{"id":1516,"date":"2025-06-18T14:50:24","date_gmt":"2025-06-18T18:50:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=1516"},"modified":"2025-07-02T12:48:55","modified_gmt":"2025-07-02T16:48:55","slug":"russia-and-iran-strategic-allies-or-tactical-partners","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2025\/russia-and-iran-strategic-allies-or-tactical-partners\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia and Iran \u2013 Strategic Allies or Tactical Partners?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Russia and Iran \u2013 Strategic Allies or Tactical Partners?\n <\/h1>\n \n \n \n\n

By Alireza Mamdouhi<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

Russia and Iran increasingly view the United States (US)-led international order not as a guarantor of stability, but as a direct threat to their sovereignty and national interests. This perception has become a defining feature of their foreign policy orientation (Vakhshouri, 2024<\/a>). For Russia, confrontation with the West has evolved into a broader ideological and geopolitical contest, not just over the sovereignty of states like Ukraine, but over the very structure of the global order. This logic of confrontation now deeply informs Moscow\u2019s regional strategy (Waller et al., 2025<\/a>). For Iran, this dynamic resonates with its own post-revolutionary worldview, which has long framed its foreign policy as part of a broader anti-colonial struggle. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has positioned itself as a challenger to Western dominance, viewing the liberal order as an extension of American imperialism and seeking to assert its sovereignty through resistance to perceived external interference (Ghahramani & Kavanagh, 2015<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moscow and Tehran both advocate for a multipolar world order grounded in \u201csovereign internationalism,\u201d a model that prioritizes national autonomy and cultural pluralism over liberal interventionism. This vision argues that no single state or coalition should dominate the global system or impose a universal ideological framework. Instead, the emphasis is on the coexistence of diverse political systems and civilizational models. In this context, Iran emerges not just as a regional partner for Russia, but as a strategic ally in a shared effort to reconfigure the global order away from US hegemony (Tazmini, 2021<\/a>; Waller et al., 2025<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Building upon the shared perception of the US-led international order as a threat and their mutual vision for a multipolar world, the subsequent analysis will delve into the manifestations of the strategic partnership between Iran and Russia. It will first examine their cooperation in the Syrian conflict, highlighting the military and political coordination that propped up the Assad regime. Following this, the discussion will pivot to the significant shifts in their defence partnership, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine and its impact on arms sales and military technology transfers, as well as their ongoing collaboration in civilian nuclear energy. Finally, the analysis will explore the internal Iranian perspectives on this alliance, contrasting the historical distrust and pragmatic engagement of the elite with the distinct views of Principlist and Reformist factions on the benefits and limitations of their country\u2019s relationship with Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Ai\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Cooperation in Syria<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Iran and Russia have developed a robust partnership rooted in shared strategic interests, most notably in the Syrian conflict, where both powers were instrumental in propping up the Assad regime. Their cooperation encompassed military operations, intelligence sharing, and political coordination. United in their opposition of Western-backed efforts to overthrow Assad, Moscow and Tehran initially collaborated to suppress the Syrian opposition and combat the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). Russia brought airpower and advanced military capabilities to the battlefield, while Iran supplied ground forces, intelligence, and logistical support through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated militias such as Hezbollah.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This collaboration intensified in 2015, when the Assad regime teetered on the brink of collapse following the fall of Palmyra to ISIL. The turning point came after Qassem Soleimani, the now deceased commander of the Quds Force, made a covert visit to Moscow in order to meet with President Vladimir Putin and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu (Bassam & Perry, 2015;<\/a> Grajewski, 2021;<\/a> <\/em>M\u0101jar\u0101-ye D\u012bd\u0101r 140 Daq\u012bqeh<\/em>, 2019<\/a>). This meeting laid the groundwork for a major military intervention in Syria. Soon after, Russia and Iran \u2013 alongside Syria and Iraq \u2013 formed the so-called RSII coalition (also referred to as the 4+1, with Hezbollah as the fifth actor) and established joint operation centers in Damascus and Baghdad to synchronize their campaign against ISIL (Al Jazeera, 2015<\/a>). This unprecedented intelligence-sharing alliance marked a significant step in institutionalizing the Iran-Russia military partnership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Russia has long viewed Iran as a critical partner in stabilizing regions vulnerable to extremism \u2013 including Central Asia, the Northern Caucasus, and Chechnya \u2013 this relationship is not without its competitive undertones. Both powers seek influence over post\u2011war Syria, and their interests do not always align (Monzavi Bozorgi et al., 2025<\/a>). Tensions have emerged over military coordination, such as disagreements on air support for Iranian-backed ground forces in Khan Tuman and disputes over basing rights, which have occasionally resulted in operational friction on the ground. Additionally, each country has pursued economic and strategic footholds: Russia through its naval base at Tartus and air facility in Latakia, Iran through its role in shaping Syrian militias and economic reconstruction. These dueling interests have created ongoing bureaucratic and diplomatic rivalries despite continued large-scale cooperation (Grajewski, 2021<\/a>). Despite this friction, Russia and Iran remain aligned through their shared objective of undermining Western influence in Syria and the broader Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Strategic Evolution of Russia-Iran Military Cooperation<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The war in Ukraine has significantly reshaped Russia\u2019s role in the global arms trade, directly influencing its defence partnership with Iran. Once one of the world\u2019s leading arms exporters, Russia has seen a dramatic decline in its global military exports as a result of the war (Zadorozhnyy, 2025<\/a>). As Moscow diverts its military-industrial resources toward sustaining its own war effort, it has increasingly turned to Iran for key battlefield technologies, marking a striking reversal in traditional arms trade dynamics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The clearest manifestation of this shift is Russia\u2019s reliance on Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly the Shahed series of loitering munitions, widely referred to as \u201ckamikaze\u201d drones (Kunertova, 2023<\/a>; Mouton, 2024<\/a>). These weapons have played a key role in Russia\u2019s battlefield tactics in Ukraine, offering a low-cost means of striking Ukrainian infrastructure and military positions. For Iran, the war provides an opportunity to test and refine its drone technology under live combat conditions. Iran has drawn valuable insights from Russia\u2019s war with Ukraine to inform its own confrontations with Israel and involvement in regional proxy wars (Sadjadpour & Grajewski, 2024<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow now extends well beyond the simple exchange of weapons. Russia has started localizing the production of Iranian drones within its own borders, while Iran is reportedly acquiring Russian hardware and technological know-how with the intent to reverse-engineer and produce advanced systems domestically (Bergmann et al., 2024<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other side, Iran has struggled for decades to modernize its air force, which is still heavily reliant on aging American aircraft acquired prior to the 1979 revolution. Russia has emerged as a potential supplier, particularly with the highly capable Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jet. Reports suggest that Iran finalized a purchase of Su-35s in early 2025, although deliveries have faced delays (Lucente, 2025<\/a>; Mehr News, 2023<\/a>). These jets are vital for enhancing Iran\u2019s air superiority and regional defence posture. Alongside aircraft, Iran has also long sought advanced air defence systems from Russia. While the S-300 system was delivered following the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement, speculation continues around the possible acquisition of the more advanced S-400 (Iddon, 2023<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nuclear Cooperation and Civilian Ambitions<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Iran\u2019s nuclear program remains a central component of its relationship with Russia. The two nations maintain long-standing cooperation in the civilian nuclear sector. The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, completed by Russia in 2013, stands as a landmark in this collaboration. It helped revive Russia\u2019s post-Soviet nuclear industry and provided Iran with a symbol of energy independence and technological progress (Avdaliani, 2025<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia supplies and retrieves spent fuel from Bushehr, thereby addressing concerns over the potential diversion of nuclear material for weapons use (Avdaliani, 2025<\/a>). Despite growing international scrutiny and intensifying sanctions, Russia and Iran continue to pursue the expansion of nuclear infrastructure. Iran aims to triple its nuclear power generation capacity, with Russia assisting in the construction of additional facilities. This includes ongoing work on Bushehr Units 2 and 3 and plans for new reactors in Sirik or Karun. A major development came in January 2025, when Presidents Vladimir Putin and Masoud Pezeshkian signed a new agreement outlining the construction of eight nuclear power plants in Iran, four of which are to be located in Bushehr (Iran Students\u2019 News Agency (ISNA), 2025<\/a>; Xinhua, 2025<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Popular Sentiment: Historical Distrust Rooted in Imperial Legacy<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A prevalent narrative within Iranian political discourse interprets Russia\u2019s regional strategy through the lens of a historical \u201cpolicy of access to open waters.\u201d This concept \u2013 rooted in the 19th-century Iran-Russia wars and reinforced by the Soviet occupation of Iran during the Second World War \u2013 sees Russia as having long harboured ambitions to expand southward into Iran in order to gain access to the Persian Gulf (Farahmand, 2010<\/a>). Iranian historians and commentators frequently reference the Iran-Russia conflicts of the 1800s and the events of 1941 as key moments that shaped this suspicion (Saeedi, 2019<\/a>).
\u00a0
These tensions are reflected in the Treaty of Golestan (1813), signed after Iran\u2019s defeat in war and amid internal unrest. The Treaty forced Iran to cede vast territories \u2013 including present-day Georgia, Dagestan, and parts of Armenia \u2013 to Russia. It also gave Russia exclusive rights to deploy naval vessels in the Caspian Sea and allowed for Russian interference in Iran\u2019s internal succession politics. In Iranian society, this agreement \u2013 along with the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828) that followed \u2013 is commonly described as a \u201cdisgraceful\u201d treaty,\u201d[1]<\/a> a label that continues to shape public perceptions of Russia\u2019s intentions (Jasim, 2024<\/a>). The 1979 Islamic Revolution institutionalized this deep-rooted skepticism through its foundational foreign policy principle of \u201cNeither East nor West,\u201d which rejected dominance by either Cold War superpower.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iranian Elite View: Russia as a Useful but Unreliable Partner<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Despite these historical grievances, Iran\u2019s post-Revolutionary foreign policy has evolved toward pragmatic engagement with Russia. Shared opposition to US hegemony and a mutual interest in preserving regional sovereignty have driven this strategic alignment. For Iran, Russia differs from Western powers because of Moscow\u2019s apparent non-interference in Iran\u2019s internal political structure \u2013 a stark contrast to the West\u2019s perceived advocacy for regime change or domestic transformation (Sariolghalam, 2023<\/a>).
Iran\u2019s strategic relationship with Russia is rooted in the perception that Moscow does not seek to change Iran\u2019s power structure, constitution, or cultural identity. Instead, Russia engages with the Islamic Republic on its own terms, respecting its political autonomy \u2013 a stance viewed as more conducive to long-term cooperation. Despite this favourable perception of Russia as a non-interfering partner, domestic disagreement persists over how deeply Iran should align itself with Moscow. This disagreement is generally divided between the Principlist[2]<\/a> and Reformist camps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Principlist View<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Principlists consistently highlight Russia\u2019s central role in resisting Western pressure, particularly emphasizing its ability to veto United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran. Russia\u2019s resistance is portrayed as a concrete advantage of the strategic partnership, as Iran \u2013 which maintains its status as an independent and influential actor \u2013 can partner with Russia to form a \u201cregional transformation with global impact\u201d in order to move towards a \u201cnew world order\u201d (Mehr News, 2025a<\/a>). Importantly, this narrative goes beyond rhetoric to serve as the ideological foundation for the Iran-Russia relationship. Cooperation with Russia is depicted as a practical embodiment of the \u201cResistance Economy,\u201d a key Principlist doctrine focused on achieving self-sufficiency and resilience in the face of external threats (Kayhan, 2025<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Iran-Russia relationship is heavily anchored in military-security cooperation and aligned regional positions, especially in Syria and in opposition to perceived actions of the \u201cZionist regime\u201d in Israel (Mav\u0101\u017ce\u02bf-e R\u016bsiye \u012ar\u0101n<\/em>, 2024<\/a>). This points to a deep, mutually reinforcing bond rooted in shared adversaries and compounded by Western sanctions. Economic cooperation is equally central in Principlist discourse. The partnership is framed as strategic and mutually beneficial, expanding across energy, transportation, agriculture, and technology. Collaboration in the energy sector \u2013 particularly gas and oil trade \u2013 is viewed as critical for reducing dependence on Western markets and creating alternative supply routes (Heidari, 2025; <\/a>Rezaei, 2025<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One major initiative is the integration of Iran\u2019s railway network with Russia\u2019s, touted as a top priority to boost trade and regional connectivity. The gas agreement signed in 2024, allowing up to 300 million cubic meters of gas to flow between the two countries per day, is heralded as the most significant gas contract in Iran\u2019s history (\u012ar\u0101n Markaz-e Tr\u0101nz\u012bte G\u0101z<\/em>, 2025<\/a>). This positions Iran as a potential transit hub for Russian gas en route to India. Improvements in financial and banking ties through bilateral and multilateral currency agreements and the use of national and digital currencies are reported to have significantly enhanced trade. In the first ten months of 2024, Iranian exports to Russia rose by 20% in weight and 12% in value compared to the previous year, amounting to $889 million in non-oil exports (Mehr News, 2025b<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reformist View<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

While recognizing the geopolitical realities that necessitate engagement with Russia, the Reformist camp in Iranian politics and society approaches the partnership with caution and pragmatism. They stress the importance of balance and transparency in Iran\u2019s foreign policy, arguing that national interests are best served through diversified relations with all major global powers, rather than aligning exclusively with either China or Russia (Kiyani,2008<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This approach reflects an understanding of Iran\u2019s geopolitical leverage, which \u2013 if managed wisely \u2013 could enable Tehran to extract concessions from both Eastern and Western blocs. Reformists contend that the strategic agreement with Russia will only yield meaningful results if pursued within a broader, balanced foreign policy framework. They often cite countries like T\u00fcrkiye and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which engage strategically with both the East and West on their own terms \u2013 not out of necessity, but through conscious choice (Rowshani & Tajik, 2025<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Economic concerns also figure prominently in Reformist critiques. They highlight the relatively shallow economic and cultural ties between Iran and Russia, noting that trade volumes remain far lower than those with China or T\u00fcrkiye (Armaki, 2025<\/a>). Reformists also argue that Russia and Iran are more rivals than partners in the energy sector and that Iran\u2019s current policies risk ceding too much ground to Russian interests. This camp also questions the reliability of Russia and China as partners, asserting that if either had a genuine interest in supporting Iran, they would have done so more meaningfully over the past two decades (Ahd\u0101f-e R\u016bsiye<\/em>, 2025<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reformist voices regularly point out Russia\u2019s limited capacity to deliver the capital and technology Iran needs to advance its industrial and scientific sectors. They also draw attention to domestic challenges such as administrative inefficiency and the undue influence of entrenched economic elites all of which, they argue, undermine the implementation of large-scale bilateral projects (\u012ar\u0101n R\u016bsiye B\u0101zi-ye Tav\u0101foq<\/em>, 2025<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reformist opinions frequently advocate for a more pragmatic, interest-based foreign policy \u2013 one less shaped by ideological posturing and more attuned to the complexities of global engagement. A recurring theme in these narratives is the detrimental impact of internal political rivalries and factionalism on foreign policy, with Reformists warning that narrow political calculations often come at the expense of broader national interests. Ultimately, their discourse seeks to redefine \u201cnational interest\u201d in a more comprehensive and less ideologically rigid way \u2013 one that avoids over-reliance on any single global power (Tav\u0101zon r\u0101 J\u0101ygezin<\/em>, 2020; <\/a>Ta\u02bf\u0101dol dar Rav\u0101be\u1e6d<\/em>, 2021<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Heading<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

[1] In everyday Iranian discourse, the Treaties of Turkmenchay and Golestan are commonly invoked as the ultimate symbols of national humiliation and defeat\u2014often labeled as a qarardad-e nangin<\/em> (a “disgraceful treaty”).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2] Principlists in Iranian politics emphasize strict adherence to Islamic revolutionary ideals and resistance to liberal influence, differing from traditional conservatives who favour small governments, economic liberalization, and fiscal moderation over ideological purity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In 2025, the Iran-Russia partnership is evolving from tactical coordination into a multifaceted strategic alliance, with growing cooperation in Syria, drone warfare, arms transfers, and nuclear energy development. Despite historical mistrust, Tehran and Moscow are united by shared opposition to Western hegemony and a vision for a multipolar world order. Yet, internal Iranian debates\u2014between Principlists seeking deeper alignment and Reformists advocating balanced diplomacy\u2014underscore the complexities of this evolving relationship.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":128,"featured_media":1517,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[93,1,100,123],"tags":[97,35,42],"class_list":["post-1516","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-iran","category-news","category-russia","category-united-states","tag-iran","tag-policy-brief","tag-russia"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1516","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/128"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1516"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1516\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1539,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1516\/revisions\/1539"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1517"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1516"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1516"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1516"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}