THE YEAR AHEAD: AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE OUTLOOK FOR 2016

CONFERENCE REPORT

CENTRE FOR SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND DEFENCE STUDIES (CSIDS)

NORMAN PATERSON SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, CARLETON UNIVERSITY

The Year Ahead:
An International Security and Intelligence Outlook for 2016

Highlights from the Conference
December 4, 2015

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CONTENTS

FOREWORD

The conference on "The Year Ahead: An International Security and Intelligence Outlook for 2016" was held at the Canadian War Museum on December 4th, 2015. The conference was organized by the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs and the Centre for Security, Interlligence and Defence Studies, both at Carleton University.

The conference was a great success, with over 150 people attending, including public servants, academics and students, representatives of the private sector, diplomats, and the interested public.

The intent was to create an opportunity for both public servants and academic experts to discuss the international security challenges that would be facing the Canadian Government and our closest Allies in 2016. It was hoped that this would be the start of an annual dialogue seeking to anticipate events requiring policy work.

A number of themes emerged in the course of the presentations and discussions that are summarized in this report on the conference. However, there are some cross-cutting questions that require further consideration:

- In confronting new international crises, is Western defence policy facing a choice between the deployment of significant ground combat forces on the one hand, and stand-off war-fighting on the other (including air power, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Special Operations Forces, cyber, and the use of local proxies)?
- Are the ongoing security crises in Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe a distraction from the real strategic challenge facing the West today, i.e., the rise of China?
- If the so-called Obama doctrine epitomizes realism and restraint, is it a break with, or a return to, traditional US foreign policy?

The summary that follows only partially captures the richness of the discussion at the conference. None of the statements in this summary should be attributed to any particular speaker. The intent is simply to highlight some of the issues raised, as a reminder for those who attended, and as food for thought for those who were not able to participate.

Finally, I would like to thank our sponsors, from both the Government of Canada and from the private sector, who made this event possible. We could not have done it without them.

Our student volunteers from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs were invaluable in both assisting with the organization of the conference and in contributing to this report.

Yours Sincerely,

Rob McRae

AGENDA

09:00 Opening Remarks: Rob McRae (NPSIA)

09:15 Hotspots - Where Might Instability and Conflict Occur in 2016?

Chair: Stephanie Carvin (NPSIA)
C. Christine Fair (Georgetown University) - *Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India*
William McCants (Brookings Institution) - *Middle East and North Africa*
Miles Kahler (American University) - *South China Sea and East Asia*

11:00 The Outlook for Stabilization Missions and Civilian Instruments

Chair: Jez Littlewood (NPSIA)
Clint Watts (Foreign Policy Research Institute) - *Iraq and Syria*
Thomas Juneau (University of Ottawa) - *Iran*
Heather Conley (Center for Strategic and International Studies) - *Russia and Former Soviet Union*

12:30 Lunch & Keynote Address
Michael O'Hanlon (Brookings Institution) - *The Future of Land Warfare*

13:30 The Cyber Dimensions of Security

Chair: Alex Wilner (NPSIA)
Ray Boisvert (Hill + Knowlton Strategies) - *Cyber Threats to Economic Security*
Catherine Lotrionte Yoran (Georgetown University) - *Deterrence and Rules of the Road*
Bill Wright (Symantec) - *Partnerships and the Private Sector*

15:15 The US and the Politics of International Security in 2016

Chair: Stephen Saideman (NPSIA)
Joshua Rovner (Southern Methodist University) - *The Obama Legacy*
Heather Hurlburt (New America Foundation) - *US International Security Policy Going Forward*

16:45 Concluding Remarks: Dane Rowlands (NPSIA)

SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES

RAY BOISVERT is a Senior Associate at Hill+Knowlton Strategies. He is an intelligence expert and well-respected thought-leader in the Canadian security space, providing clients with uniquely sourced insights into risk-mitigation strategies and solutions. Boisvert joined the firm in 2014, bringing a wealth of knowledge on data management and protection, from cyber risks to insider threats, to complement H+K's procurement and trade team. He explores client opportunities pertaining to national security assessments within the foreign investment review area. Boisvert's expertise is rooted in more than 28 years with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service from which he retired as Assistant Director for Intelligence.

STEPHANIE CARVIN is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. Her research interests are international law, security, terrorism, and technology. Currently, she teaches in the areas of critical infrastructure protection, technology and warfare, and foreign policy. Stephanie holds a PhD from the London School of Economics and published her thesis as *Prisoners of America's Wars: From the Early Republic to Guantanamo* (Columbia/Hurst, 2010). Her most recent book is *Science, Law, Liberalism and the American Way of Warfare: The Quest for Humanity in Conflict* (Cambridge, 2015), co-authored with Michael J. Williams. In 2009 Carvin was a Visiting Scholar at George Washington University Law School and worked as a consultant to the US Department of Defense Law of War Working Group. From 2012-2015, she was an analyst with the Government of Canada working on national security issues.

HEATHER CONLEY is Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Prior to joining CSIS in 2009, she served as Executive Director at the Office of the Chairman of the Board at the American National Red Cross. From 2001 to 2005, she served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau for European and Eurasian Affairs with responsibilities for US bilateral relations with the countries of northern and central Europe. From 1994 to 2001, she was a Senior Associate with an international consulting firm led by former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage. Ms. Conley began her career in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the US Department of State. She was selected to serve as Special Assistant to the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Ms. Conley is a member of the World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on the Arctic and is frequently featured as a foreign policy analyst on prominent news networks like CNN, MSNBC, BBC, NPR, and PBS.

C. CHRISTINE FAIR served as a Senior Political Scientist with the RAND Corporation, a Political Officer to the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and as a Senior Research Associate in the United States Institute of Peace's (USIP)Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention prior to joining the Security Studies Program within Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Her research focuses upon political and military affairs in South Asia. She has authored, co-authored and co-edited several books, including *Cops as Counterinsurgents: Policing Insurgencies*, edited with Sumit Ganguly (Oxford, 2013); *Cuisines of the Axis of Evil and Other Irritating States* (Lyon's Press, 2008); *Treading Softly on Sacred Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations on Sacred Space,* edited with Sumit Ganguly (Oxford, 2008); *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan* (USIP, 2008); *Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance* (USIP, 2006). She is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, Women in International Security, and the American Institute of Pakistan Studies. She serves on the editorial board of *Current History, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Asia Policy, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* and *India Review*. She is also a senior fellow with the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Her publications are available at www.christinefair.net.

HEATHER HURLBURT is the Director of New Models of Policy Change at New America. She leads research into how policy advocacy is adapting in our current environment of intense political polarization and provides guidance to advocates and funders seeking to navigate politics effectively on behalf of policy solutions. Previously, she ran the National Security Network, a premier source for internationalist foreign policy messaging and advocacy, held senior positions in the White House and State Department under President Bill Clinton, and worked on Capitol Hill and for the International Crisis Group.

THOMAS JUNEAU is an Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. His research focuses mostly on the Middle East, in particular on Iran, Yemen, Syria, and US foreign policy in the region. He is also interested in Canadian foreign and defence policy and in international relations theory. He is the author of *Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy* (Stanford University Press, 2015), co-editor of *Iranian Foreign Policy since 2001: Alone in the World* (Routledge, 2013), and co-editor of *Asie centrale et Caucase: Une sécurité mondialisée* (Presses de l'Université Laval, 2004). He has also published many articles and book chapters on the Middle East, international relations theories, and pedagogical methods, notably in *International Studies Perspectives*, *Middle East Policy*, and *Orbis*. Prior to joining the University of Ottawa, he worked for the Department of National Defence from 2003 to 2014, chiefly as a strategic analyst covering the Middle East. He was also a Policy Officer and an Assistant to the Deputy Minister.

MILES KAHLER is a Distinguished Professor in the School of International Service at American University in Washington, DC and an expert on international politics and international political economy, including international monetary cooperation, global governance, and regional institutions. He has been a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2012-2013), at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University (2007-2008), and at the Council on Foreign Relations (1994-1996 and currently). He is a member of the Editorial Board of *International Organization*. His current research centers on the role of emerging economies in global governance and challenges to the nation-state as a dominant unit in the international system. Recent edited publications include *Integrating Regions: Asia in Comparative Context* (Stanford, 2013), *Politics in the New Hard Times* (Cornell, 2013), and "Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo" (*International Affairs*, 2013).

JEZ LITTLEWOOD is an Assistant Professor of International Affairs, having joined the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in July 2007. He teaches Intelligence and International Affairs, Terrorism and International Security, Intelligence and National Security, and Chemical and Biological Weapons. His research interests include proliferation and counter-proliferation of WMD, terrorism and counter-terrorism, international security, and intelligence. Jez has served previously as an Advisor to the Counter-Proliferation Department of the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva), and with HM Forces (Army) of the UK. He is a UK national and permanent resident in Canada.

CATHERINE LOTRIONTE YORAN is Director of the Institute for Law, Science and Global Security and Visiting Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Lotrionte teaches national security law, US intelligence law, and international law. She is the Institute Liaison for the Program on Nonproliferation Policy and Law, funded by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, in cooperation with the Monterey Institute for International Studies' James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, where she focuses on international and domestic law with new developments in cyber technology and cyber threats. Lotrionte served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board at the White House, as a legal counsel for the Joint Inquiry Committee of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in the Office of General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency, and in the US Department of Justice. She is the author of numerous publications, including a forthcoming book concerning US national security law in the post-Cold War era. She is a frequent speaker at cyber conferences held by academic, military, government, and media organizations.

WILLIAM McCANTS is a fellow in the Brookings Institution's Center for Middle East Policy and director of its Project on US Relations with the Islamic World. He is also adjunct faculty at Johns Hopkins University and has held various government and think tank positions related to Islam, the Middle East, and terrorism. From 2009 to 2011, McCants served as a US State Department senior adviser for countering violent extremism. He has also held positions as program manager of the Minerva Initiative for the Department of Defense, an analyst at the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses, and SAIC, and fellow at West Point's Combating Terrorism Center. He is the author of *The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State* (St. Martin's Press, 2015).

ROB McRAE is Director of the Centre for Security, Intelligence and Defence Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. He served as Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet for Intelligence Assessment in the Privy Council Office (PCO) from 2011 to 2014 in Ottawa. He was Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to NATO from 2007 to 2011 in Brussels. During his diplomatic career, he also served overseas at Canadian Embassies in Belgrade (1982-84), Prague (1988-91), and London (1993-95), and as Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to NATO (1998-2002) in Brussels. He received the Foreign Minister's Award for Foreign Policy Excellence in 1997 and in 2000. His most recent books are *Human Security and the New Diplomacy* (McGill-Queen's University Press) and *Resistance and Revolution: Vaclav Havel's Czechoslovakia* (Carleton University Press).

MICHAEL O'HANLON is a Senior Fellow and Co-Director in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Director of Research for the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in US defense strategy, the use of military force, and American foreign policy. Before joining Brookings, he worked as a national security analyst at the Congressional Budget Office in Washington, DC. He is a visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. His most recent book is *The Future of Land Warfare* (Brookings Institution Press, 2015).

JOSHUA ROVNER is the John Goodwin Tower Distinguished Professor of International Politics and National Security, Associate Professor of Political Science, and Director of Studies at the Tower Center for Political Studies, Southern Methodist University. Before coming to SMU, he was an Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy at the Naval War College, and he also taught at Columbia University and Williams College. Rovner writes extensively on strategy and security. His recent book, *Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence* (Cornell University Press, 2011), is a wide-ranging study about how leaders use and misuse intelligence. His research interests also include international relations theory, nuclear weapons, grand strategy, and US defense policy. Rovner has written on intelligence before and after the September 11 attacks, strategy in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and possible responses to nuclear proliferation. In addition to research on intelligence, Rovner is currently working on issues relating to US force posture in the Persian Gulf, the theory and history of counterinsurgency, and contemporary deterrence theory.

DANE ROWLANDS is Director of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, having served as Associate Director and Graduate Supervisor from 2002-2012. From 2009-2012 he was the inaugural holder of the Paterson Chair in International Affairs. His primary research interests are in international debt, multilateral financial institutions, official development assistance, and the international aspects of economic development. He also conducts research on international migration, terrorism, peacekeeping, and conflict and development. He is the author or co-author of over 50 peer reviewed papers that have appeared in journals such as the *Journal of International Economics*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution, World Development, The World Economy, Journal of Development Studies*, and *Defence and Peace Economics*, and in books such as *Finance, Development, and the IMF* and *The Political Economy of War and Peace*. He has also written several technical reports on topics including emerging donors, economic impact of climate change in Northern Canada, temporary medical professional migration, biofuels policy, and foreign direct investment. He received his PhD in economics from the University of Toronto.



STEPHEN SAIDEMAN is the Paterson Chair in International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. His research interests focus on the causes and consequences of intervention into intra-state conflicts. His current work focuses on the role of legislatures in the civil-military relations of the world's democracies. He teaches courses on Civil-Military Relations and American Foreign and Defence Policy. Saideman's expertise is in civil-military relations, ethnic conflict, civil war, and foreign policy analysis. His recent books include *Adapting in the Dust: Lessons Learned from Canada's War in Afghanistan* (University of Toronto Press, 2016) and *NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone* (Princeton, 2014), co-authored with David P. Auerswald.

CLINT WATTS is a Fox Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Program on the Middle East as well as a Senior Fellow with its Program on National Security. He serves as the President of Miburo Solutions, Inc., and his research focuses on analyzing transnational threat groups operating in local environments on a global scale. Before starting Miburo Solutions, he served as a US Army infantry officer, FBI Special Agent on a Joint Terrorism Task Force, and as the Executive Officer of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. His publications include "Capturing the Potential of Outlier Ideas in the Intelligence Community" (*Studies in Intelligence* - CIA, 2011, Co-author); "Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut" (*Small Wars Journal*, 2009); "Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan: What Foreign Fighter Data Reveals About the Future of Terrorism?" (*Small Wars Journal*, 2008); "Foreign Fighters: How are they Being Recruited?" (*Small Wars Journal*, 2008); al Qaeda's (Mis) Adventures in the Horn of Africa, Combating Terrorism Center (2007, Co-editor, Co-author); and "Can the Anbar Strategy Work in Pakistan?" (*Small Wars Journal*, 2007). He is also the editor of the www.SelectedWisdom.com blog.

ALEX WILNER is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. He teaches classes on Intelligence, International Affairs, and Strategic Foresight. Wilner's research primarily focuses on the application of deterrence theory to contemporary security issues, like terrorism, violent radicalization, organized crime, cyber threats, and proliferation. His books include *Deterring Rational Fanatics* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), and *Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice* (eds., Stanford University Press, 2012), and he has published articles in *International Security*, *NYU Journal of International Law and Politics*, *Security Studies*, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, *Comparative Strategy*, and *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. Prior to joining NPSIA, Wilner held a variety of positions at Policy Horizons Canada, the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, and the ETH Zurich in Switzerland.

BILL WRIGHT is the Director of Cybersecurity Partnerships at Symantec. He brings nearly 20 years of experience spanning the legal, policy, and operational spectrums of national security, law enforcement, and international partnerships. In addition to heading up the Norton Cybersecurity Institute program, Wright manages a number of global cybercrime and cybersecurity operational and policy partner relationships with governments and industry. Prior to joining Symantec, he was Staff Director and General Counsel for two US Senate Subcommittees and served as the chief advisor to Senator Scott Brown for cybersecurity, national security, and intelligence issues. Prior to the Senate, Bill was a Senior Operations Officer at the National Counterterrorism Center and held several positions at the US Department of State.

Panel I: Hotspots – Where Might Instability and Conflict Occur in 2016?

Moderator: Professor Stephanie Carvin, NPSIA

Panelists: C. Christine Fair, William McCants, and Miles Kahler

The first panel focused on potential "hot spots" in 2016 that might engage policy makers on international security and defence issues. The three regions of concern included South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and the South China Sea and East Asia.

South Asia

In South Asia, Pakistan will continue to be an important source of instability in Afghanistan and of terrorist threats to India. India will remain vulnerable as long as Pakistan continues its decades-long history of tolerating externally-directed terrorism for political ends. But India will also be a target for domestic terror, including terrorism stemming from the Hindu community, sometimes disguising itself as Islamic terrorism. India urgently needs police reform to help counter these threats, reforms which are sought by the police forces themselves but ignored by politicians.

Afghanistan is facing a similar problem, i.e., ineffective local police forces. This problem is becoming more urgent to address as the Taliban make advances, with the support of the Pakistani intelligence services (ISI). In addition, Afghanistan has become a rentier state and is losing control of its indigenous resources, geography, and human and physical assets to external actors. The withdrawal of foreign troops has had a significant impact on Afghan security, but the accompanying economic withdrawal has been equally significant. What Afghanistan needs, if it was to stabilize its security situation, is a long-term economic commitment from the West. This commitment remains difficult to obtain because Western publics are disenchanted with the "Afghanistan Puzzle."

In 2016, the situation in Afghanistan is unlikely to improve; the reconciliation process with the Taliban will not work, and no amount of money will improve the viability of the Afghan government as long as Pakistan supports Islamic terrorism in and against Afghanistan. Hence, we in the collective West should be tough on Pakistan if we want stability in Afghanistan. Otherwise, we are out-sourcing our Afghan policy to the ISI. The continuing challenge and conundrum in South

Pakistan Seen as India's Biggest Threat

% greatest threat to county



Source: Pew Research Center, 2014

"Terrorists neither recognize boundaries nor require passports to spread their message of hate and discord."

Source: Afghan President Ashraf Ghani addressing the US Congress, March 2015

Asia is Pakistan's relationship with externally-focused terrorist groups. Pakistan adopted this policy of harbouring or encouraging certain terrorist groups nearly seven decades ago, i.e., at the time of its independence from India in 1947. It retains this policy because it is cheap and effective. Although Pakistan has been experiencing blowback from the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), it remains committed to so-called "good" Jihadists. The nature of the military's campaign in North Waziristan and the logistical support for the Afghan Taliban, as well as several insurgency groups in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, are proof of this.

This strategy is not likely to change, despite the changes of government resulting from parliamentary elections. The reason for this is that it is a strategy supported by the military, and the military is unwilling to accept civilian oversight. In fact the military establishment has thwarted international attempts to provide security assistance to Pakistan's government and police forces because it wants to maintain its status as sole protector of the state. The army simply does not want either a competent police or an effective frontier corps.

Related to the concerns of the international community about Pakistan's relationship to terrorist organizations is the fear that Pakistan could lose control over its nuclear weapons. This fear has been heightened recently by the government's boasting about having developed small tactical nuclear weapons. These can be deployed on the battlefield in the form of nuclear artillery shells or land-mines, and are intended to counter and deter India's limited-war strategy. There seems to be the belief in Pakistan that India might seize Pakistani territory in order to extract concessions on Kashmir.

Moreover, international concern about the fragility of the Pakistani state, and the potential loss of control over its nuclear weapons, enables Pakistan to extract continued military and civilian aid and financial payments from Western countries.

Meanwhile, the army is defending its out-sized role domestically through state-controlled media. Part of its communications strategy can only be described as "fear-mongering", pointing the finger at the "real" terrorists often associated with minority religious groups and ethnicities. Of more concern is mounting evidence that both the Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaida are present in South Asia, seeking recruits from the Rohingya and the Islamic community in Sri Lanka, often through diaspora networks.

In terms of what kind of bilateral approach to Pakistan should be adopted by Western countries, there is a strong and continuing need for humanitarian aid. However, this should be combined with a policy that actively seeks to contain Pakistan's destabilizing influence in the region.

The Greater Middle East

The Middle East and North Africa will see continued conflict in 2016. The rise of the IS and the conflicts across the Arab world that were born out of the Arab Spring will contribute to ongoing instability. In terms of the Islamic State (IS) in particular, the increasing number of coalition strikes has succeeded in shrinking IS territory, and the IS is definitely losing territory in Sunni minority areas. Still, no state in the region is yet able to clear and hold those Sunni areas on its own. While the policy of strangling the IS seems to make sense, the question remains as to who will replace it in the resulting power-vacuum. In order to fill that vacuum, local states will have to cut deals with the disenfranchised Sunnis in both Iraq and Syria.

Meanwhile, the pressure on the IS will give it more incentives to strike out, both at its neighbours and further afield. There is some recent evidence that the IS wants its foreign fighters to stay home and build local cells. Therefore, there may be more international terrorism as a result of the coalition's military mission. Simultaneously, IS attacks will intensify toward the countries that surround the Caliphate in order to destabilize the neighbourhood.



Source: Daily Mail

The IS has a $1.2 billion war chest to help it consolidate territorial control, build up local cells, and spread its caliphate through the use of force and terror. Likely targets are the Shia communities in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. The goal will be to exacerbate sectarian fault lines and assist its recruiting efforts.

Nor could one rule out greater conflict between the IS and Saudi Arabia in the coming year. Will the IS send a military convoy in the direction of Saudi Arabia? The Saudis would be able to handle it, but this would create a political earthquake if it pitted Wahhabists against the Saudi state.

There is real discontent in Saudi Arabia with the current regime, at a time when there is another succession coming. The Saudi political system has been under unprecedented pressure since the death of King Abdullah in January 2015. Public discontent with the royal family has been aggravated by the royal family's internal power struggles and disagreements. How Saudi Arabia, and its new military alliance, will be able to respond to the IS remains to be seen. Its obsession with confronting Iran in Yemen and Syria, while ignoring the IS, may yet turn out to be a strategic blind-spot.

Jordan is similarly at risk. While the IS does not have a strong presence in the Kingdom, the al-Nusra front operates along Jordan's border with Syria and there are Al-Qaida sympathizers within Jordan. The situation in Egypt shows no signs of stabilizing in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and in fact the weakening economy is making things worse. The Sinai insurgency is only shaken, not yet crushed, and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) might yet be pushed into a full-on revolt after being shut out of politics and the provision of social services. The military government in Egypt seems intent on turning the MB into a terrorist organization. One fear going forward is that the success of the IS serves as a bad example for young Muslim Brotherhood supporters who might try to emulate it.

In Libya, the peace process is going nowhere while the IS is increasingly present, seeing Libya as an opportunity for growth. In fact, the IS has its strongest affiliation with its Libya branch, and it sees Libya as a place to which it could retreat should it continue to lose more territory in Syria and Iraq. Libya, in turn, is destabilizing both Egypt and Tunisia. In Tunisia, there have been many young men leaving the country to join the IS, and eventually they will be coming home. The risks going forward in Tunisia are exacerbated by the increasing polarization between the state and Islamists in that country, especially at a time when Tunisia is still undergoing a shaky transition to democracy. In short, there is little reason to hold out hope for stability in North Africa in the coming year.



Source: Stratfor, 2015

In the broader Middle East, the monarchies in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states will continue to hold on in 2016, though they seem intent on pursuing their proxy wars with Iran in Syria and Yemen rather than fighting the IS, which is potentially a more potent threat. In fact, the Islamic State is not a priority for any of the countries in the region. Iraq seems to want to wall itself off from "Sunnistan" while the Turks are targeting the Kurds, and Assad is focused on the more moderate groups opposed to him rather than on the IS and other radical groups. The obsession with Iran and concern with domestic issues by many of the region's countries will allow the IS to persist. Somewhat surprisingly, the Islamic State is really only a priority for the US and its Western allies, at least so far.

South China Sea and East Asia

While the broader Middle East will continue to attract most of our attention in the coming year, the prospect of armed conflict in the South China Sea and East Asia appears relatively low. Since the 1980s, there has been, by and large, peace both between and within the countries of the region. One of the reasons for this calm is that non-interference in the affairs of other states has been accepted as the norm in the region, particularly by China. This norm tends to stabilize relationships among states. Nonetheless, a number of important states in the region are now building up their armed forces and substantially increasing their defence budgets. This military build-up is a significant development because "factory Asia" is central to Western economies, unlike either South Asia or the Middle East. Hence, while there are lower risks for conflict in the region, the consequences of conflict for the West and for the global economy are much higher.

Within this context, it is somewhat worrying that Washington continues to be focused on Afghanistan/Pakistan and the Middle East since developments in East Asia are of greater strategic importance. In all likelihood, the story in the region in 2016 will not be about rivalry between the US and China, which for the coming year should remain carefully managed by both sides. Rather, the risk of instability originates within the "divided states" of North East Asia: the Koreas and Taiwan/China.

North Korea will probably remain relatively stable and continue to simmer, with the occasional at-

tempt to project its "power." A dramatic implosion of the regime is not likely in the near term. The leadership in North Korea might be "crazy", but the country is slowly integrating with China economically. In contrast, the China-Taiwan relationship could generate friction and potentially lead to conflict. Elections in Taiwan in late 2015 have produced a less "China-friendly" government. To date China has been patient with the situation in Taiwan and has relied largely on its strategy of increasing economic inter-dependence as the best way to prepare for political reunification. This strategy has yet to show any results, as the recent elections demonstrated.

The question for 2016 is whether China will continue to be patient. For its part, the Taiwanese public, especially the younger generation, overwhelmingly supports the status quo.

They are keeping an eye on the relationship between Hong Kong and China as a possible indicator of what closer political ties could mean for them. In terms of the potential for territorial conflict in the region, tension within East Asia has diminished somewhat. The dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands has receded recently, but will not be resolved in the near future. However both countries have agreed to resume talks and have established a bilateral "hot line." Though Japan will continue to protest Chinese intrusions, the political atmosphere is better and both sides are now looking at how to resolve their disagreement over the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ).

Further south, the ongoing territorial disputes and counter-claims within the South China Sea will continue to percolate. The Philippines has sought a decision from the International Court of Arbitration on its territorial claims. China has decided not to participate in this process since it has traditionally privileged bilateral relations as the means to address differences. The court should render a decision in 2016. On one level, the source of the tension in the region is a dispute over access to fisheries and hydrocarbons, though on another level, the tension is stoked by nationalism. In their meetings thus far, Presidents Obama and Xi Jinping have made no progress on South China Sea issues, and China's island building activi-



Source: NPR, 2012

"Though some islets over which China has sovereignty have been occupied by others, China has always committed to solve the problem by peaceful negotiations. China is committed to working with countries with a direct stake in the issue to solve the dispute on the basis of respect of historical facts, according to international laws and through discussions and negotiations."

Source: Chinese President Xi Jinping speaking at the National University of Singapore, November 2015

ties continue unabated. It is difficult to see how the US will ever compromise on freedom of navigation. US warships will continue to make that point, without seeking to be provocative. More broadly, there remains an ongoing risk of conflict in South-East Asia, in part due to changing military capabilities. Vietnam is a case in point. An open conflict between China and the Philippines is less likely, due to the Philippines' more modest military capability and close ties to the US.

From a Western perspective, there are not many legal and institutional backstops to help resolve conflicts in the region. India, China, and Japan all have increasingly nationalist leaderships. What is significant is that economic interdependence does not seem to be moderating regional tensions (and North East Asia in particular possesses only very limited regional organizations of a kind that could help resolve differences). The question is what can be done to reduce the prospect of conflict.

One response is to seek to manage conflicts rather than solve them, perhaps by encouraging more transparency. For example, we could be clearer about the potential cost of conflict in the region to us all.
Interestingly, China's new assertiveness is not winning friends in the region, and this could lead to a more moderate approach in the near term. There is one interesting parallel for 2016: the focus in both China and the US will be more domestic, on the economy in the former and on the electoral campaign in the latter.

In terms of regional architecture, President Obama's effort to support the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been a first step. Without this architecture, it is highly unlikely that the disputes in South-East Asia will be solved by themselves. While there has been resistance in many states to the involvement of courts and adjudication, a strengthened ASEAN, which might be able to help resolve some of these disputes, would enable governments to reach agreements promptly and dampen their overtly nationalist positions.

Panel II: The Outlook for Stabilization Missions and Civilian Instruments

Moderator: Professor Jez Littlewood, NPSIA

Panelists: Clint Watts, Thomas Juneau, and Heather Conley

The second panel focused on the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of military missions and civilian instruments in dealing with current conflicts, and their outlook for 2016.

Iraq and Syria

In terms of the US role in the region, it is clear that the US Government did not really know what it wanted in the Middle East. While intervention in the past often was accompanied by the mantra of "clear, hold, and build", today intervention seems to have been reduced to "pick your proxy." What is missing is a debate on the use of proxies, their effectiveness, and their potential usefulness in Iraq and Syria.

In order to understand the situation in Iraq and Syria, a closer look at our experience in Somalia is necessary. Al-Shabaab, an affiliate of al-Qaeda, was at its height in 2011-2012, and controlled large swaths of the country, which it was governing in a manner similar to the Islamic State (IS). The conflict drew many young men and a large number of foreign fighters to the eastern tip of the African continent.

Over time, a small international coalition emerged, including the transitional government in Somalia, plus Ethiopia, Kenya, and the US. This coalition slowly enabled the transitional government to gain ground in Somalia, causing al-Shabaab to shrink. The growth of opposition to al-Shabaab within Somalia marked the transition to a post-al-Qaeda world there. Many who had joined al-Shabaab were beginning to ask themselves, "What do we do now? Where do we go?" To many, the answer lay in Syria. A few went to northern Mali but were pushed out by France. As al-Shabaab was losing control, there was a lot of spillover violence in Somalia's neighboring countries, such as Uganda and Kenya. With the IS losing territory in the Middle East, we are seeing the same spillover effects.

The difference with Somalia is that the IS is a much bigger problem. To counter the IS in Iraq and Syria more effectively than has been done to date will require the deployment of at least 100,000 troops in order to root them out. Realistically speaking, this is something that is unlikely to happen, at least in 2016. The US had the option to do so a few years ago, but declined to become involved after public criticism and opposition to its air campaign in Libya. Without the option on the table of committing ground troops, and therefore with no possibility to "clear, hold, and build", the alternative followed by the West has been one of adopting and using proxies, both in cyberspace and on the ground. This approach is reinforced by the fact that many in the US view the problems in the Middle East primarily as regional issues instead of as serious strategic challenges.

This strategy took off in earnest when the first substantial waves of refugees started landing on Greek islands early in 2015. The West began supporting several different groups in Iraq and Syria, following many other states which have similarly supported



Source: edmaps, 2015

proxies in the conflict. The general hope, at least in the West, seems to be that the IS will face a similar outcome as the GIA in Algeria during the 1990s: at that time, pro-Western segments of the population rejected the corruption and heavy-handed violence of the emirs, and the emirs started to lose control.

However, at the moment, the anti-IS strategy lacks clear objectives. All countries involved in the Middle East, including the proxy groups, are unable to agree on what exactly is to be achieved. Without this consensus, the West is primarily engaged in containment. While this might not be the optimal solution to the problem, it has been fairly successful. The IS is getting much of its revenue from oil sales, and the destruction of oil infrastructure in combination with the loss of territory is slowly drying up its revenue stream.

In fact the best alternative to boots on the ground is a "let them rot" strategy. A "let them rot" strategy means that we should contain the IS territorially, starve them of resources, prepare alternatives, and stabilize the region. Other viable options do not exist at this stage because there are no Sunni Arab or Kurdish forces that can control Raqqa or any other territory currently occupied by the IS. We need to bear in

mind that the complete destruction of the IS core is fundamental to stability in the region. Detention is not enough. The imprisonment of fighters in Iraq is what led to the incubation of the IS in the first place.

Second, we need to disillusion the foreign fighters, and there is some evidence that the flow of foreign fighters from the West is slowing. Defectors from the IS are helping this process. On the other hand, there are more IS affiliates and these seem to be attracting more fighters. The IS, for its part, is telling its foreign supporters to stay home and carry out their "Jihad" locally.

Strategically, we need to focus on how to disrupt Baathist support for the IS, particularly at a time when Sunnis in the region feel they have no real alternative to the IS. The Baathists (and the Sunnis more broadly) opposed Assad in Syria and the Shias in Iraq. In Somalia, the tactic of bartering with key clan leaders to entice them to defect from al-Shabaab was successful, but finding incentives for the Baathists and Sunnis to defect from the IS will be difficult. One of the central difficulties in creating a strategy to defeat the IS are the differences between preferred outcomes and goals among the various parties engaged in the conflict, both states and non-state proxy actors. The interests of Russia and Iran are on one side of the ideological spectrum and are diametrically opposed to those of the US and European countries, with Turkey and Jordan located somewhere in the middle. The dilemma for the West is that we do not want al-Qaeda, the IS or al-Nusra in power anywhere in the Middle East, and we do not want an IS-aligned Sunni force running any part of Iraq. Therefore, we should engage with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in order to convince them and their proxies to break with the al-Nusra Front.

A stabilization strategy requires that we build alliances, and this means identifying trade-offs in pursuit of those alliances. But if we do not know what we want, how can we propose trade-offs? How exactly do we propose that Eastern Syria be governed? This lack of clarity about the end-game is evident to the regional powers, making alliance-building extremely difficult. The pursuit of democracy to stabilize the Middle East may have seemed like a good idea ten years ago, but not so much today. There are too many ethnically-based fractures within states, and too many opposing groups. As the case of Iraq has shown, democracy tends to exacerbate both those fractures and regional instability.



Source: The Soufan Group, 2015

If the US is to take a pragmatic approach, then it needs to be able to work with both regional states and the proxies on the ground. This raises serious policy issues: will picking proxies be an acceptable approach? If we try to control those proxies, are we prepared to take responsibility for their actions? At least at the moment, there are no obvious answers.

Iran

Iran has the potential to be a significant regional power, although despite having many valuable assets, including oil and gas and a large population, it is not. Why is that so? The goal of becoming a regional power is not new; the Shah saw it as his primary objective, and this has not changed despite the 1979 revolution. However, Iran has failed to increase its power and influence by not capitalizing on the fall of the Taliban, the end of Saddam Hussein's rule, the rise in oil prices, the growth in the power of Hezbollah and Hamas, and the decline in the legitimacy of the West in the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iran missed this window of opportunity because its actions and capabilities never matched the country's ambitions. Iran's economy is still weak, and its conventional military power continues to lack capabilities in important areas, such as strategic readiness. The nuclear deal with the United States will do little to change this quickly.

This leaves Iran with only a narrow band of levers with which to influence international issues. The only exception to this rather lack-luster international role has been Iraq, which is a foreign policy success for Iran. Today Iran is still the most influential actor in that country. This being said, a decline of Iranian influence in Iraq is inevitable and is already visible on the horizon: Iran's partners in Iraq are less cooperative, and Iraqi nationalism is on the rise (including the rise of Najaf as a centre of religious influence). Moreover the steady return to influence of other regional powers in Iraq are all indicators of Iran's declining influence there.

Iran is also facing huge challenges with its only official state ally, Syria. It seems that whatever happens in Syria will be a loss for Iran, given shifting views on a potentially post-Assad Syria, and Iran's massive investment in propping up Assad. No successor regime to Assad will be as sympathetic as is the current regime to Tehran. The war in Syria has also distanced Iran from Hamas, its' main ally against Israel. This has forced Iran to rely on the less powerful Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This, in turn, will narrow Iran's ability to pressure Israel. In Yemen, Iran has provided limited support to the Houthis, but not enough to enable Iran to exert control over its proxy.

Overall, Iran's disappointing foreign policy is due to two reasons. First, the structure of the regional balance of power is stacked against Iran. The country suffers from "strategic loneliness" induced by strong regional forces constraining Iran's position. While Russia is engaging with Iran on some issues, a high level of suspicion and mistrust colours the relationship between the two. Russia's ambitions often clash with Iran's in the Middle East, and Russia is not interested in an Iran that is too strong. Similarly, China found that the cost of doing business with Iran often outweighed the benefits. For example, China was willing to support sanctions against Iran when the country was getting too close to a nuclear weapons capability. Like Russia, China has little interest in a strong Iran that supports militancy throughout the region. Finally, Iran's regional ambitions to be the dominant power in the Persian Gulf will inevitably clash with the regional ambitions of Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

The second reason for Iran's weak regional position results from Iran's agency, or the consequences of its own mistakes. Iran has made several choices, such as the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, that has provoked an international policy of containment, has led to increasing levels of international sanctions, and has spurred unfriendly neighbours to expand their military capabilities. Iran's economic mismanagement has led to corruption, inflation, high unemployment and underemployment, as well as shortages in domestic supplies and limits to exports. Before the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran had produced some 6 million barrels of oil per day and, as sanctions accumulated, this level decreased significantly. Sanctions, furthermore, have constrained Iran's ability to procure military and other technology from the West.



Source: The Economist, 2016

The impact of containment has been significant. Threatened by the rhetoric of Iran's Supreme Leader, Iran's neighbors, through the procurement of more sophisticated weapons, have sought military parity and a rough balance of power. Even Russia and China have constrained Iran, both directly and indirectly: Iran's decisions have undermined the country's ability to cooperate with Russia and China in areas of common interest, including the shared goal of reducing US influence in the Middle East. In fact, Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability has pushed Russia and China closer to the US.

Iran's economic mismanagement, exacerbated by sanctions, has compounded the deep structural weaknesses in Iran's economy. Corruption is widespread, the climate for foreign investment is hostile, and Iran's monetary policy has been ineffective in dealing with inflation. Economic restructuring efforts by President Rouhani have been opposed by hardliners and have died in their initial stages. It is unlikely that the gradual lifting of some sanctions through the nuclear deal will significantly improve Iran's economy. In fact, the effects of the sanctions are likely to linger, especially since some sanctions will remain in place, and sanctions could be snapped back into place if the agreement is violated. The containment of Iran will most likely continue in some respects, and could even increase. The deal does not eliminate the suspicion of Iran's neighbours, and in some cases, it has only increased them.

Overall, the international instruments used to constrain Iran have worked. Sanctions have constrained Iran and forced the country to change its course. The lesson we should take away from this is that international sanctions need to be both deep and broad. This was possible among the great powers because they share a perception that Iran poses a common threat to them. Any gains Iran incurs from the nuclear deal will be relatively limited; Iran will be able to cut its losses, though it will take decades for the country to repair itself.

Russia

The last topic of discussion for the second panel was Russia's role, including as a source of conflict in the coming year. Russia, which is often analyzed through a Western lens, sees its universe rather differently from what is portrayed in the West. The cur-

rent regime in Moscow continues to view the US as its principal challenge, having effectively exploited Russian weaknesses in the post-USSR world. Nor does Moscow believe that US and Western policies have changed much over the years. Russia views democracy promotion in the region, including the colour revolutions, as a cover for Western attempts to undermine Russian power and influence. The uprising in the Maidan in Kiev was the ultimate colour revolution, and in that sense, the most recent and most serious threat to Russian pre-eminence in the "near-abroad."

Still, the Western challenge goes beyond the near-abroad. Russia not only perceives the US and its Allies as seeking to dismantle its traditional alliances in the Middle East; it also largely blames the US for the chaos of the Arab Spring. All of these actions are interpreted in Moscow as intended to undercut Russia's standing as a great power.

As a response, Russia's strategy has been to develop New Generational Warfare (NGW). It sees this primarily as a defence against the threat posed by the West. NGW is multifaceted, a combination of hard and soft power, and reflects what we would call a "whole of government" approach. In many ways, the NGW mirrors how Russia interprets the West's support for the colour revolutions. It includes so-called peacetime forces, special-forces, information warfare, and economic measures. In fact, most of the tools are non-military in nature and are designed to have a psychological impact on the adversary, to delay the Western response, and to rally political support at home. It is occasionally combined with nuclear sword

Source: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015

rattling. The NGW can be escalated or de-escalated, depending on the political needs of the Kremlin.

In the West, we tend to see this New Generational Warfare as aggressive and risk-taking. The West's response over the last two years to this new strategy is viewed by Moscow as an attempt to contain Russia with economic sanctions and encircle it with NATO. But Russia is in this struggle for the long-term, including the so-called battle for hearts and minds, especially in Europe. In many respects, we are in fact ceding the information space to Russia through the spread of Russia Today and the Russian acquisition of European media outlets. Russia's strategy goes so far as to use cyber warfare against Russian experts in the West as a way of silencing them and controlling the information space. In Crimea, Russia began its intervention with proxy forces in order to sow confusion among Western countries and to create plausible deniability. This proved to be successful and led Putin to continue the same ploy in Eastern Ukraine. But his attempt to topple Kiev failed because proxies could not work without local support. Similarly, Russia's role in Syria is intended to shore up Moscow's influence. Russia's forward defensive stance has only been reinforced with Turkey's downing of a Russian fighter plane. Russia has sought to demonstrate that it was willing to take greater risks to protect its stake in the conflict.

How long Russia will continue to prop up proxies in Ukraine and engage in the Syrian conflict is partly connected to its economic situation. But there is little doubt that more military activism is coming in 2016. Moscow cannot fix the current economic situation at home, and economic trends are likely to further deteriorate should the price of oil and gas continue to decline. Against this backdrop of economic difficulty, the Kremlin will use international adventures to stoke domestic nationalism. It is quite possible Russian military adventurism in the Middle East will increase and further contribute to instability.

Of course, Western sanctions imposed on Russia because of its actions in Ukraine, and Russia's role in



Source: Statista, 2015

Syria, are not unrelated. At a time when Europe is reeling under the impact of massive flows of Syrian refugees, Russia has positioned itself as a key actor in Syria. The implication seems to be that Russia will be helpful in finding a solution to the Syria problem, and therefore help stem the tide of refugees, in exchange for relief from the sanctions on the Russian economy. There are no doubt some politicians in Europe that will find this a reasonable proposal, though not in Ukraine. Nor will such a deal in any way deter Russia from doing the same thing again.

We can also expect more from Russia on Arctic issues. Nationalist rhetoric around the Arctic has increased significantly, a new military doctrine has been adopted, and an Arctic strategic command has been created. Cold War-era bases have been re-opened, and though Moscow claims these are for economic purposes only, there is little economic activity that would justify the full range of Russia's militarization of the Arctic. That military build-up now includes the basing of additional submarines and surface to air missiles, and the conduct of Arctic exercises, all of which contradict Russia's peaceful narrative. This has led the US to begin to prepare an operational plan for the defence of the Arctic.

The threat from Russia should not be underestimated in the next few years. A declining power is the most dangerous type of power, especially if that power lacks the capacity to modernize itself. This will lead Moscow to increasingly turn to its international role as a way of demonstrating strength, both to the international community and to its own citizens. However, time is not on Putin's side. Should the Russian economy continue to suffer, domestic political changes are likely to follow.

Lunch Discussion: The Future of Land Warfare

Chair: Rob McRae

Keynote Speaker: Michael O'Hanlon

In much current thinking about the Obama Administration's defence policy, the sense often emerges that the Administration has retreated from the world, and that the deployment of significant conventional forces, including land forces, is a thing of the past. These accounts typically include a "straw man" which is then attacked for failing to meet today's security challenges. The "straw man" is a defence policy where the use of ground forces have been replaced by the deployment of special operations forces, the use of armed drones, and the support of proxy forces. In fact, this description of the Administration's approach was never accurate, and already a number of the tenets of the so-called Obama doctrine are being reversed.

Size of the US Army throughout History 1860-2014



Source: Michael O'Hanlon, Future of Land Warfare 2015

The US has not been, is not, and will not be getting out of Afghanistan any time soon. The Obama Administration inherited this mission and will hand it off to the next Administration. In fact, a "reassessment of the plan" is now underway in Washington in light of recent advances by the Taliban. The US currently intends to keep three operational bases in Afghanistan, and there will be 6,000 US troops deployed there in 2016. The next President will almost certainly increase that number.

In terms of the electoral campaign, Hillary Clinton is already positioning herself to the right of Obama in terms of international security policy, including on the Iran nuclear deal. And, of course, the Republicans are all to the right of the current Administration. Even in the last year of Obama's presidency, we will see a beefing up of the US NATO presence in Eastern Europe. Although this includes the deployment of "rotational" forces, the reality is that these rotations are "heel-to-toe", and additional US troops and equipment will be there continuously. It is highly likely that the next President will do even more in terms of positioning additional US battalions in Europe. In other words, the current Administration (and the next Administration) are doing a bit more in Afghanistan and a bit more in Eastern Europe: the so-called withdrawal is over.

There is a similar picture in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, US forces will be increased incrementally over the course of this year. There are already 3,500 US troops there now, and during the course of 2016, the number of trainers will increase significantly. By 2017, the next Administration will want to consolidate the gains that have been made on the ground in Iraq. In Syria, the number of special operations forces will grow from about fifty at the beginning of 2016 to hundreds by the end of the year. This will be accompanied by much more support for opposition forces on the part of the Administration.

The reality is that the Islamic State (IS) will still be there at the start of the next Administration, and the struggle against the IS will still be key to US international security policy. Ultimately, the outcome in Syria will likely be a similar arrangement to what was achieved in Bosnia. There will be regional security forces and an international military force on the ground separating them, which in all likelihood will include the Russians. In other words, there will have to be an international peace implementation force requiring significant numbers of troops deployed overseas. There may well be a re-balancing or pivot toward Asia over time, but this does not mean that the US will leave either the Middle East or Europe in terms of a significant military presence, including on the ground.

Source: Brookings Institution, 2015

Panel III: The Cyber Dimensions of Security

Moderator: Professor Alex Wilner, NPSIA

Panelists: Ray Boisvert, Catherine Lotriionte Yoran, and Bill Wright

The third panel sought to position cyber threats within the broader context of international security policy, demonstrating how security and the economy were intersecting in new and unexpected ways.

Cyber Threats to Economic Security

In a world where the security context is increasingly complex, often characterized by high velocity threats, cyber-crime has cost businesses $460 billion USD in lost revenue in 2014 alone. In a recent study out of the United Kingdom, two out of five Internet users have already been affected by cyber-crime. How we interface with our devices, from smartphones to desktop computers, will need to adapt to these new security realities. Consider the timing of product launches for most businesses: online firewalls built to fend off malicious cyber-attacks typically detect increased activity from threat actors the day a press release is announced. Cyber threats can be especially damaging to our economic security, as mobile banking and finance technology become much more prevalent. Indeed, virtually all so-called industrial enterprises have now become information technology (IT) firms since everything they do runs on data.

While security breaches, cyber espionage, and identity theft often seem like sophisticated attacks propagated by malicious malware, these problems are more often than not caused by individual negligence. In fact, a whopping 90 percent of these attacks can be prevented with fairly mundane solutions like better password management. On the other hand, thieves and hackers have many new tools at their disposal thanks to the cyber-crime underground economy. Approximately one million new pieces of malware are released every day. The cyber domain represents an asymmetric threat in which a few smaller actors can greatly affect many bigger ones. Moreover, the threat environment is increasingly diverse, with motivations for cyber-attacks ranging from pure financial gain to ideological or political opportunism, state-sponsored espionage, vigilante activism, organized crime, and more. The specialization and monetization of these tools means that nefarious individuals and corporate clients alike can access and exploit them for the right price.

The growth of data is the single most important new phenomenon of our time, and the world's largest untapped resource. It is estimated that every year fifty percent more data is brought online than the previous year, providing enormous benefits to society, while creating new vulnerabilities. Looking at old issues through the new prism of big data can yield significant benefits, but also poses major challenges to our critical systems and infrastructure. About four billion people are connected through the Internet today, representing $4 trillion in revenue opportunities. Out of eighty million cyber security events per year (400 new threats per minute), seventy percent of these attacks go undetected. Despite how widespread the problem has become, its effects are only now beginning to resonate with Internet users.



Source: IBM Corporation, 2014

By 2020, analysts are projecting that 7.5 billion personal devices will be connected to the Internet, and anywhere from 25 to 60 billion items, from toothbrushes to refrigerators, will be linked through the 'Internet of Things'. Unfortunately, security is often not a prime consideration in the development and marketing of these devices. As cyber-crime persists and disrupts the cyber domain, more will need to be done to counter these growing threats.

As with most policy issues, there are pros and cons associated with the growth of the cyber domain. On the positive side, we have experienced progress in terms of government transparency and democratic accountability, advances in research and technological development, and more opportunities for the public to connect online and interact in new and creative ways. On the other hand, the increasing complexity of data made available by new forms of collection has revealed significant gaps in our ability to analyze and make use of it. It is not always clear how to solve problems with all the information at our disposal. In other words, our ability to engineer is outpacing our ability to manage all of this data. Cyber developments are transforming our society in unexpected ways. Machine-to-machine learning, as well as artificial intelligence, will reshape employment sectors over the coming years, from industry and agriculture to education and healthcare. Genetic information can be unpacked and recoded by splicing and editing genes with simple 'copy and paste' functions analogous to modern word processing software. At the same time, identity theft is on the rise, which can lower someone's credit rating for years and make it more difficult for them to carry out routine financial transactions. There are also massive implications at the institutional level for the long-term liquidity and reliability of credit systems. Methodologies that are easily scalable and replicated in the cyber world often represent a double-edged sword. For example, these techniques can produce medical marvels with the potential to improve the quality of life for millions, but they can also be hijacked and computerized with unknowable and unintended consequences.

In terms of policy issues, security systems intended to protect critical infrastructure and public transportation can be breached through cyber-attacks, endangering us all. Consider the case of a high-speed train

derailment in Spain in 2013 that killed 78 and injured 131. Though this accident was caused by human error, the potential damage of a deliberate attack could be considerably greater. Similarly, the real legacy of the Stuxnet virus targeting Iranian centrifuges went far beyond technical damage to the Iranian nuclear weapons program: the technology for the replication of that virus and the resultant cyber threat itself are now in the public domain. According to some estimates, half a dozen variants exist for sale, an indication of the extent to which corporate espionage and malware are growing in popularity on the black market. Wi-Fi enabled devices pose another kind of policy challenge. Some toys, like the Hello Barbie, allow parents to interact with their children in fun, accessible, and innovative ways. While these toys have web-based picture, video, and messaging capabilities, they were never designed with privacy in mind. Privileged information is easy to exploit by those with malicious intent. With this Barbie doll slated for release, experts are calling it a security disaster waiting to happen, with significant risks to both personal privacy and security.

Deterrence and Rules of the Road

At least 60 nation-states have the advanced capabilities necessary to pose cyber threats to others. On the one hand, this spread of cyber capability is a victory for democratization, while on the other hand, self-professed vigilante groups, like Anonymous, are more empowered than ever. When does cyber-activism becomes a form of terrorism? Young, tech-savvy individuals can be recruited for ideological purposes or as proxies, and often operate above, below, or beyond the reach of domestic law enforcement agencies. This is why cyber is now being referred to as the fifth dimension of warfare after the land, sea, air, and space domains,. Prominent instances of 'cyber warfare' have so far been characterized by low intensity, but the Russian-implicated 'digital bomb' attacks on the NASDAQ in 2014 suggest that cyber conflicts are only likely to grow in scale.

No country has a monopoly on deterrence. What we know about this concept is derived from the era of nuclear deterrence and is not easily transferable to the domain of fifth-dimensional warfare. In fact, it is not clear what a cyber deterrence strategy would entail. The challenge in the cyber realm is to consider how we can deter specific types of behaviour, not all levels of cyber activity. So any strategy of deterrence cannot be limited to the cyber sphere. Cyber defence, on the other hand, should increase resilience by building redundancies into information and communications systems. This might provide "deterrence by denial" dividends, by deny-



Source: Proficio, 2016

ing would-be aggressors the fruits of their labour.

Non-state actors, in the cyber realm as elsewhere, will continue to challenge the nation-state's sovereignty. Strategies of deterrence will need to be modified to take into account different types of actors, both state and non-state. For example, different countries can pose different kinds of cyber threats, and even non-state actors in the cyber world vary in terms of their capabilities and incentives. Each requires a tailored deterrence strategy.

Traditional deterrence is simply not attainable in the realm of cyber security because of the fundamental problem of attribution. Following a cyber-attack, the number of potential actors is often huge, and it is nearly impossible to identify whose assets are engaged or whose return address to target. Still, there are often sufficient clues to enable a minimal level of deterrence. While levels of attribution are always increasing, it is still challenging to construct timely and accurate measures to help identify attackers. In addition, the same prohibitive barriers to entry simply do not exist in the cyber world the way they still do in the nuclear world. Anyone with a computer, Internet connection, and the know-how can wreak havoc. The silver lining in this grim picture is that it is much easier to recover from a cyber-attack than from a thermonuclear attack. After all, 'mutually assured disruption' is not as devastating as mutually assured destruction.

An interesting application of the cyber deterrence model can be seen in Chinese-US relations today. A good cyber defence begins with punishment and denial but also includes entanglement, a symmetrical interdependence that imposes serious costs on the attacker. In 2009, the People's Liberation Army urged the Chinese government to dump its US reserves. In response, China's Central Bank cautioned against the large costs that would follow down the road, so China decided against this course of action. Similarly, if China were to attack an electric grid in the US, the consequent economic shocks would inevitably be felt in China.

Normative considerations can also contribute to deterrence, where the transgression of norms damages a nation-state's soft power. For example, international taboos and regimes prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons carry a certain normative weight in international relations, though some actors will never be deterred by these considerations. The US leveraged this normative approach in 2015, convening a group of cyber specialists at the United Nations Security Council. While most members of the Council (10 rotating plus 5 permanent) agreed with the need to put in place a universal treaty governing cyber that was based on normative considerations, China and Russia continue to stymie progress in this direction.

"Many of the [cyberespionage and cybercrime] campaigns analyzed by Symantec have been targeted attacks against the energy, aerospace, healthcare, and other industries."

Source: Symantec, 2015

Low-level cyber conflict will persist into 2016, but monumental cyber events on the scale of a Pearl Harbor or 9/11 are very unlikely. The US will continue to improve its cyber security strategy, but it will be increasingly less public than is the case with other strategies. The five main cyber powers will remain the US, China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. The majority of all cyber threat incidents are likely to emerge from these countries, so their actions will inform best practices going forward. As for normative developments, some new rules are likely to emerge as well, but a universal treaty is still distant. For example, it is still an open question as to whether the United Nations Charter applies to cyber-attacks. If it does, it would give the affected states the right to retaliate under international law. Going forward, this work on norms will form the core of a deterrence strategy in the cyber domain, touching on issues such as so-called "legitimate" targets and proportionality.

Partnerships and the Private Sector

The private sector offers unique talents and capabilities for working with government agencies to help fight cybercrime. For example, Symantec reported on the Dragonfly Gang that targeted the energy sector in Europe and the US in 2014. This gang used multiple attack methods, including spear phishing, the

Source: Symantec, 2016

"watering hole", and Trojanized update techniques to infect websites, software, and user profiles and to penetrate critical infrastructure systems. Since these methods were used simultaneously, they represented especially serious threats to the energy systems of Western states. Furthermore, the resources, time, and capabilities required for conceiving and carrying out these attacks pointed to likely state sponsorship.

As cases like this show, coordination and collaboration with the private sector are essential since the private sector owns and protects most critical infrastructure. Because investigation and prosecution are so difficult in the cyber domain, information-sharing networks between the private sector and law enforcement agencies are needed now more than ever. Viable models for public-private collaboration are already in place for many industries, and such collaboration is essential in order to respond to crimes committed in cyberspace. Even without the government, cyber companies are engaging in private-to-private partnerships. About 18 months ago, the cyber-threat alliance came into being. This network of private stake-holders works together to share some of the most sophisticated cyber threat information in ways that would have been unheard of just a few years ago.

What can the public and private sectors do about cyber security? The US CEO Council Task Force Report of November 2015 listed four policy recommendations: government leadership should provide a more secure business environment; support economic engagement in tipping-point regions; establish best practice standards; and CEOs should help shape government strategy and collaboration in order to counter ongoing threats.

In Canada, a truly national strategy has been noticeably absent. Since the most neglected and most vulnerable targets of cyber-attack are Canada's major cities and municipalities, funding needs to be redirected from the federal level. The Canadian formula should be to establish a centre of leadership and excellence within the federal government; invest in step with the US and UK; partner with the private sector; acquire and deploy advanced analytics; and effectively support provinces and municipalities.

Panel IV: The US and the Politics of International Security in 2016

Moderator: Professor Stephen Saideman, NPSIA

Panelists: Joshua Rovner and Heather Hurlburt

The fourth panel sought to situate US international security policy under the Obama Administration within a broader historical perspective while identifying potentially new trends in security policy under the next Administration.

The Obama Legacy

It is often debated whether the Obama Administration possesses a so-called "grand strategy" and, if so, what its principal elements are. Grand strategy typically answers the question of how best to achieve security in times of generalized peace. In this respect, grand strategy should be distinguished from the "small-s" variety, which instead answers questions as to how best to achieve security in military missions and times of war. It is, of course, possible to achieve both of these goals simultaneously, without being mutually exclusive. This is an important distinction in light of the fact that issues of strategic failure are often confused with "grand" strategic failure. Confusion around this issue is especially significant when looking at success and failure in volatile regions, including the Middle East.

At least in recent history, the US typically seeks to maintain a grand strategy in support of the status quo. It is content with the position, status, and basic security afforded by the current geopolitical balance of power. Avoiding overreactions to peripheral threats, such as the terrorist threat posed by the Islamic State, is consistent with realist conceptions of threat assessment. In addition, awareness of the finite limitations of both US resources and power helps to set limits to any potential promises to help weaker allies. In terms of grand strategy, the Obama Administration clearly sees the rebalancing, or pivot, to Asia as its most significant legacy. Nonetheless, the US pivot towards Asia will likely be moderated or even postponed as long as the American public remains focused on developments in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

What can be described as a pivot away from Europe and the Middle East will also be affected by the size and nature of US military investments: the capacity to deploy significant land forces is particularly relevant to any future operations in Europe and the Middle East, even as air, sea, and space missions are more relevant to Asia. With China representing the main strategic challenge in terms of its rising conventional military power, the US should focus its military investment on bolstering its capabilities in space with satellites, under water with submarines, and on the surface with naval vessels. Investing in more land forces only diverts resources away from the focus on China.

In terms of which elements make up the so-called Obama doctrine, it is true that the President has tended to pursue more restraint and less adventurism in the world. This has sharply differentiated him from his predecessor. This retreat from active interventionism became particularly acute after the post-Libya fallout from 2011. For example, if your strategy is to get out of Afghanistan, then by implication you have decided that developments in Afghanistan are no longer

A Shrinking U.S. Defence Budget in Historical Context



Source: Washington Post, 2013

a threat to US interests. Obama has wanted to do less abroad for well-known reasons, including the desire to focus on problems at home, so he has consistently resisted the pressure to do more overseas.

International restraint has not been a popular "grand strategy" in the eyes of many Democrats or Republicans. The latter in particular have to portray such a policy as encouraging both Russia and China, and terrorists, such as the Islamic State (IS). Policymakers in Washington on both sides of the partisan divide have frequently expressed their desire to use greater force in foreign policy, and many presidential candidates have adopted the same view in their race for the White House in 2016. While popular opinion is divided on how much power to project abroad as part of a grand strategy, power projection retains a certain appeal for those inclined to believe the argument that American restraint encourages others who are opposed to US hegemony, i.e., those who seek to take advantage of American "weakness".

While Obama might indeed have begun as a mainstream liberal internationalist, his actions over the course of two terms in office have now defined him as an avowed realist. It might not be entirely coincidental that this has taken place at a time when the traditional bipartisan consensus on foreign policy has broken down. Within the context of increasing partisanship, foreign policy realism translates into more low-risk and low-cost missions, often including the use of Special Operations Forces and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in lieu of significant conventional and ground-based operations. Special Operations Forces and UAVs have become increasingly important military components of Obama's restrained grand strategic approach.

But restraint vis-à-vis the other major powers is also typical of the Administration's approach. This characterized the Administration's policy vis-à-vis Russia in the context of the conflict in Ukraine and the machinations over Syrian chemical weapons, and vis-à-vis China in the context of competing territorial claims in the South China Sea. From one angle, Obama's policy of restraint has successfully steered the US clear of escalatory conflicts with either Russia or China. Even now, despite the increasingly partisan and warlike rhetoric in this electoral year, Obama's foreign policy continues to be marked by greater caution and discretion in the use of force, especially in dealing with Syria and Iraq and the rise of the IS.

The Obama Administration, in its first term, had pursued a policy of greater realism in US foreign policy by winding down military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq while seeking to put a new focus on

The share of world military expenditure of the 15 states with the highest expenditure in 2014



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014

previously ignored areas, like Africa. Going into his second term, the plan was to achieve more results with less military force while resisting foreign entanglements. The idea was to bolster deterrence without provoking a reaction: the use of a variety of military, civilian, and economic instruments to deter Russian and Iranian actions were a case in point. Nonetheless, there has been growing concern among US Allies that a policy seeking to maintain the status quo with a minimum of effort could lead to a global power vacuum. Fears of a power vacuum are not new – in fact, they have their precedent in British history. But the question for US policy-makers is whether a power vacuum in the Middle East will necessarily result from the so-called pivot to Asia.

In grand strategic terms, President Obama is well within the mainstream of US history, despite his critics on both the left and the right. While restraint might be new to the 21st century, it is consistent with the breadth of US political history. The natural status quo of the US is to avoid foreign adventures and only reluctantly enter into wars abroad. This is the grand strategy of the status quo, where the world is viewed as mostly good, Americans as mostly prosperous, and the US as secure. The experience of constant warfare over the course of the last 15 years is relatively new for Americans and abnormal in US history.

Politically, the criticism of a grand strategy intended to preserve the status quo is that there is nothing heroic

in maintaining the status quo - there is no ambition, and no one to fight. The emergence of the Islamic State does not really change that. From a realist perspective, the IS is not an existential threat to the US, though in open societies terrorists can kill significant numbers of civilians and make us feel less secure than we truly are.

The danger for any future Administration is that it might over-react to small threats, such as the IS, or overcommit security guarantees to smaller allies against Russia or China. Once those assurances are given, the US would have to back them up in a crisis, and this is where conflict between the great powers could spiral out of control. Obama has grasped the fact that power in the world is a combination of both military might and economic strength, and that there are limits to US power.

The priority, therefore, should be on dealing with China, especially given the size of its economy, the size of its population, and the fact that it is a nuclear weapons state. Managing the rise of China is the real challenge in the coming period. Doing more in the Middle East or Eastern Europe will only detract from this. Unfortunately, all potential successors to Obama are more hawkish, increasing the risk in the future that the real strategic challenges will be under-appreciated and under-resourced during the next Administration.

US International Security Policy Going Forward

In what can be described as the growing democratization of US policy generally, national security policy has transitioned over the last decade from little or no partisanship to being highly partisan today. In 2008, both presidential candidates were anti-torture. Today, Congress cannot agree to pass anti-torture legislation, and in fact there is increasing support in public opinion for the use of torture. The Republican Party has turned the debate about the use of torture into a domestic policy issue. Similarly, the Republican Party a decade ago was divided on the reality and impact of climate change, but today this is no longer the case. In 2008, public opinion was firmly of the view that the military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq were not worth it, whereas today many Republicans are in favour of again sending ground troops into Iraq to deal with the IS.

An important new factor in US national security policy is the growing "diaspora insecurity" in the US, with mounting economic, security, and cultural fears directed at various ethnic communities. Fear about crime is generally down in the US, while fear about terrorism is up significantly. The trend towards greater partisanship on national security issues has in fact been fuelled by this development, with current presidential



Source: Council on Foreign Relations, 2014

contenders such as Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump reflecting sharply divergent views of both the international challenges facing the US and its role in the world. It is impossible to ignore, in particular, the impact that Donald Trump has had as a contender for the US presidency. Whether he wins or loses, he is injecting a level of white nationalism and xenophobia into the campaign that has so far been alien to mainstream policy debates in the US. He is giving a specific sector of the US public, the "nativists", a voice, expressing anxiety around race, culture, security, and the economy. This has found a parallel in the European context, where Islamophobia has increased amid an influx of over a million refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and North Africa. The conclusion in the Republican Party so far is that Trump is connecting with the public on national security issues. Meanwhile, US foreign policy realists have been pushed to the margins of the electoral debate. Part of the explanation for this is that the US public is currently not so much war-weary as it is pessimistic and disillusioned with the tools of government, domestically and internationally. Playing on both their pessimism and their fears, there will no doubt be a lot of rhetoric about national security in the coming year, despite the fact that the evidence does not back up the hype and panic of the terrorist threat being portrayed.

It is true that Obama did not necessarily set out in 2008 to do less, or simply to defend the status quo. He had set out to repair the damage that had been done by the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and to get the US back on track to deal with Iran, China, Cuba, climate change, trade, and the various crises in Africa. But what did change over the course of two terms was the growing pessimism within the Administration about the utility of using military force to produce desired outcomes abroad.

The principal source of disillusionment within the Administration was not Libya, but Afghanistan. The Administration's endorsement of the so-called military surge in Afghanistan was reluctant and took place against the backdrop of widespread corruption within the Karzai regime. The outcome of the surge only increased the pessimism within the Administration about the use of conventional warfare against asymmetric threats and reinforced the conclusion that "we do not want to do more of this."

Hence, the inclination towards restraint in international security policy emerged as a result of both domestic pressures and the experience with military missions abroad. Many in the Administration concluded that they had done a lot in Afghanistan and the outcome was bad, that they had done little in Libya and the outcome was bad, and that they had done virtually nothing in Syria and the outcome was also bad.

Afghanistan also demonstrated, yet again, that when the US did decide to intervene abroad, it had a poor track record of choosing and supporting local allies whose interests converged with its own. This lesson continues to influence US policy in terms of how it will, or will not, work with proxies on the ground in its campaign against the IS in Iraq and Syria. If the last 15 years has taught the US anything, it is that while conventional warfare is one of its strengths, the ability to counter unconventional warfare is more problematic. The adversaries of the US have also learned this fact, so they have increasingly challenged the US in unconventional ways.

The policy dilemma for the US, under a future Administration that is similarly reluctant to deploy significant numbers of troops abroad, is that the relentless search

"I will say this about Iran. They're looking to go into Saudi Arabia, they want the oil, they want the money, they want a lot of other things...they took over Yemen, you look over that border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, that is one big border and they're looking to do a number in Yemen. Frankly, the Saudis don't survive without us and at what point do we get involved? And how much will Saudi Arabia pay us to save them?"

Source: US Presidential Candidate Donald Trump's interview with Fox News' Bill O'Reilly, January 2016

for so-called moderates in civil wars is often fruitless. The "good guys" are frequently the ones that either flee the country, get themselves killed early on, or have hidden agendas. Persistent questions as to the effectiveness of sending large numbers of troops abroad, the ability of the US to deal with unconventional warfare, and the policy dilemmas involved in working with proxy forces will almost certainly continue to challenge the next Administration, whatever political stripe they may endorse.

"Our foreign policy has to be focused on the threat from ISIL and al Qaeda, but it can't stop there. For even without ISIL, even without al Qaeda, instability will continue for decades in many parts of the world -- in the Middle East, in Afghanistan, parts of Pakistan, in parts of Central America, in Africa, and Asia. Some of these places may become safe havens for new terrorist networks. Others will just fall victim to ethnic conflict, or famine, feeding the next wave of refugees. The world will look to us to help solve these problems."

US President Barack Obama, State of the Union, 2016

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