{"id":2676,"date":"2026-07-13T19:26:04","date_gmt":"2026-07-13T23:26:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=2676"},"modified":"2026-07-13T19:26:04","modified_gmt":"2026-07-13T23:26:04","slug":"security-in-the-middle-east-after-gaza-the-role-of-the-eu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2026\/security-in-the-middle-east-after-gaza-the-role-of-the-eu\/","title":{"rendered":"Security in the Middle East after Gaza: The Role of the EU"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\n
\n\n
\n
\n
\n

\n Security in the Middle East after Gaza: The Role of the EU\n <\/h1>\n \n \n \n\n

Roberta Ferrara<\/p>\n\n\n\n

University of Naples L\u2019Orientale<\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n\n <\/div>\n\n

<\/div>\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Since the 1970s, the European Economic Community (EEC)\/European Union (EU) has sought to play a complementary role to the United States (US) in the pursuit of security and stability in the Middle East. This has occurred mostly through soft security measures: diplomacy; economic and financial aid to Palestinians; civilian missions focused on stability; and dialogue with Arab states. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the Euro-Arab Dialogue: a political and economic cooperation framework launched in 1974 between the EEC and the Arab League to strengthen the relationship between the parties after the Yom Kippur War and oil crisis. However, despite these efforts, the limits of the EU\u2019s unique institutional set-up have prevented it from playing a major role in regional affairs. The ongoing war in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Hamas has highlighted the limits of the EU\u2019s diplomatic action. In the meantime, President Donald Trump\u2019s Peace Plan for Gaza has re-energized, once again, the role of the US as the chief mediator in peace negotiations<\/a>, prompting some to draw historical parallels to earlier US-brokered efforts \u2013 from Camp David to the failed Oslo Accords. What role could the EU play in the American plan? How can its involvement be decisive to achieve a just and lasting peace in the region? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Context<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

The 2006 electoral victory of Hamas in the Gaza Strip led to a severe escalation with Israel. With Hamas taking over the territory from the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel considered the Palestinian military group a security threat, as it refused to recognize the Jewish state, renounce violence, or accept previous peace agreements brokered by the PA and Israel. Hamas\u2019 accession to power in 2006 constituted a critical historical juncture that transformed governance in Gaza and its overall relationship with Israel. This shift was accompanied by the return of a range of familiar political practices \u2013 including diplomatic negotiations, economic sanctions, and ongoing military engagement \u2013 that continue to define this governance period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the meantime, two other factors made the relationship between the parties more strained. On the one hand, on November 29, 2012, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 67\/19<\/a>, which upgraded Palestine from a \u201cnon-member observer entity\u201d to a \u201cnon-member observer State.\u201d This historic vote granted Palestine implicit recognition of statehood and was seen as a move to revive the two-state solution, a move strongly opposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On the other hand, the US-brokered Abraham Accords were signed in 2020, aiming to normalize diplomatic, economic, and security relations between Israel and several Arab nations (including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan). Palestinians overwhelmingly opposed the Abraham Accords, perceiving the agreements as an abandonment of the long-standing consensus among Arab states that negotiations with Israel were contingent on ending occupation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On October 7, 2023, Hamas initiated an attack on Israel. 1,250 Israelis and foreign nationals were killed, and more than 250 others were taken hostage<\/a>. The Israeli response was a full-scale military invasion of the Gaza Strip which, by December 2025, has killed 71,266 Palestinians, left most schools and hospitals in ruins, and caused long-term damage to the local society and economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU\u2019s response to Gaza was characterized by contradictions and divisions between its member states. Some countries such as Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Germany, stood with Israel, backing its military campaign and avoiding criticism of Netanyahu\u2019s regime. Other governments, such as Belgium, Spain, France and Ireland \u2013 while strongly condemning Hamas \u2013 called for a ceasefire and criticized Israel for violating international humanitarian law. These differing positions prevented the EU from having a coordinated stance at the UN when voting on a resolution<\/a> on December 12, 2023, which called for a humanitarian ceasefire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Divergencies appeared not only between member states but also across EU institutions. While European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen showed a stronger emphasis on Israel\u2019s right to defence, the European Council issued a more cautious joint statement aimed at highlighting the EU as a unified voice. The statement took a more neutral tone than President von der Leyen, emphasizing both Israel\u2019s right to defence as well as the crucial need for humanitarian aid, civilian protection, and adherence to international law. A third voice, EU\u2019s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, was more critical of Israel, labelling the country\u2019s siege of Gaza illegal<\/a>. The inertia resulting from lack of consensus among member states and across institutions severely undermines the EU\u2019s position as mediator, letting the Americans play a leading role once again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On September 29, 2025, President Trump announced his plan to \u201cend the Gaza war\u201d and address the broader Middle Eastern crisis. The so-called Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict<\/a> was negotiated with the consultation of Arab states, namely Egypt, Qatar and T\u00fcrkiye. The EU played no formal role in the negotiations; it made no proposals of its own, despite being both a major donor to Palestine and an important partner of Israel. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803<\/a>, Trump\u2019s plan includes the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza, a multinational military body that will ensure the demilitarization and security of the Gaza Strip; and the creation of a Board of Peace (BoP), a committee led by Trump that will oversee the political transition in Gaza until a reformed Palestinian Authority can take over governance in 2027. Formally launched at the 56th World Economic Forum in January 2026, the BoP claims its main purpose is the promotion of peacekeeping all around the world, not only in Gaza. Countries wishing to participate in the BoP are required to contribute US$1 billion to the organization to renew their membership, and Trump, as its chairman, is not subject to term limits, holding the sole authority to nominate his successor. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU welcomed President Trump\u2019s commitment<\/a> to ending the war in Gaza; however, many EU member states have expressed concern over the possibility of the BoP overshadowing the role of the UN. Currently, Bulgaria and Hungary are the only two EU countries to have joined the initiative. France, Spain, Poland, and Germany declined to participate, while Italy, Romania, Greece and Cyprus joined as observers. The EU Commission also decided to join as an observer, sending the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka \u0160uica, to Washington, DC, to attend the inaugural meeting of the BoP on February 19, 2026. In a sign of continued disunity, Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares criticized the European Commission\u2019s presence at the BoP meeting<\/a>, calling it a \u201cmistake\u201d, as the EU supports a two-state solution and \u201ccannot participate\u201d in any body that excludes the Palestinian National Authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Problems<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Even if Trump\u2019s plan represents an important step towards a peace deal, it contains critical aspects which might hinder its implementation. The current plan effectively grants Israel a veto power over peace, as its military redeployments are conditioned on Hamas\u2019 demilitarization and reform of the PA. At the same time, Israel is not required to make any formal commitments towards halting settlement expansion in the West Bank or respecting the autonomy of a Palestinian state. On this issue Israel\u2019s stance is clear: Netanyahu declared that there will not be a Palestinian state<\/a>, as it is an \u201cexistential threat to Israel.\u201d Therefore, there is a real risk that, without guarantees for the Palestinian people and a plan to address occupation, Trump\u2019s plan may fail or lead to an unjust and unstable peace agreement that steamrolls Palestinian rights and territories recognized by international law. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other hand, Trump\u2019s peace plan has confirmed that the US continues to play a key diplomatic role in the region<\/a>. However, some UN officials<\/a>, such as Francesca Albanese, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Occupied Territory, criticized the plan. UN Special Adviser on Sustainability, Jeffrey Sachs, labelled the US proposal as \u201cimperialism masquerading as a peace process<\/a>.\u201d According to them, Trump is behaving in Gaza like a 19th-century colonial broker, placing himself at the helm of the BoP to oversee a foreign territory\u2019s governance, with the overall aim of advancing US interests in the region. The Middle East has figured prominently in the first and second Trump administrations\u2019 foreign policy. President Trump\u2019s main goal is to broker agreements between Israel and other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to create a regional framework favourable to US interests and to counter Chinese influence<\/a>. This attitude could prove counterproductive and place EU interests at risk. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Strategic Outlook and Policy Recommendations<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

A more active role of the EU in the region is necessary to guarantee success and counter risks of instability, which may have severe implications for European security, including energy supply limitations, new security threats, and an increase of migration and refugee flows. It is in the EU\u2019s interest to enhance its influence in the region. What practical steps should the EU take to avoid marginalization and make a meaningful contribution to peace?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1.<\/strong> The EU should consider holding an enhanced observer status at the BoP as a necessary counterweight to US and Israeli pressures and hegemony in decision-making.<\/strong> Of course, the EU has to maintain a steadfast commitment to strengthening and reforming the UN, confirming it as the core of a rules-based international order and multilateralism. However, enhanced observer status at the BoP could allow the EU to monitor negotiations and participate in debates specifically devoted to making interventions, peace proposals, and amendments. The presence of the EU, with its traditional concern for Palestinian issues, could ensure meaningful Palestinian involvement. This is fundamental to legitimate the transitory governance of the Gaza Strip and preserve Palestinian decision-making power. A more active EU at BoP could also contribute to reforming the PA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The divergences between member states and across EU institutions negatively impact the EU\u2019s international role. Therefore, the EU should take a cohesive stance on its participation at the BoP, bearing in mind some key arguments<\/strong>. Firstly, \u201cbeing inside the room<\/a>\u201d provides direct insight into how decisions are implemented, serving as a channel for influence. The EU is the largest donor to Palestinian recovery and its involvement in the BoP could help the EU shape outcomes rather than merely fund them, aligning its significant financial contributions with the necessary humanitarian, governance, and security strands of the peace plan. Moreover, \u201cnot closing the only channels that exist<\/a>\u201d is vital for influencing the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2803.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. The EU should be part of the International Security Force.<\/strong> Together with The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah Mission and EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), involvement in the ISF could contribute to the maintenance of the ceasefire.<\/strong> Participation in the ISF could enhance European influence on Israel, for example, by convincing the Israeli government to review its settlement policy and improve living conditions for the Palestinians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. The EU should use economic and financial tools to enhance its political influence.<\/strong> On the Palestinian side, the European Commission recently approved a \u20ac1.6 billion support package for 2025 to 2027, linking it to PA structural reforms<\/a>. On the Israeli side, the EU should overcome its reluctances and suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement if the Israeli government continues to violate human rights in Gaza, as required by Article 2 of the Agreement<\/strong>. The suspension of this Agreement could influence Israel to respect the provisional measures issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)<\/a>, following preliminary rulings about a \u201cplausible\u201d genocide occurring in Gaza. The EU could link Israeli participation in EU funding programs, such as Horizon Europe, to the full withdrawal from Gaza, the end of settlements in the West Bank, and apartheid policy against Palestinians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

4. The EU should invest in the implementation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an economic initiative designed to enhance connectivity and integration between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, based on three pillars: energy, transportation, and digital connectivity.<\/strong> IMEC should be a core interest for Europeans, as it could advance regional stability and security<\/a>, increasing political and economic ties between participating counties. Moreover, it could enhance the EU\u2019s political influence in the area, counterbalancing China and the US. The implementation of some projects as part of the IMEC – such as the EastMed Gas Pipeline – could make the EU a relevant player in terms of future economic cooperation projects, allowing it to increase its weight in the Middle East peace process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU could influence, for example, the implementation of the so-called \u201cGreen Blue Deal\u201d between Jordan and Israel, which provides for the supply of water from Israel in exchange for Jordanian supplies of solar power. The Gaza war stopped the project, but the ceasefire created hope that it may be relaunched in such a way that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank can also benefit from it. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

While the US commitment has been the sine qua non for a ceasefire in Gaza, the EU holds key cards to ensure the successful implementation of Trump\u2019s peace plan. With its traditional regional approach, a more active observer role of the EU in the BoP and its participation in the ISF could balance American \u2013 and Israeli \u2013 influence and ensure a more equitable peace solution. In doing so, it may also help ensure that Palestinian rights recognized by international law are considered against the backdrop of ongoing ceasefire and conflict negotiations. In addition, the use of economic leverage as well as the implementation of the IMEC corridor could enhance the EU political weight in the area, preventing the dawn of a new era of regional instability and insecurity with direct impact on Europe itself.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The historic vision of the EU to fulfill a complimentary role to the United States in the security and stability of the Middle East is being challenged by the ongoing Gaza Genocide and an interventionist America where peace is masqueraded as imperialism. By challenging American-Israeli interests, the EU can utilize preexisting instruments to stabilize the region while simultaneously increasing EU political credibility in the region.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":375,"featured_media":2678,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[104,84,103,126,171,1,37,123],"tags":[128,106,105,292,124,281,158,293,109,294,291],"class_list":["post-2676","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-china","category-european-security","category-european-union","category-human-rights","category-mentorship","category-news","category-policy-brief","category-united-states","tag-eu","tag-european-security","tag-european-union","tag-gaza","tag-human-rights","tag-israel","tag-mentorship","tag-middle-east","tag-nato","tag-peace","tag-usa"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2676","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/375"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2676"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2676\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2680,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2676\/revisions\/2680"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2678"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2676"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2676"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2676"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}