{"id":2514,"date":"2026-05-08T18:12:07","date_gmt":"2026-05-08T22:12:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=2514"},"modified":"2026-05-08T18:12:10","modified_gmt":"2026-05-08T22:12:10","slug":"irans-strategic-recalibration-in-the-south-caucasus-after-the-2025-washington-agreement-and-the-2026-israeli-american-intervention","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2026\/irans-strategic-recalibration-in-the-south-caucasus-after-the-2025-washington-agreement-and-the-2026-israeli-american-intervention\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s Strategic Recalibration in the South Caucasus after the 2025 Washington Agreement and the 2026 Israeli American Intervention"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Iran\u2019s Strategic Recalibration in the South Caucasus after the 2025 Washington Agreement and the 2026 Israeli American Intervention\n <\/h1>\n \n \n\n

Jean-Fran\u00e7ois Ratelle, University of Ottawa and Abolfazl Masoumi, Independent scholar<\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n \n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

Since the onset of the joint United States\u2013Israeli military campaign against Iran in February 2026, developments in the Middle East have emerged as a primary driver of global strategic assessments. The conflict is simultaneously generating significant secondary effects in the South Caucasus, reshaping regional alignments and the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

By assessing Iran\u2019s relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan, its core strategic interests in the South Caucasus, and its operational partnership with Moscow, this policy memo examines how the ongoing war against Iran, combined with the August 2025 Washington Accords, has disrupted Tehran\u2019s long-standing hedging strategy and could undermine its regional influence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To illustrate this shift, the memo first analyzes Iran\u2019s traditional foreign policy toward Armenia and Azerbaijan and how the Washington Accords have diminished Iran\u2019s geoeconomic role as a buffer between Armenia and Azerbaijan, thereby constraining its ability to exert leverage over both states. It further evaluates how the agreement heightens Iran\u2019s strategic vulnerabilities in the face of growing Turkish, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and U.S. presence in the region, and highlights the increasingly divergent interests and approaches of Moscow and Tehran in shaping the future of the South Caucasus. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Engaging with the outcomes of the United States\u2013Israeli military campaign against Iran, the policy memo concludes by analyzing Tehran\u2019s shifting strategic posture in the South Caucasus. This assessment is situated within the context of Iran\u2019s amicable yet strategically incongruent relationship with Moscow, as well as its intensifying competition with T\u00fcrkiye for regional influence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran\u2019s Core Interests in the South Caucasus: Economic Pragmatism over Ideology<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Iran views the South Caucasus as part of its immediate security periphery<\/a> rather than a distant foreign region. While Tehran has historical and cultural ties with the region, its policy toward the area has been driven primarily by geopolitical stability, border security, and connectivity considerations rather than ideological or religious affinity. Although Tehran formally maintained neutrality during the Armenia\u2013Azerbaijan conflict, in practice it pursued a balancing strategy aimed at preventing regional dominance by any single actor. Much like Russia\u2019s approach in the region, the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict generated a degree of political instability that enabled Tehran and Moscow to preserve their influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, while simultaneously constraining T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s ability to expand its regional presence. Iran\u2019s strategy has also emphasized the importance of preventing alterations to internationally recognized borders and safeguarding its access to European markets. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the aftermath of Armenia\u2019s military defeats in 2020 and 2023, and amid Moscow\u2019s failure to uphold its perceived security commitments under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) framework and its peacekeeping mandate, Iran increasingly came to be portrayed as one of Armenia\u2019s most reliable regional partners. Iran\u2013Armenia post-Soviet relations have been stable and cooperative. Since Armenia\u2019s independence, Iran has consistently maintained friendly and strategically significant ties with Yerevan<\/a>, supporting Armenia, both state and people, during regional crises and serving as a key transit partner. In the aftermath of the Turkish\u2013Azerbaijani blockade of the 1990s, Iran has functioned as a critical terrestrial access route and economic partner. The two countries are also involved in many trade and energy partnerships and collaborate in the transit of goods between Europe and Asia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While both nations share a foundational identity as Shia-majority states, the bilateral relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan has been characterized by persistent strategic friction since 1991. Central to Tehran\u2019s security concerns is Baku\u2019s deepening military-industrial and energy partnership with Israel, which, alongside Azerbaijan’s “one nation, two states” alliance with T\u00fcrkiye, is viewed by Iranian policymakers as a coordinated effort to contain Iranian regional influence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This tension is further exacerbated by the geopolitical implications of the Zangezur Corridor. From Tehran’s perspective, any Azerbaijani effort to establish a sovereign land link through southern Armenia constitutes a “red line,” as it threatens to sever Iran\u2019s critical northern transit link to Europe and the Caucasus. Despite these structural rivalries, the relationship maintains a degree of pragmatic stability. Both states remain tethered by mutual economic interests, specifically their shared roles in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) and Baku\u2019s continued reliance on Iranian territory for transit to its Nakhchivan exclave. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran\u2019s regional approach has been shaped less by the Muslim\u2013Christian divide or ideological concerns and more by practical and security concerns over Turkish influence, Israeli presence near its borders, transit routes affecting its access to Eurasia, and the potential domestic repercussions among its own Azeri population. Iran views the Caucasus as its \u201chistoric security margin\u201d and its immediate security and economic environment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 2025 Washington Agreement and its Initial Implementation Framework<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In August 2025, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the Washington Accords under the mediation of the President of the United States, launching the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and establishing a 99-year economic partnership between the United States and Armenia. The Washington Accords create opportunities for significant shifts in regional transit dynamics, including the movement of goods, energy infrastructure, and the broader interconnection between Asia and Europe. These developments have implications for the roles traditionally played by Russia, Iran, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus in Eurasian transport and trade networks. It reduces Central Asian countries\u2019 dependency on Chinese and Russian infrastructures as well as bypassing Iran\u2019s role in the Middle Corridor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In January 2026<\/a>, the United States and Armenia signed the TRIPP Implementation Framework<\/a> providing exclusive rights to develop the transit infrastructure. The framework excludes extraterritorial rights to American entities preserving Armenia\u2019s sovereignty including the border management aspect of the transit corridor. In this partnership, the TRIPP Development Company, a joint venture with Armenia mostly controlled by Washington, provides a monopoly in the development business surrounding the route and its infrastructure. The agreement seeks to develop the Syunik region as a hub of economic activity and local development, with the objective of enhancing transit and connectivity between Asia and Europe, connecting Azerbaijan with its autonomous region of Nakhichevan. More broadly, the TRIPP becomes a competitive alternative to the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Kars (BTK) railroad and future alternative pipeline to Europe, competing with Baku\u2013Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by securing European access to Central Asian hydrocarbons. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the energy domain, the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan reshapes the region\u2019s broader transit and supply landscape. Most notably, Armenia could become significantly less dependent on Russian and Iran natural gas, thereby opening possibilities for access to Central Asian hydrocarbons and, potentially, to Azerbaijani energy sources. Turkmen and Azerbaijani gas competes with Iran\u2019s gas output, offering a cheaper and potentially more politically reliable alternative for European countries. Azerbaijan<\/a> launched the construction of energy infrastructure, including a new transit powerline to export to Europe through T\u00fcrkiye. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Accord has inaugurated a new phase of cooperation between the former belligerents, notably facilitating the renewed transit of goods between the two states. This includes the movement of hydrocarbons originating in Azerbaijan as well as grain exports from Russia and various Central Asian countries. The emerging prospects for a peace accord between Armenia and Azerbaijan have broadened the diplomatic space for both states, transforming their engagement into a more intricate and multidimensional interaction. Furthermore, the TRIPP<\/a> effectively eliminates Moscow\u2019s role as established in the November 2020 agreement, which delegated some administrative control over border management to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although the Washington Accords do not provide any security guarantees from the United States or include enforcement mechanisms directed toward Azerbaijan, Armenia leaders hope that increased American investment would encourage a more active role by Washington and put an end to Baku\u2019s strategy of outbidding Yerevan in their bilateral relationship. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, the TRIPP represents, for Armenia, an additional step toward the West, thereby weakening Moscow\u2019s influence in the South Caucasus, while also providing an opportunity to normalize relations with Ankara and Baku. For Azerbaijan, the Washington Accords consolidate its military victory, while re-establishing direct access to Nakhchivan and stimulating its transit-based economy. Furthermore, the TRIPP reduces Baku\u2019s dependency and uncertainties link to its main transit route to Europe going through Georgia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran\u2019s Strategic Approach in the South Caucasus after the Washington Accords<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Much of the analytical<\/a> and media<\/a> commentary has framed recent developments as a geostrategic, zero\u2011sum contest in which the United States and T\u00fcrkiye have successfully marginalized both Iran and Russia from regional influence. While geostrategic and security considerations remain central, it is necessary to look beyond great power and regional competition to understand how Iran and Russia are recalibrating their relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan and assessing areas of mutual convergence to avoid strategic marginalization. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following the Washington Declaration and TRIPP announcement, the Iran official diplomatic position was articulated by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi<\/a> in a telephone conversation with his Armenian counterpart. While welcoming peace efforts and regional connectivity, Araghchi specified Iran\u2019s red lines: there must be no extraterritorial corridor or special status undermining Armenian sovereign control, and no changes that alter regional geopolitics or disadvantage Iran\u2019s strategic access. He further emphasized full respect for borders, territorial integrity, and national jurisdiction, and stressed that connectivity must not isolate Iran from established or alternative transit routes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, an examination of various members of the Foreign Policy establishment could shed light on various aspects of Iran\u2019s understanding of this situation. On 9 August 2025, Ali Akbar Velayati<\/a>, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and a senior advisor to the former Supreme Leader of Iran, framed the TRIPP as a rebranding of the Zangezur corridor concept. He said that the implementation of this project would restrict Iran\u2019s transport routes in the north and northwest to (only) T\u00fcrkiye, and that Iran will confront this move \u2018whether with Russia or without it.\u2019 He likened NATO\u2019s presence along this route to a \u2018viper\u2019 that wants to lie down between Iran and Russia and warned that Iran will not allow this alliance to approach its northern borders. The former Supreme Leader<\/a> himself in a meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan, in July 2024, had mentioned that Iran recognizes that the Zangezur Corridor is against Armenia\u2019s interests and stands in this position. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Other Iranian officials however, adopted a more moderate position and sought further clarification as the details, terms, and conditions of the TRIPP are not clear yet. In a meeting with Armenia\u2019s National Security Council Secretary, the former head of Iran\u2019s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, Kamal Kharrazi<\/a>, welcomed Armenia\u2013Azerbaijan connectivity but requested clarification regarding the governing legal and security framework of the route, particularly any external involvement. The Armenian side emphasized that border control and security would remain under Armenian authority. This exchange illustrates Tehran\u2019s core concern: not connectivity itself, but the jurisdictional and security regime under which it would operate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Noting the travel of Armenia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Vahan Kostanyan<\/a>, to Israel, Iran observes a \u2018deviation\u2019 from historical relationships. Kostanyan is closely involved in the implementation of the TRIPP initiative. The trip may therefore be understood not only as a diplomatic engagement but also as part of Armenia\u2019s efforts to advance the corridor and related regional connectivity arrangements. From the Iranian perspective, Armenia has not sufficiently taken Tehran\u2019s \u2018concerns\u2019 into account while proceeding with the project, which gives the visit broader regional significance beyond bilateral diplomacy. Current uncertainties and tensions are therefore portrayed not as a structural rivalry but as a recent policy shift by Armenia toward Western initiatives, which Tehran views as inconsistent with the traditionally predictable relationship. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although these responses appear to represent hard-line and moderate positions, they in fact reflect Iranian concerns articulated at two different levels of policy. Velayati\u2019s warning conveys the strategic perception of the corridor as a geopolitical and security challenge that could alter regional balances and introduce external influence near Iran\u2019s borders. Kharrazi\u2019s more measured statements address the operational level, focusing on the legal and jurisdictional arrangements governing the route and the necessity of preserving Armenian sovereignty and local border control. Taken together, they are complementary rather than contradictory: the first signals Iran\u2019s red lines in terms of regional balance of power, while the second defines the specific conditions under which connectivity could be tolerated. This dual messaging suggests that Tehran\u2019s opposition is directed not at transport connectivity itself, but at any arrangement that diminishes Iran\u2019s strategic position or creates a non-sovereign security regime along its northwestern frontier. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Drawing on Russia\u2019s conduct in cases such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the Syrian Civil War, Iranian assessments of Moscow\u2019s position on the TRIPP are broadly consistent with longer-standing perceptions of Russia across Iran\u2019s political spectrum. These range from proponents of deeper strategic alignment with Russia, to more skeptical voices that view reliance on Moscow as a strategic liability, such as those featured in Etemad and Shargh newspapers. Between these poles, a significant group of policymakers and experts adopts a position of cautious realism, advocating sustained engagement with Russia while maintaining a clear political safety margin featured in Donya-e-Eqtesad newspaper. Notably, across these perspectives there is a shared underlying assumption: Russia is not regarded as a fully predictable or reliably-aligned partner. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Erosion of Iran\u2019s Transit Hub Centrality <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Iran\u2019s policy toward the South Caucasus cannot be understood without reference to its broader economic strategy. In recent years, Tehran has increasingly framed its foreign policy around geo-economics rather than solely sanctions resistance and relief. A strategic guidance issued by the Supreme Leader<\/a> and the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan<\/a> (June 2024) explicitly direct the government to activate Iran\u2019s \u2018geopolitical advantages\u2019 by transforming the country into a regional hub for trade, transport, and energy through regulatory reforms and infrastructure development. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Development Plan intends to institutionalize this objective. It mandates the creation of a Regional Energy Trade Steering Committee, chaired by the President and composed of the Ministers of Oil, Foreign Affairs, and Energy, with parliamentary participation. The Committee is responsible for designing Iran\u2019s regional energy diplomacy roadmap and approving export, import, swap, transit, and electricity exchange arrangements. These measures show that Iran is indeed attempting to convert geography into economic resilience: transit fees, energy swaps, and logistics services are intended to compensate for sanctions-related restrictions on direct trade and investment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A central quantitative target of the Development Plan is to increase annual transit cargo volume from approximately 16 million tons at the beginning of the Plan to 40 million tons by its conclusion. The South Caucasus plays a crucial role in achieving this goal because it constitutes Iran\u2019s shortest overland connection to Eurasian markets. The Iran-Armenia border effectively blocks a continuous T\u00fcrkiye-Azerbaijan land corridor, thereby preserving T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s dependence on Iranian transit routes toward Azerbaijan and Central Asia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran participates in wider regional energy arrangements, including gas swap agreements with Turkmenistan and T\u00fcrkiye. These arrangements allow Tehran to earn transit revenue, estimated at roughly $1\u20131.5 billion annually, while maintaining relevance in regional energy distribution networks. It also conducts gas and electricity swaps with Azerbaijan to supply the Nakhchivan exclave. Additionally, it serves as a trucking corridor between T\u00fcrkiye and Central Asia, currently transiting tens of thousands<\/a> of Turkish trucks annually. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, emerging infrastructure projects threaten to erode this position. The I\u011fd\u0131r\u2013Nakhchivan gas pipeline<\/a>, operational since March 2025, already reduces Nakhchivan\u2019s dependence on Iranian gas swaps. If an additional pipeline link across southern Armenia were completed, Azerbaijan would obtain a direct energy connection to its exclave, while Armenia would diversify its energy supply away from Iran<\/a>. With the TRIPP, Turkmenistan\u2019s and Azerbaijan\u2019s natural gas exports directly compete with Iran\u2019s output by providing Armenia with flexibility and lower\u2011cost alternatives. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

More broadly, the proposed TRIPP corridor could connect T\u00fcrkiye to Central Asia via Azerbaijan and the Caspian basin, thereby rendering the second route of the Middle Corridor practically feasible as a bypass to Iranian transit routes connecting China and Central Asia to Europe. Furthermore, the TRIPP would strengthen the Middle Corridor and its overreliance on Georgia as a transit route<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Tehran, the issue is not merely symbolic. Such routes would divert trucking flows, logistics investment, and energy transit away from Iran, potentially reducing transit income by a significant margin and weakening incentives for infrastructure development. Iranian analyses<\/a> estimate potential losses reaching up to 2.6 billion dollars annually over time when indirect effects on logistics, investment, and associated services are considered. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even more important than immediate revenue is what Iranian policymakers call \u2018route optionality<\/a>.\u2019 Iran seeks to preserve independent land access to the Caucasus and Europe that does not depend exclusively on Turkish\u2013Azerbaijani territory. The South Caucasus therefore functions not only as an economic opportunity but as a strategic economic lifeline. Any corridor that structurally marginalizes Iranian transit routes is perceived in Tehran not as a normal infrastructure project but as a long-term reduction of Iran\u2019s geopolitical and economic leverage. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Trojan Horse on Iran\u2019s Doorstep: After T\u00fcrkiye and Israel, now NATO and the USA<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Tehran\u2019s security concerns centre on preserving the sovereignty structure along its northwestern frontier. Iranian officials emphasize the maintenance of internationally recognized borders and oppose any extraterritorial or internationally supervised transit arrangements in the Syunik province. In Iranian strategic perception, a transport corridor is not merely an infrastructure project but a potential security regime<\/a>: if administered or monitored by external actors, it could facilitate intelligence collection, surveillance, and the institutionalization of foreign, especially American and Israeli, presence near sensitive Iranian regions. The Washington Accords remain vague regarding which actors will be responsible for providing daily security along the TRIPP corridor, even though Armenia is formally recognized as retaining sovereignty over its territory. This ambiguity leaves open the possibility that American private security or military contractors<\/a> could assume a role in protecting the route. Consequently, Iran\u2019s opposition is directed less at connectivity itself than at any arrangement that alters jurisdictional control or introduces external security actors along its immediate border. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The intensity of Velayati\u2019s remarks is best understood by factoring in the role of the U.S. in this initiative. According to Korosh Ahmadi<\/a>, a former Iranian diplomat, in Iranian foreign policy thinking, where some officials regard antagonism with the U.S. as structural, any development in which Washington emerges as the agent of regional normalization would be viewed negatively. He therefore situates the corridor within Iran\u2019s long-standing confrontation with the U.S., arguing that it would elevate Washington\u2019s position as a political arbiter in the South Caucasus while creating a connectivity framework from which all regional actors – T\u00fcrkiye, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Western partners – would benefit, except Iran. In this interpretation, the corridor itself is not the principal concern; rather, the accompanying political arrangements could institutionalize U.S. influence and leave Iran structurally excluded from emerging regional trade and security networks. Velayati\u2019s rhetoric thus reflects a broader fear of geopolitical marginalization under a U.S.-backed regional order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Pan\u2011Turkic Orientation and Its Strategic Implications for Iran <\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Iran opposes any extraterritorial corridor arrangements that would create a continuous T\u00fcrkiye- Azerbaijan land connection and facilitate the Middle Corridor linking T\u00fcrkiye, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Iranian experts<\/a> assess that such a route would shift the regional balance in favor of T\u00fcrkiye, structurally reduce Iran\u2019s role in east\u2013west connectivity, and diminish Tehran\u2019s leverage in Eurasian trade and energy networks. Following the recent wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Washington Accord, T\u00fcrkiye appears a step closer toward its regional ambitions focused on pan-Turkism ranging from Anatolia to Central Asia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tehran interprets the TRIPP as a rebranded Zangezur Corridor that constitutes a geopolitical and security threat<\/a> that could undermine Iran\u2019s geoeconomic relevance in the transit between Asia and Europe by reducing dependency of regional actors on Iranian transit routes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Within Iranian strategic discourse, the project is also interpreted as part of a broader geopolitical realignment across Eurasia. Iranian officials and senior advisers have argued that a continuous transport axis from Anatolia to Central Asia would expand Turkish political and economic influence, weaken Iran\u2019s geoeconomic centrality, and potentially enable a wider external security presence in the South Caucasus. From Tehran\u2019s perspective, the concern is less ideological than structural: a functioning Middle Corridor could bypass Iranian territory while embedding new political, military, and intelligence partnerships near Iran\u2019s northwestern frontier. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, Iran appears to have avoided the worst\u2011case scenario that had emerged following the one\u2011day 2023 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the subsequent escalation in Azerbaijani rhetoric, particularly the invocation of the \u2018Western Azerbaijan\u2019 concept.3 Likewise, Baku\u2019s promotion of a \u2018special corridor\u2019\u2014 envisioned within the broader Zangezur Corridor framework and implying strong Azerbaijani\u2013Turkish control \u2014 had raised significant concerns in Tehran regarding potential geopolitical and territorial encroachments. It would have materially shifted regional power toward the Turkish bloc and most likely completely exclude Iran from connectivity, linking Europe to Asia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Between Alignment and Competition: Russia and Iran\u2019s South Caucasus Strategy<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In the South Caucasus, Russian and Iranian foreign policies converge in their shared willingness to counter Western influence and to constrain Ankara\u2019s expanding regional role. This alignment is also reflected in their cooperation within the International North\u2013South Transport Corridor, which both states have leveraged to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. However, the North\u2013South Transport Corridor remains inefficient and weakened by the prospects of the TRIPP and future Azerbaijan and Armenia collaboration. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, Moscow and Tehran continue to pursue distinct regional and geopolitical objectives aimed at advancing their own interests and influence in the South Caucasus rather than form a cohesive strategic approach as a functional partnership. The Washington Accords highlight these underlying frictions, particularly in revealing the absence of a coordinated Russian\u2013Iranian position toward the TRIPP. The corridor itself is part of a wider geopolitical contest over connectivity, influence, and control in the South Caucasus, where transport routes translate directly into political and economic leverage. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Just like Iran, Moscow has voiced general concerns and skepticism regarding the TRIPP, its implementation, and its impact on the region. Russia\u2019s official reaction<\/a> to the Washington Declaration reflects this partial but imperfect convergence. The Russian Foreign Ministry responded cautiously, emphasizing regional stability and existing agreements while avoiding direct confrontation with the initiative. Moscow has been careful not to antagonize Washington or to openly criticize American President Donald Trump, while underscoring its indispensable role in ensuring the success of the TRIPP. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iranian commentary, however, interpreted this as an ambiguous position and expressed dissatisfaction that Moscow did not oppose the project more explicitly. The former Head of Iran\u2019s Planning and Budget Organization<\/a> observes that Russia is transitioning from dominant security hegemon in the Caucasus to a constrained, reactive actor that seeks to manage decline through selective cooperation and behind-the-scenes leverage. From Tehran\u2019s perspective, Russia is expected to resist new mediation formats that elevate Western involvement in the South Caucasus; Moscow\u2019s restrained response therefore raised concerns in Iran about the reliability of Russian support. The episode illustrates that, although Iran and Russia share reservations about a U.S.-centred regional framework, their threat perceptions and priorities are not identical, and cooperation between them remains situational rather than fully coordinated. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this context, Iran finds areas of partial convergence with Russia\u2019s policy in the South Caucasus. Both states regard the proposed corridor with caution, as it could enable a new connectivity and mediation architecture in the region that would diminish their influence while expanding the presence of external actors \u2014 primarily T\u00fcrkiye and the United States, but potentially China as well. Although their motivations differ, the project is perceived in both capitals as contributing to a regional order in which Western-backed arrangements gain prominence at the expense of Iranian and Russian leverage and the increasing influence of NATO countries in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, it weakens existing regional frameworks involving Russia, Iran, and T\u00fcrkiye, such as the 3+3 initiatives<\/a> and the Six-Country Regional Cooperation<\/a>. Additionally, Armenia\u2019s shift toward Western influence is perceived by both countries as a growing risk to their regional interests. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Tehran, the primary concerns relate to border security and the risk of exclusion from emerging regional transit networks. For Moscow, the issue is more closely tied to the erosion of its longstanding role as the principal security arbiter in the South Caucasus and, more broadly, to the setbacks confronting its neoimperial ambitions in the region weakened by Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Russia and Iran share a primary interest in resisting the growing presence of NATO and Western influence in the South Caucasus, persistent divergences have prevented them from coordinating an effective strategic approach. Even prior to the TRIPP initiative, certain analysts, such as Mohsen Pak Aeen<\/a>, Iran\u2019s former ambassador to Baku, had warned over Russia\u2019s ambiguous position on Zangezur corridor. Iranian analysts often describe Russia\u2019s position as ambiguous and more flexible than Tehran\u2019s, particularly on \u2018who manages\u2019 an eventual arrangement. They believe that Russia\u2019s position on the Zangezur corridor reflects a broader pattern in its relationship with Iran: it is not a truly strategic partnership but rather a transactional one driven by shifting interests. In this context, the implicit message for Iran is to exercise caution. Russia may not be a reliable partner and could instrumentalize Iran\u2019s position to advance its own regional objectives. For example, in 2026, Moscow sought to renew its influence in the South Caucasus by seeking to fix its relationship with Baku<\/a>, as well as influencing the democratic process in Armenia<\/a> and the election of a pro-Russian government. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The February 2026 War and Its Implications<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched joint military operations against Iran, targeting its nuclear and missile capabilities with broader regime-change ambitions. While military objectives appear achievable in the short term, the political outcome remains deeply uncertain. The South Caucasus has thus far remained largely insulated from the conflict, despite Azerbaijan’s ties to Israel and limited Iranian strikes on Nakhchivan international airport<\/a> and alleged terrorist plots<\/a> supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targeting the Baku\u2013Tbilisi\u2013Ceyhan pipeline. Iran’s posture toward T\u00fcrkiye and the broader region remains ambiguous mainly due to precarious geopolitical positions and its internal turmoil. T\u00fcrkiye<\/a>, however, despite certain immediate challenges such as increased energy prices, sees opportunities in consolidating its status as a regional energy hub and crossroads. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s response to the war has been evaluated as insufficient \u2013 even unacceptable \u2013 by Iran\u2019s former ambassador to Moscow<\/a>. He attributes this restraint to Russia\u2019s self-interest, particularly economic gains and strategic distractions linked to Ukraine. His assessment implies that despite rhetoric of strategic partnership, Russia behaves as a pragmatic actor that supports Iran only when it aligns with its own interests, raising serious doubts about its reliability in moments of crisis. At the same time, Russia appears to be playing a low-profile but consequential role by supplying Tehran with actionable intelligence<\/a> on U.S. military targets, as well as with operational lessons derived from the war in Ukraine, particularly regarding the employment of unmanned aerial systems and electronic warfare capabilities. This collaboration represents a full circle, following Iran\u2019s transfer of Shahed drones to Russia at the outset of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Tehran not only provided the drones themselves but also offered technical support and assistance that enabled Moscow to establish its own production line for the Geran-2, the Russian version of the Shahed drone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regardless of the outcomes of the 2026 military campaign or the prospect of regime change in Iran, Tehran\u2019s geostrategic competition with T\u00fcrkiye over Eurasian transit routes is likely to remain a powerful geographic and economic force shaping the South Caucasus. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s ambition to establish a pan-Turkic corridor linking Anatolia to Central Asia via the Caspian Sea \u2014 while bypassing Iranian territory \u2014 poses a sustained threat to Iran\u2019s transit revenues and strategic depth, irrespective of the composition of the governing regime in Tehran. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even in the event of regime collapse and its replacement by a government aligned with U.S. and broader Western preferences, or a significantly weakened state deprived of key military instruments for projecting influence in the South Caucasus, competition between Iran and T\u00fcrkiye over Eurasian transit corridors is likely to persist. This rivalry predates the establishment of the Islamic Republic and would almost certainly outlast it. No Iranian government will find Turkish dominance of the Eurasian corridor to be in Iran’s national interest. This is a structural feature of the regional balance of power rather than an ideological preference. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the nature of the governing regime in Tehran may shape the extent and modalities of Iran\u2019s participation in the TRIPP, it is unlikely to fundamentally alter the underlying structural competition with T\u00fcrkiye and the lack of a common strategic approach with Russia. A more democratic Iranian government could, in fact, pursue a more proactive integration into the TRIPP-linked infrastructure, potentially positioning Iran as a critical southern corridor connecting Eurasian transit networks to the Persian Gulf. A pro-Western Iran, freed from sanctions and able to attract Western investment, may prove a more effective competitor to Turkish corridor dominance than the Islamic Republic was \u2013 because it can engage international financial systems and offer regional partners a credible alternative. Along this line, some factions<\/a> within the Iranian government have already highlighted a potential role for Iran in the TRIPP, particularly by linking the proposed railway to a broader North\u2013South axis that would connect Iran to the project. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, the most likely scenario is a weakened Iran embroiled in prolonged transition and domestic challenges, where the outcomes of the 2026 war and the popular mobilization against the regime forces the Islamic Republic into a posture of survival and tactical concession, producing a prolonged period of U.S.-Iran negotiations. Although the TRIPP constitutes a secondary concern relative to regime survival, particularly in a context of elite fragmentation and competition over residual state assets, including security forces, revenue streams, and territorial authority, it nevertheless reflects deeper structural dynamics. Specifically, regional competition with T\u00fcrkiye is likely to remain a defining feature of Iran\u2019s strategic environment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, Iran\u2019s capacity to oppose the TRIPP would be significantly diminished in a context of internal fragmentation, where the central government struggles to maintain a coherent and strategic policy orientation. As domestic contestation over authority, resources, and coercive instruments intensifies, Tehran is unlikely to either mount an effective opposition to the TRIPP or engage with it in a consistent and constructive manner. This erosion of state capacity would, in turn, weaken Iran\u2019s position along its northern frontier with Armenia, potentially transforming the Syunik region into both an economic and security vulnerability. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

For T\u00fcrkiye, the 2026 war could constitute a strategic window of opportunity to consolidate its influence in the South Caucasus. With Iran internally weakened and Russia preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, Ankara face fewer constraints in advancing the Middle Corridor pan-Turkic connectivity agenda. In such a scenario, both Armenia and Azerbaijan may increasingly view T\u00fcrkiye as a reliable regional partner, particularly if Ankara\u2019s initiatives are reinforced by support from the United States and the Trump administration and by broader Western engagement. At the same time, the weakening of Iran could result on unintended consequences, such as the renewal of Kurdish militancy<\/a> at Turkish borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The renewed U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus catalyzed by the Washington Accords and the TRIPP constitutes a strategic advantage for T\u00fcrkiye and Azerbaijan. It helps remove existing political and diplomatic obstacles<\/a> to the project\u2019s implementation and circumvents longstanding opposition, particularly from Iran and Russia. For Armenia, the TRIPP represents a rare opportunity to stimulate economic development, consolidate its strategic reorientation toward the West, and rebalance its negotiating position vis-\u00e0-vis Baku, while simultaneously benefiting from the expanding trade and connectivity generated by the Middle Corridor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By reconfiguring regional connectivity, the United States seeks to weaken both Iranian and Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Within this new strategic environment, any Iranian effort to obstruct the corridor in practice would no longer confront Azerbaijan or T\u00fcrkiye alone, but rather the United States itself. Such opposition would also risk damaging Iran\u2019s relationship with Yerevan and undermine its access to the North\u2013South Corridor, thereby weakening Iran\u2019s broader connectivity to Europe. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although Iran and Russia share certain tactical positions, most notably their skepticism toward externally driven regional initiatives such as the TRIPP, their strategic interests diverge. Russia\u2019s posture remains pragmatic and situational, shaped by its wider global priorities and flexibility in regional bargaining. Iranian officials, by contrast, increasingly perceive the TRIPP as a direct geopolitical threat, one that could marginalize Iran economically and strategically within emerging Eurasian trade networks. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, the Washington Accords have the potential to reshape the geostrategic and geoeconomic landscape of the South Caucasus and to challenge Iran\u2019s traditional regional foreign policy. However, the realization of these outcomes will depend on the successful implementation of an ambitious infrastructure agenda requiring sustained Western engagement, as well as the finalization of a durable peace settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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