{"id":2622,"date":"2026-06-29T12:22:57","date_gmt":"2026-06-29T16:22:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=2622"},"modified":"2026-06-29T12:22:58","modified_gmt":"2026-06-29T16:22:58","slug":"rare-earth-elements-ukraine-and-strategic-autonomy-reframing-us-turkiye-relations","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2026\/rare-earth-elements-ukraine-and-strategic-autonomy-reframing-us-turkiye-relations\/","title":{"rendered":"Rare Earth Elements, Ukraine, and Strategic Autonomy: Reframing US-T\u00fcrkiye Relations"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Rare Earth Elements, Ukraine, and Strategic Autonomy: Reframing US-T\u00fcrkiye Relations \n <\/h1>\n \n \n \n\n

By Alessandro Albanese Ginammi<\/a>, Perugia University for Foreigners<\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In 2025, the United States (US)-T\u00fcrkiye relationship moved beyond the traditional logic of NATO Alliance cohesion and entered a phase of strategic bargaining. Once anchored almost exclusively in NATO solidarity and Cold War\u2013era security imperatives, bilateral ties between the nations are now being increasingly shaped by two defining and interconnected issues: T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s calibrated position on the war in Ukraine and its growing relevance in the geopolitics of rare earth elements and critical minerals.1<\/sup> These dynamics reflect a broader transformation of the international system and intra-alliance dynamics in which great power competition, fragmented supply chains, and regional autonomy are increasingly overriding ideological alignment. <\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Washington, T\u00fcrkiye remains indispensable but unreliable; for Ankara, the US is a necessary but constraining partner. The challenge for both sides is how to construct a functional partnership that accommodates a divergence of alignment while still delivering strategic value. Rare earth elements and T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s role in Ukraine offer precisely such a framework: material, interest-based, and adaptable to a world defined by competition with Russia and China. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye, Ukraine, and the Logic of Strategic Autonomy<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s response to Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has crystallized its broader foreign policy doctrine. Ankara condemned the invasion, supported Ukraine\u2019s territorial integrity, supplied Kyiv with military equipment, and closed the Turkish Straits to military traffic under the Montreux Convention. At the same time, it refused to impose sanctions on Russia and preserved energy, trade, and diplomatic ties with Moscow. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This approach is often described in Washington as \u201cambiguous<\/a>\u201d but from Ankara\u2019s perspective, it is a rational expression of strategic autonomy. T\u00fcrkiye views the war not only as a European security crisis but also a Black Sea conflict<\/a> with direct implications for its own stability, energy security, and economic resilience. Full alignment with Western sanctions would expose T\u00fcrkiye to severe economic costs, exacerbate inflation, and jeopardize energy supplies, while full alignment with Russia would undermine its role in NATO. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s early mediation efforts following the invasion of Ukraine have reinforced its self-image as an indispensable intermediary between Russia and the West. Unlike most NATO Allies, Ankara retains the ability to communicate credibly with both sides. For the US, this role is double-edged: it dilutes Alliance discipline but preserves a diplomatic channel with Russia that would otherwise not exist. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

US Expectations and Limits of Alliance Discipline<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Throughout the second Trump presidency, the US has viewed the war in Ukraine less as a fundamental test of the rules-based international order and more as a measure of Allied burden-sharing and loyalty to US interests. Washington\u2019s discard of normative alignment and expectations of tangible demonstrations of support carries deep implications for T\u00fcrkiye that benefits substantially from NATO security guarantees. In this context, Ankara\u2019s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia and its continued economic engagement with Moscow are not seen as violations of shared principles, but rather as opportunistic behaviour that undermines NATO cohesion and reinforces perceptions of Allies \u2018freeloading\u2019 off US protection. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, these expectations reflect an older model of Alliance behaviour that is increasingly difficult to sustain. In a multipolar system, medium powers like T\u00fcrkiye are less willing to subordinate their interests to bloc politics. Ankara\u2019s behaviour in Ukraine is not an anomaly but a signal of how smaller and middle powers navigate systemic competition: hedging, mediating, and extracting leverage from multiple relationships simultaneously. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This suggests that pressuring the Turkish government into full alignment may be counterproductive. Excessive coercion risks accelerating Ankara\u2019s drift toward alternative partnerships, while reducing US influence over Turkish strategic choices. The challenge for Washington, therefore, is not to put an end to Turkish autonomy, but to channel it toward outcomes compatible with US interests. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rare Earth\u00a0Elements\u00a0and the New Geopolitics of Supply Chains<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In October 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that T\u00fcrkiye had identified the world\u2019s second largest reserve of rare earth elements, containing an estimated 694 million tons of mineral resources in Beylikova, located in northwestern T\u00fcrkiye. The discovery includes cerium, praseodymium, and neodymium<\/a>. T\u00fcrkiye discussed<\/a> developing rare-earth reserves in western Anatolia with the US after similar talks with China and Russia were halted amid disagreements over control; it is also engaging with Canada and Switzerland<\/a> on potential cooperation. T\u00fcrkiye plans on building a refinery in Beylikova, which contains ore with more than 1% rare-earth oxide by weight.  In addition, Ankara plans to apply to the Australian Institute of Geoscientists for certification under the JORC Code, which sets minimum standards for how companies publicly report exploration results and would reveal the size of deposits for potential investors. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ankara\u2019s talks with Western partners come as the US and the European Union (EU) step up efforts to reduce China\u2019s dominance in the production and processing of rare earth elements. The Turkish government has sought to balance its ties with both the West and China amid growing global trade tensions. In September 2025, T\u00fcrkiye joined a partnership<\/a> led by the US and EU aimed at diversifying critical mineral supply chains; however, it has also been offered partner-country status to the BRICS group of emerging-market powers and attracted Chinese investment in electric vehicle production. In 2026, the EU signed<\/a> a new agreement with US and Japan to cooperate on critical raw materials supply chains.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is within this context that rare earth elements and critical minerals acquire strategic significance. The global competition over rare earth elements has become a central front in US-China geopolitical rivalry. China\u2019s dominant position across extraction, processing, and downstream manufacturing of these elements represents a structural vulnerability for the US and its partners. For Ankara, cooperation supports its goal of moving up the global value chain, reducing reliance on external suppliers, and strengthening its role in strategic industries, such as defense systems, medical technologies, and consumer electronics. For Washington, T\u00fcrkiye represents a politically and geographically viable partner in efforts to diversify supply chains for key technological and defence products while reducing dependence on China without concentrating production in a limited number of partner countries. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Diversifying supply chains is therefore a national security imperative and T\u00fcrkiye is increasingly relevant for three reasons: firstly, it possesses geological potential for rare earth elements and other strategic minerals; second, it has a substantial industrial base capable of supporting processing and manufacturing; and third, its geographic position makes it a hub connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Linking Rare Earth\u00a0Elements\u00a0and Ukraine: Strategic Complementarity<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The intersection between cooperation on rare earth elements and T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s position on Ukraine is not coincidental. Both issues raise the same underlying question: how much strategic autonomy can T\u00fcrkiye exercise while remaining embedded in the Western alliance structure?  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Economic interdependence in critical sectors creates incentives for alignment that political pressure alone cannot achieve. A structured US-T\u00fcrkiye partnership on rare earth exploration, processing, and technology transfer would deepen mutual dependence, making a sharp geopolitical rupture less likely. Such cooperation would strengthen T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s stake in a Western-oriented economic order, indirectly shaping its calculations on Ukraine. While it would not compel Ankara to adopt sanctions or abandon mediation, it would raise costs of drifting too far from US strategic priorities. This logic is visible in US efforts to structure critical mineral partnerships with Ukraine, suggesting that resource cooperation is emerging as a broader instrument of strategic alignment rather than a case-specific initiative. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia, China, and\u00a0T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Hedging Strategy<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s approach to rare earths must also be understood in the context of its broader hedging strategy vis-\u00e0-vis Russia and China. Moscow remains a key energy supplier and a critical actor in the Black Sea, while Beijing is an increasingly important trade and investment partner for T\u00fcrkiye. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

China\u2019s dominance in the rare earth industry presents Ankara with both an opportunity and a constraint. On the one hand, Chinese investment and technology are an attractive prospect for developing T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s mineral sector. On the other, excessive reliance on China would undermine T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s aspiration for strategic autonomy and expose it to geopolitical pressure from its Western partners A US-T\u00fcrkiye partnership on rare earth elements offers Ankara an alternative path \u2013 one that diversifies external dependencies. For Washington, engaging with T\u00fcrkiye reduces the likelihood that Ankara will default to China. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s value extends well beyond economics. Its control of access to the Black Sea, close proximity to Ukraine, Russia, and the Middle East, and strong military capabilities make it a cornerstone of NATO\u2019s southern and eastern flanks. Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the strategic importance of the Black Sea as a contested space where naval power, energy routes, and regional stability intersect. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s enforcement of the Montreux Convention has limited Russian naval reinforcement and demonstrated Ankara\u2019s capacity to shape the operational environment without direct military confrontation. This contribution, though often overlooked, has tangible value for Ukraine, the US and other NATO Allies. Maintaining T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s integration within NATO is therefore essential, even as undercurrents persist. Cooperation on rare earth elements complements this objective by reinforcing T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s embeddedness in the Western order. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Scenarios for the Evolution of US-T\u00fcrkiye Relations<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Several trajectories could shape US-T\u00fcrkiye relations in the coming years. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Scenario 1: Strategic Convergence Through Economic Anchoring<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this scenario, the US and T\u00fcrkiye deepen cooperation on rare earth elements and other critical minerals, integrating cooperation with broader collaboration in defense technologies, energy transition, and industrial policy. Deepening economic interdependence would help stabilize the bilateral relationship and provide a practical framework for managing political differences. T\u00fcrkiye would continue to act as a semi-autonomous NATO Ally \u2013 aligned with the US on core security interests, while retaining flexibility in its diplomatic engagement with other powers and partners. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Scenario 2: Strategic Drift and Competitive Hedging<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

If cooperation on rare earth elements fails to materialize and political tensions over Ukraine intensify, T\u00fcrkiye may deepen its ties with Russia and China. In this scenario, Ankara\u2019s mediation role loses value for Washington, and the relationship becomes increasingly transactional and distrustful. NATO cohesion weakens, and supply chain cooperation shifts elsewhere. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Scenario 3: Managed Autonomy and Functional Partnership<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the most realistic scenario, the US accepts T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s strategic autonomy while selectively deepening cooperation in areas of high mutual value, particularly rare earth elements and Black Sea security. T\u00fcrkiye continues to mediate Ukraine, and Washington leverages this role pragmatically, even as political differences persist. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Policy Options for the United States<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

US policy toward T\u00fcrkiye should place cooperation on rare earth elements and critical minerals at the centre of the bilateral agenda, elevating it to a strategic pillar within broader efforts to reduce supply chain dependence on China. This would require the adoption of concrete measures, including investment, technology sharing, and regulatory coordination. At the same time, Washington should continue to reassess T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s approach to Ukraine by focusing more on practical outcomes, recognizing that Ankara\u2019s efforts and selective support for Kyiv can contribute to regional stability in ways that rigid conformity may not. Strengthening high-level institutional dialogue that links security, economic, and industrial policy would help reduce misunderstandings and prevent tensions from overshadowing the broader relationship. Finally, the US should reaffirm T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s central role within NATO while accepting that member country cohesion in a multipolar environment will inevitably involve tension and diversity in policies and approaches, as highlighted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio in his Bratislava speech.<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion: From Alignment to Strategic Interdependence<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The US-T\u00fcrkiye relationship in 2025 highlights how NATO may increasingly be shaped by pragmatism and negotiated interests, alongside \u2013 but not replaced by \u2013 shared values and ideological affinity. In this context, values remain relevant but may no longer be sufficient on their own to sustain strategic partnerships. Instead, cooperation is structured through selective interdependence across security, economic, and technological domains. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s calibrated approach to Ukraine and its growing role in rare earth elements and critical mineral supply chains should therefore be seen as interdependent strategies, offering broader theoretical insights regarding contemporary alliance patterns. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the US, this shift may require a recalibration of expectations. The ultimate choice is not between accepting Turkish autonomy or attempting to impose alliance discipline, but between shaping that autonomy through sustained engagement or allowing it to evolve in ways increasingly misaligned with US interests. Treating T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s behaviour as a problem of non-compliance risks overlooking the structural forces driving Ankara\u2019s decisions. A strategy centred on pressure alone is unlikely to succeed and may intensify T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s temptations to turn toward alternative partnerships. Instead, over time, deepening interdependence could play a stabilizing role, mitigate political disputes and increase the costs of strategic divergence on both sides. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ultimately, in an era defined by multipolar competition and systemic rivalry, resilience will depend more on flexible, interest-based cooperation. The combination of cooperation on rare earth elements and pragmatic engagement on Ukraine offers a framework through which the US and NATO can adapt their approach to T\u00fcrkiye without relinquishing core strategic objectives. By prioritizing realism, mutual benefit, and long-term interdependence, Washington can help ensure that T\u00fcrkiye remains a pivotal \u2014 if unconventional \u2014 partner, capable of contributing to Western security and economic resilience in an increasingly fragmented world. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This brief provides an overview of Turkish-American relations, its complications, and the importance of rare earth minerals.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":128,"featured_media":2623,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[180,193,171,145,37,123],"tags":[158,109,288,287,121],"class_list":["post-2622","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-black-sea","category-caspian-sea","category-mentorship","category-nato","category-policy-brief","category-united-states","tag-mentorship","tag-nato","tag-rare-earth-minerals","tag-turkey","tag-us"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2622","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/128"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2622"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2622\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2645,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2622\/revisions\/2645"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2623"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2622"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2622"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2622"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}