{"id":2346,"date":"2026-01-05T12:09:21","date_gmt":"2026-01-05T17:09:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=2346"},"modified":"2026-01-05T12:09:39","modified_gmt":"2026-01-05T17:09:39","slug":"russias-hybrid-war-in-the-balkans","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2026\/russias-hybrid-war-in-the-balkans\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia\u2019s Hybrid War in the Balkans"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Russia\u2019s Hybrid War in the Balkans\n <\/h1>\n \n \n\n

Anna Robinson<\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n \n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

\u25cf Russia has been testing and refining hybrid tactics in the Balkans since the 2010s<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u25cf Hybrid tactics prey on ethnic divisions, political instability, and encourage hostility towards the West<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u25cf Russia\u2019s tactics have increased their soft power, making it easier for malign actors to destabilize Europe<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s unconventional threats<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Hybrid threats have become an increasingly pervasive aspect of the global security landscape. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian Federation has been a key instigator of hybrid attacks, launching disinformation and propaganda campaigns, offensive cyber operations, espionage, and attacks on critical infrastructure. In Ukraine, hybrid tactics act as a force multiplier for traditional combat. Such hybrid tactics seek to weaponize divisions between social groups; the government and citizens; as well as economic and structural weaknesses to undermine faith in the systems, norms, and values of Western countries. By eroding public trust and exploiting weaknesses in target countries, societies are becoming more susceptible to internal vulnerability and Russian influence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

One area that has been a target of hybrid tactics is the Western Balkans. A critical juncture between West and East, the Balkans have been an area of competing ideology and cultural influence; it is also a region with a multitude of divisions for Russia to exploit. The repeated use of threats and fanning of tensions may imply a desire to stoke regional conflict, which could divide and disorder Europe. Much of Russia\u2019s connection to the area is rooted in old tsarist ideas of a Pan-Slavic empire<\/a>, which in the worst case scenario, could invite further expansionist ambitions into the region. Russia has largely implemented hybrid warfare tactics in places where they can leverage the most historical and cultural connections: Serbia; Republika Srpska; Montenegro; and North Macedonia (Slavic population). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Proxy Political Actors <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Since the 2010s, Russia has been developing and testing clear methods of direct interference in political systems. Their primary tactic is backing ultranationalist and populist political figures. This includes the VMRO-DPMNE party in North Macedonia, which is a pro-Russian right-wing party. They have amplified ethnic tensions<\/a>, including the Macedonian naming dispute regarding the 2018 Prespa Agreement<\/a>. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik has been a strong pro-Kremlin force in the region, advocating for the secession of Republika Srpska, the Serbian-dominated enclave in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russia recently used the Bosnian court\u2019s decision to bar Dodik from politics for six years<\/a> in an effort to condemn Western influence in the region. In Serbia, Kremlin-backed politicians have historically been influential. Prominent examples include Aleksander Vulin and Nenad Popovic<\/a>, appointed to Parliament in 2024, though Vulin has since been expelled in response to EU pressure.<\/a> President Aleksander Vu\u010di\u0107 has also frequently been accused of succumbing to Russia influence, though recent complications<\/a> in the Serbian-Russian bilateral relationship remain notable. Russia\u2019s use of state proxy actors is an effective way to ensure that the developing democratic systems in these countries remain divided and fragile. These actors are effective at preventing cooperation and often incite violent and polarizing rhetoric. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Non-political proxy actors<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Russia has also refined its hybrid tactics through the exploitation of religious and cultural ties. The Russian Federation has deep and historical ties with the Orthodox Church, an integral part of daily life and culture in many Balkan countries. Pro-Kremlin oligarchs provide financial support to the Church and its charitable works. In return, moves towards democracy are framed as immoral Western decadence, which destroys traditional culture. The Orthodox Church has frequently opposed sovereignty and democracy for Montenegro and Kosovo, framing it as a threat to pan-Slavic identity. This rhetoric maintains tensions around territory, making peace more fragile. Cultural associations, mainly in Serbia, serve to disseminate propaganda among everyday citizens and cement Russian opinions. The Wagner Group has previously attempted to recruit Serbians to fight in Ukraine through the opening of a \u201cfriendship centre\u201d<\/a>. Since the group was dismantled, the fate of criminal recruiting networks remains unclear. Another famous example is the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Centre in Ni\u0161<\/a>. Cultural and educational programs throughout the region promote Russian language and ideology. This primes citizens to be more susceptible to Russian narratives and propaganda, increasing the effectiveness of hybrid tactics. Russia\u2019s actions in the Balkans demonstrates its ability to leverage indirect, soft forms of influence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Digital Landscape<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Russia has been able to effectively weaponize social media and news outlets throughout the Balkans. Primarily, these efforts are targeted towards Serbian audiences. News outlets are flooded with Russian disinformation and propaganda. Sputnik Srbjia is a major source of Russian disinformation within the region<\/a>. The site itself is accessible to a wide audience, filling information voids with inflammatory stories. Many popular local news outlets \u2013 not tied to Russia \u2013 often repost such information as well. Disinformation portrays the West as weak, reinvigorating controversial memories such as the 1999 NATO bombings, and overstating regional conflicts. Outlets like Srbin.info<\/a>, Intermagazin.rs<\/a>, and Novosti.rs<\/a> consistently regurgitate this messaging. Russia also leverages social media platforms like Telegram to further its disinformation campaign. Rybar, a pro-Russian channel, recently posted information regarding the joint special exercise between Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo. It claimed that this was evidence of an \u201canti-Serb\u201d<\/a> axis being formed by the West. Dozens of local Serbian channels reposted this information, inciting panic and paranoia about ethnic tensions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s moves in the Western Balkans demonstrates its intentions to destabilize Europe from multiple fronts in the east, while simultaneously waging war in Ukraine This can divide the attention and resources of European nations, which improve the success of Russia\u2019s strategic ambitions. For years, malign influence has penetrated the region, as noted in NATO\u2019s 2022 Strategic Concept. NATO should build on their outlined commitment and empower the region to become more resilient to hybrid threats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Policy Recommendations<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

\u25cf Existing institutions and developmental frameworks should be buttressed by NATO to support democracy-building in the region<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u25cf Canada should support resilience and democratic stability by developing bilateral ties via NGO, diplomatic, and economic partnerships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u25cf Individuals, companies, centres, and associations who undermine democracy and encourage pro-Russian beliefs should be appropriately identified and restricted. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian Federation has been a key instigator of hybrid attacks, launching disinformation and propaganda campaigns, offensive cyber operations, espionage, and attacks on critical infrastructure. By eroding public trust and exploiting weaknesses in target countries, societies are becoming more susceptible to internal vulnerability and Russian influence. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":375,"featured_media":2348,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[209,87,84,1,100],"tags":[106,243,80,42],"class_list":["post-2346","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-balkans","category-disinformation","category-european-security","category-news","category-russia","tag-european-security","tag-hybrid-war","tag-quick-take","tag-russia"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2346","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/375"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2346"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2346\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2350,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2346\/revisions\/2350"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2348"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2346"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2346"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2346"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}