**CARLETON UNIVERSITY Fall 2021**

**Institute of European, Russian & Eurasian Studies**

**Department of Political Science**

**EURR 4102** / **PSCI 4507F**

**The Balkans since 1989**

**Tory Building 342**

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Office Hours: By appointment, preferably via Skype, Messenger, or other platform

Seminar Hours: Tuesdays, 18:05 to 20:55

This seminar explores selected topics in Balkan (or Southeast European) politics and society since 1989. Beginning with a discussion of the collapse of Communism, the seminar analyzes the problematic post-Communist transitions by devoting particular attention to aspects of democratization, political violence, and state- and nation-building. The role of the European Union (EU) is a central theme in the seminar, as all the Balkan states have either joined or aspire to join the EU in the near future. One of the main objectives of the seminar is to introduce students to current issues in Balkan studies and the recent literature about and debates surrounding particular facets of the region’s contemporary politics. It is hoped that upon completing the seminar students will have a better understanding of the region, its recent past and contemporary problems, as well as its future prospects.

The course is a seminar and consists of one weekly class. Please note, however, that the course is an in-person section with alternatives for online students. Provided below is a detailed schedule of weekly topics with readings. To access the course readings please visit the course Brightspace page; the readings are also available as electronic resources through the University Library and, in some cases, online from media outlets and research institutions.

Online Alternative: in addition to the readings and related course information on the course Brightspace page, the instructor will make available additional resources (including concise recorded lectures, PowerPoint slides, and links to relevant podcasts and other information) on the course page. Those students who are unable to attend classes on campus and opt for the online alternative must complete the readings and provide one recorded class presentation for the instructor and complete the participation requirement (as detailed in the Grading section).

Grading:

Assessment is based on the following components: one class presentation; class participation; a research proposal; and, a research paper. The grade distribution is as follows:

Class Presentation 20%

Participation 20%

Research Proposal 10%

Research Paper 50%

Class Presentation (20%) - each student is required to give one class presentation for one of the weekly seminars. The grade will be determined based on the following criteria: (a) the core content, including whether it identifies the key issues related to that week’s theme; (b) critical engagement of the literature, pointing out strengths and weaknesses; and, (c) the questions it poses about the literature and weekly seminar theme. For the in-person section, the presentation questions should be designed to stimulate class discussion. This grade will be made available to each student within one week of his or her presentation. The class presentation should be relatively concise (ideally, approximately 20 minutes); depending on class size, it may have to be presented jointly with another student and will require coordination with your peers. For those students in the Online Alternative section, a pre-recorded class presentation of one of the weekly topics is required. The presentation will be assessed on the same criteria listed above.

Participation (20%) - participation is based on regular attendance and contribution to the seminar discussions. For those students in the Online Alternative section, and instead of direct participation, students should provide either (a) short written summaries of two (2) additional weekly classes or (b) two (2) short, recorded presentations (5-10 minutes each) of two weekly classes other than their main class presentation. Additional guidelines will be posted on the course page about the short written summaries and recorded presentations.

Research Proposal (10%) – the research proposal should be no longer than four (4) pages. Its purpose is to have students start planning their research paper as early as possible in consultation with the instructor. The proposal should (a) identify the paper’s topic or research question; (b) offer a preliminary thesis; (c) provide a brief outline; and, (d) offer a preliminary bibliography. The proposal should be submitted in proper essay format. The proposal is due on Tuesday, October 19 (Week VI), via email and preferably in Word format. A late penalty of 2% per day will apply up to a maximum of 10%.

Research Paper (50%) - students are required to submit a research paper on any topic related to the post-1989 Balkans. A list of topics will be distributed to the class, although students may propose alternate subjects. Research papers should be approximately 16 pages (or circa 4,000 words) long and are due on Tuesday, November 30 (Week XIII). Research papers should be submitted by email and preferably in Word format. Extensions will be permitted only for legitimate reasons, e.g., a medical or family emergency. Otherwise, a late penalty of 2% per day will apply up to a maximum of 10%.

Seminar Readings:

This seminar does not use a course textbook. Weekly readings consist of scholarly articles, research reports and media articles. Unless otherwise noted, all weekly readings are required. In some cases, weekly classes have suggested readings that provide additional context on a particular topic; these readings are not required but are provided for those students interested in supplementary background information.

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Weekly Seminar Schedule:

Week I (September 14): Introduction to the Course

Our introductory class will review the seminar themes, issues, and objectives.

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Week II (September 21): The Revolutions of 1989

This class frames our discussion of the post-Communist transitions. Can we speak of “Revolutions” in the Balkans? What was their nature and how are they remembered today in the region? What correlation if any is there between the events of 1989-91 and the subsequent democratization process?

* Adrian Pop (2013), “The 1989 Revolutions in Retrospect,” Europe-Asia Studies, 65:2, pp. 347-369
* Grigore Pop-Eleches (2014), “Romania Twenty Years after 1989: The Bizarre Echoes of a Contested Revolution” in Twenty Years after Communism, pp. 85-102
* Venelin I. Ganev (2014), “The Inescapable Past: The Politics of Memory in Post-Communist Bulgaria,” in Twenty Years after Communism, pp. 213-232
* Aida A. Hozić (2014), “It Happened Elsewhere: Remembering 1989 in the Former Yugoslavia,” in Twenty Years after Communism, pp. 233-260
* Dragoș Petrescu (2014), Entangled Revolutions: The Breakdown of the Communist Regimes in East Central Europe, pp. 11-24 (Introduction)

Suggested Readings:

For those interested in a more detailed analysis of the Revolutions in Bulgaria and Romania, please see the following:

* Dragos Petrescu (2014), Entangled Revolutions: The Breakdown of the Communist Regimes in East Central Europe, pp. 245-332 (chapters on Bulgaria and Romania)

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Week III (September 28): Are Post-Communism and Transitions Over? The Balkans Thirty Years Later

According to Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), and other observers, the Balkans and indeed parts of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have experienced ‘democratic backsliding’ over the last decade. How should we understand ‘democratic backsliding’? Is it the result of cultural factors, local political cultures, economic depravation and demographic collapse, weak international commitment, and/or a general revolt against Western models?

* Licia Cianetti and Seán Hanley (2021), “The End of the Backsliding Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, 32:1, pp. 66-80
* Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes (2019), The Light That Failed: A Reckoning, pp. 1-18
* Kristen Ghodsee and Mitchell Orenstein (2021), Taking Stock of Shock: Social Consequences of the 1989 Revolutions, pp. 1-20 (“Introduction”)
* Sheri Berman (2017), “The Pipe Dream of Undemocratic Liberalism,” Journal of Democracy, 28:3, pp. 29-38
* Damir Kapidžić (2020), “The rise of illiberal politics in Southeast Europe,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 20:1, pp. 1-17
* Miran Lavrič and Florian Bieber (2020), “Shifts in Support for Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Western Balkans,” Problems of Post-Communism, pp. 1-9

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Week IV (October 5): The Dissolution of Yugoslavia: The Yugoslav Wars and their Legacies, 1989-2001

The violent dissolution of Yugoslavia – the wars in Croatia (1991-95), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-95), Kosovo (1998-99) and brief armed conflict in Macedonia (2001) – gave rise to seven successor states in what we now call ‘the western Balkans’, which also includes Albania. Yugoslavia’s violent collapse was associated with mass atrocities and undoubtedly shaped the democratization process in its successor states. Why are these successor states still grappling with the legacies of the war after 20-25 years? Why have transitional justice and reconciliation been so complicated in the region?

* Marie-Janine Calic (2012), “Ethnic Cleansing and War Crimes, 1991–1995,” in Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative, pp. 115-146
* Andrew Wachtel and Christopher Bennett (2006), “The Dissolution of Yugoslavia,” in Conflict in Southeastern Europe at the End of the Twentieth Century: A Scholars’ Initiative, pp. 13-43
* Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc and Vladimir Petrović (2017), “The Impact of the ICTY on Democratization in the Yugoslav Successor States,” in Building Democracy in the Yugoslav Successor States (2017), pp. 135-162
* Filip Rudic et al, “Hague Tribunal Closes Down, Leaving Disputed Legacy,” Balkan Insight, December 21, 2017, pp. 1-10

Suggested Readings:

For those interested in additional background on the Yugoslav wars and their legacies, see:

* Mark Biondich (2011), The Balkans: Revolution, War, and Political Violence since 1878, Chapter 5, pp. 193-246
* Sabrina P. Ramet (2017), “The Challenge of Democratization: An Introduction,” in Building Democracy in the Yugoslav Successor States, pp. 3-30
* Anatoly M. Khazanov & Stanley G. Payne (2008), “How to Deal with the Past?” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 9:2-3, pp. 411-431

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Week V (October 12): The International Community in the Balkans: The European Union and the West

The EU and the United States (US) have had a decisive impact in the Balkans since the 1990s, in terms of democracy promotion and state- and nation-building. How has the role of the EU changed over time in the Balkans? What are the short-term prospects of EU accession? Has the EU prioritized regional stability over democracy promotion?

* Christina Griessler (2020), “The Berlin Process. Bringing the Western Balkan Region Closer to the European Union,” Südosteuropa, 68:1, pp. 1-24
* Toby Vogel (2018), Beyond Enlargement: Why the EU’s Western Balkans Policy Needs a Reset, pp. 5, 7-9, 11-30
* Sonja Grimm and Okka Lou Mathis (2015), “Stability First, Development Second, Democracy Third: The European Union’s Policy towards the Post-Conflict Western Balkans, 1991–2010”, Europe-Asia Studies, 67:6, pp. 916-944
* Florian Bieber (2011), “Building Impossible States? State-Building Strategies and EU Membership in the Western Balkans,” Europe-Asia Studies, 63:10, pp. 1783-1802
* Solveig Richter (2012), “Two at one blow? The EU and its quest for security and democracy by political conditionality in the Western Balkans,” Democratization, 19:3, pp. 507-534

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Week VI (October 19): The International Community in the Balkans: The Role of Russia, Turkey, and China

Russia and Turkey, and more recently the People’s Republic of China, have become increasingly active in the Balkans through political engagement, economic investments, and even COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy. Do their individual and collective efforts bolster the region’s authoritarian tendencies and undermine EU initiatives?

* Dimitar Bechev (2015), Russia in the Balkans: How should the EU respond? pp. 1-4
* Heather A. Conley et al (2016), The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 1-35, 42-46 (Appendix, Bulgaria) and 57-63 (Appendix, Serbia)
* Asli Aydıntaşbaş (2019), From Myth to Reality: How to Understand Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans, pp. 1-28
* Austin Doehler (2019), From Opportunity to Threat: The Pernicious Effects of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on Western Balkan-EU Integration, pp. 1-18

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Week VII (October 26): Fall Break (Classes suspended October 25-29, 2021)

There will be no seminar class this week.

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Week VIII (November 2): Democratization and the Demographic Crisis

The Balkans (and indeed Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)) has experienced a dramatic demographic crisis since 1989 through a combination of war, emigration, and lower fertility rates. This crisis shows no signs of abating in the near future. How important are demographic trends to politics and democratization?

* Ghodsee and Orenstein, Taking Stock of Shock, pp. 21-46, 67-104
* Andy Heil, “Depopulation Disaster: The Balkans and Its Creeping Demographic Crisis,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, March 9, 2020, pp. 1-11
* Ivan Krastev (2020), “The Fear of Shrinking Numbers”, Journal of Democracy, 31:1, pp. 66-74
* Tim Judah and Alida Vračić, “The Western Balkans’ statistical black hole,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2, 2019, pp. 1-6
* Tim Judah, “Bye-Bye, Balkans: A Region in Critical Demographic Decline,” Balkan Insight, October 14, 2019, pp. 1-9

Suggested Readings:

For those students interested in the demographic picture in individual Balkan countries, please refer to the following:

* Tim Judah, “Croatia Faces ‘Long-Term Stagnation’ of Demographic Decline,” Balkan Insight 31 October 2019, pp. 1-7
* Tim Judah, “‘Too Late’ to Halt Serbia’s Demographic Disaster,” Balkan Insight, 24 October 2019, pp. 1-5
* Tim Judah, “Romania’s Demographic Tailspin Heralds Social Change,” Balkan Insight, 28 November 2019, pp. 1-6

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Week IX (November 9): Democratization in the eastern Balkans: Bulgaria and Romania

Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007, but recent international surveys suggest that neither is a fully consolidated democracy. This class focuses primarily on corruption, rule of law, and media freedoms. We will watch a short documentary, “*Bulgaria: At the Crossroads*” (2021, 25m), to contextualize our discussion.

* Claudiu Craciun (2017), “Romania’s Second Democratic Transition,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung International Policy Analysis, pp. 1-11
* Ioana Burtea, “Divide and Conquer: How Romania Lost the War on Corruption,” Balkan Insight, December 6, 2018, pp. 1-10
* Peter Gross (2014), “Spectacular Alterations, Few Changes in Romania’s Media,” in Post-Communist Romania at Twenty-Five, pp. 127-143
* Crisis Vlad Perju (2015), “The Romanian double executive and the 2012 constitutional,” International Journal of Constitutional Law, 13:1, pp. 246-278
* Venelin Ganev (2018), ““Soft Decisionism” in Bulgaria”, Journal of Democracy, 29:3, pp. 91-102
* Lada Trifonova Price (2019), “Media corruption and issues of journalistic and institutional integrity in post-communist countries: The case of Bulgaria,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 52: pp. 71-79

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Week XI (November 16): Democratization in the western Balkans: Croatia and Serbia

Croatia and Serbia are the two largest successor states of the former Yugoslavia. Croatia has joined NATO (2009) and the EU (2013) while Serbia remains an EU candidate country. They have recently been described as ‘semi-consolidated’ and ‘transitional/defective’ democracies, respectively, with ongoing problems of corruption and state capture. Why has democratic consolidation proven so problematic?

* Dušan Pavlović (2020), “The political economy behind the gradual demise of democratic institutions in Serbia,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 20:1, pp. 19-39
* Dario Čepo (2020), “Structural weaknesses and the role of the dominant political party: democratic backsliding in Croatia since EU accession,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 20:1, pp. 141-159
* Jelena Subotić (2017), “Building Democracy in Serbia: One Step Forward, Three Steps Back,” in Building Democracy in the Yugoslav Successor States, pp. 165-191
* Dunja Melčić (2017), “Building Democracy in Croatia since 1990,” in Building Democracy in the Yugoslav Successor States, pp. 192-212
* Maarten Lemstra (2020), “The destructive effects of state capture in the Western Balkans: EU enlargement undermined”, Clingendael Policy Brief, pp. 1-7

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Week XII (November 23): Democratization in the western Balkans: Bosnia-Herzegovina’s development since 1995

More than twenty-five years since the conclusion of the Dayton Accords (1995), Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) is mired in constitutional deadlock and economic malaise. Its EU and NATO membership prospects appear faint. Why has reform in BH stalled? Should the Dayton Accords be revised? What form should a post-Dayton BH take?

* Srecko Latal, “New Bosnian Peace Envoy Inherits Mission Impossible,” Balkan Insight, August 9, 2021, pp. 1-5
* Damir Kapidžić (2020), “Subnational competitive authoritarianism and power-sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 20:1, pp. 81-101
* Kurt Bassuener (2017), “A Durable Oligarchy: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s False Post-War Democratic Transition,” in Building Democracy in the Yugoslav Successor States, pp. 216-255
* Rafael Biermann (2014), “Coercive Europeanization: the EU’s struggle to contain secessionism in the Balkans,” European Security, 23:4, pp. 484-508
* Tim Judah, “Bosnia Powerless to Halt Demographic Decline,” Balkan Insight, 21 November 2019, pp. 1-8

Suggested Readings:

* Bodo Weber, Substantial Change on the Horizon? A Monitoring Report on the EU’s New Bosnia and Herzegovina Initiative (2017), pp. 1-37

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Week XIII (November 30): Democratization in the western Balkans: The Case of North Macedonia

Several issues have plagued North Macedonia’s transition. Relations with neighbouring Greece have until recently been poor because of the so-called “name dispute”. Equally problematic has been the status of the large Albanian minority, which provoked a brief armed conflict in 2001. How well has the Ohrid Agreement (2001) worked as a mechanism of state-building and democratic consolidation? What are the causes of North Macedonia’s apparent democratic regression? Has the EU prioritized stability (e.g., good ethnic relations, power-sharing arrangements) over democratization?

* Matthew Nimitz (2020), “The Macedonian “Name” Dispute: The Macedonian Question—Resolved?” Nationalities Papers, 48: 2, pp, 205–214
* Dimitar Bechev and Damir Marusic (2020), North Macedonia on the Threshold of Europe, pp. 1-16
* Sabrina Ramet (2017), “Macedonia’s Post-Yugoslav Reality: Corruption, Wiretapping, and Stolen Elections,” in Building Democracy in the Yugoslav Successor States, pp. 287-312
* International Crisis Group (2015), Macedonia: Defusing the Bombs, pp. 1-15
* Biljana Volchevska and Irena Zdravkova, “How North Macedonia Traded Justice for Peace,” Balkan Insight, 24 December 2020, pp. 1-4

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Week XIV (December 7): The Albanian Question: Kosovo and its relations with Serbia

Following an armed conflict in 1998-99 and NATO intervention, Kosovo emerged in 1999 as a United Nations protectorate that was still legally part of Serbia. In declared its independence in 2008 with the support of the US, most EU states, and Canada. What have been the implications of an independent Kosovo for the region and for EU foreign and security policy? What are the prospects of a resolution of the Serbia-Kosovo dispute in the near future?

* Adem Beha & Arben Hajrullahu (2020), “Soft competitive authoritarianism and negative stability in Kosovo: state-building from UNMIK to EULEX and beyond,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 20:1, pp. 103-122
* Aleksandra Dragojlov (2020), “Multi-level Games: The Serbian Government’s Strategy towards Kosovo and the EU under the Progressive Party,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 20:2, pp. 349–370
* Katarina Tadić and Arolda Elbasani (2018), “State-building and patronage networks: how political parties embezzled the bureaucracy in post-war Kosovo,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 18:2, pp. 185-202
* Cemaliye Beysoylu (2018), “Implementing Brussels Agreements: the EU’s facilitating strategy and contrasting local perceptions of peace in Kosovo,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 18:2, pp. 203-218
* International Crisis Group, Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue, Europe Report N°262, January 25, 2021, pp. 1-26

Suggested Readings:

* Vladimir Đorđević, “Building Democracy in the Western Balkans: The Case of Kosovo,” in Building Democracy in the Yugoslav Successor States (2017), pp. 321-344
* Argyro Kartsonaki (2020), “Playing with Fire: An Assessment of the EU’s Approach of Constructive Ambiguity on Kosovo’s Blended Conflict,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 22:1, pp. 103-120

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Classes end on December 10, 2021

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**Academic Accommodations:**

**Academic Accommodation**

You may need special arrangements to meet your academic obligations during the term. For an accommodation request the processes are as follows:

**Pregnancy obligation**: write to me with any requests for academic accommodation during the first two weeks of class, or as soon as possible after the need for accommodation is known to exist. For accommodation regarding a formally-scheduled final exam, you must complete the Pregnancy Accommodation Form (<https://carleton.ca/equity/contact/form-pregnancy-accommodation/>).

**Religious obligation**: write to me with any requests for academic accommodation during the first two weeks of class, or as soon as possible after the need for accommodation is known to exist. For more details visit: <https://carleton.ca/equity/focus/discrimination-harassment/religious-spiritual-observances/>.

**Academic Accommodations for Students with Disabilities**: The Paul Menton Centre for Students with Disabilities (PMC) provides services to students with Learning Disabilities (LD), psychiatric/mental health disabilities, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), chronic medical conditions, and impairments in mobility, hearing, and vision. If you have a disability requiring academic accommodations in this course, please contact PMC at 613-520-6608 or [pmc@carleton.ca](mailto:pmc@carleton.ca) for a formal evaluation. If you are already registered with the PMC, contact your PMC coordinator to send me your Letter of Accommodation at the beginning of the term, and no later than two weeks before the first in-class scheduled test or exam requiring accommodation (if applicable). After requesting accommodation from PMC, meet with me to ensure accommodation arrangements are made. Please consult the PMC website for the deadline to request accommodations for the formally-scheduled exam (if applicable).

**Survivors of Sexual Violence**

As a community, Carleton University is committed to maintaining a positive learning, working and living environment where sexual violence will not be tolerated, and where survivors are supported through academic accommodations as per Carleton’s Sexual Violence Policy. For more information about the services available at the university and to obtain information about sexual violence and/or support, visit: <https://carleton.ca/equity/sexual-assault-support-services>

**Accommodation for Student Activities**

Carleton University recognizes the substantial benefits, both to the individual student and for the university, that result from a student participating in activities beyond the classroom experience. Reasonable accommodation will be provided to students who compete or perform at the national or international level. Write to me with any requests for academic accommodation during the first two weeks of class, or as soon as possible after the need for accommodation is known to exist. <https://carleton.ca/senate/wp-content/uploads/Accommodation-for-Student-Activities-1.pdf>

**Plagiarism**

The University Academic Integrity Policy defines plagiarism as “presenting, whether intentionally or not, the ideas, expression of ideas or work of others as one’s own.” This includes reproducing or paraphrasing portions of someone else’s published or unpublished material, regardless of the source, and presenting these as one’s own without proper citation or reference to the original source. Examples of sources from which the ideas, expressions of ideas or works of others may be drawn from include but are not limited to: books, articles, papers, literary compositions and phrases, performance compositions, chemical compounds, art works, laboratory reports, research results, calculations and the results of calculations, diagrams, constructions, computer reports, computer code/software, material on the internet and/or conversations.

Examples of plagiarism include, but are not limited to:

* any submission prepared in whole or in part, by someone else;
* using ideas or direct, verbatim quotations, paraphrased material, algorithms, formulae, scientific or mathematical concepts, or ideas without appropriate acknowledgment in any academic assignment;
* using another’s data or research findings without appropriate acknowledgement;
* submitting a computer program developed in whole or in part by someone else, with or without modifications, as one’s own; and,
* failing to acknowledge sources through the use of proper citations when using another’s work and/or failing to use quotations marks.

Plagiarism is a serious offence that cannot be resolved directly by the course’s instructor. The Associate Dean of the Faculty conducts a rigorous investigation, including an interview with the student, when an instructor suspects a piece of work has been plagiarized. Penalties are not trivial. They can include a final grade of “F” for the course or even suspension or expulsion from the University.

**Special Information Regarding Fall 2021 Pandemic Measures**

All members of the Carleton community are required to follow COVID-19 prevention measures and all mandatory public health requirements (e.g. wearing a mask, physical distancing, hand hygiene, respiratory and cough etiquette) and **mandatory self-screening** (<https://carleton.ca/covid19/cuscreen/>) prior to coming to campus daily.

If you feel ill or exhibit COVID-19 symptoms while on campus or in class, please leave campus immediately, self-isolate, and complete the mandatory **symptom reporting tool** (<https://carleton.ca/covid19/cuscreen/symptom-reporting/>). For purposes of contact tracing, attendance will be recorded in all classes and labs. Participants can check in using posted QR codes through the cuScreen platform where provided. Students who do not have a smartphone will be required to complete a paper process as indicated on the **COVID-19 website** (<https://carleton.ca/covid19/>).

All members of the Carleton community are required to follow guidelines regarding safe movement and seating on campus (e.g. directional arrows, designated entrances and exits, designated seats that maintain physical distancing). In order to avoid congestion, allow all previous occupants to fully vacate a classroom before entering. No food or drinks are permitted in any classrooms or labs.

For the most recent information about Carleton’s COVID-19 response and required measures, please see the University’s **COVID-19 webpage** (<https://carleton.ca/covid19/>) and review the **Frequently Asked Questions** (FAQs) (<https://carleton.ca/covid19/faq/>). Should you have additional questions after reviewing, please contact [covidinfo@carleton.ca](mailto:covidinfo@carleton.ca)

Please note that failure to comply with University policies and mandatory public health requirements, and endangering the safety of others are considered misconduct under the **Student Rights and Responsibilities Policy** (<https://carleton.ca/studentaffairs/student-rights-and-responsibilities/>). Failure to comply with Carleton’s COVID-19 procedures may lead to supplementary action involving Campus Safety and/or Student Affairs.

**Submission, Return and Grading Guidelines:**

Written assignments must be submitted directly to the instructor(s) according to the instructions in the course outline.

The University uses the following letter grade scale, and percentage equivalents, which will be used to calculate final course grades:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| A+ | 90-100 | B+ | 77-79 | C+ | 67-69 | D+ | 57-59 |  |
| A | 85-89 | B | 73-76 | C | 63-66 | D | 53-56 | F 0-49 |
| A- | 80-84 | B- | 70-72 | C- | 60-62 | D- | 50-52 |  |

Standing in a course is determined by the course instructor subject to the approval of the Faculty Dean. This means that grades submitted by an instructor may be subject to revision. No grades are final until they have been approved by the Dean.

**Carleton E-mail Accounts:** All email communication to students from the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies will be via official Carleton university e-mail accounts and/or cuLearn. As important course and university information is distributed this way, it is the student’s responsibility to monitor their Carleton and cuLearn accounts.

**Official Course Outline:** The course outline posted to EURUS website is the official course outline.