{"id":2045,"date":"2025-10-20T10:20:38","date_gmt":"2025-10-20T14:20:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=2045"},"modified":"2025-10-29T11:56:08","modified_gmt":"2025-10-29T15:56:08","slug":"beyond-the-battlefield-the-effects-of-russias-war-in-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2025\/beyond-the-battlefield-the-effects-of-russias-war-in-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Beyond the Battlefield: The Effects of Russia\u2019s War in Ukraine on the Regional Security in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia and Afghanistan"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Beyond the Battlefield: The Effects of Russia\u2019s War in Ukraine on the Regional Security in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia and Afghanistan\n <\/h1>\n \n \n \n\n

By Tinatin Karosanidze and Tamar Kekenadze<\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n\n <\/div>\n\n

<\/div>\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

Executive Summary<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had far-reaching consequences for global security, particularly for regions and areas outside the European Union (EU), such as the South Caucasus, post-Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Mongolia. Although these areas are geographically far from the conflict zone, security ripple effects have been significant, as the Russian Federation has remained historically dominant and influential in these regions. However, the war in Ukraine has raised concerns about the security challenges and terrorism threats in Central Asia and South Caucasus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This white paper explores the strategic consequences of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine for broader security architecture with a focus on four critical areas: the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. It offers a regional assessment of shifting military alignments, hybrid threats, counterterrorism dynamics, and Canada\u2019s emerging security interests in this evolving landscape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Key Findings<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

\u00b7 Russia\u2019s military overstretch has significantly weakened its role as a regional security guarantor, particularly in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00b7 Traditional alliances are being re-evaluated; new security actors such as Turkiye, China, and smaller Western states are filling the resulting vacuum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00b7 Hybrid threats are rising in formerly Russian-dominated regions, increasing instability and risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00b7 The resurgence of terrorism and border insecurity in Central Asia and Afghanistan poses renewed threats to regional and global stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00b7 Canada has vital strategic interests in contributing to the mitigation of these risks, leveraging its role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and longstanding regional partnerships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00b7 Poland and Romania, as key actors in NATO and EU strategic initiatives, offer replicable models for Canadian-supported deterrence and resilience across Eurasia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Introduction <\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has not only redefined the contemporary nature of war but exposed deep strategic vulnerabilities within Europe\u2019s security architecture. NATO’s eastern flank was shown to be underprepared for full-scale military aggression, and debates over enlargement and deterrence capabilities have been reinvigorated. Compounding this is the growing uncertainty surrounding US foreign policy under a second Trump administration, casting doubt on the consistency and reliability of transatlantic security commitments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These shifting dynamics raise critical questions for states on the periphery of NATO and Russia\u2019s former sphere of influence. As they navigate the emerging multipolar order, the need for new strategic calculations, and potentially, alternative or diversified security guarantees, has become paramount.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point in global security relations. While much focus has remained on NATO\u2019s eastern flank and Western Europe, the war\u2019s ripple effects are being acutely felt across post-Soviet Eurasia. Countries that once relied on Russia for military protection are now exploring new alignments, hedging their defense dependencies, or recalibrating their neutrality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, this war has been influencing NATO\u2019s counterterrorism strategy. The war has created new opportunities for terrorist groups to exploit and ultimately increase their influence to fill the security vacuum. Among these groups we can mention IS-K\/IS-KP \u2013 Islamic State in Khorasan Province, the branch of IS \u2013 Islamic State \u2013 which has been spreading its propaganda in Western societies as well. During the war, Russia has continued to be a trusted partner for Iran, hosting members of another radical group Hamas previously in Moscow. Anti-Western propaganda is familiar for Russia as it has often blamed Western countries in facilitating the rise of terrorist organizations. For example, Maria Zabolotskaya, deputy permanent representative of Russia in United Nations (UN), has argued that emergence of IS in the Middle East and Africa can be blamed on the failed US withdrawal and intervention in Iraq and Libya. She added that the situation in Afghanistan is a vivid example of the West leveraging counterterrorism issues to serve their \u201cselfish geopolitical interests\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This white paper examines the impacts of Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine on the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan, which have been historically influenced by Russian (and Soviet) military presence, as well as political and economic interests, but are navigating an increasingly fragmented and uncertain security environment. While it is true that the war may not be immediately felt within these regions, it will still nevertheless have significant indirect implications for regional security dynamics by potentially escalating terrorism and extremism. Groups like IS, Al-Qaeda, and other Islamist militant organizations remain active not only in conflict zones, but also in launching global terror operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Canadian policymakers, these developments raise key questions about strategic engagement, NATO cooperation, counterterrorism strategy, and regional stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Methodology<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

This white paper employs a qualitative research design, utilizing a combination of primary and secondary sources to investigate the multifaceted challenges faced by selected states in the context of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Primary sources include government strategy papers, defense white papers, and formal statements issued by international organizations, such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE). Secondary sources include academic literature, policy briefs or analyses from research institutions or think tanks as well as insights derived from expert interviews.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A case study methodology underpins the country-level analysis, enabling in-depth examination of the geopolitical and security implications for Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Afghanistan. This approach facilitates comparative insights regarding the regional ramifications of the war in Ukraine, particularly concerning national resilience, foreign policy realignments, and security sector responses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Historical and Geopolitical Context<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

For decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia maintained its influence over the South Caucasus and Central Asia through a combination of hard military presence, economic dependencies, and soft power. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), bilateral military treaties, and strategic basing agreements, such as those in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, reflected Moscow\u2019s central role in regional security. As Thomas Graham and Rajan Menon<\/a> have argued, Russia’s approach was rooted in the belief that the Eastern European neighbourhood should remain within its exclusive sphere of influence, serving both as a security buffer and a geopolitical assertion of status. However, the war in Ukraine has fundamentally destabilized this architecture. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s 2022 invasion of Ukraine accelerated a visible erosion of Russia\u2019s hegemonic posture in the broader Eurasian region. Yet this war did not begin in 2022; it is the culmination of a broader imperial strategy that began with Russia\u2019s 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea. These earlier incursions served as testing grounds for military aggression, hybrid warfare, and the West\u2019s tolerance for territorial revisionism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 2008 war in Georgia, which resulted in the occupation of 20% of Georgian territory, was met with limited international pushback and no enduring deterrent mechanisms. This failure arguably emboldened the Kremlin\u2019s further actions in Ukraine and elsewhere, reinforcing a perception of impunity. The erosion of credible deterrence, both conventional and hybrid, has challenged the assumptions underpinning NATO\u2019s posture in Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The war in Ukraine has also tested the transatlantic relationship, revealing an over-reliance on US leadership and exposing uncertainties about the durability of Western unity, particularly in light of shifts in American administrations. The conflict has reignited debates in Europe about strategic autonomy, defense investment, and burden-sharing within NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While much attention remains focused on Ukraine, the shockwaves of the war have rippled well beyond its borders. Eurasia, particularly the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan have felt the tremors. These regions, historically shaped by Russia\u2019s military and political dominance, now face a strategic vacuum. Russia\u2019s overextension, domestic fragility, and inability to honor security commitments have altered the geopolitical balance. The result is a complex reordering of alliances, threat perceptions, and defense strategies across a vast and vulnerable geography.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Countries like Kazakhstan, traditionally aligned with Moscow, have resisted pressure to support the Kremlin\u2019s war aims and have actively diversified their foreign policy strategies. Some scholars identify a growing trend of \u201cstrategic hedging\u201d among Central Asian states, an effort to reduce overdependence on Russian security while cautiously engaging other powers. Meanwhile, Armenia\u2019s disillusionment with the CSTO following Russia\u2019s passivity during the 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh crises reflects a broader questioning of Moscow\u2019s reliability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This erosion has created space for other actors. China, once cautious in its military profile, is now establishing a more visible security footprint in Central Asia. As Raffaello Pantucci (2023) notes, Beijing has invested in border surveillance, counterterrorism cooperation, and limited joint exercises in Tajikistan<\/p>\n\n\n\n

and Kyrgyzstan. These changes indicate a transition from Russian-centric security alignment to multipolar, flexible, and interest-based configurations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

NATO’s role in Eurasian security is also undergoing a significant transformation. While formal enlargement remains politically sensitive, NATO has pursued partnership formats, especially with Georgia and, increasingly, Mongolia, to build interoperability and signal political support. Michael R\u00fchle discusses the strategic importance of \u201cNATO\u2019s global partnerships,\u201d which allow for flexible collaboration without formal membership. Georgia’s engagement through the NATO\u2013Georgia Substantial Package has been one of the examples of this evolving cooperation. The Alliance\u2019s \u201copen door\u201d policy is also being undermined by strategic ambiguity, raising doubts among aspirant states about the credibility of Western security guarantees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the Georgian case, what was once a society firmly committed to Euro-Atlantic integration has, in recent years, seen a partial retrenchment. Public support for NATO remains high, but political dynamics and growing disillusionment with Western inaction in the face of Russian occupation have fueled uncertainty. This creates both risk and opportunity: risk in the form of democratic backsliding and regional instability, and opportunity for Canada and NATO allies to re-engage with clear, consistent support for democratic reform and territorial integrity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, NATO\u2019s ability to provide credible security guarantees short of membership remains contested. Daniel Hamilton and Kristina Spohr<\/a> highlight how ambiguity in NATO’s posture toward aspirant states undermines deterrence and opens space for adversarial manipulation. These concerns are further compounded by shifting US policies and uncertain commitment levels, especially under new administrations. For states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, this ambiguity feeds the appeal of diversification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

NATO\u2019s strategic concept of 2022<\/a> focuses on the new security landscape created by Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine to adapt the new strategy of counter-terrorism and hybrid warfare. According to a particular NATO document, three main tasks has been identified: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. As Gvineria<\/a> analyzes, this document \u201cidentifies terrorism as one of the primary asymmetric threats to the alliance, alongside hybrid warfare\u2026\u201d. Also, the Washington Summit Declaration of 2024 highlighted NATO\u2019s new strategy<\/a> to prevent the spread of radical ideologies and adapt the counter-terrorism policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stockhammer<\/a> mentions three main challenges for security architecture: \u201clow-level terrorism,\u201d digital \u201cvalue chain,\u201d and proliferation of arms. He suggests that NATO\u2019s counter-terrorism strategy should take up a practice of selective reevaluation to answer new terrorism threats. As NATO\u2019s adaptive strategy from the 1990s to the 2000s was focused on strengthening its counter-terrorism efforts, the new security landscape is reshaping NATO\u2019s strategy to be more focused on answering these new threats connecting to arms trafficking from conflict zones. Stockhammer includes the example of when IS-KP tried to buy a Stringer missile via its contacts from Ukraine by 5000 USD.<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The literature also emphasizes the growing prevalence of hybrid threats, disinformation campaigns, and covert paramilitary activity. Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon<\/a> theorize that hegemonic decline is often accompanied by a rise in grey zone tactics, as waning powers seek to maintain influence without triggering direct confrontation. Russia\u2019s increased use of cyber and disinformation tools in Georgia and Kazakhstan supports this thesis. Similarly, China\u2019s security strategy in Central Asia increasingly includes digital authoritarianism, with exported surveillance technologies and cyber-cooperation compacts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These hybrid methods are particularly concerning in contexts of weak governance and democratic fragility, where external manipulation can exploit societal divisions. Scholars like Ronald Asmus<\/a> have long warned about the vulnerability of aspiring democracies on Russia\u2019s border, and recent events in Georgia and Armenia suggest that these vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the post-Ukraine war environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The South Caucasus region \u2013 including Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan \u2013 remains vulnerable to terrorism largely due to its proximity to unstable areas such as the North Caucasus, Turkiye, and Iran, as well as the movement of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) linked to conflicts in Syria and Iraq that have involved IS and other radical Islamist groups. These conflicts have created fertile ground for radicalization that some scholars suggest may further intensify the risk of radicalization; they express concern regarding the possibility of individuals returning home and further engaging with radical ideologies among local communities. While Armenia has been less affected by Islamist movements, the instability following the Karabakh conflict may nonetheless have left fertile ground for hybrid threats to form. In addition, there are concerns about Syrian militants (mainly from groups with ties to jihadist organizations) being transported to the South Caucasus to fight alongside Azerbaijani forces, particularly since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine could exacerbate the flow of foreign fighters<\/a>, with some potentially being diverted to the South Caucasus, either to support Azerbaijan or other parties.<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Pankisi Gorge region in Georgia gained notoriety in the 2000s as a site of jihadist recruitment, a refuge site for Islamic militants, and a key transit route. After the 9\/11 terrorist attacks, Western intelligence raised alarms on presence of Al-Qaeda in the Gorge. According to various sources, Arab foreign fighters who participated in the Chechen wars also received training in the region \u2013 a practice that Russia frequently cited in its accusations of Georgia harboring terrorists and failing to control its borders. From 2014 to 2015, Georgia re-emerged in international media coverage when IS rose to power in Iraq, drawing foreign fighters from around the world \u2013 including Georgia \u2013 to the battlefields of Iraq and subsequently, Syria. According to different sources, approximately 50 to 200 fighters left Georgia to fight in the ranks of IS or other terrorist organizations. As the war in Ukraine continues, it may present Russia with yet another opportunity to accuse others of providing safe haven to foreign terrorist fighters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recent reflections, including by Shoaib Rahim<\/a>, highlight that international engagement in Afghanistan, particularly by Western powers including Canada, was compromised by flawed diplomatic design and operational fragmentation. In his assessment of the Doha Peace Process (2018)<\/a>, Rahim identifies key failures such as the exclusion of the Afghan government, unrealistic timelines imposed by the United States, and a lack of impartial mediation as primary factors in the collapse of political settlement efforts. These deficiencies, compounded by internal divisions among Afghan elites, resulted in a fragile negotiating structure vulnerable to collapse under Taliban pressure. Canada’s mission, like that of its NATO allies, was constrained by unclear objectives and shifting operational mandates, a point echoed by Canadian commentators in major outlets like The Globe and Mail (2023).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The collapse of the Afghan Republic and the Taliban\u2019s return to power has had immediate and long-term security spillovers in the region. Central Asian states are particularly concerned about cross-border terrorism, refugee surges, narcotics trafficking, and the spread of extremist ideologies. With Russia distracted and weakened by its invasion of Ukraine, and China reluctant to assume deep security commitments, the region<\/p>\n\n\n\n

faces a growing vacuum of counterterrorism leadership. In this context, Rahim\u2019s critique serves as a cautionary framework for future interventions: local legitimacy, inclusive diplomacy, and long-term strategic alignment must form the foundation of external engagement. Canada\u2019s policy going forward should include lessons learned from Afghanistan\u2019s collapse, as well as new mechanisms to support border-state resilience through coordinated regional intelligence, multilateral diplomacy, and support for community-level stabilization initiatives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Afghanistan, however, presents another dimension of strategic instability. The US forces withdrawal and the Taliban\u2019s return to power have turned the country into a potential source of terrorist activity and transnational criminal networks. Reports by the International Crisis Group and the United States Institute of Peace warn of the risks posed by IS-KP and other extremist groups to regional security, particularly in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The new atmosphere gave more flexibility to various extremist groups to regroup or collaborate with each other. There are three main terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan now: the Taliban, IS-KP, and Al-Qaeda<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Afghanistan falling to Taliban rule has created a multitude of challenges for international relations. Despite the fact that no country or international organization formally recognizes the leadership of Taliban, some maintain diplomatic relations. Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan continue to engage in diplomatic talks with Taliban, focusing mostly on regional economic issues. All five Central Asian states have kept embassies in Kabul despite the fallout. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Russia focuses more on Ukraine, IS-KP has more possibility to increase its influence outside Afghanistan too. IS-KP is estimated to have about 25 000 fighters<\/a>, including foreign recruits from Central Asia and Europe. IS-KP carried out its first terrorist attack at Kabul airport immediately after the US military withdrawal in 2021, signaling its intent to challenge the Taliban for control over Afghanistan. As result of the attack<\/a>, 170 Afghans and 13 US militants were killed. And although IS has lost its territorial strongholds in Iraq and Syria, the group has nonetheless quickly shifted its strategy to forming smaller factions across various countries: \u201cDa\u2019esh has moved to adopt a less hierarchical, more networked and decentralized structure, following in Al-Qaeda\u2019s footsteps, with increased operational autonomy by its affiliated groups<\/a>\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has expressed concern over the situation in Afghanistan and IS-KP since the US withdrawal in 2021. As Vladimir Voronkov, UN Under-Secretary-General mentioned, \u201cDa\u2019esh and its affiliates continue to constitute a serious threat in conflict zones and neighboring countries<\/a>\u201d. In this context, some scholars consider IS-KP as the most formidable extremist group, with close to 10 000 members<\/a>. It has plotted more terrorist attacks since 2021 when Taliban came to power. The reasons of the increased terrorist attacks are the tactical shift that began in 2019 and chaos and vacuum in Afghanistan. IS-KP accused the Taliban of being apostates and polytheists<\/a> while the Taliban referred to IS-KP members as Salafis or Khawarij, or heretical extremists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is important to mention that IS-KP members, which became one of the main threats for the security of Afghanistan and Central Asia, who organize terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, are from Central Asian countries and mainly, Tajikistan. For example, the first terrorist attack following the onset of the Ukraine war occurred in Kabul in 2022 and was carried out by two Tajik members<\/a> of IS. In March 2023, a Tajik militant assassinated the Taliban governor of Balkh province<\/a>, Muhammad Daud Muzammil<\/a>, who had been a promient figure in the fight against the IS-KP network in Nangarhar. Later, in December 2023, a member from Central Asia residing in Germany plotted terrorist attacks targetting Catholic churches in three European cities<\/a>. These attacks were flollowed by several terrorist attacks in Iran \u2013 killing 90 people \u2013 and Turkiye \u2013 killing one person.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This continued into 2024, where IS-KP orchestrated a series of terrorist attacks across Afghanistan. Among the most notable was an assault on Muhammad Qasim Khalid<\/a>, the Afghan Taliban governor of Nimroz, who narrowly escaped execution by a faction of IS-KP Tajik member. On March 21, 2024, an Uzbek national affiliated with IS-KP carried out a suicide bombing at the Kabul Bank in Kandahar<\/a>. Following this, IS expanded its operations beyond the Khorasan region and launched several high-profile attacks. Among them was a widely publicized suicide bombing in Kerman province, Iran, during the anniversary procession of the General Qassem Soleimani\u2019s death. According to the Iranian investigators, one of the terrorists was of Tajik descent<\/a> who had received training instructions in Afghanistan (Table 1).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, among those noteworthy included terrorist attacks attributed to IS-KP on March 24, 2024, which saw Tajik nationals storm Crocus City Hall in Moscow<\/a> and kill 145 people. Such terrorist attacks showed the tendency, that since IS-KP became active in Afghanistan, more individuals from Central Asian countries – mainly ethnic Tajiks – have been engaged in terrorist activities. This trend created the fertile ground for radicalization in Central Asia\u2019s region that already experienced Islamic radical movements in the 1990s. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

2025 was no exception to terrorist violence, as several high-profile terrorist attacks in Turkiye and Russia took place. In an effort to thwart future terrorist attacks, the Turkish government carried out a series of operations targeting IS cells across the country. More than three hundred individuals were arrested, most of them originating from Central Asia. Subsequent investigations revealed that several of the detainees were high-ranking members of the IS-KP network operating across Central Asia, Turkiye, and the Caucasus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Due to IS-KP\u2019s terrorist activities beyond Afghanistan\u2019s borders, neighbouring countries \u2013 particularly in Central Asia<\/a> \u2013 have found it necessary to engage with the Taliban, not only to pursue counterterrorism objectives but to also advance their own economic and political interests in the region. Unlike the IS-KP, which poses a greater regional security threat, the Taliban has been viewed as a more viable partner in reshaping the regional security landscape. Central Asian countries have maintained their embassies in Kabul, signaling a pragmatic approach to diplomacy with Taliban governance. As Turgunbaeva & Ghiasi suggest, for Central Asian countries, the Taliban proves to be the better partner than IS-KP, as the latter has already attacked two Central Asian countries: Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Additionally, while China seeks stability in Afghanistan for fulfilling the interests served by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and to prevent the spread the radical ideology, Central Asian countries also try to stabilize the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The persistence of Central Asian militants remains an overwhelming challenge to international security. Since 2023, the region has been a wellspring of terrorist operations organized by its nationals, whose reach has extended from Europe to the Middle East. These attacks, carried out across countries such as Iran, Russia, Afghanistan, and Turkiye, bear the unmistakable imprint of Central Asian involvement. Although, despite the troubling export of violence, the post-Soviet Central Asian states themselves have, thus far, remained largely untouched by such acts of terrorism on their own soil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Uzbekistan was the first country to host a Taliban delegation, led by the Deputy Prime Minister Mawlawi Abdul Salam Hanafi in September 2022. In 2024 the Uzbek Prime Minister visited Kabul to discuss the trade projects. Kyrgyzstan\u2019s relations with Afghanistan continue to be shaped in part by the presence of a strong Afghan-Kyrgyz minority in the nation. In 2021, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Taalatbek Masadykov met with Taliban ministers to address issues important to this Afghan-Kyrgyz electorate. In September 2024, cooperation had expanded to include trade and energy infrastructure, which was soon followed by agreements in agriculture and transit. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kazakhstan has focused its engagement with Afghanistan on economic opportunities, particularly in the chemical, mining, and metallurgical sectors. The Kazak Prime Minister led a delegation to Kabul to participate in a Kazakhstan-Afghanistan business forum, highlighting growing bilateral commercial ties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tajikistan, despite being the main regional opponent of the Taliban, has established trade relations with Afghanistan and signed an agreement worth $120 million USD. In addition, in 2023, Tajikistan opened five joint border markets with Afghanistan. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkmenistan maintains a neutral stance and primarily engages with Afghanistan through the lens of energy cooperation. Its principal interest lies in the progress of the TAPI \u2013 Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. As a result, Turkmen officials\u2019 meetings with the Taliban have mostly focused on advancing this strategic energy TAPI project.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While not a formal diplomatic move, the US has also begun to engage with the Taliban on a limited basis. On March 23, 2025, they removed three high-profile members of the Haqqani network \u2013 including Sirajuddin Haqqani, the group\u2019s leader and the Taliban\u2019s acting Interior Minister \u2013 from its most-wanted list. According to the Taliban, two of those removed<\/a> are Sirajuddin Haqqani\u2019s brother and nephew. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The United States added the Haqqani Network as one of the deadliest groups connected to Taliban \u2013 operating in Pakistan and bordering Afghanistan \u2013 to the foreign terrorist organizations list in 2012. In doing so, they offered $5 to 10 USD reward for information leading to the capture of its leaders. However, the FBI removed the names of these individuals from the list<\/a>, causing larger questions to arise regarding the future role and presence of US hegemony in the region. As scholars mention, this removal followed the Taliban\u2019s release of US citizen George Glezmann, who had been detained in Afghanistan since 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With Russia weakened and NATO\u2019s reach limited, alternative security and development frameworks have gained prominence. The Central Asia\u2013Caucasus\u2013Europe (CACE) corridor, for example, envisions a strategic and economic bridge from Central Asia through the South Caucasus to Europe, bypassing Russian-controlled routes and creating new geoeconomic fault lines. Meanwhile, the Three Seas Initiative (3SI)<\/a>, spearheaded by Poland and supported by NATO allies, connects the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas in a project of economic resilience, energy diversification, and digital infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In considering NATO members\u2019 strategic roles, Romania has been emphasized in discussions about NATO\u2019s deterrence on the eastern flank and the EU\u2019s updated Black Sea Strategy (European Commission<\/a>). Romania stands at the intersection of NATO\u2019s military initiatives and the EU\u2019s efforts to enhance connectivity, economic resilience, and maritime security in the Black Sea. Also, Poland\u2019s assertive role in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) highlights a regional approach to infrastructure, energy security, and defense cooperation. The 3SI provides a framework for enhanced Central European resilience in the face of growing Russian assertiveness and fluctuating US involvement in Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Graham highlights Mongolia\u2019s position as a neutral buffer balancing Russian and Chinese pressures. The Ukraine war has further encouraged Mongolia to diversify security and economic partnerships, including through engagement with Canada and other liberal democracies. Mongolia is geographically distant from Ukraine, although the war’s influence on global security dynamics may affect the region\u2019s stability and terrorism risks. Mongolia is close to China and Russia, rendering them an indirect target for the potential exporting of radical ideologies from the extremist groups. As a neutral power between China and Russia, Mongolia may be targeted by the extremist groups allied with the Russian and Chinese state \u2013 countries which are on the same side in Ukraine war. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mongolia recognizes the global threat that terrorism and violent extremist present to an increasingly uncertain and multipolar world. Since 2023, Mongolia has been a member of the UN Office Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) program and established the Passenger Information Unit of Mongolia. It became the fourth country to join this program and the first Asian country to establish an UNOCT unit (UN General Assembley, 2024<\/a>). According to the UN representative of Mongolia, the country is continuing to take steps to increase awareness of, and fight against, disinformation and propaganda. In 2024, Mongolia hosted the conference titled \u201cAddressing the prevailing Digital Information Disorder: Countering the Use of the Internet by Terrorists and Extremists,\u201d organized by OSCE Transnational Threats Department together with the National Counter-Terrorism Council of Mongolia (UN General Assembley, 2024<\/a>). In addition, the \u201cCase for Central Asia\u2013Caucasus Engagement\u201d (National Interest, 2025<\/a>) proposes a new strategic platform to integrate diplomatic, development, and deterrence policy toward post-Soviet Eurasia. This vision aligns closely with Canada\u2019s potential for flexible engagement and soft security. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Against this backdrop, countries are hedging their bets. While some still look to NATO as the ultimate guarantor, others have diversified their options, seeking bilateral arrangements, new regional alignments, or transactional partnerships with authoritarian powers. Strategic pluralism, rather than bloc politics, defines the new Eurasian security order. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Canadian Strategic Engagement<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Poland, through its leadership in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), represents a strategic anchor for Central and Eastern Europe in countering Russian influence and fostering Euro-Atlantic cooperation. As highlighted by The National Interest (2024)<\/a>, Poland has played a central role in building regional infrastructure, energy interconnectivity, and digital resilience across the 3SI member states. These efforts reduce dependency on Russian-controlled supply lines and enhance regional autonomy in the face of hybrid and conventional threats. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 3SI complements broader NATO and EU frameworks by focusing on practical development and connectivity between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas. For countries in the South Caucasus and Central<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Asia, it offers a vision of post-Soviet regionalism that emphasizes integration, resilience, and Western alignment. Integrating the Three Seas Initiative into Canadian policy considerations provides a valuable model for aligning economic development with security stabilization across the broader post-Soviet periphery. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As regional actors seek to build more autonomous strategic and economic futures, new frameworks such as the proposed Central Asia\u2013Caucasus\u2013Europe (CACE) corridor have gained traction. The CACE initiative, as highlighted by The National Interest (2025), envisions a geoeconomic and geopolitical link connecting Central Asia and the South Caucasus directly to Europe, bypassing traditional Russian-controlled routes. The corridor promotes diversified energy exports, secure supply chains, and multilateral infrastructure cooperation. It also reinforces the strategic importance of Georgia and Azerbaijan as transit hubs between East and West. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this context, CACE<\/a> offers an alternative regional architecture that counters Russian and Chinese monopolies on overland infrastructure. For Canada, supporting such corridors may serve dual objectives: reducing regional dependency on adversarial actors, and facilitating sustainable development and security cooperation among emerging democracies. Integrating the CACE vision into Canadian foreign policy also complements NATO\u2019s military posture with a civilian, development-focused track aimed at long-term stabilization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recent policy commentary underscores two interlinked narratives in Eurasia’s evolving security order: the significance of credible NATO-aligned deterrence models (as seen in Romania), and the consequences of softening international stances toward Russia\u2019s occupation of Crimea. Recognizing Russia\u2019s annexation of Crimea as legitimate would embolden other revisionist powers and fundamentally erode international legal norms regarding sovereignty. Meanwhile, Romania has demonstrated how mid-sized NATO allies can reinforce the alliance\u2019s eastern posture through infrastructure development, multinational coordination, and hybrid threat management.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These examples illustrate the critical importance of defending international legal standards and investing in alliance readiness. Canada\u2019s strategic outlook would benefit from incorporating these dual lessons: defending non-recognition policies in contested regions like Crimea while simultaneously learning from NATO forward-deployed frameworks in countries like Romania. Taken together, these academic and policy perspectives provide the analytical foundation for understanding Eurasia\u2019s post-Ukraine security recalibration – and for formulating Canada\u2019s strategic options in response. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regional Security Implications<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Across the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Afghanistan, Russia\u2019s declining influence has triggered regional realignments, new threat landscapes, and emerging opportunities for external engagement. For Canada, understanding these dynamics is critical to shaping effective policy responses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the South Caucasus, Armenia has grown increasingly disillusioned with Russia, particularly following Moscow\u2019s failure to act during Azerbaijan\u2019s 2023 offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. Yerevan is now actively pursuing closer ties with the EU and the United States. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, has capitalized on Russia\u2019s invasion in Ukraine to boost its military cooperation with Turkiye and Israel, positioning itself as a dominant regional power. Georgia, while maintaining its strategic commitment to NATO integratio<\/p>\n\n\n\n

struggle with domestic political instability and the enduring occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russian forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Central Asia, countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have distanced themselves from Moscow\u2019s geopolitical agenda. Kazakhstan notably refused to recognize Russia\u2019s annexation of Ukrainian territories, reaffirming its commitment to territorial integrity as a core foreign policy principle. Kazakhstan has deepened defense partnerships with Turkiye, NATO, and select Western actors, while Uzbekistan – traditionally outside the CSTO – has pursued independent counterterrorism and security dialogues with the United States and China. China\u2019s growing footprint, especially in Tajikistan, highlights Beijing\u2019s transactional interest in border security and regime stability rather than full-spectrum defense cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, the region is facing increased pressure from transnational threats. The reassertion of Taliban control in Afghanistan and the resurgence of IS-KP have heightened fears of terrorism, arms trafficking, and extremist ideology spilling into Central Asia. Weak border management capacities and the erosion of Russia\u2019s traditional role as a security bulwark have created a dangerous vacuum. Parallel to these trends, cyber and information warfare have intensified. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and others have been targeted by Russian disinformation campaigns aiming to undermine public trust in democratic institutions and discourage Western engagement. These hybrid threats have led to growing interest in cyber cooperation with NATO-aligned actors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mongolia, long maintaining a neutral foreign policy posture, is also recalibrating. Concerns about Russian unpredictability and Chinese dominance have pushed Ulaanbaatar to pursue closer security and economic ties with democratic partners, including the US, Japan, and Canada. Mongolia\u2019s strategic location and democratic credentials position it as a valuable partner for middle-power engagement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Afghanistan remains a critical axis of instability. The Taliban\u2019s unchecked consolidation of power, Russia\u2019s diminished role, and China\u2019s limited security ambition have allowed terrorist groups such as IS-KP to flourish. Cross-border smuggling of arms and narcotics continues to destabilize the region. For bordering states like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, this poses a direct security threat, prompting interest in greater intelligence-sharing and joint counterterrorism mechanisms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Together, these developments suggest that Canada has an opportunity to deepen its role as a stabilizing actor. This includes advancing NATO partnerships, co-sponsoring cybersecurity and counterterrorism initiatives, and investing in diplomatic and development programs that enhance regional resilience. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Future Security Scenarios and Policy Recommendations<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s 2014 annexation of Crimea<\/a> remains one of the most significant violations of international law in recent history. Recognizing this act, or failing to robustly oppose it, would send dangerous signals to other revisionist powers seeking to alter borders by force. As noted in the analysis by The National Interest (2024), legitimizing Russia\u2019s control over Crimea would reward aggression and erode international norms surrounding sovereignty and territorial integrity. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

For aspiring NATO-aligned nations such as Georgia and Moldova, the failure to maintain a firm stance on Crimea undermines the credibility of international deterrence. It also emboldens separatist movements supported by external powers, particularly in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. In Central Asia,<\/p>\n\n\n\n

states with Russian-speaking minorities observe the situation closely, wary of Moscow\u2019s justifications for intervention under the pretense of \u201cprotecting compatriots.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Canada\u2019s unwavering support for Ukraine\u2019s territorial integrity remains essential. Backsliding on Crimea would not only harm Kyiv\u2019s war effort but also undermine Canadian diplomatic credibility across Eurasia. As part of NATO\u2019s eastern flank engagement, Canadian policymakers must continue advocating for non-recognition, bolster security assistance to at-risk states, and ensure hybrid threats exploiting ambiguous status territories do not escalate into new conflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Romania has emerged as a pivotal actor in NATO\u2019s Black Sea strategy, showcasing how smaller but committed allies can meaningfully reinforce alliance posture in contested regions. Following Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, Romania rapidly expanded its defense spending, modernized its armed forces, and upgraded key infrastructure, including the Mihail Kog\u0103lniceanu Air Base \u2014 set to become one of NATO\u2019s largest air hubs in Europe. Romania\u2019s role is further reinforced through its leadership in regional maritime security efforts, including trilateral cooperation with Bulgaria and Turkiye to counter drifting mines in the Black Sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, Romania has played a critical role in supporting Ukraine\u2019s economic resilience by facilitating the transit of over 29 million tons of Ukrainian grain through its ports, despite Russian attempts to blockade Black Sea maritime routes. It also hosts the Headquarters Multinational Corps Southeast in Sibiu, enhancing NATO’s regional command and control capacity in crisis scenarios.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Canada can view Romania as a strategic partner and operational hub within NATO\u2019s Black Sea architecture. Joint participation in military exercises would help build interoperability with Romanian and other allied forces. Canada could contribute cyber defense expertise, helping Romania counter hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns that have intensified in the region. Infrastructure support and humanitarian collaboration could also be explored to reinforce Canada\u2019s commitment to Eastern European security and resilience. This model of NATO-aligned deterrence in Romania can serve as a valuable reference for engaging other aspirant or front-line states, particularly Georgia and Armenia, as they navigate uncertain security environments amid a weakening Russian presence and ambiguous Western guarantees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Eurasian states reassess their security futures in the post-Ukraine context, two contrasting strategic directions are emerging:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Option A: NATO as a security anchor despite its limited footprint beyond Eastern Europe, some aspirant states (like Georgia) still view the alliance as the ultimate guarantor of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. For these countries, deepening interoperability with NATO standards, participating in joint exercises, and securing bilateral defense commitments from individual NATO members are seen as vital steps toward eventual membership or at least enhanced deterrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Option B: Strategic diversification and bilateral guarantees given uncertainties surrounding NATO\u2019s future enlargement and potential policy shifts under a new US administration, other regional actors may opt for diversified security partnerships. This could include closer defense ties with China, or even non-aligned groupings. These actors may pursue flexible arrangements that prioritize regime security, border control, or cyber defense, rather than full-spectrum alliance integration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Strategic Recommendations for Canada<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
    \n
  • Expand NATO regional initiatives through technical support and military training missions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
      \n
    • Deepen defense cooperation with Mongolia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
        \n
      • Invest in regional CT capacity-building, particularly in border zones adjacent to Afghanistan.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
          \n
        • Contribute to hybrid threat awareness and resilience by supporting anti-disinformation programs.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
            \n
          • Engage multilaterally in regional defense forums, including OSCE dialogues and confidence-building platforms.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
              \n
            • Enhance counterterrorism cooperation with Central Asian Republics, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Mongolia<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
                \n
              • Participate on framing the Security Policy and border control mechanisms together with Central Asian and South Caucasus countries<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
                  \n
                • Deradicalization programs \u2013 several countries in the region of Central Asia and South Caucasus have implemented de-radicalization programs to counter extremist ideologies \u2013 collaborating in adopting such programs will facilitate the process that thus far, been struggling to gain political traction.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
                    \n
                  • Advance Strategic Engagement with CACE states through: \n
                      \n
                    • Backing multilateral efforts that increase the corridor\u2019s resilience to hybrid threats.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                    • Encouraging diplomatic alignment with CACE-participating states as part of Canada\u2019s broader Eurasia engagement strategy<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                    • Supporting infrastructure financing and regional governance frameworks through international institutions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                    • Consider engagement with the 3SI through: \n
                        \n
                      • Investment in critical infrastructure and digital connectivity projects led by trusted allies like Poland.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                      • Policy dialogue and technical assistance in the 3SI\u2019s energy and cyber defense pillars.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
                      • Support for South Caucasus participation in transregional linkages with 3SI corridors, particularly through Georgia. <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

                        Conclusion <\/h2>\n\n\n\n

                        The ripple effects of Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine extend far beyond Europe. In Eurasia, the reshuffling of defense alignments and emergence of new security actors are already reshaping the regional landscape. Canada, as a capable actor within NATO and the global security community, must engage strategically to protect its interests, support its allies, and contribute to long-term regional stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        This white paper underscores the urgency of proactive engagement across counterterrorism and multilateral defense diplomacy. The evolving security vacuum must be addressed with foresight, allied coordination, and a renewed commitment to regional security partnerships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Canada has both a responsibility and an opening. By advancing its contributions to NATO\u2019s deterrence efforts, supporting resilience-focused development corridors like the Three Seas Initiative and the Central<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Asia\u2013Caucasus\u2013Europe platform, and deepening counterterrorism cooperation with frontline states, Canada can reinforce stability and uphold democratic values in an increasingly contested region. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Table 1 <\/h2>\n\n\n\n
                        Date<\/th>Attack<\/th>Location<\/th>Casualties<\/th>Central Asian Involvement<\/th><\/tr><\/thead>
                        28-Jan-2025<\/td>Santa Maria Church<\/td>Istanbul, Turkiye<\/td>1 killed<\/td>Tajik<\/td><\/tr>
                        14-Jan-2024<\/td>Governor’s Office<\/td>Nim Roz province, Afghanistan<\/td>3 kiled<\/td>Tajik<\/td><\/tr>
                        22-Mar-2024<\/td>Crocus City Hall<\/td>Moscow, Russia<\/td>145 killed, 550 injured<\/td>Tajik<\/td><\/tr>
                        21-Mar-2024<\/td>New Kabul Bank<\/td>Kandahar, Afghanistan<\/td>21 killed, 50 injured<\/td>Uzbek<\/td><\/tr>
                        3-Jan-2024<\/td>Kerman<\/td>Iran<\/td>90 killed<\/td>Tajik<\/td><\/tr>
                        30-Jul-2023<\/td>JUI-F<\/td>Khar, Pakistan<\/td>63 killed, 200 injured<\/td>Not specified<\/td><\/tr>
                        23-May-2023<\/td>Checkpoint ambush<\/td>Nangahar, Afghanistan<\/td>5+ killed<\/td>Not specified<\/td><\/tr>
                        1-Feb-2023<\/td>School bombing<\/td>Kabul, Afghanistan<\/td>20 killed<\/td>Uzbek<\/td><\/tr>
                        5-Sep-2022<\/td>Russian Embassy Bombing<\/td>Kabul, Afghanistan<\/td>8-10 killed, 15-20 injured<\/td>Uzbek and Tajik<\/td><\/tr>
                        8-Oct-2021<\/td>Kunduz Mosque<\/td>Kunduz, Afghanistan<\/td>50 killed<\/td>Uzbek and Tajik<\/td><\/tr>
                        26-Aug-2021<\/td>Hamid Karzai Airport<\/td>Kabul, Afghanistan<\/td>170 killed<\/td>Uzbek and Tajik<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

                        <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                        Executive Summary Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had far-reaching consequences for global security, particularly for regions and areas outside the European Union (EU), such as the South Caucasus, post-Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Mongolia. Although these areas are geographically far from the conflict zone, security ripple effects have been significant, as the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":375,"featured_media":2049,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[85,84,145,100,94,116],"tags":[214,199,215,109,42,173,204,216,43],"class_list":["post-2045","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-eurasia","category-european-security","category-nato","category-russia","category-south-caucasus","category-white-paper","tag-afghanistan","tag-central-asia","tag-mongolia","tag-nato","tag-russia","tag-security","tag-south-caucasus","tag-terrorism","tag-ukraine"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2045","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/375"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2045"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2045\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2127,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2045\/revisions\/2127"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2049"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2045"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2045"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2045"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}