in Lebanon is addressing both the capacity and legitimacy gaps in the state.¹⁶⁰
- **The Country-Level Funding for the Middle East 2019-2021** project enables GAC to address the capacity gap of the Lebanese government resulting from the pressure that the Syrian refugees are causing. GAC and UNHCR provide humanitarian assistance and protection to refugees in Lebanon, through the project. The project provides shelter, adequate water, sanitation, and health services, as well as it works with the Lebanese government to build peaceful relations between refugees and local citizens.¹⁶¹
- **The Emergency -Country Specific Funding in the Middle East 2019-2021** program enables Canada to provide Lebanon with the needed technical expertise to strengthen the government's capacity to respond to situations of armed conflict and violence. The program also helps the Lebanese government to ensure treating civilians and detainees according to international humanitarian law.¹⁶²
- **The Daring to Shift: Young Women at the Center of Inclusive Growth 2019-2023** project enables Canada to enhance their silence and economic inclusion of participating unemployed and underemployed youth and their communities in Lebanon. The project develops and supports youth empowerment, leadership, and social entrepreneurship, and enables them to take advantage of economic opportunities. The project also aims to close the gap between the private sector and government by creating linkages to develop policies and programs. In this context, Canada is addressing the legitimacy gap of the Lebanese government.¹⁶³
- Canada recognizes the evolving pressure that the great influx of Syrian refugees poses on the government's capacity and urban areas. As a result, Canada contributed with efforts, to the Ministry of Education and Higher Education of Lebanon, to improve access to quality education in Lebanon. The Canadian investments in education quality in Lebanon have been effective so far, as 5,588 Syrian and Lebanese children who have missed schooling for 2 years or more received help to catch up on school.¹⁶⁴

GAC entry points according to ALC assessment:

1. Entry Points targeting Authority:

- Formation of new government- This is an opening for reform and election of transparent and accountable leaders
- IMF funding - This is a window of opportunity for reforming economic policies
- Security sector reform policies- Due to the lack of police available to cover all locations of the state, Canada could use this opportunity to train and give advice with the government on a new reform that has been on its way to change.

2. Entry Points targeting Capacity:

- Rebuilding Beirut port after the damage and destruction caused by the 2020 explosion, creates a good opportunity for Canada to engage in Lebanon and help build the capacity of the state. Lebanon highly depends on the Beirut port, as it is the main access point for imports. By offering the help to rebuild the Beirut port, Lebanon will restore its access to food products.¹⁶⁵ As Lebanon is currently looking for donors who are willing to invest in the rebuild of the port, a number of stakeholders offered to participate in the reconstruction of the Port of Beirut such as France and Kuwait.¹⁶⁶
- Funding to support Covid-19 - Canada could continue to provide funds to support non-governmental organizations helping manage the pandemic in Lebanon and rebuild its health sector.

3. Entry Points targeting Legitimacy:

- The Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), should be a proper entry point to invest in building transparency between the Lebanese government and the civil society actors.¹⁶⁷
- United Nations Development Program - Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The PBF constitutes an essential component of the enhanced UN architecture to provide for a more sustained engagement in support of countries emerging from conflict and will support peacebuilding activities which directly contribute to post-conflict stabilization and strengthen the capacity of Governments, national/local institutions and transitional or other relevant authorities.
- Women Peace and Humanitarian Fund - This fund aims to support civil society organizations involved in peacebuilding and gender equality efforts

4. Additional Stakeholders

Internal Stakeholder

The Lebanese government: Lebanon has a confessionalist system or consociational democracy¹⁶⁸, as power is distributed along ethnic and religious lines. Lebanon has eleven officially recognized sects: Shia, Maronite, Druze, Sunni, Greek Orthodox, Green Catholic, Alawaite, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Evangelical Protestant, and Jew, all represented in the government's legislative and executive branch¹⁶⁹.

Lebanese parliament: Under the constitution of Lebanon, elections must be held for the parliament every 4 years. The highest offices in the government are proportionally reserved for representatives from religious communities.¹⁷⁰ After the resignation of Mustapha Adib, political leaders are struggling to form a new government.¹⁷¹ The previous Lebanese government was backed and controlled exclusively by Hezbollah and their allies, the Shiite community.

March 8 (pro-Syria) political block: Formed in 2005, this political coalition known as March 8, includes Hezbollah, the Shia Amal Movement, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and allied parties. They won 68 seats according to Lebanese vote tallies in 2018 elections, but not enough to secure a simple majority in parliament. This has led to negotiation gridlocks regarding major initiatives such as a revision to the constitution¹⁷².

March 14 (anti-Syria) political block: Formed in 2005 as well, the rival March 14 coalition is made up of the Sunni Future Movement, the Maronite Lebanese Forces, and allied MPs. The Future Movement remains the largest Sunni bloc in parliament¹⁷³.

The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), in Lebanon, is responsible for health control, including licensing of water bottling enterprises, and monitoring drinking water quality to ensure meeting quality standards.¹⁷⁴

Civil society actors

The civil societies of Lebanon advocate for legal reform and put pressure on the government to enforce policies to fulfill the needs of the people. They also support vulnerable communities who have been affected by recent and past crises ever since the civil war in 1975. Lebanon has a considerable number of civil society organizations. They are independent, non-governmental agencies, which all seek to strengthen human rights in society and promote good governance. These organizations are mainly funded by domestic and foreign donors. Examples of these NGOs; ALEF- Act for Human Rights, Alkarama and Baldati.

Other major civil society actors when it comes to service delivery is the **Beit El Baraka**, which supports citizens struggling with access to food due to low income, poverty, and the increasing cost of living, as well medical services, decent living, and access to education needs.¹⁷⁵ In regard to the scarcity of food that Lebanon faces, this organization had planted 500,000 sqm of organic soil in February to grow nutritious food for many families to access.¹⁷⁶ They have also operated a

free supermarket based on a points system that seems to be sustainable to the citizens there because they are able to acquire a large amount of donations to keep this system afloat.¹⁷⁷

Regarding the current Beirut explosion, more than 6,500 people in addition to those killed, have been heavily affected.¹⁷⁸ The **Stay Safe** organization's main objectives are providing public health aid and medical relief for people injured from the Beirut port explosion.¹⁷⁹ There are also a few charities who have formulated campaigns and fundraisers to aid those affected from the explosion, such as **Impact Lebanon**¹⁸⁰, **Food for Disaster Victims of Beirut, Lebanon**¹⁸¹ and **Offre Joie**¹⁸².

The **Tafaol Association** focuses on social development services; Its mandates are to develop sustainable programs that provide strategies of better health services, education, and human rights services, specifically focusing on marginalized societies; women, and children.¹⁸³

The Green Line Association is a Lebanese non-governmental organization. It was founded in 1991 with the goal of exposing environmental threats, increasing environmental awareness, and conducting scientific frameworks for sustainable environmental management policies.¹⁸⁴

External Stakeholders

Lebanese Diaspora: Numerous sources estimate that there are more Lebanese living outside Lebanon than within the country¹⁸⁵. The Lebanese government puts the figure of the Lebanese diaspora at 15.4 million in 2018¹⁸⁶ while World Bank data estimate the Lebanese population living in Lebanon in 2018 to 6.8 million¹⁸⁷. The diaspora population consists of Christians, Muslim, Druze, and Jewish groups¹⁸⁸. Lebanon is one of the largest remittance receiving countries worldwide, where remittances have exceeded one fifth of its nominal GDP and surpassed financial inflows from both exports of goods and services and foreign direct investments over the past decade¹⁸⁹.

UNIFIL

In 1978, the U.N. Security Council established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, which was not complete until 2000. UNIFIL¹⁹⁰ has been criticized for ineffectiveness in stopping various violent incidents in Lebanon¹⁹¹. However, with over 10,000 personnel and a budget of more than 500 million Dollars, it remains a potential that can be scaled up should there be a need.

USA: The United States has sought to bolster forces that could serve as a counterweight to Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon, providing more than \$1.7 billion in military assistance to Lebanon with the aim of creating a national force strong enough to counter non-state actors and secure the country's borders¹⁹²

France: France and Lebanon have deep historical ties. In 1860, France intervenes to protect Christians when a civil war broke out between the Maronite Christians and the Druze's, a minority

branch of Islam. Between 1920 and 1943, the State of Greater Lebanon existed under a French Mandate. Lebanon proclaimed its independence in 1943. During another civil war between Christians and Muslims in the 80s, French troops were deployed to Lebanon as part of a multinational peacekeeping force to defend Lebanon. Former French President Jacques Chirac was very close to the assassinated Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri's family, which continues to exert power in Lebanese politics. Current French President Emmanuel Macron, intervened in Lebanese politics in 2017 when Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned his post while visiting Saudi Arabia, and visited Beirut days after the explosion in 2020. France is a major economic partner of Lebanon and the Lebanese diaspora in France is one of the largest¹⁹³.

United Nations (UNHCR): The influx of Syrian refugees has further strained the economy and social structures of Lebanon. In 2015, the Lebanese government appealed to the UNHCR-UN's refugee governing body to suspend the registration of Syrian refugees. As a result, seeking refuge in Lebanon as a valid entry is no longer valid.¹⁹⁴

The WHO and UNICEF are external stakeholders, which provide the Lebanese government with technical and financial support for safe water supply planning. The Lebanese economy can greatly benefit from their involvement.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF): In the aftermath of the terrible tragedy in Lebanon, Ms. Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said it was time for Lebanon to unite and overcome the Beirut explosion disaster as well as address the deep economic and social crisis that the country has faced. She confirmed that the IMF was exploring all possible ways to support the people of Lebanon and embark on critical reforms that will put in place a meaningful program to turn around the economy and build accountability¹⁹⁵.

Israel: The relations between the two states have been highly looped for almost 40 years. Israel and Lebanon have a history of conflict and politically motivated violence. Israel occupied parts of southern Lebanon until it withdrew in May 2000.¹⁹⁶

Foreign investors and companies are important external stakeholders in Lebanon, due to their influence on the country's economic development. As Lebanon is currently looking for donors who are willing to invest in the rebuild of the Beirut port, several stakeholders offered to participate in the reconstruction of the Port of Beirut. **France** and **Kuwait** investors are increasingly interested external investors.¹⁹⁷

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the UN's development network, its role is to plan and implement programs in partnership with key stakeholders from governments, non-governmental organizations, and civil society. The UNDP is partnering with approximately 300 Lebanese professionals, and currently implemented around 60 local and national projects that seek to address and enhance areas critical to Lebanon's future.¹⁹⁸

Fragility Risk Assessment

Governance” Another key governance indicator is “Political Stability and Absence of Violence”. Lebanon’s score was extremely low and decreasing. The World Bank’s governance indicators ranked Lebanon at 8% in 2009 and 7% in 2019 and this indicator measured social unrest/violence, intensity of internal conflicts (ethnic, religious or regional) and government stability, just to name a few. In terms of political violence, specifically regarding assassinations and killings of political figures, Lebanon has experienced numerous incidences. Between 2005 and 2020, notable political violent incidences include the killing of Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri along with 22 other people¹⁹⁹, the killing of former Communist Party leader and critic of Syria, George Hawi by a bomb in his car²⁰⁰, the killing of Gebran Tueni, a member of parliament by a car bomb²⁰¹, the killing of the Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel by gunmen²⁰², the killing of Christian lawmaker Antoine Ghanem, the killing of Saleh al Aridi - a leader of the Lebanese Democratic Party²⁰³, the killing of Wissam al-Hassan, head of information branch of the Internal Security Forces in 2012, the killing of Mohamad Chatah - Former Lebanese Finance Minister and the list goes on²⁰⁴. So many other interpretations can be given to these violent killings, but we are highlighting these incidences as affecting Lebanon’s capacity, authority and legitimacy to perform its regalian tasks.

Human development: To include, COVID-19 has threatened children and youth. UNICEF has stated that “Lebanon’s deteriorating economic situation is threatening the livelihoods of the most vulnerable Lebanese households, putting children and young people’s education, protection and health at risk.”²⁰⁵ The government is responsible for human development which includes service delivery of basic needs to its society. However, civil societies and international agencies have been at the forefront for responding to the citizens’ access to public services. Other actors involved in providing the needs of the citizens of Lebanon are, USAID-United States Agency for International Development, and their mandates or interests are to support the education, economics, and the water quality in Lebanon.²⁰⁶ Due to hyperinflation rates and the devaluation of the Lebanon pound, educational and health standards have diminished drastically, and the aid of financial support is needed.²⁰⁷ Other non-state actors such as UNICEF and the EU Humanitarian aid have been rendering support towards Lebanon.²⁰⁸ The effects of the Beirut explosion have also put refugees and many citizens into critical living conditions. Around 300 thousand of families lost their homes, establishments, and livelihoods.²⁰⁹ Lebanon is also undergoing an economic crisis and the effects of COVID-19.”²¹⁰

Security and crime: Although there has been no recent civil war in the state, many of their law enforcers such as police are heavily armed and are able to use this force against civilians. There are terrorist groups such as the Hezbollah and suicide bombers who cannot be stopped for their crimes and influences of their regime to citizens of Lebanon.²¹¹ The capacity to limit these crimes and occurrences have been a security issue for Lebanon across the country

5. Additional Information on Clusters

Environment Cluster

Climate

Lebanon has a subtropical climate, characterized by being hot and dry in the summers, and mild and humid in the winters. Arable land is scarce in Lebanon. Nonetheless, Olives, grapes, tobacco, figs, and almonds are crops grown in the foothills. Bananas, citrus and vegetables crops are grown on the watered coastal plain.²¹²

Water supply

Since 1992, the Lebanese government has taken considerable measures to address the water supply management. Under the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) a number of long-term water projects, such as the construction of dams and mountain lakes, were implemented to respond to water supply insufficiency in Lebanon. However, the government's management of water supply is based on old regulations and procedures, which contradicts today's current legislation laws, leading to paralyzing daily management.

Wastewater

The Lebanese government works on improving the public wastewater service through its adoption to its National Water Sector Strategy (NWSS), which serves as a reference guide for all public administrations and institutions. In addition, the CDR intervened to respond to the insufficient wastewater services in Lebanese territories. It implemented programs to protect the Lebanese coasts and water resources from pollution. However, the Lebanese government lacks the ability to aid its population during natural crises. One example is its weak response to the 2020 Beirut port explosion. This highlights the Lebanese authorities' leadership gap to face environmental and natural disasters.²¹³

Demography and population Cluster

Population

In 2019, Lebanon's total population reached 6,855,713 million. The population growth has fallen from 6.744% in 2013, to reach 0.285% in 2019.

In Beirut, the economy is disproportionately continuing to grow and as a result provides the highest number of job opportunities relative to other Lebanese cities. In addition, the transformation of agriculture production led to the massive departure from the Bekaa, South and North regions, and migration towards Beirut. As a result of high competition for jobs, many sectors in construction, agriculture, and industry have heavily depended on informal arrangements in

securing their workforce. However, this led to unequal and illegal practices, such as temporary jobs, tough working conditions, and lack of formal contracts.²¹⁴

Population Diversity

Lebanon has a heterogeneous population consisting of numerous ethnic and religious groups. Ethnically, the Lebanese society is a mixture of Arabs, Kurdish, Phoenicians, Greeks, and Armenians. While Arabic is the official language of the country, people also speak English and French.

95% of the Lebanese population are Arabs. The religious divisions in Lebanon are extremely complicated, where the Lebanese constitution officially acknowledges 18 religious groups.²¹⁵ The population of Lebanon is 54% Muslims, including Shia and Sunni, 40% Christians, 5.5% Druze, and other religious minorities such as Bahais, Buddhists, Hindus, and Mormons.²¹⁶

The emergence of civil war in Lebanon resulted from the various militias that provided that state with security.²¹⁷ These militias formed from representatives of Maronite Christian leaders, Sunni Muslim leaders, Shi'i populist leaders, and Palestinian Liberation Organization, which represented the largest Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon. Due to Lebanon's history of civil conflicts, efforts of sharing power among diverse communities became fundamental.²¹⁸

Population density

Lebanon's population density increased from 465.762 people per square km in 2008, to reach 669.494 people per square km in 2018, indicating a high concentration in urban areas. This high concentration in urban areas leading to destabilization due to the increased competition for limited resources such as fresh water. However, according to the World Bank, people's access to safely managed drinking water score has slightly increased from 46.3 in 2010, to 47.7 in 2017.²¹⁹

The Palestinian refugee camps experienced increase in influx of Syrian refugees, where housing options are scarce. Because real estate, service industry and tourism are concentrated in urban areas, the cities, it is expected that more Syrian refugees will move to urban areas to seek work opportunities.²²⁰

Before the civil war, the population composed of several different religious groups, usually lived together in harmony. However, after the civil war, thousands of Christians moved to the north of Beirut, while Muslims moved to the south and east, reflecting the separating settlements of the Lebanese people from each other.²²¹

Youth population

Furthermore, the high youth unemployment rate of 17.8%, of the total labor force ages 15-24, contributes to high demand for scarce services, which leads to unrest and instability.²²² Protests took place in Beirut streets against increasing unemployment, especially after the emergence of COVID-19 pandemic.²²³

Lebanon suffers from high rates of migration and emigration that negatively influence the youth population. Youths tend to migrate from rural areas to the cities and emigrate to countries such as, Arab Gulf, US, and European in order to find better living conditions and job markets.²²⁴ This is due to the high level of unemployment among youth in Lebanon. Furthermore, the COVID-19 situation drive an increase in food prices in Lebanon, which fueled recent protests in the state. As a result, it is estimated that migration will increase in Lebanon.²²⁵

Syrian Refugees

Lebanon hosts the largest number of refugees per capita. According to UNHCR, 1.5 million Syrian refugees are settling in Lebanon, and 20,000 refugees of other origins such as Iraq, Ethiopia and Sudan, in addition to 200,000 Palestinian refugees. As a result, Lebanon, as a small country, is struggling to maintain its demographic balance and to regain growth after its economic crisis.²²⁶

The presence of such a large refugee population in Lebanon exacerbated the political and economic situation facing the country, and posed extra pressure on the infrastructure, services and competition for jobs.²²⁷

According to the World Bank, the Syrian refugees' effects would double the unemployment rate in Lebanon and push 170,000 Lebanese into poverty. There have been reported growing tensions between Lebanese and Syrian communities. This is due to the history of occupation and exploitation of Lebanon by Syria, and the division in Lebanon between those who support the Syrian regime and those who support the opposition groups.²²⁸

Palestinian refugees in Lebanon

During the 1948 Israeli-Arab war, thousands of Palestinians were forced to flee their homes after the creation of the country Israel. Consequently, there are nearly 475,000 Palestinian refugees settling in Lebanon. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon receive assistance in education and healthcare through the United Nations' Agency for Palestinian Refugees UNRWA.²²⁹

In 2019, thousands of Palestinian refugees protested in Lebanon demanding that the Lebanese government end the requirement of obtaining a work permit for the Palestinian refugees to legally get employed. However, the Lebanese Ministry of Labour procedures of closing down undocumented non-Lebanese businesses targets Syrian refugees and Palestinians too. However, the Lebanese government has been criticized for not granting the Palestinian refugees a designated status as "foreign workers" nor "refugees", which denies their rights and benefits under each category. As a result, the Lebanese government and political system discriminates against Palestinians, by which they are banned from working in many professions such as law, medicine, engineering, taxi drivers and barbers. Therefore, the majority of Palestinian workers in Lebanon hold low-wage jobs such as agriculture and constructure works. It is estimated that unemployment rate of Palestinians in Lebanon is 20%. Furthermore, "Palestinians are also

banned from owning property or inheriting property from their family members” in Lebanon. In addition, they are denied citizenship in Lebanon.²³⁰

Palestinians who are registered with DPAR and UNRWA, are granted personal ID card stating that they are Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. During periods of heightened security in Lebanon, Palestinian refugees in camps face restrictions on movement, to enter or exit their camps, which limit their access to employment and essential services. Palestinian refugees who are registered with the Lebanese authority require Palestinian travel documents to travel, however, they confront limitations in applying for visas to third countries because of their status as Palestinian refugees. Unlike, Palestinian refugees who are registered under DPAR and UNRWA, obtain travel documents valid from one to five years.²³¹

Palestinian refugees are marginalized in Lebanon. In 2010, it was estimated that 56% of Palestinian refugees are unemployed in Lebanon. Accordingly, after the influx of Syrian refugees, the number of poor and unemployment persons has increased in Lebanon. It is estimated that 53% of Palestinian refugee who are registered under the Lebanese authority, live in 12 camps. These camps suffer from serious overcrowding, poor infrastructure, such as water and electricity, and inadequate housing conditions. Moreover, housing opportunities for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are divided into three options: Palestinian refugee camps, renting a residence outside the camps, which are usually expensive to afford, and relying on informal contracts with Lebanese associates to buy property.²³²

Palestinian refugees are denied access to health services in Lebanon, as a result, they rely on the UNRWA and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) to provide them with the needed health care. Also, Palestinian refugees are denied access to public schools in Lebanon, as a result, they only have two options, to pursue their education in one of the 69 UNRWA schools, which are often overcrowded, or to join private schools, which are unaffordable. Therefore, drop-out rates are high among Palestinian refugees. As a result of the poor housing conditions and high unemployment rate, gender-based violence against women and the use of violence against children are reportedly increasing in Palestinian societies. However, the implementation of preventive measures and response programs to these forms of violence are reportedly proven to be challenged.²³³

During the Syrian crisis, Palestinian refugees were allowed to enter Lebanon using their ID cards or travel documents issued by the Syrian authorities. Consequently, it was reported that their valid residency permits, granted by the Lebanese authority, was not renewed, and therefore, leading to considering their residency as illegal in Lebanon. As a result, Palestinian refugees coming from Syria face the risk of being detained, arrested or departed, due to the lack of legal status and valid documentations.²³⁴


Government urban planning

In practice, the Urban Planning Code had limited implications. Only 15% of Lebanon's land is covered by 180 master plans, while 85% is either not planned or has partial plans covering specific areas. The national actors of urban planning mostly concentrate on reconstruction and emergency management instead of long-term developments, especially after the destruction caused by the 2006 war against Israel and the emergence of Syrian refugees in 2011. However, decision-makers regarding investments in construction favors the capital city, Beirut.²³⁵

The political power of the Lebanese government in urban development is challenged by the emergence of civil society and regional organizations and their growing influence on urban regimes.²³⁶ The government's lack of control of urban development led to; random urbanization along in the suburbs of large cities, negative impact on archeological sites, proliferation of unlicensed quarries, and infringes on agricultural lands and coastlines.²³⁷ There is a mismanagement in urban planning, which does not align with the geography of Lebanon. The government does not properly respond to territorial specificity, or to urban disproportions, or to the impact of Syrian crisis that contributes to urban expansion. This is also due to different logics of the different governing actors, who seek to serve their own objectives without coordination.²³⁸

A. Lebanon urban-rural (2018)²³⁹


Lebanon urban-rural (2018)



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B. Lebanon major export destinations²⁴⁰


Lebanon major export destinations (2018)



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C. Lebanon Age Breakdown (2018)²⁴¹

Lebanon age breakdown (2018)



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6. Canada and Lebanon Relations

Canada has more than 200,000 people from the Lebanese community, and approximately 50,000 Canadians live in Lebanon. The bilateral relationship of the two states is strengthened by robust cultural ties and common participation in La Francophonie.²⁴²


More than half of the Syrian refugees, 30,000, who were settled in Canada, came from Lebanon.²⁴³

7. ALC Analysis

According to 2016 CIFP fragility report, Lebanon's global fragility ranking in 2015 is 59.²⁴⁴

	Authority	Legitimacy	Capacity
Definition²⁴⁵	"Reflects the institutional ability of the government to enact binding legislation over its population and provide it with a stable and secure environment."	"Reflects leadership support of the population along with international recognition of that support."	"Reflects the state's resources that can be mobilized for developmental and defensive purposes."
Examples of indicators	-Conflict intensity - Government effectiveness -Political stability	-Level of democracy -Voice and accountability	-GDP per capita -Education -Life expectancy
Recent CIFP Ratings²⁴⁶ -higher scores are worse (best score is 1, worst is 9)	5.38 (2012) 5.51 (2011) 5.39 (2010)	5.85 (2012) 6.32 (2011) 6.24 (2010)	4.62 (2012) 4.78 (2011) 4.90 (2010)

Key Drivers of Potential Fragility In Lebanon



Authority assessment Environmental performance

Water supply

Since 1992, the Lebanese government has taken considerable measures to address the water supply management. Under the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) a number of long-term water projects, such as the construction of dams and mountain lakes, were implemented to respond to water supply insufficiency in Lebanon.

However, the government's management of water supply is based on old regulations and procedures, which contradicts today's current legislation laws, leading to paralyzing daily management.²⁴⁷

Wastewater

The Lebanese government works on improving the public wastewater service through its adoption to its National Water Sector Strategy (NWSS), which serves as a reference guide for all public administrations and institutions. In addition, the CDR intervened to respond to the insufficient wastewater services in Lebanese territories. It implemented programs to protect the Lebanese coasts and water resources from pollution.

Solid waste

The Lebanese government issued a number of legislations to govern wastes. For example, in 2010, the Council of Ministers' decision No.1 established a committee headed by official ministers to develop a waste management plan proposal covering all Lebanese regions. Later, the Council of Ministers issued decision No. 55 adopted a number of measures to address the solid waste problem in Lebanon.²⁴⁸

However, the Lebanese government lacks the ability to aid its population during natural crises. One example is its weak response to the 2020 Beirut port explosion. This highlights the Lebanese authorities' leadership gap to face environmental and natural disasters.

Legitimacy assessment

State-society relation

The current status of the state-society relation is weak. This is because citizens do not trust their government, which highlights a legitimacy gap in the state. Many of Lebanese people are boycotting tax payment, due to their lack of trust in the government, and because they are not obtaining their basic rights such as adequate services.

Regarding participation in the political system, women typically do not participate in the government, except in 2005 and 2019 women were included in the Lebanese cabinet for the first time. Refugees do not enjoy political rights, and do not participate in the government.²⁴⁹ Moreover, in Lebanon's parliamentary poll less than half of the registered voters participated in the elections, around 47%, in 2018. Many people explained that they were skeptical of the elections and believed that it was predetermined.²⁵⁰

All citizens have the right to form competitive political groups, according to the Freedom House the score of the right of forming competitive political groups is high, which is 3/4. However, in reality to gain power through competitive elections are very weak, according to Freedom house low score, which is 1/4.²⁵¹

The relationship between citizens and the state is institutionalized under the constitution. The constitution protects the citizens' right to move freely in Lebanon without any immigration requirements, gain access to free education, receive health-care benefits at any public health

institution, participate in political system, get exempted from taxes with no condition of reciprocity, own and inherit property in Lebanon, enter or exit Lebanon from any port, travel to and from another countries in accordance with visa requirements, and seek consular protection by Lebanon through Lebanese embassies abroad.²⁵² However, Lebanese citizens are obligated by law to bear arms on behalf of Lebanon.

For example, according to Freedom House the score of the citizens' right to practice and express their religious faith is high which is 3/4 .

Because by law citizens have the right to participate in the political system, expression of personal views on political issues are uninhibited in Lebanon. According to Freedom House the score of expression of personal views is high, which is 3/4 .²⁵³ However, some individuals face arrests and detentions because of criticizing the government or political elites such as the president.

Water supply

Despite the government's environmental policies, water supplies from the state-owned water company are limited. As a result, most of the Lebanese citizens boycott paying taxes, due to the lack of water supply and the weak water services provided by the government. This indicates the lack of trust between consumers, the citizens, and providers, the national actors, of water. This legitimacy trap is highlighted in the poor consumer payment rates which hinders the covering operating costs of water supply management.²⁵⁴

Natural disasters

After the explosion the Lebanese government opened an investigation to reveal reasons behind the Beirut port blast, it referred the case to a special court with no appeals process. As a result, the domestic investigation lacks public credibility.²⁵⁵

However, in the rebuilding plan of Beirut, after the 2020 Beirut port explosion, the Beirut Urban Lab ensured that the rebuilding process includes the residence of the affected areas' perspectives. This indicates the existence of transparency between environmental decisions and citizens.²⁵⁶

The government's policies counteracting pressures related to demography and population

There are a number of official national actors who are responsible for urban and land-use planning in Lebanon such as, the Director General for Urban Planning (DGU), and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), the Higher Council for Urban Planning (HCUP), the local authorities such as; municipalities and unions of municipalities, and other sector ministries. In addition, the National Physical Master Plan for the Lebanese territories is the main tool for regulating territorial planning in Lebanon. However, it does not properly respond to territorial specificity, or to urban disproportions, or to the impact of Syrian crisis that contributes to urban expansion.

Because there is more than one actor who is responsible for urban planning, the regulatory role becomes more complex, which led to problems such as weak coordination capacities. Furthermore, the national actors of urban planning started to concentrate on reconstruction and emergency management instead of long-term developments, especially after the destruction caused by the 2006 war against Israel and the emergence of Syrian refugees in 2011.

The CDR remains a key actor due to its technical capacities, and its links to the Council of Ministers, and to the biggest international financial funders. The territorial action remains dependent on foreign funds such as grants or loans. However, decision-makers regarding investments in construction favors the capital city, Beirut.

There is a mismanagement in territorial planning, which does not align with the geography of Lebanon. This is due to different logics of the different governing actors, who seek to serve their own objectives without coordination.

In 1983, the Lebanese government issued the Urban Planning Code, Law 96/83, which stipulates the master plans and the detailed plans for cities and villages. However, the government's urban management lacked control and regulation mechanisms. The government's lack of control of urban development led to; random urbanization along in the suburbs of large cities, negative impact on archeological sites, proliferation of unlicensed quarries, and infringes on agricultural lands and coastlines.²⁵⁷

In practice, the Urban Planning Code had limited implications. Only 15% of Lebanon's land is covered by 180 master plans, while 85% is either not planned or has partial plans covering specific areas. After issuing a ministerial decree in 1971, that greatly contributed to urban increase and fragmentation of forest and agricultural areas, the HCUP issued a decree, in 2005, to urban increase by limiting land exploitation ratios to 25%.

Besides the DGUP and the HCUP, other public institutions are directly involved in defining urban planning in Lebanon, such as the Ministry of Planning and CDR. However, the Ministry of Planning lacks the capabilities to control rapid urbanization, leading to its marginalization. On the other hand, the CDR plays a central role in defining urban policy in Lebanon. It developed NPMPLT in 2004, which is a strategic reference document for regional and local urban planning, adopted by public administrations and authorities.²⁵⁸

However, the political power of the Lebanese government in urban development is challenged by the emergence of civil society and regional organizations and their growing influence on urban regimes.²⁵⁹

Capacity assessment

The relationship between citizens and the state is based on reciprocal gains, according to the constitution, citizens have by law legal rights and responsibilities toward their state. In Lebanon, there are personal income tax levied on wages, salaries, and business income, tax on capital gains and investment income, tax on interest, tax on piecemeal compensation, and non-residence tax.²⁶⁰

The personal income tax rate increased from 20% in 2010, to 24% in 2019. However, when tracing tax collectors, it is estimated that 75% of the population has not paid taxes since 1975, the beginning of the civil war in Lebanon. This is because the Lebanese Tax department suffers from insufficient personnel.²⁶¹ Citizens are escaping and boycotting tax payment because the government is not providing them with the fundamental services such as electricity, streetlights, adequate roads, and proper transportation. As a result, “We won’t pay” campaign was released, where the majority of citizens agreed not to fund corruption by boycotting tax payment. Citizens are applying pressure on the indifferent political officials, where they aim to have the banks extend the loan payment period and to lower the interest rate for loans. The relationship between citizens and the state indicates lack of trust and legitimacy.

Lebanon suffers from poor infrastructure and deterioration in services.²⁶² Moreover, due to the difficult financial circumstances that Lebanon is experiencing, some people are unable to earn half of their salaries or have lost their jobs and, therefore, unable to secure their basic day-to-day expenses. People are rebelling against political authorities by not paying taxes, as some have lost their jobs, their savings are frozen, and they are unable to pay for their basic needs.²⁶³

Water supply

The Lebanese government implemented promulgation of Law 221/2000 to restructure water and water waste sectors. It also issued regulatory and structural decrees and put them into effect, after appointing boards of water institutions, to rehabilitate and improve services of water institutions, expand their coverage areas, and maintain their administrative and financial stability.

Several major contracts were signed during 2017, to respond to drinking water supply in Lebanon. The Lebanese government was solely capable of funding a number of these projects such as Supply of drinking water to the villages of Hermel. However, the majority of these water projects were funded by foreign investors in liaison with the CDR such as the Rehabilitation and improvement of drinking water systems in Zahle and surroundings projects. Other major projects are under preparation between 2018 and 2020. Most of these water projects are supposed to be sponsored by foreign investors in liaison with the Lebanese government, which indicates the government’s dependency on foreign funds to run its investments. Examples of these water projects are the Renovation of water systems in Minnieh – Danniye, the Expansion of Dbayeh drinking water treatment plant, and the Project to supply drinking water to Akkar Coastal Area – Lot II.²⁶⁴

However, national actors are struggling to improve water supply reliability, and drinking water quality. The mismanagement of drinking water services in Lebanon is due to lack of systemized approach to monitoring water quality. The national actors, MoEW, and regional actors, WE, do not have monitoring plans to guarantee water quality or safety. For example, MoEW does not have a laboratory to test water samples and it lacks water quality specialist capacity. Moreover, due to the institutional constraints, WE are unable to properly improve their financial viability.

The MoEW and WE management lack the tools to implement and enforce law mechanisms, which explains the absence of water compliance. Furthermore, the management of water supply lacks the measures to implement regulations of pricing. This is due to financial deficits resulting from poor consumer payment rates that hinder covering operating costs. This capacity gap is because of the lack of trust between consumers, the citizens, and providers, the national actors, of water.²⁶⁵

Moreover, there is a weak institutional capacity resulting from the government-mandated hiring freeze. The ratio of employees estimated around 2, who are working in water public services is low compared to the number of connected households, estimated around 1000.

Wastewater

Most of the wastewater projects, signed in 2017, are funded by the Lebanese government in liaison with foreign investors. Examples of these projects are, the Execution of wastewater networks in the Temnin system in the Upper Basin of the Litani River, and the Operation and maintenance of the main coastal collector extending from Nahr el Bared to the wastewater treatment plant located in Tripoli.

Overall, the Lebanese government is dependent on foreign investors to help manage its environmental resources.

Food security

Due to the government's lack of capacity to mitigate the consequences of the 2020 Beirut port explosion, it is estimated that half of the Lebanese population will face the risk of a food crisis.²⁶⁶ Resulting from the country's inability to quickly rebuild the silos, the country's primary grain storage that was damaged during the Beirut explosion.²⁶⁷

Urban planning

The Ministry of State for Planning manages urban regulations; however, it is not provided with adequate capacities, and lacks the human and financial resources to handle this role. The Ministry and central institutions' unclear mandate to develop urban responsibilities, led various institutions to formally and informally be responsible to handle urban issues.

The DGUP has a technical role to review building permits, and to secure their formal approval by the local municipalities. Yet it is operating within a rigid structure, and due to technical and legal issues it has no clear collaboration mechanisms with municipalities. This highlights a capacity gap.

The key local actors in urban development and policymaking in Lebanon are Municipalities and UoMs. Most of the Municipalities lack proper human resources such as, required expertise and competencies, which hinder the efficiency of urban development process. This resulted from the

lack of adequate qualifications at the human resource level, and the very low wages. This negatively affected the quality of municipal work and service delivery.

In Lebanon the key institutions in urban planning are DGUP, CDR, UoMs, and OEA. However, due to the weak system of coordination, they operate independently without being aware of other planning projects that are taking place in the country.²⁶⁸


Municipalities in urban areas serve as an important financial resource that drives local economic development. Adding to this, the foreign financial donors are funding local actors for urban planning. Although local actors desire to reform and provide proper territorial planning to the state, they lack the capability to coordinate with each other for proper delivery on the ground.²⁶⁹

The Urban Planning Code of 1983 lacks proper referencing to other laws and legislations, as a result, it restrained the power of local authorities by giving them only a consultative role in the implementation of urban policies.²⁷⁰


Women in Lebanon

Women in Lebanon face economic, social, and cultural barriers including gender stereotyping. Furthermore, due to legal frameworks that explicitly discriminate based on sex or gender, Women face barriers to access justice in Lebanon. Laws in Lebanon fail to criminalize certain violations of women's rights adequately. As a result, they suffer from gender-based violence due to laws that discriminate against women such as the Criminal Code, the Nationality Law, and the Personal Status Law. Adding, the absent definitions of crimes, such as rape and marital rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment have aggravated the risk of increased violence against women. In addition, administration of justice in Lebanon lacks effective gender-sensitive investigations, lack of proper prosecution, lack of adequate resources, and discriminatory practices and policies.²⁷¹


7. Poorest performance countries in 2015²⁷²




E.Fragility and refugees hosted²⁷³




F.Political Disorder in Lebanon (October 2019- October 2020)²⁷⁴



G.Political Disorder in Lebanon (January 2016- October 2020)²⁷⁵



H. Rioting events in Lebanon by City (February- July 2020)²⁷⁶




I. Map of Lebanon²⁷⁷



J. Proportional Representation Breakdown²⁷⁸

Lebanon 2018: The parliament

The Lebanese parliament has proportional representation, according to the Taif Accord.




On May 6, 2018, Lebanon elected a new parliament for the first time in nearly 9 years. This election was governed by the new electoral law passed in 2017, a proportional representation, that was intended to create fairness among all political parties to also have a chance to win seats, instead of a majority government system.²⁷⁹ “Of the 597 candidates, 128 winners from Lebanon’s 15 electoral districts claimed parliamentary seats.”²⁸⁰


K.Electoral Districts²⁸¹

Electoral districts


Lebanese will
elect 128 MPs
- 64 Muslims,
64 Christians




L. Total COVID-19 cases in Lebanon. cclv




M. Total COVID-19 deaths in Lebanon



N. A graph representing food insecurity in Lebanon after 2020 Beirut port explosion²⁸²



O. March 8 (pro-Syria) political block and March 14 (anti-Syria) political block²⁸³



End Notes

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