{"id":2625,"date":"2026-06-29T13:47:44","date_gmt":"2026-06-29T17:47:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=2625"},"modified":"2026-06-29T13:47:45","modified_gmt":"2026-06-29T17:47:45","slug":"strategic-stability-in-flux-can-nato-balance-deterrence-defence-and-arms-control-in-a-new-missile-age","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2026\/strategic-stability-in-flux-can-nato-balance-deterrence-defence-and-arms-control-in-a-new-missile-age\/","title":{"rendered":"Strategic Stability in Flux: Can NATO Balance Deterrence, Defence, and Arms Control in a New Missile Age?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Strategic Stability in Flux: Can NATO Balance Deterrence, Defence, and Arms Control in a New Missile Age? \n <\/h1>\n \n \n\n

By Alessandro Leonardi, University of Roma Tre\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n \n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The\u00a0official\u00a0expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in February 2026 represents a significant rupture in global strategic stability.<\/a>\u00a0For the first time since 1972,\u00a0when\u00a0SALT I negotiations yielded the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the strategic relationship between Washington and Moscow is entirely unconstrained by a legal framework.\u00a0While the strategic environment has faced periodic shocks, such as the 2002 United\u00a0States\u2019\u00a0(US)\u00a0withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (and the follow-on Russian decision\u00a0not to\u00a0ratify\u00a0START II) and the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)\u00a0Treaty\u00a0in 2019, regulatory continuity persisted until\u00a0the recent expiration of the New START<\/a>.\u00a0As the current normative vacuum is unprecedented in the modern era, the\u00a0North Atlantic Treaty\u00a0Organization\u00a0(NATO)\u00a0Alliance faces\u00a0a new \u2018strategic trilemma\u2019:\u00a0the simultaneous and often contradictory imperatives\u00a0of maintaining credible extended deterrence;\u00a0enhancing conventional defence against hybrid and missile threats;\u00a0and reconstructing a confidence-building, risk-reduction framework to prevent accidental escalation. The central policy problem is that the traditional tools of strategic stability\u00a0\u2013 quantitative and qualitative ceilings, inspections, and transparency\u00a0\u2013\u00a0have been discarded in favour of vertical\u00a0nuclear\u00a0proliferation. NATO must navigate an environment where\u00a0the absence of constraints increases the risk of miscalculations, potentially leading to an unmanaged arms race that reduces the security\u00a0for all\u00a0NATO Allies.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Context: The Long Transition and the Paradox of the New START<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The\u00a0international\u00a0arms control regime, which persisted through various systemic shifts from 1972 until 2026, has finally fractured. However, a rigorous assessment\u00a0of its lifespan\u00a0suggests that the final pillar of this regime,\u00a0the New START,\u00a0was already flawed.\u00a0A\u00a0key\u00a0qualitative\u00a0weakness\u00a0of New START was the absence of a ban on Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs).<\/a>\u00a0This omission allowed Moscow to channel its modernization efforts toward lethal, MIRV-capable systems,\u00a0while remaining formally\u00a0compliant to\u00a0the treaty limit of 1,550 warheads.\u00a0Well before the collapse of the INF Treaty in 2019<\/a>,\u00a0Moscow\u2019s Strategic\u00a0Rocket\u00a0Forces (RVSN) and the missile industry exploited this normative\u00a0\u2018shield\u2019\u00a0to initiate a massive\u00a0\u2018re-MIRVing\u2019\u00a0process. This modernization was driven by a\u00a0powerful bureaucratic momentum<\/a>\u00a0within the Russian military-industrial complex. By focusing on systems that exploited New START\u2019s qualitative loopholes, institutional actors, such as the\u00a0Moscow\u2019s Institute of Thermal Technologies (MITT)<\/a>, secured long-term funding and development pathways for a new generation of delivery vehicles. This momentum\u00a0facilitated\u00a0the emergence of a direct nexus between treaty-compliant modernization and the later deployment of advanced long-range capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Strategic Trilemma between Extended Deterrence and the \u2018Upload\u2019 Disparity<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The end of New START has transformed the re-MIRVing process into a catalyst for a new arms race. In this new unconstrained environment, the US possesses a significant technical advantage. Washington currently carries fewer warheads on its Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine Force (SSBN) than their maximum loading capacity to comply with New START and could rapidly surge its deployed strategic forces<\/a>. If the US opts to utilize its technological edge, it would effectively out-deploy Moscow, potentially doubling its arsenal to levels above the failed treaty\u2019s limits. As Washington initiates the deployment of its modernized strategic triad \u2013 spanning from the Sentinel<\/em> intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Columbia-class SSBNs, and the intercontinental bomber B-21 Raider<\/em> \u2013 Russia is likely to view this comprehensive revitalization as a direct threat to its retaliatory capability.<\/a> In response, Moscow may prioritize asymmetrical offset centred on long-range theatre strike capabilities. This likely reaction is deeply rooted in the bureaucratic momentum of Russian military-industrial complex, favouring dual capable systems that operate in regulatory grey zones. By fielding theatre long-range systems like the Oreshnik<\/em> capable of bypassing Western defences, the Russian military would hold European targets in its crosshairs, utilizing sub-strategic coercion to neutralize Washington strategic upload capability.<\/a>  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Defence, Resilience, and the Hypersonic Decision Gap<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The\u00a0US\u2019\u00a0planned\u00a0deployment of the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), or\u00a0Dark Eagle<\/em>, in Germany would introduce a profound level of strategic compression.<\/a>\u00a0Unlike traditional\u00a0ICBMs, which allow for a 25-plus minutes warning window, a hypersonic system launched from central Europe can reach critical command nodes in Moscow in less than 10 minutes. This\u00a0drastic reduction<\/a>\u00a0in decision time undermines de-escalatory signalling and places\u00a0extreme pressure<\/a>\u00a0on the adversary\u2019s early warning systems, potentially triggering automated \u2018launch on warning\u2019 responses. Even a conventional strike on communications, command-and-control (C3) centres would be strategically relevant. Therefore,\u00a0the deployment of such systems in substantial numbers would create a \u2018launch-on-warning\u2019 incentive for Moscow, further destabilizing the offensive-defensive\u00a0balance and increasing the risk of automated nuclear response.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Managing Uncertainty\u00a0in a Multipolar System<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Emerging from a Cold War environment coalesced around a bipolar international power-distribution, traditional arms control has proven ill-suited for the asymmetrical, multipolar international disorder of the last two decades. In the current environment, priorities must shift toward Confidence-Building and Risk Reduction Measures (CBMs and RRMs).<\/a> In a world without inspections, stability depends on predictability. To achieve this goal, the international community must work to prevent accidental escalation through transparency and launch notifications. The reconstruction of a stabilizing framework is currently stymied by two primary structural hurdles: Russia\u2019s current lack of trustworthiness and China\u2019s strategic intentions.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The main obstacle to reopening dialogue with Russia is the paradox of negotiating limits on the same systems being employed in the current war in Ukraine. It would be politically fraught for the US to engage in fresh negotiations, while Russia utilizes these assets as tool of active coercion and battlefield destruction. Moreover, Putin\u2019s recent insistence on incorporating French and British nuclear capabilities into arms control negotiations appears to be a calculated attempt to drive wedges between Washington and its two European nuclear Allies<\/a>. This move puts Washington in an uneasy negotiating position, forcing it to negotiate over assets that France and the United Kingdom (UK) consider non-negotiable. This is hardly a novel tactic: since SALT I, Moscow has consistently argued that the independent arsenals of European Allies should be factored into the overall NATO strategic balance.<\/a> Putin\u2019s proposal risks to exacerbate infra-systemic fault lines, foster suspects of decoupling, and \u2018fears of abandonment\u2019 between the US and its European Allies. Simultaneously, China\u2019s strategic stalling (and its own ambitions to increase its arsenal) prevents the necessary transition toward a trilateral framework. By hiding behind the rhetoric of minimal deterrence, Beijing refuses to accept any oversight while rapidly expanding its nuclear and conventional inventory.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the American and Russian nuclear stockpiles greatly exceed those of all other nuclear-weapon states, the strategic equation has irrevocably shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar calculus through China\u2019s ambitions to drastically increase its own arsenal. This shift is primarily seen through the Chinese Rocket Force\u2019s massive conventional long-range inventory.<\/a> These missiles provide Beijing with a high-precision, non-nuclear capability to hold regional strategic assets in the mire, including forward air bases, carrier strike groups, and command-and-control (C2) nodes. Most significantly, the recent fielding of conventionally armed variant of the DF-27 allows China to exert strategic pressure across the entire Asia-Pacific Region (APR) without crossing the nuclear threshold.<\/a> This scenario of \u2018conventional entanglement\u2019 complicates the global force posture of NATO\u2019s primary security provider, the US. Consequently, the NATO Alliance must factor in these trans-regional dynamics, as China\u2019s ability to strike strategic nodes in the Indo-Pacific directly impacts upon Washington\u2019s capacity to sustain its commitments and maintain the strategic balance in the Euro-Atlantic theatre.<\/a>  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Technological Acceleration: The AI-Hypersonic Nexus<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The \u2018Strategic Trilemma\u2019 is further complicated by the integration of\u00a0Artificial Intelligence (AI) into Early Warning<\/a>\u00a0and launch-control systems. As the\u00a0speed of warfare accelerates<\/a>\u00a0through the deployment of Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs), the decision-making window for political leaders has shrunk from thirty minutes to mere seconds.\u00a0In the immediate\u00a0future there\u00a0will\u00a0be\u00a0formidable\u00a0pressure on military bureaucracies to integrate AI to merge and interpret sensor data<\/a>.\u00a0However, the \u2018black-box\u2019 nature of neural network-based AI introduces unprecedented\u00a0risks<\/a>. Because these models recognize patterns in ways that are non-replicable and often incomprehensible to human operators, they are prone to hallucinations or false positives \u2013 interpreting unusual atmospheric phenomena or cyber-spoofing as an incoming strike. In a strategic environment dominated by fast-flying systems like the\u00a0Dark Eagle<\/em>\u00a0or\u00a0Oreshnik<\/em>, the reliance on AI-driven recommendations could lead to a \u2018compressed escalation\u2019 where a machine\u00a0initiates\u00a0a retaliatory strike before human deliberation even occurs. This technological entanglement\u00a0necessitates\u00a0that any future\u00a0arms\u00a0control negotiations must deal not only with warheads and delivery systems, but also with the algorithms governing their employment.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Shift towards Integrated Deterrence<\/strong>\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In response to this acceleration, NATO has transitioned toward a posture of integrated deterrence. With the expiration of New START in sight, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) moved to solidify the Alliance\u2019s defensive architecture. During the NATO-Ukraine Council meeting on January 12, 2026 \u2013 convened following Moscow\u2019s employment of the Oreshnik<\/em> \u2013 NATO Allies underscored the urgent requirement for layered Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD).<\/a> This strategic shift was codified on February 12, 2026, when several NATO Allies launched multinational initiatives<\/a> to develop next-generation sensors designated to counter ballistic and hypersonic threats (like the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS)). These initiatives, alongside a new High Visibility Project<\/a> for drone-based deep precision strike capability, signal a move away from static, treaty-based stability, toward a dynamic denial posture. Furthermore, the 2026 US National Defence Strategy<\/a> reinforces this approach by emphasizing trans-regional deterrence, acknowledging that while NATO remains a regional alliance, its security is inextricably tied to the \u2018two-peer\u2019 challenge.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Policy Recommendations<\/strong>:\u00a0\u00a0<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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  1. Rediscover a dual approach<\/strong>: Combine military modernization with a standing\u00a0<\/strong>negotiating\u00a0offer\u00a0to both Russia and\u00a0China\u00a0on Strategic Stability Dialogue,\u00a0which would\u00a0likely benefit\u00a0NATO\u00a0Alliance cohesion by reassuring the most risk-adverse NATO\u00a0member\u00a0states.\u00a0\u00a0<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
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    1. Prioritize Qualitative Limits<\/strong>: Advocate for a Multilateral MIRV-freeze to mitigate first-strike incentives and neutralize the advantage of rapid uploading.\u00a0\u00a0In the post-START environment, the primary risk is no longer aggregate warheads counts, but the rapid surge\u00a0in\u00a0capacity,\u00a0afforded by US upload potential and Russia\u2019s modernization of MIRV-capable systems.\u00a0A \u2018freeze\u2019 approach would be aimed at neutralizing the perceived advantages of rapid arsenal expansion, signalling a commitment to strategic sufficiency rather than the\u00a0reckless\u00a0pursuit of superiority.\u00a0\u00a0<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
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      1. Establish\u00a0\u2018Cold War\u00a0Plus\u2019\u00a0Communication Channel<\/strong>s: Strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters to manage crisis in an era of hypersonic weapons.\u00a0NATO should strengthen secure, real-time links between military headquarters \u2013 specifically\u00a0the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)\u00a0and the Russian Ministry of Defence \u2013 to manage crisis in an era defined by HGVs. These channels must be hardened against cyber-interferences and electronic warfare to ensure they\u00a0remain\u00a0viable\u00a0during high-intensity grey zone friction or hybrid confrontations.\u00a0\u00a0<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
          \n
        1. Manage AI Integration in Command and Control<\/strong>:\u00a0Establish\u00a0\u2018human-in-the-loop\u2019 standards between launch commands and early warning systems to\u00a0prevent\u00a0AI\u00a0systems\u00a0from triggering accidental escalation during high-speed hypersonic encounters.\u00a0While AI may become indispensable for processing massive data streams from next-generation\u00a0sensors like the HBTSS, it must never\u00a0possess\u00a0the autonomous authority to\u00a0initiate\u00a0a response. Hence, the\u00a0NATO\u00a0Alliance should champion an international protocol that mandates\u00a0a \u2018deliberation window<\/a>\u2019 for human commanders, even in high-speed hypersonic confrontations.\u00a0<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
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          1. Define a Clear Doctrine for Conventional Hypersonic<\/strong>: Clarify that systems like\u00a0Dark Eagle<\/em>\u00a0are for\u00a0Anti-Access\/Ariel\u00a0Denial (A2\/AD)\u00a0suppression<\/a>,\u00a0while acknowledging that\u00a0their\u00a0speed<\/a>\u00a0remains\u00a0inherently destabilizing.\u00a0NATO should explicitly disavow \u2018decapitation\u2019 or strategic nuclear roles for these assets to reduce the risk of Russia misperceiving conventional precision strikes as existential threats to its\u00a0C2\u00a0architecture.\u00a0<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
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            1. Strengthen Hybrid Resilience<\/strong>: Protect undersea and digital infrastructure as a core\u00a0component\u00a0of strategic stability to prevent\u00a0hybrid,\u00a0non-kinetic bypassing of deterrence.\u00a0By neutralizing low-cost, high-impact hybrid threats, the\u00a0NATO\u00a0Alliance prevents adversaries from bypassing deterrence thresholds\u00a0and undermining stability at the lowest level of the escalation ladder. This approach ensures that the emerging new capabilities in air, missile, and drone-defence would not be\u00a0compromised\u00a0by asymmetric disruption aimed at eroding domestic resilience and political will during a crisis.\u00a0\u00a0<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

              In an era where there is a lack of policy governing US-Russian Strategic relations, this policy memo provides an overview of existing tension points between Moscow and Washington<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":128,"featured_media":2627,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[84,155,171,145,1,37,100,123],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2625","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-european-security","category-menotorship","category-mentorship","category-nato","category-news","category-policy-brief","category-russia","category-united-states"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2625","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/128"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2625"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2625\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2631,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2625\/revisions\/2631"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2627"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2625"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2625"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2625"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}