Zambia:
A State Fragility Analysis
with
Policy Options

Image : https://www.drivingdirectionsandmaps.com/zambia-google-map/

Coursework submitted in part-fulfilment of INAF 5499 – Fragile States: Theory and Policy
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Carleton University

For Professor Dr. David Carment
December 7, 2018

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ALC	**Authority, Legitimacy, Capacity**
CIFP	**Country Indicators for Foreign Policy**
DRC	**Democratic Republic of Congo**
EU	**European Union**
FAO	**Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations**
FDI	**Foreign Direct Investment**
GBV	**Gender Based Violence**
GDP	**Gross Domestic Product**
HD	**Human Development**
HIPC	**Highly Indebted Poor Country**
IFAD	**International Fund for Agricultural Development**
INTOSAI	**International Organization of Supreme Audit**
NDP	**National Development Plan**
NGO	**Non-governmental Organization**
ODA	**Official Donor Assistance**
PF	**Patriotic Front**
SDG	**Sustainable Development Goals**
SOE	**State Owned Enterprise**
SSA	**Sub-Saharan Africa**
UN	**United Nations**
UNDP	**United Nations Development Program**
UPND	**United Party for National Development**
WB	**World Bank**
WFP	**World Food Program**

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OVERVIEW

After establishing multi-party democracy in 1991 Zambia is a state that has enjoyed a stable level of democracy and governance absent significant political violence and conflict. However the past decade has seen a steady decline in implementing effective economic policy, resource management and governance - leaving Zambia in a precarious state. The following analysis will use an evidence-based approach placing emphasis on the proximate and structural factors and conditions as the root cause[i] of fragility. Using a dynamic profile of Zambia, key drivers and events will be identified to provide policy options to build institutions and further advance state resiliency.[ii]

Source	Rank	Scale
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy - Fragility Index 2017 (p. 4)	**45/168**	**1 - Most Fragile**
Center for Systemic Peace - State Fragility Index: Global Report 2017 (p. 43)	**44/167**	
Fund for Peace - Failed States Index (2018)	**41/178**	
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development - States of Fragility 2018 (p. 10)	**44/58**	

Figure 1: Fragility Scores

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In SSA Zambia is a good 'neighbour' with little spillover[iii] effects in the region having maintained a relatively stable state with a limited history of conflict, and natural, political or humanitarian crises. Post-1991 there have been two transfers of power which few African states can claim. Ambitious government NDP's have consistently identified the same issues which drive Zambia's recent decline in stability[1]; debt, poverty, limited public service provision, food insecurity, limited economic opportunity, high birth rates and burgeoning youth-bulge, import dependence, uniform dependence on a vulnerable agricultural and a stressed mining sector, and a high-cost bureaucratic civil service.

Political rhetoric and posturing has not matched policy outcomes and has not adequately addressed the basic needs of many of its denizens. Recent events and executive politicking has resulted in a visible increase in levels of political violence[iv], backsliding[v], executive overreach[vi] and investor uncertainty.[vii] The interaction of the above factors and recent events have seemingly deepened an already visible institutional capacity gap[viii] and reinforces a negative feedback loop[ix] between economic policy and governance. Zambia appears to be lacking the revenues and human capital to effectually tackle the drivers of its fragility with a whole-of-government approach. Zambia would largely benefit from building stable partnerships with their economic investors in the mining sector and diversifying the agricultural sector to bolster institutional capacity building.[x] These revenues would increase the capacity to provide essential public goods and services to marginalized populations and signal political will, cultivate good practice for accountability and transparency[xi] measures, and ultimately promote good governance.[xii]

[1] **CIFP rankings**; 2012, **81 / 197** - 2017, **45 / 168**

METHODOLOGY

The framework followed uses Carleton University's CIFP project which identifies a fragile state as that which '… lack(s) the functional authority (A) to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity (C) to provide basic social needs for their populations, and/or the political legitimacy (L) to effectively represent their citizens at home or abroad'.[13] The interdependent and dimensional ALC framework was used to provide context, inform our diagnosis and prescription, and direct scenarios analyses and policy recommendations.

Using the CIFP data collection methodology quantitative data was recorded for 75 indicators across six clusters (Governance, Economic Development, Security, Human Development, Demography and the Environment) from 2000-2018. To accommodate missing data and provide further background; open-source research included a variety of primary and secondary quantitative and qualitative sources.[2] After establishing a static baseline preliminary assessment indicated that Governance was a key driver of state fragility and a subsequent CIFP Governance and Democracy Processes cluster analysis was also carried out to provide further nuance. Upon aggregation, evaluation and theoretical applications of the trend and cluster analyses developed a dynamic profile of Zambia.

The key below summarizes the evaluation of intensity and trend for each indicator and forms the basis of economic development and governance as key drivers of Zambian fragility. Further indicator data for both fragility and governance and democracy clusters can be found in Appendices 1 and 2.[3]

[2] academic journals, polls/surveys, expert reports, think tanks, NGO's, interviews, and events reporting
[3] The appendices also contain relevant visuals and graphics for key factors and drivers.



Figure 2. Indicators Legend

END USER

The Government of Zambia, the Auditor General, the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, and Mines and Mineral Development are the best-suited to direct policy that will address Zambia's elements of fragility because they are the most critical and relevant decision and policy-makers in the Zambian context.

ALC ANALYSIS

The dimensions of the ALC framework include; Authority 'the extent to which a state possesses the ability to enact binding legislation…exercise coercive force…provide core public goods and to provide a stable and secure environment to its citizens'; Legitimacy, 'the extent to which a particular state commands public loyalty to the governing regime and generates domestic support for that government's legislation and policy' and Capacity, 'the extent to which a state can mobilize and employ resources towards productive ends'.[14]

Authority:

The rule of law in Zambia is relatively weak[15] but executive decision-making has certainly pushed progressive and binding legislation expediently. As of writing President Edgar Lungu just successfully petitioned the judiciary to amend the constitution to allow him to stand for a 3rd term.[16] The state has a monopoly on violence primarily via the military which is well resourced, capable, non-politicized and professional. Conversely the police forces do not share the same status as salaries are lower and ostensibly contribute to corruption, politicization and the use of excessive force.[17] The most apparent weakness in state authority is the inability to reliably provide goods and services to a large proportion of the public.

Legitimacy:
Zambia has a history of short-lived coups,[4] but the coup of 1990 in response to the government's attempt to remove maize subsidies, the primary staple of Zambia, and double the price[18] ultimately ushered in multi-party democracy. The state has enjoyed a relatively free and open democracy,[19] but there have been several instances of political violence and rioting around elections as tensions often run high in Zambian politics.[20] The results of the last election in 2016 were heavily contested and the *Emergency Powers Act* was enacted to repress dissent and opposition, which included the opposition party's leader and dozens of Cabinet members. These harsh measures are suggestive of government backsliding to authoritarianism[21] characteristic of politics pre-1991 and evident with the incumbents push for a third term.[22] These events have not gone unnoticed by civil society and although the government has never overtly or directly been challenged, the latest polls by *Afrobarometer* show a negative shift in the perceptions of the executive.[23] The questionable misuses of executive power only work against the democratic values and norms that Zambia has largely observed for the past two decades.

Capacity:
Approximately 60% of the population lives in rural areas emphasizing the degree of complexity in Zambia's capacity gap. Institutions and infrastructure are stressed and struggle to provide essential services to roughly 70% of the population.[24] Roads often do not connect communities,[25] water infrastructure does not provide water for a majority of the population, sanitation services only reaches 30% of the population, electricity is consistently unreliable[26] (half the population without), and food security is roughly at the same level it was in 2000.[27] Zambia has made great strides in improving health services[28] and education despite decreases in funding. But with limited fiscal resources to improve physical infrastructure, trying to mobilize a relatively new, inexperienced and bureaucratic civil service[29] with cautious political will[30] the government encounters several obstacles to implement effective and efficient policy for capacity building.

DYNAMIC PRIMARY DRIVERS

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
Intensity: High | Trend: Volatile

Economic Growth (% of GDP)	Economic Size (Relative - GDP per capita)	Economic Size (Total GDP)	External Debt (% of GNI)	FDI (% of GDP)	Foreign Aid (% of Central Government Expenditures)	Foreign Aid (Total per capita)	Inflation	Informal Economy (Black Market)	Women in the Labour Force
V	V	V	V	→	V	V	V	→	→
Infrastructure - Reliability of Electrical Supply	**Infrastructure - Telephone Mainlines per capita**	**Internet Usage per capita**	**Paying Taxes**	**Regulatory Quality**	**Remittances Received (GDP per capita)**	**Reserve Holdings (Total)**	**Trade Balance (% of GDP)**	**Trade Openness (% of GDP)**	**Unemployment (% of population)**
V	V	↗	→	→	→	→	V	V	V

Figure 3. Economic Development Indicators

The Zambian economy is highly vulnerable due to its reliance on undiversified mining and

[4] The first coup was stopped before it was carried out; the second lasted 5 hours.

agricultural sectors. Moreover, without the resources to ensure a stable fiscal environment Zambia will continue to rely on foreign aid[31] and loans. Zambia is the second largest producer of copper in Africa[32] and copper comprises over 70% of total exports.[33] The Zambian economy is therefore highly susceptible to fluctuations in the global commodity price of copper. With high prices incentivizing FDI, increases in production and employment, a strengthened Zambian kwacha, and a resulting uptick in government revenue. Conversely, low commodity prices decrease FDI, lower production, trigger layoffs and lessen government revenue. However, taxation on the mining industry has been historically lax and ripe for capital flight, with the government intending to raise royalty taxes by 1.5% in 2019, which should add to government revenues.[34] Overall, Zambia has shifted from being a low-income country to one of the least developed lower middle-income countries in the world (under 'HIPC' their debt was cancelled).[35] Zambia has an unsustainably high reliance on borrowing with a combined internal and external debt load of approximately ~60%.[36] The magnitude of their debt led to the establishment of a Debt Management Office and the last annual debt report made public by the Ministry of Finance was in 2012,[37] leading to legitimate suspicions of hidden indebtedness. The rapid increase in debt is also accompanied by a high informal economy and stagnant tax revenues[38] from an increasing failure to establish a necessary stable and reliable tax base.[39] The agricultural sector in Zambia is crucially important accounting for 67% of the labour force, 18% of GDP, with most of the population reliant on subsistence farming for their livelihood and food supply.[40] However, the agricultural sector has many challenges, first among them is the country's dependence on maize, and subsequent lack of agricultural diversification. Maize accounts for 45% of harvested land, is cultivated by 80% of farmers, and is responsible for 50% of the average Zambian's daily caloric intake.[41] Unfortunately, maize requires a steady water supply, and absent sufficient irrigation infrastructure, is highly vulnerable to dry spells during the rainy season. Drought in Zambia is common and the strong el Niño event of 2015-16 revealed the vulnerabilities of an agriculturally dependent population.[42] Moreover, the impact of decreased maize production extends beyond rural Zambia as the maize trade and its retail operations, as well as those of other agricultural products, are a major source of employment and income.[43] Transportation infrastructure is critical for the agricultural sector and access to markets and financial services are hindered by non-existent or inadequately maintained roads.

Large and small farms are at odds as rudimentary tilling (by hoe) is still common practice leading to gross production inefficiencies and preventing farmers from maximizing yields and profit.[44] While trade openness is improving in Zambia, drought restricts exports, which leads to negative trade balances and chemical imports raise prices with the knock-on effect of high inflation which in 2016 was close to 20%.[45] In addition to the agricultural sector, energy production in Zambia is also water-reliant, with 95% of power being hydroelectric.[46] Energy needs are currently insufficient to keep pace with growing demand spurred by population growth, urbanization, expanding industry, and when combined with poor rainfall countrywide rolling blackouts are common.[47] Transportation again is a key sector to link communities however, paving roads in Zambia is two times the average of their neighbours indicating the unlikelihood that transportation will improve in the near future and it also alludes to the high levels of corruption at both the civil and industrial level.[48] Significant gains have been made in the provision of electricity, telephone and internet coverage, but these improvements are concentrated in urban areas. The confluence of structural economic limitations and red tape in the civil service do little to improve the overall economic growth for a significant proportion of the population. Without a consistent and sizable increase in foreign investment, ODA or government revenue Zambia appears to teeter-totter between marginal and medium economic growth for the near future.[49]

GOVERNANCE:

Intensity: Medium/High | Trend: Deteriorating

Freedom of the Press	Government Effectiveness	Level of Corruption	Level of Democracy	Level of Participation in International Political Organizations	Percentage of Females in Parliament	Permanence of Regime Type	Refugees Hosted	Restrictions on Civil Liberties	Restrictions on Political Rights	Rule of Law	Voice and Accountability in Decision-making
↓	→	→	→	→	↗	7 years	→	→	→	→	→

Figure 4. Governance Indicators

The cluster analysis points to governance as being a key driver in Zambia's fragility. Governance is visibly top-down, discretionary and disproportionate in favor of the executive over the legislature and judiciary.[50] The judiciary is relatively independent[51] but its influence is in decline and at the discretion of the executive. The imbalance of political power and lack of authoritative legal checks and balances[52] countenances the executive's large-scale freedom. As Parliament lacks the oversight to effectively monitor government actions, the executive can continue to nurture clientele and patron interests. Following the elections of 2014 restrictions on political rights and civil liberties markedly entered Zambian politics and are now commonplace. The government's decision to shut down *The Post*, arguably Zambia's only independent news agency, in 2016 suggests there is an interest to silence the media.[53] As discussed earlier in regards to the construction of roads corruption is an issue and recently the UK, Ireland and Finland froze their aid to Zambia in response to a corruption investigation and allegations that their aid was misappropriated.[54] Zambia relies on foreign aid for government expenditures but due to the significant debt repayments it is not enough to build institutional capacity.[55] The gains made for democratic processes have improved nevertheless the latest "partly-free" election in 2016 had the UPND opposition capturing 47% of the vote and what followed were claims of vote tampering and illegitimacy. A post-election riot ensued consistent with a trend observed in the last three elections with narrow margin victories.

Following the riots and President Lungu's enactment of the *Emergency Powers Act* opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema was only released with the help of international mediators.[56] Should the turn to more authoritarian measures continue polity fragmentation is arguably only going to increase[57] and general opposition could induce more repressive responses by the government. This cycle would erode the public's faith in the government's legitimacy and lead to a more destabilizing political landscape.

Lastly the discussed divide between rural and urban communities also extends to effective governance. Local tribal chiefs maintain informal networks by allocating land, settling legal disputes and influencing household decision-making.[58] Without secure property rights and unenforceable contracts the rural populations are also at the discretion of the executive.[59] Nurturing relationships through commerce and development can foster linkages whilst acknowledging that the gap in service provision can be narrowed.

DYNAMIC SECONDARY DRIVERS

DEMOGRAPHY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:
Intensity: High | Trend: Stable

Life Expectancy Female	Life Expectantcy Total	Migration (Estimated Net)	Population Density	Population Growth
				C
Slum Popullation (Proportion of Population)	Urban Growth Rate	Youth Bulge	Population Diversity Ethnicity	Population Diversity Religion
	C	C	C	C

Figure 5. Human Development Indicators

Zambia is ranked 150th out of 169 on the Human Development Index,[60] with approximately 60% of Zambians living in poverty, of whom 45% live in extreme poverty.[61] The most concerning indicator is food security which with 45% of the population considered undernourished by the Food and Agriculture Organization, a figure that has remained troublingly constant in the last 20 years. [62] Furthermore, the prevalence of chronic malnutrition for children under age five is the ninth highest in the world at 45.4% and some 53% and 46% of Zambian children have Vitamin A and iron deficiency respectively, compromising their long-term development.[63] The overall food security and undernourishment situation is at risk of deteriorating during crop shortages, which exacerbate this lack of food access for many. While the pervasiveness of subsistence farming and an inconsistent food supply drive poverty in rural Zambia, a deterioration in wages, poor working conditions and widespread job insecurity also contribute to the sustained levels of abject poverty. Closing these gaps will continue to be a significant challenge considering the Zambian population has almost doubled in the past 18 years, with a burgeoning youth bulge, as the average Zambian woman has five children (down from six since 2000).[64] The widely acclaimed mainstreaming of gender in the recent NDP remains a challenge largely due to low levels of education and access to health services. The rate of HIV infection is deeply worrying currently at 11.5% of adults (aged 15- 49) and 5.7% for females (aged 15-25). Consistent yearly expenditures for health services is necessary as increased coverage to anti-retroviral therapy and a concerted effort by the Ministry of Health to improve social programs that prevent transmission[65] have helped reduced infection dramatically since 2000.[66] Malaria is an issue, with the entirety of the population at risk, with over 17% reportedly infected in 2015 (the last year with data), with a higher proportion of these infections coming in the wetter northern provinces.[67] Other water and vector-borne diseases such as Tuberculosis and Cholera remain issues as well, an outbreak of the latter was reported in 2017.[68] Poor sanitation and lack of improved water access facilitate these outbreaks and further represent the deep challenges and deficiencies of Zambia's HD development situation, and whose limited capacity to respond to these issues will continue to be stretched by an ever-growing and vulnerable population.

Access to Improved Water	Access to Sanitation	Education Primary Completion - Female	Education Primary Completion - Total	Education Primary Enrollment Total
Education Primary Enrollment Ratio Female/Male	Food Security	Gender Inequality	Health Infrastructure (Expenditures as a % of GDP)	HIV/AIDS - % of Adult Females Infected
HIV/AIDS Proportion of Adult Population Infected	Human Development Index	Infant Mortality	Literacy - Total	Literacy - Female

Figure 6. Demography Indicators

ENVIRONMENT:

Intensity: Medium | Trend: Volatile

Arable/Fertile Land Available	Consumption - Commercial Energy consumption per capita	Consumption - Energy Use per capita	Energy Intensity	Consumption Use of Solid Fuels
→	V	↗	↗	↗
Disaster Risk	**Environmental Perfomance**	**Forest Annual (% Change in Area)**	**Pollution - CO2 Emissions per capita**	**Pollution - CO2 Emissions per Dolar PPP**
→	→	↘	↗	↗

Figure 7. Environment Indicators

Zambia's vulnerability to environmental shocks, such as drought and flooding is a persistent issue. Drought occurs in Zambia approximately every 5 years[69] and it not only stifles the economy at-large but deteriorates the country's already tenuous HD situation. Maize as well as secondary staples like cassava and sugarcane are dependent on a steady water supply to grow.[70] However, periodic dry spells and even droughts during the rainy season are typically caused by el Niño events which reduce rainfall in the country's central and southern provinces.[71] Zambians are weary of the prospect of the next drought as seen in 2016 whereby critical food insecurity and an already high poverty rate was exacerbated by the depletion of livelihoods and high food insecurity. While Zambia lies largely within the Zambezi River Basin and boasts an abundant natural water supply, only 2% of cultivated land is irrigated due to a lack of modern irrigation systems a byproduct of lacking transport and energy infrastructure.[72] The government has repeatedly postured for agricultural diversification programs which promote the planting of drought-resistant crops, as unveiled in their new NDP,[73] however this has been met with mixed-success as infrastructure and market access remain weak, and an agricultural transition that affects millions of livelihoods has innerved cultural attitudes. Along with depressing agricultural output, lower water levels mean Zambia's hydroelectric dams will produce less energy, creating power shortages and stifling economic activity across the country including mining operations.[74] Conversely, as the dams sit largely within the Zambezi River basin, above normal rainfall can cause flooding in rural areas. Consequential flooding occurs in Zambia every 2.5 years[75] and as the river and marshes overflow farmland is inundated drowning crops and washing away livestock.[76] Moreover, during these episodes poor drainage in the city's slums result in flooded homes and without strong social networks there is an increase in displaced populations.[77] Wetter conditions also increase the risk of water and vector-borne disease outbreaks due to the contamination of water and sanitation facilities, as well as the creation of still pools of water as flooding recedes.[78] The Disaster Risk Index places Zambia as the 8th most susceptible state in the world to a disaster and this is due to debilitating drought and flooding.[79] Unfortunately, el Niño events, historically occurring every 2 to 7 years, are forecasted to increase in frequency and strength as the global climate changes.[80] This further clarifies the need for concerted action on emergency programs addressing diversification and resiliency.

STATIC DRIVERS

SECURITY AND CRIME:

Intensity: Low | Trend: Stable

Conflict intensity	Dependence on External Military Support	Human Rights - Empowerment	Human Rights Physical - Integrity	Military Expenditures (% of GDP)
→	→	→	→	→
Political Stability	**Refugees Produced**	**Risk of Ethnic Rebellion**	**Terrorism (# of Fatalities)**	**Terrorism (# of incidents)**
→	→	→	→	→

Figure 8. Security and Crime Indicators

Zambia has no history of destabilizing conflict despite the presence of associated root causes including a colonial past, endemic poverty, secessionist claims,[81] ethnic/tribal cleavages,[82] and acute horizontal inequalities.[83] Structural causes could include corruption, widespread poverty and imbalances of power. Proximate causes could include elections, interest group exclusion,[84] political incitement, and constitutional amendments. Trigger events could be changes in leadership or declarations of states of emergency. As none of these causes have manifested into intra or inter-state conflict, security concerns are low. Despite the police often being accused of excessive force and corruption the disparity in funding versus the military could be a cause for public safety. Funding for the military has fluctuated (from 4.2% to 1.1% of GDP)[85] in the past decade and still Zambia has one of the largest standing armies in SSA with no conflict and no discernible change on threat levels in that time. Funding for the police could stabilize rising urban crime rates.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS:

External Actors

China

Interests: Chinese interest in Sub-Saharan Africa is centered on its need for raw materials to feed Chinese industrial production and Zambia represents a main source of copper for Chinese industry with 51% of their raw copper imports originating from Zambia.[86]
Actions: China has invested heavily in Zambia's mining sector, with CSOEs claiming a majority stake in several copper mines, and loaned significantly in infrastructure projects, such as the $397 million construction of a new airport in the Copperbelt (financed by the Chinese Ex-Im Bank, and to be constructed by Chinese SOE AVIC international).[87] Chinese loans have become a main source of debt, and they own approximately 20 to 30% of Zambian debt (estimates vary due to incomplete data).[88]

United States

Interests: The U.S. has a stated goal of building-up Zambia as a leading free-market democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.[89] The U.S also seeks to maintain influence in SSA.
Actions: Donates approximately $300 million in aid annually through USAID, whose programs seek to improve health issues, reduce incidences of HIV and malaria, overall poverty reduction, increasing access to education and electricity, promote economic growth and improve democratic governance processes.[90]

Regional Stakeholders

Includes South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania and other neighbouring countries.
Interests: Secure borders with its neighbours, building and maintaining bilateral trade relationships, primarily with regards to South Africa, the DRC and Tanzania.[91] Providing Zambian sea access and transit of goods to and from Zambia, occurring mostly via Tanzanian, South African and Mozambican ports is also important.[92]

International Monetary Fund

Interests: The IMF has been involved in consultations with the Zambian government over a bailout package as Zambia's debt load becomes untenable, with external debt currently makes up 38% of GNI, and total public and publicly guaranteed debt is now estimated at close to 61% of GDP.[93]
Actions: Any IMF programme that is negotiated would come with conditionalities, most likely tighter controls on spending, and changes to tax and monetary policy. Talks between Zambia and the IMF have stalled regarding a financial

aid package citing inadequate financial management and fiscal discipline with the government engaged in unsustainable borrowing.[94]

Aid Community

Includes major donors like the WB, European Union and the United Kingdom, and smaller donors such as Ireland, Sweden, Finland, and Japan.

Interests and Actions: The WB directs much of its aid toward the implementation of the 7th NDP's policies.[95] EU-funded initiatives are involved in relevant issues like energy infrastructure projects in the rural areas and cities, health, SDGs, Gender equality and GBV prevention.[96] The UK's aid has been going towards gender equality, economic growth initiatives and HIV/AIDS prevention.[97] Irish Aid, while involved in poverty reduction, has been focussed on climate change adaptation programs in the agricultural sector.[98]

Recent Developments: Aid has been frozen since September by the UK, Ireland, Sweden and Finland as a corruption investigation is underway regarding the embezzlement of millions of dollars of aid funding.[99]

Internal Actors

Government of Zambia

Led by President Lungu since 2015. Key ministries for directly addressing fragility include the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Finance, Zambian Revenue Authority, Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development, the Ministry of Education.

Interests: the Patriotic Front (PF) government's stated goals are to maintain power, fight corruption, increase government revenue, restructure their debt load, develop and diversify the economy, and improve HD outcomes.[100]

Actions and Recent Developments: President Lungu, ruling since the 2015 election that followed the death of President Sata, was re-elected again in 2016 with only 51% of the vote and almost exclusively in Lusaka, the Copperbelt and Eastern and North-Eastern provinces.[101] With the President's successful bid to capture a third term by constitutional amendment and suppressing the opposition, which has not only included crackdowns on the UPND, but shutting down a critical newspaper (the *Post)* and banning opposition rallies with the Public Order Act.[102] Certain HD issues like HIV/AIDs have been reasonably addressed with rates on the decline. Economic growth has slowed, borrowing remains high, food security, extreme poverty, and vulnerability to environmental shocks all remain high. The 7th NDP outlines much-needed policies but the political will and economic support will be required to carry this out. Corruption has re-emerged as a major problem with a recent report by the Auditor-General highlighting the misappropriation of funds.[103] A complementary piece by Africa Confidential exposed the degree of aid embezzlement leading to many donors freezing aid pending an investigation, with Lungu sacking the minister of community development as an immediate response.[104]

The Zambian People

A population of 17.1 million, with extremely high birth-rates and a massive youth population (45% under 14).[105] High rates of poverty and HIV, with widespread food security issues. High ethnic diversity and tribal affiliations but no majority tribe.[106] Mostly rural and dependent on productive farmland to survive, although the country is urbanizing at a steady

pace.[107]
Interests: They are interested in economic prosperity and job creation, improved infrastructure and market access for farmers, greater access to reliable energy, a livelihood that is resilient to environmental shock, increased food security, better health outcomes, and the reduction in systemic health issues. They are also interested in a more effective government with less government corruption, more transparency, and more voice and accountability in decision-making.[108]

The Opposition (UPND)

Interests: They would like to increase their own popular support and undermine support for Lungu's PF government.
Actions and Recent Developments: They have wide support in Zambia, particularly in the Western and Southern provinces. Opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema (HH), and his UPND party won 47% of the vote in the last election in 2016 continue to question the government's legitimacy and this led to post-election rioting.[109] HH was arrested for treason for failing to stop for presidential motorcade and many opposition MPs were suspended for boycotting Lungu's address.[110] HH and the UPND continue to energize the opposition against the state.[111]

Tribal Chiefs

There are 73 tribes in Zambia ruled by 286 chiefs, and the chiefs have immense local authority and responsibility.[112] The chiefs control the distribution of land within their chiefdom, collectively accounting for 90% of Zambian land.[113]
Interests: Like the people at-large, the chiefs seek improved health, HD and economic outcomes for their communities. They are also interested in retaining their authority and legitimacy as local rulers
Actions and Recent Developments: Tribal chiefs are the custodians of customary law at the local level and their decisions affect behaviour and social norms, this has made engagement at the chief-level crucial in combatting the HIV/AIDS epidemic by promoting safe practices and preventative measures.[114]

Mining Companies

Interests: The mining firms are interested in an improved business climate (low entry barriers, attractive tax scheme), adequate and improved transportation infrastructure, and an increased and reliable power supply. A cobalt surge in 2016[115] expanded exploratory mining operations but a drop in copper prices halted the majority of these operations.
Actions and Recent Developments: Based in the Copperbelt region, and North-Western Province. Employs 10% of the population and whose productivity ultimately drives the economy, accounting for 70% of exports and approximately 20% of government revenue.[116] The drop in copper prices into August 2018 resulted in increased tax and royalty demands on the larger mining corporations leading to contract disputes.
The four major mining operations (80% of production) are all majority-foreign owned by Canadian firms First Quantum Minerals, Barrick and FQM, Swiss Glencore, and Indian Vedanta Resources, respectively. Chinese investment has increased with several smaller nascent operations securing approval to invest in expansion and exploration projects.[117]

UN NGOs in Zambia

Interests: The UNDP, FAO, WFP and IFAD are all deeply engaged in Zambia, having committed to support the implementation of the country's 7th NDP and help address Zambia's health and HD problems.

Actions and Recent Developments: UNDP projects have included strengthening adjudicators in GBV cases, supporting active citizen participation through CSOs, dissemination of forecast information to help famers adjust planting strategies, promoting sustainable youth employment programs like cobblestone paving, supporting HIV/AIDS prevention programs, and many more.[118] IFAD has a role as a source of funding for agricultural programs. The UNDP, FAO and WFP have also recently partnered with the Green Climate Fund in 2018 to tackle climate change induced risks to small-holder farmers in Zambia. The partnership has committed to $157 million in funding towards climate-resilient food security and poverty reduction programs implemented by the Agriculture Ministry.[119]

Civil Society Organisations

CSOs were very influential in bringing about democracy but as their relative influence is in decline[120] is significant engagement with organisations involved in poverty reduction, food relief, women's rights, human rights, education access, clean water, legal aid, climate change adaptation, farmers' lobbying and advocacy, and governance reform.[121]

SCENARIOS

For expediency the following scenarios are based on a six-month timeframe. However it is in the opinion of this analysis that in the next 5 years, Zambia will increase in overall fragility, specifically institutional capacity and its interplay with legitimacy and executive decision-making. A largescale financial, environmental, or humanitarian crisis could trigger an economic or humanitarian intervention which would lead to regional instability and a possible fragility trap.[122]

Most likely:

The most likely scenario for Zambia is a coming el Niño event (predicted this year)[123] during the rainy season that will produce longer dry spells in the south while producing wetter conditions in the north.[124] A mild drought will stress the livelihoods of Zambians who rely on rain-fed crops and exacerbate food security issues. Meanwhile, above normal rainfall in Northern Zambia will increase the likelihood of a water and vector-borne disease outbreak as flooding overwhelms sanitation services and increases the risk of contaminating drinking-water facilities, most of which are already of substandard quality and poorly protected as well as creating stagnant water pools.[125] While this year's el Niño will be a mild one humanitarian disaster seems unlikely. Of course, the government's responsiveness to drought and flood shocks is in part predicated on its economic fortunes and relative stability in the mining sector, if copper prices remain steady the government should cope. While the Zambian government's incremental increase to mining royalties will provide needed revenue that has historically gone missing[126], despite agitating some investors, corruption and the country's debt outlook will dampen productivity. President Lungu and the PF government will remain firmly in power. Moreover, the Zambian people, especially the opposition, will remain openly skeptical of revenue allocation amid the latest corruption scandal and further fuel dissatisfaction. Policies toward much-needed economic diversification and the implementation of the 7th NDP will continue to be hindered by financial mismanagement amidst a static economy and ongoing human development concerns.

Best-case:

There is strong economic growth founded on a reliable rainy season that leads to abundant crop yields and along with a healthy copper price, boosts FDI, and sparks investment provided the planned royalty tax hike is favorable. With the maize crop doing well in the rainy season, agricultural output will increase, and energy will be produced in abundance due to high water levels. There are no more corruption scandals or power moves made by the PF government that trigger popular discontent or further alienate aid donors. Amid a steady copper price, the increase to the mineral royalty tax will not discourage investment but instead increases government revenue from the mining sector. With increased revenue, in conjunction with a crackdown on corruption and financial mismanagement, this would allow responsible borrowing, debt servicing and lessen the risk of a future debt crisis. While state capacity remains weak, Zambia can implement more policies to address economic diversification, systemic HD challenges and climate resilience. This would all increase the people's faith in the government's effectiveness and boost legitimacy. In a best-case scenario, the government can more effectively address its capacity deficit with healthy political and economic activity withstanding no environmental pressure.

Worst Case:

With an el Niño that is far worse than expected, this will seriously tax the state's resilience, especially susceptible to drought and flooding. With extremely dry conditions, rural Zambians will face a significant shortfall in production of their source of food and income. This shortfall will exacerbate acute food security issues and extreme poverty seen throughout the country. Moreover, decreased water levels in the Zambezi River basin will sap the hydroelectric dams and lead to an energy crisis. An erratic power supply and rolling blackouts will sporadically shutdown businesses, factories and mining operations across the country, leading to more layoffs, higher unemployment, scurry investment and lessen spending. The diminishment in government revenue resulting from the stifled economy will negatively impact the implementation of key resilience programs. Government weakness and lack of administrative capacity will be magnified, and this will further erode the people's waning trust in the PF government and galvanize the opposition, seriously testing state legitimacy. This could foster a negative feedback loop as a stark lack of resources and government mismanagement weaken capacity.[127]

Wild card:

Based on the assumption that billions of dollars in hidden external debt is discovered. Many investors and international organizations have already expressed worry and suspicion about Zambia's current debt-load, with suggestions it could be double the official $8.7 billion figure.[128] Unfortunately, in this scenario, a debt crisis that may have seemed 5 to 10 years down the road will instead ripen much sooner. The IMF will become involved in recommending economic reforms tasked with creating macroeconomic stability. As we saw recently with the hidden-debt turned financial crisis in Mozambique, the government will be forced to cut spending and be temporarily blocked from receiving foreign loans to service its debt.[129] This will surely deplete Government-led efforts to address the economic and HD challenges facing the country of already thin resources as money is diverted to repayments and FDI plummets. This will also exacerbate the ongoing frosty relationship with aid donors over the recent corruption scandal, and would risk losing more aid funding in the future, further imperiling the implementation of resiliency programs that require this developmental assistance. When the next environmental shock hits Zambia, the state will be even less prepared to deal with its effects and could lead to a humanitarian crisis. In the immediate short-term however, many people will feel betrayed by the government and its fierce opposition will become even more vocal, gain popularity and likely incite rioting. While government authority will persist, its legitimacy and capacity will breakdown.

POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Policy Option #1: *Strengthen relationships in the Mining Sector*

The Zambian government is called upon to improve the monitoring of extraction/mining companies declared production data and strengthen tax regimes. Zambia's tax regime for mining post-privatization has been volatile, inconsistent (exemptions and concessions), and severe with post hoc charges after exogenous market shocks. These influences result in the loss of much needed revenue, increase unemployment, aggravate inflation and elicit capital flight.[130]

Relevance: The IMF's label of high risk for investment will make it difficult to attract new FDI and instill confidence in current investors. To curb this less than ideal position it is recommended that the government use their capability to resolve the current tensions with major mining stakeholders[131] and make a concerted effort to hash out a working contract. Additionally, agree upon and establish a stable tax regime and regulatory framework that stipulates effective monitoring with enforcement mechanisms that promote transparency and accountability.[132]

Entry Points: Zambia's economic growth has largely been attributed to revenues gained from the mining sector. With larger mining companies heavily dependent on copper and cobalt commodities, the frequent changes in the tax regime have made other ventures rather tenuous. The executive approval of recent mining contracts for small-to-medium sized companies to continue exploratory mining projects that were stalled in several Copperbelt mines, alleviates some of the current macro-economic tension. Although this alleviation is not guarantee macro-economic stability it signals political will to garner investment.

Risk: If the government maintains its current course in an economically risk-averse climate investor uncertainty will only increase based on past practices for tax regime volatility[133] and fluctuating commodity prices.[134] Without securing the essential revenues generated from the mining sector the government could be forced to concede further losses and rely on foreign aid or increase borrowing.

Alternatively, the Minster of Mines and Minerals Development can use the experience from their recent successful negotiations to secure contracts with the provision of increased monitoring and regulation guaranteeing essential revenue streams.

Evaluation: The stagnation of revenues from current mining contract disputes is readily documented. The impact of a transparent and regulatory framework not only fosters good faith and promote best practices, but *inter alia* increase commodity revenues, employment and investment at the local level.

Policy Option #2: *Establish an Independent Oversight and Accountability Office.*

It is recommended that the Government of Zambia, in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the Auditor General, establish an independent office to improve bureaucratic oversight and accountability. In accordance with the INTOSAI and their audit framework, this independent agency will undertake a performance audit of the government's functions.

Relevance: With aid donors and the IMF questioning the government's financial management, a high debt load, the need to optimize resources towards fighting economic, environmental and human development challenges, a recent corruption scandal highlighted by the Auditor-General and fluctuating public opinion, concrete steps toward addressing the overall productivity and efficiency of government is deeply prudent.

Entry Points: Such an agency will evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and policy relevance, in line with the government's stated goals of the 7th NDP. This should set a baseline for the length of time from policy to fruition, monitor the allocation and appropriation of government funds, and the progress of the government's agenda. This also should encourage the various ministries and government agencies to remain on track with the 7th NDP, reduce inefficiencies, and minimize 'leakage' of government revenue. This policy's impact would be measured in the release of an annual report and complimentary data by this new office profiling its findings. Furthermore, future Auditor-General reports would demonstrate that there is less misappropriation of government revenue as the civil service becomes more closely monitored, transparent, and efficient.

Risk: Without clear steps toward improving accountability and government effectiveness, the public's perception of the current government will wane. In addition, alienated aid donors like the United Kingdom will be weary of re-engaging with the government. If the government is perceived as unreliable and inefficient it will further complicate efforts to secure a financial aid package from the IMF. On the ground, service delivery and infrastructure projects may continue to be handicapped by a misallocation of funds.

Evaluation: Enhanced accountability and oversight will strengthen internal and external support for this government and allow it to deliver on its agenda more fully, addressing challenges that face all Zambians.

Policy Option #3: *Agricultural Infrastructure*

Relevance: With a substantial proportion of the population undernourished and impoverished it is recommended that the government invest in irrigation infrastructure and agricultural diversification. The agriculture sector is the 4th largest contributor to the GDP and the largest employer in the state. With agricultural production incredibly vulnerable to drought, an already urgent food security situation, improved water access and crop diversification will have clear ramifications for both economic and human development.

Entry Point: Zambia can build on their partnerships with IFAD and the FAO. The key activities of both organizations both complement and overlap with one another. The IFAD strategy predominantly focuses on productivity and disease resistant crops while the FAO agricultural program includes crop rotation, agro forestry and conservation. Our recommendation is to foster horizontal collaboration to build on the expertise of both programs and coordinate a sustained strategy for drought resistant crops like cowpeas, sunflower and sorghum that are generally foreign to most households.[135] The cooperation of the two programs can also connect small-scale farms and wholesalers and create entry points to commercial and financial markets that are inaccessible due to drought.

Risk: To minimize increased domestic investment diversifying agricultural outputs would alleviate lower yields during drought events. Positive account balances during drought should be the immediate goal to determine future initiatives and account for externalities including climate change. The impact is stable household incomes and greater food security.

POLICY RECOMMENDATION:

Acknowledging that good governance,[136] the capacity to govern effectively[137] and strong macro-economic policy[138] is essential to Zambia's resilience. The aforementioned policy options are in response to the evidence-based research that was undertaken to identify the drivers of fragility in Zambia. The options are feasible and viable subject to the Zambian government's preferences however it is recommended that Policy Option #3 is adopted.

Increased foreign direct investment, increased sources of government revenue and improved oversight and accountability would all have tremendous long-run implications for addressing fragility and creating stability in Zambia. However, with limited food security, insufficient water access, impoverishment and extreme vulnerability to environmental shocks, the most immediate need is for Zambia's marginalized rural populations to have a reliable food supply and self-sufficient livelihood, brought about by sustainable farming practices. This would itself have a long-term stabilizing effect as the Zambian agricultural sector and its people become less vulnerable.

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Appendices

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Appendix 1. Fragile State Clusters

Key

Trend (2000-2018)	Increasing	Constant	Decreasing
Evaluation (Intensity)	Low	Medium	High

Indicator Description	Indicator Source	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	EVALUATION	SCALE
Governance																						
Press freedom	Freedom House				65	63	65	64	64	64	65	64	61	60	60	61	62	61	63		Stable NOT FREE; 140/201 EVENTS: Executive has shut down The Post the only independent non-partisan press in Zambia	0 (WORST)-100(BEST)
Government effectiveness, point estimate	World Governance Indicators	-0.88		-0.78	-0.84	-0.87	-0.94	-0.85	-0.72	-0.73	-0.81	-0.85	-0.66	-0.48	-0.49	-0.5	-0.56	-0.66	-0.62		Increasing; Weak Last 5 Years Decreasing	-2.5 (WEAK) - 2.5 (STRONG)
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)	Transparency International													37	38	38	38	38	37		Stable One of the most corrupt; 36/180	0 (MOST CORRUPT) - 100 (LEAST CORRUPT)
POLITY2 - Net Democracy/Autocracy score	Polity IV	1	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6		Stable Threshehold of being a democracy	-10 - +10 "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5 and "democracies" (+6 to +10)
Number of organizations in which the country is a member	CIA World Factbook																				50 orgs	#
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)	World Development Indicators	10.1	10.1	12	12	12	12.7	14.6	15.2	15.2	14	14	11.5	11.5	11.5	10.8	12.7	18	18		Improving	1-100%
DURABLE - Number of years since last regime change	Polity IV																				2 regime changes;3 coups (unsuccessful) 7 Years since regime change	#
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum	World Development Indicators - UNHCR	3E+05	3E+05	2E+05	2E+05	2E+05	2E+05	1E+05	1E+05	83485	56785	47857	45632	25653	23594	25578	26447	29338			10x less then in 2000	#
Civil Liberties Index	Freedom House, Annual Survey of Freedom	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	Stable Partly Free	Out of 7 (0 not free - 7 Free)
Political Rights Index	Freedom House, Annual Survey of Freedom	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	Stable Partly Free	Out of 7 (0 not free - 7 Free)
Rule of law, point estimate	World Governance Indicators	-0.48		-0.31	-0.39	-0.49	-0.52	-0.54	-0.53	-0.41	-0.48	-0.49	-0.46	-0.37	-0.27	-0.24	-0.23	-0.3	-0.33		Last 5 Years: Slightly Deteriorating Weak	-2.5 (WEAK) - 2.5 (STRONG)
Voice and accountability, point estimate	World Governance Indicators	-0.41		-0.32	-0.37	-0.44	-0.43	-0.21	-0.21	-0.16	-0.30	-0.24	-0.17	-0.13	-0.11	-0.11	-0.07	-0.31	-0.34		Last 5 years: Deteriorating Weak	-2.5 (WEAK) - 2.5 (STRONG)

Economic Development																						
Economic Growth – Percentage of GDP	GDP Growth %	World Development Indicators	3.897	5.317	4.506	6.945	7.032	7.236	7.904	8.352	7.774	9.22	10.3	5.565	7.598	5.059	4.696	2.92	3.757	4.077		Volatile
Economic Size – Relative – GDP pc	GDP per capita (constant 2005 US $)	World Development Indicators	938.4	961.5	978.1	1018	1061	1108	1163	1227	1286	1365	1463	1500	1566	1596	1621	1618	1630	1646		Volatile Slowly Increasing (improving)
Economic Size – Total – GDP	GDP (constant 2005 US $)	World Development Indicators	1E+10	1E+10	1E+10	1E+10	1E+10	1E+10	1E+10	2E+10	2E+10	2E+10	2E+10	2E+10	2E+10	2E+10	3E+10	3E+10	3E+10	3E+10		Volatile Steadily Increasing (improving)
External Debt – Percentage of GNI	Present value of debt (% of GNI)	World Development Indicators																	38.75			Volatile - High
FDI – Percentage of GDP	Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of	World Development Indicators	3.38	3.541	7.115	7.079	5.852	4.284	4.827	9.418	5.241	4.533	8.533	4.725	6.789	7.487	5.553	7.482	3.163	3.355		Constant (little investment; need to improve)
Foreign Aid – Percentage of Central Government Expenditures	Net ODA received (% of central government expenses)	World Development Indicators		98.85	136.4	99.83	104	71.02	80.96	39.06	37.1	56.68	33.1		22.99	23.05	18.28	16.3	20.6			Volatile; Stable
Foreign Aid – Total per capita	Net ODA received per capita (current US $)	World Development Indicators	75.46	52.74	72.9	67.45	96.19	97	118.7	80.35	85.21	94.44	66.38	72.45	65.11	75.58	63.87	49.51	58.02			Volatile; Stable; Aid makes up quite a large proportion pc
Inflation	Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	World Development Indicators	26.03	21.39	22.23	21.4	17.97	18.32	9.02	10.66	12.45	13.4	8.502	6.429	6.576	6.978	7.807	10.11	17.87			Volatile; High
Informal Economy – Black Market	Index of Economic	Heritage Foundation	62.8	59.5	59.6	55.3	54.8	55	56.8	56.2	56.2	56.6	58	59.7	58.3	58.7	60.4	58.7	58.8	55.8	54.3	Steady
Informal Economy – Ratio of PPP to GDP	PPP (current international $)/ GDP (current US $)	Calculated by CHLP	3.111	3.611	4.399	4.733	4.779	4.464	3.603	4.003	3.746	5.046	4.797	4.861	5.147	5.396	6.153	8.669	10.31	9.52		Deteriorating; getting poorer relative to incraasing GDP and Internationally
Infrastructure – Reliability of Electricity Supply	Electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of	World Development Indicators	3.18	3.475	3.778	4.056	4.267	5.372	6.187	12.41	22.31	18.21	17.69	23.74	7.641	8.564	14.96					High Losses; eg., rolling black outs Volatile
Infrastructure – Telephone Mainlines per capita	Telephone mainlines (per 100 people)	World Development Indicators	79%	79%	79%	77%	78%	79%	75%	72%	69%	67%	85%	60%	56%	76%	73%	72%	61%	59%		Stable - Volatile
Internet Usage per capita	Internet users (% of population)	World Development Indicators	0.191	0.233	0.478	0.98	2.014	2.852	4.16	4.87	5.55	6.31	10	11.5	13.47	15.4	19	21	25.51			Increasing but low
Paying Taxes	Paying taxes rank	World Bank: Ease of Doing Business																		85		Stable
Regulatory Quality	Regulatory quality, point estimate	World Governance Indicators	-0.26		-0.6	-0.55	-0.54	-0.73	-0.62	-0.49	-0.46	-0.53	-0.5	-0.44	-0.43	-0.47	-0.5	-0.44	-0.48	-0.47		Weak; Stable
Remittances Received – percentage of GDP	Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)	World Development Indicators, Calculated by				0.741	0.778	0.635	0.452	0.422	0.381	0.269	0.215	0.197	0.286	0.192	0.215	0.222	0.184	0.363		Stable
Reserve Holdings – Total	Total reserves (includes gold, current US $)	World Development Indicators	2E+08	2E+08	5E+08	2E+08	3E+08	6E+08	7E+08	1E+09	1E+09	2E+09	2E+09	2E+09	3E+09	3E+09	3E+09	3E+09	2E+09	2E+09		Stable
Trade Balance – Percentage of GDP	Current Account Balance (% of GDP)	World Development Indicators	-18.4	-18	-15.8	-13.5	-7.15	-2.78	4.645	-1.24	-3.33	5.953	7.525	4.658	5.379	-0.58	-1.43	-3.63	-4.55	-3.9		Last 5 Years: Volatile
Trade Openness – Percentage of GDP	Trade (% of GDP)	World Development Indicators	60.39	64.67	64.92	62.31	70.81	62.2	57.86	65.77	59.45	56.12	67.9	76.21	79.1	84.6	80.06	79.87	73.96	71.63		Volatile
Unemployment – Total	Unemployment, total (% of total labour force)	World Development Indicators	12.93					15.9			7.93		13.19		7.85					7.5		Volatile; Despite recorded %'s
Women in the Labour Force	Labour force, female (% of total labour force)	World Development Indicators	47.54	47.49	47.44	47.41	47.39	47.37	47.38	47.39	47.41	47.43	47.45	47.47	47.5	47.56	47.63	47.7	47.78	47.8		Stable

Security and Crime																							
Conflict intensity	Annual sum for INT (intensity) variable	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		Stable; Excellent	#
Dependence on External Military Support	Intervention of other states or external actors (1-12)	Fund for Peace (FfP) Failed States Index	0	0	0	0	0	0	6.1	6.1	6.5	7.5	7.3	7.3	7	7.2	6.9	6.6	6.9	7.2	6.9	Froce Intervention is not an Issue bu Aid is; Slightly	1-(LEAST FRAGILE) - 12 (MOST FRAGILE)
Human Rights – Empowerment	Empowerment Rights Index	CIRI Human Rights Index	7	8	10	9	9	7	10	7	8	7	8	8								Indifferent government respect for	0 (NO GOV RESPECT) - 14 (FULL GOV RESPECT)
Human Rights – Physical Integrity	Physical Integrity Rights Index	CIRI Human Rights Index	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	5	4	4	4	4								No government respect for rights;	0 (NO GOV RESPECT) - 14 (FULL GOV RESPECT)
Military Expenditure – Percentage of GDP	Military expenditure (% of GDP)	World Development Indicators					1.6703	1.8481	1.7441	2.0635	2.0802	1.7316	1.3826	1.2623	1.3937	1.4344	1.6619	1.7855	1.4508	1.3415		Stable	1-100%
Political Stability	Political stability/no violence, point estimate	World Governance Indicators	0.03		-0.28	0.22	0.19	0.11	0.36	0.36	0.47	0.57	0.52	0.51	0.66	0.44	0.16	0.15	0.14	0.11		Decreasing; Increasing in strength	-2.5 (WEAK) - 2.5 (STRONG)
Refugees Produced	Refugee population by country or territory of origin	World Development Indicators	98	62	92	100	124	151	203	196	195	206	228	240	243	232	316	344	246			Stable	#
Risk of Ethnic Rebellion	Number of battle-related deaths for 'internal' and 'international internal' conflicts	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		Stable	#
Terrorism – Number of Fatalities	Total number of fatalities during recorded terrorist attacks per year	Global Terrorism Database	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		Stable; Exceptionally Good	#
Terrorism – Number of Incidents	Total number of recorded terrorist attacks per year	Global Terrorism Database	8	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		Stable	#

Human Development																						
Access to Improved Water	Improved water source (% of population with access)	World Development Indicators	48.585	49.342	50.228	51.108	51.983	52.851	53.715	54.572	55.423	56.268	57.107	57.94	58.769	59.593	60.412	61.225			Improving but still poor	1-100%
Access to Sanitation	Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	World Development Indicators	25.985	26.262	26.633	26.999	27.362	27.721	28.076	28.428	28.776	29.12	29.46	29.796	30.129	30.46	30.787	31.112			Improving but marginal, still poor	1-100%
Education – Primary Completion – Female	Primary completion rate, female (% of relevant age group)	World Development Indicators	54.094		53.218		64.238	67.972	76.509	79.783	83.568	78.407	99.939		86.378	77.591					Steadily increasing; improving	1-100%
Education – Primary Completion – Total	Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)	World Development Indicators	59.239		58.631		69.234	80.275	81.551	85.189	88.91	83.079	95.397		86.067	78.652					Steadily increasing; improving	1-100%
Education – Primary Enrolment – Total	School enrollment, primary (% gross)	World Development Indicators	66.64	66.255	69.05		81.24	89.199	87.265	89.596	90.062	87.117	84.575	88.409	90.125	87.907					Steadily increasing; improving	1-100%
Education – Primary Enrolment – Ratio of Female to Male	Ratio of female to male primary enrolment	World Development Indicators	0.9786	0.9898	0.985		1.0042	1.0203	1.033	1.0087		1.028	1.0275	1.0253	1.0327	1.022					Stable	1:01
Food Security	Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)	FAOSTAT		47.4	49	50	49.9	50.2	51.1	52.6	53.5	53	51.5	50	48.8	47.4	46.1	44.9	44.4	44.5	Slightly Improving 50% of pop is undernourished	1-100%
Gender Inequality	Gender Inequality Index	UNDP HDR	0.647					0.67					0.568	0.572	0.567	0.562	0.561	0.546	0.519	0.517	Improving; but still low	0-1; low to high
Health Infrastructure – Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP	Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)	World Development Indicators	7.9154	7.3428	7.6774	8.4222	7.4486	7.3885	5.3275	4.7918	5.4581	5.1704	4.6043	4.6195	4.8283	5.1231	5.0967	5.3543			Stable; Inadequate	1-100%
HIV/AIDS – Percentage of Adult Females Infected	Female adults with HIV (% of population ages 15+ with HIV)	World Development Indicators	11.8	10.8	9.9	9.1	8.4	7.9	7.5	7.3	7.1	7	7	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.5	6.3	6	5.7	Improving	1-100%
HIV/AIDS – Proportion of Adult Population Infected	Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)	World Development Indicators	15.5	15	14.5	14	13.5	13.1	12.7	12.5	12.4	12.3	12.3	12.3	12.3	12.2	12.1	12	11.8	11.5	Improving	1-100%
Human Development Index	Human Development Index	UNDP HDR	0.432										0.544		0.569		0.580	0.583	0.586	0.588	Increasing; Marginal	0-1
Infant Mortality	Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	World Development Indicators	96.6	91.6	85.3	79	72.7	66.8	62.7	60.9	57.9	55.6	53.4	51.5	49.6	48.3	46.3	44.2	43	41.5	Improving	per 1000
Literacy – Total	Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	World Development Indicators			69.149					61.428			83.008								Lacking data; Improving	1-100%
Literacy – Female	Literacy rate, adult female (% of females ages 15 and above)	World Development Indicators			61.839					51.787			77.747								Lacking data; improving	1-100%

Demography																							
Life Expectancy - Female	Life expectancy at birth, female (years)	World Development Indicators	46.4	47.09	47.94	48.92	50.02	51.24	52.58	54.01	55.52	57.04	58.52	59.9	61.15	62.24	63.16	63.9	64.48			Increasing; Improving	#
Life Expectancy - Total	Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	World Development Indicators	43.02	43.81	44.72	45.73	46.82	47.99	49.25	50.58	51.95	53.32	54.62	55.81	56.85	57.71	58.39	58.9	59.28			Increasing; Improving	#
Migration - Estimated Net	Net migration per year	World Development Indicators			-93014					-1E+05					-34490					-40000		Increasing	#
Population Density	Population density (people per sq. km)	World Development Indicators	14.17	14.56	14.96	15.36	15.78	16.21	16.66	17.12	17.6	18.1	18.63	19.19	19.77	20.38	21.01	21.66	22.32	22.99		Increasing	per km
Population Growth	Population growth (annual %)	World Development Indicators	2.807	2.743	2.7	2.676	2.676	2.695	2.712	2.728	2.763	2.818	2.883	2.95	3.005	3.037	3.04	3.024	3.003	2.985		Constant	1-100%
Slum Population - Proportion of Population	Slum population in urban areas/urban population	UN Data	57.2					57.2		57.3							54					Improving	ratio
Urban Growth Rate	Urban population growth	World Development Indicators	1.505	3.316	4.043	4.009	3.999	4.006	4.014	4.02	4.048	4.087	4.146	4.203	4.259	4.295	4.297	4.285	4.262	4.245		Constant	1-100%
Youth Bulge	Population ages 0-14 (% of total)	World Development Indicators	46.44	46.62	46.75	46.86	46.93	46.97	47.03	47.02	46.98	46.89	46.77	46.54	46.28	46.01	45.71	45.38	45.09	44.78		Constant; Decreasing	1-100%
Population Diversity - Ethnic	Score calculated by Lucas Pokrywa	CIA World Factbook and Levinson (1998)																		0.904		Constant; High Diversity; no visible cleavages	0-1 (High Diversity)
Population Diversity - Religious	Score calculated by Lucas Pokrywa	CIA World Factbook and Levinson (1998)																		0.392		Constant; Diversity; no visible cleavages	0-1 (High Diversity)

Environment																					
Arable/Fertile Land Availability	Arable land (hectares per person)	World Development Indicators	0.267	0.251	0.232	0.252	0.244	0.226	0.243	0.232	0.233	0.264	0.245	0.252	0.259	0.244	0.243	0.236		Stable	hectare pp
Consumption - Commercial Energy Consumption per capita	Commercial and public services consumption (per capita)	IEA Energy Balances reports (OECD and non-OECD)	2E-08	2E-08	1E-08	2E-08	1E-08	1E-08	1E-08	1E-08	1E-08	2E-08	1E-08	2E-08	2E-08	1E-08	1E-08	1E-08		Volatile	J / h
Consumption - Energy Use per capita	Energy use per capita (kt of oil equivalent)	World Development Indicators	591	611.1	635.5	653.8	674.6	681.5	692.6	652.5	579	558.2	580.1	621	721.5	735.9	707.2			Increasing: Marginal	kilotonnes
Energy Intensity	Energy use per $1,000 GDP (constant 2005 PPP)	World Development Indicators	593.5	595.7	599.6	603.2	604.2	607.7	604.7	588.6	592.4	590	593.8	608.9	620.3	635.3				Increasing	per capita GDP
Consumption - Use of Solid Fuels	Population using solid fuels	UN Data	8.845	9.031	9.395	9.778	9.716	10.09	9.337	6.736	7.336	7.563	7.757	8.559	10.69	10.57				Increasing; Not good	1-100%
Disaster Risk	World Risk Index	United Nations University																	64/171	Constant but Stable with low risk; might increase with global warming and el-Nino events	High Risk
Environmental Performance	Environmental Performance Index	Yale Environment Performance Index																	2018 EPI Country Rank (117 out of 180) --------- EPI Score 50.97	Stable; Not good	[0=worst, 100=best]
Forest - Annual Percentage Change in Area	Percentage annual change in area	World Development Indicators	68.78	68.56	68.34	68.11	67.89	67.66	67.44	67.22	66.99	66.77	66.54	66.32	66.1	65.87	65.65	65.42		Stable; Marginal decline	1-100%
Pollution - CO2 Emissions per capita	CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)	World Development Indicators	0.173	0.176	0.178	0.185	0.183	0.19	0.185	0.152	0.166	0.186	0.194	0.206	0.249	0.261	0.288			Increasing	1000/pc
Pollution - CO2 Emissions per Dollar PPP	CO2 emissions (kg per 2005 PPP $ of GDP)	World Development Indicators	0.104	0.101	0.099	0.097	0.089	0.086	0.077	0.059	0.06	0.063	0.06	0.061	0.07	0.071	0.075			Decreasing; Must be caused by industry	kg/GDP

Appendix 1A. Governance and Democracy Clusters

Indicator Name	Indicator Description	Indicator Source	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Assessment	Scale
Democratic Participation																							
Checks and Balances	Global ranking of governmental checks and balances	Database of Political Indicators, World Bank									3.49	3.74	3.79	3.47	3.51	3.75	3.71	4.04	3.97	3.4		Weak and decreasing	[1 = heavily influenced; 7 = entirely independent]
Degree of Party Dominance	Number of opposition members in the national legislature as a proportion of the total	Database of Political Indicators, World Bank	10	10	6	6	6	6	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1				
Fractionalization of Legislature	Herfindal Index	Database of Political Indicators, World Bank																0				No data But there are opposition parties	Quality of Governance Institute
Percentage of Female Parliamentarians	Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)	World Development Indicators	10.1	10.1	12	12	12	12.7	14.6	15.2	15.2	14	14	11.5	11.5	11.5	10.8	12.7	18	18		Increasing	1-100%
Polity Score	Net Democracy -Autocracy Score	Polity IV	1	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6		Middle Ground/slowly improving	"autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5) and "democracies" (+6 to +10)
Executive Recruitment – Regulation	Global index measuring regulation of executive recruitment	Polity IV	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		Good Competitive	(1) Unregulated: Changes 2) Designation/Transitional 3) Regulated
Executive Recruitment – Competition	Global index measuring competitiveness of executive elections	Polity IV	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		Good Competitive	Stable (GOOD)
Executive Constraints	Global index measuring legal and legislative constraints on executive activity	Polity IV	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5		Deteriorating	(1) Unlimited Authority. (2) Intermediate Category (3) Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority (4) Intermediate Category (5) Substantial Limitations on Executive (6) Intermediate Category (7) Executive Parity or Subordination
Female Parliamentary Quota	Quota for female parlimentaries (%)	Global database of quotas for women																			11%	Surpassed Target Increasing	1-100%
Minority Access to Civil Services	Percentage of minority employees in the public service	MAR																				0 No discrimination (Bemba, Lozi)	0 No differential 1 Some indeterminate differential 2 Significant differential
Minority Voting Rights	Existence of voting rights for minorities, including the right to vote, degree of intimidation, access to polling station	MAR																				0 (none reported)	0 No differential 1 Some indeterminate differential 2 Significant differential
Federalism – Municipal	Degree of autonomy provided to municipal governments	Database of Political Indicators, World Bank	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		autonomous	0, no autonomy 1, autonomy
Federalism – Provincial	Degree of autonomy provided to state/provincial governments	Database of Political Indicators, World Bank	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		Constant	0, no autonomy 1, autonomy

Indicator Name	Indicator Description	Indicator Source	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Assessment	Scale
Government and Economic Efficiency																							
Economic growth – Percentage of GDP	GDP Growth %	World Development Indicators	3.897	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	7.774	9.22	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	4.696	2.92	3.757	4.077		Volatile	1-100%
Economic Size – Relative – GDP per capita	GDP per capita (constant 2000 US $)	World Development Indicators	938.4	961.5	978.1	1018	1061	1108	1163	1227	1286	1365	1463	1500	1566	1596	1621	1618	1630	1646		Volatile Slowly improving	GDPpc - $
Economic Size – Total – GDP	GDP (constant 2000 US $)	World Development Indicators	1E+10	1E+10	1E+10	1E+10	1E+10	1E+10	1E+10	2E+10	2E+10	2E+10	2E+10	2E+10	2E+10	2E+10	3E+10	3E+10	3E+10	3E+10		Volatile Steadily increasing	GDP $
External Debt – percentage of GNI	Present value of debt (% of GNI)	World Development Indicators																	38.75			Volatile High	1-100%
Ease of Doing Business	Ease of Doing Business Survey - Overall Rank	World Bank, Ease of Doing Business																			87	87	(out of 194)
Starting a Business	Starting a business rank	World Bank, Ease of Doing Business				77.9	78.13	78.34	78.4	78.81	82.86	82.9	83.04	83.17	81.8	85.09	84.95	84.88	84.83	84.89	85	Improving = Generally Easy	0=Difficult - 100 = Easy
Protecting Investors	Protecting investors rank	World Bank, Ease of Doing Business						56.67	56.67	56.67	56.67	56.67	56.67	56.67	56.67	56.67	50	50	50	50	50	Stable	0=Difficult - 100 = Easy
Trading Across Borders	Trading across borders rank	World Bank, Ease of Doing Business						17.33	18.23	21.19	18.6	22.3	20.38	20.38	20.38	21.77	63.49	46.99	46.99	56.88	56.88	Improving	0=Difficult - 100 = Easy
Closing a Business	Closing a business rank	World Bank, Ease of Doing Business																	85	85		Stable	0=Difficult - 100 = Easy
Economic Freedom	Economic Freedom score	Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom	62.8	59.5	59.6	55.3	54.9	55	56.8	56.2	56.2	56.6	58	59.7	58.3	58.7	60.4	58.7	58.8	55.8	54.3	132 out of 180	Mostly Unfree
National Savings Level	Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	World Development Indicators											36.03	33.99	35.39	35.61	33.31	34.57	32.53			Stable	1-100%
Foreign Investment Freedom	Investment Freedom	Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom	70	70	70	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	55	55	55	60	55	50	55	55	Stable	Was Mostly free and has declined to mostly unfree
Intellectual Property	Protection of intellectual property	Fraser Institute/ Free the World (Area 2C)	3.23	3.23	3	3.33	3.33	6.05	5.92	6.14	5.78	5.24	5.23	5.78	6.09	6.02	5.92	5.8	5.6			Deteriorating	1 (not free) - 10 (free)
Contract Regulation	Contract Regulation	Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom															49.89	49.89	51.74	50.82		Stable	1 least free - 100 most free
Enforcing Contracts	Enforcing Contracts Rank	World Bank, Ease of Doing Business				471	471	471	471	471	611	611	611	611	611	611	611	611	611	611		Strongly Deteriorating	Days it takes to enforce a contract
Dealing with Licences	Dealing with Licenses Rank	World Bank, Ease of Doing Business								48.3						22						Improving	Days to enforce
Registering Property	Registering Property Rank	World Bank, Ease of Doing Business					73	73	73	73	42	42	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45		Improving	Days
Educational Attainment	Proportion over 15 with no schooling	World Bank, Thematic Data Educational Attainment									12.94											Stagnant	1-100%
Enrolment Rates	Gross enrolment ratio, all levels combined (except pre-primary)	UNESCO Statistics	65.97	65.64	67.53		80.19	88	87.26	88.34	90.06	85.49	83.39	90	92.4	86.29						Strongly Improving	1-100%
Health Expenditure	Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)	World Development Indicators	7.915	7.343	7.677	8.422	7.449	7.389	5.327	4.792	5.458	5.17	4.604	4.619	4.828	5.123	5.097	5.354				Volatile	1-100%
Access to Services – Improved Water	Access to an Improved water source (% of population with access)	World Development Indicators	48.58	49.34	50.23	51.11	51.98	52.85	53.71	54.57	55.42	56.27	57.11	57.94	58.77	59.59	60.41	61.23				Slightly	
Government Effectiveness	Government Effectiveness, point estimate	World Bank Group, Governance Matters V	-0.88		-0.78	-0.84	-0.87	-0.94	-0.85	-0.72	-0.73	-0.81	-0.85	-0.66	-0.48	-0.49	-0.5	-0.56	-0.66	-0.62		Deteriorating	Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance)
FDI – percentage of GDP	Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	World Development Indicators	3.38	3.541	7.115	7.079	5.852	4.284	4.827	9.418	5.241	4.533	8.533	4.725	6.789	7.487	5.553	7.482	3.163	3.355		Volatile	Variable - highs of 9% lows of 3
Foreign Aid – percentage of Central Government Expenditures	Aid (% of central government expenditures)	World Development Indicators											44.96	28.69	25.79	21.06	19.79	26.25	19.04			Decreasing	1-100%
Inequality – GINI Coefficient	GINI Coefficient	World Development Indicators			42.1		54.3	54.6					55.6					57.1				Deteriorating	0 absolute equality - 100 absolute inequality
Trade Balance – percentage of GDP	Current Account Balance (as % of GDP)	World Development Indicators	-18.4	-18	-15.8	-13.5	-7.15	-2.78	4.645	-1.24	-3.33	5.953	7.525	4.658	5.379	-0.58	-1.43	-3.63	-4.55	-3.9		Improving	1-100%
Unemployment – Total	Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)	World Development Indicators	12.93	12.43	11.91	11.4	10.89	10.37	9.771	9.179	7.93	10.61	13.19	9.99	7.85	7.816	7.783	7.75	7.777	7.792		Constant	1-100%
Paying Taxes	Paying taxes rank	World Bank: Ease of Doing Business indicators						38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	37	26	26	11		Deteriorating	0=Difficult - 100 = Easy

Indicator Name	Indicator Description	Indicator Source	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Assessment	Scale
Accountability																							
Corruption – World Bank	Control of Corruption	World Bank Group, Governance Matters V						3	3	3	3	3	2.5	2.5	3	3	3	3	3	3		Constant	(1=low to 6=high)
Voice and Accountability	Voice and accountability, point estimate	World Bank Group, Governance Matters V	-0.41		-0.32	-0.37	-0.44	-0.43	-0.21	-0.21	-0.16	-0.30	-0.24	-0.17	-0.13	-0.11	-0.11	-0.07	-0.31	-0.34		Deteriorating	Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance)
Press Freedom	Index of Press Freedom	Freedom House				65; Not Free	63; Not free	65; Not Free	64; Not Free	64; Not Free	64; Not Free	65; Not Free	64; Not Free	61; Not Free	60; Not Free	60; Not Free	61; Not Free	62; Not Free	61; Not Free	63; Not free		Slightly decreasing and deteriorating	1 (Free)- 61-100 (Not Free)
Political Donations	Provision for disclosure of contribution to parties (binary variable)	IDEA, Political Party Finance, Disclosure of Income																			NO		YES/NO
Party Financing	System of regulation for financing of political parties (binary variable)																				NO		YES/NO

Indicator Name	Indicator Description	Indicator Source	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Assessment	Scale
Human Rights																							
Disappearances	Disappearances, Number of Cases	CIRI Human Rights Index	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2								Stable	0= Frequent violations of this right 1= Some violations of this right 2= No reported violations of this right
Extrajudicial Killings	Killings, number of cases	CIRI Human Rights Index	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1								Stable	
Torture	Torture, number of cases	CIRI Human Rights Index	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0								Constant	
Freedom of Movement	Freedom of Movement Index	CIRI Human Rights Index	1	1	1	1	1	0	0													Deteriorating	
Freedom of Assembly and Association	Freedom of Assembly and Association Index	CIRI Human Rights Index	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1								Volatile	
Freedom of Speech	Freedom of Speech Index	CIRI Human Rights Index	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1								Constant	
Women Political Rights	Women Political Rights Index	CIRI Human Rights Index	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2								Stable	
Women Social Rights	Women Social Rights Index	CIRI Human Rights Index	1	1	1	0	0			0												Stable	
Women Economic Rights	Women Economic Rights Index	CIRI Human Rights Index	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0								Fluctuating	
Civil Liberties	Civil Liberties Index	Freedom House, Annual Survey of Freedom	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	Deteriorating	1 to 7: 1 representing the greatest degree of freedom AND 7 the smallest degree of freedom
Political Rights	Political Rights Index	Freedom House, Annual Survey of Freedom	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	Constant	
Human Rights – Empowerment	Empowerment Rights Index	CIRI Human Rights Index	6	7	7	7	7	5	6													Deteriorating	0 (no government respect for these rights) to 10 (full government respect for these rigths)
Human Rights – Physical Integrity	Physical Integrity Rights Index	CIRI Human Rights Index	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	5	4	4	4	4								Slightly Deteriorating	
Minority Access to Education	Minority Access to Education	MAR	0	0	0	0	0															NO DATA - But Secondary Sources do not indicate there is a significant issue with exclusionary practices	0 No differential 1 Some indeterminate differential 2 Significant differential
Minority Commerce	Minority ability to engage in commercial activities	MAR	0	0	0	0	0																
Minority Professions	Minority presence in professions	MAR	0	0	0	0	0																
Minority Official Positions	Minority presence in governmental institutions	MAR	0	0	0	0	0																
Minority Organization BEMBA	Minority ability and right to organize	MAR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1													Stable; But not good	
Minority Organization TONGA	Minority ability and right to organize	MAR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1													Stable; But not good	
Minority Organization LOZI	Minority ability and right to organize	MAR	2	2	2	2	2	2	2													Stable: But Bad	
Differential Ownership	Differential rules and practices regarding ownership of property	MAR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0													NO DATA	
Minority Pol Mil recruitment	Recruitment of minorities in to the police and military	MAR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0													NO DATA	

Indicator Name	Indicator Description	Indicator Source	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Assessment	Scale
Political Stability and Violence																							
Permanence of Regime Type	Number of years since last regime change	Polity IV																				2 regime changes 7 years since last change Stable	# years
Black Market	Informal Market	Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10		Constant	1 least free - 100 most free
Battle-related Deaths	Number of Conflict-related deaths per year	Uppsala Conflict Database	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		Stable	No conflict related deaths including One sided violence
Dependence on external support	Intervention of other states or external actors	Fund for Peace (FfP) Failed States Index							6.1	6.1	6.5	7.5	7.3	7.3	7	7.2	6.9	6.6	6.9	7.5	6.9	Stable for Conflict Deteriorating for Economic Intervention	1 least fragile - 12 most fragile
Military Expenditure as a percentage of GDP	Military expenditure (% of GDP)	World Development Indicators					1.67	1.848	1.744	2.063	2.08	1.732	1.383	1.262	1.394	1.434	1.662	1.786	1.451	1.342		Decreasing	1-100%
Political Stability	Political stability/no violence, point estimate	World Bank Group: Governance Matters V	0.03		-0.28		0.22	0.11	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	0.16	0.15	0.14	0.11		Deteriorating	World Median is 1.1, the higher the number the better the stability, current range is - 2.96 (Yemen) to 1.92 (Greenland)
Refugees Produced	Refugee population by country or territory of origin	World Development Indicators															79	351	265			Stable	#
Terrorism Fatalities	Total number of fatalities during recorded terrorist attacks per year	US National Counterterrorism Center	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		Stable	#
Terrorism Incidents	Total number of recorded terrorist attacks per year	US National Counterterrorism Center	8	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2		Stable	#
Polity Fragmentation	Degree of fragmentation of the polity	Polity IV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		No overt fragmentation	(0) No overt fragmentation (1) Slight fragmentation (2) Moderate fragmentation (3) Serious fragmentation:

Rule of Law																							
Police, Law, and Criminality	Rule of Law	World Bank, Governance Matters database	-0.48		-0.31	-0.39	-0.49	-0.52	-0.54	-0.53	-0.41	-0.48	-0.49	-0.46	-0.37	-0.27	-0.24	-0.23	-0.3	-0.33		Slightly Deteriorating	Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance)
Prison Population Rate	Prison Population Rate	International Centre for Prison Studies	116		123			124			120		128		116		109		114			Constant	Per 100,000
Prison Occupancy Level	No. of detainees compared to capacity	Source:International Centre for Prison Studies			1.73		1.45			1.59			1.72		1.81		2.02		2.3			Increasing	xCapacity
Number of Political Prisoners	Number of Political Prisoners	Fraser Institute/Free the World												0	0	0	0	0	15			#	# (Data taken from the US state department)
Judicial Independence	Independence of the Judiciary	Fraser Institute/Free the World	6.18	6.18	4.67	4.50	4.50	2.86	3.48	4.15	4.57	4.65	4.12	4.18	4.58	4.52	5.07	4.96				Volatile	On a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 represents more freedom,
Impartial Courts	Impartiality of the court	Fraser Institute/ Free the World	4.86	4.86	4.33	4.5	4.5	5	4.58	4.54	4.18	4.63	4.98	5.25	5.13	4.78	5.14	4.77				Constant	On a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 represents more freedom,
Integrity of the Legal System	Integrity of the Legal System	Fraser Institute/ Free the World	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.67				Stable	On a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 represents more freedom,
Military Interference in the Rule of Law	Presence of the military in political systems	Fraser Institute/ Free the World	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3				Stable	On a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 represents more freedom,
Property Rights	Protection of rights to private property	Heritage Foundation	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	40	40	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	46	49.6	Volatile	1 least free - 100 most free
Minority Legal Protection	Minority Legal Protection	Source Minorities at Risk (MAR)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Stable	0 No differential 1 Some indeterminate differential 2 Significant differential
Minority Dispossessed Land	Minority Dispossessed Land	Source Minorities at Risk (MAR)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Stable	0 No differential 1 Some indeterminate differential 2 Significant differential
Minority Legal Procedures	Minority Legal Procedures	Minorities at Risk																					No Data

Appendix 2. Governance Visuals

2A. Afro Barometer updated survey results from April 2017 (n=1200, margin of error +/- 3)



Note: Reprinted from *Zambians see corruption rising, government failing in anti-graft fight*, by Afrobarometer, retrieved from: http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad213-zambians-see-corruption-rising-government-failing-anti-graft-fight

2B. Presidential Electoral Map (2016) and Regional Proportion of PF votes



Note: Reprinted from *Mapping the 2016 Election Results*, by Lighton Phiri, retrieved from: http://lightonphiri.org/blog/mapping-the-zambia-2016-presidential-election-results

Appendix 3. Economic Development Visuals

3A. Debt and GDP per capita growth by Presidential term



Note: Reprinted from *Zambia: Political Institutions and Development*, by Knoema, retrieved from http://hi.knoema.com/oztywce/zambia-political-institutions-and-development

3B. Maize Production and Trade Flows in 2017



Note: Reprinted from *Production and Trade Flow Map*, by Famine Early Warning System, retrieved from: http://fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/zm_maize_norm.pdf

3C. Copper price fluctuations since 2005



Note: Reprinted from *Economic and Social Crisis in Zambia*, by Knoema Corporation, retrieved from https://knoema.com/infographics/ewsqewc/economic-and-social-crisis-in-zambia-copper-s-fall-at-center

3D. Annual Unemployment (Male, Female, Youth)



Note: Reprinted from *Economic and Social Crisis in Zambia*, by Knoema Corporation, retrieved from https://knoema.com/infographics/ewsqewc/economic-and-social-crisis-in-zambia-copper-s-fall-at-center

3E. Economic Freedom Rankings: World Map



Note: Reprinted from *Economic Freedom Rank,* by Fraser Institute, retrieved from https://www.fraserinstitute.org/economic-freedom

3F. Annual Foreign Direct Investment



Note: Reprinted from *Economic and Social Crisis in Zambia*, by Knoema, retrieved from http://hi.knoema.com/ewsqewc/economic-and-social-crisis-in-zambia-copper-s-fall-at-center

3G. Tax Revenue (% GDP)





Note: Reprinted from *Total tax revenue, including social contributions as a share of national GDP*, by International Center for Tax and Development, retrieved from https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/government-revenue-dataset

3H. Internet use (2015): World Map



Note: Reprinted from *World Map of Internet Access,* OurWorldData, retrieved from https://ourworldindata.org/internet

3I. Internal and External Debt (% GDP)



3J. Electricity access (Rural v Total)



Note: Reprinted from *Energy Production and Changing Energy Sources*, by Ritchie, Hannah and Max Roser, retrieved from https://ourworldindata.org/energy-production-and-changing-energy-sources

Appendix 4. Security and Crime Visuals

4A. Homicide Rates: World Map



Note: Reprinted from *Homicides*, by Max Roser, retrieved from https://ourworldindata.org/homicides

4B. Human Rights v Political Regime Type, by country (2014)



Note: Reprinted from *Human Rights*, by Max Roser, retrieved from www.ourworldindata.org/human-rights

Appendix 5. Human Development Visuals

5A. Food Security Overview



Note: Reprinted from *Food Security Situation in Zambia*, by OCHA, retrieved from www.un.ocha.org

5B. Extreme Poverty: World Map



Note: Reprinted from *Poverty*, by Max Roser, retrieved from www.ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty

5C. Regional prevalence of HIV/AIDS



Note: Reprinted from *We are also dying of AIDS*, by Human Rights Watch, retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/

5D. Deaths by Cause (2016)



Note: Reprinted from *What does the world die from?* By Hannah Ritchie, retrieved from https://ourworldindata.org/what-does-the-world-die-from

Appendix 6. Demography Visuals

6A. Population Pyramid (2017)



Note: Reprinted from *Zambia*, by CIA World Factbook, retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html

6B. Linguistic Map of Zambia



Note: Reprinted from *Foundation for Educational Products in Zambia*, by SOZ, retrieved from http://sozambia.nl/sites/default/files/upload/languespm.gif

6C. Gender Inequality Index: World Map



Note: Reprinted from *Economic Inequality by Gender,* by Max Roser and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, retrieved from https://ourworldindata.org/economic-inequality-by-gender

6D. Urban slum population %: World Map



Note: Reprinted from *Urban Population in Slums*, by Max Roser, retrieved from https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/urban-slums-total

6E. Urban and rural population growth



Note: Reprinted from *Urbanization*, by Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser, retrieved from https://ourworldindata.org/urbanization

Appendix 7. Environmental Visuals

7A. The Global and Regional impact of El Niño during the Southern African wet season



Note: Reprinted from *Global Impacts of El Nino and La Nina*, by Rebecca Lindsey, retrieved from https://www.climate.gov/news-features/featured-images/global-impacts-el-ni%C3%B1o-and-la-ni%C3%B1a



Note: Reprinted from *El-Niño Outlook 2018,* by VAM Security Analysis, retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WFP-0000074434.pdf

Appendix 8: Membership in International Organizations – CIA The World Factbook

ACP	African- Caribbean- and Pacific Group of States
AfDB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
EITI	Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
FAO	Food and agriculture organization
G77	Group of 77
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICCt	International Criminal Court
ICRM	International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFRCS	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary fund
Interpol	International Criminal Police Organization
IOC	International Olympic Committee
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ITSO	International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
ITUC (NGOs)	International Trade Union Confederation
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Dem. Rep. of the Congo
NAM	Nonaligned Movement
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PCA	Permanent Court of Arbitration
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO	United Nations Educational- Scientific- and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Force for Abyei
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
UNWTO	World Tourism Organization
UPU	Universal Postal Union
WCO	World Customs Organization
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

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