“On the doxastic theory of perception, all perceptual states are at least partly constituted by a kind of belief or judgment. Multiple theorists have recently defended this view. I draw on a view I defend elsewhere, the revisability view of belief, to construct an argument against the doxastic theory of perception. On the revisability view of belief, all beliefs are necessarily capable of being revised in response to relevant counter-evidence. I draw on empirical evidence to further argue that at least some perceptual states lack this capacity. Together, these results force the doxastic theorist to the view that perceptual states themselves are not revisable in response to counter-evidence, even though they each possess as an essential component a state that is so revisable. I argue that this position is not ultimately tenable, for the reason that it either jeopardizes the view that belief is an essential component of perception or else jeopardizes the view that belief is necessarily revisable.

Friday, September 27, 2019
1201 Richcraft Hall
1:00 P.M.

Everyone welcome!