{"id":2618,"date":"2026-06-29T11:41:02","date_gmt":"2026-06-29T15:41:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=2618"},"modified":"2026-06-29T11:41:03","modified_gmt":"2026-06-29T15:41:03","slug":"defence-industrial-cooperation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2026\/defence-industrial-cooperation\/","title":{"rendered":"Strengthening Security of Supply through Defence Industrial Cooperation:\u202fThe 3+3 Format"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Strengthening Security of Supply through Defence Industrial Cooperation:\u202fThe 3+3 Format \n <\/h1>\n \n \n \n\n

By Roberts Kits<\/a>, University of Latvia<\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In recent years, Europe\u2019s geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted toward the Northeast, with the Baltic region emerging as a core arena of strategic competition between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia<\/a>. As Russia prepares for a protracted conflict with NATO<\/a>, the Organization\u2019s member countries are increasingly focused on deterrence and defence. Traditional conceptions of deterrence are constructed around three pillars: capability, credibility, and communication<\/a>. This memo focuses on the second \u201cC\u201d \u2013 credibility \u2013 by examining prospects for strengthening the resilience of NATO\u2019s military supply chains in the Baltic region through defence industrial cooperation between the three enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) framework nations (Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)) and the three host nations (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a response to Russia\u2019s military aggression and hybrid warfare against Ukraine since 2014, the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit marked a significant step towards reinforcing the security of the Baltic region. Canada, Germany, and the UK assumed leadership as framework nations for eFP battlegroups in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, respectively. While the eFP signals a strong multinational Allied presence in the Baltic states, lessons from Ukraine since 2022 inevitably raise critical questions: is NATO ready to fight for a prolonged period? And can NATO secure supply chains so that they remain close to the war fighters? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This policy brief first analyses how resilient supply chains lay the foundation for credible long-term deterrence. Second, it examines the role and prospects of defence industrial cooperation between eFP framework nations and host nations, before finally concluding with three concrete policy recommendations.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why\u00a0Does\u00a0Security of Supply Matter?\u00a0<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

There is an old saying attributed to Dwight. E. Eisenhower that wars are won or lost primarily because of logistics<\/a>. It is also true that logistics are one of the most complex aspects of multinational operations<\/a>, as each nation brings its own peculiarities while the combined force must act as a single organization. To put this into perspective, the Canadian-led NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia (formerly, the eFP battlegroup) is composed of 14 nations, making it NATO\u2019s most diverse<\/a> military unit. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO began scaling the three eFP battlegroups in the Baltics into brigade-sized units. Germany\u2019s 45th<\/sup> Panzer brigade has been relocated to Lithuania and is expected to achieve full operational combat capability by 2027<\/a>. Canada is also considering a permanent military presence<\/a> in Latvia.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regardless of how its war against Ukraine ends, Russia will remain an existential security threat to the Baltic states. To deter and, if necessary, defend against Russia in the Baltic region, NATO Allies \u2013 especially the eFP framework nations \u2013 must demonstrate both the capacity and the resolve to fight alongside the host nations for as long as it takes to defend NATO territory. This, in turn, requires a continuous and resilient flow of supplies through to the battlefield.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While experts have called for the prepositioning of equipment and supplies<\/a> to sustain operational capability in the longer term, this approach has clear limitations \u2013 most importantly because stockpiles are finite in the event of a prolonged conflict. To secure an uninterrupted supply, it is essential to develop local defence industrial capacities. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Security of supply extends beyond the availability of raw materials and manufacturing components. Latvia\u2019s Defence Industry Law<\/a> defines security of supply as a guarantee of access to the materiel and services required by the National Armed Forces to fulfil its tasks. This understanding emphasizes that the defence industrial base is an integral part of comprehensive defence strategy across the peace-crisis-war spectrum. It also implies that the defence industries of eFP host nations must be able to supply not only their national militaries but also Allied armed forces. However, defence industries in the Baltic states, while growing rapidly, are still relatively nascent, and there may not be sufficient latent industrial capacity to scale up production quickly in time of crisis.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Failure to secure military supply chains would pose strategic risks that are particularly acute given the geographic characteristics of the Baltic states. A close proximity to Russia and reliance on the roughly 65km-wide Suwa\u0142ki corridor<\/a> to link the region to the rest of Europe exacerbate supply vulnerabilities. To ensure that NATO forces deployed in the region can fight a prolonged war, it is necessary to establish short, resilient, and regionally-anchored military supply chains and, at the same time, to deepen defence industrial cooperation between the eFP framework nations and host nations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Enhancing the Enhanced Forward Presence<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The National Security Concept of Estonia<\/a> posits that the Baltic states constitute a single area of operations. This means that regional cooperation should be understood as a key enabler of credible deterrence and effective defence. This logic applies not only to trilateral Baltic cooperation but also among all Allies deployed in the region.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To improve coordination between the three framework nations and the three host nations, the 3+3 format<\/a> was launched in 2023. Although it was originally envisaged as a platform for political and strategic dialogue in areas of common interest, such as training and exercises, it also holds untapped potential to serve as a venue for industrial cooperation and joint supply chain management. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There are already examples of bilateral cooperation in this area. Recently, the Latvian Ministry of Defence signed a Memorandum of Understanding<\/a> (MoU) with the Canadian Commercial Corporation \u2013 Canada\u2019s government-to-government contracting agency\u202f\u2013\u202f concerning bilateral cooperation in military equipment, services, infrastructure, and industry. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, since the Baltics consider themselves to be a single area of operations, a broader relationship of regional cooperation between the framework and host nations is needed. Dialogue must take place at all levels \u2013 political, strategic, operational, tactical, as well as between defence industries. Regular information sharing and practical measures to harmonize defence investment and industrial policies will strengthen the security of supply and help forge new defence industrial partnerships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What\u00a0Do Host Nations Have to Offer?\u00a0<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The three host nations are among the top spenders<\/a> in NATO. With defence budgets reaching 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2026, the Baltic states are actively developing local defence industrial capabilities. In recent years, offset strategies have been widely used to stimulate defence manufacturing and innovation<\/a>. There are notable success stories, such as the production of 6×6 armoured personnel carriers in Latvia<\/a> and subsequent expansion into assembly and maintenance of more advanced systems such as infantry fighting vehicles<\/a>. Nevertheless, the Baltic defence industries remain primarily focused on niche technological areas and generally lack the scale to support full production cycles of heavy armaments or other advanced military systems. At the same time, their relatively small size makes Baltic defence industries flexible, innovation-oriented, and able to rapidly adapt. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This environment creates opportunities for foreign defence companies to enter the market and address the existing gaps in cooperation with local partners. As of 2025, all three framework nations allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence and have committed to increase defence expenditure up to 5% of GDP by 2035. Consequently, there is a strong push to build homegrown defence industrial capabilities, including by establishing cross-border partnerships<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recently, German defence companies have been particularly active in the Baltic states. For example, Rheinmetall has signed separate agreements with both Lithuania and Latvia<\/a> to establish 155mm artillery ammunition production facilities. More recently, Lithuania Defense Services, a joint venture established in 2022 by Rheinmetall and KNDS Germany, announced plans to assemble Leopard 2A8 tanks in Lithuania<\/a>.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Canada<\/a> and the UK<\/a> are also pursuing ambitious efforts to expand their defence industrial capacities. For example, a Canadian company Cambli has recently partnered with Latvian firm Rescue Dynamics<\/a> to establish assembly lines for its BlackWolf tactical armoured vehicles in Latvia. Of the three eFP framework nations, such partnerships are especially relevant for Canada given the geographical distance between Canada and the Baltic region. Partnering Canadian defence industry with local companies in Latvia not only facilitates access to new markets but also helps build viable defence industrial capacity in the Baltic states for warfighting purposes, especially in a prolonged conflict.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This logic extends beyond the manufacture of original equipment to also encompass access to critical components and materials. For example, last year the Canadian company Neo Performance Materials announced plans to establish a permanent magnet manufacturing facility in Estonia <\/a>\u2013 a component that is essential for sensors and electronic systems widely used in defence technology, such as aircraft, missiles, and drones. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The new geopolitical reality, growing defence budgets, and commitment to develop defence industrial capabilities underscore the need to coordinate defence investment and industrial policies within the 3+3 format. Such coordination would help secure military supply chains precisely where they are needed the most. This approach would align with broader NATO efforts to ramp up defence industrial capacities, such as aggregating demand through multilateral cooperation<\/a> and adopting new technology at the speed of relevance<\/a>.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusions and\u00a0Recommendations\u00a0<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Secured supply chains through defence industrial cooperation are not just desirable; they are a strategic necessity for credible deterrence. Since its creation, the eFP format has not only enhanced military capabilities and readiness but also served as a catalyst for deeper political and economic cooperation<\/a>, from which the defence industries of framework and host nations stand to benefit. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To harness the potential of defence industrial cooperation within the 3+3 format, the policymakers in the three framework nations and the three host nations should consider the following actions: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

1.\u202fExpand the Scope of 3+3 Format to Include Defence Industrial Cooperation.\u202f<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\u00a03+3\u00a0agenda\u00a0should\u00a0be\u00a0broadened by\u00a0having\u00a0regular meetings of key\u00a0representatives\u00a0\u2013 such as\u00a0National Armaments Directors\u00a0\u2013\u00a0from the Baltic states, Canada, Germany, and the\u00a0UK\u00a0to promote dialogue, coordinate policies,\u00a0and identify opportunities\u00a0for\u00a0defence industrial cooperation and\u00a0strengthening\u00a0security of supply\u00a0across the region.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2.\u202fEstablish an Annual 3+3 Defence Industry Forum<\/strong>.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To facilitate the establishment of cross-border partnerships between defence companies, regular and open dialogue is essential. As several bilateral defence industry events already exist, a dedicated 3+3 Defence Industry Forum could be built on these foundations, providing a multilateral platform for collaboration. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

3.\u202fDevelop Regionally Anchored Production Capacities.\u202f<\/strong>  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Host nations and framework nations should invest in new production facilities and reinforce supply chains for the militaries deployed in the Baltic region. Framework nations\u2019 defence industry national champions should take a leading role and integrate host nations\u2019 defence industries into regional supply chains. This approach would promote transfer of knowledge and technology, as well as strengthen the overall capacity to sustain operations over a prolonged period. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This policy brief analyzes how resilient supply chains and further defence industrial cooperation can strengthen the credibility of NATO’s Forward Presence Framework. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":128,"featured_media":2620,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[218,146,84,103,171,145,1],"tags":[106,156,109,35],"class_list":["post-2618","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-baltics","category-defence-spending","category-european-security","category-european-union","category-mentorship","category-nato","category-news","tag-european-security","tag-latvia","tag-nato","tag-policy-brief"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2618","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/128"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2618"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2618\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2646,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2618\/revisions\/2646"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2620"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2618"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2618"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2618"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}