{"id":2466,"date":"2026-02-26T11:49:48","date_gmt":"2026-02-26T16:49:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=2466"},"modified":"2026-02-26T12:41:22","modified_gmt":"2026-02-26T17:41:22","slug":"habituation-in-war-the-appointment-of-chrystia-freeland-as-a-node-in-ukraines-attritional-war-strategy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2026\/habituation-in-war-the-appointment-of-chrystia-freeland-as-a-node-in-ukraines-attritional-war-strategy\/","title":{"rendered":"Habituation in War: The Appointment of Chrystia Freeland as a Node in Ukraine\u2019s Attritional War Strategy"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Habituation in War: The Appointment of Chrystia Freeland as a Node in Ukraine\u2019s Attritional War Strategy\n <\/h1>\n \n \n\n

Kimberlee Nesbitt <\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n \n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

On January 5th, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the appointment of former Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Member of Parliament, Chrystia Freeland, as Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine. In a post on X, Zelenskyy stated, \u201cUkraine needs to strengthen its internal resilience \u2013 both for the sake of Ukraine\u2019s recovery if diplomacy delivers results as swiftly as possible, and to reinforce our defence if, because of delays by our partners, it takes longer to bring this war to an end.\u201d In the following days, Freeland confirmed she accepted President Zelenskyy\u2019s appointment and that she would be resigning as a Member of Parliament, taking effect as of January 9th, 2026. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Freeland\u2019s appointment as voluntary Economic Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine is being made against the larger and developing backdrop of ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States (US) to come to an agreed upon pathway to peace. This negotiation process continues to be arduous for Ukraine. It also comes alongside a deepening of foreign diplomatic relations between Canada and Ukraine under the Mark Carney government; this, coming on the back of Prime Minister Carney\u2019s historical speech at Davos<\/a>, where he stressed the end of the rules-based international order and hinted at the decline of American hegemony \u2013 a speech that some<\/a> have held to ultimately represent the beginning of a multipolar era in world politics. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the coming months, the Eastern European and Transatlantic Network (EETN) will publish a series analyzing key developments shaping the war; these include prospective pathways to peace, ongoing diplomatic negotiations and tensions, and the shifting security and economic governance landscape in Ukraine. Freeland is an integral node among an emerging and vital network aimed at supporting Ukraine and its future as the anniversary of the full-scale invasion nears and passes. This series aims to make clear that Russia is not only engaged in a war of attrition so as to try to reclaim its great power status, but that Ukraine is increasingly prepared to respond to this war of attrition with strategies and methods of asymmetric and hybrid warfare. Ukraine is prepared to make the strategic, economic, and relational moves necessary to better guarantee its future, as well as its success on the battlefield and in diplomatic negotiations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This first brief of the series reflects on Freeland\u2019s appointment and builds upon an argument first offered by Ukrainian scholar Valeriia Gusieva<\/a>, where she suggested that cultural resilience is a foundational pillar to security. I extend her argument here by suggesting that cultural resilience and situated experience are also crucial to sustaining a coherent and effective attritional war strategy \u2013 Freeland\u2019s appointment, in this case, should be understood light through the lens of political habituation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chrystia Freeland: A Ukrainian-Canadian MP and Soviet War Crimes Researcher<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Chrystia Freeland was born in Peace River, Alberta in 1968 to a Ukrainian mother and Canadian father. Though she formally entered Canadian federal politics in 2013, she is perhaps most known through her association with former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his government. Under Trudeau, Freeland was appointed to serve as Minister of International Trade in Trudeau\u2019s cabinet. In this position, she was a key negotiator in the hard-fought Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) (which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, in 2020), as well as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union (EU) that was signed in 2016. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While it is fair to assume that many Western audiences are familiar with the whiplash antics of American President Donald Trump, who often combines \u201ccompetitive tactics and emotional rhetoric\u2026 [framing] negotiations in zero-sum terms<\/a>,\u201d less well known are the tensions that characterized the negotiation process of CETA. As researchers Achim Hurrelmann and Frank Wendler illuminate<\/a>, CETA encountered historical diplomatic tensions throughout its negotiation process: \u201cThis challenge becomes evident at various stages in the trade policy process, but it is most pronounced in the ratification of bilateral agreements, which require approval in all member states.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On paper, arriving at CETA was through the bilateral process of negotiation between Canada and the EU; in reality, however, Freeland was situated in a much more difficult negotiating position. Because the subsequent ratification of CETA would require the approval of all EU member states, such a negotiating process proved to be a lesson for both Freeland and the European Commission, who was charged with ensuring the twenty-eight member states were in alignment. Indeed, as scholar Joris Larik remarks<\/a>, the alleged crisis of CETA negotiations soon became a \u201ccautionary tale\u201d about the \u201ccumbersome and vulnerable EU treaty-making procedures, where internal politics and technical legal discussions detracted from the merits (or demerits) of the actual agreement.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This became most visible through the tensions experienced with the Wallonia Parliament in Belgium, an autonomous regional government with veto power over EU trade deals. In late 2016, the Walloon government publicly rejected CETA, in part because of their worry that the trade deal would \u201callow multinationals to sue governments<\/a>.\u201d Walloon regional minister-president, Paul Magnette, told reporters the following: \u201cI don\u2019t consider this as a funeral, I don\u2019t consider this as a veto without any conditions. I consider this as a request to reopen negotiations so that European leaders could hear the legitimate demands which have been forcefully expressed by an organized, transparent civil society.\u201d As Larik suggests<\/a> however, this crisis led to \u201cprofound internal reflections on EU trade policy, causing even a shift in the EU\u2019s practice in concluding trade agreements. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was largely in response to these tensions and apparent deadlock within Wallonia that Freeland made the public decision to walk out on CETA negotiations with our European allies. Following her decision, Freeland spoke<\/a> with Canadian journalists candidly: \u201cIt\u2019s become evident for me, for Canada, that the European Union isn\u2019t capable now to have an international treaty even with a country that has very European values like Canada. And even with a country so nice, with a lot of patience like Canada.\u201d At the time, the move was taken by some in Canadian media as an \u201cemotional<\/a>\u201d response; Conservative critics in the House of Commons characterized<\/a> Freeland\u2019s walk out as a \u201cmeltdown,\u201d alleging she required \u201cadult supervision\u201d \u2013 language that carried clear sexist and gendered connotations. Still others suggested<\/a> this walk out is exactly what the negotiation process needed, as it eventually led to the signing of the trade agreement. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reflecting on her CETA negotiation experience in 2026, Freeland said<\/a> the following about negotiating with European allies, which is worth quoting at-length here: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

“You can sort of have two kinds of negotiations. Some negotiations start with a kind of win-win premise where the two parties come together wanting a deal, wanting to be friends, seeing each other as long-term partners, and they\u2019ll disagree about stuff, but the negotiation is really about everyone working hard together to find the best possible landing zone. I would say Canada\u2019s negotiations with the EU about our trade deal with Europe, CETA, were conducted in that way, and they were hard, right? \u2026 Our final slightly melodramatic moments in Namur, in Wallonia, you know, proceeded by moments in Vienna, in Germany, in the European Parliament. I mean, it was a long slog and there were lots of obstacles and there was some drama, but it was clear there was goodwill on all sides.” <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this interview, Freeland goes on to characterize how Trump falls into an alternative negotiation camp compared to that which characterized CETA; she reaffirmed<\/a> the idea that the American President abides by the logic of a zero-sum game: \u201c\u2026when you are dealing with a party that has that kind of a view [zero-sum game logic] and that kind of an attitude, then I think you have to be very clear in your own mind about red lines. And you have to be very prepared to say, thus far and no further, we\u2019re not gonna capitulate our approach.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Freeland later went on to become Canada\u2019s Minister of Finance in 2020, where she was responsible for introducing four federal budgets, including federal aid measures related to Canada\u2019s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. She was the first woman to serve in this role, a fact that would later be considered by the Canadian media<\/a> as crucial in the decay of her relationship with Trudeau prior to his own resignation in late-2025. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beyond her political career, Freeland\u2019s academic and journalistic works span two decades and have drawn the ire of the Kremlin. While pursuing graduate studies in Russian history and literature at Harvard, where she was responsible for documenting and translating archival and investigative materials related to the Bykivnia graves<\/a> \u2013 an unmarked, mass burial site used by the NKVD (the secret police of the Soviet Union) to dispose of executed dissidents and prisoners. It remains one of the largest mass burial sites in Ukraine, even amidst<\/a> Russia\u2019s current invasion. Her research played a decisive role in debunking the Stalin-era myth that the executions were exclusively carried out by the Nazis during World War Two. This research eventually attracted the attention of the KGB \u2013 the main security agency of the Soviet Union \u2013 who then reportedly<\/a> assigned Freeland the codename \u201cFrida,\u201d closely surveilling and building a case against her throughout the course of her study.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a Canadian with Ukrainian heritage, Freeland has been among the most outspoken advocates for sustained Canadian support to Ukraine. In response, she is one of thirteen Canadian officials barred from entering Russia under retaliatory sanctions imposed by Vladimir Putin himself in 2014 and has been the target of various Russian disinformation campaigns<\/a>. Freeland has also faced public attacks from American President Donald Trump, who on several occasions has described her in disparaging terms, including \u201ctoxic<\/a>,\u201d a \u201cterrible person<\/a>,\u201d a \u201csource of ill will for Canada<\/a>,\u201d and an overall \u201cwhack<\/a>.\u201d From a feminist perspective, Freeland\u2019s experience navigating such attacks underscores her familiarity with the gendered power dynamics employed by hegemonically masculine leaders like Trump and Putin<\/a> \u2013 an experience that may indeed prove to be a strategic asset in a war whose social construction and conduct are themselves deeply gendered<\/a>. While much of international politics continues to be a \u201cman\u2019s game,\u201d<\/a> Freeland nonetheless works against the masculine grain in a pursuit of fair and just agreements and futures. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contextualizing the Habituation of Freeland and Concluding Remarks <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

As this series continues to examine changes within President Zelenskyy\u2019s inner circle in response to both Ukrainian domestic pressures and Russia\u2019s growing attritional war strategy, I suggest that Freeland\u2019s appointment as a voluntary Economic Advisor to Ukraine signals an awareness within Ukrainian leadership and its closest allies that responding to Russia\u2019s attritional warfare in 2026 cannot be confined to military operations alone. No longer are we in an era where hard power capabilities are the only measure of a nation\u2019s strength; the personal and personnel also matter. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Freeland will be an important figure to watch, particularly as it relates to dialogue between Ukrainian feminists and the pro-democracy movement \u2013 not because Freeland herself has expressed a desire to pursue a feminist agenda in Ukraine\u2019s economic reconstruction, but because her presence reflects the often-implicit reality that gendered political experience shapes how the dynamics of endurance, credibility, and trust are produced and sustained in wartime economies. In a war of attrition, where authority is continuously reaffirmed under conditions of prolonged uncertainty, reputational attack, and economic strain, such situated experience becomes strategically relevant, I suggest, as a form of habituation to sustained delegitimization. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The notion of habituation draws from a long philosophical tradition \u2013 mostly commonly, Aristotelian ethics, where habituation (hexis) was used to refer to repeated exposure and practice from durable dispositions rather than momentary or instantaneous reaction. In contemporary political thought, philosophers and scholars inspired by phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty have elaborated<\/a> upon this idea to explain how subjects develop capacities for political action through ongoing relational strain. In feminist ethics, habituation helps to explain how \u2013 often oppressed \u2013 actors learn to endure, navigate, and act within conditions of prolonged vulnerability, scrutiny, and marginalization over time. It moves beyond experience; it is an engaged and embodied vision and practice. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In an attritional war where legitimacy is not necessarily secured through fast-paced or singular victories but continually reproduced across various political, economic, and social structures, as well as through relations of alliance management and public trust, this mode of habituation takes on strategic significance. Indeed, for President Zelenskyy, it works in his favour to cultivate and incorporate actors habituated to sustained delegitimization because it acts as a shock absorber to the disinformation campaigns<\/a>, partner unreliability in a so-called newly-founded \u201ctransactional realist<\/a>\u201d world, and economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this phase of the war and ongoing occupation. The hope is that these hybrid shocks are absorbed by such a habituation without suffering from significant strategic drifts that may carry over into the battlefield. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Historically speaking<\/a>, nations and militaries perceived to possess greater status and capabilities \u2013 that is, the greater of two powers \u2013 engage in warfare by attrition. Those familiar with Russia and the former Soviet Union\u2019s historical record of aggression, occupation, interference, and war across Eastern Europe will also recognize this mode of warfare, perhaps all too familiarly. The Baltics, the Balkans, Poland, Chechnya, Georgia \u2013 they all know this playbook. The Russian Federation continues to seek what it perceives as its rightful seat at the table of great-power politics; even those of us who reject John J. Mearsheimer\u2019s structuralist projections onto Eastern Europe as lying within a fixed Russian \u201csphere of influence\u201d cannot ignore such an imperial desire percolating within the Russian state since the unipolar moment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In attritional war, time is a previous resource. As Sun Tzu warned<\/a>, prolonged conflict could be of great risk to either warring side, on account of exhausting the state apparatus, undermining domestic order and morale, and eroding strategic advantage; for him, military strategy was a subtle and complex technique whose success depended on minimizing the temporal risks and costs of war. While Sun Tzu viewed attritional war as a strategic failure, the work of military theorist and general Carl von Clausewitz<\/a> requires us to remember that wars of attrition often emerge as a political condition over time, shaped by friction, uncertainty, and an overall inability to achieve decisive political outcomes. What Ukraine demonstrates to the international community, this series aims to show, is that Russia\u2019s apparent great power strategy grounded in attrition \u2013 like empire itself \u2013 can burn out. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is reported<\/a> by sources close to both Freeland and Prime Minister Carney that Freeland received Zelenskyy\u2019s offer on December 22nd, 2025; by December 24th, she had shared with the Prime Minister her intentions to leave Canadian parliament to join the Ukrainian team. In responding to the Kremlin\u2019s continued war of attrition, concerns beyond immediate hard power capabilities, military strategy, and command structures must be addressed. Freeland possesses a unique form of habituation to sustain delegitimation; her appointment may indeed be an important shock absorber to Russia\u2019s ongoing disinformation campaigns, American partner unreliability, and the economic fatigue increasingly characterizing this war. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the level of a broader wartime strategy, I suggest this capacity can also function as a form of resilience; it signals to communities, civil society, international partners, and adversaries alike that broader Ukraine\u2019s leadership is prepared to govern through a liminal phase of uncertain futurity rather than govern toward a rapid endpoint. This is a strategy in stark contrast to Putin\u2019s assumption that a \u201cquick military operation\u201d could sweep Ukraine in 2022, or that Trump<\/a>, once elected, could end the war in Ukraine in the first 24-hours of his second term. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that habituation is not merely an individual trait or disposition, but also a culturally sedimented capacity that is experienced transnationally and relationally. As Gusieva has argued, cultural resilience constitutes a foundational pillar of security; indeed, classical realist Hans J. Morgenthau has emphasized<\/a> how such resilience at times is what pushes a nation beyond survival towards victory. I extend this logic here by suggesting that such cultural resilience is forged through repeated exposure to, and embeddedness within, enduring imperial projects and traditionalist military practices \u2013 in this case, namely, Russia\u2019s ongoing attempts to reclaim imperial-great power status, legitimate its occupations, and sustain attritional warfare alongside its hybrid threats towards Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Ukraine, cultural habituation operates as resilience, but it is neither neutral nor abstract; rather, its experience is deeply racialized, ethnicized, and gendered. It is racialized and ethnicized through the persistent positioning of the nation as materially peripheral to Europe while cast as subordinate to Russia\u2019s so-called historical sphere of influence; it is gendered through the paternalizing narratives directed at Ukraine and other Eastern European states aspiring to EU membership, as well as in the recurring trope of Ukraine as the \u201clittle brother\u201d to a masculinized \u201cMother Russia.\u201d More specifically, we see this reproduced through the hegemonically masculine practices embodied by state actors in political negotiations of economic and security matters; these behaviours continue to structure much of how political negotiation, listening, and diplomatic exchange take place. Freeland, in this respect, is a node within a broader relational structure of habituation and diplomatic practice in wartime Ukraine \u2013 one whose own political endurance aligns with, and stands to reinforce, Ukraine\u2019s culturally embedded capacity to govern through attrition. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Please stay tuned for the next installment of this series, which will analyze Ukraine\u2019s 2025 energy scandal and subsequent political moves undertaken President Zelenskyy following a state investigation that exposed high-level embezzlement within the nation\u2019s energy sector.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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