SUCCEED:

Somali Unified Canadian Collaboration for Economic and Educational Development

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Executive Summary

The ceaseless conflict and insecurity that have continually plagued Somalia too often overshadow the people, communities, and livelihoods caught in between. Underlying these challenges are demographic stresses and socio-economic tensions that must be properly addressed for any meaningful progress to be made. With a budget of $20m, The Somali Unified Canadian Collaboration for Economic and Educational Development (SUCCEED) Project will help address these underlying challenges through two objectives:

1. Informal facilitation of peace talks and peace education training sessions with regional clan leaders.
2. Economically empowering regional Somali women to increase their participation in decision-making.

The project seeks an ultimate outcome of helping to resolve broader socio-economic tensions and political conflict in the country.

Goals and Objectives (Rationale)

Project SUCCEED is an innovative track two response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. While the crisis in Somalia is a highly complex phenomenon which must be tackled on all fronts, project SUCCEED has very specific goals and objectives. The ultimate long-term outcome of the project is to reduce the socio-economic tensions between the federal government and al-Shabaab thereby improving peace and stability in Somalia. However, given the numerous regional clans and their influence across the country, project SUCCEED must strategically focus on the goal of improving the socio-economic tensions between regional clans and insurgent groups. SUCCEED believes that improving the situation on a regional level first is necessary in order to have an impact on a larger state-wide level. As such, it will take on an incremental approach which consists of innovative objectives ideally structured to help achieve its goal.

One of the objectives is launching an informal facilitation process with clan leaders and elders to promote peace education and problem solving of underlying socio-economic issues.[i] The leaders, which consist of Suldaans, Ugaas or Issiims are extremely influential and respected figures within regional Somali communities and are well positioned to make a direct impact on the socio-economic tensions between everyday Somalis and al-Shabaab.[ii] As such, the aim is to teach clan leaders key principles of peace education who will in turn pass their knowledge down the hierarchy to the everyday Somali citizen. SUCCEED will strategically hold these informal consultations, dialogues and peace education training sessions with clan leaders and elders as their respectable status will maximize outreach to Somali citizens and increase the chance of success.

Another objective of SUCCEED is to promote the economic empowerment of women within Somali communities thereby allowing more women to lead and participate in decision making at all levels. This objective will both fulfill the gender equality mandate of Global Affairs Canada and UN Women, as well as improve the livelihood of women in Somalia.[iii] Somali women generally have a weak position in the labour market and represent a large proportion of Somalis in vulnerable employment.[iv] If women are economically empowered, their leadership statuses and capacity to make meaningful change will improve. Consequently, women will become more influential figures within the Somalian society, and they can become influential drivers of positive change in the socio-economic crisis.[v]

Project Partners and Stakeholders

Global Affairs Canada & UN Women:

- GAC and UN Women are best positioned and equipped to pilot the project. GAC already supports multiple local Somali initiatives on inclusive governance including diversity, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, peace and security, with a focus on conflict prevention and peace building.[vi]

Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation (CIIAN):

- CIIAN is a world-renown organization that provides trusted expertise and training in peacebuilding, mediation, facilitation and conflict resolution making it an ideal partner for SUCCEED's mission.[vii]

Coalition for Grassroots Women Organization (COGWO):

- COGWO is very active in the social, political and economic empowerment of Somali women through peace promotion, women rights, and capacity building making it an ideal partner for SUCCEED.[viii]

Somali Canadian Education and Rural Development Organization (SCERDO)[ix] & Somali Canadian Women and Children Association (SCWCA)[x]:

- Somali Diaspora in Canada are highly invested and are very active in peace promotion given the numerous organizations established with the mandate of improving the socio-economic crisis in Somalia. Therefore, not only are they important stakeholders, but they can also take on active roles within the SUCCEED mandate as they already have a strong connection to Somali communities and a comprehensive understanding of, and affiliation with, Somali culture.

Somali Clan Leaders:

- Clan leaders are highly influential and respected members of Somali communities and their participation is vital importance to achieving SUCCEED's goals and objectives.

Canadian and Somali Governments:

- Canada is an undisputed stakeholder in this scenario as it could be used as an opportunity to repair its international image given its failed historical missions in Somalia, to regain its international leadership role as a peacekeeper, and to advance its goals of human rights, peace, democracy etc.
- Somali government is inevitably a stakeholder as its stability, legitimacy and effectiveness is dependent upon regional stability and improved nation-wide socio-economic status of Somalis.

Pre-Project Risk Assessment

Prior to launching the project, several minimally acceptable conditions must be met. First, there should be very low levels of Al-Shabaab activity in the local area of engagement. Given their history of targeting government and NGO workers,[xi] they could present a serious threat to those involved in the project. While clan violence is also a concern, it should not present the same level of danger to Canadians and partners as Al-Shabaab. Still, the intensification of clan violence could pose a safety threat and reduce the project's chances of success. After establishing a baseline for current conflict intensity in target communities, full engagement should only occur after three months of stable conditions, as indicated by the number of clan disputes resolved peacefully relative to the number of violent conflicts and casualties. Furthermore, we must obtain the support of the clan elders and other local authorities, relevant regional governments, and the federal government—or at least, ensure that none of these actors will attempt to undermine the project. Finally, there must be no government collapse or civil war, and we must be able to engage safely without encouraging the spread of COVID-19. These conditions are somewhat consistent with the most-likely scenario. The diagnostic flagged Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia for intensified violence, but we intend to work in the North-Central area surrounding Galkayo. The federal government's stability is a potential issue, but outright government collapse or civil war were not considered likely.

There are also some specific features of the project that would be necessary before we would accept it. Women must be included as participants, and the programming must be structured such that they feel comfortable participating fully. Local women's organizations are also important partners, as their knowledge and experience are vital for women's empowerment within Somalia's cultural context. Furthermore, we should ensure that informal barriers to participation do not exclude lower-income people,

especially from training that could improve their skills. This also intersects with the issue of women's participation, considering the larger time burdens that lower-income women often face. Features like flexible hours or reasonable compensation for participation could help. A final category of necessary participants is members of the Canadian Somali diaspora. Their understanding of the culture, linguistic skills, and ability to improve the project's image, given Canada's unfortunate history in Somalia, makes them well-suited for outreach, training, and facilitation. In terms of operating procedures, we need measures to ensure the security of Canadians and local partners, particularly given the weakness of the central government. We would also need procedures to avoid spreading COVID-19 within Somalia. Because connectivity and internet access are lacking,[xii] this would need to include physical distancing, masks, and potentially delaying parts of the project requiring Canadian actors' direct involvement. Finally, we would need language capabilities in Somali and Arabic.

Although the project should have several positive impacts, we are also sensitive to possible unintended negative impacts. The anticipated impacts include the establishment of a network of CSOs and diaspora members, informal problem-solving sessions between clans, and the greater empowerment of women. On the other hand, potential negative impacts could include the exacerbation of the COVID-19 pandemic, the entrenchment of existing inequalities, or the alienation of the local population through cultural insensitivity. The COVID-19 procedures, measures for inclusion and empowerment, and consultation of local CSOs and diaspora members should reduce the likelihood of these negative impacts. Ultimately, this project should contribute to realizing Somalia's best-case scenario and avoiding its worst-case. First, the informal consultation process will be designed to support and encourage the President. It could also improve his legitimacy among the general population, but particularly among the main participants. The project should also contribute to the reduction of violence, especially between rival clans. In the long run, participants should be better equipped to participate in peace-building and democracy and teach others to do the same. Finally, the continued support and coordination of local CSOs can occur even if conditions on the ground prevent the team from remaining in Somalia.

Location

*Appendix 1 displays the Geographical Division of Land by State and Non-State Actors Control in Somalia (2019). The geographic extent of the project covers areas outside of insurgent and armed group occupation. Namely, this includes areas primarily in red and yellow as demonstrated in the above map of territorial control by faction in Somalia. Our project would work best in areas covered in blue in favor of non-hotspot conflicts. Notably, Galkayo was a Somali city which laid on a dangerous border fault line, between the Darod and Hawiye. Their conflict led to hundreds injured and displaced.[xiii] However, in 2017, the landmark Galkayo Agreement (a 3-year process) was achieved through a core network of peacebuilders conducting track II diplomacy.[xiv] These mediators included prominent women and youth groups, as well as coalitions of elites at all levels of state.[xv] The agreement re-established social relations along the border and serves as an exemplary success story for Somalia.

Operational Limitations

The power to shape and instill peacemaking efforts in Somalia is contingent on several factors related to cooperation, timing, and location. Project SUCCEED is highly dependent on the willingness of local Somali actors and organizations to engage with our project partners. Notably, the project's necessary participants, the Somali-Canadian diaspora could face certain pushback in returning to participate in post-conflict reconstruction as Somalis may view them as opportunists in advancing personal interests.[xvi] This skepticism is worsened by Canada's military involvement in the disastrous 1993 Somali Affair.[xvii] This

perception of returning Somali diaspora coupled with Canada's history in Somalia requires our project partners to advance our objectives with cognizance to these potential limitations.

Given Somalia's rising levels of conflict, engaged local actors may have rapidly changing needs that will create a deviation in interests. project SUCCEED sees its highest chances of success prior to the escalation of violence within the conflict cycle. The presence of a peak point conflict or sudden outbreak of violence could significantly hinder and potentially derail the project's goals. Accordingly, timing is a crucial aspect for the project's intended impact, and one which our project partners will need to be particularly mindful of.

Traditionally, war and other outbreaks of violent conflict are customarily fought by Somali men. Corollary, in the aftermath of conflict, men are delegated the formal role of negotiator for concession-making in the pursuit of peace or settlement. As a part of the normative gender role in Somalia, women hold no *formal* power in matters of peacemaking or negotiation.[xviii] Neither formal institutions nor customary clan councils/committees exists for Somali women to represent their collective interests.[xix] Traditionally marked by a patriarchal society, women have little formal agency among their clansmen.

Operational Considerations

The Somali axiom "women can build peace but only men can make peace"[xx] speaks to the place of Somali women in traditional peace processes. Through gender roles as wives, daughters, and mothers, Somali women hold significant *informal* power for peace-making. Female agency and power are regarded by Somali men through maternal and marital links which accord Somali women strong kinship beyond their patrilineal clansmen; this reinforces their ability to formulate reconciliatory dialogue between clans.[xxi] Somali women are not blind to the constraints they face in peacebuilding. However, they understand that their agency for peace is most influential when acting collectively.[xxii] Educated women and membership within a women CSO or association is crucial to allow collective action and increasing Somali women involvement in peace activism.

Project Monitoring and Evaluation

Several performance measurement indicators can be used to monitor the project's Active Phase. The number of clan communities and women CSOs engaged, number of disputes resolved peacefully, number of emergent violent conflicts, and number of cooperation activities between stakeholders and Somali locals work to assess the project's immediate impact and if it requires restructuring. Establishing a free-flow of feedback between Canadian and local Somali partners and stakeholders will help deepen Somali-Canadian relationships.

The Canadian-Somali Management Plan (*reference to Logic Model) will also seek to formally request a monthly report on Canadian progress, findings, and decisions within the region. These reports will accompany a formal meeting between Global Affairs Canada and on-the-ground operatives to open discussion and promote best practices to ensure maximizing the project's effectiveness.

Operational Timeline

*Appendix 2 & 3 displays the Logic Model and the graphical Operational Timeline to reach Project SUCCED's goals.

Post-Project Impacts

Impact Evaluation Design

After implementing the SUCCESS project, an evaluation team will measure the overall effectiveness of the programming including its successes and challenges. Due to the gendered nature of the SUCCESS project's programming, the evaluation team as for as possible will be composed of an equal

balance of women and men.[xxiii] The evaluation team will conduct participatory impact assessments through focus groups with the support of local CSO partners to help facilitate the community-based forums.[xxiv] In particular, the evaluation team will work with local CSO partners in engaging a diverse range of community participants.   These participants will take ownership over the development, implementation, and conclusions of the impact assessment.[xxv] This will help ensure the beneficiaries have a voice as active agents with a common understanding of how the information gathered from the evaluation will improve potential follow-on activates.[xxvi] If necessary, separate consultations will take place where strong divisions may exist between particular community participant groups.[xxvii] To help facilitate the development of the impact assessment some broad-level questions will be provided to the community participants related to the main objectives of the project. These will include: how socio-economic tensions have been mitigated through problem-solving; how the project strengthened socio-economic empowerment of women in the community; and the level of capacity among community leaders to train others in peace education.

The post-project impact evaluation will focus on both intended and unintended impacts at the level of project objectives looking at not only what was accomplished within the scope of the projects' objectives but also understand how and why these targets were attained.[xxviii][xxix] This will be done in part by determining what specific peace building impacts can be attributed to the intervention by comparing the actual results with the desired outcomes outlined in the projects logic model.[xxx] Beyond the logic model a pre-assessment analyses that will be considered in the design of the evaluation includes a conflict analyses to understand how the project fits within the wider context of the regions tensions helping to identify any key issue indicators.[xxxi] A stakeholder analyses will also be conducted to both identify any potential actors who may be spoilers as well as build trust with key stakeholders, particularly since the impact assessment will be taking a participatory approach.[xxxii] A related analyses that will be integrated into the design is an evaluability assessment that will consider the capacities of the project environment including the level of regional political support and community buy-in to the project.[xxxiii]

Immediate & Long-term Post-Project Impacts:

The planned immediate post-project impact on the structures and process for resolving conflict will include the establishment of a peacebuilding network of CSOs and key Canadian Somali diaspora members identified to directly and indirectly engage with clan communities. One of the implementing partners, CIIAN, will have trained and assisted this network of CSOs in facilitating informal problem-solving sessions over socio-economic tensions between regional clans. A long-term impact over four years will be support provided to leaders among these local CSOs, particularly women, who have been identified for their ability to facilitate these problem-solving to become peace education trainers for their community and especially their youth.

The economic empowerment of women in the regional communities involved in the project will be achieved through interventions directly coordinated by GAC in partnership with the ILO and UN Women work in the region. These interventions will have the immediate impact of providing practical entrepreneurial skills through market relevant training and improved financial literacy. Long-term impacts over four years will include support for women to access financial services along with the development of a regional women's forum for business facilitated by local CSO partners to strengthen the status of women in their communities. A follow-on activity that could build off local women's increased social status is their integration into the formal peacebuilding process potentially through the UN's Elsie Initiative which aims to increase women's meaningful participation in peacekeeping operations.[xxxiv] By addressing the underlying regional socio-economic tensions within Somalia, this project seeks an ultimate outcome of resolving broader political conflict in the country.

**Appendix 1. Geographical Division of Land by State and Non-State Actors Control in Somalia**

Appendix 2: Project SUCCEED Logic Model

PROJECT SUCCEED LOGIC MODEL

Activities | **Outputs (Products and Services)** | **Target Audiences** | **Direct Outcomes** | **Interim Outcomes** | **Intermediate Outcomes** | **Final/Ultimate Goal**

Research, Monitoring and Surveillance (Scope)
- Research on the persistence, fate, movement, and effects of Somali clans and insurgent groups
- Monitoring and tracking On the presence of current conflict or other outbreaks

Risk Assessment
- Assess risks of potential violent conflicts that are of concern to the Project

Risk Management
- Manage the risks to the Project from new and existing conflicts in assessing their conflict lifecycle (latent, emergent, escalation, peakpoint)

Conflict Emergencies Management
- Prevention
- Preparedness
- Response
- Recovery

Canadian-Somali Project Management Plan (via Canadian-Somali collaboration)
- (Planning/implementation, negotiate actions, enforcement, research and monitoring)

Advance Informal Consultation and Mediation
- (Mediation and strategic planning; research & analysis of policies and adherence to them)

Outputs (Products and Services):
- 1a. Data, assessments, and technical reporting
- 1b. Risk management measures
- 1c. Canadian emergency regulations
- 1d. Social and technical advice to support incident response and assess that Project actors are protected
- 1e. Educational and economic adivce
- 1f. Program oversight, expert advice, guidance, and training

Target Audiences:
- Canadians, Somali government, non-governmental organizations, media, academics, international organizations, stakeholders implicated in conflict resolution and peacebuilding
- Individuals and organizations subject to emergency regulations
- Responsible parties, jurisdictional authorities; international response agencies
- Local Somali population, stakeholders, Project partners, local civil society organizations

Direct Outcomes:
- 2a. Canadians and organizations are aware of the information and/or risks posed by conflict
- 2b. Informal facilitation process begun; building on women-led CSOs, forming dialogue between clan leaders
- 2c. Project individuals understand emergency regulatory requirements
- 2d. Canada's (relevant departments; GAC) technical advice is provided to Project Partners
- 2e. Partners take action to consult and mediate to establish protected areas
- 2f. Reduction in uncertainty associated with risk from Project sites/location
- 2g. Risk reduction plans are developed and implemented at higher-risk Project sites/location

Interim Outcomes:
- 3a. Somali insurgent groups and clans are engaged in meaningful conversation
- 3b. Implemented risk management measures are effective in reducing the identified risks
- 3c. Canadian Somali network grows to support the conservation of stability and peace
- 3d. Somali locals value, and benefit from mediation, consultation and the established network
- 3e. Canadians and organizations use information to make informed decisions about Project sites/location

Intermediate Outcomes:
- 4a. Project participants are trained in peace education so they can impart this knowledge onto youth and other local community members
- 4b. Women's increased social status via the UN's Elsie Initiative
- 4c. Women are economically empowered and are engaged in formal institutions of peacemaking

Final/Ultimate Goal:
- 5a. Project SUCCEED will help reduce Somali socio-economic tensions between regional clans and insurgent groups

Appendix 3: Operational Timeline

SCOPING PHASE

6 Month Scouting

FUNDING & APPLICATION

10% of the budget assigned to establish the scope for informal consultation and dialogue with local Somalis

SUB-STRUCTURING PHASE

1 Year Groundwork

FUNDING & APPLICATION

20% of the budget assigned to establish relationships between relevant stakeholders and Project Partners

ACTIVE PHASE

3 Year Operationalization

FUNDING & APPLICATION

30%-40% of the budget assigned to fund project partners engaging in informal and formal mediations and consultations

REPORTING PHASE

6 Month Immediate and Post-Impact Assessment Time

FUNDING & APPLICATION

10% of budget assigned to contingency plan for emergencies including rapidly escalating conflict, medical exigencies, and other crisis outbreaks; leftover budget will be assigned to relevant arising or post-Project needs

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