{"id":2364,"date":"2024-12-29T07:55:56","date_gmt":"2024-12-29T12:55:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/cifp\/?p=2364"},"modified":"2025-08-13T10:28:50","modified_gmt":"2025-08-13T14:28:50","slug":"u-s-russia-proxy-war-in-ukraine-is-a-case-of-deterrence-failure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/cifp\/2024\/u-s-russia-proxy-war-in-ukraine-is-a-case-of-deterrence-failure\/","title":{"rendered":"U.S.-Russia Proxy War in Ukraine Is a Case of Deterrence Failure"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n U.S.-Russia Proxy War in Ukraine Is a Case of Deterrence Failure\n <\/h1>\n \n \n <\/header>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n

U.S.-Russia Proxy War in Ukraine Is a Case of Deterrence Failure<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Joe Biden\u2019s recent<\/a> decision to allow Ukraine to strike deep within Russia using advanced American missile technology is but the latest step in the escalation<\/a> ladder. Vladimir Putin has stated such actions would place Russia on a war footing<\/a> with NATO. Biden\u2019s  risky decision is symptomatic of a larger set of problems related to deterrence failure and the absence of military restraint<\/a> in a multipolar world. Adding to the complexity, Russia’s response<\/a>, including its proposed deployment of advanced missile systems to Belarus, signals a significant escalation in technological capabilities that undermine traditional deterrence frameworks<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Deterrence has long been the cornerstone of international security. Yet, in a multipolar world, where power is fragmented and alliances shift unpredictably, maintaining its  effectiveness is increasingly complex and difficult. This does not mean that multipolarity and deterrence are incompatible. Rather new strategies of deterrence must be developed,  that are consistent with  today\u2019s gray zone conflict environment characterised by incrementalism, asymmetrical power relations, problems of attribution, and  rapid changes in technology.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The foundational works of political scientists such as  John Mearsheimer<\/a> and Stephen Walt<\/a> explain how in a multipolar system, power asymmetries and shifting alliances form and dissolve rapidly. These shifts create uncertainty about the strength and resolve of adversaries, making it harder to assess risks accurately. Stronger states are less deterred by weaker adversaries, further emboldening aggression. In addition, technological advancements like near-zero-miss precision-guided weapons<\/a>, including  the innovative and deadly hypersonic missiles used by Russia<\/a>, make threat escalation strategies even more tempting. Near-zero-miss technologies blur the lines between conventional and nuclear<\/a> strategic doctrine, while emerging capabilities like electromagnetic pulse<\/a> (EMP) weapons and drones <\/a> pose challenges in terms of broader military strategy and tactics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alliance Entrapment and Absence of a Shared Strategy<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In today’s multi-nodal yet regional landscape<\/a>, significant shifts in the balance of power seldom result from military conquest. Put differently, while major powers continue to rely heavily on their conventional armed forces, they often fall short of achieving their overarching geopolitical goals through war and the use of force<\/a>. Examples of these shortcomings are evident in instances such as the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan<\/a> in 2001, Iraq<\/a> in 2003, and Libya in 2011, as well as Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine in 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the difficulties in gauging U.S., NATO, and EU resolve in confronting Russia \u2014 which ultimately resulted in a move from a deterrence position, to compellence<\/a>, to a proxy war \u2014 lies in the divergent priorities<\/a> and the different values<\/a> that each member  in the North Atlantic alliance assigns to particular goals. Not to mention, their (un)willingness to bear and share in the potential risks<\/a> and costs of a specific action (such as the continued arming of Ukraine) that they did not particularly choose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A related impediment is simply the absence of consensus<\/a> within any alliance coalition regarding the primary end goal and the actions that are to be prioritized. As the strongest member and leading party in the North Atlantic alliance, the United States believes that all other member states must follow its lead in opposing Russia, having very little regard for others\u2019 strategic autonomy<\/a>. Other states, such as Poland and the UK, meanwhile, are far more hawkish than Washington, even courting direct war<\/a> with Russia \u2014 although for different reasons. Still others, like Turkey and Hungary, have chosen to pursue a more balanced and multi-aligned strategy so as to not unnecessarily antagonize Moscow. Through various provocations and escalatory tactics \u2014 often coordinated with Kyiv \u2014 the more bellicose states in the former camp have effectively managed to pull<\/a> the more reluctant nations in the latter group as well as those in the middle like Germany into a proxy war with Russia with no clear diplomatic solution in sight. In this way alliance entrapment<\/a> by more belligerent  NATO members has contributed  to the rapid escalation of the conflict both vertically in terms of intensity and horizontally in terms of geographic spread and across domains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bad Policy<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

To make matters worse, Washington\u2019s Ukraine policy under President Biden has suffered from inconsistency and incoherence. Biden\u2019s foreign policy team under former Hilary Clinton advisors Anthony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, and Toria Nuland came into office intent on taking a more confrontational tack<\/a> against both Russia and China. With regard to Russia, these intervention entrepreneurs<\/a>  resented how the Ukraine crisis was handled under  Presidents Obama and Trump. In line with Neoconservative Republicans like Lindsey Graham and Ted Cruz, not only did Blinken and company, view  tolerance for Russia\u2019s pre-emptive takeover of Crimea as unacceptable<\/a>,  they were also concerned about deeper economic integration and energy ties<\/a> between West-Central Europe (i.e. Germany) and Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

U.S. objection against Europe-Russia interdependence was most evident in the Biden administration\u2019s stated goal of terminating Nord Stream II<\/a>. Thus, even before Moscow\u2019s \u201cspecial military operation\u201d against Kyiv in the winter of 2022, the Biden administration sought to punish and isolate<\/a> Russia through increasing economic sanctions almost immediately after coming to power in 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Coercive actions such as economic sanctions fall outside direct military confrontation. They constitute the \u201cgray zone\u201d of major power conflict. In gray zone conflicts, states rely on low-intensity tools and tactics short of military action<\/a> \u2014 such as propaganda and information warfare, sanctions, use of ideological or identity-based  non-state actors, as well as cyber space and social media \u2014 to achieve strategic and tactical outcomes<\/a>. Weaponizing the gray zone can often lead to direct military confrontation and kinetic conflict<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, in the Russia-Ukraine war, ethnic dynamics play a significant role in the conflict. Russia\u2019s justification for its actions often centers on reclaiming territories like Crimea and the Donbas, where it claims to protect ethnic Russians<\/a> and Russian-speaking populations. From Russia\u2019s perspective, the risks of acting now are outweighed by the potential long-term consequences of inaction, such as permanently losing control over Crimea and the Donbas to Ukraine.  Over time, intensifying ethnic divisions in Ukraine, particularly in the Donbas region, became a key factor<\/a> in Russia’s decision to intervene. Moscow framed its actions as a preventive measure <\/a>to protect ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations<\/a> from alleged threats posed by far-right Ukrainian nationalists. However, this narrative served more as a pretext for advancing broader<\/a> strategic aims, including maintaining influence over Ukraine and countering its shift toward Western alliances. In this context, both Kyiv and Moscow saw war as a means to resolve the security dilemma created by Ukraine\u2019s geopolitical realignment. For Russia, intervention offered a chance to secure its strategic objectives without needing prolonged military preparation, while a weak Ukraine sought to re-assert its sovereignty<\/a> and resist Russian aggression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lure of Escalation<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A key aspect of the breakdown in deterrence between Russia and the U.S. is the appeal of the logic of escalation to both sides. Although the threat of escalation and higher cost is supposed to motivate both sides to find off-ramps<\/a> to military conflict and compromise at the negotiating table, both Moscow and Washington repeatedly find themselves in a game of chicken, trying to demonstrate their superior ability to tolerate the ever higher risks and costs of conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As costly and problematic as this might be for each side, the outcome could be even worse as the process is not controlled and is mired with uncertainty. Indeed, the more escalatory spirals are repeated in an uncoordinated setting, the higher the probability of a disastrous outcome eventually occurring. Coordination and engagement regarding \u201cred lines\u201d are key to stable relations between rival powers. Failures of deterrence ultimately stem from failures in coordination and communication.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The change in U.S. policy under Biden to confront Russia through increasingly escalatory gray zone strategies was a major contributing factor to the Ukraine war. For example, in the lead-up to the Russian intervention in 2022, there were 3,000 close-contact incidents<\/a> between U.S. and Russian forces. These flashpoints, some of which were deliberately escalatory, created room for military accidents, miscalculations, and errors. If Russia’s responses were indeed based on crossed \u2018red lines\u2019, then the advanced military equipment and training supplied by the West only made Russia\u2019s intervention in 2022 more likely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Absence of Strategic Empathy<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another important cause of deterrence breakdown is the absence of strategic empathy. Strategic empathy is necessary to avoid or remedy basic errors in analyzing an adversary’s behavior. Misunderstandings, biases, and faulty assumptions can result in poor analysis leading to heightened tensions. Empathy<\/a> offers a way to counter such missteps, making it crucial for accurately interpreting adversary actions and calibrating responses. Strategic empathy requires a cognitive shift: simulating or imagining another\u2019s experience, mindset, and perspective<\/a>. Unfortunately, what has guided U.S. strategy on Russia,  so far, is cognitive bias<\/a> driven by analogistic and universalist<\/a> thinking. Indeed, the U.S. foreign policy establishment has committed fundamental errors,<\/a> attributing Russia\u2019s behavior to intrinsic hostility<\/a>, a universal Imperial drive<\/a> and even Putin\u2019s personal ambitions<\/a> rather than to situational and geopolitical factors. As a result, Washington and its allies have systematically underestimated their own role in provoking a Russian response and the wider war that has ensued.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One critical conceptual shift that must occur within the transatlantic security community is the recognition that competing great powers like Russia are no longer adversaries that can be decisively defeated; instead, they must be constructively and effectively deterred<\/a>. Such an understanding is crucial for avoiding the pitfalls of false optimism<\/a>, the  exorbitant costs<\/a> and the folly<\/a> that the policy of absolute victory entails. Deterrence, as a strategy, aims instead to dissuade adversaries from taking hostile actions by convincing them that the costs or consequences of such actions would outweigh any potential benefits. This is achieved through the credible threat of retaliation or punishment, rather than seeking their total destruction and elimination as geopolitical competitors through decisive victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In practical terms, policies that seek the total defeat of enemies typically not only demand the decisive and proactive use of military force<\/a> to attain specific objectives to undermine the adversary, they  also require escalation dominance<\/a>. Such strategies prioritize military preparedness, force modernization, and operational planning to ensure the capability to secure victory in conflict scenarios and the ability to escalate readily<\/a>. But they come at a much higher risk of regional and global war<\/a>, especially when involving nuclear powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While diplomacy may still play a role in these strategies, it often excludes engagement<\/a> with the actual adversary and focuses instead on shaping<\/a> international coalitions<\/a> and garnering support from allies<\/a>. Not only does exclusion  <\/a>reflect a zero-sum framing and a pack mentality<\/a> that rewards ideology and Manichaean<\/a> thinking,  it is also inherently risky and destabilizing. Furthermore, exclusion may not even be feasible and practical in today’s highly geopolitical, interest-based, and multipolar landscape<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conversely, policies centered on improving deterrence  strategies better match the realities<\/a> of a more polycentric and regional world fatigued<\/a> by constant wars involving the U.S.. Traditional deterrence strategies prioritize  the  maintenance of a credible and strong military, having both  robust defensive and offensive capabilities. However, in today\u2019s conflict environment deterrence must  equally prioritise diplomacy, negotiation, and the establishment of clear communication channels<\/a> with rivals and adversaries<\/em> to manage gray zone conflict effectively and to mitigate the risk of misperception or miscalculation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Military restraint<\/a> emphasizes the complementary power of strength and peace<\/a>, seeking to harmonize rather than oppose these forces. Central to this shift is the process of weaning the U.S. and its allies off institutions  deeply rooted in  unrestrained and poorly executed<\/a> interventions<\/a>. This transformation requires fundamental changes in the mandates and purposes of core  foreign policy  bureaucracies<\/a> \u2014including diplomatic, foreign aid, intelligence, and defense departments\u2014that have repeatedly demonstrated ineffectiveness<\/a>  in foreign interventions  and war fighting over the past two decades<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

David Carment  and  Dani Belo<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

U.S.-Russia Proxy War in Ukraine Is a Case of Deterrence Failure Joe Biden\u2019s recent decision to allow Ukraine to strike deep within Russia using advanced American missile technology is but the latest step in the escalation ladder. Vladimir Putin has stated such actions would place Russia on a war footing with NATO. Biden\u2019s  risky decision […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[1,11],"tags":[43,40,46,45,36,44,42,41],"class_list":["post-2364","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news","category-recent-reports","tag-defence","tag-deterrence","tag-empathy","tag-escalation","tag-russia","tag-technology","tag-trump","tag-war"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":"idea-take-flight"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/cifp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2364","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/cifp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/cifp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/cifp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/cifp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2364"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/cifp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2364\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2367,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/cifp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2364\/revisions\/2367"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/cifp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2364"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/cifp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2364"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/cifp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2364"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}