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<oembed><version>1.0</version><provider_name>Eastern European and Transatlantic Network</provider_name><provider_url>https://carleton.ca/eetn</provider_url><author_name>Trevor Peeters</author_name><author_url>https://carleton.ca/eetn/author/trevorpeeters/</author_url><title>Russia&#x2019;s Hybrid War in the Balkans - Eastern European and Transatlantic Network</title><type>rich</type><width>600</width><height>338</height><html>&lt;blockquote class="wp-embedded-content" data-secret="cQU17KRX3e"&gt;&lt;a href="https://carleton.ca/eetn/2026/russias-hybrid-war-in-the-balkans/"&gt;Russia&#x2019;s Hybrid War in the Balkans&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" security="restricted" src="https://carleton.ca/eetn/2026/russias-hybrid-war-in-the-balkans/embed/#?secret=cQU17KRX3e" width="600" height="338" title="&#x201C;Russia&#x2019;s Hybrid War in the Balkans&#x201D; &#x2014; Eastern European and Transatlantic Network" data-secret="cQU17KRX3e" frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no" class="wp-embedded-content"&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;&lt;script type="text/javascript"&gt;
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</html><thumbnail_url>https://carleton.ca/eetn/wp-content/uploads/sites/44/2026/01/BALKANS.webp</thumbnail_url><thumbnail_width>2048</thumbnail_width><thumbnail_height>902</thumbnail_height><description>Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian Federation has been a key instigator of hybrid attacks, launching disinformation and propaganda campaigns, offensive cyber operations, espionage, and attacks on critical infrastructure. By eroding public trust and exploiting weaknesses in target countries, societies are becoming more susceptible to internal vulnerability and Russian influence.</description></oembed>
