

EURR 5101/PSCI 5112

Russian Domestic Politics -Actors and Processes

Wednesday 11.35 a.m. – 14.25 p.m. (Ottawa time zone)

This course will be held remotely online

I General information

Instructor: Professor Piotr Dutkiewicz
On-line Office Hours: *Monday 12 - 14*
Email: piotr.dutkiewicz@carleton.ca

II Course description

The course will examine the evolution of Russian domestic politics and society since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Themes discussed include the transformation of Russia's political system, changes in the behavior of political elites, the evolution of Russia's social structure, and federal-regional relations.

III Course Format

This course will be delivered **synchronously** (online office hours, online group meetings, real-time online presentation)

IV Learning outcomes

Russia is rapidly transforming and her international behavior frequently overshadows a complex and dynamic domestic evolution. The purpose of the course is to critically examine key processes in Russian domestic politics and society since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and to explore a complex evolution of the interplay of the Russian political, social and institutional system at the federal and regional levels.

V Texts

Most required readings (journal articles and book chapters) will be available in electronic format via the Ares Course Reserves system (there is a link in CU Learn to Ares). **Readings assigned for the course that are compulsory for all students are marked with an asterisk (*)**. There are also suggested additional readings (without mark *). Most of these optional supplemental readings are also available online .

If you find that a required reading is not available for a given week, please notify the instructor for that session immediately.

For details regarding placing materials on reserve in MacOdrum Library, please visit:
<http://www.library.carleton.ca/services/library-reserves-faculty-and-instructors/ares>.

VI Evaluation at a glance

Course evaluation	In %
Seminar participation	25 %
One (short) discussion paper and presentation in class	25%
Policy recommendations	25%
One (short) critical comment on suggested video	25%
Total	100%

For the evaluation details please see below.

VII Evaluation in detail

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

- **Seminar participation:** Regular weekly online attendance is compulsory for this class. Unexcused absences will result in a reduction in the participation mark for the course, which can have a marked impact of the course grade. Students will be graded on the basis of attendance, the quality of regular contributions to the class discussion, and, most importantly, demonstrated familiarity with required course readings. Each student will be evaluated according to these criteria during each seminar session.
- **Discussion paper:** The paper should address a specific question agreed with the course instructor. The length should be **5-6 pages** (typed, double-spaced, 12-point font). The paper should contrast, critique and analyze the readings offering a concrete argument with respect to the given question. Additional reading, beyond what is required for the week, may be specified by the instructor to enrich your discussion. Clarity and conciseness are important; the paper should **NOT** simply describe or reiterate the readings. The paper should be submitted electronically to the instructor for the respective session and to the student commentator by 10 a.m. . on each FRIDAY before the class presentation. It is very important that the paper be submitted on time, since both the instructor and the class need time to read it before the session.
- **Presentation of the Discussion Paper:** All students will present their discussion paper to the class (dates will be assigned in the first meeting). In the presentation of his or her discussion paper, each student should focus on the key arguments made within the written discussion paper, drawing on examples from the readings where appropriate. The student should be prepared to present the arguments verbally in a presentation of **TEN – TWELVE** minutes. Students should **NOT** simply read the written paper.
- The discussion paper and presentation will be evaluated on the basis of the cogency of the argument made, presentation and effectiveness of communication, and demonstrated

familiarity with and reflection on course readings, with a combined grade for the oral and written components. Neither the paper nor the oral presentation should provide lengthy summaries of course readings. (You may provide a short synopsis of the relevant reading, however, up to one page in the written paper, or two pages if more than one reading is involved.)

- Policy paper (assignment for the last class) shall address key policy recommendations for week 12 of the seminar. The length should be **5 pages** (typed, double-spaced, 12-point font). Area of the policy paper shall follow key areas discussed during the seminar (for instance social policy or elite formation). Structure of the paper will be provided.
- Critical comment on suggested video (**1 page**) shall critically evaluate short video from its clarity, key message, potential bias and main conclusion suggested to the viewer
- **Submission, Return and Grading of Term Work:**

Written assignments must be submitted directly to the instructor(s) according to the instructions in the course outline. .

Final standing in courses will be shown by alphabetical grades. The system of grades used, with corresponding grade points is:

Percentage	Letter grade	12-point scale	Percentage	Letter grade	12-point scale
90-100	A+	12	67-69	C+	6
85-89	A	11	63-66	C	5
80-84	A-	10	60-62	C-	4
77-79	B+	9	57-59	D+	3
73-76	B	8	53-56	D	2
70-72	B-	7	50-52	D-	1

Late Penalties and Failure to submit assignments:

Any student who fails to hand in the discussion paper will receive a failing mark in the course.

Penalties for late assignments will be as follows:

Discussion paper: Late assignments will suffer an immediate deduction of 15% (on a 100% scale), and 3% for each day late.

- Students absent on a date of an oral presentations or commentary will receive a “0” unless a valid medical (or equivalent) excuse is provided. Advance notice should be provided to the instructor.

VIII . Course schedule

COURSE OUTLINE

Week 1

INTRODUCTION

1. Explanation of requirements and content of the course.
2. Mini - lecture on “grand transformation in Eastern Europe – key issues.
3. Discussion of academic resources.
4. Selection of presenters.

Week 2

EVOLUTION OF THE POST-COMMUNIST REGIME – FROM YELTSIN TO PUTIN – PART ONE (System collapse – Yeltsin)

We will discuss two approaches to the regime change in Russia after collapse of communism.

1. Orthodox view on regime evolution:
 - The collapse of the Soviet Union marked “*the end of history*,” meaning that liberal democracy became the only viable model for organizing societies worldwide. Implication for Western policy toward Russia: non-intervention/non-confrontation.
 - Later, it became apparent that liberalism in post-Soviet countries could not be achieved overnight. This led to the *transitionalist paradigm*, where the societies were understood as transitioning on a spectrum from A (“communist dictatorship”) to B (“liberal democracy”). Implication for Western policy toward Russia: low-scale intervention, promotion of civil society NGOs – i.e., small nudges toward the endpoint on the transition spectrum.
 - (ongoing) Acceptance of entrenched authoritarianism (alternatively called by many other definitions, e.g.: hybrid regime, competitive authoritarianism, patrimonial presidentialism, superpresidentialism, etc.) as status-quo. Implication for Western policy toward Russia: non-intervention/confrontation.

2. Non-Orthodox view on regime evolution:

The style of power and the political process (liberal/authoritarian) is not instrumental for understanding regime evolution, as it would then appear static (authoritarian at all times, not the least due to remnants of the authoritarian Soviet institutions). Rather, it is more important to look at the regime’s legitimation on social, economic, and ideological grounds, where each compete in terms of importance and complete each other to create a more or less solidified support base for the regime.

Readings:

*Neil Robinson, *Russia: A State of Uncertainty*, Routledge 2002

Chapter 3 Democrats on the Offensive, pp. 114-154

Chapter 4 August 1991 and the Decline of Russia's Democratic Movement, pp.156-196

*McFaul, Michael, Yeltsin Legacy, *The Wilson Quarterly* 24, 2 Spring 2000

*Vadim Volkov. *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*. Cornell University Press (THEME: ELITES or SOCIAL STRUCTURE or ECONOMY)

Chapter 5, “The Privatization of the Power Ministries,” pp. 126-154

Chapter 6, “The Politics of State Formation,” pp. 181-192 (final part of chapter, starting with “Putin’s Dilemma” subsection)

Richard Sakwa. *The Crisis of Russian Democracy*, Cambridge 2011, Chapter 1, Dual State in Russia, pp. 1-52

*Piotr Dutkiewicz and Vladislav Inozemtsev (eds.). *Democracy versus Modernization, A Dilemma for Russia and for the World*. Routledge 2012

Chapter 9, G. Pavlovsky. “Democracy and How it is used in Russia,” pp. 97-110

Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*, Cambridge University Press 2002

Chapter 8, "Russian Mobilization and the Accumulating "Inevitability" of Soviet Collapse," pp. 385-406, 441-442

Bunce and Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries* (for another theme: NGOs), Conclusion, 327-352

Videos:

BBC News. The day Boris Yeltsin said goodbye to Russia --

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xGMyAnefL-8>

Russia Capitalism after Communism -- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ui8p3MEWW78>

Fall of the Soviet Union Explained in 5 Minutes -- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M16RMXZDG_g

Week 3

EVOLUTION OF THE POST-COMMUNIST REGIME – FROM YELTSIN TO PUTIN – PART TWO (Putin and Putinism)

In order to make any change after taking over from Yeltsin, to define new rules and "bring state back" Putin's Kremlin elite needed more power and new resources in order to avoid becoming trapped in the new dependency cycle by the oligarchs. In fact, power and resources are synonymous with *accumulation*. What they were really looking for was a different mode of accumulation that would not differentiate between "economic" and "political power". We will unveil that – quite complex - process of regaining "undifferentiated power" by V.Putin's group.

Readings:

*Richard Sakwa. *Putin Redux*. Routledge 2014 :

1. Chapter 2, The Contradictions of Putinism , pp. 14-38
2. Chapter 3, The Impasse of Power, pp. 61-81

*Piotr Dutkiewicz and Dmitri Trenin (eds.). *Russia: The Challenges of Transformation*. NYU Press 2011:

1. Chapter 1, Piotr Dutkiewicz. "Missing in Translation: Re-conceptualizing Russia's Developmental State," pp. 9-40

2. Chapter 2, Vladimir Popov. "The Long Road to Normalcy: Where Russia Now Stands," pp. 41-72

3. Chapter 3, G. Derluguian. "The Sovereign Bureaucracy in Russia's Modernizations," pp. 73-87

4. Chapter 15, D. Trenin, "Of Power and Greatness," pp. 407-432

*Vadim Volkov. *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*. Cornell University Press:

Chapter 6, "The Politics of State Formation," pp. 181-192 (final part of chapter, starting with "Putin's Dilemma" subsection)

Videos:

Russia: Who really is Vladimir Putin -- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BEYFfiUQu6I>

Week 4

Part One

RUSSIAN SOCIETY – EVOLUTION & STRUCTURE

We will paint the portrait of a contemporary Russian society that is undergoing a massive transformation since mid-1980s. With the help of selected readings based on large scale sociological surveys we will try to reconstruct social structure of the country in the context of a long, turbulent, socially costly and multi-faceted transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy, from socialism to capitalism and from the empire to a regional power.

One of our key tasks will be to show the complexity and dynamics of Russian society and its formal and informal mechanisms and rules, including in its relations to the state. Russian society in our seminar will be presented as socially complex, multi-ethnic, multi-confessional whose civilization is both deeply rooted historically and simultaneously representative of the post-modern system of unconstrained constructivism (an ability to transform almost anything into an object of capitalization).

One of the key goals of this class will be to provide evidence for our guiding thesis that Russian society is, in fact, not merely an object of high-level political processes, *but an adaptive, dynamic and – at times reluctant – subject of its own history.*

Readings:

Some background (optional): Ivan Berend, *History Derailed*, Univ. of California Press, 2003, Chapter 5: Social changes, pp.181- 234. Optional BUT important.

*Natalya Tikhonova, *The Russian roller coaster: Changes in Russia’s social structure in the post-communist period*, in *SOCIAL HISTORY OF POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA*, Piotr Dutkiewicz, Vladimir Kulikov and Richard Sakwa (eds), Routledge, 2016, pp. 1-18

* Valery Fedorov, “New Russia: Cast of characters The evolution of Russian public opinion 1989-2014)” in *SOCIAL HISTORY OF POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA*, Piotr Dutkiewicz, Vladimir Kulikov and Richard Sakwa (eds), Routledge, 2016, pp. 1-30

*Mikhail Gorshkov, “The sociology of post-reform Russia,” in Piotr Dutkiewicz & Dmitri Trenin eds., *Russia: The Challenges of Transformation*, New York University Press, 2011, pp.145 – 190

*Gorshkov, Mikhail K. *Post Reform Russia as a New Social Reality Sociological Analysis of Social Structure // Russian Sociology in Turbulent Times / Ed. by V.A. Mansurov. – Moscow: RSS, 2011, pp. 54-68. (note: to be posted on CuLearn)*

Part two

CIVIL SOCIETY IN RUSSIA or RUSSIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

The meaning of “civil society” has been contested over time. An ideologically-charged neoliberal understanding of it was imposed on the new Russian regime in the 1990s. This understanding was informed by the Western (mostly American) foreign policy objectives, which were informed by a desire to replicated the 1989 color revolutions in post-communist countries. Here, civil society is adversarial towards the state. However, the foreign NGOs did not do enough to engage the public or the market, focusing instead on political PR campaigns, which made them irrelevant to the Russian population. Further, their support for Western foreign policy and attempts to smear the Russian government also tarnished their reputation with the population.

After the US withdrew funding to the sector, the emergent vacuum – both *conceptual* and *institutional* – was overtaken by local initiatives. In effect, Putin’s “crackdown” on the NGOs followed a withdrawal of funds. Since grassroots organizations concerned with service provision had not received much in foreign

funding, the restrictions on foreign financing did not impact the actual service provision, but did curb foreign political influence. Further, some foreign-origin organizations, such as faith organizations, continue to operate and provide services to the disenfranchised.

Readings:

*Zbigniew Rau, (ed.) *The Reemergence of civil society in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, 1991. Chapter 8, **John Gray**, "Post-Totalitarianism, Civil Society, and the Limits of the Western Model," pp. 145-160

*Lisa McIntosh **Sundstrom**, *Funding civil society : foreign assistance and NGO development in Russia*, 2006. Chapter 1: Crossing Boundaries: Analyzing Civil Society and Transnational Influences (pp. 1-25)

*Lisa McIntosh **Sundstrom**, *Funding civil society: foreign assistance and NGO development in Russia*, 2006. Chapter 5, Implications for Theory and Practice, pp.169-182

Catherine Owen, "A Genealogy of Kontrol' in Russia: From Leninist to Neoliberal Governance." *Slavic Review*, Vol. 75, No. 2 (SUMMER 2016), pp. 331-353

***Elena A. Chebankova**, *Civil society in Putin's Russia*, 2013, *Civil Society in Putin's Russia*, chapter 5. "State-sponsored civic associations," pp. 99-117

* **Chebankova**, *Civil Society in Putin's Russia*, chapter 6. "Foreign-sponsored associations in Russia," pp. 118-139

***Chebankova**, *Civil Society in Putin's Russia*, chapter 7. "Grassroots movements in modern Russia: A cause for optimism?" pp. 140-163

Lars Trägårdh; Nina Witoszek; Bron Raymond Taylor, (eds) *Civil society in the age of monitory democracy*, 2013. Chapter 4: "Monitory versus managed democracy: does civil society matter in contemporary Russia?" by **Kathryn Stoner-Weiss**, pp. 111-136

***Melissa L. Caldwell**, "Placing Faith in Development: How Moscow's Religious Communities Contribute to a More Civil Society." *Slavic Review*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (SUMMER 2012), pp. 261-287

***Jo Crotty**, "Making a Difference? NGOs and Civil Society Development in Russia." *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Jan., 2009), pp. 85-108

***Julie Hemment**, "Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and Potemkin NGOs: Making Sense of Civil Society in Post Soviet Russia." *Slavic Review*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (SUMMER 2012), pp. 234-260

***Heather J. Coleman**, *Translating Canadian Models: International Partnerships and Public Policy Reform in Russia*, *Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (March 2009), pp. 25-52

Bunce and Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries*. Conclusion, 327-352

Videos:

Tightening the Screws: Clampdown on Russian Civil Society --

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1AlKqWNq1Ds>

Russia's Foreign Agent Law has chilling effect on Civil Society groups, NGOs --

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YUMVhhcJlvc>

Civil Society and Foreign Agents | 20 questions with Vladimir Putin --

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRqY9o_u8Fo

Russian NGO's fear new foreign agent law -- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=malID3d4e4s>

Week 5

Russian opposition : systemic v. non systemic

It will help us to better understand how the Russia's opposition was formed and acted since 1991, how the government dealt with the protest movement, when the protest movement picked and declined, who were and are the supporters of opposition in different periods of time. Also, we need to

understand the dual nature of Russian opposition including “official” or coopted organizations, and “non-official” or “street” groups. The seminar will demonstrate that paradigmatic split between “official” and “non-official” organizations rests on their approach towards westernization and security concerns of Russia rather than right/left paradigm. There are two different periods in the history of Russian opposition and protest movement. The first mainly coincides with Yeltsin era (1990s – the very beginning of 2000s) while the second began in the first years of Putin era and continuing.

In the first period the opposition groups

1. represented different parts of political spectrum – far left (CPRF), far right (national-populist LDPR), liberal left/left-of-center (Yabloko).
2. Functioned as a real opposition, tried to impeach Yeltsin several times in 1993 and 1999, CPRF’s leader Zyuganov was close to win Presidency in 1996, dominated in the State Duma and many regions. As to this period the main goal is to understand how the opposition forces differentiated from each other in terms of ideology, why the most powerful force, CPRF, never won and was coopted into the state late 1990s – 2000s, why Yabloko never won either and declined to cooperate both with the government and with the other opposition groups.

The second period began in early 2000s when ideological differences took a back seat to new structure of opposition, such as “official” and “non-official” organizations. We will discuss why we use these terms, which groups and why are considered as “official” and “non-official” and what their role and achievements are.

We will look at what protest was mainly about in the different periods of time. We will analyze how the state response for the protest changed from pure political competition to cooptation and then to measures to greater clampdown on dissent. We will also discuss different theoretical approaches to the theme that provide different lenses to understand the history of the protest movement and opposition since 1991.

Readings:

*Chebankova ,Elena. Ideas, Ideology & Intellectuals in Search of Russia’s Political Future. PP 1-14

For the 1990s :

Boris Yeltsin and Russia's democratic transformation. Ellison, Herbert J. 2006 *Chapter 2. The politics of reform. pp 69-77, 110-123, 133-139

Neil Robinson, Russia: A State of Uncertainty, Routledge 2002

*Chapter 3. Russian politics under Boris Yeltsin. Pp 81-89

*Reisinger, William M. Russia’s Regions and Comparative Subnational Politics. Routledge, 2013. Chapter 5. Opposition parties in dominant- party regimes. Inclusion and exclusion in Russia’s regions. Rostislav Turovsky. Pp 82-101.

For the 2000-2010

Moscow in movement: power and opposition in Putin's Russia, Greene, Samuel A., author. 2014

Ch. 6 Our Home Is Russia. Russia’s Housing-Rights Movements

OPTIONAL 148 -155 (Moscow’s Butovo protest over housing)

*pp. 155-164 (Housing protest and Khimki)

Ross, Cameron ed. 2016, Systemic and non-systemic opposition in the Russian Federation : civil society awakens? *Chapter 2 The Protest Movement in Russia 2011–2013: Sources, Dynamics and Structures, Denis Volkov, pp 35-47

Sakwa, Richard 2014, Putin Redux : Power and Contradiction in Contemporary Russia *(Putin’s opponents in 2011-2013, clampdown on opposition after Bolotnaya) pp. 148-154 and 163-167

For 2019 - 2020

*Kolesnikov, Andrei, What are Russians protesting about, Moscow Carnegie Center, July 15, 2019.
<https://carnegie.ru/2019/07/15/what-are-russians-protesting-about-pub-79480>

*Kolesnikov, Andrei, Volkov, Denis, Russia’s growing appetite for change, Moscow Carnegie Center, January, 30, 2020
<https://carnegie.ru/2020/01/30/russians-growing-appetite-for-change-pub-80926>

Grove, Thomas, Russia protests present new challenge to Putin’s dominance, WSJ, Aug 11, 2019
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-protests-present-new-challenge-to-putins-dominance-11565556427>

Arkhipov, Ilya, Reznik, Irina, As Putin’s popularity and the economy dip, protest pops up across Russia. Bloomberg, Aug 14, 2019.

Discussion questions

What theoretical approaches are best applied to understand the Russian opposition processes between 1991-2020?

Why did Zyuganov fail to win in 1996 and then his party agree to cooperate and be co-opt in the government?

Why did Yavlinsky and his party Yabloko never win and never cooperate with other opposition organizations?

Why did Yeltsin co-opt communists to the government in 1998-1999, was it good or bad for the country/government/opposition?

Has the official opposition been coopted in mid-2000s? Did the opposition remain a part of state system in mid and late 2010s when people’s unhappiness of living conditions became evident? Is it true that opposition is more likely to be coopted when it is strong enough to threaten the regime but too weak to take power? Is non-official opposition co-opted too and even has relations with the Kremlin?

Did opposition and the protesters have a chance to change Russia’s history in 2011-2012? Why did they miss the chance if they had any – the state was strong, no enough public support, the opposition was poor organised and managed?

What was the role of “official opposition” in 2011-2012 events?

Do you agree that the very fact of Russian opposition existence supports authoritarianism by giving the impression that the country has democracy, pluralism, and elections?

Let's play: if you were a prominent liberal opposition figure what should you do to unite opposition and come its leaders together to get at least 5 percent of Duma seats (both things did not happen and are unlikely to happen)

Does opposition represent any of social strata? Which strata's view are represented, and which ones are not?

Week 6

RUSSIAN ELITES – WHO RULES RUSSIA

During this class we will define the composition of various elite groups in Russia, their evolution and links to the respective Soviet-era groups. We will reveal different patterns of elite formation characteristic of different regimes (Yelstin -Putin-Medvedev). We will also discuss relations between "elites" and rest of the Russian society notably middle classes.

Readings:

*Iván Szelényi and Szonja Szelényi, "Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe: Introduction," in: *Theory and Society*, Vol. 24, No. 5, Oct., 1995, pp. 615-638

*Natalia Zubarevich, *Society and elites in Russian regions: post-Soviet changes*, in *SOCIAL HISTORY OF POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA*, Piotr Dutkiewicz, Vladimir Kulikov and Richard Sakwa (eds), Routledge, 2016, pp.1-27

*Leonid Grigoriev, "Elites : the choice of Modernization," in Piotr Dutkiewicz & Dmitri Trenin eds., *Russia: The Challenges of Transformation*, New York University Press, 2011, pp.191 – 225

*Gaman-Golutvina O. V. [Changes in Elites Patterns](#) // *Europe-Asia Studies*. 2009. Vol. 60. No. 6

Ilja Viktorov, *The Legacy of Tandemocracy Russia's political elite during Putin's third presidency: Interview with the sociologist Olga Kryshatanovskaya* (**note : this reading will be posted on CuLearn**)

Timothy Colton, "Leadership and the politics of modernization," in Piotr Dutkiewicz & Dmitri Trenin eds., *Russia: The Challenges of Transformation*, New York University Press, 2011, pp. 115 – 145. Optional BUT important.

Week 7

GENDER IN RUSSIAN CONTEXT – SOCIO-POLITICAL and ECONOMIC ASPECTS

This section of our seminar will provide a broad overview of gender issues in Russia. Its aim is to introduce class to the development of Russian gender order in Pre-revolutionary, Soviet and Post-Soviet periods of Russian history. We will discuss such issues as :

- Russian gender culture in historical perspective and its conceptualization (women's movements, women's issues and man's question in the 20-th century),
- contemporary gender culture (transformation of the gender arrangements during the last two decades)
- gender inequality, within the spheres of economy and employment, politics, family, sexuality and citizenship

Readings:

*Janet Elise Johnson and Aino Saarinen, "Twenty-First-Century Feminisms under Repression: Gender Regime Change and the Women's Crisis Center Movement in Russia." *Signs*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Spring 2013), pp. 543-567

* Richard Stites, *The Women's Liberation Movement in Russia*, pp. 3-37; 89-99

(optional) Elizabeth Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade: Gender Politics in Revolutionary Russia*, pp. 1-12; 68-98.

*Gal, Susan, and Gail Kligman. *The Politics of Gender after Socialism*. pp. 15-36.

F. Stella, *Lesbian Lives in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia: Post/Socialism and Gendered Sexualities*, pp. 111-160. (optional)

*Valerie Sperling, "Women's Organizations: Institutionalized Interest Groups or Vulnerable Dissidents?" in Alfred Evans, Lisa McIntosh-Sundstrom, and Laura Henry, eds., *Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment* (M.E. Sharpe, 2006), pp. 161-177.

Videos:

What Russians think of LGBT? -- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XavTuBMansA>

Russians react to LGBT flag on US Embassy -- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b7bwZ4-HIF4>

Vladimir Putin on Gay Rights in Russia | Charlie Rose Interview --

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NvTYMhbMbQ0>

Russia's anti-gay law | The Economist -- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O8P9jWcgjmA>

International Women's Day in Russia -- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WyzZnVafHuw>

Why is Russia a post-feminist country? -- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3DjBiique-A>

Week 8

RUSSIAN INCARNATION OF "THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION "

This seminar seeks to explore the milestones along the path of economic and social development in Russia in the 1991 - 2017 period. This time of transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, from socialism to capitalism, from authoritarianism to new forms of individual freedoms was, as is any turning point, brimming over with action and policies that – sometimes – had to be made overnight. It was a blur of events, from which it is not always so easy to sift out the really important moments that defined path of Russian economic transformation. During this seminar, we will attempt to draw as unbiased a picture of the economic changes, anchoring the discussion in the central theme of this section, which is how economic transformations and transition affected the social structure of society and delineated the path of current Russian economic development.

Readings:

*Massimo Florio, "Economics, Privatization in Russia and the waning of the 'Washington consensus,'" *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 9, no. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 374-415

*Myant, M. and Drahokoupil, J. (2011), *Transition Economies: Political Economy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia*, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 49-81 (Chapter 4) (R).

*Popov, V. (2007), "Shock Therapy versus Gradualism Reconsidered: Lessons from

Transition Economies after 15 Years of Reforms”, *Comparative Economic Studies* 49, pp. 1-31 (ON).
*Vadim Volkov. *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*. Cornell University Press
Chapter 5, “The Privatization of the Power Ministries,” pp. 126-154
*Sachs, Jeffrey and Woo, Wing T. (1994). “Structural factors in the Economic Reform of China, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union”. *Economic Policy*. Vol. 9, pp. 101-145 (ON).

Videos:

The Modern Economy of Russia -- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6wBvG533K8A>

Week 9

RUSSIAN REGIONS - Part 1: Politics – Economy – Society.

The goals of this class are to :

- Outline multiple ways to perceive regional complexity of Russia, countering a monolithic and unitary view of the country;
- Demonstrate how the focus of perception influences the research questions pursued;
- Emphasize questions related to populations and the representation of their political interests via institutional and non-institutional means (“Russia is not only Putin and the regime: there are people living there”);
- Explore whether it is warranted to assume a radical break/discontinuity in regional politics between the Yeltsin and Putin regime;
- Explore whether Russia’s institutional federalism should be equated with democracy/democratic procedure

Readings:

*William M. Reisinger, Ch. 1, “Studying Russia’s regions to advance comparative political science,” ed. by William M. Reisinger, *Russia’s Regions and Comparative Subnational Politics*, New York: Routledge 2013 pp. 1-24

*Cameron Ross. *Federalism and Democratization in Post-Communist Russia*. Manchester, GB: Manchester University Press, 2003. Chapter 9 “From constitutional to political asymmetry: crafting authoritarian regimes in Russia’s regions and republics,” pp. 157-171

*Daniel S. Treisman, *After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia*, 1999. Chapter 3, “Fiscal Transfers and Fiscal Appeasement,” pp. 47-80

*Hale, Henry E. 2005. "The Makeup and Breakup of Ethnofederal States: Why Russia Survives Where the USSR Fell." *Perspective on Politics* 3 (1): 55-70.

*Andreas Heinemann-Gruder, Chapter 1, “Russia’s Ethnofederalism: Under-Institutionalized, not self-sustaining” by pp. 16-54 ed. By Graeme Gill. *Politics in the Russian Regions*, Palgrave Macmillan 2007
Ora John Reuter and Graeme B. Robertson, “Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments,” *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (Oct., 2012), pp. 1023-1037

*William M. Reisinger and Bryon J. Moraski, “Deference or governance? A survival analysis of Russia’s governors under presidential control,” pp. 40-63 in ed. by William M. Reisinger, *Russia’s Regions and Comparative Subnational Politics*, New York: Routledge 2013

*Zubarevich, Natalia. *The Social History of Post-Communist Russia*, eds. Piotr Dutkiewicz and Richard Sakwa, 2016, *Post-Soviet Society and Elites in the Russian Regions*, pp. 229- 254

*Zubarevich, Natalia. "Four Russias: Human Potential and Social Differentiation of Russian Regions and Cities" pp. 67-85 in Lipman et al (eds) *Russia 2025*, Palgrave Macmillan 2013.

*Alexander Sergounin, "Russia's regionalisation: The interplay of domestic and international factors," pp. 101-119 in eds. Graeme P. Herd and Anne Aldis, *Russian Regions and Regionalism: Strength through weakness*, Routledge 2003

*Nikolay Petrov, "From a Federation of Corporations to a Federation of Regions," in Lipman et al. (eds.), *Russia 2025* 2013, pp. 181-201.

RUSSIAN REGIONS Part 2: Regional Politics – 2018 Gubernatorial Elections

We will devote last hour of this seminar to discuss gubernatorial elections of 2018 as they set up the path for the Duma elections (2022) and Presidential election (2024).

Readings:

Press, news, social media .

Week 10

Migration to Russia – Opportunities and Obstacles

During the Soviet era immigration and emigration were severely restricted. In contrast, today Russia ranks as one of the most popular destinations of migration globally. This section of the seminar will provide a broad overview of migration related themes in Russia. Its aim is to introduce the class to the development of migration to Russia and migration policies since the end of the Soviet era. We will discuss such issues as:

- The type of immigration to Russia in terms of source countries, purpose (work, education, refuge), length of stay (temporary versus permanent), migrants' characteristics (gender, age, ethnicity, religion, etc) and its evolution over time;
- The push-pull factors of migration to Russia;
- The benefits and issues related to immigration;
- Current and past policies (or lack thereof) directed at managing migration flows and integrating migrants into society; and
- The connection between migration issues and the other topics/themes discussed in this class, including regimes, ideology, power structures, gender, civil society, regionalism, and economics.

Background (optional):

- Schenk, C. (2017). Why control immigration?: strategic uses of migration management in Russia. Introduction: Russia as an immigrant magnet (p. 1 – 6).

Readings:

*Hofmann, E. T., Carboni, J. L., Mitchneck, B., & Kuznetsov, I. (2016). Policy streams and immigration to Russia: Competing and complementary interests at the federal and local levels. *International Migration*, 54(2), 34-49. doi:10.1111/imig.12227 (15 pages)

*Nikiforova, E., & Brednikova, O. (2018). On labor migration to Russia: Central asian migrants and migrant families in the matrix of russia's bordering policies. *Political Geography*, 66, 142-150. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.04.006 (8 pages)

*Riazantsev, S. V., & Pis'mennaia, E. E. (2010). The effects of foreign academic migration for russia. *Russian Education & Society*, 52(5), 55-70. doi:10.2753/RES1060-9393520505 (15 pages)

- *Reeves, M. (2015). Living from the nerves: Deportability, indeterminacy, and the 'feel of law' in migrant Moscow. *Social Analysis*, 59(4), 119-136. doi:10.3167/sa.2015.590408 (17 pages)
- Lebedeva, N., & Tatarko, A. (2013). Multiculturalism and immigration in post-soviet Russia. *European Psychologist*, 18(3), 169-178. doi:10.1027/1016-9040/a000161 (9 pages)
- *Karpova, G. G., & Vorona, M. A. (2014). Labour migration in Russia: Issues and policies. *International Social Work*, 57(5), 535-546. doi:10.1177/0020872814536420 (11 pages)
- *Balzer, H. (2010). Migration between China and Russia. *Post-Soviet affairs*.(26)1. p.1 - 37. (36 pages)

Total page count: 101 pages

Reading Details

Hofmann, E. T., Carboni, J. L., Mitchneck, B., & Kuznetsov, I. (2016). Policy streams and immigration to Russia: Competing and complementary interests at the federal and local levels. *International Migration*, 54(2), 34-49. doi:10.1111/imig.12227 (15 pages)

Topic: Regionalism

Abstract: This article uses Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework to explain forms of national- and region-level governance used in the Russian Federation to manage unprecedented levels of international immigration. First, we identify the ways that the Russian federal government has legislated and governed international migration from 1991 through 2010. We then compare the federal level to the case of the Krasnodar region, an ethnically diverse region in the North Caucasus. We find that that migration policy adoption in Russia at the federal level is relatively immune to economic trends or labour needs but more sensitive to foreign and domestic political objectives. At the regional level, local socio-political and economic concerns predominate and political objectives are secondary. Finally, we argue that migration policy changes or adopted policy at the regional level may be explained by an interaction effect between changes in political leadership, federal level policy adoption, and regional level context.

Nikiforova, E., & Brednikova, O. (2018). On labor migration to Russia: Central Asian migrants and migrant families in the matrix of Russia's bordering policies. *Political Geography*, 66, 142-150. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.04.006 (8 pages)

Topic: Migration and Family (also good brief history of migration to Russia)

Abstract: Russia is a relatively recent addition to the list of the world's top destination countries for migrants. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has seen a number of re-configurations of its relationships with the other former USSR republics. These dynamic de- and re-bordering processes have been shaped by Russia's [policy-making](#) in the field of migration, as well as changes in the character of migration itself, particularly from Central Asia. In this article, we explore the ways in which migrants from Central Asia are impacted by and negotiate this changing situation. The view of Russian society and the state of these migrants primarily as 'homo laborans'—working subjects—is not only erroneous, but creates a particular imaginary for policy-making which denies certain migrants the right to family life, often forcing [family members](#) and children to become undocumented and denying them access to state support and protection.

Riazantsev, S. V., & Pis'mennaia, E. E. (2010). The effects of foreign academic migration for Russia. *Russian Education & Society*, 52(5), 55-70. doi:10.2753/RES1060-9393520505 (15 pages)

Topic: Academic migration

Abstract: Academic migration could be important for the development of Russia, and could bring benefits that are social, political, demographic, and economic. Russian education could be improved through having a large population of foreign students, and Russian influence in the world would also increase through such a program.

Reeves, M. (2015). Living from the nerves: Deportability, indeterminacy, and the 'feel of law' in migrant moscow. *Social Analysis*, 59(4), 119-136. doi:10.3167/sa.2015.590408 (17 pages)

Topic: Bureaucracy

Abstract: While deportability has elicited interest as a legal predicament facing migrant workers, less attention has been given to the way in which this condition of temporal uncertainty shapes migrants' everyday encounters with state agents. Drawing on ethnography among Kyrgyzstani migrant workers in Moscow, I show that in conditions of documentary uncertainty 'legal residence' depends upon successfully enacting a right to the city and the personalization of the state. Alongside fear and suspicion, this space of legal uncertainty is characterized by a sense of abandon and awareness of the performativity of law. I explore 'living from the nerves' as an ethnographic reality for Kyrgyzstani migrant workers and as an analytic for developing a more variegated account of state power and its affective resonances in contemporary Russia.

Lebedeva, N., & Tatarko, A. (2013). Multiculturalism and immigration in post-soviet russia. *European Psychologist*, 18(3), 169-178. doi:10.1027/1016-9040/a000161 (9 pages)

Topic: Multiculturalism and Diversity

Abstract: This paper addresses some social and psychological issues concerning multiculturalism and immigration in post-Soviet Russia, which is one of the most multicultural societies in the world. The paper begins by describing the current cultural and immigrant diversity in Russia, and then provides a short description of Russian immigrants and the social and psychological problems that immigrants and the larger society face. We present the conceptual framework and findings from empirical studies that examine the reciprocal acculturation and intercultural relations between migrants and members of the larger society. We analyze these studies with respect to their relevance to three hypotheses that have been advanced for examining intercultural relations: the multiculturalism hypothesis; the integration hypothesis; and contact hypothesis. Findings of the studies showed that measures of security, identity, perceived threat/discrimination have a significant relationship with ethnic tolerance, mutual attitudes, acculturation strategies and expectations, and the well-being and life satisfaction of both immigrants and members of the larger society. The results of these studies support all three hypotheses in both groups. The authors concluded that the efforts to improve relations between members of the larger society and immigrants should be directed at enhancing the basic sense of security and at developing programs that increase multicultural attitudes, ethno-cultural competence, and tolerance between both groups. (9 pages)

Karpova, G. G., & Vorona, M. A. (2014). Labour migration in Russia: Issues and policies. *International Social Work*, 57(5), 535-546. doi:10.1177/0020872814536420 (11 pages)

Topic: integration

Abstract: Contemporary Russian reality is characterized by inconsistency in the official discourse regarding the problems and prospects of labour migration in Russia and the lack of a clear framework for building a network of social support for labour migrants. Research was carried out into the cultural resources for migrants provided by two types of regional social services: the territorial authorities and human rights NGOs providing social support for migrants. The authors argue that development of services requires integration mechanisms aimed at an inclusive culture for labour migrants.

Balzer, H. & Repnikova, M. (2010). Migration between China and Russia. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Volume 26, Issue 1.

Topic: Chinese migration to Russia

Abstract: Drawing on data from a year's fieldwork in Northeast China and several visits to the Russian Far East, a senior scholar and a current PhD candidate examine migration between Russia and China, focusing on the Chinese context. Does evidence support claims of large-scale legal or illegal Chinese migration to Russia since 1991? The number of Chinese working in Russia is assessed in terms of Chinese global migration, and shifting economic and demographic conditions in the two countries are considered with respect to prospects for future Chinese migration.

Other Readings (not included)

Malakhov, V. (2014). Russia as a new immigration country: Policy response and public debate. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 66(7), 1062-1079. doi:10.1080/09668136.2014.934140

Abstract: Both the Russian public and its elites were taken by surprise by the fact that Russia has become an immigration country. It has resulted in widespread anti-immigrant sentiments and inconsistency in government actions. Russian immigration politics, as well as immigration politics in liberal democracies of the West, are characterised by a waver ng between protectionist and liberal *laissez faire* approaches. This leads to a mismatch between public rhetoric and legal decisions. However, two features seem to make the Russian situation specific: open borders with most of the countries of the former Soviet Union and omnipresent corruption. Corruption results in a discrepancy between formal (legal) decisions and informal (illegal) practices.

Nasritdinov, E. (2016). 'only by learning how to live together differently can we live together at all': Readability and legibility of central asian migrants' presence in urban Russia. *Central Asian Survey*, 35(2), 257-275. doi:10.1080/02634937.2016.1153837 (18 pages)

Topic: integration

Abstract: This paper questions the effectiveness and usefulness of the Russian government's policies of migrant integration. Using a unique combination of ethnographic research methods (observations, interviews and survey) with methods from psychology (cognitive mapping) and urban studies (GIS mapping), I depict the presence of Central Asian migrants and their interaction with local long-term residents in two cities of the Russian Federation: Kazan and Saint Petersburg. On the basis of my

findings, I argue that the readability (defined as the ease with which the city can be 'read' and understood) and legibility (defined as the degree to which individual components of an urban environment are recognizable by their appearance) of urban space in Kazan have positive effects on the relationship between these two communities, while the ambiguity and uncertainty of urban identity in Saint Petersburg make the life of migrants very vulnerable and unpredictable, and result in the growth of xenophobic views among the local residents. This allows me to argue that the policy of migrant integration will be more successful if it is built on learning to live with differences, instead of trying to 'Russify' migrants or create various forms of supra-ethnic identity.

Gorenburg, D. (2013). Migration policy in Russia. *Russian Politics and Law*, 51(3), 3-5.
doi:10.2753/RUP1061-1940510300

Judah, B. (2013). Russia's migration crisis. *Survival*, 55(6), 123.

Morgunova, A. B. (2014). Labor migrants in Russia. *Sociological Research*, 53(3), 39-70.
doi:10.2753/SOR1061-0154530303

Round, J., & Kuznetsova, I. (2016). Necropolitics and the migrant as a political subject of disgust: The precarious everyday of Russia's labour migrants. *Critical Sociology*, 42(7-8), 1017.
doi:10.1177/0896920516645934

Spahn, S. (2014). Managed xenophobia: Migration and the national question in Russia. *Osteuropa*, 64(7).

Vendina, O. (2013). Migrants in Russian cities. *Russian Politics & Law*, 51(3), 48-65.
doi:10.2753/RUP1061-1940510303

Bahry, D. (2016). Opposition to immigration, economic insecurity and individual values: Evidence from Russia. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 68(5), 893-916. doi:10.1080/09668136.2016.1178710

Ivanov, S. (2012). International migration in Russia. *Problems of Economic Transition*, 55(5), 3-25.
doi:10.2753/PET1061-1991550501

Klupt, M. A. (2012). Strategic management of international labor migration in Russia: Regional aspect. *Regional Research of Russia*, 2(1), 55-59. doi:10.1134/S2079970512010042

Week 11

Ideological currents in the post-soviet Russian politics

There are roughly two types of ideological projects in the public space right now: ones that seek to imitate ideologies from the west, re-develop traditional Russian currents or amalgamate both. We will discuss: "Eurasianism", New Russian traditionalism, Russian version of liberal democracy, Russian nationalism and so called "system" approach in the process of regime's (de)legitimization.

Readings:

*A M. Kuznets (2007) Russia in Search of a National Idea, *Russian Social Science Review*, 48:3, 4-7

*Elena Chebankova (2015) Competing Ideologies of Russia's Civil Society, *Europe-Asia*

Studies, 67:2, 244-268.

* *EURASIAN INTEGRATION: THE VIEW FROM WITHIN* Edited by Piotr Dutkiewicz and Richard Sakwa (Routledge, Great Britain), 2014
EURASIANISM AS A "PHILOSOPHY OF THE NATION" by Valery Badmaev (pp.31-46)

*Clover, Charles. 1999. "Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland: The Reemergence of Geopolitics." *Foreign Affairs* 78 (2): 9-13.

*Ingram, Alan. 2001. "Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet Russia." *Political Geography* 20: 1029-1051.

*Kipp, Jacop W. 2002. "Aleksandr Dugin and the ideology of national revival: Geopolitics, Eurasianism and the conservative revolution." *European Security* 11 (3): 91-125.

*Kuzio, Taras. 2016. "Nationalism and Authoritarianism in Russia: Introduction to the Special Issue." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 49: 1-11.

*Laruelle, Marlène. 2004. "The two faces of contemporary Eurasianism: an imperial version of Russian nationalism." *Nationalities Papers* 32 (1): 115-136.

*Morozova, Natalia. 2009. "Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Russian Foreign Policy Under Putin." *Geopolitics* 14 (4): 667-686.

Shekhovtsov, Anton, and Andreas Umland. 2009. "Is Aleksandr Dugin a Traditionalist? "Neo-Eurasianism" and Perennial Philosophy." *The Russian Review* 68 (4): 662-678.

Shlapentokh, Dmitry. 2007. "Dugin Eurasianism: A Window on the Minds of the Russian Elite or an Intellectual Ploy?" *Studies in East European Thought* 59 (3): 215-236.

*Tsygankov, Anrei P. 1998. "Hard-line Eurasianism and Russia's Contending Geopolitical Perspectives." *East European Quarterly* 32 (3): 315-334.

Videos:

What It's Like to be a teenager in Putin's Russia | NYT Opinion --

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zv0s4ds2Fek>

"With the absence of values, society begins to decay" – Putin --

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q5pSe2zRaQI>

Week 12

WHAT CAN/SHALL BE DONE –"Round Table Scenarios For Russia"

What kind of policies for what kind of Russia ?

Evaluation / Presentations of the "policy papers".

In this class participants/students will present a short "policy papers" on how to improve key aspects of Russian state management, improve NGO capacity, revamp economy etc. A short guidelines on how to prepare such paper will be posted on CuLearn. Each student shall contact instructor to discuss in advance a topic and sources for this presentation/paper.

Readings:

*Roderick Lane, "The Imaginary Curtain", pp.271 -300, in: Piotr Dutkiewicz & Dmitri Trenin eds., *Russia: The Challenges of Transformation*, New York University Press, 2011 (R, EU)

* D. Trenin, "Of Power and Greatness", pp. 407 – 432, in: Piotr Dutkiewicz & Dmitri

Trenin eds., *Russia: The Challenges of Transformation*, New York University Press, 2011 (R, EU)

X. Academic Accommodations

Pregnancy

Please contact your instructor with any requests for academic accommodation during the first two weeks of class, or as soon as possible after the need for accommodation is known to exist. For more details, visit the Equity Services website: carleton.ca/equity/wp-content/uploads/Student-Guide-to-Academic-Accommodation.pdf

Religious obligation

Please contact your instructor with any requests for academic accommodation during the first two weeks of class, or as soon as possible after the need for accommodation is known to exist. For more details, visit the Equity Services website: carleton.ca/equity/wp-content/uploads/Student-Guide-to-Academic-Accommodation.pdf

Students with Disabilities

If you have a documented disability requiring academic accommodations in this course, please contact the Paul Menton Centre for Students with Disabilities (PMC) at 613-520-6608 or pmc@carleton.ca for a formal evaluation or contact your PMC coordinator to send your instructor your Letter of Accommodation at the beginning of the term. You must also contact the PMC no later than two weeks before the first in-class scheduled test or exam requiring accommodation (if applicable). After requesting accommodation from PMC, meet with your instructor as soon as possible to ensure accommodation arrangements are made.

Survivors of Sexual Violence

As a community, Carleton University is committed to maintaining a positive learning, working and living environment where sexual violence will not be tolerated, and is survivors are supported through academic accommodations as per Carleton's Sexual Violence Policy. For more information about the services available at the university and to obtain information about sexual violence and/or support, visit: carleton.ca/sexual-violence-support

Student Activities

Carleton University recognizes the substantial benefits, both to the individual student and for the university, that result from a student participating in activities beyond the classroom experience. Reasonable accommodation must be provided to students who compete or perform at the national or international level. Please contact your instructor with any requests for academic accommodation during the first two weeks of class, or as soon as possible after the need for accommodation is known to exist. <https://carleton.ca/senate/wp-content/uploads/Accommodation-for-Student-Activities-1.pdf>

For more information on academic accommodation, please contact the departmental administrator or visit: students.carleton.ca/course-outline

Plagiarism

The University Senate defines plagiarism as “presenting, whether intentional or not, the ideas, expression of ideas or work of others as one’s own.” This can include:

- reproducing or paraphrasing portions of someone else’s published or unpublished material, regardless of the source, and presenting these as one’s own without proper citation or reference to the original source;
- submitting a take-home examination, essay, laboratory report or other assignment written, in whole or in part, by someone else;
- using ideas or direct, verbatim quotations, or paraphrased material, concepts, or ideas without appropriate acknowledgment in any academic assignment;
- using another’s data or research findings;
- failing to acknowledge sources through the use of proper citations when using another’s works and/or failing to use quotation marks;
- handing in "substantially the same piece of work for academic credit more than once without prior written permission of the course instructor in which the submission occurs.

Plagiarism is a serious offence which cannot be resolved directly with the course’s instructor. The Associate Deans of the Faculty conduct a rigorous investigation, including an interview with the student, when an instructor suspects a piece of work has been plagiarized. Penalties are not trivial. They may include a mark of zero for the plagiarized work or a final grade of "F" for the course.

More information on the University’s Academic Integrity Policy can be found at:

<https://carleton.ca/registrar/academic-integrity/>

Intellectual property

Student or professor materials created for this course (including presentations and posted notes, labs, case studies, assignments and exams) remain the intellectual property of the author(s). They are intended for personal use and may not be reproduced or redistributed without prior written consent of the author(s).