{"id":1631,"date":"2025-07-25T12:12:02","date_gmt":"2025-07-25T16:12:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=1631"},"modified":"2025-08-05T16:55:15","modified_gmt":"2025-08-05T20:55:15","slug":"iran-and-europes-struggle-to-preserve-the-jcpoa","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2025\/iran-and-europes-struggle-to-preserve-the-jcpoa\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran and Europe\u2019s Struggle to Preserve the JCPOA in the Shadow of U.S. Withdrawal"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Iran and Europe\u2019s Struggle to Preserve the JCPOA in the Shadow of U.S. Withdrawal \n <\/h1>\n \n \n\n

By Alireza<\/strong> Mamdouhi<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n \n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), concluded in Vienna on July 14, 2015, marked a significant milestone in international diplomacy by forging a comprehensive agreement between Iran and the P5+1 nations (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US)), alongside the European Union (EU) (European External Action Service (EEAS), n.d<\/a>.). The primary goal of this agreement was to ensure Iran’s nuclear program remained exclusively peaceful in exchange for substantial sanctions relief. The plan would work by rolling back Iran’s nuclear capabilities, effectively extending its “breakout time” from several months to a minimum of one year (EEAS, n.d<\/a>.). Key provisions included stringent limits on uranium enrichment, reducing Iran’s low-enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kg and restricting enrichment levels to 3.67%. Operational centrifuge numbers were capped, and critical facilities such as Fordow and Arak were repurposed for civilian use under continuous monitoring from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  (Bradner, 2015<\/a>; Kerry, 2015<\/a>; Peralta, 2015<\/a>). The EU, led by its High Representative, played a pivotal role in these diplomatic efforts, championing the JCPOA as a successful model of multilateral engagement and a pathway to broader diplomatic relations with Iran  (EEAS, n.d.<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The diplomatic success of the JCPOA began to unravel dramatically on May 8, 2018, when the US, under President Donald Trump, unilaterally withdrew from the agreement (IAEA Spokesperson, 2018<\/a>; Wagner & Rocha, 2018<\/a>). While evidence from the IAEA indicated that Iran was complying with the deal, the US cited perceived deficiencies in the agreement itself and reinstated extensive primary and secondary sanctions on Iran. This “maximum pressure” campaign effectively cut off Iran’s access to the international financial system, thereby negating the economic benefits that had been fundamental to Iran\u2019s cooperation with the JCPOA\u2019s conditions (Ferragamo et al., 2025<\/a>). In retaliation to the US withdrawal and the lack of the anticipated economic relief, Iran began a phased reduction of its commitments to the JCPOA starting in July 2019. This included surpassing limits on its enriched uranium stockpile and progressively raising enrichment levels, initially to 4.5% and later to 60% (Arms Control Association, 2022<\/a>). Furthermore, Iran reduced its cooperation with the IAEA, limiting the ability for the organization to oversee Iran\u2019s nuclear development.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Europe\u2019s Inability to Save the JCPOA<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The EU consistently positioned itself as a key diplomatic actor in the Iran nuclear issue. Since 2006, the EU High Representative has led diplomatic initiatives involving the E3\/EU+3 and Iran, culminating in the JCPOA. The EU’s approach has been centered on engagement and critical dialogue with Iran, driven by the dual goals of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and reducing the risk of regional conflict (Alcaro, 2019<\/a>). Even after the US backed out of the JCPOA, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to the agreement, expressing deep regret over America\u2019s decision to re-impose sanctions (Parsi & Bassiri Tabrizi, 2020<\/a>). In the immediate aftermath of the US withdrawal, Iran called on Europe to take a leading role in upholding the agreement by helping to protect Iranian oil from the reinstated US sanctions. For its part, the EU updated its Blocking Statute in order to distance itself from complying with the American sanctions (Mairson, 2019<\/a>). However, this measure proved largely symbolic, as many European companies, fearing exposure to US secondary sanctions, chose to withdraw from Iran (Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 2019<\/a>). The dominance of the US dollar and the allure of the larger US market therefore severely hindered European attempts to maintain trade with Iran. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite Europe’s stated ambitions for strategic autonomy, particularly in foreign policy and trade, the reality of its deep economic and financial integration with the US posed significant challenges in upholding the JCPOA without America.  Within some Iranian political circles, the EU\u2019s inability to provide any meaningful alternative to the benefits of the JCPOA was perceived as a failure to uphold its commitments, with some commentators going far enough to call the EU\u2019s inaction as an implicit approval of America\u2019s withdrawal (Kayhan, 2019<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Inability for INSTEX to Replace the JCPOA<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Despite being highly sensitive towards American sanctions, Europe worked to maintain the core agreements of the JCPOA through the creation of the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). Established by the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) on January 31, 2019, INSTEX aimed to circumvent US sanctions and facilitate legitimate trade between Europe and Iran, particularly for \u2018humanitarian trade\u2019 in medicine and food (Parsi & Bassiri Tabrizi, 2020<\/a>; Zimmt, 2020<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In response, Iran created the Special Trade and Finance Instrument (STFI) to collaborate with INSTEX. Initially, Iranian officials had high hopes for the mechanism, expecting it to address the country\u2019s economic challenges by facilitating significant trade with Europe (Zimmt, 2020<\/a>). However, these expectations weren’t met. Iranian officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi and Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati, expressed frustration with this new program. They acknowledged that INSTEX hadn’t delivered the promised results for humanitarian trade and failed to expand into other vital sectors, such as oil and other commodities promised under the JCPOA (Mashregh News, 2020<\/a>; Student News Network (SNN), 2020<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

From a European perspective, INSTEX failed because of Iran\u2019s refusal to comply with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards on anti-money laundering and terrorism financing. Without Iran\u2019s cooperation in these areas, the INSTEX program was never implemented in full, thus leading to underwhelming economic benefits for Iran (Lopez, 2018<\/a>). As an intergovernmental organization, the FATF aims to combat money laundering and terrorist financing by setting international standards and promoting their effective implementation (FATF, n.d.<\/a>). Iran has been reluctant to fully ratify FATF agreements, such as the Palermo Convention and the Combating the Financing of Terrorism bill, because it fears that compliance would hinder its efforts to bypass sanctions and fund regional activities, including supporting para-military  resistance groups, some of which are designated as ‘terrorist organizations’ by Western governments (Mehr News Agency, 2024<\/a>). Adhering to these standards would also make Iran more heavily reliant on the international monetary system, a system from which it has a proven history of being cut off due to unilateral decisions from the US (US Department of the Treasury, 2019<\/a>).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The situation reflected a cyclical dynamic: Europe, constrained by US pressure, offered a limited solution that Iran found inadequate for its broader needs. Iran\u2019s subsequent non-compliance with the FATF provided Europe with a justification for the mechanism\u2019s failure, thus entrenching the impasse. Both sides blamed each other, but the core issue remains in the US\u2019 ability to dominate international finance and trade flows. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iranian Domestic Critique of Western Diplomacy<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Principlist factions within Iran have consistently portrayed European diplomatic efforts as superficial, suggesting they merely mask a deeper alignment with US interests. The longstanding metaphor of a “velvet glove” concealing an “iron fist,” is frequently invoked by Iran\u2019s Guardian Jurist1<\/sup> to describe EU foreign policy, reflecting a deep-rooted mistrust of Western intentions (Tabnak, 2023<\/a>). In a notable 2022 speech, the Guardian Jurist asserted, \u201cthe support promised by Western powers to compliant governments is illusory; it never materializes. All governments must come to understand this… Today, the world\u2019s bullies have shed the velvet glove, revealing their iron fists\u201d (Tabnak, 2023<\/a>). This rhetoric has been widely echoed by Principlist circles, who express strong alignment with and loyalty to the country\u2019s head of state. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This deep-seated mistrust towards the West was a primary reason why the Principlist group opposed the JCPOA from the outset (Mehr News Agency, 2020<\/a>). Viewing negotiations with the West as a form of colonial coercion, Principlist leaders argued that it was Iran\u2019s \u201cmilitary and nuclear strength\u201d that had compelled the US to engage diplomatically (Mashregh News, 2023<\/a>). Principlists repeatedly cautioned against trusting European powers, accusing them of repeatedly betraying Iran throughout history. In line with this perspective, they categorically rejected any dialogue concerning Iran\u2019s nuclear program, framing the program as an essential pillar of the country\u2019s defensive posture. This group also vehemently opposed efforts to ratify the FATF regulations, contending that compliance would undermine Iran\u2019s strategic flexibility and further constrain its ability to sustain a functioning economy under the weight of international sanctions (Mashregh News, 2023;<\/a> Ghobadi, 2025<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iranian Reformist Advocacy for Engagement with Europe<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In contrast, Reformists aligned with the Rouhani administration advocated for closer cooperation with Europe as a means to isolate the US and alleviate the impact of sanctions following Washington\u2019s withdrawal from the JCPOA. Reformist media outlets embraced what they saw as progress in nuclear negotiations, anticipating that the INSTEX agreement would yield tangible economic and diplomatic benefits. Iranian media, echoing the administration\u2019s policy outlook, highlighted support from the European business community for the deal, reinforcing the Rouhani government’s optimism about the opportunities of the new agreement (Jamshidi, 2020<\/a>).\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Transition from Rouhani’s Optimism to Raisi’s Defiance<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The internalization of America\u2019s decision to quit the JCPOA proved pivotal in reshaping Iran\u2019s political landscape towards cooperation with the West. Although the Rouhani administration had championed the JCPOA as a pathway to economic relief, the US withdrawal from the agreement and Europe\u2019s subsequent failure to find an alternative significantly bolstered Principlist credibility. Seizing on widespread disillusionment with a decade-long policy of engagement with the West, Principlists portrayed diplomatic outreach and reliance on European mediation as both futile and harmful to Iran\u2019s national interests. The collapse of the JCPOA, coupled with the failure of the INSTEX mechanism, prompted a shift toward a more assertive nuclear policy and a rejection of European mediation (IRNA, 2021<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Propelled, in part, by the failure of the JCPOA, Iran\u2019s 2021 presidential elections brought Principlist Seyed Ebrahim Raisi to power. Raisi adopted a more confrontational approach toward the West, making the resumption of nuclear negotiations conditional on the full lifting of sanctions and firmly excluding Iran\u2019s ballistic missile program and regional activities from the negotiating agenda (Mehr News Agency, 2022<\/a>; Tasnim News Agency, 2024<\/a>). His presidency marked a clear departure from Rouhani\u2019s cooperative stance, signaling the consolidation of Principlist influence across all branches of government. The dynamics of negotiation under Raisi\u2019s leadership, in contrast to his predecessor, will be examined in the next article, with a focus on the evolving contours of Iran\u2019s diplomatic strategy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

References\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Alcaro, R. (2021). Europe\u2019s defence of the Iran nuclear deal: Less than a success, more than a failure. The International Spectator<\/em>, 56<\/em>(1), 55\u201372. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/03932729.2021.1876861<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arms Control Association. (2022). Restoring the JCPOA\u2019s nuclear limits<\/em>. https:\/\/www.armscontrol.org\/factsheets\/restoring-jcpoas-nuclear-limits<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bradner, E. (2015). What’s in the Iran nuclear deal? 7 key points<\/em>. CNN. https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20150404070719\/http:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2015\/04\/02\/politics\/iran-nuclear-deal-main-points-of-agreement\/<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

EEAS (n.d.). Nuclear agreement \u2013 JCPOA<\/em>. https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/nuclear-agreement-%E2%80%93-jcpoa_en<\/a> [Retrieved: July 12, 2025]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

European External Action Service. (n.d.). Iran and the EU<\/em>. https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/iran-and-eu-0_en<\/a> [Retrieved: July 17, 2025]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

FATF. (n.d.). What we do<\/em>. https:\/\/www.fatf-gafi.org\/en\/the-fatf\/what-we-do.html<\/a>. [Retrieved July 12, 2025] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ferragamo, M., Masters, J., & Merrow, W. (2025, June 16). What are Iran\u2019s nuclear and missile capabilities?<\/em> Council on Foreign Relations. https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/article\/what-are-irans-nuclear-and-missile-capabilities<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghobadi, P. (2025). FATF amniyat-e eqtes\u0101d\u012b-ye \u012ar\u0101n r\u0101 tahd\u012bd m\u012b-konad<\/em> [FATF threatens Iran\u2019s economic security]. Mersad News. https:\/\/mersadnews.ir\/index.php\/story\/fatf-\u0627\u0645\u0646\u06cc\u062a-\u0627\u0642\u062a\u0635\u0627\u062f\u06cc-\u0627\u06cc\u0631\u0627\u0646-\u0631\u0627-\u062a\u0647\u062f\u06cc\u062f-\u0645\u06cc\u200c\u06a9\u0646\u062f<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

IAEA Spokesperson. (2018). Statement on Iran by the IAEA Spokesperson<\/em>. IAEA. https:\/\/www.iaea.org\/newscenter\/pressreleases\/statement-on-iran-by-the-iaea-spokesperson<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

IRNA. (2021). Seyyed Ebr\u0101h\u012bm Ra\u02be\u012bs\u012b beh \u02bfonv\u0101n-e p\u012br\u016bz-e entekh\u0101b\u0101t-e riy\u0101sat jomh\u016br\u012b ma\u02bfarref\u012b shod<\/em> [Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi introduced as the winner of the presidential election]. https:\/\/www.irna.ir\/news\/84374744<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jamshidi, A. (2020). Tasv\u012bb-e FATF r\u0101h-e ch\u0101neh-zan\u012b-ye Or\u016bp\u0101 r\u0101 b\u0101z m\u012b-konad<\/em> [Passing FATF opens Europe\u2019s bargaining path]. Farhikhtegan Daily. https:\/\/farhikhtegandaily.com\/page\/129959\/<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kayhan. (2019). Diplom\u0101si-ye enfe\u2018\u0101l\u012b, Or\u016bp\u0101 r\u0101 h\u0101r kard!<\/em> [Passive diplomacy drove Europe wild!]. Kayhan. https:\/\/kayhan.ir\/fa\/news\/177771\/\u062f\u06cc\u067e\u0644\u0645\u0627\u0633\u06cc-\u0627\u0646\u0641\u0639\u0627\u0644\u06cc-\u0627\u0631\u0648\u067e\u0627-\u0631\u0627-\u0647\u0627\u0631-\u06a9\u0631\u062f<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kerry, J. (2015). Press availability on nuclear deal with Iran<\/em>. US Department of State. https:\/\/2009-2017.state.gov\/secretary\/remarks\/2015\/07\/244885.htm<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lopez, H. (2018). Europe must not give in to US pressure on Iran<\/em>. Euractiv. https:\/\/www.euractiv.com\/section\/global-europe\/opinion\/1397488\/<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mairson, S. (2019). The step-by-step unravelling of the Iran nuclear deal<\/em>. Iran Watch. https:\/\/www.iranwatch.org\/our-publications\/articles-reports\/step-step-unravelling-iran-nuclear-deal<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mashregh News. (2020). \u02bfAraqch\u012b: E\u02bftem\u0101d\u012b beh Or\u016bp\u0101\u012b-h\u0101 va INSTEX nad\u0101r\u012bm<\/em> [Araghchi: We do not trust Europeans or INSTEX]. Mashregh News. https:\/\/www.mashreghnews.ir\/news\/1113449\/\u0639\u0631\u0627\u0642\u0686\u06cc-\u0627\u0639\u062a\u0645\u0627\u062f\u06cc-\u0628\u0647-\u0627\u0631\u0648\u067e\u0627\u06cc\u06cc-\u0647\u0627-\u0648-\u0627\u06cc\u0646\u0633\u200c\u062a\u06a9\u0633-\u0646\u062f\u0627\u0631\u06cc\u0645<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mashregh News. (2023, July 22). Eqted\u0101r-e nez\u0101m\u012b-ye \u012ar\u0101n \u0100mr\u012bk\u0101 r\u0101 v\u0101dar beh moz\u0101kerah kard<\/em> [Iran\u2019s military power has compelled the U.S. to negotiate]. Mashregh News<\/em>. https:\/\/www.mashreghnews.ir\/news\/1707918\/\u0627\u0642\u062a\u062f\u0627\u0631-\u0646\u0638\u0627\u0645\u06cc-\u0627\u06cc\u0631\u0627\u0646-\u0622\u0645\u0631\u06cc\u06a9\u0627-\u0631\u0627-\u0648\u0627\u062f\u0627\u0631-\u0628\u0647-\u0645\u0630\u0627\u06a9\u0631\u0647-\u06a9\u0631\u062f\u0647-\u0627\u0633\u062a<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mehr News Agency. (2020). Barj\u0101m, abz\u0101r-e fesh\u0101r-e Or\u016bp\u0101 bar \u012ar\u0101n: Ejr\u0101-ye protokol-e elh\u0101q\u012b motavaqef shod<\/em> [JCPOA as Europe\u2019s pressure tool on Iran: Implementation of Additional Protocol suspended]. Mehr News. https:\/\/www.mehrnews.com\/news\/4954375<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mehr News Agency. (2022). Ra\u02be\u012bs\u012b: naf\u02bf-e mellat-e khodm\u0101n r\u0101 dar moz\u0101kerah b\u0101 \u0100mr\u012bk\u0101 nem\u012b-b\u012bn\u012bm<\/em> [Raisi: We see no benefit to our nation in negotiating with the U.S.]. Mehr News. https:\/\/www.mehrnews.com\/news\/5592424<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mehr News Agency. (2024). Barrasi-ye j\u0101m\u2018eh-ye goruh-e vizheh-e eqd\u0101m-e m\u0101l\u012b pol\u2011shuyi: doroy-e sekkeh\u2011ye FATF bar\u0101ye Ir\u0101n<\/em> [A comprehensive review of the Financial Action Task Force: FATF’s double-edged sword for Iran]. Mehr News<\/em>. https:\/\/www.mehrnews.com\/news\/6334731\/\u0628\u0631\u0631\u0633\u06cc-\u062c\u0627\u0645\u0639-\u06af\u0631\u0648\u0647-\u0648\u06cc\u0698\u0647-\u0627\u0642\u062f\u0627\u0645-\u0645\u0627\u0644\u06cc-\u067e\u0648\u0644-\u0634\u0648\u06cc\u06cc-\u062f\u0648\u0631\u0648\u06cc-\u0633\u06a9\u0647-FATF-\u0628\u0631\u0627\u06cc<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Tasnim News Agency. (2024). Rev\u0101yat-e Jamsh\u012bd\u012b az moz\u0101ker\u0101t-e shah\u012bd Ra\u02be\u012bs\u012b bar\u0101-ye gostarsh-e rav\u0101bet-e kh\u0101rej\u012b<\/em> [Jamshidi\u2019s account of Martyr Raisi\u2019s negotiations to expand foreign relations]. https:\/\/www.tasnimnews.com\/fa\/news\/1403\/03\/26\/3104601<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Wagner, M., & Rocha, V. (2018). Trump withdraws US from Iran nuclear deal<\/em>. CNN. https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/politics\/live-news\/trump-iran-nuclear-deal\/<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zimmt, R. (2020). INSTEX: More about politics than economics<\/em>. Atlantic Council<\/em>. https:\/\/www.atlanticcouncil.org\/blogs\/iransource\/instex-more-about-politics-than-economics\/<\/a> <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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