{"id":1487,"date":"2025-06-02T16:12:55","date_gmt":"2025-06-02T20:12:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=1487"},"modified":"2025-07-28T10:15:48","modified_gmt":"2025-07-28T14:15:48","slug":"turkiyes-evolving-strategic-posture-regional-interventions-amidst-shifting-nato-dynamics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2025\/turkiyes-evolving-strategic-posture-regional-interventions-amidst-shifting-nato-dynamics\/","title":{"rendered":"T\u00fcrkiye’s Evolving Strategic Posture: Regional Interventions Amidst Shifting NATO Dynamics"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n T\u00fcrkiye’s Evolving Strategic Posture: Regional Interventions Amidst Shifting NATO Dynamics\n <\/h1>\n \n \n \n\n

By Alireza Mamdouhi<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

This article is the first in a two-part series exploring T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s evolving strategic posture and its implications for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Focusing on Ankara\u2019s assertive foreign policy in the Middle East and its growing alignment with Russia, this opening piece examines how T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s pursuit of strategic autonomy \u2013 particularly through military interventions in Syria, Iraq, and Libya \u2013 is reshaping its role within the Alliance. Though a NATO member since 1952, T\u00fcrkiye has increasingly favored unilateral actions driven by its national security imperatives since Erdo\u011fan became the country’s first directly elected president in 2014, often conflicting with collective NATO objectives. At the same time, deepening defence, energy, and diplomatic ties with Russia have introduced further friction into T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s relationship with its Euro-Atlantic Allies. The series continues by analyzing the bilateral dimensions of the T\u00fcrkiye-Russia relationship, assessing the broader consequences for NATO\u2019s internal cohesion and strategic coherence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Remarks<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Military Engagements in the Middle East and North Africa<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Syria: Strategic Depth and Counter-Kurdish Policy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s military interventions in northern Syria have been shaped by a complex mix of security anxieties, geopolitical ambition, and humanitarian necessity. At the heart of Ankara\u2019s strategy has been its determination to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish autonomous zone along its southern border. Turkish officials have long viewed the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Defense Units (YPG), as direct affiliates of the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party (PKK)\u2014an organization designated as a terrorist group by T\u00fcrkiye as well as Canada, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU). These concerns have driven T\u00fcrkiye to launch successive cross-border operations\u2014such as Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring\u2014aimed at dislodging Kurdish forces and establishing Turkish-aligned control in northern Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But Ankara\u2019s motives extended beyond counterterrorism. The war in Syria had, by 2016, spilled into Turkish territory\u2014not only in terms of security but also demographically. Hosting over 3.6 million Syrian refugees, T\u00fcrkiye became the largest refugee-hosting nation in the world, a burden that was increasingly politicized at home (Erdo\u011fan et al., 2021<\/a>). Establishing a \u201csafe zone\u201d in Syria became a cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy, intended both to prevent further refugee flows and to repatriate hundreds of thousands already within its borders (International Center for Transitional Justice & Bridges of Truth, 2024<\/a>). These zones were also designed to project Turkish influence deep into Syrian territory, embedding it in the political and security fabric of post-war governance  (Siccardi, 2021<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Crucially, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s involvement in Syria was also shaped by an early ambition to see the end of the Assad regime. From the outset of the uprising, Ankara positioned itself as a champion of the Syrian opposition both ideologically, through its alignment with Sunni Islamist groups, and materially, by providing arms, training, and logistical support to rebel forces (Hinnebusch & Saouli, 2019<\/a>). This support was as much about regime change as it was about reshaping regional order in T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s image, advancing a Sunni political bloc and therefore counterbalancing Iran\u2019s Shia regional axis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These efforts, though at times strained by shifting alliances and international dynamics, ultimately played a role in tipping the balance. In late 2024, the Assad regime collapsed under sustained pressure from rebel groups, external actors, and internal economic decline (Zelin & Cagaptay, 2025<\/a>). A transitional administration comprising elements of the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition has since taken shape, with Ankara quickly moving to formalize relations and deepen its involvement in Syria\u2019s political reconstruction (Cagaptay et al., 2015<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For T\u00fcrkiye, the fall of the Assad regime is not only a vindication of its long-standing policies but a pivotal opportunity to entrench its role in shaping Syria\u2019s future. By influencing the security architecture of northern Syria, overseeing the return of refugees to newly stabilized regions, and integrating pro-Turkish factions into governing institutions, Ankara aims to transform its once reactive relationship with Syria into long-term strategic influence in the governance of the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s assertive policy in Syria frequently brought it into friction with its NATO Allies, exposing sharp divergences in strategy and underlying geopolitical priorities. While NATO as a collective actor avoided direct military intervention and focused instead on counterterrorism, humanitarian relief, and diplomatic resolution (NATO, 2024a<\/a>), T\u00fcrkiye pursued unilateral operations aimed not only to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) but also to push back Kurdish groups it viewed as existential threats. The core of this discord lay in the military partnership between the US (and some European Allies) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which were largely composed of YPG fighters (Thomas & Zanotti, 2024<\/a>). From T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s perspective, this support amounted to arming and legitimizing actors affiliated with the PKK\u2014a red line for Turkish national security. The resulting tensions reached a peak when T\u00fcrkiye launched major incursions into Kurdish-controlled areas in 2019, prompting US sanctions and open rebuke from European leaders  (Al Jazeera, 2019<\/a>; Center for Preventive Action, 2025<\/a>). Emmanuel Macron, the President of France, publicly criticized NATO\u2019s inability to respond to what he termed T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s \u201ccrazy\u201d offensive, and called for Europe to adopt a more autonomous Middle East policy (Banks, 2019<\/a>). NATO, while recognizing Ankara\u2019s legitimate security concerns, struggled to balance internal cohesion with the conflicting operational agendas of its members on the ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iraq: Persistent Operations Against the PKK<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s military footprint in northern Iraq is neither new nor incidental. While cross-border operations against the PKK date back to the 1990s (Lippman, 1995<\/a>), they have grown in scale and intensity since 2015, evolving into a central pillar of Ankara\u2019s counterterrorism doctrine. The PKK\u2019s entrenched presence in the Qandil Mountains and its periodic attacks on Turkish territory have long been used by T\u00fcrkiye as rationale for military incursions in the area. However, in recent years, T\u00fcrkiye has transitioned from short-term raids towards longer, more sustained campaigns \u2013 most notably through the multi-phase Operation Claw that was launched in 2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Framed by Turkish officials as legitimate self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter, these operations are presented as necessary responses to cross-border threats (de Wet, 2019<\/a>). Nevertheless, the legal foundation remains contested. The Iraqi central government has repeatedly condemned these operations as violations of its sovereignty, stressing that T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s actions often take place without Baghdad\u2019s consent or coordination. This has fueled diplomatic friction, especially when Turkish strikes have resulted in civilian casualties or targeted areas beyond traditional PKK zones (Bozkurt, 2022<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s engagement in Iraq goes beyond counterinsurgency. It serves as a demonstration of Ankara\u2019s regional autonomy and capacity to shape outcomes independently in a landscape increasingly dominated by non-state actors, shifting alliances, and rival spheres of influence. In many ways, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s security strategy in Iraq mirrors its approach in Syria: pre-emptively blocking the emergence of a contiguous Kurdish-controlled corridor that could inspire separatist sentiment among T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s own Kurdish population (Phillips, 2020<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Interestingly, Turkish operations in Iraq have found some tacit support from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil, despite the PKK\u2019s ideological affinity with parts of the Kurdish population there. Economic interdependence between T\u00fcrkiye and the KRG \u2013 most notably through energy exports and cross-border trade \u2013 has facilitated a de facto understanding between the two sides. This informal agreement has enabled T\u00fcrkiye to expand its military presence through semi-permanent bases and intelligence-sharing mechanisms with the KRG, allowing Ankara to frame its operations as part of a cooperative regional security agenda rather than unilateral aggression (Cagaptay et al., 2015<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s increasingly expansive operations in northern Iraq have been framed as part of a legitimate counterterrorism strategy, their implications for NATO and regional diplomacy are more complex. Many NATO Allies, including the US, officially designate the PKK as a terrorist organization, aligning in principle with T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s security concerns and justifications for military action. On several occasions, NATO\u2019s previous Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg acknowledged T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s right to self-defence under international law and affirmed the Alliance\u2019s solidarity with T\u00fcrkiye in its fight against terrorism (Sander, 2015<\/a>). However, NATO has not directly participated in T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s operations against the PKK in Iraq (Kurdistan24, 2018<\/a>). Instead, the Alliance\u2019s presence in the country is limited to the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), a non-combat advisory initiative aimed at strengthening Iraqi security forces and preventing the resurgence of ISIS\u2014operating strictly with the consent of the Iraqi government and with respect for its sovereignty (NATO, 2025<\/a>). This divergence in operational scope has at times strained NATO\u2019s diplomatic posture as some NATO members have raised concerns over the proportionality of Turkish strikes and their impact on civilians (Foltyn, 2025<\/a>). Moreover, the Iraqi government has repeatedly condemned these incursions as violations of its sovereignty, demanding greater respect for territorial integrity and urging Ankara to resolve security matters through diplomatic channels  (Fraser & Abdul-zahra, 2025<\/a>). This has placed NATO in a delicate balancing act\u2014supporting a key member\u2019s counterterrorism prerogatives while trying to maintain legitimacy and strategic coherence in a region already fraught with competing interests and fragile state authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Libya: Maritime Ambitions and Military Intervention<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In late 2019, Ankara signed a military cooperation agreement and a maritime boundary deal with the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. These agreements paved the way for Turkish deployment of drones, military advisors, and Syrian mercenaries to halt the advance of Khalifa Haftar\u2019s Libyan National Army (LNA) on Tripoli.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s intervention in Libya marked one of its most significant instances power projection in North Africa and the broader Mediterranean. Far from being a reactive maneuver, Ankara\u2019s decision to back the UN-recognized GNA was grounded in a set of well-calibrated strategic objectives. T\u00fcrkiye sought to reshape the post-conflict order in Libya to favour its regional vision, while simultaneously using the Libyan theatre to assert its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. By providing the GNA with equipment and personnel, Ankara not only changed the balance on the battlefield but also established a foothold in the strategic maritime corridors off Libya\u2019s coast (Young, 2020<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This intervention allowed T\u00fcrkiye to contest the emerging anti-Ankara axis of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Greece, whose growing cooperation in the Mediterranean was perceived by T\u00fcrkiye as an encirclement strategy. The maritime delimitation agreement signed between T\u00fcrkiye and the GNA in November 2019 was central to preventing this perceived encirclement. By creating an Exclusive Economic Zone that stretched across contested waters, this agreement bolstered T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s legal claims to potential energy exploration zones and directly challenged Greek maritime assertions (Badi & al-Jabassini, 2025<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beyond the geopolitical chessboard, ideological alignment also played a role in this situation. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s support for the GNA was a continuation of its broader alliance with Qatar. Both countries have championed Sunni Islamist movements across the region, viewing political Islam not only as an ideological ally but also as a tool for fostering influence in post-authoritarian states. In Libya, this translated into robust support for factions aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, countering the more secular, military-backed leadership of General Khalifa Haftar, who was supported by Egypt, the UAE, France, and Russia (Baskan, 2016<\/a>). T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s intervention was pivotal in halting Haftar\u2019s assault on Tripoli in early 2020, marking a decisive shift in Libya\u2019s civil war. Turkish-backed forces pushed the LNA into retreat, forcing a ceasefire and eventually contributing to the fragile UN-led political process that produced Libya\u2019s interim Government of National Unity. This success has given T\u00fcrkiye considerable leverage in shaping Libya\u2019s political reconstruction, military restructuring, and economic recovery, particularly in sectors such as infrastructure, defense, and energy (International Crisis Group, 2020<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contrary to T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s long-term and strategic involvement in Libya, NATO\u2019s earlier involvement in the Libyan conflict was more limited, reactive, and governed by a multilateral legal framework. NATO\u2019s 2011 intervention, known as Operation Unified Protector, was conducted under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 which mandated the use of all necessary means to protect civilians under threat from Muammar Gaddafi\u2019s regime. The Alliance\u2019s goals were narrowly defined: enforce a no-fly zone, implement an arms embargo, and prevent further violence against civilians. NATO\u2019s actions were supported by the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) and conducted in coordination with a broad international coalition, reflecting a commitment to multilateral norms and legitimacy (NATO, 2024b<\/a>). NATO naval forces patrolled the Mediterranean to enforce the arms embargo, denying transit to vessels suspected of smuggling weapons in and out of Libya. After Gaddafi’s fall, NATO withdrew, repeatedly emphasizing support for a political resolution, national unity, and the creation of integrated state institutions, including a unified military and secure borders (NATO, 2011<\/a>). T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s engagement, by contrast, developed over time into a deeply embedded presence in Libyan affairs. While NATO promoted a neutral and internationally sanctioned mission, T\u00fcrkiye acted independently and often in friction with other NATO Allies \u2013 most notably France \u2013 whose interests in Libya diverged sharply (France 24, 2020<\/a>). Thus, while both NATO and T\u00fcrkiye operated under the banner of civilian protection and support for a recognized Libyan government, their timing, motivations, and strategic depth of involvement diverged significantly, highlighting T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s emergence as an autonomous regional actor pursuing influence far beyond alliance consensus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Al Jazeera. (2019, October 15). Trump hits Turkey with sanctions, calls for ceasefire.<\/em> https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/economy\/2019\/10\/15\/trump-hits-turkey-with-sanctions-calls-for-ceasefire<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Badi, E. & al-Jabassini, A. (2025). Turkey\u2019s Syria and Libya strategies add up to a Mediterranean power play<\/em>. Atlantic Council. https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/menasource\/turkey-syria-libya-strategy-mediterranean-power-play\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Banks, M. (2019, October 24). Jens Stoltenberg: ‘Differences’ between NATO allies on Syria response<\/em>. The Parliament Magazine. https:\/\/www.theparliamentmagazine.eu\/news\/article\/jens-stoltenberg-differences-between-nato-allies-on-syria-response<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Baskan, B. (2016). T\u00fcrkiye and Qatar in the Tangled Geopolitics of the Middle East<\/em>. New York: Palgrave Pivot. https:\/\/link.springer.com\/book\/10.1057\/978-1-137-51771-5<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bozkurt, A. (2022, August 29). Iraq says Turkey has violated its sovereignty 22,742 times since 2018<\/em>.  Middle East Forum<\/em>. https:\/\/www.meforum.org\/iraq-says-turkey-has-violated-its-sovereignty<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cagaptay, S., Fidan, C.B., & Sacikara, E.C. (2015). Turkey and the KRG: an undeclared economic commonwealth<\/em>. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy<\/em>. https:\/\/www.washingtoninstitute.org\/policy-analysis\/turkey-and-krg-undeclared-economic-commonwealth<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Center for Preventive Action. (2025). Conflict between Turkey and armed Kurdish groups<\/em>. Council on Foreign Relations. https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/global-conflict-tracker\/conflict\/conflict-between-turkey-and-armed-kurdish-groups<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

de Wet, E. (2019). The invocation of the right to self-defence in response to armed attacks conducted by armed groups: Implications for attribution. Leiden Journal of International Law<\/em>, 32<\/em>(1), 91-110. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/S0922156518000560<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Erdo\u011fan, M.M., Kiri\u015fci, K., & Uysal, G. (2021). Improving Syrian refugee inclusion in the Turkish economy: How can the international community help?<\/em> World Refugee & Migration Council. https:\/\/wrmcouncil.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/09\/Turkey-Syrian-Refugees-WRMC-final.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Foltyn, S. (2025, April 29). Life inside Iraq’s ‘Forbidden Zone’ controlled by Turkey<\/em>. BBC World Service. https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/c985lw7lywlo<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

France 24. (2020, June 17). France blasts ‘extremely aggressive’ Turkish intervention against NATO mission targeting Libyan arms<\/em>. https:\/\/www.france24.com\/en\/20200617-france-blasts-extremely-aggressive-turkish-intervention-against-nato-mission-targeting-libyan-arms<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fraser, S., & Abdul-zahra, Q. (2025, May 8). Turkey and Iraq reaffirm commitment to work against Kurdish militants and other security threats<\/em>. CityNews & The Associated Press. https:\/\/halifax.citynews.ca\/2025\/05\/08\/iraqs-prime-minister-visits-turkey-as-neighbors-work-to-strengthen-cooperation\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hinnebusch, R. & Saouli, A. (Eds.). (2019). The War for Syria: Regional and International Dimensions of the Syrian Uprising. <\/em>London: Routledge. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.4324\/9780429201967<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

International Crisis Group. (2020). Turkey wades into Libya\u2019s troubled waters.<\/em> International Crisis Group.https:\/\/www.crisisgroup.org\/europe-central-asia\/western-europemediterranean\/turkey\/257-turkey-wades-libyas-troubled-waters<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

International Center for Transitional Justice & Bridges of Truth. (2024). The accelerating tragedy of Syria’s displaced: Failed commitments, forced returns, and the normalization of international crimes<\/em>. https:\/\/www.ictj.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2024-12\/ictj_report_syria-forced-return.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kurdistan24. (2018, June 6). NATO will not get involved in Turkish operations against PKK in Kurdistan: Secretary-General<\/em>. https:\/\/www.kurdistan24.net\/index.php\/en\/story\/376158\/NATO-will-not-get-involved-in-Turkish-operations-against-PKK-in-Kurdistan:-Secretary-General<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lippman, T. (1995, March 23). Turkey catches flak in congress; several NATO nations also assail military incursion into Iraq. Washington Post<\/em>. https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/archive\/politics\/1995\/03\/23\/turkey-catches-flak-in-congress\/92a588a7-7acc-4dc0-86b9-7b513404f3cc\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

NATO. (2011). Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR NATO-led arms embargo against Libya<\/em>. https:\/\/www.nato.int\/nato_static_fl2014\/assets\/pdf\/pdf_2011_06\/20110608_Factsheet-UP_Arms_Embargo.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

NATO. (2024). Countering terrorism<\/em>. https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_77646.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

NATO. (2024). NATO and Libya (February \u2013 October 2011)<\/em>. https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_71652.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

NATO. (2025). NATO Mission Iraq<\/em>. https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_166936.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Phillips, C. (2020). The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East<\/em>. Yale: Yale University Press. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.2307\/j.ctv1k03s4j<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Siccardi, F. (2021). How Syria changed Turkey\u2019s foreign policy<\/em>. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/research\/2021\/09\/how-syria-changed-turkeys-foreign-policy?lang=en<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sander, A. (2015, July 28). NATO backs Turkish military action<\/em>. Politico. https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/nato-turkey-kurds-strikes-iraq-isil-stoltenberg-ergodan\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thomas, C., & Zanotti, J. (2024). Turkey (T\u00fcrkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations<\/em> (CRS Report No. R44000). United States Library of Congress. https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/crs-product\/R44000<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Young, M. (2020). Into the Libya vortex. <\/em>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace<\/em>.<\/em>  https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/middle-east\/diwan\/2020\/01\/into-the-libya-vortex?lang=en<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zelin, A.Y., & Cagaptay, S. (2025). A New Age for Turkish Relations with Syria<\/em>. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https:\/\/www.washingtoninstitute.org\/policy-analysis\/new-age-turkish-relations-syria<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A new analysis explores T\u00fcrkiye’s evolving strategic posture within NATO, highlighting its unilateral military interventions in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, alongside deepening ties with Russia. How is Ankara’s pursuit of strategic autonomy reshaping its role in the Alliance?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":128,"featured_media":1490,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[145,92],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1487","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-nato","category-brief"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1487","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/128"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1487"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1487\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1493,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1487\/revisions\/1493"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1490"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1487"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1487"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1487"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}