{"id":1663,"date":"2025-07-31T14:52:28","date_gmt":"2025-07-31T18:52:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=1663"},"modified":"2025-07-31T15:36:31","modified_gmt":"2025-07-31T19:36:31","slug":"realist-approach-to-arctic-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2025\/realist-approach-to-arctic-policy\/","title":{"rendered":"Realist Approach to Arctic Policy"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Realist Approach to Arctic Policy \n <\/h1>\n \n \n\n

By Bogdan Koutsenko<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n \n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

The objective of this paper is to evaluate arguments for and against the realist approach to international relations commentary on the Arctic. The paper argues that the Arctic is a highly mutable space, characterized by a strong disconnect between perception and interpretation, on the one hand, and material reality, on the other. While novel approaches to realism in international relations (IR) theory, like neoclassical realism, offer ways of thinking about distortions to decision-making capabilities, they tend to neglect the ways in which Arctic dynamics are endowed with meaning through the interplay of strategic priorities operating outside of the region itself. Addressing this lacuna makes it possible to centre the role of perception; assess the co-creation of security dynamics; and address the subtle differences between the dominant realist perspective and a more pragmatic appreciation of the region\u2019s security dynamics. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

During the Cold War, the Arctic represented a \u201cbuffer zone between… two superpower rivals\u201d \u2014 a strategic concept that shaped high-level thinking regarding the risk of nuclear conflict between two hegemons of the bipolar world order (\u00d8sthagen 2020, 5). While both liberal and realist paradigms failed to anticipate the Cold War\u2019s relatively peaceful end, they have nonetheless remained dominant lenses for understanding foreign policy and state behaviour, particularly as strategic interests in the Arctic have undergone a resurgence. The continued prominence of these frameworks underscores the enduring appeal of systemic explanations for state behaviour, even in the face of unpredictable geopolitical shifts.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Throughout the 1990s, the formation of various supranational organizations \u2014 the Arctic Council (1996), the WWF Arctic program (1992), the Northern Forum (1991), and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (1993)\u00a0 \u2014as well as the establishment of norms governing state actions \u2014 like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which entered into force in 1994 \u2014 led scholars like Oran Young to observe a transformation in the Arctic and frame it as a \u201cfocal point for a range of initiatives involving transnational cooperation\u201d (Young 2005, 9). Over time, these discursive spaces and practices, founded on the mutual commitment of participating members to common objectives, would become second nature (Young 2005, 9).\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Today, the realist paradigm has once again become the preferred framework for understanding foreign policy and national security in the Arctic (Buchanan 2023). While Russia\u2019s 2016 Foreign Policy Concept follows a \u201cdual track\u201d approach to the Arctic \u2014peaceful and cooperative on one hand, zero-sum and realist on the other \u2014 Lieutenant General Rolf Frolland of the Norwegian Air Force points to the decision of Russian Chief of Defense Gerasimov in 2019 to launch the \u201cactive defense\u201d concept \u2014 high readiness, mobility, strong coordination and massive firepower \u2014 in urging the Norwegian government to adopt an approach that is \u201crealistic, pragmatic and aimed at ensuring hard security\u201d (Frolland 2021). This self-perpetuating, securitizing cycle has led to the increasing militarization of the Arctic by Russia and NATO, hindering possibilities for cooperation in the region (Fakhoury 2023). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to Mariya Omelicheva, numerous scholars have analyzed the Arctic from the realist perspective, both through defensive realism \u2014 which perceives Russia as a status quo state reacting defensively to NATO\u2019s eastern encroachment \u2014 and offensive realism \u2014 which, in the tradition of John J. Mearsheimer, sees Russia as a power maximizer driven to expand its regional dominance and secure a strategic advantage on the world stage (Omelicheva 2016; \u201cThe Kremlin\u2019s Arctic Dreams<\/em>\u201d 2022). The media and popular writing on the subject have been dominated by the more sensationalist framing approaches of realist accounts (Knutsen and Pedersen 2024). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

With the longest Arctic coastline, sovereignty over half the region\u2019s population, and a technological edge inherited from the Soviet Union, Russia stands as the undisputed hegemon in the Arctic (Charron, Plouffe, and Roussel 2012). Russia seeks to leverage its position in the Arctic as a pivot into a new world order (\u201cThe Kremlin\u2019s Arctic Dreams<\/em>\u201d 2022). Arctic countries adopt standard responses prescribed by realist theory, including bandwagoning (joining the hegemon) or balancing (counterweighting the side of the hegemon) (Charron, Plouffe, and Roussel 2012).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Russian
Russian Troops in the Arctic<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine has increased threat perception in the Arctic, serving as a key vector in the evolving security landscape of the region (Newcomer et al. 2022). Despite this, Elizabeth Buchanan argues that the Kremlin is interested in pursuing peaceful relations in the Arctic for strategic reasons (Buchanan 2023). Jonas Kjell\u00e9n observes that Russia\u2019s construction of built infrastructure along the latitudinal axis of its Northern Sea Route rather than the longitudinal axis of a nuclear strike, as during the Cold War, suggests economic rather than military motives for its Arctic frenzy (Kjell\u00e9n 2022). Elina Brutschin and Samuel R. Schubert argue that the co-occurrence of military, extractive, and transportation infrastructure suggests that Russian military mobilization in the region can be explained by an upsurge in economic activity, itself the outcome of a warming climate (Brutschin and Schubert 2016). The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies has described Russia\u2019s Arctic policy as a proactive response, which seeks to diminish the uncertainty of geo-strategic developments in the Arctic resulting from a changing climate (\u201cThe Kremlin\u2019s Arctic Dreams<\/em>\u201d 2022).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While realist frameworks help explain many key dynamics in the Arctic, they often underestimate the region\u2019s symbolic and strategic fluidity, as well as its historical entanglement in broader international and security orders \u2014 thereby offering an overdetermined perspective on the options available to states in the region. The Arctic is not a fixed geopolitical arena, but a mutable space shaped by extra-regional priorities and strongly influenced by perceptions and interpretations of state behaviour. A more pragmatic approach would invite greater attention to the ways in which meaning is produced, contested, and leveraged in shaping the actions of states.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Buchanan, Elizabeth. Red Arctic\u202f: Russian Strategy under Putin<\/em>. Washington, D.C:\u00a0
Brookings Institution Press, 2023.\u00a0
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Brutschin, Elina, and Samuel R Schubert. \u201cIcy Waters, Hot Tempers, and High Stakes: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics of the Arctic.\u201d Energy Research & Social Science<\/em> 16 (2016): 147\u201359. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.erss.2016.03.020<\/a>.\u00a0
Charron, Andrea, Jo\u00ebl Plouffe, and St\u00e9phane Roussel. \u201cThe Russian Arctic Hegemon: Foreign Policy\u00a0
Implications for Canada.\u201d Canadian Foreign Policy Journal<\/em> 18, no. 1 (2012): 38\u201350.\u00a0
https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/11926422.2012.674384<\/a>.\u00a0
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Fakhoury, Renato. \u201cPolar Stars: Toward an Epistemological Understanding of Security\u00a0
Constellations and the Arctic Case.\u201d Global Studies Quarterly<\/em> 3, no. 4 (2023). \u00a0
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Folland, R. Arctic Security: Deterrence and D\u00e9tente in the High North.<\/em> Washington, D.C.: The Arctic\u00a0
Institute \u2013 Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, 2021. https:\/\/www.thearcticinstitute.org\/arctic-security-deterrence-detente-high-north\/<\/a>.\u00a0
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Kjell\u00e9n, Jonas. \u201cThe Russian Northern Fleet and the (Re)Militarisation of the Arctic.\u201d Arctic<\/em>\u00a0
Review on Law and Politics<\/em> 13 (2022): 34\u201352.\u00a0\u00a0
https:\/\/doi.org\/10.23865\/arctic.v13.3338<\/a>.\u00a0
\u00a0
Knutsen, Bj\u00f8rn\u202fOlav, and Marius Pedersen. 2024. \u201cHow to Understand Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier in the Arctic.\u201d Arctic Review on Law and Politics<\/em> 15 (November 18): 153\u2013 176. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.23865\/arctic.v15.6500<\/a>.\u00a0
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Newcomer, James L., Jack Borgen, P. Terrence Hughes, Sarah McKenzie, and\u00a0
\u00a0 Jacqueline O. Smith. 2022. \u201cRussia in the Arctic: Gauging How Russia\u2019s Invasion of Ukraine Will Alter Regional Dynamics.\u201d Center for a New American<\/em>\u00a0
Security<\/em>. https:\/\/s3.us-east-<\/a> 1.amazonaws.com\/files.cnas.org\/documents\/RussiaintheArctic_2022_Final.pdf.\u00a0
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Omelicheva, Mariya Y. \u201cCritical Geopolitics on Russian Foreign Policy: Uncovering the\u00a0
Imagery of Moscow\u2019s International Relations.\u201d International Politics<\/em> (Hague, \u00a0
Netherlands) 53, no. 6 (2016): 708\u201326. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1057\/s41311-016-0009-5<\/a>.\u00a0\u00a0
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\u00d8sthagen, Andreas. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Three Levels of Arctic Geopolitics.\u00a0
Balsillie Paper<\/em> 3, no. 0 (December 14, 2020). https:\/\/balsilliepapers.ca\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/12\/Balsillie-Paper-Osthagen.pdf<\/a>.\u00a0\u00a0
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The Kremlin\u2019s Arctic Dreams: Geo-Strategic Implications for Russia and the World in 2040. Washington, DC: Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins<\/em> University<\/em>, 2022. \u00a0
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%20The%20Kremlin%27s%20Artic%20Dreams.pdf.\u00a0
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Young, Oran R. \u201cGoverning the Arctic: From Cold War Theater to Mosaic of Cooperation.\u201d\u00a0
Global Governance<\/em> 11, no. 1 (2005): 9\u201315. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1163\/19426720-<\/a> 01101002.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This paper applies the realist theory to the Arctic and tracks this thought through modern history.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":128,"featured_media":1667,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[86,84,1,92,166,100,165],"tags":[108,169,168,167,42,170],"class_list":["post-1663","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-arctic","category-european-security","category-news","category-brief","category-realist","category-russia","category-theory","tag-arctic-security","tag-classical-realism","tag-neorealism","tag-realism","tag-russia","tag-theory"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1663","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/128"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1663"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1663\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1674,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1663\/revisions\/1674"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1667"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1663"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1663"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1663"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}