Balancing Work and Care in the Post-Soviet Russian Labor Market

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Abstract

Female employment rates in Russia have declined substantially since the end of the Soviet period. At the same time, there has been pronounced change in policies enabling women to balance work and family, or “familial policies.” The availability of child care has contracted sharply, and long maternity and parental leaves have been introduced. This paper describes these changes within the context of Russia in transition, and explores the effect of child care and leave policy on women’s employment using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. We conclude that, over the longer-term, women are more likely to remain employed if they work for enterprises which provide child care and maternity leaves. Yet new, private enterprises are less likely to provide such leaves, painting a somewhat bleak picture of the long-term employment prospects for women in Russia.

Keywords: Russia, transition, maternity/parental leave, child care, women’s employment.

JEL codes: J22, P23, P36
Introduction

The Soviet period in the Russian history is traditionally characterized as a period of high female labour force participation. While female employment in Russia still remains relatively high compared with many other countries, the position of women in the Russian labor market has deteriorated dramatically in the post-Soviet period. The number of employed women has decreased by 22 percent, from 39.1 million in 1990 to 30.5 million in 1998. Part of the fall is due to a decline in overall employment. Russia has changed from a country with close to universal employment during the Soviet area to one of the lower employment developed countries: the percentage of those between 15 and 64 employed in Russia was 58.6 percent in 2001, lower than the EU-15 average of 64.2 percent or the US at 62.4 percent (Natalia Smirnova, 2004). The brunt of the decline in employment has been borne by women: 72 percent of the unemployed were women in 1993, and 64 percent in 1998.

Several explanations exist for the decline in female employment. One is that, after the elimination of the requirement for compulsory employment at the beginning of transition, many workers voluntarily exited the labour force. Another is that privatization and need to eliminate excess labour increased tensions in the labor market and pushed out traditionally vulnerable groups, including women with children. With ineffective enforcement of laws establishing job protection for women, and insufficient national mechanisms for ensuring that those rights are obeyed, including weak court and pre-court case resolution systems and trade unions, combined with the dramatic decline in economic welfare in all the countries of the former Soviet bloc, the negative effect of privatization was most keenly felt by women.

There is now a fairly extensively literature on changes in the Russian labor market during the

1 Figures on women as a percentage of the unemployed derived from a Survey conducted by Centre for Labour Market Studies (CLMS) in Moscow in 1999 within the framework of Russian-Canadian Project "Women and Labour Market Reform in Russia," which was funded by the Canadian International Development Agency and administered by Carleton University, Ottawa. It was conducted in October 1999 in five Russian regions: Moscow, Kirov, Murmansk, Nizhny Novgorod, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area (Salekhard and Urengoi). Survey participants included heads of enterprises, employees and trade union representatives of the same enterprises and organizations. A total of 278 enterprises and employers were surveyed (about 50 in each of the regions and 77 in Moscow and Moscow region) with total of 2213 employees and 131 trade union leader.

2 CLMS, 1999
transition period (see, for example, Rostislav. I. Kapelushnikov, 2001; Katarina Katz, 2002; Ann-Mari Sätre Ahlander, 2001; Smirnova, 2004; Hartmut Lehmann and Jonathan Wadsworth, 2000; Anna Lukyanova, 2003; Louise Grogan, 2000), which explores these factors among others.

Yet, with a few exceptions (such as Michael Lokshin, 1999; Judith R McKinnen, 2004) the existing literature on Russian labor markets neglects the possible role of family policy in explaining these changes. This is despite a relatively large literature showing that policies towards women with children in Western Europe and North America do indeed affect women’s labor market participation. The neglect of family policy is unfortunate since policies towards families, particularly state support for women with children, have changed dramatically in the post-Soviet period. Family support systems in Russia at the onset of transformation were widely available and tended to be generous and comprehensive. Most family programs were designed by the central government but delivered through state enterprises, agricultural collectives, and local governments. Numerous programs, including child care and leave provisions, were attached to the workplace. Family policies supported women’s participation in the labour force, but also made employment the main access route to child care and related services, as is the case in countries with conservative welfare regimes. With transformation, however, all this has changed.

The 1990s and early years of the 21st century have seen fundamental changes in child care arrangements, job protection for (pregnant) women, and maternity/parental leave policies in Russia. Familial policies have been introduced to encourage women to have children and stay home with them. There has been a movement from Soviet-style enterprise-level provision of services to a more Western European, social insurance model, where the government collects social insurance or social security premiums and pays out maternity or parental or other benefits. Yet these new systems coexist with Soviet-era enterprise provision, and a hard neo-liberal private sector sometimes offering informal contracts and no benefits at all. The aim of this paper is, first, to describe these complex changes and, second, to investigate the effect of these changes on women’s employment.

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**Russia in Transition**

Three sets of factors underlie current Russian policy towards women as workers and mothers. The first is broad economic and demographic factors. Transition introduced not only markets to Russia, but also unemployment, job insecurity, and rising income inequality and radically worse labor market prospects for male workers with low education and declining-industry skills. Superimposed on these economic and political realities was and is a demographic crisis of extremely high abortion and mortality rates and very low fertility rates. The country’s total fertility rate, which was around two lifetime births per woman from the late 1960s through the early 1980s, as a result of deliberate pro-natalist policies, dropped steeply after 1987, falling to 1.4 births per woman in 1994 (Goskomstat of Russia, 2002). Most recent United Nations Human Development Report data puts the Russian birthrate at 1.1 over the 2000 to 2005 period. In 2000, there were 70 percent more abortions than live births (Grogan and Julie Horrocks, 2005). At the same time, male life plummeted from 62.2 percent in 1984 to 57.6 percent in 1994 (Goskomstat of Russia 2002), although it seems to have recovered slightly to 60.7 years in 2002. These demographic and macroeconomic factors are continually in the background, conditioning Russian policy and legislation.

Russia is not unique in experiencing problems. Russia’s *particular* response to the demographic and economic crisis is shaped by Russian values. Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made headlines in 1987 when he said perestroika offered Soviet women what they really wanted – the chance to stay at home with their children (UNICEF 1999). Yet he was voicing sentiments shared by many Russian men. 1994 World Values Survey data cited by Heather Antecol (2003) found that 76 percent of Russian men agreed or strongly agreed that preschool children suffer in their mother is working, and 87 percent agree that being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay - higher levels of agreement than in any other

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European country surveyed, or the US and Canada. A 1999 survey carried out by the Centre for Labour Market Studies in Moscow that interviewed 278 managers found 88 percent of employers preferred to hire men (when asked about specific positions, for example, receptionist, more employers had a preference for women). Of that 88 percent, 23.4 cited higher productivity and 11.4 percent fewer associated costs as the reason for their preference. Women’s child care leave was singled out as particularly costly. Put together, these various snapshots paint a consistent picture of Russia perhaps the most traditional of all of Western developed countries in terms of male attitudes towards gender roles.

The economic and demographic crisis, along with Russian values, shapes the Russian leadership’s policy priorities. Yet, as has been argued by, for example, Sylvia Walby (2004), a country’s gender regime – the way in which gender roles are structured – is path dependent. Put simply, where you start matters. Russian policy is constrained by the Soviet legacy. Under the Soviet regime, social services such as child benefits, maternity provisions, family allowances, child care services, and sanatoria (health resorts) were provided by enterprises, which functioned as “micro-welfare states.” Employment was the primary, often the sole, means by which people could access social services. Child care is a clear and well-documented example. There are two main forms of child care in Russia: nurseries for children up to the age of 3, and kindergartens for 4 to 6 year olds. Children start school at age seven. During the Soviet era, there was only a very minimal taxpayer-funded government run kindergarten system. Child care institutions were seen as part of the educational system. However they were mostly provided by state enterprises. Because

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6 The sole exception is 77 percent agreement in Hungary that preschool children suffer if their mother works for pay. By way of contrast, agreement for these statements in the US is less than 50 percent for preschool children suffer and 45 percent for being a housewife is as fulfilling (Antecol, 2003, p. 33).

7 Centre for Labour Market Studies, 1999.
employment was near universal, all children had access to pre-school institutions through a parent’s workplace.\(^8\)

Transition saw the emergence of both privatized, formerly public, enterprises and newly created private enterprises. The former state enterprises often initially did not change anything in their operation except the official form of ownership, and inherited extensive social infrastructure from the Soviet period. However the micro-welfare state model proved to be unsustainable in the face of increased domestic and international competition. Enterprises minimized production costs by reducing their provision of the social services, including child care. The percentage of children in child care facilities collapsed in the initial part of the transition period – for example, the percentage of children attending nurseries declined from 26 percent in 1989 to 14 percent in 1992. The number of preschool institutions declined from 87.9 in 1990 to 53.2 thousand in 2000. To some extent, enterprise level provision has been replaced by government provision, as enterprises have transferred their social infrastructure to local governments. However there are still gaps in provision: in 2001, just under 40 percent of 4 to 6 year olds attended kindergarten.\(^9\)

The void left by the withdrawal of state enterprises has not been filled by the private sector. Less than one percent of Russian children are cared for in a privately-owned child care centre.\(^10\) Newly created enterprises, facing an unstable economy and lacking a pre-existing infrastructure, often utilize informal contracts to avoid obligations to provide social benefits, as will be elaborated later in the subsequent sections of the paper. The 1999 law on the foundations of obligatory social insurance shifted the responsibility for paying child benefits, family allowances, maternity and other leaves away from the enterprises to regional social insurance funds. In 2000 responsibility for providing preschool, kindergarten education shifted to local governments. Yet, as we discuss below, substantial gaps in service provision remain.

\(^8\) In the Russian system, child care institutions are often referred to as "preschool educational institutions," and are seen as a part of an educational system. Therefore this paper uses terms "child care" and "preschool" institutions interchangeably.

\(^9\) Calculated by authors from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey.

\(^10\) Calculated by authors from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, 2001 survey.
These three features of transition: economic and demographic crisis, traditional Russian male values, and an unsustainable system of enterprise level provision, created a perfect environment for the growth of a traditional policy towards families and children. If women could only be persuaded to stay at home and look after their children, it would solve economic problems (men could fill jobs left vacant by women) and demographic problems (more children). It would mesh with widely held beliefs (at least, widely held by men) about the appropriate role of women. And the provision of social services by women would relieve enterprises and governments of the pressure to provide services, creating cost savings. In the next section we will show how maternity and parental leaves progressively expanded during the transition period, encouraging women to, at least temporarily, leave the workforce. We will then examine the effect of family policies on women’s employment. Yet in all of the analysis, one thing must be borne in mind. However strong the pro-family ideology, women’s actions are shaped and constrained by economic reality. In traditional-values Russia, 97 percent of men agree or strongly agree that most women have to work these days to support their families, more agreement than in any other country surveyed (Antecol, 2003).

**Legislative/legal framework**

At the beginning of the 1990s, a number of the family and labour laws which were drafted during the Soviet period were still in force. Russia had a long-standing tradition of employer-paid maternity leaves at full salary. Traditionally, entitlement to maternity leave has been linked to employment. In 1993, the leave was extended to women who are laid off during pregnancy; in 1995, it was extended to full-time students; and in 1997 it was extended to 156 days for multiple births.

At the present time, there are two major types of leaves: maternity and “parental” leave. Maternity leaves normally last 140 days (70 days before and 70 days after the delivery). Mothers with at least one year of employment receive 100 percent of their regular
salary during their maternity leave with a maximum total monthly payment of 85 times the minimum monthly wage (set at 450 roubles or about $14 per month in 2002).  

Under the Soviet regime, it was possible for women to take “child care” leaves after their maternity leave entitlement ended. Child care leave was extended up to 36 months in 1991. In 2002 parental leave replaced child care leave and, while the name changed, the length of time people could claim benefits remained unchanged. While on leave, a parent will receive a leave payment of 500 roubles (about $17) per month until the child reaches 1.5 years old and 50 roubles (about $1.7) per month during the age of a child from 1.5 to 3 years old. The leave is still normally taken by women, though if a father or other family member wishes to take any part of this leave, he may (with the written permission of the mother). Women have an opportunity to work part-time or from home while taking the leave, or to take the leave in parts (with breaks) with the right to return to the same position. 

The main condition for taking leave is access to social insurance by a mother, which (except, for the self-employed, farmers and students) is provided by employer. Up until 2001, maternity leaves and the former child care leave were paid by the employer. According to the new labour code, benefits are paid out of regional “social insurance funds” until the child reaches 1.5 years old. The leave benefits from child's 1.5 to 3 years old are still paid by the employer from the payroll funds.

Employers, instead of paying benefits directly, were required to pay a new, “single social tax,” or “unified social tax” amounting to 35.6 percent of an employee’s earnings up to 100,000 roubles (around $3,500 US), 20 percent of earnings between 100,000 and 300,000 roubles, and lower amounts on higher earnings. In other words, if an enterprise paid an employee 50,000 roubles per year, it would pay an additional 17,800 roubles into the social insurance funds.

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13 1995 Federal Law on State Benefits to Individuals with Children (with amendments made in 2002)
14 2001 Presidential Decree #136
insurance fund (KPMG, 2004). In turn, the social insurance fund pays for employees’ maternity, parental and other leaves, as well as other pension and other benefits.

Yet a change in gender regime is rarely straightforward, and new private sector employers have resisted both Soviet-style enterprise-level provision of benefits, and the new social insurance funds. Employers often associate costs with extended paid leaves, which in turn impedes female employment. As noted in the previous section, research has found that employers prefer to hire men. More than 50 per cent of employers surveyed by the Centre for Labor Market Studies in 1999 indicated that the parental leave would decrease women's attractiveness as employees. Since the social insurance fund has been paying the maternity and parental leave allowances, the costs of leave are now mostly associated with replacement workers (hiring, letting them go at the end of the leave), but lingering perceptions may still remain.

In practice, enterprises can resist the gender regime by finding ways to reduce their obligations to provide benefits, through utilization of gaps in the legislation, exploiting the lack of law enforcement mechanisms, or not hiring women. To borrow a term from the taxation literature, the practice of newly privatized firms towards workers rights is more like “avoidance”, that is, attempting to minimize provision while mostly staying within the law. The practice of the newly emerging private enterprises, however, is more like “evasion”, using illegal means to get around providing benefits.

The most common evasion mechanism is the practice of "informal contracts," when employees (both men and women), in return for declining legally-stipulated social benefits, are promised and paid “shadow” salaries much (numbers vary - from twice as much to 20 - literally depending on the enterprise) higher than the ones officially stated in the labor contract. The information about the wages and salaries is confidential given its character.

17 Centre for Labour Market Studies, 1999
18 Wadsworth and Lehmann (2000) found that Russian women were less likely than men to be in new jobs, unlike say Britain, where the opposite is true.
when a person gets hired. However, quite often an employee has only a very blurry idea of
the amount of the compensation to be received every month.19

The significance of informal agreements and their impact on female employment
cannot be underestimated. Within the general legislative framework around family created by
the government, in the conditions of poor law enforcement, "the actual terms are being
negotiated at the individual level directly between employers and employees. This situation
puts many parents in a poor bargaining position, especially working women, who are still the
primary users of family leaves" (UNICEF 1999: 54).

The reason why enterprises would offer informal contracts are obvious: paying salary
for employees on leave (under the old system) or paying 35.6 percent of payroll into a social
insurance fund (under the new system), as well as providing a host of other employment
rights, is expensive. But why do workers agree to these conditions? There is something in
informal contracts for employees: when enterprises evade the single social tax, employees
evade income tax, which at 13 percent (KPMG, 2004) is low by North American standards,
but still not trivial. Eligibility for some benefits, such as parental leave, depends solely on
whether or not you have employment, not how much you get paid, so why should anyone pay
more premiums for the same benefits? To the extent that informal contracts are being offered
by new firms, workers may accept informal working conditions to enter a dynamic, growing,
private sector. Or, in an economy of high and persistent unemployment, people may simply
have no alternatives. Trading off benefits for increased salary will be particularly attractive
for younger workers, those in good health, and those without family responsibilities and,
because they are less likely to take advantage of maternity and parental leaves, men – just as,
in the US, young, unattached, healthy workers may choose the cheapest, no-frills HMO
policy their company has on offer.

19 19 This discussion draws from an analytical report prepared by the Centre for Labour Market Studies,
Moscow within the framework of Russian-Canadian Project "Women and Labour Market Reform in Russia,"
which was funded by the Canadian International Development Agency and administered by Carleton
University, Ottawa. For more information about the survey, please contact authors directly.
Yet what does the lack of benefits mean for women in Russia? What does it mean to be working in the old economy, with child care, leave, and other benefits, compared to the new economy, with no protection? To explore this issue, we did some empirical research.

**The Data**

Below we analyze which enterprises are more likely to provide family benefits and the impact of family policies, notably maternity leave and provision of child care on the position of women in the labour market in 2002 using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). The RLMS is a household-based survey designed as a panel study with a national probability sample of 4718 households. It is perhaps the most widely used dataset in the study of Russian labor markets (see, for example, Smirnova, 2004; Lehmann and Wadsworth, 2000; Lukyanova, 2003; Grogan and Horrocks, 2005). The data set we use is comprised of ten rounds conducted from 1992 to 2002. Rounds I-IV surveyed over six thousand households while Rounds V-X surveyed a different panel of approximately four thousand households. The data were weighted across the rounds for comparability and to ensure that the survey was representative on the national scale.

The RLMS has some limitations. Women are asked about leave in a combined way which included both maternity and parental leaves. This combination does not allow us to separate the effect of these two, very different, types of leave. Another limitation is that data about the availability of leave and child care only became available in 2000, while the main decline in employment took place in the middle of the 1990s. At the same time, it has a number of strengths. First of all, it is a longitudinal data set, so we are able to ask women about their access to leave and child care in 2000, and then trace the effect of that access in subsequent years. We have a wealth of information not only on conventional income and employment variables, but on family composition, the presence or absence of extended family members, and variables such as attitudes. Moreover, the RLMS is collected independently from official government agencies so it is not subject to manipulation. Finally, it is simply the best publicly-available data set on women’s employment in Russia.

**Enterprise characteristics**
Public and a number of privatized enterprises often use a system of social benefits, including regular paid vacations, paid sick leaves, payment for sanatoria or children's camps, and (increasingly rarely) child care, as part of the benefits package. Given the low real monetary wages, and the fact that benefits are almost universal for all employees of an enterprise, benefits can serve as additional incentives for the employees. Despite the fact that during the transition period, it became possible to obtain social benefit-type services in the market, low wages and general pauperization of the population kept the importance of benefits to employees high.

The new private sector in Russia, in turn, is characterized by the much lower level of social and legal protection of employees, particularly women. Lacking the social infrastructure that allows many public and privatized enterprises to provide benefits at moderate expense, new enterprises tend not to offer social benefits, sometimes compensating employees through the form of higher wages, sometimes compensating employees through informal cash payments or “shadow wages”, and sometimes not compensating employees at all.

Below we assess the likelihood of provision of social services by different types of enterprises, on the example of child care and leave. In Table 1 we provide results of these binominal regressions. The regressions in Table 1 are based on individual employee responses to questions about their employer, again using the 2000 RLMS data. Maternity leave and child care were taken as 0/1 dummy variables, with the presence of leave or child care taking on the value of one. The results show that child care services and maternity leaves are indeed most likely to be provided by public enterprises and large enterprises – the log of enterprise size was highly significant. Enterprises that have been in existence for longer are more likely to provide benefits. The number of years that an employer has worked at the enterprise has a positive effect on the availability of maternity/parental leave and, to a much lesser extent, on child care. It is not clear whether this is because enterprises that retain workers offer leave, or whether employees choose to stay with enterprises with more generous leave provisions. Interestingly, education level has a positive (though insignificant) effect on access to leave, but no, or a negative effect, on access to child care.

Table 1 about here.
The results of Table 1 are important because they allow us to predict what the future holds for leave and child care provision in Russia. The pure public sector now accounts for only a quarter of the workforce – 26.7 percent of women and 24.1 percent of men work in the public sector according to 1999 CLMS data. The vast majority work in combined private/public enterprises. If enterprise level provision can be replaced by municipal provision or provision through social insurance schemes, then newly emerging public forms of provision may cushion women from the negative effects of privatization. But if not, the continuing process of transformation, as new enterprises grow and old enterprises restructure and become more like new enterprises, will leave increasing numbers of women without benefits. In the next section of the paper we explore the effect of provision of benefits on women’s and men’s employment.

**The Model**

The focus of our analysis is how the availability of child care and maternity/parental leaves affect women's employment decisions. We model labor supply within a straightforward mainstream framework (Francine Blau and Mariane Ferber 2001). Individuals allocate time between market work and leisure by comparing the value of their time in the market and the value of their time at home, and will choose to participate in labor if they are offered a market wage higher than their reservation wage ($w^*$), that is, the value the woman places on her time at home.

We hypothesize that wages are determined by so-called human capital: women with more education, more work experience, or higher-skills will receive higher wages, and therefore be more likely to be employed. Non-labor income, including income of other household members, increases the reservation wage and therefore decreases the probability of employment. Other factors that will increase the reservation wage are the number and age of children, since more or younger children implies a greater need for household production, that is, more laundry, more cooking, more shopping, and so on. Women who have access to formal or informal quality child care (other adults in the household to help with child care) would be expected to be more likely to be employed. Distance to child care centres may also affect women's labour force participation decision. Marital status has an ambiguous effect: it
may increase non-labor income in that women may have access to a husband’s earnings. At
the same time, it decreases access to state and other benefits, thereby pushing women into
paid employment.  

Another important factor that would affect woman’s employment decisions is
availability of woman-friendly services and provisions at the workplace. Such provisions
include maternity and parental leave, paid sick leave, the opportunity to have breastfeeding
breaks and other provisions allowing women to combine work and family. Policies that allow
for better balance between work and employment would tend to make employment more
attractive, therefore increasing female labor force attachment. However as mentioned above,
social benefits may decrease women’s attractiveness as workers, lower the monetary wages
employers will offer women, and thereby reduce labor force participation. Long leaves may
also lead to “depreciation of human capital” and therefore lower wages, which would also
decrease labor force participation. Even though Russian employers are, in theory, required to
provide job guarantees to people on leave, realistically it is difficult to believe that employers
will keep a position open while a person is on a three year (say) parental leave. One would
expect the strength of job protection to be inversely related to length of leave. Other studies
(e.g. Christopher J. Ruhm and Jacqueline L. Teague 1995) have found that long
maternity/parental leaves tend to have a negative effect on women’s employment overall,
whereas studies looking at short leaves of less than a year’s duration have been more likely to
find a positive effect (e.g. Tommy Ferrarini 2003). We expect to find similar results for
Russia.

This theoretical framework makes it possible to model a discrete choice between
employment and non-employment in the labour force given the values of her market and
reservation wage in contemporary Russia. The woman's employment decision can be
expressed in the following form of binominal logit:

\[
    p_i = \frac{e^{RX}}{1 - e^{RX}}
\]

where \( p_i \) is the probability of remaining in employment and

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20 There are a number of benefits available in the Russian legislation for single mothers, inaccessible to married
women.
\[ BX = \beta_0 + \Sigma \beta_i x_i \]

where \( \beta \)'s are the respective coefficients of the explanatory variables, and \( x_i \) represents a vector of characteristics of the individual, her household, and her employer, for example, age, education, and whether or not the employer provides child care. \( \beta \)'s in the logit model measure the marginal effects on the log-odds (the log of the odds of working compared to not working). For example, \( \beta_i \) indicates how the log-odds in favor of working change when \( x_i \) is changed by a unit.

**Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics**

Given that the maternity leave and child care provision data are based on the responses of the survey participants about whether their enterprises provide those services, we had to select only those women (and men) of official working age (for men 16-65; for women 16-60), who participated in the labour force in 2000 either working or being on leave (maternity leave, other paid or unpaid leave) in order to avoid an endogeneity problem.

The analysis focuses on several categories of women, including mothers with children younger than 7 years old, the age at which children start school, mothers with children younger than 18 years old and all women with and without children. We also looked at the effect of provision of family-friendly services through enterprises on men and on all employees. This was to see whether the effects of family policy pertain only to women or they are the simply the characteristics of the enterprises which tend to retain their workers.

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. The dependent variable, employment status, was defined as zero if the woman is not working or on leave (maternity leave, other paid or unpaid leave), or 1 if the woman was employed. Around 81 percent of the women in our sample were employed in 2002, along with 83 percent of the men. This figure might initially strike one as high. However, bearing in mind that our initial sample is comprised exclusively of people who were employed or on leave in 2000, to have substantial numbers of that sample not working two years later suggests that labor market insecurity is widespread. Given the difficulty in distinguishing between discouraged workers who have
withdrawn from the labor force and the unemployed, we simply aggregated these two categories.

The explanatory variables can be divided into enterprise and individual/household characteristics. There are several variables which refer to the enterprise-level provision of benefits, when the employees were asked in 2000 if their enterprises provided those. “Provision of leave” refers to paid leave for pregnancy, giving birth and parental leave. The limitation of this variable is that it does not distinguish between maternity (leave for pregnancy and giving birth) and parental leave. Eighty percent of women reported that they did have a leave provision, which may be considered either high (most women can access leave) or low (given that leave is guaranteed by statute, the number of employed women reporting access to leave should be closer to 100 percent than 80 percent). It should be stressed that all employed women, including part-time, sessional and seasonal workers, are eligible for maternity leave benefits. “Provision of child care” indicates whether or not the respondent has access to free child care in an enterprise's preschool or full or partial payment for child care in another preschool institution. Child care is the least widely available of all of the various enterprise level benefits – only around 10 percent of respondents had access to child care. Limitations of the data set did not permit the inclusion of other variables pertaining to child care characteristics such as care quality and proximity of child care centers, or allow us to distinguish between enterprise-provided workplace child care and enterprise-subsidized child care elsewhere.

“Availability of sanatoria” refers to full or partial payment by the enterprise for sanatoria, children's camps, or tourist camps. Such payments are more common in public and large privatized enterprises, which have accumulated a large social infrastructure. More women than men had access to sanatoria; in general the benefit is available to just over one third of our sample. “Paid vacation” and “paid sick leave” are straightforward variables. However, as they are highly correlated with the availability of paid maternity/parental leave, they were not included in some of the regressions.

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21 Sanatoria refer to health resorts, which in most cases are inherited from the Soviet period and available only through large industrial or public enterprises.
22 The high correlation between these variable is due to the fact that maternity leave, paid vacation and paid sick leave are considered to be a part of the "benefits package" required to be provided by the law. If an enterprise
Individual and household characteristics include standard variables such as age and level of education, marital status, and number of children. The majority are married. The marital status dummy includes common law relationships for the purposes of this paper and equals to 1 for married or cohabiting, zero otherwise. About 12 percent of the women in the sample have a child under 7. Over one quarter of the women and less than 20 percent of the men in the sample work in managerial or professional positions, which is unsurprising given the overrepresentation of women in the health professions in Russia. Given that our sample is comprised entirely of people who are either employed or on leave, and the overall numbers on leave are quite small, it is somewhat surprising that only 59.8 percent of men and 45.7 percent of women worked full-time. Full-time workers are defined as those who worked 40 or more hours per week at the time of the survey in 2000. Again, this is an indication of the insecurity characterizing the Russian labor market, or possibly that the cut-off for “full-time” work in the dataset is quite high.

**Results**

The results of the estimation of the binominal logit (BL) for several categories of women and men are presented in Tables 3 and 4.

The results for women are presented in Table 3. Overall, the coefficients on the binominal model are significant and in the expected direction. Maternity/parental leave has, interestingly, a strong, positive and significant effect for all women and all mothers, but not for mothers of children under 7. In interpreting the maternity/parental leave results, it is important to bear in mind that the maternity/parental variable measures availability of leave at the enterprise in 2000. We can generally assume that women who had leave in 2000 also had leave available when their children were small. This is a reasonable assumption given that the average job tenure in Russia within the protected sector is extremely long, so many people in the sample are in the same job now as they were when their children were small (Lehmann and Wadsworth, 2000). Also, the overall tend in leave provision is downwards, so it is unlikely that many people are moving from a situation when they had no leave utilizes an informal contracting system and chooses not to provide benefits, it will most likely avoid all benefits. Similarly, enterprises that comply with the law may comply with all aspects of the law.
provisions when their children were small to one where they worked at enterprises offering maternity leave when they had older children.

The results for all mothers reflect the combined impacts of the old and new maternity/parental leave programs. Comparing the results for all mothers with the results to new mothers, it seems that maternity/parental leave has a strong positive effect on the probability of employment only for mothers of older children, that is, only for people who experienced the pre-transition maternity leave program. We hypothesize these mothers used leave provisions and then returned to their employers, hence leave provisions allowed them to keep, maintain and build labor market attachment. The positive effect of maternity leave on all women can be seen as, in part, a reflection of the impact on mothers (recall that the “all women” category includes women with adult children). Also, provision of leaves can be seen as a characteristic of workplaces/enterprises, which tend to retain workers. Hence there may be a positive effect of leave provision on employment of women without children as a result of their employment on such enterprises. As mentioned, these enterprises are most likely to be state or newly privatized enterprises.

Mothers of children under 7 are less likely to be employed if they have access to leave provisions. This may be simply because they are still on leave and have yet to return to the work place. Alternatively, it may be that the new maternity/parental leave provisions are less conducive to women’s return to employment than the leave system mothers of older children experienced. Another part of the explanation comes from the fact that younger workers are more likely to work under an informal contract at private enterprises willing to exchange access to benefits in return to jobs and higher salaries.

Child care, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, has a strong positive effect for all women, but not for mothers or mothers of young children. It is likely that we are picking up an effect of provision being available historically at certain types of enterprises, that is, public enterprises or privatized enterprises. The enterprises that provide child care may simply be different in ways that makes them more likely to retain workers.

Education consistently has a positive and significant effect on the probability of employment. The age/participation profile generally fits a quadratic pattern for women and for all mothers. However for mothers with children younger than 7, although age does
appear have a first positive and then negative effect on the probability of participation, the coefficients are not precisely estimated.

There are a number of standard reasons why we might expect to see a non-linear age/employment relationship, for example, as younger people finish their schooling and accumulate experience they are more likely to become employed, as older workers age and experience health problems they are more likely to drop out of the labor force. In Russia, however, there is an additional dynamic going on. As private sector firms have expanded, they have hired predominantly younger workers. For example, women between 16 and 35 represent more than a third (37.9 percent) of all women employed in the private sector, as opposed to only 24.3 percent of women in the public sector.\textsuperscript{23} Private sector employers may prefer younger workers because their attitudes and expectations, for example, willingness to accept risk, are consistent with the new Russian economy, rather than being shaped by Soviet-era expectations.\textsuperscript{24} Or it may simply be most firms, in Russia or elsewhere, tend to choose young workers when hiring, and private sector firms hire more new workers than public sector firms. An additional explanation, as suggested earlier, is that private firms hire younger workers because they are more likely to agree to work under an informal contract.

Household characteristics in general do not appear to have strongly significant effects on female employment decisions but affect employment for some women. The number of other adults (usually pensioners) in the household has a strong significant positive effect on the employment of mothers, but essentially no effect on the employment of women in general. One explanation of this finding is that the availability of household members to look after children, especially school-age children, frees women to enter employment. However women often live in extended family situations because they are unable to afford, or unable to obtain, an apartment of their own. Hence the presence of other adults in the household may be proxying lower levels of household income, or urban residence. However since we control for other household income, this should not be a factor.

We controlled for the presence children in the household in a variety of ways. First, we included a dummy variable to indicate the presence of children under 7. This does not

\textsuperscript{23} The discussion is based on the analytical report prepared by the Centre for Labour Market Studies, 2000, Moscow.

\textsuperscript{24} The Soviet-era employment contract could sometimes be summarized as “I’ll pretend to work, you’ll pretend to pay me.”
have any significant effect on the employment of any category of women and men. However a variable controlling for the number of children under 7 squared had a significant (at p=0.1) negative effect on employment. Having a baby under 1 year old, as expected, has a strong negative relationship with female employment, which is equally strong for all categories of women.

Marital status has a consistently negative relationship with female employment and is the most significant for mothers with children under 7 years old. It is not clear exactly what drives this relationship. It could be that women do not need to work if they have access to a husband’s income; however we control for other household income, so this should not be a primary factor. Possibly the increasingly familial values which appear in the Russian society mean that women face pressure from friends and family members to stay at home when they are married. It is also possible that employers discriminate against married women, either being reluctant to hire married women or offering married women lower wages.

Professional characteristics, including being in a professional or managerial position or years of work experience do not produce any consistent or significant results for women. It may be explained by the fact that a growing female workforce is concentrated in the low paid spheres, such as light industry, healthcare and education, also having controlled for education may make being in a professional position insignificant.

To test to see whether the effect of leave and other provisions was simply capturing enterprise level effects, we ran our employment regression for men and for all workers. The results are reported in Table 4. To separate out male and female effects in the combined regression, we interacted a number of variables (marital status, children under 7, presence of post-work adults, age, experience, child care, and so on) with the male dummy variable. If a variable affects men and women differently, the interaction with the male dummy variable will be significant. So, for example, the coefficients on marriage or children under 7 interacted with the male dummy are strongly positively significant and positive, showing marriage and children affect men and women very differently. Women are pulled out of employment; men are not. Interestingly, too, the coefficient on the age*male interaction variable is negative and significant, suggesting that the age/employment profile slopes upwards less steeply for men than it does for women.
Yet again the fact that we get a positive – although insignificant – coefficient on child care in the male equation, and a positive one in the overall equation, makes us think that the significance of leave and child care provisions may be a characteristic of the workplaces retaining workers. Further, such variables as payments for sanatoria and paid vacation (a variable that is highly correlated with the leave variable) produce positive significant coefficients for men as well that again, confirmed a hypothesis of workplace characteristics.

Conclusion

The Russian labor market has, historically, allowed women to combine employment and motherhood. It was achieved through provision of such policies as leave and child care among others. Our results have shown that, overall, mothers of older children – women who had children in the 80s and early 90s – working at enterprises that offer leave are more likely to stay employed. Women with children under 7 appear to drop out temporarily as a result of leave policies. Further research, and more waves of data, are required to determine the longer-term effect of leaves on these women.

Yet the types of enterprises which offer benefits as part of the compensation package – large, well-established, public enterprises – are in decline in Russia. Unfortunately enterprise child cares have not been replaced, to any appreciable extent, by privately-provided child cares. Newly-emerging private enterprises frequently offer informal contracts and shadow wages, and leave benefit provision to the government, making the minimum possible contribution to familial policies at the state level. Neo-liberal theory would suggest that the enterprises which do not provide excessive benefit packages would be more competitive and would retain their workers. However we do not see this in the data: people without benefits are less likely to be employed in subsequent years. Perhaps this has to do with the volatility of the new private sector, the competition for jobs within that sector and high turnover.

The policy implications of these findings are that Russia needs to develop a well functioning market economy, stronger civil society, judicial system, and a social insurance system financed through general taxation. In addition, as suggested, the development of
other schemes of family services provision, such as municipal and through social insurance system, may help reducing negative effects of privatization for women.

Yet ultimately the answer to the question posed at the beginning of the paper remains a puzzle. We suggested that maternity and parental leave, together with contraction of child care, are part of a set of policies designed to encourage women to leave the labor force and have children. In our research we found that family policies do not seem to have their intended effect: employed women with access to these benefits appear to be more likely, overall, to stay employed. Yet by studying only women who are employed in 2000 we miss another possible route by which family policies can affect labor force participation. Perhaps family policies are pushing women into the home by making employers reluctant to hire women in the first place. More research is needed to capture the total effect of family policies on women’s work.

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**Tables**

**Table 1:** Regression results: likelihood of provision of maternity leave and child care facilities by enterprises, 2000.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Maternity leave</th>
<th>Child care</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public enterprise dummy</td>
<td>1.8518***</td>
<td>.2482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of operation of enterprise</td>
<td>.0150***</td>
<td>.0069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years worked at this enterprise</td>
<td>.1640***</td>
<td>.0380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of the enterprise size</td>
<td>.6238***</td>
<td>1.626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of work at the enterprise (squared)</td>
<td>-.0038***</td>
<td>.0011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>.0728**</td>
<td>.0468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise size</td>
<td></td>
<td>.09E-05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.0325***</td>
<td>.6540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at p=0.01, ** significant at p=0.05, *significant at p=0.10

Source: calculated by authors using Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey individual data.

a. Overall goodness of fit of the model:
   -2 Log Likelihood 544.508
   Goodness of Fit 1794.032
   Cox & Snell - R^2 .209
   Nagelkerke - R^2 .401

Table 2 - Summary table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>All (men and women)</th>
<th>All men</th>
<th>All women</th>
<th>Mothers with children of all ages</th>
<th>Mothers with children younger than 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>N %</td>
<td>n %</td>
<td>n %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (each category)</td>
<td>3719 1725 1994 1534</td>
<td>234</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working in 2002</td>
<td>3059 82.3</td>
<td>1438 83.4</td>
<td>1621 81.3</td>
<td>1274 82.9</td>
<td>166 70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On leave in 2002</td>
<td>121 3.3</td>
<td>19 1.1</td>
<td>102 5.1</td>
<td>97 6.3</td>
<td>44 18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the labour force (working or on leave)</td>
<td>3180 85.5</td>
<td>1457 84.5</td>
<td>1723 86.4</td>
<td>1371 89.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working in 2002</td>
<td>539 14.5</td>
<td>268 15.5</td>
<td>271 13.6</td>
<td>165 10.7</td>
<td>24 10.3</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Enterprise characteristics (all for 2000)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision of child care</th>
<th>385</th>
<th>10.4</th>
<th>166</th>
<th>9.6</th>
<th>219</th>
<th>11.0</th>
<th>174</th>
<th>11.3</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>8.1</th>
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<tr>
<td>Provision of leave</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1605</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>1246</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sanatorium at enterprise</td>
<td>1362</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of paid vacation</td>
<td>3139</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>1427</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>1712</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>1326</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of paid sick leave</td>
<td>3128</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>1426</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>1702</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>1316</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Public enterprise</td>
<td>2443</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>1401</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>1073</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual and household characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full time work 2000</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>1032</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (mean)</td>
<td>3719</td>
<td>41*</td>
<td>1725</td>
<td>41*</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>41*</td>
<td>1534</td>
<td>40*</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of pensioners in the household (mean)</td>
<td>3719</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>1725</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>1534</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean and median other household income, rubles per month</td>
<td>4727*</td>
<td>315*</td>
<td>380*</td>
<td>2445**</td>
<td>4603*</td>
<td>3047*</td>
<td>4727*</td>
<td>3155**</td>
<td>4758*</td>
<td>3000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education (median)</td>
<td>3719</td>
<td>12**</td>
<td>1725</td>
<td>12**</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>12**</td>
<td>1534</td>
<td>12**</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial/professional position 2000</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding second job</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<td>4.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>2852</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>1468</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>1384</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>79.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presence of babies under 1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of children under 7</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>15.2</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

* mean, ** median

Source: Summary figures calculated by authors using Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey individual data.
### Table 3 - Results of the estimation of binominal logit (part 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Mothers</th>
<th>Mothers with children younger than 7</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education 2002</td>
<td>.0847***</td>
<td>.0285</td>
<td>.0724**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's age</td>
<td>.2733***</td>
<td>.0350</td>
<td>.2393***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>-.0034***</td>
<td>.0004</td>
<td>-.0028***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status dummy 2002</td>
<td>-.2104</td>
<td>.1485</td>
<td>-.2804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of experience 2000</td>
<td>-.0029</td>
<td>.0083</td>
<td>.0178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for children under 7 2002</td>
<td>.1328</td>
<td>.3136</td>
<td>.3103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of child care 2000</td>
<td>.4117*</td>
<td>.2541</td>
<td>.3026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other household income</td>
<td>-1.8E-05*</td>
<td>1.071E-05</td>
<td>-1.7E-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other adults 2002</td>
<td>.0988</td>
<td>.1526</td>
<td>.7106**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for managers/professionals 2000</td>
<td>.1094</td>
<td>.1784</td>
<td>.1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children under 7 squared</td>
<td>-.3084*</td>
<td>.1977</td>
<td>-.3419*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of sanatorium 2000</td>
<td>.2028*</td>
<td>.1523</td>
<td>.1759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babies under 1 2002</td>
<td>-3.9502***</td>
<td>.6150</td>
<td>-3.8612***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of leave 2000</td>
<td>.3239***</td>
<td>.1641</td>
<td>.4212***</td>
</tr>
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*** significant at p=0.01, ** significant at p=0.05, *significant at p=0.10

Source: RLMS

### Table 4 - Results of the estimation of binominal logit (Part 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Men and women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of education 2002</td>
<td>.0624***</td>
<td>.0193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's age</td>
<td>.2208***</td>
<td>.0236</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>-.0027***</td>
<td>.0003</td>
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<td>Marital status dummy 2002</td>
<td>-.3297***</td>
<td>.1338</td>
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<td>Years of experience 2000</td>
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<td>.0079</td>
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<td>Dummy for children under 7 2002</td>
<td>-.3715**</td>
<td>.2059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of child care 2000</td>
<td>.4077*</td>
<td>.2433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other household income</td>
<td>-4.8E-06</td>
<td>4.340E-06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pensioners 2002</td>
<td>.0091</td>
<td>.1373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for managers/professionals 2000</td>
<td>.1563</td>
<td>.1605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children under 7 squared</td>
<td>-.1953***</td>
<td>.0920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of sanatorium 2000</td>
<td>.1999</td>
<td>.1435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of paid vacation</td>
<td>.4025***</td>
<td>.1658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male dummy (m=1) interacted with:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m* provision of paid vacation</td>
<td>-.1625</td>
<td>.2333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m* Availability of sanatorium 2000</td>
<td>.1040</td>
<td>.2237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m* managers/professionals 2000</td>
<td>-.0548</td>
<td>.2529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m* Years of experience 2000</td>
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<td>.0111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m* children under 7 2002</td>
<td>.8679***</td>
<td>.3243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m* Marital status 2002</td>
<td>.9358***</td>
<td>.2194</td>
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<td>m* postwork adults</td>
<td>-.0234</td>
<td>.2186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m* Respondent's age</td>
<td>-.0118**</td>
<td>.0061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m* Provision of child care 2000</td>
<td>-.2502</td>
<td>.3672</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** significant at p=0.01, ** significant at p=0.05, *significant at p=0.10

Source: calculated by authors using Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey individual data.
a - Baby under 1 - men were not asked that question
b Provision of maternity leave - men were not asked that question
c - Paid vacation, paid sick leave and paid maternity leave and public enterprise - highly correlated variables - could include only one of those in each regression