{"id":1718,"date":"2025-08-11T12:51:41","date_gmt":"2025-08-11T16:51:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=1718"},"modified":"2025-08-12T10:24:10","modified_gmt":"2025-08-12T14:24:10","slug":"the-impact-of-raisis-presidency-on-nuclear-negotiations","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2025\/the-impact-of-raisis-presidency-on-nuclear-negotiations\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran-Europe Relations: The Impact of Raisi’s Presidency on Nuclear Negotiations and Diplomatic Tensions"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Iran-Europe Relations: The Impact of Raisi’s Presidency on Nuclear Negotiations and Diplomatic Tensions \n <\/h1>\n \n \n \n\n

By Alireza Mamdouhi<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

\"Iranian<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

During his time as Iran\u2019s President from 2021\u20132024, Seyed Ebrahim Raisi spearheaded a marked recalibration of Iran\u2019s foreign policy characterized by heightened distrust and skepticism toward Europe and its efforts to play a central diplomatic role in resolving current United States (US)-Iran tensions. Diverging from the positions of the previous Rouhani presidency, Raisi\u2019s administration viewed Europe less as an independent geopolitical actor and more as an extension of a declining US-dominated international order.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a result, Raisi demonstrated little willingness to engage with European powers, consistently voicing skepticism regarding their intentions and portraying them as strategically subordinate to the US (Vinjamuri et al., 2025<\/a>). Reflecting this shift in tone, Raisi\u2019s addresses to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2024 repeatedly underscored the perceived decline of US hegemony, declaring that the \u201cproject to Americanize the world has failed\u201d and that the \u201cold liberal order … has been pushed aside\u201d\u00a0 (Jamshidi, 2022<\/a>). During this speech, he urged European states to distance themselves from US expansionist policies and to honour their commitments to Iran, warning that \u201cUS unilateralism is not in the interest of anyone.\u201d Although Raisi expressed conditional interest in economic cooperation with Europe, he simultaneously cautioned against what he termed as \u201calien\u201d interference in shaping these relations (News University ANA, 2025<\/a>).\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Differences Between Raisi and Rouhani Administrations Regarding Relations with Europe<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

A key distinction between Raisi\u2019s administration and that of Rouhani was the former\u2019s renewed emphasis on strengthening the \u201cresistance economy\u201d in Iran. Originally introduced by Ayatollah Khamenei but largely sidelined during Rouhani\u2019s tenure, this strategy aimed to achieve economic self-sufficiency and neutralize the impact of foreign sanctions. Under Raisi, this strategy translated into a more deliberate policy of boosting domestic production, expanding non-oil exports, and reducing reliance on imports (Tasnim News, 2019). This focus marked a clear departure from Rouhani\u2019s approach, which prioritized diplomacy with the West as the primary way to reduce economic isolation and improve Iran\u2019s security. Contrarily, by publicly decoupling Iran\u2019s economic trajectory from the success of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Raisi\u2019s administration sought to minimize perceived external leverage over its nuclear program. This posture allowed Iran to maintain a firm stance on its demands despite European pressure, as the immediate economic necessity for a deal was downplayed domestically (Mashregh News, 2022a). Though this strategy hardened Iran\u2019s negotiating position, it also contributed to the prolonged nature of negotiations by diminishing the perceived urgency for Iran to make a compromise (Mashregh News, 2025<\/a>).\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In parallel, the long-standing \u201cLook East\u201d policy, championed by Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, has gained unprecedented momentum during Raisi\u2019s presidency. This doctrine was based on the belief that the current US-led international system would lose influence to an emerging global order centred around Asia. Raisi\u2019s administrated followed this policy by strengthening Iran\u2019s ties with its Eastern partners, particularly China and Russia, as a means to counter the diplomatic isolation and sanctions imposed by the US and Europe (Mashregh News, 2025<\/a>; Velayati, 2022<\/a>). This strategic pivot further limited prospects for cooperation with Europe, as Tehran increasingly perceived Europe and the US as being aligned, thus leading Iran to prioritize partnerships with Asian powers over engagement with the West (Mashregh News, 2025<\/a>; Velayati, 2022<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

During this time, Iranian official discourse on nuclear negotiations with Europe also adopted a much more firm and critical tone. For example, Raisi openly condemned the US and the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) for what he described as a \u201cvery improper\u201d act of advancing a resolution at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors that was sharply critical of Iran while all sides were still engaged in negotiations on Iran\u2019s nuclear program (Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) English, 2022<\/a>). Raisi also questioned the reliability of US and European negotiators, stressing that Iran would not allow negotiations to be for negotiations\u2019 sake and insisting that any dialogue must be results-oriented and produce tangible outcomes for Iran (Akbari, 2021<\/a>; Tasnim News, 2025<\/a>). Central to this administration\u2019s stance was the categorical rejection of expanding the scope of negotiations, particularly through Raisi\u2019s assertion that \u2013 despite being a core concern for Europe \u2013 Iran\u2019s ballistic missile program was non-negotiable (Akbari, 2021<\/a>; Institute for Peace and Diplomacy (IPD) Middle East Research Team, 2021<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Late 2021: Initial Stalemates in EU-Iran Nuclear Negotiations <\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The Raisi administration\u2019s approach to negotiating  its nuclear program with Europe began with the seventh round of the \u2018Vienna talks\u2019 in November 2021. Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian and Iran\u2019s chief negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani consistently emphasized two central demands during these talks: one, the complete and verifiable lifting of all sanctions imposed after the US withdrawal in 2018; and two, legally binding guarantees to prevent any future US administration from abandoning the agreement (IRNA, 2021<\/a>). Additionally, Iran\u2019s negotiating team sought assurances that sanctions relief would result in tangible and sustainable economic benefits for their country (IRNA, 2021<\/a>). These demands were proposed to mitigate against the negative effects of the first JCPOA, where the absence of such guarantees led to significant economic disruption for Iran after the US\u2019 unilateral exit in 2018. During the Vienna talks, Iran submitted two documents outlining proposals on sanctions removal and nuclear commitments, with a third document on guarantees and verification that they were abiding by the JCPOA. In presenting these proposals, Bagheri Kani asserted that Iran\u2019s position during these talks was based on principles accepted by all parties, despite European dissatisfaction (Ahqaqi, 2021<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

European partners, particularly the E3, reiterated their commitment to reviving the JCPOA, viewing it as the most effective means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, they also expressed mounting concerns over Iran\u2019s accelerated nuclear activities (E3, 2022<\/a>). According to IAEA reports, these advancements undermined the non-proliferation benefits of the original deal and sharply reduced Iran\u2019s breakout time to produce weapons-grade uranium (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023<\/a>). Shortly after Raisi assumed office in August 2021, Iran began enriching uranium to 60% while also producing uranium metal. By the start of the November 2021 Vienna talks, Iran had accumulated 113.8 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium. Enriching to 20% completes almost all the necessary work to produce the fissile material for a bomb (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023<\/a>), a threshold Iran surpassed with its 113.8 kilogram stockpile. While European officials acknowledged Iran\u2019s concerns regarding sanctions relief, they viewed the demand for legally binding guarantees as particularly difficult to fulfill, especially in the context of Iran\u2019s renewed effort to enrich its uranium (Arms Control Association, 2022<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

2022 to Early 2023: Escalation of Tensions and Diplomatic Impasse <\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

From 2022 to early 2023, the diplomatic climate surrounding the European Union (EU)-Iran nuclear talks deteriorated sharply; this breakdown was caused by two major events.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first was Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Before the invasion, Russia had played a relatively constructive role in Iran\u2013IAEA relations. While occasionally criticizing Iran for its breaches of the nuclear accord and delays in the JCPOA negotiations, Russia largely positioned itself as a mediator between Iran and the West. However, the full-scale invasion and resulting war between Russia and Ukraine fundamentally altered this dynamic, introducing significant challenges for the already faltering nuclear negotiations between Iran and European powers (Notte, 2023<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran’s response to the war has gone beyond mere rhetorical support for Russia. Tehran has provided significant military assistance to Moscow, particularly in the form of loitering munitions such as the Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 drones, which have been widely used by Russian forces on the battlefield Ukrainian conflict (Kunertova, 2023<\/a>). In October 2022, reports emerged suggesting that Iran was also preparing to supply Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, thus deepening its involvement in the conflict (Avdaliani, 2024<\/a>). Iranian officials, including Amirabdollahian, defended providing Russia with these weapons and asserted that the drones did not violate UN Security Council Resolution 2231. This Resolution, which was adopted to lift sanctions on Iran as part of the JCPOA, regulates the transfer of goods that could potentially contribute to nuclear weapon delivery systems (Javan Online, 2022<\/a>). Iran’s ambassador to the UN further supported this stance, arguing that these military transfers were outside the scope of the Resolution (Mashregh News, 2022b<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The geopolitical shift triggered by Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine had a direct impact on the stalled JCPOA negotiations. As Russia grew increasingly dependent on Iran for both economic and military support, Moscow\u2019s leverage over Tehran in the nuclear talks diminished (Notte, 2022<\/a>). This new dependence reduced Russia’s ability \u2013 and, perhaps more critically, its willingness \u2013 to mediate the nuclear discussions effectively. As the war in Ukraine continues, Russia\u2019s stance on Iran\u2019s nuclear ambitions has become more tolerant. In fact, Moscow now appears to view Iran\u2019s pursuit of nuclear weapon capabilities as beneficial to its own strategic interests. From Russia\u2019s perspective, a broader confrontation between Iran and the West could serve to further complicate the West\u2019s foreign policy focus, creating additional pressure on the liberal international order at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions (Notte, 2022<\/a>; Notte, 2023<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This shift in Russia\u2019s approach, transforming from a constructive mediator to a more disengaged partner, has further undermined European efforts to revive the nuclear deal. For European nations, Iran\u2019s military assistance to Russia has become a significant point of contention. The EU swiftly condemned Iran\u2019s actions to provide Russia with military drones and missiles to use in the war. In response, the E3 and other European countries imposed new rounds of sanctions targeting Iranian officials and entities for human rights abuses and military cooperation \u2013 sanctions that were separate from those tied to Iran\u2019s nuclear program (Court et al., 2024<\/a>). Tehran quickly retaliated by sanctioning European individuals and organizations, accusing them of inciting unrest and meddling in its sovereign affairs (Fars News Agency, 2023<\/a>). This cycle of punitive measures and countersanctions has further eroded trust and severely disrupted communication channels between the two sides. The introduction of these new, non-nuclear sanctions, coupled with Iran\u2019s reciprocal measures, signaled a broader breakdown in bilateral relations, making it increasingly difficult to compartmentalize the nuclear negotiations from other contentious issues. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second factor contributing to the breakdown of the EU-Iran relationship during this period was the death of Masha Amini in September 2022 and the resulting political unrest in Iran. Amini died in police custody after being arrested for improperly wearing her hijab. The Iranian government\u2019s handling of the protests criticizing the government drew strong condemnation and sanctions from European nations which, in turn, affected the prospects for the nuclear program negotiations. European governments, now reconsidering their approach to Iran, became increasingly hesitant to advance a deal with Tehran under its conservative conditions. Amirabdollahian also repeatedly denounced European statements and actions regarding the protests, accusing them of interference in Iran\u2019s internal affairs and acting on a double standard (IRNA, 2022<\/a>). This highly charged political environment further complicated any possibility of a diplomatic breakthrough on the nuclear issue, as European policy toward Iran began to increasingly incorporate conditions tied to domestic human rights concerns (Deutsche Welle, 2022<\/a>; Lynch, 2022<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

As the Raisi administration ended in May 2024, Iran-Europe relations were left strained, and the nuclear negotiations remained at a standstill. Despite existing communication channels aimed at preventing a complete diplomatic breakdown, trust further dissolved as the talks became increasingly entangled with broader disputes over Iran\u2019s human rights record and its military support for Russia. European frustration deepened as Iran\u2019s nuclear program advanced through higher enrichment levels and expanded centrifuge capacity, pushing the revival of the JCPOA further out of reach and prompting consideration of alternative strategies. As a result, Raisi\u2019s legacy has been defined by an unyielding approach that emphasized resilience and national demands over compromise. This stance, while projecting Iran as a powerful and resilient actor, nevertheless prolonging the deadlock as well as Iran\u2019s economic and political isolation. Raisi\u2019s successor, Masoud Pezeshkian, now has to navigate balancing Iran\u2019s emboldened nuclear program with his political ambitions to return to a more open and constructive relationship with Europe (Donya-e-Eqtesad, 2024<\/a>).\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

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Lynch, S. (2022). EU set to hit Iran with sanctions over protest crackdown<\/em>. Politico. https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/eu-to-hit-iran-with-sanctions-over-protest-crackdown-death-mahsa-amini-iranian-women\/<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mashregh News. (2022). Agar be eqtes\u0101d-e mog\u0101vamati tavajjoh m\u012b-shod, moshkel\u0101t-e emr\u016bz r\u0101 nad\u0101sht\u012bm<\/em> [If attention had been given to a resistance-based economy, we wouldn\u2019t have today\u2019s problems]. https:\/\/www.mashreghnews.ir\/news\/1320210\/\u0627\u06af\u0631-\u0628\u0647-\u0627\u0642\u062a\u0635\u0627\u062f-\u0645\u0642\u0627\u0648\u0645\u062a\u06cc-\u062a\u0648\u062c\u0647-\u0645\u06cc\u200c\u0634\u062f-\u0645\u0634\u06a9\u0644\u0627\u062a-\u0627\u0645\u0631\u0648\u0632-\u0631\u0627-\u0646\u062f\u0627\u0634\u062a\u06cc\u0645<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mashregh News. (2022). Pahp\u0101d-e \u012ar\u0101n\u012b dar jang-e \u016akr\u0101\u012bn; sen\u0101ry\u016by\u012b ke \u012bn r\u016bzh\u0101 dar h\u0101l-e pokht va paz-e \u0101n hastand<\/em> [Iranian drone in the Ukraine war; A scenario that is being cooked these days]. https:\/\/www.mashreghnews.ir\/news\/1431397\/%D9%BE%D9%87%D9%BE%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%A7%D9%88%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%88%DB%8C%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%BE%D8%AE%D8%AA<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mashregh News. (2025). Taf\u0101vot-h\u0101-ye moz\u0101ker\u0101t dar dowlat-e Ra\u2019\u012bs\u012b b\u0101 dowlat-e p\u012bsh\u012bn ch\u012bst?<\/em> [What are the differences in negotiations under Raisi\u2019s government compared to the previous one?]. https:\/\/www.mashreghnews.ir\/news\/1339195\/\u062a\u0641\u0627\u0648\u062a-\u0647\u0627\u06cc-\u0645\u0630\u0627\u06a9\u0631\u0627\u062a-\u062f\u0631-\u062f\u0648\u0644\u062a-\u0631\u0626\u06cc\u0633\u06cc-\u0628\u0627-\u062f\u0648\u0644\u062a-\u067e\u06cc\u0634\u06cc\u0646-\u0686\u06cc\u0633\u062a<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

News University ANA. (2025). Ra\u02be\u012bs\u012b: \u0100mr\u012bk\u0101 va Or\u016bp\u0101\u012b-h\u0101 dar qeb\u0101l-e \u012ar\u0101n girift\u0101r-e eshteb\u0101h-e moh\u0101sab\u0101t\u012b hastand<\/em> [Raisi: The U.S. and Europeans are making a miscalculation regarding Iran]. ANA News Agency. https:\/\/ana.ir\/fa\/news\/667658\/\u0631\u0626\u06cc\u0633\u06cc-\u0622\u0645\u0631\u06cc\u06a9\u0627-\u0627\u0631\u0648\u067e\u0627\u06cc\u06cc\u200c\u0647\u0627-\u062f\u0631-\u0642\u0628\u0627\u0644-\u0627\u06cc\u0631\u0627\u0646-\u06af\u0631\u0641\u062a\u0627\u0631-\u0627\u0634\u062a\u0628\u0627\u0647-\u0645\u062d\u0627\u0633\u0628\u0627\u062a\u06cc-\u0647\u0633\u062a\u0646\u062f<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Notte, H. (2022). Don\u2019t expect any more Russian help on the Iran nuclear deal<\/em>. War on the Rocks. https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2022\/11\/dont-expect-any-more-russian-help-on-the-iran-nuclear-deal\/<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Notte, H. (2023). The Iran nuclear price tag<\/em>. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https:\/\/library.fes.de\/pdf-files\/international\/20083.pdf<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tasnim News. (2019). Goz\u0101resh-e tahl\u012bl\u012b-ye Tasn\u012bm- \u0100q\u0101-ye Ra\u2019\u012bs-e Jomh\u016br! Magar goz\u0101sht\u012bd eqtes\u0101d abz\u0101r-e qodrat b\u0101shad?<\/em> [Tasnim\u2019s analytical report – Mr. President! Did you allow the economy to be a tool of power?] https:\/\/www.tasnimnews.com\/fa\/news\/1398\/06\/06\/2084073\/%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A2%D9%82%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%DA%AF%D8%B1-%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AF<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tasnim News. (2025). Cher\u0101 moz\u0101ker\u0101t-e haste-\u012b dar dowlat-e Shah\u012bd-e Ra\u02be\u012bs\u012b be natije na-ras\u012bd?<\/em> [Why did the nuclear negotiations not reach a conclusion during the administration of martyr Raisi?]. https:\/\/www.tasnimnews.com\/fa\/news\/1404\/03\/04\/3321170\/%DA%86%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%AC%D9%87-%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Velayati, A. A. (2022). Ir\u0101n, R\u016bsiyah va Ch\u012bn; seh qudrat-e mohem va mostaqel dar mogh\u0101bel-e towse\u2018a\u1e6dalabi-ye \u0100mrik\u0101 va Gharb<\/em> [Iran, Russia, and China: Three important and independent powers against the expansionism of the U.S. and the West] (Dialogue). Khamenei.ir. https:\/\/farsi.khamenei.ir\/others-dialog?id=50652<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Vinjamuri, L., Ayd\u0131n-D\u00fczgit, S., Bajpaee, C., Cooley, A., de Hoop Scheffer, A., Emmers, R., Fravel, M. T., Lind, J., Nasr, V., Quencez, M., Stelzenm\u00fcller, C., Della Costa Stuenkel, O., Vakil, S., & Zarakol, A. (2025). Competing visions of international order: Responses to US power in a fracturing worl<\/em>d. Chatham House. https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2025-03\/2025-03-27-competing-visions-international-order-vinjamuri-et-al.pdf<\/a> <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This brief considers how the Presidency of Seyed Ebrahim Raisi, with his heightened distrust of Europe and the West has impacted Iranian-European relations<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":128,"featured_media":1723,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[85,84,103,93,145,1,92],"tags":[192,106,97,35],"class_list":["post-1718","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eurasia","category-european-security","category-european-union","category-iran","category-nato","category-news","category-brief","tag-europe","tag-european-security","tag-iran","tag-policy-brief"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1718","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/128"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1718"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1718\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1734,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1718\/revisions\/1734"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1723"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1718"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1718"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1718"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}