{"id":2608,"date":"2026-06-29T09:39:51","date_gmt":"2026-06-29T13:39:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=2608"},"modified":"2026-06-29T09:39:52","modified_gmt":"2026-06-29T13:39:52","slug":"enemy-politics-in-russia-a-long-term-security-risk-for-europe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2026\/enemy-politics-in-russia-a-long-term-security-risk-for-europe\/","title":{"rendered":"Enemy Politics in Russia: A Long-Term Security Risk for Europe"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\n
\n\n \n \n \n \n
\n\n
<\/div>\n \n
\n
\n\n

\n Enemy Politics in Russia: A Long-Term Security Risk for Europe \n <\/h1>\n \n \n\n

By Viktor Lambin, University of Helsinki<\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n \n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Recent think tank and policy discussions\u00a0about\u00a0the\u00a0Russian\u00a0Federation\u00a0have primarily focused on three issues: the prospects of a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine;\u00a0developments on the battlefield;\u00a0and the limits of Russia\u2019s resilience to Western economic sanctions (European Council\/Council of the European Union\u00a02025<\/a>). While these questions are undoubtedly central\u00a0to the ongoing war, they risk obscuring a critical dimension of European security\u00a0\u2013\u00a0that is, the future of enemy politics, or\u00a0\u201cenemization,\u201d\u00a0in\u00a0post-war Russia.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this policy brief, enemization refers to the systematic construction and reproduction of internal and external enemy images by political elites and state-controlled media, framing so-called \u201cenemies\u201d as existential threats to national survival, identity, and sovereignty. Enemization serves crucial political functions such as legitimizing authoritarian governance, mobilizing public support for repressive and confrontational domestic and foreign policies (Skak 2016<\/a>; Pynn\u00f6niemi 2021<\/a>). While enemization has radicalized during the war against Ukraine, it reflects a broader and longer-standing pattern in Russian politics. Even if the war ends, enemization is likely to remain one of the central organizing frameworks shaping how Russian political discourse interprets international relations, if an authoritarian regime continues. In this case, the European Union (EU) is likely to continue being framed as an adversary, limiting prospects for stable post-war engagement across Eurasia and sustaining long-term security risks.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore, understanding how enemization functions, why it persists, and how it shapes Russia\u2019s postwar behaviour is essential for developing realistic and effective EU policy responses. Even though enemization also occurs in other countries of various political systems, the case of Russia \u2013 as a neighbouring country that has demonstrated willingness to use force \u2013 plays substantial relevance for European security. This policy brief examines the persistence of enemization in Russia and evaluates its implications for European security and long-term post-war engagement, arguing that under conditions of continued authoritarian rule, enemy narratives are likely to remain a durable feature of Russian politics regardless of war outcomes or leadership configurations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Continuity and\u00a0Escalation of\u00a0Enemization\u00a0in Russia<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Enemization in Russia has been a recurring feature of Russian public discourse since at least the 1990s, when political, social, and economic instability revived threat and enemy perceptions, conspiracy theories, and nostalgia for \u201cglorious past\u201d and a strong state (Gudkov 20051<\/sup>; Yablokov 2018<\/a>). The Chechen wars and terrorist attacks further reinforced enemy framing, while trust in military and security institutions, including the presidency, grew stronger (Gudkov 2005). Under Putin, negative mobilization of the population around the ideas of enemies, threats, and other symbolic constituents of the besieged fortress narrative has become a core component of regime communication and governance (Sharafutdinova 2014<\/a>; Shakhrai 2015<\/a>).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Enemization dynamics are visible in concrete rhetorical and legislative practices. Russian propaganda, following a long-established Soviet mechanism of using references to Nazis or Fascists to delegitimize political opponents (Brunstedt 2026<\/a>), routinely frames Ukraine as a \u201cNazi regime\u201d (President of Russia 2022<\/a>), or Western values as aimed to destroy Russian culture, while domestic opposition and various social minorities are labelled as foreign agents, traitors, or extremists. Legislative measures continue to limit human rights and freedoms of these alleged enemies (The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation 2022<\/a>), while intensifying public glorification of wartime sacrifices and spreading binary logic of enmity into education and other spheres of social life.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine represents the culmination of the enemization in Russian public discourse. To justify aggressive foreign policies and domestic repressions against its own citizens, the Russian regime has strengthened and radicalized its propaganda of enmity. Russian social surveys results, although requiring cautious interpretation, consistently demonstrate a widespread public endorsement, usually between 70 and 80% of respondents, of enemy images portraying Russia as a besieged fortress surrounded by hostile actors (Levada-Center 2025<\/a>). These enemy images are reflected in official state communications and state media framing of Ukraine as a \u201cNazi regime\u201d; the West as seeking Russia\u2019s collapse; and active narration of foreign agents and traitors among domestic political opposition and other social groups such as religious and sexual minorities. Such narratives reinforce the perception of existential threats to the Russian worldview \u2013 also commonly referred to as Ruskiy Mir<\/em> \u2013 and legitimize aggressive foreign policies and repressions at home.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although questions remain as to what extent Russian elites genuinely believe in these enemy narratives or opportunistically instrumentalize them, public opinion data shows widespread support of enemy perceptions with official messaging (Levada-Center 2025<\/a>). Even if the Russian regime adopts less confrontational rhetoric, the institutionalization and long-term reproduction of enemy narratives across political discourse, media, and education may suggest that such perceptions will persist at least for a certain period. This persistence reflects not an inherent social disposition, but rather the cumulative effect of sustained propaganda of enmity which resonates, among other things, with certain popular \u2013 though not uniform \u2013 perceptions, biases, opinions, and worldviews present within a society (Amanatullah et al. 2023<\/a>). For Europe, this means that rhetorical moderation alone should not be read as evidence of rapid de-escalation, since the drivers reproducing enemy narratives may remain in place after the formal conclusion of the war. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\u00a0Drivers of\u00a0Post-War\u00a0Enemization\u00a0in Russia<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Enemization in Russia should not be understood as a temporary wartime social and political mobilization tool, but as a longstanding political instrument and condition. First, a substantial and meaningful reversal of enemy narratives would require a major disruption of the Russian political and informational environment that sustains it. Second, enemization in wartime Russia predates the war and has become institutionalized in Russian politics throughout history. The routinized enemy narratives tend to be self-reinforcing, shaping public expectations and interpretations even after the immediate conditions that intensified them have changed. Finally, enemization is closely linked to a broader narrative of confrontation with the West, within which the war against Ukraine is framed as a separate episode in a bigger geopolitical struggle (Tolz and Hutchings 2023<\/a>); a particular possible scenario if Putin remains in power. Thus, even if hostilities end, the drivers that reinforce enemization are likely to persist, allowing enemy narratives remain in place and manifest.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although military outcomes of the war against Ukraine remain obscure, they will likely shape the tone and targets of Russian enemization in distinct ways while keeping the underlying logic intact. Russian authorities will likely declare any war outcomes as victorious, and such declarations will reinforce enemization by legitimizing the use of military force as an effective foreign policy instrument, and the use of repression as an effective domestic policy instrument (Bleier et al. 2024<\/a>); both are based on the perception of enemies and threats. If the war ends in a prolonged stalemate without clear successes and lines drawn, the Kremlin could credibly sell narratives to the population; enemization may shift from triumphalist to resentful tones, picturing Russia as constrained or undermined by hostile external and internal forces which prevented the country from achieving a complete victory. Finally, possible military defeat could intensify revanchist narratives and scapegoating directed at already constructed enemies. Thus, across these outcomes, enemization is likely to be adapted and reformulated but not abandoned. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

One may hope that substantial regime change may positively affect enemization by beginning its partial or even full demobilization. This unlikely possibility requires us to look deeper into the phenomenon. While political leadership in autocratic Russia shapes policy choices, enemization also draws on pre-existing historical perceptions and biases in parts of society; rather than inventing enemies from scratch, Russian propaganda amplifies and rearticulates such narratives by promoting the most useful ones in a given political context (Gudkov 2005). These enemy narratives are embedded in state institutions, public expectations about politics, security, and national identity. As a result, Russian political elites operate within pre-determined moral boundaries that constrain the range of discursive options, including how enemies are defined, justified, and, if needed, de-enemized (Hansen 2016<\/a>). Even in the event of elite change, successor elites would likely be motivated to maintain at least elements of familiar narratives of enemization to avoid accusations of weakness, betrayal, and capitulation, especially from those we define as ultra-patriotic and nationalist radicals. In turn, to secure some stability amidst the leadership\u2019s change, the new elites may find it easier to reproduce familiar enemy constructs, instead of dismantling them altogether, as historical experience in post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s suggests.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To conclude, post-war Russia is likely to remain dependent on enemization as a policy instrument across a range of plausible war outcomes. While the specific targets and intensity of enemization may shift, the institutional framework that supports them will likely persist. Even a regime change would not automatically disband enemy narratives as the new elites may face strong incentive to continue employing in some way such enemy rhetoric to secure their own power. That is why Europe should prepare for a strong possibility to deal with Russia, in which enemization remains politically usable even if its form evolves over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Policy\u00a0Implications and\u00a0Recommendations for Europe<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

As demonstrated above, enemization depends on propaganda\u2019s resonance with pre-existing social and historical biases and perceptions. State messages about a hostile West or treacherous domestic political opposition draw much of its legitimacy from this resonance. Accordingly, it is unlikely that certain changes in European policies or rhetoric would suffice to transform elite threat messaging. Despite contemporary censorship conditions in Russia, however, European actions remain visible and preferable to at least some segments of Russian society. Therefore, Europe should prioritize reaching Russian society directly through its policies to mitigate enemization narratives. Even though Europe cannot directly dismantle enemization narratives within Russia, EU policies could influence the credibility and resonance of such narratives while showing that it does not consider Russian society as a whole to be a threat nor an actor to be punished.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. European post-war strategic communication planning should aim for long-term deterrence over rapid or even gradual normalization.<\/strong>  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Europe needs to base their post-war planning on the assumption that enemization in Russia will persist after the end of active hostilities in Ukraine and that it will affect Russian foreign and domestic political agendas. Although the EU has already invested substantial resources in becoming more independent from Russian energy and raw materials, as well as in its military industrial complex, such planning also requires a well-planned discursive strategy of communicating with not only the Russian regime or state elites, but Russian society as a whole. Expectations that Russia will become more pacifist and less prone to use militant instruments due to its losses in Ukraine appear to be wishful thinking, so it is essential to embrace the opposite possibility to manage the security effects of this enemization. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Utilize discursive restraint in official communication.<\/strong>  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

European officials should avoid using rhetorical frames in public speeches and documents that portray Russia as a civilizational enemy or a permanently hostile society. This, however, by no means implies that the official rhetoric needs to be softened towards the Russian government \u2013 the condemnation of Russian aggression is necessary and justified. Discursive restraint, suggested here as the policy instrument, should be understood not as conciliation but rather as a tool to limit the discursive reproduction of enemization.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Clearly differentiate between the Russian regime and the population.<\/strong>  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although the issue of moral responsibility of the society in an authoritarian regime for the crimes committed throughout the war is a subject of academic and political debates, avoiding the narrative of collective responsibility may be beneficial, specifically in this case of mitigating the risks of enemization for European security. Messaging that brings together the regime and the population contributes to the regime\u2019s claim that it represents the nation as a whole and validates narratives of collective punishment and guilt. This in turn leads to consolidation of the Russian public around their leaders or, at the very least, around the narratives framing Europe as a threat and enemy to Russians.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This policy brief explores enemization in Russia and its implications for European security, arguing for their enduring and challenging problem for post-war engagement. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":128,"featured_media":2610,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[84,171,1,37,100],"tags":[192,106,158,286,42],"class_list":["post-2608","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-european-security","category-mentorship","category-news","category-policy-brief","category-russia","tag-europe","tag-european-security","tag-mentorship","tag-putin","tag-russia"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2608","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/128"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2608"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2608\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2613,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2608\/revisions\/2613"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2610"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2608"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2608"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2608"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}