{"id":2061,"date":"2025-10-22T13:12:29","date_gmt":"2025-10-22T17:12:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=2061"},"modified":"2025-10-22T13:12:30","modified_gmt":"2025-10-22T17:12:30","slug":"the-2025-moldovan-energy-crisis-and-the-challenges-for-europe-la-crise-energetique-moldave-de-2025-et-les-defis-pour-leurope","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2025\/the-2025-moldovan-energy-crisis-and-the-challenges-for-europe-la-crise-energetique-moldave-de-2025-et-les-defis-pour-leurope\/","title":{"rendered":"The 2025 Moldovan energy crisis and the challenges for Europe \u2013 La crise \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique Moldave de 2025 et les d\u00e9fis pour l\u2019Europe"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n The 2025 Moldovan energy crisis and the challenges for Europe \u2013 La crise \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique Moldave de 2025 et les d\u00e9fis pour l\u2019Europe\n <\/h1>\n \n \n\n

By Pierre L. Prokopczyk<\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n \n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

The separatist Moldovan region of Transnistria has plunged into a humanitarian crisis since Russian gas supplies via Ukraine were cut off on January 1st, 2025<\/a>. The strategically important Kuchurgan thermal power plant is no longer able to supply Moldova with electricity, causing stability to erode and putting Transnistria under economic and humanitarian strain. Although the military risk posed by Russian troops stationed in Transnistria is relatively limited, dependence on energy resources is an important geopolitical tool in Russia\u2019s hybrid warfare. The situation provides Canada with an opportunity to strengthen its economic and political engagement in Eastern Europe, encourage energy diversification policies, and ensure regional stability. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Historical context<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The history of the separatist region of Transnistria began in 1940, when the Soviet Union annexed the Romanian region of Bessarabia (now Moldova). In this predominantly Romanian-speaking region; the decision was made to incorporate part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to add a Russian-speaking population to the newly founded Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Located across the Dniester River, this territory was named Transnistria. The aim was to industrialize and Russify<\/a> the territory around this new linguistic minority, which would consequently be the centre of the Soviet industrialization process of the Moldovan SSR. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

During the USSR\u2019s disintegration, Transnistria declared its independence from Moldova, fearing a weakening of its linguistic rights. Fights broke out between the Moldovan military and Transnistrian forces, supported by the Russian 14th Army stationed in Tiraspol. This conflict lasted until 1992<\/a> when a ceasefire agreement was signed between the parties. This agreement provided for the deployment of Russian and Moldovan troops in Transnistria, which has since become a de facto state benefiting from Russia\u2019s military, political, and economic support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 2025 energy crisis<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In the current context, Transnistria is an important territory to analyze given Russia\u2019s military presence, as well as Moldova\u2019s intention to move closer to the European Union (EU). Moldova is a strategic priority for Russia, which still sees opportunities to bring the country back into its sphere of influence, and does not hesitate to destabilize the Republic by using various means of political and economic pressure. However, Russia\u2019s military threat to Moldova does not currently count as one of these pressure points. As of 2022, Russia officially maintains only 1500 troops in Transnistria<\/a>, all of which are lightly equipped solely for the purpose of maintaining the ceasefire. More importantly, there is no naval access nor any airports that could support a high-intensity conflict. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Instead, Moldova\u2019s dependence on Russian energy poses the greatest threat for its security. Up to 80% of the Moldovan republic\u2019s electricity<\/a> comes from the Kuchurgan thermal power plant in Transnistria, which runs on Russian gas transmitted via pipelines through Ukraine. While Moldova pays for the gas it accesses through these pipelines, Transnistria receives its supply free of charge. Critically, deliveries to Kuchurgan were halted on January 1, 2025, when the contract allowing Russian pipelines to transit through Ukraine expired<\/a>. Without such gas deliveries, the Transnistrian electricity grid went offline, causing mass blackouts<\/a> across the region. The EU intervened quickly<\/a> by offering Moldova and Transnistria electricity supplies from Romania and financial solutions to diversify its gas supplies, but Transnistria initially refused any cooperation<\/a> despite the critical humanitarian situation that was developing. Critical infrastructure could not function without electricity, and people found themselves unable to heat their homes in the middle of winter<\/a>. Today, Transnistria produces its electricity from coal, but this remains insufficient compared to previous levels. The economy still suffers<\/a> from a lack of power. Purchasing electricity from Moldova and the EU is essential to support its society, but represents a cost that it has never had to bear before.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Moldovan energy crisis of 2025 highlights how Russia\u2019s energy policy is intrinsically linked to its foreign policy objectives. While Russia\u2019s ambition to divert Moldova away from European integration is clear, Moldova seems to be resisting. In 2024, Moldovans voted in favour of a constitutional revision enshrining European integration as a strategic and irreversible objective<\/a> and re-elected pro-EU incumbent Maia Sandu as president<\/a>. For Transnistria, the threat is existential, as free deliveries of Russian gas kept Moldova dependent on Russia, justifying Moscow\u2019s investment in Tiraspol. Without this connection, Russia\u2019s political influence over Transnistria is likely to weaken while calls for reunification with Moldova are expected to grow stronger. Indeed, without the possibility of gas deliveries through Ukrainian pipelines and with the closure of the eastern border, Transnistria has no choice but to diversify its trading partners and turn to the EU. However, reunification of Moldovan territory would not mean an end to Russian interference as Moscow intensifies its “near abroad” doctrine,<\/a> leading to the exploitation of Russian-speaking minorities beyond its own borders. A scenario similar to the Baltic states remains possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recommendations <\/h2>\n\n\n\n

While the situation in Moldova may seem distant to Canada, the energy crisis of 2025 represents a key political and economic lesson, as Canada also faces a need to diversify its trading partners. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While energy dependence is now considered a weapon in Russia\u2019s hybrid war against the EU, many European countries continue to source Russian gas<\/a>, mainly for economic reasons but also because of the difficulty of diversifying their trading partners. Canada could become a privileged partner in European energy policy and increasingly replace Europe\u2019s dependence on Russian gas. Doing so would help boost Canada\u2019s own efforts to diversify its trading partners while simultaneously deepening Canada-Europe economic and political relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to develop infrastructure to transport Canadian gas eastward, given that almost all facilities are located on the west coast. The construction of an East-West oil and gas pipeline has previously been met with sharp opposition from Quebec<\/a>, First Nations<\/a>, and environmental advocacy groups<\/a> across the country for environmental, territorial, and economic reasons. However, in the face of the American threat, the need to diversify trading partners could provide favourable momentum, as recently demonstrated by polls in favour of the project<\/a>. Any revival of a cross-country pipeline will have to involve significant consultation and involvement of provinces and First Nations in order to receive both legislative and public approval. If this occurs, Canada could see itself become a much more important partner in helping Europe meet its energy needs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Version fran\u00e7aise<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

La r\u00e9gion s\u00e9paratiste moldave de Transnistrie est plong\u00e9e dans une crise humanitaire depuis l\u2019arr\u00eat des livraisons de gaz russe transitant par l\u2019Ukraine le 1er janvier 2025<\/a>. D\u2019une importance strat\u00e9gique majeure, la centrale thermique de Kuchurgan n\u2019a plus la capacit\u00e9 de fournir \u00e0 la Moldavie de l\u2019\u00e9lectricit\u00e9, si bien que la stabilit\u00e9 s\u2019est \u00e9rod\u00e9e et la Transnistrie a \u00e9t\u00e9 soumise \u00e0 des pressions \u00e9conomiques et humanitaires. Bien que le risque militaire des troupes russes stationn\u00e9es en Transnistrie soit relativement limit\u00e9, la d\u00e9pendance \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard des ressources \u00e9nerg\u00e9tiques constitue un outil g\u00e9opolitique important et un outil dans la guerre hybride men\u00e9e par la Russie. La situation offre au Canada l\u2019occasion de renforcer son engagement \u00e9conomique et politique en Europe de l\u2019Est, d\u2019encourager les politiques de diversification \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique et d\u2019assurer la stabilit\u00e9 r\u00e9gionale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contexte historique<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

L\u2019histoire de la r\u00e9gion s\u00e9paratiste de Transnistrie d\u00e9bute en 1940, quand l\u2019Union sovi\u00e9tique annexe la r\u00e9gion roumaine de la Bessarabie (actuelle Moldavie). Dans cette r\u00e9gion majoritairement roumanophone, la d\u00e9cision sera prise d\u2019y incorporer une partie de la R\u00e9publique socialiste sovi\u00e9tique ukrainienne afin d\u2019ajouter une population russophone dans la nouvellement fond\u00e9e R\u00e9publique socialiste sovi\u00e9tique moldave, situ\u00e9e au-del\u00e0 du fleuve Dniestr. Ce territoire est nomm\u00e9 Transnistrie. L\u2019objectif \u00e9tait alors d\u2019industrialiser et de russifier<\/a> le territoire autour de cette nouvelle minorit\u00e9 linguistique, qui sera au centre de la campagne d\u2019industrialisation de la Moldavie sovi\u00e9tique.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lors de la d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration de l\u2019Union sovi\u00e9tique, la Transnistrie d\u00e9clarera son ind\u00e9pendance de la Moldavie sous le motif de crainte d\u2019un affaiblissement de leurs droits linguistiques. Des combats auront lieu entre l\u2019arm\u00e9e moldave et les forces transnistriennes, soutenues par la 14\u1d49 arm\u00e9e russe stationn\u00e9es \u00e0 Tiraspol, le conflit durera jusqu\u2019en 1992<\/a> quand un cessez-le-feu sera sign\u00e9. Celui-ci pr\u00e9voit le d\u00e9ploiement de troupes russes et moldaves en Transnistrie, qui devient un \u00c9tat de facto b\u00e9n\u00e9ficiant du soutien militaire, politique et \u00e9conomique de la Russie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Crise \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique de 2025<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Dans le contexte actuel, la Transnistrie est un territoire \u00e0 surveiller, \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 la pr\u00e9sence militaire russe et les intentions moldaves de se rapproche de l\u2019Union europ\u00e9enne (UE). La Moldavie est une priorit\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique pour la Russie, qui voit encore ses chances de la faire retomber dans sa zone d\u2019influence et n\u2019h\u00e9site pas \u00e0 provoquer de la d\u00e9stabilisation dans la r\u00e9publique en usant des moyens de pression politiques et \u00e9conomiques. La menace militaire ne fait pas partie de ces moyens de pression. Si, officiellement, la Russie maintient 1500 troupes en 2022<\/a>, ces troupes sont l\u00e9g\u00e8rement \u00e9quip\u00e9es dans l\u2019unique but de maintenir le cessez-le-feu. Il n\u2019y a ni acc\u00e8s naval ni a\u00e9rien pouvant leur apporter le n\u00e9cessaire \u00e0 un conflit de grande intensit\u00e9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

La vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique repr\u00e9sente une menace plus importante pour sa s\u00e9curit\u00e9, alors que l\u2019\u00e9lectricit\u00e9 de la r\u00e9publique moldave provient jusqu\u2019\u00e0 80 %<\/a> de la centrale thermique de Kuchurgan, en Transnistrie, et fonctionne au gaz russe livr\u00e9 \u00e0 travers de pipelines traversant l\u2019Ukraine. Si la Moldavie paye pour ces livraisons, la Transnistrie non. Les livraisons vers Kuchurgan cesseront le 1er janvier 2025 \u00e0 l\u2019expiration du contrat autorisant les pipelines<\/a> russes \u00e0 traverser l\u2019Ukraine. Sans ces livraisons de gaz, le r\u00e9seau \u00e9lectrique Transnistrien est pass\u00e9 hors-ligne, causant des pannes g\u00e9n\u00e9ralis\u00e9es<\/a> \u00e0 travers le territoire. L\u2019UE interviendra rapidement<\/a> en offrant \u00e0 la Moldavie et \u00e0 la Transnistrie des livraisons d\u2019\u00e9lectricit\u00e9 depuis la Roumanie et des solutions financi\u00e8res afin de diversifier ses livraisons de gaz, mais la Transnistrie refusera initialement toute coop\u00e9ration<\/a>, bien que la situation humanitaire soit critique. Les infrastructures critiques ne pouvaient fonctionner sans \u00e9lectricit\u00e9 et les populations se retrouvaient sans moyen de chauffer leur logement en plein c\u0153ur de l\u2019hiver<\/a>. Aujourd\u2019hui, la Transnistrie produit son \u00e9lectricit\u00e9 gr\u00e2ce au charbon, mais cela reste insuffisant comparativement aux niveaux pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents, l\u2019\u00e9conomie continue de souffrir<\/a> d\u2019un manque d\u2019\u00e9lectricit\u00e9. L\u2019achat d\u2019\u00e9lectricit\u00e9 \u00e0 la Moldavie et \u00e0 l\u2019UE est indispensable pour soutenir la soci\u00e9t\u00e9, mais repr\u00e9sente un co\u00fbt qu\u2019elle n\u2019a jamais eu \u00e0 assumer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

La crise \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique moldave de 2025 met en lumi\u00e8re comment la politique \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique de la Russie est intrins\u00e8quement li\u00e9e \u00e0 ses objectifs en mati\u00e8re de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re. Alors que son ambition en Moldavie est affich\u00e9e \u2014 d\u00e9tourner le pays de son int\u00e9gration europ\u00e9enne \u2014, celle-ci semble r\u00e9sister. En 2024, les Moldaves se prononcent en faveur d\u2019une r\u00e9vision constitutionnelle ent\u00e9rinant l\u2019int\u00e9gration europ\u00e9enne comme objectif strat\u00e9gique et irr\u00e9versible et r\u00e9\u00e9lisent Maia Sandu au poste de pr\u00e9sidente<\/a>. Pour la Transnistrie, la menace est existentielle alors que les livraisons gratuites de gaz russe maintenaient la Moldavie dans un \u00e9tat de d\u00e9pendance vis-\u00e0-vis de la Russie, justifiant l\u2019investissement de Moscou \u00e0 Tiraspol. Un affaiblissement de la pr\u00e9sence russe en Transnistrie est probable, tout autant que le sc\u00e9nario d\u2019une r\u00e9unification. En effet, sans possibilit\u00e9 de livraison de gaz par les pipelines ukrainiens et avec la fermeture de la fronti\u00e8re est, la Transnistrie n\u2019a pas d\u2019autre choix que de diversifier ses partenaires commerciaux et de se tourner vers l\u2019UE. Une r\u00e9unification du territoire moldave ne signifierait cependant pas la fin de l\u2019ing\u00e9rence russe, alors que Moscou intensifie sa doctrine de \u00abl\u2019\u00e9tranger proche\u2009\u00bb<\/a>, provoquant l\u2019instrumentalisation des minorit\u00e9s russophones au-del\u00e0 de ses propres fronti\u00e8res. Un sc\u00e9nario similaire \u00e0 celui des pays baltes demeure possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recommandations<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Si la situation moldave semble lointaine pour le Canada, la crise \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique de 2025 repr\u00e9sente une opportunit\u00e9 politique et \u00e9conomique, alors que nous faisons aussi face \u00e0 un besoin de diversification de nos partenaires commerciaux.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alors que la d\u00e9pendance \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique est maintenant consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme une arme de la guerre hybride de la Russie contre l\u2019UE, de nombreux pays europ\u00e9ens continuent \u00e0 se fournir en gaz russe<\/a>, principalement par consid\u00e9rations \u00e9conomiques, mais aussi par difficult\u00e9 de diversifier les partenaires commerciaux. Le Canada pourrait devenir un partenaire privil\u00e9gi\u00e9 dans la politique \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique europ\u00e9enne en proposant une alternative \u00e0 la d\u00e9pendance au gaz russe. Un tel projet aiderait le Canada \u00e0 diversifier ses partenaires commerciaux tout en d\u00e9veloppant les relations transatlantiques.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Suivant cet objectif, il est n\u00e9cessaire de d\u00e9velopper les infrastructures de transport de gaz canadien vers l\u2019est, alors que la quasi-totalit\u00e9 des installations se trouvent sur la c\u00f4te ouest. La construction d\u2019ol\u00e9oducs est-ouest pour le p\u00e9trole et le gaz \u00e9tait autrefois re\u00e7ue avec hostilit\u00e9 par le Qu\u00e9bec<\/a>, les Premi\u00e8res Nations<\/a> et les groupes de d\u00e9fense de l\u2019environnement<\/a> \u00e0 travers le pays, invoquant des raisons environnementales, territoriales et \u00e9conomiques. Cependant, devant la menace am\u00e9ricaine, le besoin de diversification des partenaires commerciaux pourrait soutenir une Initiative favorable, comme d\u00e9montr\u00e9 r\u00e9cemment par les sondages favorables<\/a> au projet. Toute tentative de retour de ce projet devra comprendre une profonde consultation et coop\u00e9ration avec les provinces et les Premi\u00e8res Nations afin de non seulement obtenir l\u2019appui l\u00e9gislatif, mais aussi de l\u2019opinion publique. Dans cette optique, le Canada pourrait devenir un partenaire majeur dans la politique \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique europ\u00e9enne.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The separatist Moldovan region of Transnistria has plunged into a humanitarian crisis since Russian gas supplies via Ukraine were cut off on January 1st, 2025. The strategically important Kuchurgan thermal power plant is no longer able to supply Moldova with electricity, causing stability to erode and putting Transnistria under economic and humanitarian strain. Although the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":375,"featured_media":2062,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[84,103,126,100],"tags":[194,105,124,211,42],"class_list":["post-2061","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-european-security","category-european-union","category-human-rights","category-russia","tag-energy-security","tag-european-union","tag-human-rights","tag-moldova","tag-russia"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2061","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/375"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2061"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2061\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2063,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2061\/revisions\/2063"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2062"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2061"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2061"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2061"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}