

MALI
Policy Paper

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Executive Summary

Mali is one of the world's 19 most fragile countries.¹ Its severe fragility is exacerbated by an ongoing conflict in the country's north. We assess the country's key drivers of fragility and develop policies to begin addressing the conflict and support the move out of fragility.

Overview: The sub-Saharan country of Mali is being battered by an ongoing and degenerating conflict following an uprising in the north of the country in 2011. Mali ranks as fragile, with poor scores in authority, legitimacy and capacity.² Fragility has been linked to political instability and violence, instability of contracts, and corruption. Moreover, these factors cause donors to cut back aid,³ as the donor community did in 2012 following a military coup in 2012.⁴ This leads to a fragility trap, in which the country is unable to exit a state of fragility due to the continued presence of these factors that in turn affect the amount of aid.⁵ In the case of Mali, the main drivers of fragility are ethnic and political violence, poor governance and human rights abuses, and unequal and poor development.




Figure 1 - Regional Map of Mali⁶

There have been three major Tuareg uprisings since the country won independence in 1960. In 1962, the Tuareg revolted in an effort to establish an independent zone. Perceptions of an unfair distribution of state benefits and development, compounded by the fact that the majority of the regime was drawn from ethnic groups to the south, prompted the rebellion.⁷ Another uprising in 1991 was linked to exclusion from political power.⁸ In 2012, there was another rebellion over persistent perceptions of exclusion and a failure to implement better political representation, and which has involved Islamist armed groups such as Ansar Dine and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).⁹ The latest rebellion has been fueled by the use of weapons from Libya, brought by Tuareg mercenaries after the fall of the Libyan regime.¹⁰



Figure 2 – Map of West African States¹¹

Violence has been continual and involves a number of actors, including the Malian government, foreign military forces such as France and UN peacekeepers, Tuareg militia groups, and Islamist insurgents. In 2012, the Malian military overthrew the democratically elected leader of Mali, and lost the north as a result. The coup was motivated by a perceived mishandling of the Tuareg rebellion. Soldiers were sent into battle without

adequate weapons and ammunition. This led to discontent and unrest. Further governmental incompetence resulted in mutiny.¹² A French-led military intervention in 2013 pushed the coalition of Tuareg and Islamist insurgents back, but the Malian state still has no meaningful presence in the north. The conflict, as well as serious deficiencies in governance and development which are also exacerbated by the fighting, have affected the state's authority, capacity, and legitimacy.

Malian security forces have not been particularly effective at restoring control in the north. Besides enacting a coup, they have also recently been involved in repressing protest, sometimes violently. Protestors have been fired upon and killed.¹³ Contributing to the conflict are ongoing ties between the government and the anti-separatist Tuareg militia GATIA, which have undermined the peace process by calling into question the commitment of the government to peace.¹⁴

While the government, in partnership with the UN, has made efforts to reconcile the warring factions, the peace accords have met with little success. A National Conference of Understanding has been called for December, but the groups who are to participate in it have yet to meet with Mahamat Saleh Annadif, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, responsible for mediation.¹⁵ Given the ongoing fighting between GATIA and the pro-independence coalition, the Coordination of Movements for Azawad (CMA), the peace accords signed in June 2015 have held little credibility.¹⁶

The greatest problem faced by the government and by partners is the government's inability to exercise authority over its territory, deliver services to underdeveloped regions to reduce the horizontal inequalities that have fueled the conflict, and govern effectively.

Government officials have been unable to carry out their duties due to unrest and violence,¹⁷ and elections scheduled for November have been pushed back again because of the conflict, damaging the legitimacy and credibility of the state.¹⁸ Corruption and human rights abuses are endemic to government and security forces.¹⁹

End User

The end-user for this policy brief is the Government of Canada, in particular Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and the Department of National Defence (DND). Canada's official development aid to Mali in 2014-2015 was 152 million dollars, primarily targeting poverty and inequality, especially among women and youth, and delivery of basic services for food security, health and nutrition, and improvements in governance.²⁰ Given the dynamic conditions and evolving security situation in Mali, GAC should use our analysis to adjust its priorities and identify areas of concern. The expected outcome for stakeholders is a sustainable reduction in violence with a credible commitment to the peace process, legitimate and effective governance over all the territory of Mali, and improved economic opportunities that reduce support for armed groups.

External and Internal Stakeholders

Ibrahim Boubacar Keita is the president and former prime minister of Mali, elected in 2013. He has made his priority the reunification and reconciliation of the state of Mali.²¹ He has demonstrated a willingness to work with external actors, including Western donors and military partners. However, he has faced accusations of corruption, both from political rivals²² and from the international donor community.²³

Moreover, he has been accused of maintaining links with GATIA, a pro-government Tuareg militia. His party has suffered recent defections over poor governance and a failure to resolve the conflict.²⁴ He is opposed by Soumalia Cisse, an opposition leader in Bamako, who wants to lower the cost of entering elections and remove corruption from government.²⁵

Abdoulaye Idrissa Maiga was appointed Minister of Defense early in September, 2016, following the capture of a central Malian town by suspected Islamist gunmen.²⁶ Though he has made it a priority to improve the effectiveness of the Malian military and security forces by procuring more equipment and training troops, the Malian security forces continue to face difficulty in financing supporting operations. Furthermore, the Malian government has not enjoyed much success in building partnerships in the north with former rebel groups and militias.²⁷

Angela Merkel is the Chancellor of Germany. She has committed 550 German soldiers to the UN peacekeeping force, and has offered support to implementing the peace accord. Germany is also contributing to the training mission in Mali, which is involved in training Malian security forces. On a visit in October, she liaised with Keita to promote the implementation of the peace accord. Germany prioritizes the stability and security of Mali, among other states in the Sahel region, in order to curb migration from North Africa into Europe.²⁸ Recently, Germany approved a hike in development aid to UNHCR, raising their contribution to the organization's activities in Africa to 298 million Euros.²⁹

The CMA is a collection of pro-independence armed groups. They want to establish an independent state in the north called Azawad. In 2015, they signed on to a peace agreement with the government and GATIA. However, fighting between pro-

independence and pro-government forces, particularly around the northern town of Kidal, has demonstrated that little progress has been made in implementing the terms of the agreement.³⁰ Moreover, there is evidence that the CMA may have maintained ties with Islamist groups.³¹

The Groupe Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA) is a pro-government militia formed in 2014 to counter violence from pro-independence groups. They are led by General El Hadj Ag Gamou, who formerly fought for Libya.³² They armed themselves partly in order to obtain a place in the peace negotiations.³³ They are opposed by the CMA, and have ties to the Malian government.³⁴ Though GATIA signed the peace agreement,³⁵ there is ongoing fighting between them and the CMA, and in October they blockaded the town of Kidal and refused to allow food or other goods through unless they were able to distribute them. Most of the Tuareg in GATIA are from the Imghad clan, historically subservient to the CMA-affiliated Ifoghas clan, and ethnic resentment also contributes to the conflict between the two groups.³⁶ Gamou claims that one of the primary causes of conflict between GATIA and the CMA is the fact that the mayor of Kidal is of the Ifoghas clan.³⁷

French troops have been deployed in Mali since early 2013 under operation Serval.³⁸ Since that time, Operation Serval has been succeeded by Operation Barkhane. Operation Barkhane is an anti-terrorism operation being undertaken in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The French forces in the Region are 3000 strong and are tasked with what French President Francois Hollande has said as, "prevent... the highway of all forms of traffics to become a place of permanent passage, where jihadist groups between Libya and the Atlantic Ocean can rebuild

themselves."³⁹ The French operation has been criticised as not contributing to peace and security in Northern Mali by ignoring the conflict between the Malian State and Northern rebel groups, as well as between the rebel groups themselves.⁴⁰

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established in Mali pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100 on April 25, 2013.⁴¹ Since April 2013 MINUSMA consists of 13,083 personnel, with 11,883 being uniformed personnel and 1,246 civilian personnel.⁴² The current approved budget for 2016-2017 is USD \$ 933,411,000.⁴³ The MINUSMA mandate is to "support political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-related tasks."⁴⁴ This was qualified in 2015 to include: monitoring the ceasefire agreement, supporting the implementation of the peace agreement, protection of civilians and human rights, performing humanitarian assistance, and undertaking cultural preservation.⁴⁵ A 2015 survey done in the Northern provinces of Mali have found that the population in those areas does not trust that MINUSMA can provide security in the conflict regions or positively affect change.⁴⁶

Affected stakeholders also include the Malian people, including the Tuareg and other northern peoples affected by state fragility and conflict.

Key Issues

The Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) rank authority, legitimacy and capacity (ALC) for states. Authority refers to a states ability to control people and territory. Legitimacy measures the extent to which the population of a state views the government as truly representative of them, accountable and responsive to their needs.

Capacity describes the ability of the state to deliver services to the population. Together, poor performance in these areas indicates a fragile state.⁴⁷ CIFP is an initiative undertaken by students and faculty at Carleton University that has three main objectives. Firstly, CIFP develops tools for fragile state evaluation and assessment. Second, CIFP evaluates individual country performance. CIFP also engages in research regarding the link between "state fragility and selected key variables."⁴⁸ CIFP ranks the severity of key variables on a 9 point system, 9 indicating the poorest possible performance.⁴⁹

We rank ALC and structural clusters from 1 (most important for fragility) up. Intensity is ranked Low/Medium/High. Trend is ranked Negative (degrading conditions)/Stable (no improvement and no degradation of conditions)/Volatile(unstable improvement and degradation of conditions)/Positive (improvement of conditions). We used the most recently available rankings for ALC.

Authority: 2015 CIFP Rating⁵⁰ - 6.72

Rank: 1

Intensity: High

Trend: Negative

The Malian government's level of authority since the 2012 coup and subsequently has been low, and is currently deteriorating. The state does not have a monopoly of force over the entire territory. Attacks against French and other foreign peacekeepers have been ongoing.⁵¹ Attacks against troops and camps in Niger have also occurred from Mali,⁵² indicating a poor ability to monitor and secure borders. The state is responsible for service delivery as part of its level of authority, but has little presence in the north and is therefore unable to provide many basic services.

Legitimacy: 2012 CIFP Rating⁵³ -6.32

Rank: 2

Intensity: High

Trend: Volatile

Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was democratically elected in 2013 as the president of Mali, and so represents a legitimate government. This government, although legitimate for the State, has no presence in the conflict regions of the north. These regions are instead governed by local armed groups, who have no legitimacy except that a 2015 survey shows that population in select regions look to these local armed groups for governance and security.⁵⁴ Perceived and actual corruption of elites has also deeply affected the government's legitimacy.⁵⁵

Capacity: 2014 CIPF Rating⁵⁶ - 7.54

Rank: 2

Intensity: High

Trend: Negative

Foreign aid and initiatives by foreign governments have recently increased the Malian government's capacity. Due to the insecurity in the north, the government has not been able to use its new capacity for those whose lack of goods and services from the conflict itself. The appointed governors of Kidal, Menaka and Taoudenni have been unable to attend their duty stations due to the levels of violent instability, and the number of prefects is at 53%.⁵⁷ This is an obvious demonstration that the Malian government has little ability to govern in the north. Due to chronic violence, the state has been unable to deliver development aid to the northern regions. The Malian military lacks the capacity to independently defend its own territories, and relies on foreign intervention.

Cluster Analysis

Security

Rank: 1

Intensity: High

Trend: Negative

Mali's security since the 2012 coup has been weak. World Bank indicators for the absence of political instability, violence and terrorism deteriorated from 2013-2014.⁵⁸




Figure 2 – Estimate of perceptions of political stability and the absence of violence and terrorism.

While expenditures on the security sector have risen since 2014 to 2.4% of the GDP, and battle-related deaths have fallen overall since 2013,⁵⁹ the state remains absent from the north.




Figure 3 – Battle-related deaths per year in Mali.

The number of attacks against peacekeepers, as well as fighting between the opposed Tuareg militias GATIA and the CMA, has risen, and in the center of the country the security situation has also worsened. This indicates that the conflict in the north is actually spreading south.⁶⁰ There is also evidence that the conflict has moved

beyond the borders of Mali, and there are now attacks against soldiers and refugee camps in Niger that appear to have their origin in Mali.⁶¹

Despite the signing of a peace deal in June 2015, little progress has been made in its implementation. The conflict has also prevented effective governance of the north, with interim authorities unable to go to their cities because of the violence.⁶² Tens of millions of dollars of developmental aid have also been put on hold until the conflict de-escalates, contributing to the fragility trap.⁶³

Besides the fighting between rival secular militias, Islamist groups such as Ansar Dine and AQIM have continued to attack soldiers and civilians. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) reports several attacks in the month of November against Malian soldiers and UN peacekeepers.⁶⁴ These attacks continue to increase in frequency and sophistication, posing a threat to peacekeeping forces, preventing the effective administration of governance and developmental aid, and contributing to a more unstable environment.⁶⁵

Security forces are also involved in human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention, torture, and killings.⁶⁶ Protests against the government in Gao were put down violently by security forces.⁶⁷ In August, protestors were shot while calling for the release of Ras Bath, an activist and critic of the government and military.⁶⁸ ACLED also reports that GATIA, allied to government forces in the north, has continued to fight,⁶⁹ as well as executions of rival tribespeople.⁷⁰

Overall, the deteriorating and serious nature of the security crisis, as well as its effects on the delivery of services to the territory of the state, indicates that resolving the security situation is of primary importance in our policy plan. Effective

governance and development in the north cannot proceed without stabilization.

Governance

Rank:2

Intensity: High

Trend: Negative

Governance since the 2012 coup has been poor. Prior to the coup, Mali had been considered a model state for democracy, although governance had been relatively concentrated in one ethnic group, the Mande.⁷¹ Using a structural analysis, we note that between 2011-2012, the CPIA rating for transparency, accountability and corruption fell to 3.⁷² Voice and accountability shows consistent downwards trends.⁷³ The control of corruption has remained unstable; although there have been some recent improvements, it is difficult to tell whether or not these will be permanent.⁷⁴




Figure 4– Control of corruption percentile rank.

Political stability and the absence of violence and terrorism also fell in 2012 and have shown little improvement.⁷⁵ Structural analysis furthermore indicates that overall perceptions of government effectiveness, while showing some recent improvement, have been on a general decline.⁷⁶ This trend

indicates a negative development for governance.

Perceived corruption has greatly increased⁷⁷ and has led to general population apathy, and the upcoming election have been met with little enthusiasm.⁷⁸ This indicates a low level of legitimacy for the Malian government, which has also faced opposition from civil society over proposed election laws that raised the cost of becoming a candidate by USD \$43,000, two-and-a-half times higher than the previous sum.⁷⁹ This decision was widely contested by opposition leaders such as Soumailia Cisse.⁸⁰ The elections taking place in late November have been delayed for two years, owing to the instability in the north, which has also been blamed for affecting the election campaign and impeding the democratic process.⁸¹

Interim authorities have been appointed but are not in place, indicating poor control over territory and continued volatility in the security situation. Moreover, promises made in the 2015 peace accords to make local authorities an elected position have not been followed through.⁸² These interim authorities are appointed, leading to violent protests in the northern city of Gao that resulted in deaths.⁸³

Resolving the security situation in Mali is of paramount importance to allow effective governance and the delivery of aid and development assistance, to ensure sustainable stability. The poor quality and lack of robustness of institutions in fragile states has been demonstrated to be a driver of state fragility.⁸⁴ We must put into place policies which contribute to greater government effectiveness and accountability mechanisms that reduce the risk of corruption, thereby augmenting the government's ability to exercise authority over its territory and improve its legitimacy.

Human Development

Rank: 3

Intensity: High

Trend: Negative

Development has been greatly impeded by the conflict. Although schools have reopened in the north, teachers have not been able to attend them due to the instability.⁸⁵ Continued instability and violence, if sustained, will have deleterious effects on the education and development prospects for the entire region. Instability is also responsible for the withholding of millions of dollars in aid.

While there has been some improvement in certain economic indicators, such as GDP and GDP per capita,⁸⁶ growth has been unstable, and is largely subject to fluctuations in conflict and stability. Inequality has also proved to be unstable, with the latest trend showing a slight increase in inequality as measured by the GINI coefficient.⁸⁷




Figure 5– GDP growth per capita in Mali.

Currently, Mali uses 59.4 kilowatt hours per capita, indicating serious shortfalls in infrastructure development.⁸⁸ A lack of modern energy infrastructure affects economic development and job creation, and limits the diversification of the economy.⁸⁹ According to 2012 World Bank Data, 50.4 percent of Mali's population that resides in urban areas has access to electricity. This is vastly different from Mali's rural areas, where only 11.9 percent of the population

has access to electricity.⁹⁰ This inequality of access and general poor levels of access points to inequality of development between rural and urban areas, highlighting the inequality between Northern Mali, which is mostly rural, and Southern Mali. Differences between rural and urban regions is illustrated in Figure 6.




Figure 6 – Access to Electricity by Percentage of Population in Urban and Rural Environments, as well as the Total Population.

Compounding issues in unequal access to development resources, the conflict in the north has interrupted aid flows, prevented populations from obtaining income, and displaced 135 000 Malians.⁹¹ Resentments over the unequal distribution of development played a role in provoking conflicts in the north and must be addressed to mitigate the risks of further instability.

Before significant investments can be made in infrastructure development and economic growth, the security situation must be brought under control and governance over all the state's territory be established in order to provide a stable environment for development to take place while also mitigating the risks of corrupt, rent-seeking behavior on the part of elites.

Environment

Rank: 5

Intensity: Medium

Trend: Stable

The influence of the environment on the quality of life in Mali has been deteriorating slightly since the effects of climate change have begun to show.⁹² The environmental issues that Mali face are long-term and are not directly related to deficiencies that could be the focus of feasible, and actionable policies. For this reason, in terms of analytical value and policy direction, it is not of the same importance as some of the other analysis clusters. The main concern for the environment in Mali is the prevalence of droughts. 2015 World Bank Data shows that 41 percent of Mali's GDP comes from agricultural practices.⁹³ Drought would therefore cause a decrease in employment, food security and economic development. Decreases in water availability may also make conflicts between agriculturalists and pastoralists more likely, as there is a decrease in available fertile land.⁹⁴

Northern Mali has been influenced negatively by climate change. Tessalit, a region in Northern Mali shows a decrease in average annual precipitation of 26 percent from the periods 1951-70 compared with 1971-2000.⁹⁵ A decrease in water would also affect Mali's energy infrastructure, as 80 of Mali's electricity is generated from hydro-power.⁹⁶ Decreases in rainfall decrease the energy output by hydroelectric facilities.⁹⁷

Economic Development

Rank: 4

Intensity: High

Trend: Volatile

Following the 2012 crisis, security and political instability generated ample domestic output fluctuations, in particular a sharp drop in GDP growth as a result of

infrastructure destruction, population outflows, suspension of economic activities, and a collapse in aid and tourism.⁹⁸ Figure 4 illustrates this instability. Mali's economy is projected to grow by around 5% annually over the next three years, reflecting a return to normalcy and a gradual tapering of the recent surge in international aid.⁹⁹




Figure 7 – Annual Percentage of GDP Growth in Mali

Mali's favourable economic outlook is subject to substantial and persistent downside risks, among which the most critical are the collapse of the peace agreement and the resurgence of insecurity throughout the country, recurrence of lapses in governance, climatic shocks, and any further decline in global gold or cotton prices, the major two export products of Mali.¹⁰⁰

Demography and Population

Rank: 5

Intensity: Medium

Trend: Negative

The demography of Mali could present a problem to the security situation in Mali within the next few years. 2015 World Bank Data shows that population under 14 has risen to 47.5% of the total population.¹⁰¹ Youth bulges have been connected to security risks before, reflecting the fact that large amounts of youth with high rates of unemployment mean that they are more

likely to engage in rebelling as a way to generate income.¹⁰²

Mali has also been experiencing increasing urbanisation, which can put strains on public services.¹⁰³ While the percentage rate per year of urbanisation in Mali has fallen to 4.9 in 2015 from its highest at 5.7 in 2006-2007,¹⁰⁴ the urban population increased to 39.9 % of the total population. Moreover, while the percentage of the urban population living in slums has decreased since 1990 (94.2%), it is still very high at 56.3%, with a majority of the urban population living in slum conditions.¹⁰⁵




Figure 8 – Left Map showing ethno-linguistic divisions, Right Map showing population density¹⁰⁶

Scenarios

Best case: In December the National Conference of Understanding will be taking place in an effort to finally implement the peace agreement, which has hitherto enjoyed little success. In the best-case scenario, GATIA and the CMA both attend the NCU with Ibrahim Keita. Keita makes a credible commitment to integrate the former rebel groups, as well as GATIA, into a northern security force. He also makes the interim authorities for the north elected positions, instead of unelected officials that have caused civil unrest and violence in Gao, and ensures greater northern representation in the political process, thereby following through on the terms of the peace accord.

Keita is able to move the Malian military into the north and provide security, stability and rule of law, capitalizing on help from France and Germany, while also integrating former rebel units into a northern security force that works in cooperation with the government. This will reduce the threat of Islamist groups while increasing legitimacy and authority by enhancing government credibility. By May 2017, the security situation will stabilize enough to allow Malian farmers in the north to work without substantial interference. Stability in the north will also enhance the ability of the government to efficiently deliver substantial international development aid to the underdeveloped regions in northern Mali, such as meals for children in almost 1000 northern schools that have been closed due to instability and violence. Finally, in four months, facing serious opposition in Bamako from citizens and opposition leaders, Keita repeals a controversial electoral reform bill that significantly raised the cost of entering elections, ensuring a more open democratic process and greater political representation overall.

Significant benchmarks, such as energy and natural resource exploitation infrastructure, are begun. Unemployment rates begin to fall as jobs become available.

Worst case: The CMA and GATIA fail to come to an agreement and do not attend the NCU. Despite the urging of the US, Keita continues his support for GATIA, fuelling violence in the north. After one year there is no improvement in the security situation, and the CMA declares that it will not negotiate with the Malian government, citing broken promises and a lack of progress in implementing the terms of the peace process. The US reduces the aid package of 1 billion dollars and will not help the Malian military, as their urgings to Keita

to cut support and ties to GATIA went unheeded.

Over the next six months, ongoing demonstrations in Bamako over corruption and the new electoral law are met with violence, and security forces fire on protestors. During this violence, and demonstrations in Timbuktu and Gao in solidarity, political opponents and opposition leaders are detained. A military commander initiates a coup, claiming to be doing so in order to restore democracy and hold free elections, but the international community, including Germany under Angela Merkel, withdraws development aid and civil and military cooperation. The result is military collapse in the north. Ansar Dine and AQIM make significant gains in the north by the end of the year. Due to the threat of violence, no progress is made on improving infrastructure and development.

Policy Responses

Security: The desired outcomes are increased state authority over its territory, a state monopolization of violence, an end to human rights abuses by security forces, and a decrease in violent incidents. Success is indicated by a sustained decrease over one year of violent incidents, a sustained Malian troop presence in northern territory over one year, and an end to protestor deaths by security forces within one year. Impact assessments will be conducted every month to monitor compliance with training objectives that prioritize respect for human rights, with continued training and funding conditional on meeting the above benchmarks.

Our entry points are engagement with Defense Minister Maiga and the European Union training mission (EUTM) in Mali. In conjunction with the EUTM, we propose sending a force of 200 Canadian soldiers and officers to train with the Malian

military. We expect this would cost 16 million dollars per year,¹⁰⁷ and will be able to train approximately 2000 soldiers.¹⁰⁸ The EUTM has focused on increasing the operational capacity of the Malian armed forces while also mentoring senior leadership in subordination to legitimate civilian authority. They have a budget of 33.4 million Euros and involve roughly 500 soldiers.¹⁰⁹ Our contribution, especially given our experience training foreign militaries in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Ukraine, will be a substantial capacity-boost to the EUTM. We should also contribute 1 million dollars for non-lethal equipment procurement, such as mine detectors and radios, to enhance the ability of the Malian army to operate while reducing casualties.

This policy should increase the effectiveness of the Malian army at the tactical level, allowing them to operate effectively in the north, while also ensuring that the senior leadership does not carry out another coup.

The risks associated with this policy include threats to Canadian soldiers, the risk of enabling a second coup with the training provided, and the risk of a military with more power to inflict human rights abuses. The risk to Canadian soldiers can be mitigated by conducting training primarily in areas away from conflict-affected regions. Extensive monitoring and mentorship, with training and equipment funding conditional on compliance with respect for human rights and civil authority, should mitigate the risks of a coup or human rights abuses.

Governance: The goal for the policy proposed is to increase governmental legitimacy and authority. This can be done by increasing the Malian government's ability to exercise governance over the ungoverned areas within the Malian regions of Gao, Kidal and Tombouctou. Success for this policy should be measured through the

emplacement of interim authorities in those regions of Mali within the next year, the ability to hold democratic elections for those positions the following year. This will depend on the effectiveness of the policy up to that point and the security situation in Mali at that time.

In order to place interim authorities in the unstable regions of Mali, first our security goals previously mentioned must be achieved. This is evidenced by the fact that currently in order for government officials to even visit the insecure regions of Mali, permission must be obtained from the local armed groups.¹¹⁰ We propose that Canada take the position of a Cash-on-Delivery aid donor that will contribute funds once certain conditions have been met. The Cash-on-Delivery aid system is an innovative aid system designed by the Centre for Global Development, which "is a contract for funders and recipients to agree on a mutually desired outcome and a fixed payment for each unit of confirmed progress."¹¹¹ The financial aid that Canada gives through this method is an incentive for Mali to achieve the conditions proposed. Once the security situation has been achieved, Mali will introduce interim governments for currently ungoverned regions, and the leadership must be drawn from local candidates. Once this has been achieved and the local situation is stable, Canada should invest in supporting the local elections by monitoring, as well as through infrastructure development to facilitate the voting of individuals in harder to reach areas. Another policy directed at increasing government legitimacy that can be enacted through the Cash-on-Delivery program is the removal of corruption. Canada can invest in periodic assessments of levels of corruption, while promising funds to Mali once certain levels have been reached, thereby encouraging Mali to enact these changes.

This policy should increase the governance of Northern Mali through its local capacity and legitimacy, while also giving the local Malian people greater representation in government and give foreign aid donors new avenues to directly influence Northern Mali's deficiencies. Chauvet and Collier discuss the potential negative impacts of having elections too frequently or infrequently,¹¹² and so the impacts of the elections brought on by this policy must be closely monitored and adjusted accordingly. Other potential risks of implementing this policy are the use of isomorphic mimicry to meet benchmark steps, as well as the potential for the Malian government not to react to tactics of incentive. Isomorphic mimicry is a process by which a newly created institution in a developing State mimics a successful institution in a developed State in form, but not in function. This would allow the new institution to appear functional in order to gain benefits and recognition, while not having any or little positive functioning processes.

Human Development: In order to positively influence Mali's human development, the infrastructure of the areas in which human development are inadequate must be improved. This will be done through the increase of Mali's electrical infrastructure to its Northern regions. The benefits of access to electricity are well documented,¹¹³ and include evidence such as increasing studying hours, which increases education and thereby long term earning potential.¹¹⁴ The reduction in household air pollution also decreases the risk of respiratory disease, especially among women and children. Access to electricity increases household business income, and allows agricultural practices to become more efficient through the use of electric tools. The success of the proposed policy would be

measured through the achievement of those previously mentioned factors, in the quality of life and economic achievement of the population of Mali.

We propose that Canada invest in Mali through donor projects aimed at directly influencing individuals' access to electricity in the rural areas of Northern Mali. The entry point for this project will be Malick Alhousseini, the Malian Minister for Energy and Water and a native Muslim from the Gao region of Mali. The goals of this policy will be accomplished by providing households with off-grid electricity solutions such as solar panel electricity. A similar project aimed at providing electricity to rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa proposes a cost of US \$36 million in order to provide 20 million people with access to electricity by 2030.¹¹⁵

World Bank Data for 2012 shows that at that time, only 11.9 percent of Malians in rural areas had access to electricity.¹¹⁶ Increasing this amount would improve the quality of life for the population in those areas. Increasing Northern Malian's access to electricity would decrease the horizontal inequality issues that Mali faces between its Northern and Southern regions and populations.

Possible risks in the undertaking of this policy include the potential for the appropriation of assets by armed rebel groups, and subsequently being used as a catalyst for rent seeking behaviour. For this reason it is important that before undertaking this policy, or other investments in Northern Mali, the security objectives outlined must be firmly in place.

Another possible avenue for Canada to positively influence human development in Mali is support for the World Food Programme (WFP). The WFP is currently undertaking an initiative to provide meals at school for children in Mali's Northern regions¹¹⁷, often their only meal. The World

Food Programme has advertised that if USD \$3 million is not funded into the program, it will have to suspend its activities.¹¹⁸ If these activities are suspended, parents are more likely to keep children at home to improve household income.¹¹⁹ Contributing to this project would constitute a cost effective method of positively affecting the development and wellbeing of children in Northern Mali.

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¹³ "Three killed in Mali anti-government protest," *ENCA*, July 13, 2016, accessed on November 21, 2016, <https://www.enca.com/africa/three-killed-in-mali-anti-government-protest>.

¹⁴ "Mali's new President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita sworn in," *BBC*, September 4, 2013, accessed on November 21, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23957259>.

¹⁵ "Stalled peace process, fresh ceasefire violations risk Mali's stability – UN peacekeeping chief," *UN News Centre*, October 6, 2016, accessed on November 21, 2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55227#.WC4p_eYrLIU.

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<http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/report-secretary-general-situation-mali-s2016498>.

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⁷² World Bank, World Bank Development Indicators, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>. From the World Bank description of this variable, “Transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector assess the extent to which the executive can be held accountable for its use of funds and for the results of its actions by the electorate and by the legislature and judiciary, and the extent to which public employees within the executive are required to account for administrative decisions, use of resources, and results obtained. The three main dimensions assessed here are the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their performance, access of civil society to information on public affairs, and state

capture by narrow vested interests.” A mark of 6 is high, a mark of 0 is low.

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⁷⁵ World Bank, World Bank Government Indicators, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators#>. From the World Bank description of this variable, “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-

motivated violence, including terrorism. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.”

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⁸¹ “Voters to go to the polls Sunday in troubled Mali,” *Daily Mail*, November 18, 2016, accessed on November 21, 2016, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3950754/Voters-to-polls-Sunday-troubled-Mali.html>.

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⁸⁴ Graziella Bertocchi and Andrea Guerzoni. “Growth, history, or institutions What explains state fragility in sub-Saharan Africa?.” *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 6 (2012): 779.

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included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars.”

⁸⁷ “Cadre Strategique Pour La Relance Economique Et Le Developpement Durable Du Mali,” April 2016, accessed on November 21, <http://www.maliapd.org/Fatou/CREDD%202016-2018.pdf>, pg. 33.

⁸⁸ “POWER PEOPLE PLANET Seizing Africa’s energy and climate opportunities,” *Africa Progress Panel*, 2015, accessed on November 21, http://app-cdn.acwupload.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/APP_REPORT_2015_FINAL_low1.pdf, pg 39-46.

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⁹⁰ World Bank Data.

<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS&country=>. From the World Bank description of this variable, “Access to electricity is the percentage of population with access to electricity. Electrification data are collected from industry, national surveys and international sources.”

⁹¹ Helena Pes, “Despite Mali peace accord, more flee persistent violence,” *UNHCR*, November 7, 2016, accessed on November 21, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/11/582043509/despite-mali-peace-accord-flee-persistent-violence.html>.

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<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS&country=>.

From the World Bank description of this variable,

“Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator.”

⁹⁴ “Overview of Climate Change and Adaptation in Mali,” *WeAdapt*, February 18 2016, accessed on November 21, 2016, <https://www.weadapt.org/knowledge-base/national-adaptation-planning/mali>.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ “Climate Impacts on Energy,” *Environmental Protection Agency*, accessed on November 21, 2016, <https://www.epa.gov/climate-impacts/climate-impacts-energy>.

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<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS&country=>.

From the World Bank description of this variable,

“International inbound tourists (overnight visitors) are the number of tourists who travel to a country other than that in which they usually reside, and outside their usual environment, for a period not exceeding 12 months and whose main purpose in visiting is other than an activity remunerated from within the country visited. When data on number of tourists are not available, the

number of visitors, which includes tourists, same-day visitors, cruise passengers, and crew members, is shown instead.”

⁹⁹ “Country Overview – Mali,” *The World Bank*, May 3, 2016, accessed on November 21,

<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mali/overview>.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

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<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS&country=>.

From the World Bank description of this variable: “Population between the ages 0 to 14 as a percentage of the total population. Population is based on the de facto definition of population.”

¹⁰² Marc Sommers, “Governance, Security and Culture: Assessing Africa’s Youth Bulge,” *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, December 12, 2011, Volume 5, Issue 2.

¹⁰³ Daniel LaGraffe, 2012, “The youth bulge in Egypt: An intersection of demographics, security, and the Arab Spring,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 5 (2): 65-80.

<http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1156&context=jss>

¹⁰⁴World Bank Data,

<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS&country=>.

From the World Bank description of this variable,

“Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects.”

¹⁰⁵World Bank Data,

<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS&country=>.

From the World Bank description of this variable, “Population living in slums is the proportion of the urban

population living in slum households. A slum household is defined as a group of individuals living under the same roof lacking one or more of the following conditions: access to improved water, access to improved sanitation, sufficient living area, and durability of housing.”

¹⁰⁶http://www.mivy.ovh.org/journal/2013/13_01_mali-carte.jpg

¹⁰⁷ “Ukraine crisis: Canada sending 200 trainers for Ukraine military,” *CBC News*, April 14, 2015, accessed on November 21, 2016, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ukraine-crisis-canada-sending-200-trainers-for-ukraine-military-1.3031806>.

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¹¹¹ Nancy Birdsall and William D. Savedoff, 2011, “Cash On Delivery A new approach to foreign aid,” Revised Edition with a New Preface, Center for Global Development.

¹¹² Chauvet, L. and Collier, P, 2007, “Elections and Reform in Failing States,” paper prepared for UNU-Wider Conference on Fragile States – Fragile Groups, June, Helsinki.

¹¹³ Khandker, Shahidur S. R., Douglas D. F. Barnes, and Hussain H. A. Samad, 2013,

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¹¹⁴ Khandker, S. R., D. F. Barnes, and H. A. Samad. 2012. “The Welfare Impacts of Rural Electrification in Bangladesh.” *Energy Journal* 33 (1): 199–218.

¹¹⁵ “Scaling Off Grid,” accessed on November 21, 2016, <https://www.scalingoffgrid.org/>

¹¹⁶ World Bank Data. <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS&country=>. From the World Bank description of this variable, Access to electricity is the percentage of population with access to electricity. Electrification data are collected from industry, national surveys and international sources, See Annex A

¹¹⁷ “World Food Programme – Mali,” World Food Programme, accessed on December 8, 2016, <http://www.wfp.org/countries/mali>

¹¹⁸ “Les repas scolaires du PAM sont compromis pour les enfants du Mali à la veille de la rentrée scolaire,” World Food Programme – News, September 27, 2016, accessed on December 8, 2016,

<http://fr.wfp.org/nouvelles/nouvelles-release/les-repas-scolaires-du-pam-compromis-pour-les-enfants-du-mali-a-la-veille-de-la-rentree-scolair>

¹¹⁹ “Mali : Programme Alimentaire Mondial (PAM) : La bouffe à l’école motive,”

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