Developing a Market-Based Monetary Policy Transparency Index and Testing Its Impact on Risk and Volatility in the United States

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Abstract

This paper extends the literature by developing an objective market-based index, which is dynamic and continuous and can be used to measure the monetary policy transparency for a country or, simultaneously, a series of countries. It was found that the agents in the money market are forward looking and that the more transparent the monetary policy is, the less risky and volatile the money market will be. Furthermore, during the tenure of Chairman Greenspan, the volatility and risk in the money market fell. The policy regime changes of adjusting the target rate by multiples of 25 or 50 basis points and including a balance-of-risks sentence in FOMC statements also resulted in a reduction in volatility in money markets.

Keywords: Monetary policy transparency, forward-looking agents, risk, volatility, money market

JEL Codes: E43, E51, E52, E58
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I. Introduction

Central banks are unequivocally moving towards greater openness or to more transparent monetary policy frameworks by engaging in, among other things, inflation targeting, publishing inflation forecasts and increasing the number of public statements from bank officials. Whether such moves are desirable or not, or to what degree they are desirable, is still open to question. The theoretical studies in favor of and/or against more transparency in central banking, although ample, are not unanimous in their findings, and empirical tests of these arguments are scarce, mostly because transparency in the monetary policy is a concept hard to measure.

The existing transparency measures have some limitations. Most of them are not in time-series form and so can only be used for cross-sectional studies. Moreover, they can only be used for a limited number of hypotheses. They are based on the quantity, timeliness, and periodicity of information provided by central banks and finally, they are somehow static. In general, the existing measures of transparency can be divided into four groups:

(i) Descriptive accounts of transparency: This kind of transparency measure concentrates on strategies that central bankers follow in order to communicate with the public. It mostly includes do’s and don’ts of the central bankers’ actions, see, e.g., Blinder et al. (2001). The main problem with this measure is that no index can be derived/constructed from these do’s and don’ts.

(ii) Central bank surveys or self-evaluating transparency indexes: A series of surveys are sent to central banks to investigate the extent to which they communicate their private information to the public, including the degree to which they are following the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), see, e.g., Fry et al. (2000) and Sundararajan et al. (2003). With this type of measures there is a possibility of
misunderstanding the survey questions and/or manipulating responses by the central banks to obtain an appropriate score.

(iii) Official documents and information: Researchers construct indexes of transparency of monetary policy by evaluating the behavior of central bankers (e.g., whether they give speeches regularly or not) and the type and frequency of documents the central bank makes available to the public (such as minutes from meetings, inflation reports, etc.), see, e.g., Eijffinger and Geraats (2002) and de Haan and Amtenbrink (2002). One possible weakness with this approach is that the particular items looked at and the weight assigned to them by each set of authors may differ for purely subjective reasons.

Furthermore, these measures quantify the degree of openness of central banks based on the information provided, but do not necessarily reflect the true degree of understanding, by the public, of central banking practices. In sum, the common problem with the above three measures is that they are not in time-series form; instead, they are calculated for cross-sectional studies. Thus, these measures limit the number of hypotheses that may be tested concerning the impact of more transparent monetary policies in the economy.

(iv) Market-based indicators: These indexes are based on what market participants understand from the central banks’ actions and signals as well as the implementation of the monetary policy. The existing market-based indicators also have limitations. For example, Howells and Mariscal (2002) provide a measure of monetary policy transparency for a small number of cross-section countries, therefore, limiting the number of hypotheses that may be tested.

The degree to which market participants understand and anticipate monetary policy can also be gauged by using time-series market-based expectations of monetary policy, and more particularly, high frequency measures of monetary policy surprises. In general, the time-series market-based measures of policy surprises in the U.S. include those based on federal funds futures rates, e.g., Poole and Rasche (2000), Kuttner (2001) and Söderström (2001). These measures restrict the analysis to post 1988, the year when this market was established. Furthermore, as it was mentioned by Poole et al. (2002), Fed funds rate futures could reflect the expected changes in the target rate only if the times of
target rate changes were known. Since this information became available only after 1994, these measures further restrict researchers to post 1994.

Other measures are based on actual market rates including Treasury bill rates and Eurodollar deposit rates, e.g., Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002). These measures mostly concentrate on a change in the single interest rate at the time of a target change. A single rate does not contain full information on the monetary policy transparency as, in general, interest rates, and especially their relationships, reflect the behavior of market participants (arbitrageurs and speculators). Consequently, these measures are static and, more seriously, they are very narrowly defined by putting too much emphasis on a single piece of information.

Finally, some policy surprise measures are based on the analysis of the financial press, e.g., Poole et al. (2002) and Söderström (2001). These measures can be subjective as the interpretation of the financial press fully depends on the background and experience of the researchers. The overall limitation of these measures arises from the fact that they are usually series of unequal intervals. Therefore, they may restrict the researcher to studies with quarterly or less frequent data or to specific techniques of estimation such as the factor-model approach which allows the researcher to deal systematically with data irregularities [e.g., Stock and Watson (2002)].

It should be noted that the construction of a market-based index depends on the characteristics of the market or markets whose prices are used to establish the index. Consequently, it is extremely important to identify the market(s) carefully before constructing a monetary policy index based on the information generated from the market(s). The purpose of this paper is to develop an index, which is dynamic and can be used to measure the monetary policy transparency for an individual or, simultaneously, a series of countries. To the best knowledge of the author, no such index exists in the literature. In this study the measure is developed for the United States monetary policy for the 1982-2003 period. The choice of the country is based on the fact that the United States has a complex banking system (12 Federal Reserves) with no clear policy objectives, like inflation targeting, interest rate band, etc. Consequently, the index, if successful in detecting the Federal Reserve monetary transparency, will be useful in
checking the central bank transparency of any country, especially countries that have clear monetary policy goals like Canada and New Zealand.

This paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, a monetary policy index was constructed. Such an index is dynamic and can also be continuous when intraday minute or shorter interval observations are used. Second, it was found agents in the money market in the U.S. are forward looking in the sense of Lucas (1976). Finally, it was found, using the index, that the more transparent the monetary policy is, the less risky and volatile the money market will be.

Section II provides a description of our data and the validity of the assumptions used to develop the index. Section III is devoted to the theoretical foundation of the index and its construction. Section IV covers the empirical tests on the power of the index in investigating the hypothesis that higher transparency reduces risk and volatility in the money market. The final section provides a summary and conclusions.

II. Data Description and the Validity of the Assumptions

In this section we describe the data used in this paper and their sources. We also explain the necessary assumptions for the development of the index. Finally, we will provide empirical evidence for the validity of these assumptions in our sample period.

A. Data description

The daily data on the Fed funds effective, the Treasury bill (secondary market) and the exchange rates (Japanese Yen per one US dollar) for the period 1982 (October 5)-2003 (December 31) are used. The number of observations is 5308 days. The source of these data is the St. Louis Federal Reserve website. The effective Fed funds rate is a weighted average of the rates on Fed funds transactions of a group of Fed funds brokers who report their transactions daily to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Data on GDP and the Federal Government debt outstanding were obtained from the same source. The data on GDP and debt are quarterly observations. To generate a daily series, an interpolation of these series was computed. Specifically, an ARIMA(1,1,0) process was used while the last value in each period was maintained.

The choice of the sample period is based on the availability of data on target Fed funds rates. According to Sarno and Thornton (2003, p. 1099), the Fed was explicitly
targeting the funds rate from 1974 to October 1979. The Fed switched to a non-borrowed reserves operation procedure in October 1979, and in October 1982 switched to a borrowed reserves operating procedure. However, “Exactly when the Fed switched from a borrowed reserve operating procedure to an explicit funds rate targeting procedure is contentious [...] there seems to be general agreement that the Fed has explicitly targeted the funds rate at least since the late 1980s.” In any event, for the purpose of this paper and the construction of the index, available target rates with their respective dates are needed.

To the best knowledge of the author, a non-interrupted set of data on Fed funds target rates is only available from October 1982. For the period 1982-1989 we use a series prepared by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) Secretariat. This series is based on the staff’s interpretations of FOMC transcripts and other documents publicly available.¹ Note that May 7, 1988 corresponds to a Saturday, when markets were closed. Following Rudebusch (1995), we use May 9, 1988 as the day when the target was changed. Furthermore, for the target change of “early January 1989”, we assume January 5 as the day when the target was changed. For the period 1990 onwards, the series reported on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System’s website was used.² Following Poole et al. (2002), let us call “event days” the days on which the FOMC meets (whether the target was changed or not) and the inter-meeting days on which the target rate was changed.

In the calculation of the transparency index, to avoid an artificial reduction in the index, we use 360-day Fed funds and Treasury bill rates. For all other analyses in this paper, however, rates are expressed on a 365-day basis. For the period under consideration, the Fed has made some transparency-oriented changes. Some of the most representative changes include: (i) October 19, 1989 when the Fed started the practice of adjusting the funds rate target by 25 or 50 basis points,³ (ii) February 4, 1994 when the

¹ Rudebusch (1995) also constructed a Federal funds target rate series. His series is available for the periods 1974-1979 and 1984-1992. Although Rudebusch’s series has been widely used by researchers, we use the FOMC Secretariat’s series because it allows us to study the longest consecutive time period.
² Alternatively, the series can be found in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s website.
³ According to Poole and Rasche (2003), this practice started in August 1989; however, we will follow Sarno and Thornton’s (2003) estimation of October 1989, since it is likely that it took the market at least two months to realize that the FOMC had enacted this practice. Also note that according to Rudebusch (1995), the target change occurred on October 18, 1989, not on the 19. Since the Secretariat series are used we will assume that the change started on the 19.
Fed began announcing policy decisions after each FOMC meeting, (iii) August 19, 1997 when the FOMC started including a quantitative Fed funds target rate in its Directive to the New York Fed Trading Desk and (iv) May 18, 1999 when the Fed extended its explanations regarding policy decisions, and started including in press statements an indication of the FOMC’s view regarding prospective developments (or the policy bias). Furthermore, (v) on January 19, 2000, the FOMC issued a press statement explaining that it would include a balance-of-risks sentence in its statements, replacing the previous bias statement.4 The practice was first implemented in the following FOMC meeting, on February 2. Finally, (vi) since March 19, 2002, the Fed has included in FOMC statements the vote on the directive and the name of dissenter members (if any).5

The index developed in this paper will be used to determine whether transparency-oriented reforms at the Fed have indeed increased the market’s understanding of Fed policies. Finally, we will also test whether monetary policy has been more transparent during Alan Greenspan’s tenure (August 11, 1987 to the present).

B. Assumptions

Since the index developed in this paper is market based, three important assumptions should be made: (1) there is no uncertainty; (2) Fed funds and three-month Treasury bill rates are cointegrated and finally, (3) the market participants are forward looking in the sense of Lucas (1976).

B-1 Assumption 1: There is no uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921), that is, we distinguish between risk and uncertainty. Risk exists if agents can use historical data to assign numerical probabilities to random events. However, random events to which agents cannot assign probabilities are said to involve uncertainty. It should be noted that there are periods of uncertainty in the sample period, specifically towards the end of the Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker’s tenure and the start of the new chairman’s tenure. In that period, because of the change in authority, market participants could not easily understand or interpret the Fed signals. Other periods of uncertainty are associated with the October 87 stock market crisis as well as September 2001. We will adjust the index for these events. Note that we do not consider the Fed reaction relevant.

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5 For a review of these changes, see Poole and Rasche (2003).
to the Asian crisis as an uncertain event from the agents’ point of view since agents could use the recent historical reaction of the Fed related to the October 87 crisis to calculate the probability associated with what action the Fed was going to take.

**B-2 Assumption 2:** Since the construction of the monetary policy index in this paper is based on the data of the short end of the yield curve we need short-term rates, say, Fed fund and Treasury bill rates to be cointegrated. The existing literature provides empirical evidence for this assumption. For example, Sarno and Thornton (2003) have shown the Fed funds (FF) and 3-month Treasury bill (TB) rates are cointegrated. Furthermore, the adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium largely occurs through the movements in the FF rate rather than the TB rate. Note that, if two or more economic variables are cointegrated, they should not diverge from each other by too great an extent in the long run. It is possible, however, for such variables to drift apart in the short run or according to seasonal factors, but if they continue to be too far apart in the long run, then economic forces, such as a market mechanism or government intervention, will begin to bring them back together [Granger (1986)]. Consequently, the exclusion of a short-run set of variables which account for government interventions results in biased coefficients if, in fact, some policy regime changes included in this set cause variables in the model to move together over the long run. The existing literature ignores this fact. Consequently, contrary to Sarno and Thornton (2003), we allow the short-run dynamic system to include policy regime changes or other exogenous factors which affect such system.

Furthermore, in the error correction equations, again contrary to Sarno and Thornton’s (2003) study, we allow the contemporaneous variable to affect the dependent variable. This is due to the fact that as one would expect in an efficient market, like the U.S. money market, a change in FF should result in a change in TB, if not immediately, within a few minutes. Consequently, in the error correction equation, which reflects the short-run relationship between FF and TB, one should include the contemporaneous variable.

We will test if two non-stationary series TB and FF are cointegrated. We will use $\lambda_{\text{max}}$ and Trace tests developed by Johansen and Juselius (1991) while allowing the

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$^6$ For the variable TB, the absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller $t$ statistic (for a lag length of 5) is 0.0910 and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric $t$ statistic (for a lag length of 4) is
short-run dynamic system to be affected by day-of-the-week dummies and dummy variables accounting for the internal and external shocks in the sample period, which could affect the relationship between FF and TB. These shocks include the modification in the reserve maintenance period from one week (for most large institutions) to two weeks (for all institutions) on February 2, 1984, the appointment of Alan Greenspan as the chairman of the Fed on August 11, 1987, the October 1987 stock market crisis, two policy regime changes on October 19, 1989 and February 4, 1994, the Asian crisis in 1997 as well as five occasions on April 18, 1994; October 15, 1998; January 3, 2001; April 18, 2001 and September 17, 2001 when the Fed changed the FF target outside the regular meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee.

Since October 1989, the Fed has followed the practice of changing the FF targets by 25 or 50 basis points and since February 1994, with the five exceptions mentioned above, the Fed has changed the FF target at regular meetings of the FOMC. Note that since reserve requirements are binding at the end of the reserve maintenance period, known as settlement Wednesday, the funds rate tends to be more volatile on settlement Wednesdays [Sarno and Thornton (2003)]. Consequently, the FF time series are affected by the increased volatility on settlement days. The variable to account for settlement Wednesdays was, therefore, included. We will also include dummy variables to capture well-known episodes of high volatility that occurred in 1985 (December 30 and 31) and 1986 (December 31). Finally, we adjusted the test results, following Cheung and Lai (1993), for a potential bias possibly generated by small sample errors.

Table 1 reports the result of $\lambda_{\text{max}}$ and Trace tests for lag length of twenty days. A twenty-lag length was needed in order to ensure that the error term is not autocorrelated. The only non-congruency is non-normality. However, as it was mentioned by 0.56884. Both $t$ statistics are less than 2.86 (5% critical value), indicating that TB has one unit root. For the variable $\Delta TB$, the absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller $t$ statistic (for a lag length of 4) is 27.74 and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric $t$ statistic (for a lag length of 4) is 62.19. Both $t$ statistics are more than 2.86 (5% critical value), indicating that $\Delta TB$ is stationary. For the variable FF, the absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller $t$ statistic (for a lag length of 10) is 0.5484 and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric $t$ statistic (for a lag length of 4) is 1.57231. Both $t$ statistics again are less than 2.86 (5% critical value), indicating that FF also has a unit root. For the variable $\Delta FF$, the absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller $t$ statistic (for a lag length of 9) is 25.21 and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric $t$ statistic (for a lag length of 4) is 86.86. Both $t$ statistics are more than 2.86 (5% critical value), indicating that $\Delta FF$ is stationary. Note that the lag length in all of these
Johansen (1995), a departure from normality is not very serious in cointegration tests, see also, e.g., Hendry and Mizon (1998). Both \( \lambda_{\text{max}} \) and Trace tests reject \( r \) (degree of cointegration) = 0 at 5% level while they cannot reject \( r \leq 1 \), implying that \( r = 1 \). This result confirms the finding of Sarno and Thornton (2003). The estimated long-run relationship between TB and FF rates normalized on TB coefficient is:

\[
TB_t = 0.144 + 0.934 \times FF_t.
\]  

Table 1 about here

A Likelihood Ratio test [CHISQ(1) = 17.02, \( p \)-value = 0.00] rejects the null hypothesis that the slope coefficient is one implying that there is no one-to-one relationship between these rates over the long run. Furthermore, according to [CHISQ(1) = 88.12, \( p \)-value = 0.00], we reject the null hypothesis that TB is weakly exogenous for the long-run coefficients, while according to [CHISQ(1) = 1.21, \( p \)-value = 0.27], we cannot reject the null hypothesis that FF is weakly exogenous for the long-run coefficients. This implies that the first differences of TB do not contain information about the long-run parameter, whereas the reverse is true for the first differences of FF.

We now need to investigate the long-run stability of the relationship. Figure 1 shows Hansen and Johansen’s (1993) LR test for the stability of the cointegration space for the relationship. BETA_Z (solid line) pictures the actual disequilibrium as a function of all short-run dynamics. At the same time, BETA_R (broken line) is corrected for the short-run effects, including the policy effects, and shows the ‘clean’ disequilibrium. In fact, it is the BETA_R series that is tested for stationarity and thus determines the number of cointegration relationships in the maximum likelihood procedure [Hansen and Juselius (1995)].

Figure 1 about here

As we can see from Figure 1, according to the LR test, the relationship is stable over the long run when series are corrected for the short-run effects. Furthermore, when the first five years are reserved for the initial estimate, even without correcting for the short-run effects, the relationship is stable over the long run. In sum, in this section, we tests was chosen according to the minimum of Akaike’s (1970, 1974) information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz’s (1978) information criterion (SC).
provide evidence for the validity of Assumption 2, i.e., there exists a long-run stable relationship between FF and TB.

**B-3 Assumption 3:** Market participants are forward looking in the sense of Lucas (1976). To provide an empirical evidence for this assumption we need to estimate the error-correction model (conditional model) as well as the marginal model.

**B-3.1 Conditional and Marginal Models: Superexogeneity Test Result**

Having established in the previous sub-section that a long-run relationship between FF and TB exists, we need first to verify the direction of causality between these two variables. To conduct the causality test, we will estimate:

\[
\Delta TB_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \beta_i \Delta TB_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Phi_i \Delta FF_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \psi_{1i} ETB_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \psi_{2i} ETB_{t-i}^2 + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \psi_{3i} ETB_{t-i}^3 + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \psi_{4i} (ETB_{t-i}^2)(ETB_{t-i}^3) + DUM_t' \zeta + u_t,
\]

\[(2)\]

\[
\Delta FF_t = \alpha_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \alpha_i \Delta FF_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \delta_i \Delta TB_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \eta_{1i} EFF_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \eta_{2i} EFF_{t-i}^2 + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \eta_{3i} EFF_{t-i}^3 + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \eta_{4i} (EFF_{t-i}^2)(EFF_{t-i}^3) + DUM_t' \gamma + v_t,
\]

\[(3)\]

where \(\Delta\) before any variable means the first difference of that variable. Variables ETB and EFF are the error terms from the long-run relationship when the coefficient of variables TB and FF, respectively, is normalized. DUM = (M_t, T_t, WED_t, TH_t, D851231_t, D861231_t, GREEN_t, OCT87_t, ASIA_t, TA_t, TAF_t, SWED_t, REMA_t, D940418_t, D970819_t, D981015_t, D99518_t, D000202_t, D010103_t, D010418_t, D010917_t, D020319_t, EDAY_t, TARATE_t), \(u_t\) and \(v_t\) are the disturbance terms which are assumed to be white noise with zero mean.

The dummy variables M_t, T_t, WED_t and TH_t are for Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays, respectively. For example, M = 1 for Mondays and zero, otherwise. Dummy variables D851231_t and D861231_t are equal to one on December 30 and 31, 1985 and December 31, 1986, respectively, and are equal to zero, otherwise. These dummy variables are included to capture the high volatility of Fed funds rate on those days. Dummy variable GREEN_t =1 since August 11, 1987 when Alan Greenspan
was appointed chair of the Fed and is zero, otherwise. OCT87t and ASIAt are dummy variables accounting for the October 87 and Asian crises, respectively. In both events, central banks in industrial countries flooded the money markets with liquidity to ease the downfall in the stock markets. The easing of the markets took at least until the end of October of the year the crisis took place.

Consequently, we created OCT87t = 1 for October 19 to 30, 1987 and zero, otherwise, and ASIAt = 1 for October 17 to 30, 1997 and zero, otherwise. Dummy variable TAIt = 1 since February 4, 1994 and is equal to zero, otherwise. Dummy variable TAFt = 1 since October 19, 1989 and is zero, otherwise. These two dummy variables were created to account for the two policy regime changes, which have happened in the sample period as explained before. Dummy variable SWEDt accounts for settlement days on Wednesdays, i.e., it is equal to one on Wednesdays when it is a settlement day and zero, otherwise. Dummy variable REMAt = 1 since February 2, 1984 when the reserve maintenance period was modified from one week (for most large institutions) to two weeks (for all institutions) and is zero, otherwise.

Dummy variable D970819t =1 since August 19, 1997, when the FOMC started including a quantitative Fed funds target rate in its Directive to the New York Fed Trading Desk, and zero, otherwise. Dummy variable D99518t =1 since May 18, 1999, when the Fed extended its explanations regarding policy decisions, and started including in press statements an indication of the FOMC’s view regarding prospective developments (or the policy bias), and zero, otherwise. Dummy variable D000202t = 1 since February 2, 2000, when the FOMC started to include a balance-of-risks sentence in its statements replacing the previous bias statement, and zero, otherwise. Dummy variable D020319t = 1 since March 19, 2002, when the Fed included in FOMC statements the vote on the directive and the name of dissenter members (if any), and zero, otherwise.

Dummy variables D940418t, D981015t, D010103t, D010418t and D010917t are equal to one for April 18, 1994; October 15, 1998; January 3, 2001; April 18, 2001 and September 17, 2001 (when the Fed changed the FF target outside its regular meetings), respectively, and zero otherwise. Dummy variable EDAYt is equal to one for the days (“event”) when the Fed funds target rate was changed whether at a regularly scheduled...
FOMC meeting, or otherwise, and also for the days on which the FOMC met, but did not change the target rate. It is equal to zero, otherwise. Dummy variable TARATE is equal to one for the days when the Federal funds target rate actually was changed and is equal to zero, otherwise. These days can be among the regularly scheduled FOMC meeting dates or other days. Note that TARATE is a subset of EDAY, as it excludes the days when FOMC met, but did not change the target. Note that we also assume the forecast error may be different in the “event” days and days when the target rate was changed. $\beta$’s, $\Phi$’s, $\alpha$’s, $\Psi$’s, $\delta$’s, $\eta$’s, $\gamma$ and $\zeta$ are constant parameters.

We will conduct the Wald test for the following hypotheses:

1. $H_1: \beta_1 = \beta_2 = \cdots = \beta_k = 0$, $H_2: \Phi_1 = \Phi_2 = \cdots = \Phi_k = 0$, $H_3: \alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \cdots = \alpha_k = 0$ and $H_4: \delta_1 = \delta_2 = \cdots = \delta_k = 0$. If we can reject $H_1$, $H_2$ and $H_3$, and fail to reject $H_4$, then FF Granger causes TB, provided we also fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of at least one of the error terms in Equation (2) (i.e., $\psi_{1i}$, $\psi_{2i}$, $\psi_{3i}$ and $\psi_{4i}$ for all $i = 1$ to $k$) is zero. If we can reject $H_1$, $H_3$ and $H_4$, and fail to reject $H_2$, then TB Granger causes FF, provided we also fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of at least one of the error terms in Equation (3) (i.e., $\eta_{1i}$, $\eta_{2i}$, $\eta_{3i}$ and $\eta_{4i}$ for all $i = 1$ to $k$) is zero. Note that in this case the changes in TB contain information on changes in FF. This implies that market participants can, on average, predict the Fed’s decision on target changes. If none of these hypotheses can be rejected, then there is a bi-directional causality between these rates. If agents ignore a small deviation from equilibrium, while reacting substantially to large ones, the error-correction equation is non-linear [Kia (2003a)]. Consequently, we follow Kia and allow all kinds of non-linearity in our error correction models (2) and (3).

In fact, a non-linear error-correction model, in a restricted form, was originally developed by Escribano (1985). This model was used, among others, by Hendry and Ericsson (1991), and recently Teräsvirta and Eliasson (2001) developed two unrestricted versions of the model. Moreover, Sarno and Thornton (2003) developed a restricted non-linear ECM between FF and TB. To correct for overlapping observations and heteroscedasticity, Newey and West’s (1987) robust error for 5-order moving average was used. In order to ensure that the causality tests are not biased or lack power because of an inappropriate choice of lag length, we will conduct the causality test for $k =$ the lag length $= 1, 5, 10$ and $20$. Table 2 reports causality tests for each of the TB and FF variables.
At least the coefficient of one error correction term was found to be statistically significant for both equations (2) and (3) (the full estimation results are available upon request). According to the Wald test results on Null H2, FF does Granger cause TB at the conventional level of significance. The result is consistent for all lag length k. Moreover, according to the Wald test result on Null H4, TB does not Granger cause FF at the conventional level of significance. The only exception is at non-optimal lag length of k=5 and k=10. Consequently, the direction of causality is one way and it is from FF to TB. This result implies that the Fed has been following a discretionary monetary policy during our sample period. Furthermore, FF is strongly exogenous for TB.

Having established that the direction of causality is from FF to TB, we need to concentrate on the ECM for TB that is implied by our cointegrating vector. Using this ECM, we can investigate if market participants are forward looking, i.e., expectations are formed rationally. Consequently, its parameters are no longer invariant to the process of forcing variables as was mentioned by Lucas (1976). Namely, at least one of the parameters varies with changes in the expectation process. This requires that at least one variable in this equation fails to be superexogenous in the sense of Engle et al. (1983) and Engle and Hendry (1993).
**Error-correction (conditional) model (ECM)**

Our ECM for TB is:

\[
\Delta TB_t = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \beta_i \Delta TB_{t-i} + \sum_{i=0}^{k} \Phi_i \Delta FF_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \psi_{1i} ETB_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \psi_{2i} ETB_{t-i}^2 + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \psi_{3i} ETB_{t-i}^3 + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \psi_{4i} (ETB_{t-i}^3)(ETB_{t-i}^3) + DUM_t \zeta + \epsilon_t
\]

where the only difference between Equation (4) and Equation (2) is that the contemporaneous variable \( \Delta FF_t \) also appears as an independent variable. Table 3 reports the parsimonious error-correction (conditional) model for TB for the initial lag length of \( k=20 \). The estimation method is Least Squared. According to diagnostic tests reported in the last row of Column 2 of the table, the error term is both autocorrelated and heteroscedastic and, therefore, standard errors are corrected by using Newey and West’s (1987) robust error for 5-order moving average.

According to the Hansen’s (1992) stability \( L_i \) test, for the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient is stable, reported in Column 3 of the table, all coefficients are stable. However, as we would expect due to overlapping observations and heteroscedasticity, the variance is not stable. Consequently, the joint Hansen’s (1992) stability \( L_c \) test result, which is equal to 12.11 (\( p \)-value=0.00), rejects the null of joint stability of the coefficients together with the estimated associated variance.

As the results of the ECMs indicate, the short-run relationship between TB and FF is non-linear implying that a small deviation from the equilibrium may be ignored, but market participants react substantially to a large deviation. According to this result (second column of the table), a deviation from the long-run equilibrium takes a day to return to equilibrium while there are some tendencies toward further deviation from equilibrium after twelve and fifteen days. Note that the sum of the positive coefficients of non-linear error term is smaller than the negative (error correcting) coefficient. None of the dummy variables was found to be statistically significant in Equation (4) and so they were dropped. Note that as it was shown earlier in this section the contemporaneous variable \( \Delta FF_t \) in Equation (4) is strongly exogenous for \( \Delta TB_t \). Consequently, it is a valid conditioning regressor in Equation (4). Moreover, we will see in the next subsection that
in Equation (4) the contemporaneous variable $\Delta F_{Ft}$ is also weakly exogenous for the coefficients of interest in the sense of Engle et al. (1983), Engle and Hendry (1993) as well as Hendry and Richard (1983). In the next sub-section, we will concentrate on our formal test for superexogeneity and invariance hypothesis associated with our conditional model.

**Marginal Model and Superexogeneity Test Results**

To formulate the superexogeneity and invariance hypothesis, assume the information set $I_t$ includes the past values of $\Delta TB_t$ and $\Delta FF_t$ as well as the current and past values of other valid conditioning variables included in Equation (4). Define, respectively, the conditional moments of $\Delta TB_t$ and $\Delta FF_t$ as

\[
\eta_{TB}^t = \mathbb{E}(\Delta TB_t \mid I_t), \quad \eta_{FF}^t = \mathbb{E}(\Delta FF_t \mid I_t), \quad \sigma_{TB}^t = \mathbb{E}[(\Delta TB_t - \eta_{TB}^t)^2 \mid I_t], \quad \sigma_{FF}^t = \mathbb{E}[(\Delta FF_t - \eta_{FF}^t)^2 \mid I_t],
\]

and let $\sigma_{TBFF}^t = \mathbb{E}[(\Delta TB_t - \eta_{TB}^t)(\Delta FF_t - \eta_{FF}^t) \mid I_t]$. Consider the joint distribution of $\Delta TB_t$ and $\Delta FF_t$ conditional on information set $I_t$ to be normally distributed with mean $\eta_t = [\eta_{TB}^t, \eta_{FF}^t]$ and a non-constant error covariance matrix $\Sigma = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_{TB} & \sigma_{TBFF} \\ \sigma_{TBFF} & \sigma_{FF} \end{bmatrix}$. Then, following Engle et al. (1983), Engle and Hendry (1993) and Psaradakis and Sola (1996), we can write the relationship between $\Delta TB_t$ and $\Delta FF_t$ as:

\[
\Delta TB_t = \alpha_0 + \psi_0 \Delta FF_t + (\delta_0 - \psi_0) (\Delta FF_t - \eta_{FF}^t) + \delta_1 \sigma_{FF}^t (\Delta FF_t - \eta_{FF}^t) + \psi_1 (\eta_{FF}^t)^2 + \psi_2 (\eta_{FF}^t)^3 + \psi_3 \sigma_{FF}^t \eta_{FF}^t + \psi_4 \sigma_{FF}^t (\eta_{FF}^t)^2 + \psi_5 \sigma_{FF}^t (\eta_{FF}^t)^3 + \psi_6 \text{Dev}_{FF} + z_t^\gamma + u_t,
\]

(5)

where $\alpha_0, \psi_0, \psi_1, \psi_2, \psi_3, \psi_4, \psi_5, \psi_6, \delta_0$ and $\delta_1$ are regression coefficients of $\Delta TB_t$ on $\Delta FF_t$ conditional on $z_t^\gamma$ where $z$ includes past values $\Delta TB_t$, $\Delta FF_t$ and other valid conditioning variables included in Equation (4). The error term $u_t$ is assumed, as before, to be heteroscedastic (due to the overlapping observations), normally, identically and independently distributed. Because the error is heteroscedastic the term $\text{Dev}_{FF} (= \text{the deviation of the variance of the error term from a five-period ARCH error of } \Delta FF)$ is added, see Engle and Hendry (1993).

Note that $\Delta FF_t$ is the control/target variable that is subject to policy interventions. Although the parameter of $\Delta FF_t$ is assumed to be constant over the sample period, but it
is possible that this parameter changes [Lucas (1976)] under interventions affecting DGP (data generating) process of $\Delta FF_t$. In this case, agents have a forward-looking behavior and the conditional model (4) is not policy invariant. Hence, the parameters of interest in the analysis will be $\delta$ and $\psi$ in the behavioral relationship (5). Under the null of weak exogeneity, $\delta_0=\psi_0=0$. Under the null of invariance, $\psi_1=\psi_2=\psi_3=\psi_4=\psi_5=\psi_6=0$ in order to have $\psi_0=\psi$. Finally, if we assume that $\sigma_t^{FF}$ has distinct values over different, but clearly defined regimes, then under the null of constancy of $\delta$, we need $\delta_1=0$. If these entire hypotheses are accepted the equation will be reduced to Equation (4), and the agents in the money market are not forward looking. In other words, expectations are not formed rationally. It should also be mentioned that “superexogeneity is sufficient but not a necessary condition for valid inference under intervention” [Engle et al. (1983), p. 284]. This is due to the fact that estimable models with invariant parameters, but with no weakly exogenous variables are easily formulated.

For the superexogeneity test, we need to specify the stochastic mechanism, which generates our contemporaneous variable $\Delta FF_t$, i.e., the marginal model. The marginal model is, in fact, the data generating process of $\Delta FF_t$. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 report the marginal model. The estimation method, similar to the conditional model, is Least Squared, where standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Diagnostic tests reported in the last row of Column 4 of the table suggest that, as one would expect, due to overlapping observations, the error term is both autocorrelated and ARCH heteroscedastic.

According to Hansen’s (1992) stability $L_i$ test reported in Column 5 of Table 3, all coefficients are stable. However, again as we would expect, due to overlapping observations and heteroscedasticity, the variance is not stable. Consequently, joint Hansen’s (1992) stability $L_c$ test result, which is equal to 10.97 ($p$-value=0.00), rejects the null of joint stability of the coefficients together with the estimated associated variance. The estimated model seems a reasonable marginal model for the analogues of $\eta^{FF}$.

Based on the significance of the dummy coefficients, there is strong evidence for a structural break due to the “event” days, the policy regime changes of February 2, 1984, February 4, 1994 and March 19, 2002 as well as April 18, 2001 (when the Fed changed the FF target outside its regular meetings) and October 1987 crisis. The instability of the
marginal model implies that the parameters of the associated conditional models will not be policy invariant when economic agents are forward-looking. Table 4 provides some evidence on this issue.

From the estimated marginal model, estimates of $\eta^{FF}$ and $\sigma_t^{FF}$ were calculated. As for $\sigma_t^{FF}$, since the error is heteroscedastic, according to ARCH test, a five-period ARCH error, therefore, was estimated. We also constructed DevFF as differences between the variance of the error term of the marginal model and the variance constructed by ARCH estimation. All of these constructed variables were then included in the ECM, Equation (5). The estimation results on these constructed variables are given in Table 4. The estimated method is Least Squared where standard errors, as before, are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, using Newey and West’s (1987) robust error for 5-order moving average.

Table 4 about here

The individual Chi-squared test is on the null hypothesis that the coefficient of each variable is zero. The Chi-squared or F-test on the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all constructed variables are jointly zero is given in the last row of the table. As the estimation result in Table 4 shows, the joint F-test (or Chi-Squared-test) on the null hypothesis that coefficients of these constructed variables are jointly zero is rejected, indicating that these variables together should be included. This result immediately implies that the contemporaneous variable ($\Delta FF_t$) in the conditional model, reported in Table 3, failed to be superexogenous, i.e., agents are forward looking and expectations are formed rationally.

Since the coefficient of $(\Delta FF_t - \eta^{FF})$ is statistically insignificant, $\Delta FF_t$, as it would be expected, is weakly exogenous. Furthermore, the coefficient of $\sigma^{FF}(\Delta FF_t - \eta^{FF})$ is also statistically insignificant, implying that the null of constancy cannot be rejected for this variable. However, since the coefficient of $\sigma^{FF} \eta^{FF}$ and DevFF is statistically significant at the conventional level, the null of invariance with respect to policy changes is violated. Consequently, we reject the null of invariance, while accepting weak exogeneity and constancy conditions for our contemporaneous variable. Note that constancy and invariance are different concepts. Parameters could vary over time, but be invariant with
respect to policy changes. It should also be noted that since $\Delta FF$ is weakly exogenous and its coefficient is constant, the inference on the parameters in the agents’ model (ECM) is efficient.

However, as it was mentioned by Engle and Hendry (1993), we need all three conditions to be satisfied in order to ensure superexogeneity. The failure of the invariance condition, therefore, justifies the result of the joint F-test (or Chi-Squared-test) on the null hypothesis that all coefficients of the constructed variables are jointly zero. Namely, in general, we reject the null hypothesis that $\Delta FF$ is superexogenous. That is, although the coefficient of $\Delta FF$ in our ECM is weakly exogenous and constant over the sample period, any change in the regime affecting money markets in the U.S. influences economic agents’ investment behavior.

In fact, since most policy rules relate to past information about the economy, the possibility of a policy variable, like the Fed funds rate, being superexogenous seems unlikely. Consequently, a change in the monetary policy, which alters the process that the control variable $\Delta FF$ is formed, will affect investment decisions made by economic agents in the money market in the United States. Namely, the agents in this market are forward looking. Furthermore, since the contemporaneous variable in the ECM reported in Table 3 is weakly exogenous, it can be treated as though it is fixed in repeated samples. Moreover, since the Fed funds rate is also strongly exogenous, the ECM can be used for prediction. In sum, in this section we provided evidence to support the validity of the underlying assumptions behind the construction of the indexes to be developed in this paper.

III. A Money-Market Measure of the Transparency of Fed Policymaking

In this section, we will construct an index of the transparency of monetary policy. Our index is based on the degree to which money market participants anticipate the decisions taken at the regularly scheduled FOMC meetings (whether a target change occurred or not), as well as those (target changes) made outside these meetings. We will
first introduce the theoretical justification for our index and then we will construct both our formal index and an extended version.

A. A Monetary Policy Index: Theoretical Justification

By monetary policy transparency, following Sundararajan et al. (2003, p. 5), we mean “[…] an environment in which the objectives of the policy; its legal, institutional, and economic framework; policy decisions and their rationale; data and information related to monetary and financial policies; and the accountability of the policymaking body are provided to the public in an understandable, accessible and timely basis.” Under this definition, there is an absence of asymmetric information between monetary policy makers and other economic agents. The implementation of the monetary policy can be made public in one or more of the following ways: remarks of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve as well as other senior management of the Fed, testimony before the House and Senate Banking Committee, the release of the Beige book, the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee meetings, changes in reserve requirements, changes in the discount rate and open market operations.

Assume there is no uncertainty, FF and TB are cointegrated and market participants are forward looking. The difference between these two rates (Dif) is positive since the rate on non-collateralized overnight interbank loans (Fed funds) is risky while loans to Federal Government (Treasury bills) are risk-free. Thus, Dif measures the default risk minus maturity risk premiums. Suppose further that there is no expected significant change in the structure of the U.S. banking industry (i.e., risk associated with interbank loans) and/or in the credibility of the U.S. government.

Under these assumptions, there is no reason to believe that Dif deviates from its equilibrium value (its trend) unless Fed actions, and/or other exogenous shocks, change one or both of these rates in a different proportion. However, under a forward-looking assumption (rational expectations), the deviations of Dif from its trend should be short-lived if there is an absence of asymmetric information between monetary policy makers and other economic agents. This is due to the fact that such deviations lead to potential arbitrage or speculative profits. Such potential profits result in arbitrage and/or speculative activities until the deviation of Dif from its equilibrium value (trend) is eliminated. Thus we can establish the following:
Proposition: Because FF and TB are cointegrated and money market participants are forward looking, the life of deviations of Dif from its trend value depends on the degree of monetary policy transparency provided there is no uncertainty. The deviations are short-lived if monetary policy is highly transparent and vice versa.

Let us consider Figure 2. In this figure FF is the Fed funds rate, TB is the 3-month Treasury bill rate and Dift (= FFt – TBt) is assumed to have a trend value or equilibrium level, Tdiff. The upper panel shows the movements of the FF and TB rates. The lower panel shows the movements of Dif around its trend or equilibrium level. Suppose full certainty (100% transparency) on monetary policy exists, i.e., the Fed fully conveys its private information on monetary policy decisions to the market. Let us start from equilibrium, i.e., Dift=Tdiff, and assume at time t the Fed conducts a “discretionary” monetary policy and tightens the market by, say, an outright sale of Treasury bills in order to increase the target rate from FF0 to FF1 at time t+1, the target-change day or the day of the FOMC meeting. There will be a drain in reserves. Banks compete for interbank funds and the Federal funds rate will go up. This will lead to an increase in the Federal funds-Treasury bill rate differential, Dift. Banks will also sell their Treasury bills or other liquid assets to obtain the required liquidity and so put a further downward pressure on Treasury bill prices. Since we assumed full monetary policy transparency, the market participants, knowing the intention of the Fed, will also sell Treasury bills. These speculative/arbitrage activities will continue until the interbank and the money markets are again in equilibrium. At such a time, we would expect, when full transparency exists, Dift+1 and Tdiff to almost coincide.

The Fed’s action and the subsequent market’s reaction will continue until the next target-change day or FOMC meeting when the Fed’s desired target rate (FF1) is officially announced. According to this analysis, one would expect under full monetary policy transparency, deviations of Dif from its average/trend (or equilibrium) to be temporary. The solid curve in the lower panel of Figure 2 depicts such movements.

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8 Note that a “discretionary” conduct of policy means that the central bank is free at any time to alter its instrument setting instead of complying with a rule. In an “interest-rate smoothing” regime the central bank follows a “rule-based” policy. However, the discretionary conduct of policy also includes interest-rate smoothing, as the central bank is free to react at any time to the movements of the market.
If we assume there is a lack of (less than 100%) monetary policy transparency, then deviations of Dif from Tdif last longer and may not be temporary, see the broken curve in the panel. The reason is that the forward-looking market participants could easily be confused by the action of the Fed and may overreact/underreact in the right or the opposite direction where the authorities wish the market to go. This may make the life of the central bankers more difficult and may result in more activities by the Fed to correct the situation. For example, given our assumption that market participants are forward looking and so their behaviors are not policy invariant, an outright sale of Treasury bills by the Fed may be considered an interest rate smoothing action by the market and may lead the participants to purchase Treasury bills in order to sell them at a higher price when the Fed starts buying them back. This will result in widening the deviations of Dif from Tdif. Consequently, any $|D_t|$ — where $D_t = D_{t-1} - T_{dif-t-1}$ — is an indication of the monetary policy transparency, a small $|D_t|$ means a high transparency and vice versa.

Note that we are assuming the market is not efficient in the strong form, i.e., the market participants do not know Fed’s private information before being publicized. If the market is efficient in the strong form, market participants will, on average, perceive the target rate in advance, and if there exists potential for arbitrage/speculative profits, arbitrageurs and speculators will trade until potential profits are eliminated. Namely, arbitrage and speculative activities will eliminate any $D_t$, which is associated with potential arbitrage/speculative profits. If the market is not efficient in the strong form, arbitrageurs and speculators must be given inside information through Fed’s signals/operations.

Let us now assume the Fed is following an “interest-rate smoothing” policy. Starting from full monetary policy transparency and equilibrium, suppose market participants, due to some signals from the Fed and/or some economic shocks, which caused movements in the equilibrium interest rate, expect a positive change in the target rate. A higher expected rate in the near future creates potential for arbitrage/speculative profits. Profit maximization leads arbitrageurs/speculators (investors) to operate along the short end of the yield curve by selling their three-month bills and buying very short-term bills or lending overnight. This action leads to an increase in TB and a reduction in D. To moderate the reduction in the overnight rate as well as to confirm its intention, the Fed
will put an upward pressure on non-borrowed reserves by selling bills. The Fed’s action leads to an upward pressure on FF. Arbitrage and speculative activities as well as the Fed reactions continue until the money market is again in equilibrium.

As before, one would expect D, under full monetary policy transparency, to approach zero at equilibrium when the potential for arbitrage/speculative profits is eliminated. In this case, the magnitude of D, in absolute value, is small and short-lived as Dif represented by the solid curve shows in Figure 2. Clearly, when monetary policy transparency is low, as the movements of Dif represented by the broken curve show, D is high in absolute value and is long-lived. Note that again even while monetary policy transparency from the central bank point of view may remain constant, the market perception of a monetary policy action may change when such an action is conducted.

Let us consider another case of 100% monetary transparency. Suppose the Fed changes the target rate and hints that this rate will soon be changed (increased) again, say, within the next three months. Let us start from equilibrium, where D=0. To avoid the capital loss resulting from the increase, holders of three-month Treasury bills sell their bills and invest in shorter-term assets or in the overnight market. This leads to an increase in TB and a fall in FF, i.e., Dif falls and |D|>0. To moderate the fall in FF and make its intention clear, the Fed puts an upward pressure on non-borrowed reserves, say, by an outright sale of Treasury bills. Given the fact that bills are cheap (TB is high), instead of selling bills, banks compete for interbank funds and put an extra upward pressure on FF.

Market actions and the fed reactions continue until equilibrium is again achieved (D=0). Specifically, there are enough speculative and arbitrage activities by the forward-looking market participants to make deviations of Dif from Tdif short lived along the solid line in the lower panel of Figure 2 so that at the time of the target rate announcement |D|=0 or is very close to zero (i.e., an indication of 100% or very close to 100% transparency). Thus, when FF and TB are cointegrated and market participants are forward looking, |D| can capture a market-based monetary policy transparency in the absence of uncertainty.

In sum, so far, based on some conditions (assumptions) of which their validity was verified in the previous section, we have established a theoretical justification behind our index. Such an index, contrary to the existing market-based indexes in the literature, e.g., Howells and Mariscal (2002), is dynamic and includes expected policy actions. It
should be mentioned that one may argue that Dif may deviate from its trend not only because of speculative and arbitrage activities of the market participants based on their expectations (understanding) on future Fed actions, but also based on other factors, such as the mobility of capital and/or the federal government debt per GDP.

As it was mentioned earlier in this section, Dif measures default risk premium minus maturity risk premium. There is no theoretical reason or empirical evidence, to the best knowledge of the author, to believe that these premiums deviate on average from their equilibrium values (trends) when the structure of the interbank market or the credibility of the U.S. government in servicing the outstanding debt or expected future debt remains constant. This is especially true at high frequency observations. It is, however, possible the credibility of a bank or some banks in the interbank market changes. But FF is the weighted average of the interbank rates, which should not be changed as one or some banks pay more on their loans while in the meantime some other banks pay less. An overall banking crisis, if it exists in the sample, should, of course, be dummied out.

One may, however, argue that the deviation of Dif from its trend can be a function of the mobility of capital or the size of the debt at high frequency data even for a large country like the United States. Before such a scenario can be investigated, it should be noted that the mobility of capital or the size of the debt as well as any other internal or external shocks, aside from the expectations on Fed activities, does influence FF and TB in the same proportion, especially at high frequency observations, provided the structure of interbank market remains the same. To provide some empirical evidence for this argument, we first investigate the Granger causality between the change in the log of the US exchange rate (ge) and the gap between Dif and its forty-day (to capture two months) moving average (cdif), i.e. gap_t = Dif_t – cdif_{t-1}. This test is based on the assumption that the exchange rate (Japanese Yens per US dollar) movements at high frequency data capture the mobility of capital. Then we will investigate the Granger causality between gap and the change in the log of debt-GDP ratio (gdy), where to generate a daily series of gdy, an interpolation of these series from quarterly series was computed.

All of these variables are stationary. The stationarity test results are available upon request. Note also that in all of these tests we conditioned the dependent variables
on the variables included in the set DUM, already defined in the paper. We will use Akaike’s (1970, 1974) information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s (1978) information criterion (SC), the generalized cross validation (GCV) method developed by Craven and Wahba (1979), used by Engel et al. (1986), as well as Hannan and Quinn’s (1979) criterion (HQ) to determine the lag length (k) for a global lag length of 60 days to incorporate a three-month period.

According to the lag specification tests, the optimum k for all these criteria was found to be one. The Wald test (adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation) result [Chi-Squared(1)=0.68 with significance level 0.41] strongly rejects the null hypothesis that ge Granger causes gap and [Chi-Squared(1)= 0.57 with significance level 0.45] strongly rejects the Null hypothesis that gyd Granger causes gap. Consequently, we conclude that Dif deviates from its trend only because of speculative and arbitrage activities of the market participants based on their expectations (understanding) on future Fed actions.

B. Basic Index

The index will be constructed in three steps:

(1) We identify “event days” as the days on which the Federal funds target rate was changed whether at a regularly scheduled FOMC meeting or outside the meetings and also the days on which the FOMC met but did not change the target rate. When the FOMC meetings took place over two days, we choose the second day of the meeting as the event day.

Our first event date in the sample is October 5, 1982, the first meeting of the FOMC during our period of study. On this date, the FOMC adopted a target for the Federal funds rate of 10%. Our second event date is October 8, 1982, when the FOMC changed the target (to 9.5%) outside a regularly scheduled meeting. Our last event date is December 9, 2003, the last meeting of the FOMC within our sample period. On this occasion, the Fed left the target rate unchanged. In total, we have 227 event days.

(2) For each event day, we calculate $|D_t| = |D_{it} - T_{dif_{t-1}}|$, where $T_{dif_{t-1}}$ is the average of $D_{it}$ between two event dates. Namely, we calculate daily observations of the absolute value of the deviation of FF minus TB from the trend differential at each event
date.\footnote{Although it would be more intuitive to calculate Tdif as the daily geometric average (as opposed to the arithmetic average), about 10\% of the time Dif is a negative value and often the number of days between event days is an even number. Furthermore, consistent approximations of the geometric average are not possible for all dates in the sample. To make the measure consistent across all observations we use simple arithmetic averages. Another potential problem with geometric averages occurs when the differential is zero or close to zero, since in such a case the geometric mean artificially drives the trend to zero.} For example, for the event day of October 8, 1982, Tdif\textsubscript{t-1}, as the arithmetic average of Dif\textsubscript{t} for t = 5-Oct-82, 6-Oct-82, 7-Oct-82, is Tdif\textsubscript{t-1} = (2.13 + 1.40 + 2.06)/3 = 1.863333, while, |D| = |Dif\textsubscript{t} - Tdif\textsubscript{t-1}| = |1.88 - 1.863333| = 0.016667.

(3) We consider the maximum/minimum of |D|, at the event dates in the sample period, to be the least/most transparent monetary policy over the period, and we calculate the index as follows:

\[ T_t = \text{transparency index} = \frac{100}{e^{\left|D_t\right|}}. \]  

If |D| = 0\%, we will have T = 100\%, the highest transparency degree and for |D| = 10\% we will have T = 0.0045\% which may be considered zero transparency for the case of the United States. Consequently, our calculated index for the first event day in the sample period (October 8, 1982) is \(100/e^{\left|0.016667\right|} = 98.347\). In sum, when the Treasury bill market is not efficient in a strong form, forward-looking market participants can completely perceive the target rate, only due to 100\% transparency, so that \(e^{\left|D\right|} = 1\). See Figure 3 for the annual average of the basic transparency index.

Figure 3 about here

Since we assumed no uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921), to make the index unbiased, Figure 3 has been adjusted for the uncertainty created by the October 87 stock market crisis and before the start of Chairman Greenspan’s tenure in 1987. The index in this figure is also adjusted for the uncertainty created by the September 2001 crisis.\footnote{It should be noted while after September 11, 2001 market participants knew the Fed would ease policy, but a great deal of uncertainty existed on the magnitude of the expansion as well as on the economy.} For all other analyses in this paper the raw index is used. For instance, for the entire sample, index T averages 83.64\%. The maximum value of T is 100 (full transparency or full anticipation) and it occurs on September 26, 1995. The least transparent outcome (T = 23.42\%) occurs, early on in the sample, on December 16, 1987 while a fairly low value for T also occurs on September 17, 2001. These two low values are clearly due to
the uncertainty created by the events of the stock market crisis in 1987 and of September 2001, respectively.

It should be again noted that the index developed in this paper is market based. It, therefore, reflects what market participants perceive from hints, actions or reactions (to exogenous shocks) of the monetary authorities and not what these authorities intend to convey to the market. Specifically, the public availability of the data does not suffice to achieve transparency. What is important is how agents manipulate the data to extract useful information. In other words, a market-based measure of monetary transparency depends on the understanding (manipulation) of the data. Namely, market participants may observe a different norm/direction in the policy during the day or within a month or a period than what the central bank actually follows. Furthermore, even though monetary authorities believe they have been as transparent as before, the index developed in this paper reflects changes in what market participants understand from policy regime changes. Consequently, a market-based transparency index may fluctuate as policy regime changes or when there are exogenous shocks to the system when agents are forward looking. This can be clearly seen in our index (Figure 3).

As explained in Section II, during the sample period there have been policy regime changes, which, without any doubt, resulted in a higher monetary policy transparency in the United States. These changes occurred on August 11, 1987, October 19, 1989, February 4, 1994, August 19, 1997, May 18, 1999, February 2, 2000 and, March 19, 2002. We will use our index to determine whether the above transparency-oriented changes at the Fed have indeed increased the market’s understanding of Fed policies.

Since the basic index, \( T \), has irregular intervals a quarterly sample out of the observations was constructed. Namely, we took the average of the index in each quarter. According to both Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, variable \( T \) is stationary.\(^{11}\) Table 5 reports the means with their standard errors (adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity) of the index before and after each policy regime change. All means

\(^{11}\) The absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller \( t \) was estimated to be 6.77 [more than 2.89 (5% critical value)] and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric \( t \) was estimated to be 7.12 [more than 2.89 (5% critical value)]. Both of these tests were done for a lag length of zero (where, for a global lag of 20 days, the AIC and SC criteria are at their minimum).
are statistically significant. The above policy regime changes resulted in positive and statistically significant changes in the transparency index. Consequently, according to these results, the index developed in this paper clearly captures the increase in the monetary policy transparency created by the above policy regime changes. Namely, the index developed in this paper fully reflects a transparency index.

C. Extension of the Index

Being a variable with unequal intervals, the basic index developed in this paper can be used in studies with quarterly or less frequent data. Alternatively, it restricts the researchers to specific techniques of estimation, such as the factor-model approach which allows researchers to deal systematically with data irregularities [e.g., Stock and Watson (2002)]. To make the measure suitable for all kinds of research, using the above methodology and logic, we extend our index as follows. For the event days, the index is defined exactly as before [Equation (6)]. For all other days, we compute an estimated or forecasted value of \( \hat{D}_t \), called \( \hat{D}_t \), where \( \hat{D}_t = |D_{it} - Ad_{it}| \), with \( D_{it} \) is defined as before (\( = FF_t - TB_t \)) and with \( Ad_{it} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{j} D_{i,t}}{n} \), where \( j \) is the last event day and \( n \) is the number of days since the last event day. Given \( \hat{D}_t \), we calculate an index for non-event days \( \hat{T}_t \),

\[
\hat{T}_t = 100 / e^{\hat{D}_t}.
\]

Note that our index \( \hat{T}_t \) is dynamic and also continuous in the sense that we can construct it for intraday minute or even shorter-interval, instead of daily, observations. It should be mentioned that there are several important characteristics of the Federal funds market (e.g., the last day of the reserve maintenance period, the last day of quarters, years and months, etc.) that lead to predictable movements in the funds rate without any impact on three-month Treasury bill rate. The daily index, consequently, can be affected, mostly, negatively by these characteristics. To avoid a biased calculation of the daily index, we will filter (dummy out) the daily index for these features of the Fed funds market.

To further clarify how the index is constructed on non-event days consider once again the first two event dates in the sample \( i = \) October 5, 1982 and \( j = \) October 8, 1982,
and assume that we want $\hat{T}_t$ for $t = \text{October 7, 1982}$. We first compute

$$ Adif_t = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{j} \text{Dif}_{t-i}}{n} = \frac{(2.13+1.40)/2}{1} = 1.765. $$

We then compute $\hat{D}_t = |\text{Dif}_t - Adif_t| = |2.06-1.765| = 0.295$, and $\hat{T}_t = 100 / e^{0.295} = 74.453159$. Figure 4 depicts the annual average of the extended index. Note that for event days the extended index is given by $T_t$ and for non-event days, by $\hat{T}_t$. On average, for the entire sample period, the extended transparency index equals 85.68% which is close to the estimated average of the basic index (83.64%).

Figure 4 about here

As Figure 4 shows, the extended index is smoother than the basic index as it contains more information. However, these two indices show almost the same movements during the sample period, except in 1998 when they deviate from each other by 10%. We will again investigate, using our daily observations and extended index, whether the regime changes of August 11, 1987, October 19, 1989, February 4, 1994, August 19, 1997, May 18, 1999, February 2, 2000, and March 19, 2002 have resulted in more transparency (as measured by our extended index). According to both Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, our extended index $\hat{T}$ is stationary. \(^{12}\) Table 5 also reports the means with their standard errors (adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity) of the daily index before and after each policy regime change. As the results reported in the table indicate, all means and their changes are positive and statistically significant, confirming the earlier findings that these policy regime changes resulted in a higher monetary policy transparency. Furthermore, the results imply that the daily monetary policy transparency index developed in this paper also fully and clearly captures the increase in the monetary policy transparency created by the above policy regime changes. Namely, the daily index developed in this paper also fully reflects a monetary policy transparency index. It should be emphasized again, that as both

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\(^{12}\) The absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller $t$ was estimated to be 41.46 [more than 2.86 (5% critical value)] and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric $t$ for the lag length of 4 (where, for a global lag of 20 days, the AIC and SC criteria are at their minimum) was estimated to be 42.32 [more than 2.86 (5% critical value)].
developed indexes reflect, the view of the market, based on the actions of the central bank, could rapidly change if agents are forward looking. Both indexes are based on two important assumptions: FF and TB are cointegrated and market participants are forward looking, i.e., expectations are formed rationally and the behaviors of participants in the overnight money market in the United States are not policy invariant. We provided empirical evidence for these two important assumptions in the previous section.

IV. Risk and Volatility in the Money Market: Further Evaluation of the Index

It is commonly believed [e.g., Thornton (1996) and Blinder et al. (2001)] that monetary policy transparency leads to lower uncertainty and risk in financial markets. If our indexes, both the basic and the extended, are a true proxy for monetary policy transparency in the United States, it should have a negative relationship with the risk observed in the money market in the country. This section is devoted to such an investigation. We will first test if the index has a negative impact on the risk in the money market. We will conduct this test by using the rational expectations model of the term structure. The test is based on the idea that the more the Fed conveys its private information to the market the higher the forecast ability of the market participants will be and, consequently, they will demand a lower risk premium. We then test if our index has any impact on the volatility in the money market in the United States. This test is based on the idea that a higher volatility of the return in the money market is associated with a higher risk in the market and, therefore, if a more transparent monetary policy results in a lower volatility it will help to reduce risk in the money market.

A. Risk in the Money Market and the Index

The pure (rational) expectations model of the term structure (RE), in which the term premia are set identically to zero, implies that at any moment in time, the expected TB, for example, prevailing at the beginning of three months from now \((1 + TB^t_3)\) should be equal to the implied forward three-month Treasury bill rate (FTB\(_t\)) in the absence of term premium or any other risk. From the first statement of the theory [e.g., Van Horne (1965)], we know that 

\[
FTB_t = \frac{(1 + TB_6/4)^2}{1 + TB_t/4} - 1
\]

Here TB\(_6\) is the six-month
spot rate and we assume both six- and three-month spot Treasury bill rates are at the annual rate. Specifically, we can write:

\[ 1 + 3TB_t^e = FTB_t \]  \hspace{1cm} (8)

If this equality is violated, investors and speculators, trade three- and six-month Treasury bills, to capture potential arbitrage profits, until Equation (8) is restored. For example, if \( 1 + 3TB_t^e > FTB_t \) speculators will sell their six-month bills and buy three-month bills, pushing the price of six-month bills down \( (TB6_t \text{ will go up}) \) and increasing the price of three-month bills up \( (TB3_t \text{ will go down}) \). This speculative activity continues until the potential for speculative profits is eliminated, i.e., \( 1 + 3TB_t^e \) is again equal to \( FTB_t \).

Furthermore, by orthogonal decomposition at any given time \( t \) we have:

\[ TB_t = TB_t^e + V_t \]  \hspace{1cm} (9)

where \( V_t \) is the agents’ forecast error in the absence of transaction costs, risk and other premia (including term premium, liquidity premium and reinvestment premium).

Substituting (8) in (9) yields:

\[ TB_{t+1} = FTB_t + V_{t+1} \]  \hspace{1cm} (10)

If the market is efficient (expectations are rational), \( TB_{t+1} - FTB_t = V_{t+1} \) is stationary \([\text{e.g., Campbell and Shiller (1987)}]\) and, in the absence of risk premia and transaction costs, has a zero mean. The error term \( (V_t) \) is stationary as both Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests reject the null hypothesis that \( V_t \) is not stationary. The absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller \( t \) was estimated to be 6.87 and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric \( t \) for the lag length of 4 was estimated to be 7.20, both \( t \) statistics results are higher than 2.86 (5% critical value).\(^{13}\) However, the mean of \( V_t \) over our sample period was found to be -0.30%, at the annual rate, with an autocorrelated-heteroscedastic adjusted \( t \) statistic of -17.73.\(^{14}\) The mean of the absolute value of \( V_t \) was found to be 0.42%, at the annual rate, with an autocorrelated-heteroscedastic adjusted \( t \) statistic of 31.4. Both of these means are far from being zero, indicating term premium or other risk premia exist, assuming a trivial transaction cost.

\[^{13}\text{The lag length in augmented Dickey-Fuller or Phillips-Perron nonparametric tests was obtained according to AIC and SC criteria for a global lag of 20 days.}\]

\[^{14}\text{Autocorrelation is due to the overlapping observations. We used, as before, Newey and West’s (1987) robusterror for 5-order moving average to correct the standard error.}\]
hypothesis is valid in the United States money market, and risk premia exist) is consistent, among many others, with the finding of Van Horne (1965), Mankiw and Miron (1986) and Taylor (1992).

We will, consequently, modify Equation (10) to

$$TB_{t+1} = FTB_t + RP_{t+1} + V_{t+1} = FTB_t + W_{t+1},$$

where \( RP \) is risk premia and \( W_t = RP_t + V_t \). Note that \( RP \) includes term, liquidity, interest exposure and reinvestment risk premia where reinvestment risk premium has a negative effect on \( RP \). If our index is a satisfactory representative of the monetary policy transparency in the United States it should have a negative relationship with \( W_t \) in Equation (11), see Thornton (1996), Haldane and Read (2000) and Blinder et al. (2001), among others, for arguments and econometric tests on the relationship between transparency and forecast errors of market participants.

We estimate the following equation:

$$|W_t| = \xi_0 + \xi_1 LT_{t-1} + DUM_{t-1}' \varsigma + \epsilon_t,$$

where \(|W_t|\) is the absolute value of the forecast error from Equation (11), \( LT_t \) is the logarithm of \( \hat{T}_t \), \( \xi \)'s are constant parameters, \( \varsigma \) is a vector of constant parameters and \( \epsilon_t \) is the white noise disturbance term. Vector DUM (defined earlier) included in the equation in order to capture the impact of monetary policy regime changes as well as other shocks on the risk premia.

Note that variables \( LT \) and DUM enter in Equation (12) with one lag length (three months ago) since the implied forward rate was used three months before (at the time of forecast) the actual rate was realized. Our index, if it is a real proxy for monetary transparency in the United States, should have a negative relationship with the risk premia if the estimated \( \xi_1 \) is negative and statistically significant. Since our sample is daily observations, \( LT \) is our extended index and the lag length is 90 days. Note that the index and the calculated forward rate [an element of \(|W_t| = TB_t - FTB_{t-1}\)] have the same lag length in Equation (12). However, there is no theoretical reason to believe that the index can be influenced by the calculated forward rate. Furthermore, we can investigate the causality between these two stationary variables by estimating each variable by its 20 lagged values as well as the lagged values of the other variable.
By doing so, we found the Wald test on the coefficients of twenty lagged values of LT_t in a regression of LT_t on its twenty lagged values as well as twenty lagged values of |W_t| is 113.93 (p-value=0.00), while the Wald test on twenty lagged values of |W_t| is 14.09 (p-value=0.70). At the same time, the Wald test on the coefficients of twenty lagged values of |W_t| in a regression of |W_t| on its twenty lagged values as well as twenty lagged values of LT_t is 4841.96 (p-value=0.00), while the Wald test on twenty lagged values of LT_t is 48.54 (p-value=0.00). This result implies that LT_t Granger causes |W_t| while |W_t| does not Granger cause LT_t. Specifically, we conclude LT_t is strongly exogenous in Equation (12).\(^{15}\)

Equation (13) is the parsimonious estimated result of Equation (12), where the figures in brackets are standard errors adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.

\[
|W_t| = 1.03 (0.21) - 0.12 (0.04) LT_{t-1} - 0.13 (0.02) TA_{t-1} + 0.15 (0.07) REMA_{t-1} \\
-0.19 (0.05) GREEN_{t-1} + 0.51 (0.03) D010917_{t-1} + 0.39 (0.01) D010103_{t-1} \\
+ 0.15 (0.01) D940418_{t-1} + 0.57 (0.15) OCT87_{t-1} -0.52(0.25) D851231_{t-1},
\]

\[R^2=0.09, \sigma=0.39, \text{RESET}=0.20 \text{ (significance level}=0.90)\]

The estimated coefficient of LT is negative and statistically significant implying that as the monetary policy is more transparent the forecast errors and risk premia will fall. This result confirms Thornton (1996), Haldane and Read (2000) and Blinder et al. (2001). According to the estimated coefficient of dummy variable TA, the Fed policy of changing FF rate at regular FOMC meetings resulted in a lower risk and forecast error in the money market in the United States.

The positive and statistically significant estimated coefficient of REMA implies that modifying the reserve maintenance period from one week (for most large institutions) to two weeks (for all institutions) in February 1984 resulted in a higher forecast error, while the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the dummy variable GREEN means the forecast error in the money market fell during the tenure of Chairman Greenspan. The estimated coefficient of D010917, as one would expect, is

\(^{15}\) All Wald test results are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
positive and statistically significant, which reflects a higher risk environment associated with September 2001.

Furthermore, as the positive and statistically significant estimated coefficient of D010103 and OCT87 indicates, the unexpected change in the target rate on January 3, 2001 and during the October 87 stock crisis resulted in a higher forecast error. However, according to the estimated coefficient of dummy variable D940418, which is negative, the forecast error (and/or risk premia) fell on April 18, 1994 when the Fed changed the FF target outside its regular meetings. The surprising result is the estimated coefficients of dummy variables D851231 and D861231. Both are negative and statistically significant implying a high volatility of FF on December 31, 1985 and December 30 and 31, 1986 resulted in a lower forecast error on those days.

We also used quarterly averages of the daily observations to create a quarterly sample to test the power of our basic index T. For quarterly observations of T, we also took the average of our index in each quarter. We adjusted Equation (12) for relevant quarterly dummy variables and used the Least Squared estimation technique to estimate the equation with our quarterly data. In the first round of regression, among dummy variables, only REMA was statistically significant. After dropping dummy variables with statistically insignificant coefficients, we found the coefficient of dummy variable REMA to be statistically insignificant. We, consequently, dropped this dummy variable from the regression. The parsimonious estimated Equation (12) with LT being the logarithm of our quarterly index is as follows:

\[
W_t = 7.87 \ (2.41) -1.68 \ (0.54) \ LT_{t-1}. \tag{14}
\]

\[R^2=0.09, \ \sigma=0.33, \ DW=1.69, \ \text{Godfrey}(5)=0.85 \ (\text{significance level}=0.53), \ \text{White}=2.78 \ (\text{significance level}=0.73), \ \text{ARCH}(5)=3.10 \ (\text{significance level}=0.68), \ \text{RESET}=0.10 \ (\text{significance level}=0.95)\]

\[16 \ \text{Again we found LT to be strongly exogenous in Equation (12) as the Wald test on the coefficients of four lagged (incorporating a year) values of } |W_t| \text{ in a regression of } |W_t| \text{ on its four lagged values as well as four lagged values of LT, is 44.98 (p-value=0.00), while the Wald test on twenty lagged values of LT, is 3.96 (p-value=0.41). This result implies that } |W_t| \text{ does not Grange cause LT, indicating that LT is strongly exogenous in Equation (12).} \]
According to the Godfrey test result, the error term is not autocorrelated and as White and ARCH test results indicate it is also homoscedastic. According to the RESET test result, there is no misspecification. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of LT clearly confirms the earlier finding in this paper that a higher monetary policy transparency leads to a lower forecast error (a higher efficiency in the money market).

B. Volatility in the Money Market and the Index

To further investigate the strength of our transparency index we will examine the relationship between our index and risk, measured by the volatility, in the money market. It is important to note that theoretically the impact of transparency on volatility is arguable. For example, in a 1976 Freedom of Information Act filing, the Fed argued in favor of secrecy motivated by its desire to reduce interest rate variability [see Goodfriend (1986)]. This view is consistent with the literature [see, e.g., Dotsey (1987)] that argues that the cleaner and more frequent the “signal” (or the more transparent monetary policy is) the larger the responsiveness of interest rates to news, and thus the greater their volatility.

Another strand of the literature, however, argues that more transparency tends to reduce market volatility. Tabellini (1987), for example, shows that when market participants face parameter uncertainty (or multiplicative uncertainty) and learn over time, using Bayes’ rule, the learning process is the source of additional volatility in asset prices. In this case, more transparency tends to reduce market volatility. Since recent empirical evidence suggests that the 1994 transparency move by the Fed is not associated with higher market volatility [e.g., Thornton (1996)], we will follow Tabellini (1987) and assume a more transparent monetary policy tends to lower volatility.

Earlier in the paper we found that FF and TB are cointegrated and FF Granger causes TB. Hence, we would expect the volatility of the daily movements in FF, say VFF, to affect the volatility of the daily movements in TB, say VTB, (i.e., the risk in the money market). We, therefore, investigate the usefulness of our index in capturing the impact of monetary policy transparency on the volatility of the money market. We assume the volatility of TB is a function of the volatility of FF and policy regime changes.
as well as other shocks specified in EDUM defined below. We assume such a relationship has a linear approximation as specified by Equation (15):

$$V_{TB_t} = \Gamma_0 + \gamma L_{T_t} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Gamma_i V_{FF_{t-i}} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} \Phi_i V_{TB_{t-i}} + EDUM_t' \Gamma + \varepsilon_t, \quad (15)$$

where $\Gamma_0, ..., \Gamma_k, \Phi_0, ..., \Phi_k, \gamma$ and $\Gamma$ are constant parameters. Dummy vector $EDUM = (DUM_t, STU_t, TUE1_t, HB_1_t, HA1_t, HB3_t, HA3_t, LDY_t, LQBA_t, LQ_t)$. Dummy variables included in DUM were defined earlier. To capture the possible volatility in the money market created by other factors, like window dressing, holidays and other seasonality, following Hamilton (1996), we included dummy variables $STU_t$, $TUE1_t$, $HB1_t$, $HA1_t$, $HB3_t$, $HA3_t$, $LDY_t$, $LQBA_t$, and $LQ_t$.

These dummy variables are defined as: $STU = 1$ on Tuesdays before settlement Wednesdays and zero, otherwise. $TUE1 = 1$ on Tuesdays before settlement Wednesdays if Wednesday was a holiday, and zero, otherwise. $HB1 = 1$ for the day before a one-day holiday, and zero, otherwise. $HA1 = 1$ for the day after a one-day holiday, and zero, otherwise. $HB3 = 1$ for the day before a three-day holiday, and zero, otherwise. $HA3 = 1$ for the day after a three-day holiday, and zero, otherwise. $LDY = 1$ for the last day of the year, and zero, otherwise. $LQBA = 1$ for two days before, one day before, on, one day after, or two days after the end of the year, and zero, otherwise. $LQ = 1$ for the last day of the first, second and third quarters, and zero, otherwise. And finally, $LQ = 1$ for the last day of the first, second, third and fourth quarters, and zero, otherwise.

Note that in Equation (15) $V_{FF}$ is predetermined and if $\gamma$ is negative then the higher the monetary policy transparency ($L_T$) is, the lower the volatility of the three-month Treasury bill rate will be. Following, among many, Schwert (1989), Kearney (2000) as well as Kia (2003b), the methodology developed by Davidian and Carroll (1978) was used. Let $x$ be any variable in column vector $x_t = (\Delta TB_t, \Delta FF_t)'$ and estimate Equation (16) for $\Delta TB_t$ and $\Delta FF_t$.

$$x_t = \sum_{i=1}^{20} \alpha_i x_{t-i} + EDUM_t' \mu^x + \varepsilon_t, \quad \varepsilon_t \sim niid(0, \Sigma). \quad (16)$$

The parameters $\alpha^x$s and vector $\mu^x$ are assumed to be constant. We assume a lag length of 20 days (reflecting a month) is sufficient for the market participants to learn from the past
movements in the TB rate. The dummy variables included in vector EDUM capture the shocks on the rate during our sample period. Furthermore, a 20th-order autoregression for the absolute values of errors from Equation (16), including dummy variables in vector EDUM that allow for different daily standard deviations, should be estimated:

$$|\hat{u}_{xt}| = \sigma_{x} = \sum_{i=1}^{20} \delta_{i}^{x} \sigma_{i}^{x} + EDUM_{i}^{x} \eta_{x} + \nu_{t},$$  \hfill (17)$$

where $\delta_{i}^{x}$, for $i = 1$ to 20 and the column vector $\eta_{x}$ are constant parameters. The absolute value of the fitted value of $u_{xt}$ (i.e., $|\hat{u}_{xt}|$) is the standard deviation (adjusted heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation) of $x_{t}$ for $x_{t} = \Delta TB_{t}$ and $\Delta FF_{t}$. However, since the expected error is lower than the standard deviation from a normal distribution, following Schwert (1989), all absolute errors are multiplied by the constant 1.2533.

As it was also mentioned by Kia (2003b), the conditional volatility in Equation (17) represents a generalization of the 20-day rolling standard estimator used by Officer (1973), Fama (1976) and Merton (1980). This is due to the fact that the conditional volatility estimated by Equation (15) allows the conditional mean to vary over time in Equation (16), while it also allows different weights to be applied to the lagged absolute unpredicted changes in Treasury bills and Fed funds rates.

Note that here the conditional mean of these rates was also allowed to vary with the shocks represented by dummy variables included in vector EDUM. Furthermore, Engle (1993) reviews the merit of this measure of volatility, among others. This measure of volatility is similar to the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model of Engle (1982), which, in its various forms, has been widely used in the finance literature. Davidian and Carroll (1978) argue that the specification in Equation (17) based on the absolute value of the prediction errors is more robust than those based on the squared residuals in Equation (16).

However, it should be noted that the variables in equations (15) and (17), excluding dummy variables, are generated regressors. Consequently, when these equations are estimated, their $t$ statistic should be interpreted with caution. To cope with this problem, following, among many, Kearney (2000) and Kia (2003b), the equation for the conditional volatility [i.e., Equation (15)] is estimated jointly with the equations
determining the conditional volatilities of $\Delta TB$ and $\Delta FF$ using the generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation procedure (SUR).\textsuperscript{17}

In the GLS system, two equations are generated by Equation (16), two equations are generated by Equation (17) and including Equation (15) a system of five equations with 5,308 observations (with a final sum of 5,034 usable observations) is estimated. In the GLS estimation, for each equation and the system of equations, we used Newey and West’s (1987) robust error for 5-order moving average to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The GLS estimator incorporates the possibility of cross-equation correlation among the error terms. The final parsimonious GLS estimation result of Equation (15) is given by Equation (18), where standard errors appear in brackets.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{align*}
V_{TB_t} &= 0.02 (0.0023) - 0.002 (0.001) L_{T_t} - 0.002 (0.0009) V_{FF_{t-5}} \\
&\quad - 0.002 (0.0003) V_{FF_{t-15}} + 0.58 (0.03) V_{TB_{t-1}} + 0.38 (0.03) V_{TB_{t-2}} \\
&\quad + 0.09 (0.03) V_{TB_{t-3}} - 0.13 (0.02) V_{TB_{t-4}} - 0.32 (0.03) V_{TB_{t-5}} \\
&\quad + 0.09 (0.02) V_{TB_{t-6}} + 0.18 (0.02) V_{TB_{t-7}} - 0.002 (0.0004) GREEN_t \\
&\quad - 0.002 (0.0005) TAF_t - 0.006 (0.001) ASIA_t - 0.05 (0.0007) D851231_t \\
&\quad - 0.03 (0.003) D861231_t - 0.01 (0.0004) D940418_t - 0.02 (0.0003) D000202_t \\
&\quad - 0.02 (0.0002) D010103_t - 0.02 (0.0003) D010418_t \\
&\quad - 0.03 (0.0004) D010917_t
\end{align*}

\( R^2 = 0.88 \) and \( \sigma \) = the standard error of the regression = 0.0007

The estimated coefficient of our monetary policy index (LT) is negative, indicating that a more transparent monetary policy leads to a lower volatile money market. This result confirms the finding of Tabellini (1987), among many, that a higher degree of transparency tends to lower market volatility. Among all dummy variables included in EDUM, the coefficients of dummy variables GREEN, TAF, ASIA, D851231, D861231, D940418, D000202, D010103, D010418 and D010917 were found to be

\textsuperscript{17} See Kia (2003b), Footnote 4, for a full explanation on why in our case the GLS estimation technique should be used.

\textsuperscript{18} The stationarity test results for VTB are as follows: The absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller \( t \) for a lag length of 8 = 11.07 and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric \( t \) test for the lag length of 3 = 52.04, both \( t \) statistics are higher than 2.86 (5% critical value) indicating the conditional volatility VTB is stationary. The stationarity test results for VFF are as follows: The absolute value of the augmented Dickey Fuller \( t \), for a lag length of 9 = 15.42 and the absolute value of the Phillips-Perron non-parametric \( t \)-test for the lag length of 10 = 49.49, both \( t \) statistics are higher than 2.86 (5% critical value) indicating the conditional volatility VFF is stationary.
statistically significant. As the negative coefficient of dummy variable GREEN indicates, the volatility and risk in the money market fell during the tenure of Chairman Greenspan. As it would be expected, the estimated coefficient of TAF is negative, implying that the Fed’s change of policy regime in October 1989 led to a lower volatility in the money market in the United States.

As it would be expected, the estimated sign of dummy variable ASIA was negative, reflecting the massive intervention of all industrial countries’ central banks in their money markets. The estimated coefficient of dummy variables D851231 and D861231 is negative implying that the outliers in the Fed funds rate in the last days of 1985 and 1986 resulted in a lower volatility in the Treasury bill rate. The estimated coefficient of D940418 is negative implying that on April 18, 1994, when the Fed changed the FF target outside its regular meetings, it helped to lower volatility in the money market.

According to the estimated negative coefficients of dummy variables D000202 when the FOMC started to include a balance-of-risks sentence in its statements replacing the previous bias statement, it led to a reduction in the volatility in the money market. Finally, according to the estimated negative coefficients of dummy variables D010103, D010418 and D010917, a 50-basis point reduction in the target rate on January 3, April 18 and September 17, 2001 reduced the volatility in the money market. We also repeated the above exercise with our quarterly data explained above and our basic index. We found our basic index has a negative effect on volatility, but the estimated coefficient was not statistically significant. The statistically insignificant coefficient could be due to a lack of observations on the index in each quarter. In sum, we showed in this section the monetary policy transparency indexes developed in this paper can be used successfully to detect the impact of monetary policy transparency on risk and volatility.

V. Summary and Conclusions

The existing measures of monetary policy transparency include indicators based on descriptive accounts, surveys, official documents and information as well as market interest rates. However, these measures have some limitations, such as a lack of an objectively designed index or indexes without time-series properties. In this paper, we
developed an objective market-based index, which is dynamic and continuous and can be used to measure monetary policy transparency for a country or, simultaneously, a series of countries, using time-series as well as cross-sectional data.

Assuming that participants in the money market are forward looking, we developed our index for the United States monetary policy for the period October 1982-December 2003. We also investigated the validity of our assumption and found, in fact, money market participants are forward looking and, therefore, their behavior can change with any policy regime or other exogenous shocks in the sense of Lucas (1976). Furthermore, we found, using our index, that the more transparent the monetary policy in the United States is, the less risky and volatile the money market will be. Moreover, the rational expectations model of the term structure is valid in the United States money market, but risk premia in this market exist.

Using our constructed index, we found a negative relationship between monetary policy transparency and risk and volatility in the economy. Furthermore, risk and uncertainty in the money market fell in the United States during the tenure of Chairman Greenspan. Moreover, the Fed policy of changing Fed funds target rate at regular FOMC meetings resulted in a lower risk and forecast error in the money market. We also found that the Fed’s change of policy regime in October 1989, when the Fed started the practice of changing the Fed funds target rates by 25 or 50 basis points, led to a lower volatility in the money market. Finally, we conclude that the practice of a more transparent monetary policy leads to more stability and lower risk in the financial markets.

One possible extension of this study is to modify the index for markets where market participants are not forward looking. Moreover, future studies should use the index developed in this paper to investigate if a more transparent monetary policy leads to higher economic growth. Even though the Federal Reserve became officially transparent only recently, it would also be interesting to do the same exercise for the period starting when the Federal Reserve was first established. Finally, one could also extend this line of research by comparing the power of different time-series market-based measures of monetary policy transparency, including our index and the popular policy surprise measures based on Federal funds futures data.
REFERENCES


Figure 1: Long-Run Stability Test

Test of known beta eq. to beta(t)

1 is the 5% significance level
Figure 2: Monetary Policy Transparency

\[ D_{t} = FF_{t} - TB_{t} \]
\[ D_{t} = D_{t} - T_{d t, t-1} \]
Figure 3: Transparency Index

Basic Index

Figure 4: Extended Transparency Index

Extended Index
Table 1*: Tests of the Cointegration Rank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \lambda_{\text{max}} )</th>
<th>( \lambda_{\text{max}} ) 95%</th>
<th>Trace</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>12.25</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>12.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diagnostic tests**:
- LM(1) \( p \)-value = 0.47
- LM(4) \( p \)-value = 0.92
- Normality \( p \)-value = 0.00

(1) \( \lambda_{\text{max}} \) has been adjusted to correct a possible small sample bias error. Namely, \( \lambda_{\text{max}} \) has been multiplied by the small sample correction factor \( (N - kp)/N \), where \( N \) is the number of observations, \( k \) is the number of lags and \( p \) is the number of endogenous variables, see Cheung and Lai (1993). Consequently, \( \lambda_{\text{max}} = (N-kp) \ln(1-\lambda_i) \).

(2) The source is Osterwald-Lenum (1992), Table 1, p. 469.

(3) Trace has been multiplied by the small sample correction factor \( (N - kp)/N \), see Cheung and Lai (1993).

Consequently, Trace test = - \( \sum_{i=r+1}^{P} \ln(1-\lambda_i) \). Both Trace and \( \lambda_{\text{max}} \) tests were developed in Johansen and Juselius (1991).

* The model includes constant, policy and day-of-the-week dummies. Lag length is 20.

** LM(1) and LM(4) are one and four-order Lagrangian Multiplier test for autocorrelation, respectively [Godfrey (1978)].

Table 2: Causality Tests*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>( \Delta \text{TB} )</th>
<th>( \Delta \text{TB} )</th>
<th>( \Delta \text{FF} )</th>
<th>( \Delta \text{FF} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \text{TB} )</td>
<td>( \Delta \text{TB} )</td>
<td>( \Delta \text{FF} )</td>
<td>( \Delta \text{FF} )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k = 1 The optimum lag length</td>
<td>( \chi^2(3) = 11.12 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(1) = 8.81 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(1) = 3.81 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(1) = 0.49 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k = 5</td>
<td>( \chi^2(5) = 25.06 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(5) = 17.48 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(5) = 113.11 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(5) = 19.70 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k = 10</td>
<td>( \chi^2(10) = 41.22 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(10) = 19.94 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(10) = 153.52 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(10) = 21.11 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k = 15</td>
<td>( \chi^2(15) = 49.01 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(15) = 29.96 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(15) = 239.22 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(15) = 25.10 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k = 20</td>
<td>( \chi^2(20) = 69.80 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(20) = 42.06 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(20) = 222.01 )</td>
<td>( \chi^2(20) = 31.67 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* \( \Delta \text{TB} \) is the first difference of three-month Treasury bill rate and \( \Delta \text{FF} \) is the first difference of Fed funds rate. All Wald tests were corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
Table 3: Conditional and Marginal Models: Treasury Bill and Federal Funds Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables*</th>
<th>Dependent Variable=ΔTB</th>
<th>Hansen’s Stability Li Test (p-value)</th>
<th>Dependent Variable=ΔFF</th>
<th>Hansen’s Stability Li Test (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.001)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔTBt-1</td>
<td>0.10 (0.03)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔTBt-6</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.02)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔTBt-19</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFt</td>
<td>0.02 (0.01)</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFt-1</td>
<td>0.01 (0.004)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFt-3</td>
<td>0.01 (0.002)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECTBt-1</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.003)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECTBt-5</td>
<td>0.001 (0.0002)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ECTB2)(ECTB3)t-12</td>
<td>0.0000004 (0.0000001)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFt-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.30 (0.06)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFt-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.15 (0.02)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFt-5</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.10 (0.02)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFt-6</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.10 (0.02)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFt-7</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.09 (0.02)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFEDAYt-1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.68 (0.17)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFEDAYt-4</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.14 (0.05)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFTAFt-1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.43 (0.04)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFREMAt-19</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.03)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFD020319t-10</td>
<td>-0.28 (0.06)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFD010418t-18</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.06 (0.12)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFFOCT87t-9</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.74 (0.16)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Joint (coeffs + var.) = 12.11 (p-value=0.00)

Joint (coeffs + var.) = 10.97 (p-value=0.00)

* ΔTB is the first difference of three-month Treasury bill rate, ΔFF is the first difference of Fed funds rate, ECTB is the error-correction terms when the long-run relationship (1) is normalized on TB. ΔFFEDAY is the product of ΔFF and EDAY, where EDAY is equal to one for the days (“event”) when the Federal funds target rate was changed and it is equal to zero, otherwise. ΔFFTAF is the product of ΔFF and dummy variable TAF, which is equal to 1 since February 4, 1994 and to zero, otherwise. ΔFFREMA is the product of ΔFF and dummy variable REMA, which is equal to 1 since February 2, 1984 and to zero, otherwise. ΔFFD020319 is the product of ΔFF and dummy variable D020319, which is equal to one since March 19, 2002, when the Fed included in FOMC statements the vote on the directive and the name of dissenter members (if any), and zero, otherwise. ΔFDD010418 is the product of ΔFF and dummy variable D010418, which is equal to one on April 18, 2001 and zero, otherwise. ΔFFOCT87 is the product of ΔFF and dummy variable OCT87, which is equal to one for October 19 to 30, 1987 and zero, otherwise.

** Newey and West’s (1987) robust error for 5-order moving average was used to correct for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
Table 4: Superexogeneity Tests for Variable $\Delta FF_t^*$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables**</th>
<th>Chi-Squared (1) (p-values)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta FF_t - \eta^{FF}$</td>
<td>0.27 (0.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^{FF} (\Delta FF_t - \eta^{FF})$</td>
<td>1.33 (0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(\eta^{FF})^2$</td>
<td>0.56 (0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(\eta^{FF})^3$</td>
<td>3.80 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^{FF} \eta^{FF}$</td>
<td>4.45 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^{FF} (\eta^{FF})^2$</td>
<td>0.01 (0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(\sigma^{FF})^2 \eta^{FF}$</td>
<td>0.19 (0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dev$_{FF}$</td>
<td>7.16 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F-Statistics (or Chi-Squared) on null hypothesis that coefficients of all constructed variables in this column are jointly zero. 7.29 (or 58.32) (0.00) or (0.00)

$\Delta TB_t = \alpha_0 + \psi_0 \Delta FF_t + (\delta_0 - \psi_0) (\Delta FF_t - \eta^{FF}) + \delta_1 \sigma^{FF} (\Delta FF_t - \eta^{FF}) + \psi_1 (\eta^{FF})^2 + \psi_2 (\eta^{FF})^3 + \psi_3 \sigma^{FF} \eta^{FF}$

$+ \psi_4 \sigma^{FF} (\eta^{FF})^2 + \psi_5 \sigma^{FF} (\eta^{FF})^2 + \psi_6$ Dev$_{FF}$ + $z' \gamma + u_t$.

Newey and West’s (1987) robust error for 5-order moving average was used to correct for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. $\hat{R}^2=0.04$, $\sigma=0.06$, DW=1.98, Godfrey (5)=1.26 (significance level=0.27), White=239 (significance level=0.01) and ARCH (5)=285 (significance level=0.00).

** $\Delta TB$ is the first difference of three-month Treasury bill rate, $\Delta FF$ is the first difference of Fed funds rate, $\eta^{FF}$ is the conditional mean of $\Delta FF$, $\sigma^{FF}$ is the conditional variance of $\Delta FF$, and Dev$_{FF}$ is the deviation of variance of the error term from a five-period ARCH error of $\Delta FF$. **
Table 5: Policy Regime Changes and Monetary Transparency - Standard Errors Adjusted for Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation in Brackets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Quarterly Index</th>
<th>Daily Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1982-Aug. 1987</td>
<td>77.75 (2.79)</td>
<td>80.84 (1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1987-Dec. 2003: Greenspan period*</td>
<td>8.06 (3.07)</td>
<td>6.26 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1982-Oct. 1989</td>
<td>78.19 (2.20)</td>
<td>81.81 (0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1989-Dec. 2003: 25 and 50 bp period**</td>
<td>8.66 (2.52)</td>
<td>5.78 (0.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1982-Feb. 1994</td>
<td>81.26 (1.73)</td>
<td>83.14 (0.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1994-Dec. 2003: Announcing Target Change period***</td>
<td>5.83 (2.29)</td>
<td>5.43 (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1982-Aug. 1997</td>
<td>82.11 (1.48)</td>
<td>83.79 (0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1997-Dec. 2003: Target &amp; NY period****</td>
<td>6.19 (2.33)</td>
<td>6.28 (0.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1982-May. 1999</td>
<td>82.24 (1.36)</td>
<td>84.10 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1999-Dec. 2003: Explanation period*****</td>
<td>7.87 (2.44)</td>
<td>7.22 (0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1982-Feb. 2000</td>
<td>82.22 (1.29)</td>
<td>84.24 (0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2000-Dec. 2003: Balance of Risk period******</td>
<td>9.45 (2.32)</td>
<td>7.78 (0.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1982-Mar. 2002</td>
<td>82.81 (1.22)</td>
<td>84.81 (0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2002-Dec. 2003: Vote &amp; Names period*******</td>
<td>12.68 (1.38)</td>
<td>10.22 (0.66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Alan Greenspan took office as Chairman of the Fed on August 11, 1987.

** On October 19, 1989, the Fed started the practice of changing the Fed funds target rate in multiples of 25 and 50 basis points.

***Beginning on February 4, 1994, the Fed started announcing policy decisions at the conclusion of the FOMC meetings.

****The FOMC started to include a quantitative Fed funds rate in its Directive to the NY Fed Trading desk.

***** Since May 18, 1999, the Fed extended its explanations regarding policy decisions, and started to include in press statements an indication of the FOMC’s view regarding prospective developments (or the policy bias).

****** On January 19, 2000, the FOMC issued a press statement explaining that it would include a balance-of-risks sentence in its statements, replacing the previous bias statement. The practice was first implemented the following FOMC meeting, on February 2.

******* Since March 19, 2002, the Fed has included in FOMC statements the vote on the directive and the name of dissenter members (if any).