{"id":2070,"date":"2025-10-24T15:07:14","date_gmt":"2025-10-24T19:07:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=2070"},"modified":"2025-11-20T15:40:56","modified_gmt":"2025-11-20T20:40:56","slug":"shifts-in-arctic-policy-since-2022-environmental-security-and-regional-cooperation-taking-the-back-seat","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2025\/shifts-in-arctic-policy-since-2022-environmental-security-and-regional-cooperation-taking-the-back-seat\/","title":{"rendered":"Shifts in Arctic Policy since 2022: Environmental Security and Regional Cooperation Taking the Back Seat"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Shifts in Arctic Policy since 2022: Environmental Security and Regional Cooperation Taking the Back Seat\n <\/h1>\n \n \n\n

By Sophie LeBoeuf<\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n \n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

Summary<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

\u25cf Since 2022, the Arctic has evolved from a region of cooperation and to one of competition and division.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u25cf Previously deemed \u2018exceptional\u2019 due to its collaborative status quo\u2019s resilience against geopolitical changes, increased militarization and economic competition indicates an abandonment of this norm, along with decreased prioritization in environmental security, climate change, and scientific exchanges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u25cf These shifts further compound environmental and climate consequences – as militarization and economic development pose great risks to Arctic environmental security and temperatures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u25cf Policies from Russia (since 2022) and the United States (since January 2025) have pivoted towards economic development, along with a decrease in efforts to foster sustainable development. Russia has also included an explicit pillar of militarization to its main strategic priorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u25cf Canada and other NATO countries have stated environmental and climate commitments in policy and have also increased militarization in their Arctic regions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Background<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Prior to 2022, the Arctic was governed in a spirit of cooperation in large part due to its unforgiving environmental conditions and longstanding culture of multilateralism between states, Inuit, and other Arctic Indigenous communities through institutions like the Arctic Council. This institution was used to foster sustainable development, reduce risks of environmental accidents, as well as environmental degradation. It functioned as a forum for the negotiation of Arctic agreements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, increased militarization and attention has been devoted to the Arctic by both Russian and NATO-Arctic nations. In March 2022, the A7 members of the Arctic Council announced a diplomatic pause in protest of Russia\u2019s invasion. Currently, Russia does not participate and has withdrawn its funding<\/a> for the council. The region has been increasingly divided into competing blocs<\/a>, ruining decades of progress as well as sidelining Indigenous voices and cooperative initiatives. As a result, the region has shifted from a culture of cooperation to competition, leaving scientists isolated, and with fewer opportunities for bilateral, multilateral, and scientific collaboration in the name of protecting the Arctic\u2019s future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rising global temperatures have led to an increase of melting ice in the Arctic, contributing to longer shipping seasons, increasing traffic in the region, and more opportunities for resource extraction, including mining of critical minerals and other sources of energy. These potential economic prospects are largely uncertain and challenging to pursue<\/a> with the region\u2019s unforgiving operational conditions and lack of infrastructure. Regardless, the Arctic is growing increasingly vulnerable to exploitation due to climate change and the fracturing of the Arctic status-quo. The latter has resulted in policy shifts from collaboration and prioritization \u2013 albeit, not equal across all states \u2013 of environmental security, to securitization and economic development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russian Arctic Policy\/Strategy since 2022<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s Arctic Strategy is centred around securitization and economic development, with little regard for environmental security or sustainability. In response to Western sanctions, Russia has framed economic development and defense in the Arctic as a tenet of national security, viewing its Northern Sea Route(NSR) as crucial for controlling northern Russia and its surrounding waters<\/a>. In addition, NATO\u2019s northern expansion, with Sweden and Finland becoming full-members, has aggravated Russia’s fear of encirclement, rooted in its view of the Arctic as \u2018NATO territory<\/a>\u2019. Increased militarization, such as the Safe Arctic 2025 Exercise<\/em><\/a>, underscore Russia\u2019s strategic priority for defense posturing in the Arctic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

NSR is a large tenet of Russian economic development in the Arctic, which provides faster shipping routes between Europe and Asia, most notably for Russian energy. Increased naval traffic in the Arctic region, compounded by a lack of coast guard and joint-surveillance cooperation initiatives, increases the risk of oil spills and shipping accidents. In addition, pollution and ecological damage are symptomatic of unsustainable development. Russia is expected to release a new Arctic Strategy<\/a> soon, unveiling its updated development priorities. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

NATO Countries and New Arctic Strategies<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

NATO\u2019s northern expansion has led to increased militarization of the Nordic Arctic. NATO\u2019s Arctic approach focuses largely on \u201csecurity requirements, posture gaps, and force multiplication<\/a>\u201d. After joining NATO, Sweden and Finland committed to its defense spending guidelines, resulting in significant expansions of military bases, personnel and resources<\/a>. In addition, increasing hybrid security threats<\/a> from Russia have prompted further development of defense capabilities. Although NATO remains dedicated to environmental security protection, observers urge the organization to adopt a holistic approach<\/a> for the Arctic that considers its unique vulnerabilities, operational challenges, and various intersecting dimensions<\/a> regarding climate change, including environmental and human security. Further policy development is needed to adapt<\/a> its Climate Change and Security Action Plan to the Arctic\u2019s idiosyncrasies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Kingdom of Denmark\u2019s Arctic policy<\/a> balances sustainable development and security concerns, whilst maintaining a level of non-political cooperation. Though recent incursions on NATO countries\u2019 air<\/a> and naval<\/a> spaces, notably in Denmark<\/a>, pose serious challenges for any prospect of Arctic cooperation with Russia. Denmark\u2019s recent military exercise in Greenland<\/a> highlights its effort to bolster its presence and defense capabilities in the Arctic. Denmark has increased its militarization in Greenland since 2022, and most prominently since the start of Donald Trump\u2019s second term, given the latter\u2019s continued ontological threats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Canada\u2019s Arctic Foreign Policy<\/a><\/em> (March, 2025) stresses close ties between Canada and the United States to \u201csecure North American homeland\u201d, as well as with its Nordic Allies. It will initiate \u201cArctic security dialogue\u201d with \u201clike-minded states\u201d, further alluding to Canada\u2019s recent shift towards \u2018friendshoring<\/a>\u2019 in foreign policy, as well as increasing polarization among Arctic actors. Although Canada remains dedicated to its Arctic and Northern Policy Framework <\/a>\u2013 which prioritizes the wellbeing of northern communities, development of Arctic research, and environmental security \u2013 its increase in Arctic securitization and economic development necessitates further policy adaptation to the changing geopolitical environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second term of Donald Trump marks a major shift in the United States\u2019 Arctic policy<\/a> from one of prioritizing security, climate change, sustainable development, and international governance, to a more \u201cbusiness-like\u201d strategy that prioritizes large-scale resource extraction in Alaska. President Trump\u2019s tariffs and annexation threats to American Arctic Allies further allude to this major shift. In addition, the Trump Administration has rescinded the previous Administration\u2019s restrictions on resource development in order to unleash \u201cAlaska\u2019s extraordinary resource potential<\/a>\u201d, including new logging<\/a>, energy<\/a> and mining<\/a> projects in previously protected parks and forests. In addition, climate research is being dismantled and the scientific element<\/a> once central to American Arctic policy is now cut out. At the Alaska Summit<\/a> between Putin and Trump in August 2025, Putin alluded to further cooperation in the United States by making mention of the Arctic, though emphasizing more diplomatic and economic cooperation, not environmental.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion- Risks to Environmental Security and Climate Change<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Increased militarization in the Arctic risks environmental consequences. Military training exercises can lead to contamination and natural habitat-loss<\/a> in training areas, in addition to levels of noise-pollution that harm humans and wildlife. Militarization can also severely disrupt Indigenous livelihoods across the Arctic region, with communities like the Saami<\/a> and Inuit<\/a> relying on a longstanding tradition of land-based sustenance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Decreased research collaboration severely reduces scientists\u2019 abilities to track changes in the Arctic climate and ecology. Interviews with Russian and American scientists in the Bering Strait<\/a> in June indicate that prior to 2022, bilateral cooperation allowed for standardization of data collection, optimization of research processes through pooling of resources and skills, as well as increased habitat conservation and better outcomes for wildlife, eventually leading to the adoption of international market standards and best management practices. Since Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, these scientists have had virtually no communication, resulting in a massive knowledge gap in understanding Arctic changes, as well as a decline in trust. In addition, pressing security risks such as permafrost thaw<\/a>, affecting infrastructure, food security, and public health, are lacking in crucial data, rendering it unpredictable and difficult to manage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This new status quo of polarization and militarization is chipping away at every avenue for bilateral cooperation, which has tangible effects on Arctic environmental security. The longstanding fishery regulation agreement<\/a> between Norway and Russia, dating back to 1976, had persevered through these geopolitical changes. It is now at risk due to a recent Russian ultimatum to Norway<\/a> to close its economic zone to its vessels. This occurred in light of Norway\u2019s sanctions against companies Norebo and Murman Seafood in July 2025. A breakdown of this agreement would increase risks of poaching and unsustainable fishing, as well as pose serious risks to the region\u2019s ecosystem. Overall, these strategic shifts indicate an abandonment of the previous norm of collaboration in the Arctic, and the emerging norm of competition, polarization and militarization, all of which pose grave dangers to the natural world in the Arctic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Rising global temperatures have led to an increase of melting ice in the Arctic, contributing to longer shipping seasons, increasing traffic in the region, and more opportunities for resource extraction, including mining of critical minerals and other sources of energy. These potential economic prospects are largely uncertain and challenging to pursue with the region\u2019s unforgiving operational conditions and lack of infrastructure.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":375,"featured_media":2071,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[86,145,1,100,123],"tags":[108,109,42],"class_list":["post-2070","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-arctic","category-nato","category-news","category-russia","category-united-states","tag-arctic-security","tag-nato","tag-russia"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2070","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/375"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2070"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2070\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2283,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2070\/revisions\/2283"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2071"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2070"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2070"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2070"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}