{"id":2701,"date":"2026-08-04T18:26:03","date_gmt":"2026-08-04T22:26:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/?p=2701"},"modified":"2026-08-04T18:26:04","modified_gmt":"2026-08-04T22:26:04","slug":"from-zivilmacht-to-machtpolitik-the-strategic-evolution-of-germanys-international-role","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/2026\/from-zivilmacht-to-machtpolitik-the-strategic-evolution-of-germanys-international-role\/","title":{"rendered":"From Zivilmacht to Machtpolitik? The Strategic Evolution of Germany\u2019s International Role"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n From Zivilmacht to Machtpolitik? The Strategic Evolution of Germany\u2019s International Role\n <\/h1>\n \n \n\n

By Clara D\u2019Elia, University of Roma Tre<\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n \n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

Since its establishment in 1949, the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany was grounded in the concept of Zivilmacht (civilian power), a model based on the renunciation of military force, multilateral cooperation, and economic diplomacy. However, the Russian Federation\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 acted as a significant catalyst for change in Germany\u2019s foreign policy and broader geopolitical positioning. Following these shifts in the European strategic environment, then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed Zeitenwende (a turning point in history) had arrived, which would redefine Germany\u2019s security policy through increased defence spending and a more prominent place in international affairs. The electoral victory of Friedrich Merz as current Chancellor has ultimately shifted Germany\u2019s international role to a more assertive and openly strategic posture, distancing itself from the civilian power model of the past.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This essay examines Germany\u2019s evolution from a culture of military restraint toward one of new strategic posturing, analyzing whether this transformation represents a definitive abandonment of its identity as a civilian power in favour of a return to a modern form Machtpolitik (power politics). Through an examination of the historical trajectory from the Cold War to the chancellorship of Friedrich Merz starting in 2025, this essay suggests that Germany is not reverting to aggressive militarism but is instead adopting a form of defensive and integrated Machtpolitik, necessary to ensure security within the Euro-Atlantic order. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Erosion of the Civilian Power Paradigm<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

For over seven decades, the Federal Republic of Germany defined its national identity through the lens of a Zivilmacht<\/a> (civilian power). Emerging from the ruins of 1945, it anchored itself in the West under Konrad Adenauer\u2019s policy of Westbindung<\/a> (western integration), replacing traditional power politics with a culture of military restraint, multilateralism, and rejection of nuclear arms. This identity consolidated during the Cold War through the dogma of \u201cNever Again\u201d<\/a> and the diplomatic success of Willy Brandt\u2019s Ostpolitik<\/a> (eastern policy), which favoured economic interdependence and dialogue over the use of military force. Even after reunification in 1990, Germany struggled to move beyond this posture, exposing a lasting tension between its expanding economic influence and its unwillingness to deploy its military \u2013 an approach that NATO Allies frequently criticized as \u201cchequebook diplomacy<\/a>.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered these certainties. Then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed a Zeitenwende had taken place, ushering in a shift in Germany\u2019s strategic mindset<\/a> and promising a massive investment in defence through a \u20ac100 billion special fund<\/a>. However, the Scholz era (2021\u20132025) was marked by a profound gap between rhetoric and reality. Hampered by bureaucratic bottlenecks, internal coalition disputes, and a lingering culture of pacifism, the implementation of the Zeitenwende proved difficult. Scholz\u2019s reluctance to supply \u2018offensive\u2019 weapons \u2013 especially Taurus missiles<\/a> \u2013 combined with concerns about Germany\u2019s actual capacity to increase defence spending levels, caused political inconsistency and eroded trust in his leadership at home and abroad. Consequently, the collapse of the Scholz\u2019s governing coalition in late 2024, triggered by fiscal disputes over the debt brake<\/a>, paved the way for a more radical transformation under Friedrich Merz.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Merz Chancellorship: Enforcing Zeitenwende 2.0 <\/h4>\n\n\n\n

The election of Friedrich Merz as Chancellor in February 2025 marked the definitive end of Germany\u2019s post-war strategic ambiguity. Merz\u2019s rise to power envisioned a \u201cZeitenwende 2.0<\/a>,\u201d a strategy that aimed to translate the previous government’s hesitant rhetoric into concrete, assertive action. Under Merz\u2019s leadership, Germany has accelerated its transition from a reluctant partner to a burgeoning military leader in Europe, driven by the dual pressures of Russian aggression and uncertainty in the transatlantic security relationship following the second election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States (US). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unconditional Support for Ukraine and Strategic Assertiveness <\/h4>\n\n\n\n

The most immediate shift under Chancellor Merz has been the abandonment of self-imposed \u201cred lines\u201d regarding the war in Ukraine. In stark contrast to Scholz\u2019s \u201ctwo steps forward and one step back\u201d approach<\/a>, Merz\u2019s government adopted a stance of support with \u201cno ifs or buts<\/a>,\u201d strengthening Germany\u2019s role as the leading military supporter of Kyiv in Europe. Crucially, the Merz administration lifted range restrictions<\/a> on German-supplied weaponry, allowing Ukraine to strike military targets within Russian territory \u2013 a decision that signalled a clear break from the fear of escalation that characterized Scholz\u2019s government. This policy is supported by Germany’s continued commitment to providing substantial military assistance to Ukraine<\/a>, separate from domestic defence spending, although the level of assistance remains subject to annual budget decisions<\/a>. By framing Ukraine\u2019s defence as essential to preserving the European security order, Friedrich Merz has effectively normalized the use of military force as a legitimate and necessary instrument of Germany\u2019s foreign policy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In line with this strategic imperative, the Merz government has extended its commitment beyond military assistance, actively seeking to reshape Europe\u2019s broader geopolitical frameworks. To shield Eastern Europe from shifting transatlantic dynamics, Merz has recently proposed supporting Ukraine to become an \u201cassociate member<\/a>\u201d within the EU. This proposal would see Ukraine attend high-level EU meetings as an observer without voting rights, effectively allowing it to gain access to EU decision-making forums while it progresses through the legal and administrative work of becoming a full EU member state. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rearmament and the “Kriegst\u00fcchtigkeit” of the Bundeswehr <\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Domestically, the Merz chancellorship has been defined by an unprecedented drive for rearmament, aiming to transform the Bundeswehr into \u201cthe most powerful conventional army in Europe<\/a>.\u201d Following the June 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague<\/a>, Germany committed to significant new spending targets: 3.5% of GDP by 2029, rising to 5% by 2035. To finance the increase defence spending, the German government pushed through a controversial reform of the constitutional debt brake, establishing a massive \u20ac500 billion infrastructure and defence fund<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This financial commitment has been matched by structural reforms aimed at achieving Kriegst\u00fcchtigkeit (war readiness). The adoption of the \u201cOperational Plan for Germany\u201d (OPLAN)<\/a> designates Germany as the central logistical hub for NATO in Europe, preparing the nation to serve as the transit corridor and operational base for Allied troops in the event of a large-scale conflict with Russia. This shift acknowledges that Germany is no longer just a security contributor, but a frontline state exposed to hybrid threats, requiring full coordination between military forces and civilian infrastructure. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Return of Conscription and Societal Friction <\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Perhaps the most socially divisive aspect of Merz\u2019s security overhaul has been the move to address the personnel crisis within the armed forces. In late 2025, the government passed the Military Service Modernization Act<\/a> with the ambition of reaching 260,000 active personnel by the 2030s. This legislation relies on a hybrid model: while initially prioritizing voluntary service with financial incentives, it also established the legal framework for a \u201cneeds-based service duty<\/a>\u201d (Bedarfsabh\u00e4ngige Dienstpflicht) that can be activated if volunteer targets are not met. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The potential reintroduction of conscription, which had been abolished in 2011, has sparked significant civil unrest<\/a>. Younger generations view the move as a regression to militarism, highlighting a disconnect between the government’s strategic objectives and the pacifist undercurrents of German civil society. The friction reveals that while the German political elite have embraced a harsher security and foreign policy, under a modern form of defensive and integrated Machtpolitik, the societal transition away from the civilian power identity remains incomplete and contested. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

European Autonomy and the \u201cAtomic Zeitenwende\u201d <\/h4>\n\n\n\n

The geopolitical context of Merz\u2019s chancellorship is heavily influenced by second Trump administration in the US. In the wake of President Trump\u2019s \u201cAmerica First<\/a>\u201d foreign policy strategy, Merz has pushed for more European strategic autonomy<\/a> and an urgent strengthening of German defence. This has led to a breaking of the ultimate German taboo: the nuclear question. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While explicitly ruling out the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal, the Merz government is pursuing an \u201cAtomic Zeitenwende<\/a>\u201d through an integration strategy. Germany has deepened cooperation with Europe\u2019s two nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom (UK), within the framework of the E3<\/a> \u2013 an informal trilateral forum originally established in 2003 to coordinate diplomatic efforts over Iran\u2019s nuclear program. Despite Brexit complicating its institutional dimension, the E3 has evolved into a broader platform for strategic coordination, including strong joint support for Ukraine<\/a>. Through initiatives such as the Kensington Treaty<\/a> \u2013 and in the context of strengthened Franco-British nuclear cooperation through the Northwood Declaration<\/a> \u2013 Germany is seeking to link European security more closely to Franco-British nuclear deterrents. These developments mark a deep cultural shift: nuclear deterrence is no longer discarded but instead embraced as a necessary component of European defence, with Germany acting as a key political facilitator of this shared capability. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Theoretical Analysis: A Return to Machtpolitik? Neoclassical realist approach <\/h4>\n\n\n\n

The radical transformation of German security policy under Friedrich Merz raises a fundamental question: has Germany abandoned its identity as a Zivilmacht in favour of a return to Machtpolitik? The evidence suggests that while the civilian power model in its idealistic and pacifist form has largely faded, Germany is not returning to the aggressive, unilateral power politics of the pre-1945 era. Instead, it is adopting a defensive and integrated Machtpolitik. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The theory of neoclassical realism<\/a> helps explain why Germany could no longer remain a civilian power after 2022 while also highlighting the variables that have complicated this transformation. External pressures, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, altered the distribution of power and threat perception in Europe, compelling the German government to embark on a Zeitenwende to adapt its material capabilities. Yet the theory recognizes that systemic imperatives are filtered through domestic variables. Perceptions of policy-makers, institutional constraints such as the debt brake, and a society shaped by pacifist norms have all slowed decision-making and implementation of reforms, reflecting what Hanns W. Maull defined as Machtvergessenheit<\/a>, or, a \u201clack of realism\u201d or \u201coblivion of power.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under these conditions, Germany\u2019s rearmament is not simply about accumulating hard power, but instead about responding to a shifting geopolitical environment in an integrated and defensive manner. Integration (Einflu\u00dfpolitik<\/a>) occurs through NATO and EU institutions, allowing Berlin to exercise influence and maximize security without alarming Allies. The defensive dimension (Abwehrpolitik<\/a>) focuses on denying Russian victory and protecting the status quo rather than redrawing Europe\u2019s borders. This approach illustrates a neoclassical realist compromise: Germany adapts to systemic requirements while being constrained and shaped by internal political and societal factors, explaining why its strategic transformation has been slow and deliberate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overcoming Machtvergessenheit <\/h4>\n\n\n\n

As argued by Maull<\/a>, Germany is in the process of overcoming its \u201cforgetting of power.\u201d For decades, the Federal Republic of Germany operated under the illusion that European economic interdependence and normative power projection were sufficient to secure its interests \u2013 characteristically liberal ideals. The Merz era reflects a growing recognition that civilian power may require the support of military strength to remain credible. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Merz government has realized that to preserve the liberal international order \u2013 a core objective of the Zivilmacht concept \u2013 it must employ the tools of Machtpolitik. Thus, the dichotomy traditionally rendered between the two ontologies is false. Germany is not choosing power over law; rather, it frames the strengthening of its military as part of a broader effort to provide security for Europe and the liberal international order. Its refusal to pursue an independent nuclear arsenal while simultaneously seeking deeper integration into Allied nuclear frameworks demonstrates this nuanced position. Initiatives such as the establishment of a high-level Franco-German Security Council for nuclear dialogue<\/a>, or the debate at this year\u2019s Munich Security Conference on the need for a credible and autonomous deterrence strategy<\/a> to safeguard Europe\u2019s future, demonstrate that Germany remains firmly anchored in the institutions that have shaped its identity since its founding. At the same time, Germany is discussing options with European partners to develop a deterrence posture that is autonomous, independent, and credible. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recent diplomatic developments strongly illustrate this assertive and autonomous stance. On the diplomatic front, Friedrich Merz has cast aside any lingering hesitation, explicitly accusing the Trump administration of allowing itself to be \u201chumiliated\u201d by Iran<\/a> during the course of the ongoing US-Iran conflict. This position reflects a pragmatic call for European self-reliance in response to unpredictable US diplomacy, rather than an open challenge to the NATO Alliance. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion <\/h4>\n\n\n\n

The chancellorship of Friedrich Merz has placed the Federal Republic of Germany on a decisive path towards a difficult, yet necessary, transformation. The hesitation and ambiguity that defined the Scholz era and the Zeitenwende 1.0 have been replaced by a strategic clarity that acknowledges the harsh realities of the current security environment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

By challenging fiscal constraints with the \u20ac500 billion fund, addressing societal taboos with the reintroduction of conscription, and engaging with previously avoided strategic debates, Germany has fundamentally redefined its role. It has transitioned from a reluctant partner, long constrained by neglect of military power and capability development, to an emerging pillar of European stability, actively shaping defence initiatives and security cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, this transition carries significant perils. Societal backlash against conscription and concerns over Germany\u2019s military buildup underscore the fragility of both internal and external support. The success of a defensive, integrated Machtpolitik depends not only on the consensus of Germany\u2019s European partners but also on its economy\u2019s capacity to sustain substantial defence spending<\/a>. Furthermore, fears of a potential authoritarian turn \u2013 partly driven by rising domestic support for the far-right Alternative for Germany party<\/a> \u2013 continues to create anxieties among the Allies. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ultimately, Germany has not yet returned to the aggressive nationalism of its past. Instead, it is slowly becoming a \u201cnormal\u201d geopolitical power by acknowledging that, in a multipolar world, abstaining from projections of power may undermine chances for survival.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

For decades, Germany’s foreign policy was defined by Zivilmacht\u2014the idea that economic influence, multilateral cooperation, and diplomatic engagement could replace power politics. Rooted in the lessons of the Second World War and reinforced by European integration, this civilian power identity positioned Germany as a champion of the rules-based international order. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the growing return of geopolitical competition have fundamentally challenged these assumptions. Germany’s Zeitenwende represents more than an increase in defence spending; it signals a profound reassessment of Berlin’s strategic identity. This article examines Germany’s transition from Zivilmacht to a more assertive Machtpolitik, arguing that while multilateralism remains central to German foreign policy, military capability and strategic deterrence have become indispensable tools for protecting both German and European security in an increasingly contested international system.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":375,"featured_media":2703,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[146,84,103,171,145,1,165],"tags":[179,147,106,296,298,109,42,297,170,43,78],"class_list":["post-2701","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-defence-spending","category-european-security","category-european-union","category-mentorship","category-nato","category-news","category-theory","tag-defence","tag-defence-spending","tag-european-security","tag-germany","tag-liberalism","tag-nato","tag-russia","tag-social-contract","tag-theory","tag-ukraine","tag-war-in-ukraine"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2701","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/375"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2701"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2701\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2704,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2701\/revisions\/2704"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2703"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2701"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2701"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/eetn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2701"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}