{"id":1552,"date":"2025-07-05T15:37:20","date_gmt":"2025-07-05T19:37:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=1552"},"modified":"2025-07-07T11:31:23","modified_gmt":"2025-07-07T15:31:23","slug":"new-defence-partnerships-beyond-nato","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2025\/new-defence-partnerships-beyond-nato\/","title":{"rendered":"New Defence Partnerships Beyond NATO"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n New Defence Partnerships Beyond NATO\n <\/h1>\n \n \n\n

By Sam Paquette <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n \n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

On the last day of the June 2025 NATO Summit in the Netherlands, the Alliance signed a new agreement pledging to significantly increase defence spending. This agreement pushes NATO Allies to boost their defence spending from 2 percent of GDP to 3.5 percent by 2035, while also contributing another 1.5 percent to general defence expenditures such as critical infrastructure projects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Mark
Photo Courtesy of NATO<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Getting NATO members to agree to this new benchmark was a clear political victory<\/a> for US President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly criticized Allies for lagging behind in defence spending<\/a>. While there is hope that this new pledge will appease American interests, some Allies are beginning to create new collective security networks outside of NATO. They aim to distance themselves from the US, <\/a>given its increasingly diverging outlook on international competition<\/a>. Canada, a long-time laggard in NATO spending<\/a>, is one of the most active Allies in this effort.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite doubling down on Canada\u2019s commitment to NATO spending targets \u2013 including a plan to hit the 2 percent benchmark by early 2026 while also agreeing to this new pledge \u2013 Prime Minister Mark Carney has worked towards building partnerships with Europe that go beyond the traditional Alliance. This includes signing a new Security and Defence Pact (SDP) with the EU<\/a> at the conclusion of the 2025 Canada-EU Summit, which took place just before NATO Allies met in the Netherlands. The SDP pushes Canada and the EU to increase their cooperation in areas such as cybersecurity, foreign interference, maritime security, and emerging technologies. It also commits both sides to continue supporting Ukraine in its ongoing war with Russia, complementing the $2 billion military aid package<\/a> that Canada announced when it hosted the G7 Summit earlier in June.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the defence industrial cooperation side, the SDP discusses Canada\u2019s involvement in additional PESCO projects and the creation of an Administrative Agreement between Canada\u2019s Department of National Defence and the European Defence Agency.<\/a> These measures aim to strengthen defence industrial integration between both parties, including developing harmonized procurement standards that facilitate market access.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In short, this agreement lays the foundation for Canada to participate in ReArm Europe, the EU\u2019s large-scale campaign to strengthen its defence industry. ReArm Europe ensures that at least 65 percent of the defence equipment is manufactured either by an EU manufacturer or a third-country company that has an SDP with the EU. A core part of this new initiative is the \u20ac150 billion SAFE instrument<\/a>, which provides loans to EU member states and partner countries for weapons procurement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU-Canada SDP has important implications for both parties. On the EU side, this agreement indicates that the EU is constructing a network of alliances and initiatives that is separate but complementary to NATO objectives. This network aims to enhance the EU\u2019s strategic autonomy and collective defence by strengthening its industrial defence cooperation with its partners to fill key capability gaps. The SDP with Canada is one part of this web, as the EU has also recently engaged with the UK<\/a>, Australia<\/a>, and Japan<\/a> in similar arrangements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\"Canadian
Mark Carney (Prime Minister, Canada). Photo Courtesy of NATO<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n<\/div>\n\n\n
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For Canada, this agreement will open new channels for joint procurement, research and development, and defence cooperation with European firms. It will also contribute towards Canada\u2019s industrial growth and NATO defence spending targets. On the strategic policy side, this agreement also furthers Prime Minister Carney\u2019s goal of diversifying Canada\u2019s defence supply chains away from the US.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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However, some barriers remain to implementing this agreement. While this SDP provides an outline for Canada\u2019s participation in ReArm Europe, full access to this initiative will require additional work.\u00a0 A second agreement will need to be negotiated for Canadian firms to engage in European joint procurement projects. Furthermore, as other analysts have recently mentioned, Canadian defence firms are also limited in their access of the EU single market as certain EU states have not yet ratified the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The full benefits of this EU-Canada SDP will therefore remain constrained until these barriers are resolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It will now be paramount for Canada to decide which strategic sector(s) to prioritize when collaborating with the EU. Doing so would be the first step in moving Canadian and European political motivation to diversify defence partnerships from words to reality.

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On the last day of the June 2025 NATO Summit in the Netherlands, the Alliance signed a new agreement pledging to significantly increase defence spending. This agreement pushes NATO Allies to boost their defence spending from 2 percent of GDP to 3.5 percent by 2035, while also contributing another 1.5 percent to general defence expenditures such as critical infrastructure projects.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":128,"featured_media":1554,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[146,84,103,145,1,92],"tags":[147,109,148,80],"class_list":["post-1552","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-defence-spending","category-european-security","category-european-union","category-nato","category-news","category-brief","tag-defence-spending","tag-nato","tag-partnership","tag-quick-take"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1552","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/128"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1552"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1552\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1558,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1552\/revisions\/1558"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1554"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1552"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1552"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1552"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}