


Keywords
on
**Forced Migration
and
Refugee Studies**



Edited by
Paula Banerjee, Priya Singh & Nasreen Chowdhory



Published by:

Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group
IA-48, Sector-III, Ground Floor
Salt Lake City
Kolkata-700097, India

Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group



In Collaboration with
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung



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This book has been published in collaboration with Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung-South Asia.

This publication is brought out with the support of the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. It is a part of the research programme of the Calcutta Research Group on migration and forced migration. It is conducted in collaboration with Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, Institute of Human Science, Vienna, and Several Universities and Institution in India.

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Sponsored by the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung with funds of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of the Federal Republic of Germany. This publication or parts of it can be used by others for free as long as they provide a proper reference to the original publication. The content of the publication is the sole responsibility of the partner and does not necessarily reflect a position of RLS.

Keywords on Forced Migration and Refugee Studies

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To
Ranabir Samaddar
A Pioneer of Forced Migration Studies in South Asia

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Editors Note

The handbook aims at a compilation and brief explication of key terms used in the multidisciplinary field of refugee and forced migration studies. There have been significant debates, contributions, and interpretations in recent years which have reshaped the way academia analyses and maps refugee and migration studies, at the same time, expanding its scope. Research on refugees and forced migrants has had a long history cutting across disciplines, exploring multiple dynamics such as forced and voluntary movements, displacement and dispossession, heterogeneity and agency of forced migrants, human rights, humanitarianism and protection and practice and policy. In addition, academics, policy makers and practitioners are contending with the diverse challenges posed by a global pandemic as it permeates the refugee and migrant space exacerbating the precarious state of public health, particularly in the global south with far reaching consequences.

At this critical juncture/crossroads , migrant and refugee studies as a field of enquiry is rapidly expanding and diversifying, concomitantly, its terminology is constantly evolving to keep pace with the burgeoning discipline, which found its moorings as a separate entity in the early 1980s. With the development of refugee and forced migration studies, academic research as well as advocacy in terms of the rights of migrants and refugees have acquired a global reach which in turn has induced the emergence of a rapidly growing literature focused on the same, including handbooks devoted to the study of refugees and forced migrants from an interdisciplinary perspective. In comparison, the vocabulary or terminology of refugee and forced migration studies, which has amplified by leaps and bounds in scope and importance, has not yet found a separate, focused and comprehensive compendium dedicated to itself. The Handbook of keywords on Refugee and Forced Migration intends to fill this lacunae/void. The arrangement of keywords are in alphabetical order. The definition/explanations are within the range of 200 to 2000 words.

Last but not least, the conceptualisation of this volume would not have been possible without the guidance of Ranabir Samaddar. His scholarship and encouragement always inspires us to take up new challenges.

Acknowledgements

This project would not have been possible without the collaboration and support of many people and institutions. We would like to thank all the contributors who provided us with the keywords amidst multiple demands on their time. We thank them for their contribution to this compendium as well as their continued dedication to scholarship and advocacy.

We would like to acknowledge the support of Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung-South Asia (RLS), in particular the resident representative Nadja Dorschner, for collaborating with CRG for this project. We owe a special thanks to Pragya Khanna from RLS for her suggestions and support to this initiative, as well as Neha Naqvi and Jitendra Kumar of RLS for their continuous cooperation.

The volume would not have been possible without the help of the team at CRG. We gratefully acknowledge the support extended by Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury for being there for us at all times even while navigating multiple administrative and leadership roles. We are thankful to Subhashree Rout, Samaresh Guchhait, Partha Pratim Sarkar, Shatabdi Das, Rituparna Datta, Debashree Chakraborty, Imran Philip, Kaveri and Debashree Sarkar for their help and support. We are thankful to Sohini Sengupta for her assistance in copy-editing the compendium. We would like to acknowledge the members of the CRG Governing body for their continued support of the endeavour, especially, Shyamalendu Majumdar, Byasdeb Dasgupta, Arup Kumar Sen, Mouleshri Vyas and Samata Biswas.

We are so grateful for the presence of Ranabir Samaddar in our midst. He is a constant source of encouragement to excel and never to cut corners. He leads by his own example. We are particularly happy that a scholar of his stature penned the introduction to this handbook.

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Introduction

Introduction

Uncertain Location makes Keywords in Refugee and Migration Studies

I

Keywords in refugee and migration studies tell us of the broader dynamics of social, economic, political, and legal marginalization of groups of populations and maintenance of the conditions of these ever-continuing marginalities. Spatial-territorial marginalisation with consequences for human life tells us further of the grey and at times black areas of the global time. The situation has produced words that have significance as contested meanings. They indicate a network of significations, and the invisible, but real social relations of power, exploitation, and precarious mode of life. Some words are keys to this larger understanding because their birth carries stories of contests. These words carry such stories of lives beyond words. Words can be only gestures towards those lives and that is why words become keys to that larger world. Indeed, experiences tell us of words as powerful gestures. Yet, it is important to remember, as much as the hidden realities produce words, words too, in turn, produce new contests. Scholars have shown how these keywords are subjects of this double play of reality and the active life of words.

Still, the question remains: How do some words initially appearing minor to our general understanding become key to understanding the marginalities? Else, belonging to mainstream language, these words would have remained banal, vacuous, telling nothing of the hidden or partially closed from our gaze, the world of domination, contests, and struggles. Scholars point out the significance of the “minor” position of certain words that transform as keywords – words crucial to a greater understanding. “... our definition of ‘minor keywords’ entails taking migration as analytics that might be deployed to introduce some minor but nonetheless disruptive or even subversive uses within the established and taken-for granted lexicon of political theory, unsettling its internal hierarchies and destabilizing its regime of truth. Ultimately, it is indubitably the disruptive and incorrigible force of migrants themselves within the wider socio-political field, and the larger social formations of migration as such, that unsettle the ossified discourses of power...,” write Nicholas de Genova and Martina Tazzioli.¹ They are minor words in the mainstream of a language, yet because they occupy a

minor position in language and communication, they acquire a disruptive capacity in relation to our received understanding. Their meanings are open, they have not been standardised; they remain minor words of life. Leading a group of 22 scholars engaged in critical studies on refugees and migrants, working out the meanings of 11 (of them a few with analogous terms) words, the editors explain the reason and dynamics of this collective effort. Clearly, this effort is remarkable, and for this, critical academics in migration and refugee studies will be grateful to this group of twenty-two scholars.

Intriguingly, however, they never say that without the collective effort this collection of minor keywords would not have been possible. There is one more thing: In quizzing political theory, Nicholas de Genova, Martina Tazzioli and their team adopt migration as a critical standpoint. This is an instructive mode, though it leaves the possibility unaddressed by them, namely that governments across the world, especially in the North, are attempting to normalise “migration” by flexible control and management strategies. As a result, words are being incorporated in the governmental language of managing population flows. Hence, even in the lexicon of refugee and migration studies, we need to locate the contested milieus, locations, and meanings. Few words are purely insurgent. Even the most disruptive word, “revolution” is now deployed to describe “orange revolution” or “lipstick revolution.” “Border” would be one such contested word. We shall come to this word later in the concluding part of this note. Suffice it to point out now the contests around that word. Belonging to mainstream history of state making and part of the infamous history of colonial statecraft – think of Lord Curzon’s use of the term “frontier,” border has produced borderlands. Etienne Balibar has spoken of Europe as borderland.² Willem van Schendel has shown, people in border areas in the east and northeast of South Asia use the bordering space on either side to live, labour, trade, and survive.³ Indeed, histories of friendship and enmity have given birth to anti-immigrant words as well as words of accommodative gestures – used by governments to specific purposes. At times, the same word can carry double meanings.

Hence, three points:

- (a) Precisely because these words are minor, they require patient digging into their histories, erasures, and, paradoxically, their status as “live words.” They are cartridges long thought to be dead, rain soaked, old, but live as soon as they are loaded;

- (b) Keywords in refugee and migration studies are contested in every sense of this meaning; hence they call for plurality of approach, collection, and configuration;
- (c) Finally, turning “minor” meanings into interrogative gestures towards larger significations requires collective effort, because language is a collective enterprise, but with a specific formation marked with irremediable fault lines. These fault lines should have prevented a language from becoming a common, yet these cannot. This double nature of the minor words speaks of the duality of keywords.

II

Keywords in migration and refugee studies are bound to remain mostly minor because the reality that produces these words – globally, nationally, regionally, and locally – is marginal to mainstream governance. To the extent they disturb the settled schema of rule, they figure in the grammar of governance. Thus, statelessness is a matter of concern because it questions the given history of citizenship. Similarly, confinement and camp are constant reminders of the always incomplete reality of freedom of movement. How do we capture this displaced world of liberal values and freedoms? Keywords in refugee and migration studies provide us with one way to capture the displaced world. Yet this purpose will be inadequately achieved unless we accept location as a prime element in our search for keywords. The postcolonial reality along with the reality of the South within the North is the irreducible backdrop of the search. All these call for collaboration of critical scholars, jurists, and activists in defence of human rights and justice as an essential part of a relevant plan to prepare a text of keywords. Locations and experiences suggest words that will be destined to remain as minor in a global framework. Yet, say, how can we leave out a word like “partition” or “statelessness” or “boat people” from any global collection of keywords? *Keyword* as a mode of thinking is of general significance, while as a compendium of experiences it will be deeply experiential and hence, specific. Such a compendium will be a collection of specifics – yet producing a universal. This is what philosophers call the production of *concrete universal*.

I still remember how nearly a decade back the UNHCR’s (its Delhi office) eyebrows were raised when they found that the discussions and studies of statelessness in South Asia were made in the context of citizenship practices. The “Geneva-based wisdom” of law faced

postcolonial realities. Their preferred view was that statelessness had a clear (in other words positive) definition given the UN Convention relating the Status of Stateless Persons (1954) and the subsequent Convention on Reduction of Statelessness (1961). In other words, statelessness could be and should be defined by a set of criteria, and not as an absence or *lack* of citizenship. Citizenship was the holy cow and how it could be “denigrated” as an institution? Yet the fact remains, namely, that citizenship as an institution only “incompletes” itself; and statelessness is the name of a lack, an incompleteness. Statelessness is the name of a condition which functions as a permanent critique of citizenship. To the constitutionalists and policy framers, citizen is the principal figure and citizenship the principal institution of polity and politics. Even though the UNHCR has had a mandate for stateless persons ever since the Office was established in 1950, yet it originally extended only to stateless persons who were refugees. So, refugees having no nationality were *de jure* stateless, whereas refugees with nationality were *de facto* stateless. But soon the UNHCR realised that while the vast number of refugees could be stateless, many stateless persons were not legally considered as refugees. The blocked situation led in 1974 to an expansion of UNHCR’s mandate on stateless persons in general. But we know that with all these, the Convention itself did not define the term stateless. In other words, what happens to persons lacking an effective nationality, or whose citizenship status is increasingly hollowed out? Both 1954 and 1961 Conventions are largely powerless to address the rightlessness of these individuals. They are legally binding with respect to *de jure* statelessness only. All that the 1954 Convention says is that a stateless person is one not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law. Statelessness is an aberration, *another* condition, while statelessness in actual politics functions as a permanent critique of the liberal notion of nation state and citizenship as its main institution. Thus, the word statelessness carries within it histories of deprivation, conditions of rightlessness produced by multiple factors that exhaust the meaning of citizenship, and flights, escapes, and struggles for dignity.

This is the role of a subjugated word which questions, critiques, disrupts the accepted meaning of a mainstream word. It carries what Michel Foucault called “subjugated knowledge” or we may say here, “subjugated histories.”⁴

Subjugated knowledge or histories indeed confirm what Raymond Williams wrote in the introduction to his famous *Keywords* (1976), “the fact is, they just don’t speak the same

language”.⁵ Williams continued, “When we come to say ‘we just don’t speak the same language’ we mean something more general: that we have different immediate values or different kinds of valuation, or that we are aware, often intangibly, of different formations and distributions of energy and interest. In such a case, each group is speaking its native language, but its uses are significantly different, and especially when strong feelings or important ideas are in question. No single group is ‘wrong’ by any linguistic criterion, though a temporarily dominant group may try to enforce its own uses as ‘correct.’ What is really happening through these critical encounters, which may be very conscious or may be felt only as a certain strangeness and unease, is a process quite central in the development of a language when, in certain words, tones and rhythms, meanings are offered, *felt* for, tested, confirmed, asserted, qualified, *changed*. In some situations, this is a very slow process indeed; it needs the passage of centuries to show itself actively, by results, at anything like its full weight. In other situations, the process can be rapid...”

As an instance, Williams pitchforked the word “culture” and savaged the word to show that words are not innocent.

But I found myself preoccupied by a single word, *culture*, I had heard it previously in two senses: one at the fringes, in teashops and places like that, where it seemed the preferred word for a kind of social superiority, not in ideas or learning, and not only in money, or position, but in a more intangible area, relating to behaviour; yet also, secondly, among my own friends, where it was an active word for writing poems and novels, making films and paintings, working in theatres. What I was now hearing were two different senses, which I could not really get clear: first, in the study of literature, a use of the word to indicate, powerfully but not explicitly, some central formation of values (and *literature* itself had the same kind of emphasis); secondly, in more general discussion, but with what seemed to me very different implications, a use which made it almost equivalent to *society*: a particular *way of life* - ‘American culture’, ‘Japanese culture’.⁶

Williams here was not merely alluding to words as carriers of multiple meanings and contexts. Words are contributing to “some central formation of values,” and as the next step they are effacing the value question to become “equivalent to society.” Keyword, in William’s case *culture*, is an instance of “we just don’t speak the same” language. *Culture* is thus a keyword. Yet from William’s *Keywords* we get something equally significant as lesson. His introduction narrates the long gestation period of the book, his drawing from endless engagements with the vocabulary. Vocabulary is not individually owned; it is no vocabulary if not shared by a group or the society at large. It has the nature of commons, yet contested at every turn. Williams wrote, “I found that the connections I was making, and the area of concern which I was attempting to describe, were in practice experienced and shared by many other people...”

One central feature of this area of interest was its vocabulary, which is significantly not the specialized vocabulary of a specialized discipline, though it often overlaps with several of these, but a general vocabulary ranging from strong, difficult, and persuasive words in everyday usage to words which, beginning in particular specialized contexts, have become quite common in descriptions of wider areas of thought and experience. This, significantly, is the vocabulary we share with others, often imperfectly, when we wish to discuss many of the central processes of our common life.”⁷ Meanings are more than significations. Hence, Williams adopted a cluster approach to show the network of meanings and the affiliation of words. He, as we know, put out these groups at the outset of his book. I believe *Keywords* brings out the collective nature of the enterprise. With humility, Williams, in the last paragraph of his introduction to the 1983 edition of *Keywords* acknowledges the contribution of others in making clear to him the manifold significance of several specific words. Yet, remarkably, Raymond Williams is like a lone scientist examining with a microscope the material – the words. Words are the object.

But what happens when you invest these words with life and activity? You cannot but realise that the power of these words draws from their collective body made of flesh, blood, bones, muscles, etc. – words as collective and each word as a collective - and hence, you, as a scientist, must work in a group, a team, to check the histories of the parts that have gone into making this body, *word as live entity*. Williams admitted that his selection was arbitrary, which is natural and understandable given the herculean task he had taken for himself. But some omissions may be costly – in some cases judged by generations later. New concerns produce new keywords. The immediate years of post WWII led Raymond Williams to thinking of the word culture, which, as he said, had been invested with radically new meanings by the sociology of Karl Mannheim and “increased American influence.” Today, as Nicholas De Genova, Sandro Mezzadra and John Pickles leading a group of 17 scholars point out, it is inconceivable that any compendium of keywords will leave out words like “border” or “migration” or “immigration”. In their words,

It is remarkable that Raymond Williams, in his landmark work, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (1976), has no entry for either “Migration”/ “Immigration” or “Borders.” Likewise, in the much more recent compilation on *New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (2005), edited by Tony Bennett, Lawrence Grossberg, and Meaghan Morris, “border” and “migration” seem to have once again eluded scrutiny. In their Introduction, Bennett, Grossberg, and Morris (2005, p. xxiii) indicate that they had planned to include an entry on “boundaries”, but this did not happen. This is a pity, because boundary and border are words that perfectly meet the two basic criteria mentioned by

Raymond Williams (1985, p.15) thirty years earlier: “they are significant, binding words in certain activities and their interpretation; they are significant, indicative words in certain forms of thought.”... Hence, the absence of the keywords that we propose here was equally a result of the fact that borders and migration had not yet fully emerged as a problem-space for cultural studies.⁸

The approach of Nicholas De Genova, Sandro Mezzadra and John Pickles and their team is thematic. They focus on migration, knowledge, and politics; militant investigation and thus counter-mapping; border spectacle and border regime; politics of protection; externalization; migrant labour; differential inclusion/exclusion; migrant struggles and subjectivity; and hence migrant space/times. And, significantly, they pose the issue of collective endeavour in preparing their work on new keywords with these words,

As militant researchers who are engaged with one or more migrant movements, we have also elected to compose this essay as a collective experiment, drawing on the collaborative writing of 17 activist scholars working on migration and border studies... Writing this paper has thus been a collaborative effort, what we may describe as a fascinating and mad experiment in writing collectively... Central to this endeavour is the need to be sensitive to the “geographies” of the keywords that we develop.

The question of geography is of central importance to decipher the configuration of the problematics of migration. By the same token, any mapping exercise of the issues of migration cannot begin without reckoning with the geographies of migration. More therefore, we need a new kind of collaboration to bring out the postcolonial nature of the keywords in refugee and migration studies. Trafficking, statelessness, walls and fences, camps, specific forms of labour, integration, acculturation, register of citizenship, policing, crime world, Pacific Solution, Fortress Europe – name any word or phrase springing out of our police planet, you will see postcolonial marks on their origin and present currency. The specific geographical realities compel collaborative exercises as much as resistance networks inspire collective work of mapping crucial words and concepts operating in this field.

III

To conclude: Words relating to refugees and migrants operate in a network of contentious meanings and thus some of these words become key to our understanding of the field.

Take the instance of the word, *border* to which we have already referred. Its association in history is manifold and varied, and hence its meaning is contentious. Now the formal meaning of border is, “side, edge, boundary or part of it.” It denotes the edge around a thing. In its widespread prevalent meaning, it is a cartographic institution of demarcation,

identification, enclosure, delimitation, and protection. Therefore, border relates to the concept of boundary. It is also connected with another word in the same family of meanings, namely, frontier. Yet, border and its associated sense of a boundary making exercise goes beyond marking a territory. It is present in all aspects of our social life – gender, family, landed property, caste, race, ideas, everything. It figures as a commonplace in social understanding and is an analytic tool to make sense of the social world. It also shows how territory and its associated institutions work together as an assemblage of power. In this way, while we traditionally think of borders as inscribed onto maps in which discrete territories are separated by lines and colours, this imagination is never clean and without complications. This is because, borders also denote passages - of people, information, money, commodities, and cultural and social artefacts. In short, a border indicates *crossing, passing* – to be allowed or disallowed. Borders and border crossing are inseparable twins. Crossing indicates mobility, yet mobility is achieved only by crossing a hurdle, a preventing institution. In this way, mobility is translated into acts of migrating across borders. Also, to note in this connection is the fact that the relation between the two concepts – border and crossing – points to a third notion. The notion is of citizenship. Border safeguards citizenship, crossing of borders by aliens endangers it. In the beginning, we associated citizenship with rights and sovereignty of the people. Today it is a mark of identity. What will then happen to those who achieved mobility by crossing the hurdle? Will they have no identity? Thus, there are various qualifications to this situation, such as a refugee’s claim to asylum, or dual citizenship, agreement on free movement, etc. Yet the stateless, the refugees, and millions of illegal labouring immigrants who have crossed the border are what Hannah Arendt famously called those who do not have the right to have rights. Moreover, borders and mobility will produce the “borderlands.” As the usage of the term indicates, a border zone is one where different sets of people come into contact, trade, etc. Some say, people of borderlands are the “nowhere” people. Some say they are simply illegal migrants. In this way, border and its associated terms indicate graded territoriality and graded assemblages of power which are built on settlements, mobility, life, economy, and apparatuses of rule. In short, border does not mean a seamless space within the bordered space separating it from another seamless space outside. It is a contentious term congealed in the opposite act of crossing. Think of the way Lord Curzon spoke of *frontier* as a reality to be managed in order to impart stability to

colonial governance.⁹ Frontier, an inherently unruly situation is to be governed. On the other hand, when you read Mahnaz Ispahani's *Roads and Rivals*, the same frontier becomes the battle ground of rivalry, migration, and new openings.¹⁰ You speak to a critical scholar of Africa; you will hear a different story of state making and nation making in sub-Saharan Africa following the border making and boundary delimitation policies by European colonial powers in 1884 following the Berlin Congress. You may also think of borders as symbolising women's lives, real lives of women in the borderlands.¹¹ You mention the phrase "migrant crisis" to a refugee and migration studies scholar in Europe, in all possibility s/he will refer to the European migration crisis of 2015, when thousands upon thousands of refugees arrived in Europe from the East fleeing wars in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. You mention the phrase "migrant crisis" to any lay reader of newspapers or viewer of television in India, s/he will take you as referring to the return of millions of labour migrants in India caught in the countrywide lockdown as Covid-19 crisis set in in 2020 and trying to walk hundreds of miles to return with many dying on the road. Two different milieus, two different invocations.

In short, significations and meanings of a single word can be manifold. This is the reason we require collaboration to bring out the full range of the history and currency of a word.

B.S. Chimni, the noted refugee studies scholar, pointed out nearly fifteen years ago that the shift in currency of the word "refugee studies" to "forced migration studies" was not an innocent one – as if a whole new field was being discovered. The shift represented new imperatives of global governance. He wrote,

The move from Refugee Studies to Forced Migration Studies takes place within an imperial global order in which hegemonic states seek to use the ideas and practices of humanitarianism to advance parochial goals. The critique here is not of Forced Migration Studies per se but the shape it has assumed and the way the ideology and practices of "humanitarianism" are being deployed. On the other hand, there is no alternative to recognizing the existential realities of displacement, for legal categories cannot be the ultimate arbiters of social realities: the translation of knowledge into legal categories is always implicated in power. But if it is not to be left to states and international organizations to shape Forced Migration Studies, there is a need to be self-conscious about the intimate relationship between knowledge and power... As for Refugee Studies, it must be remembered that even when restrictive measures of Western states are criticized, what are validated are often particular philosophical and political ideas about what kind of boundaries western states may legislate (Gibney 2004). Invariably methodological nationalism carries the day, even when the turn to Forced Migration Studies is legitimized based on growing global democratic space. The world of displacement has thus become a site of power to embed selective humanitarian practices that facilitate the exercise of hegemon.¹²

A shift is happening again. New words are being added to the vocabulary. Thus, the word *solidarity*, a word just like *border*, betokens a swamping of the boundary between refugee studies and forced migration studies. A long-forgotten word like “*girmitya*” or a recurring word like *partition* tells us of other histories and geographies of forced migration that will probably not be included in a compendium planned or envisioned by mainstream Northern scholarship. These are keywords because they point to the violent nature of the origin of the modern migration process and – its colonial and postcolonial nature. In the same way, *solidarity* gestures towards processes that place human migration on a scale that is delinked or at least clearly separate from the theory of sovereignty. The scale may be local, international, regional, or national. On the question of scale, one scholar has pointed out, “Around the world, different labels are used to describe urban solidarity policies and practices: the term ‘sanctuary’ is popular in Canada, the USA, and the UK. In other countries, a range of labels are used, such as ‘refuge’ city and ‘solidarity’ city. It may be tempting to associate labels such as ‘solidarity city’ with bottom-up activism and ‘sanctuary city’ with managed top-down policies initiated by mayors and city councils. However, a common feature of the urban policies and practices to protect illegalized and other vulnerable migrants and refugees is that they blend bottom-up and top-down approaches. Adding to the complexity is that such urban policies and practices may not only focus exclusively on illegalized inhabitants but also on other issues, such as resettling refugees, and on helping vulnerable non-migrant populations, such as the homeless or persons without access to health care.”¹³

Words are thus vacillating in meaning, hence the need to capture words in motion, these meanings in motion.¹⁴ Therefore, we need cameras all around. Far off traces suddenly come alive and become vivid, like the word *camp* in India, when suddenly, in the wake of the citizenship registration drive a few years back, many were put in camps which functioned as prisons. Before that, people used to hear of shelter camps, food distribution camps, army camps, and now suddenly they hear about camps for those whose status has been declared as alien.

In words, thus, we find the images of our own histories. These histories now reappear before us as independent objects of society, objectified as *words*.

[I am grateful to Sandro Mezzadra for letting me access to the two articles mentioned in n1 and n 8. Paolo Novak reminded me of the continuing significance of the writings by Lord Curzon and Mahnaz Ispahani's authored respectively at the beginning of the last century and towards its end. I gained also from the discussion at the Calcutta Research Group on its initiative to create a postcolonial compendium of keywords in refugee and migration studies; thanks, in particular to Paula Banerjee and Samir Kr. Das. A shorter version of this note will appear in Migration Review.]

Notes

¹N. de Genova and Martina Tazzioli (eds.), "Minor Keywords of Political Theory: Migration as a Critical Standpoint -A Collaborative project of Collective Writing", *Politics and Space* (pp. 1-95), 2021, p. 3 - <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2399654420988563> (accessed on 2 February 2023)

² Etienne Balibar, "Borders of Europe" in Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene*, reprint, Verso, 2012, chapter 5, pp. 87-105; also see Etienne Balibar, "Europe as Borderland", The Alexander von Humboldt Lecture in Human Geography, University of Nijmegen, 10 November 2004

³ Willem van Schendel, *The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia* (London: Anthem Press, 2004)

⁴See Michel Foucault in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, p. 51 - <https://irispublishers.com/gifsm/fulltext/the-undercommons-and-subjugated-knowledge-the-powers-of-non-state-practices-that-decolonize-knowledge.ID.000509.php> (accessed on 8 February 2023)

⁵ Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (revised edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 10

⁶*Ibid*, p. 12

⁷*Ibid*, p. 14

⁸Nicholas De Genova, Sandro Mezzadra and John Pickles (eds.), "New Keywords: Migration and Borders", *Cultural Studies*, Volume 29, no. 1, 2015, pp. 55-87

⁹ George Nathaniel Curzon, *Frontiers, The Romanes Lecture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908)

¹⁰ Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989)

¹¹ Paula Banerjee, *Borders, Histories, Existences: Gender and Beyond* (New Delhi: Sage, 2010)

¹² B.S. Chimni, "The Birth of a 'Discipline': From Refugee to Forced Migration Studies", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Volume 22, No. 1, 2009, (pp. 11-29), p. 24

¹³ Harold Bauder, *From Sovereignty to Solidarity: Rethinking Human Migration* (New York: Routledge, 2022), p. 91

¹⁴ Classic again is the way Raymond Williams annotated with more than one entry the word "humanity" belonging "to a complex group of words, including human, humane, humanism, humanist, humanitarian". - *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, op. cit., pp. 148-151

Keywords on Forced Migration and Refugee Studies

A

Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act 1949

The Partition of British India into the sovereign territories of India and Pakistan was accompanied by widespread violence—much of which was on women. Thousands of women were murdered, abused, raped and abducted, forcibly converted, often separated from their families and, at other times, killed by their own families/ communities. The Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act 1949 was created under the assumption that any conversion (of women) taking place after 1947 was forced conversion, and any such woman would be recovered and rehabilitated according to their respective religions, that is, a Hindu or Sikh woman, unaccompanied by her family, and converted into Islam in Pakistan, would be repatriated to India. Mixed marriages of Hindu or Sikh women to Muslim men would be treated as forced unions, the women ‘recovered’ and returned to their families. An abducted person was by definition a male child under the age of 16 or a female of any age, who had become separated from her family at any time between March 1, 1947 and January 1, 1949. By the time the act was repealed in 1957, 20,000 women were claimed to have been recovered by activists and police on both sides of the border in the west. This act and subsequent action placed women’s agency, citizenship and subjectivity in a nexus, in which their citizenship was determined by the citizenship of their father and husband, the naturalness of their religion vis a vis that of the state they are in, and never on the basis of their desire and agency. This Act was not implemented in eastern India, and in fact faced steep opposition from women activists there.

SB

Source

Mehra, Manan. 2020 . “An Overactive State: The Case of Abducted Women at Partition.” February 13, 2020. <https://cip.org.in/an-overactive-state-the-case-of-abducted-women-at-partition/>

Sengupta, Anwesha. 2012. “Looking Back at Partition and Women: A Factsheet.” *Peace Prints: South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*, 4, no. 1.

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Abu Dhabi Dialogue

The Abu Dhabi Dialogue was established in 2008 as a means of building trust and increasing cooperation among Asian countries of origin and destination on issues relating to labour migration governance. The Member States of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue are Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam. Regular observers include IOM, ILO, OECD, UN Women, the private sector and civil society representatives. The current Chair-in-Office, since October 2021, is the Government of Pakistan, and the permanent secretariat is provided by the Government of the United Arab Emirates.

As a state-led Regional Consultative Process, the ADD aims to enable safe, orderly and regular migration in some of the world's largest temporary labour migration corridors. Through multilateral dialogue and cooperation on the joint-development of labour mobility-related programming, implementation and reporting, the ADD helps to ensure that Member States develop partnerships for adopting best practices, and are in a position to learn from one another's experience.

ADD has three stated principles known as the three pillars of effective governance guide that identify the thematic priorities and the design of programmes that are initiated ADD.

These include:

- Ensuring the protection of migrant workers, empowering migrant workers to fulfil their goals and aspirations and affording migrant workers the opportunity to benefit from the outcomes of temporary labour migration;
- Responding to the changing needs of both businesses and workers, with particular attention to the requirements of women migrant workers;
- Supporting labour market institutions in the enhancement of the efficacy of their labour migration policies, including those relating to fair recruitment, skills development and recognition, the provision of information and orientation, and access to justice

These principles are meant to facilitate safe, orderly and regular temporary labour migration. The ADD although predating the GCM, sites Article 50 of the GCM, which invites

Regional Consultative Processes to review the implementation of the Global Compact with the respective regions, beginning in 2020, alternating with discussions at a global level at a four-year interval, in order to effectively inform each edition of the International Migration Review Forum, with the participation of all relevant stakeholders, as the basis for its continuum.

SS

Source

“Submission to the International Migration Review Forum May 2022.” Abu Dhabi Dialogue.<https://migrationnetwork.un.org/system/files/docs/Abu%20Dhabi%20Dialogue%20-%20GCM%20Report%20FINAL.PDF>

Asylum Seeker

An individual who is seeking international protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted the request for asylum. Not every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every recognized refugee is initially an asylum seeker. A person becomes an asylum seeker by making a formal application for the right to remain in another country and keeps that status until the application has been concluded. The relevant immigration authorities of the country of asylum determine whether the asylum seeker will be granted protection and becomes an officially recognized refugee or whether asylum will be refused. Often, asylum seekers are confused with illegal immigrants. An asylum seeker can become an illegal immigrant if their asylum claims are denied. Asylum seekers are largely forced migrants who have been driven out of their country. In North American English, the term *asylee* is also used. An *asylee* can either be an asylum seeker, as defined above, or a person whose claim for asylum was accepted and asylum was granted.

The 1951 Refugee Convention binds its signatories to the obligation to grant asylum to people who fall within the definition of the Convention and Protocol. Asylum seekers who do not fall within this definition may still be granted complementary forms of protection if they fall within other refugee definitions, such as those given in the OAU Convention of 1969 or the Cartagena Convention of 1984. Whilst waiting for a decision, asylum seekers have limited rights in the country of asylum. In most countries, they are not allowed to work

or seek any employment. In countries that are not signatories to the 1951 Convention, forced migrants can seek asylum under the UNHCR mandate. If granted refugee status, they are known as mandate refugees.

Every year, around one million people seek asylum. National asylum systems are in place to determine who qualifies for international protection. However, during mass movements of refugees, usually because of conflict or violence, it is not always possible or necessary to conduct individual interviews with every asylum seeker who crosses a border. These groups are often called 'prima facie' refugees. (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Master Glossary of Terms,2006). This is done in situations when the reasons for seeking asylum are generally well known and individual assessment would otherwise overwhelm the capacities of those determining the status of asylum. Group determination is more readily done in states that not only have accepted the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention, but also use a refugee definition that includes people fleeing indiscriminate or generalized violence, which may not be covered in the 1951 Convention.

PB

Source

"Asylum Seeker". (2006). *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Master Glossary of Terms*, June 2006. <https://www.unhcr.org/glossary/#asylum-seeker>

B

Bangia(Assamese/Asamiya term)

The Assamese middle class's perception of the Muslim peasantry's obscene language, Bangia, as the 'devil's tongue,' contributed gasoline to the anti-foreigner, anti-Bengali, and anti-Sylheti wave (Dass, 1980; Tunga, 1995; Deka, 1995; Goswami, 1997). Bengali Muslims took over Assam's agriculture while Bengali Hindus dominated the administration roles. The Assamese leadership took keen note of the circumstances. It outlined two goals that it intended to work toward in the future. First, to protect Assam from the ongoing Muslim immigration, and second, to 'remove the Bengali-speaking regions of Sylhet and Cachar from the administrative unit of Assam in order to liberate government offices from the grip of the Bengali Hindu employees' (Dass, 1980; Barpujari 1999; 2004a; 2004b). For instance, the Asamiya Deka Dal outlined a comprehensive plan to preserve the Assamese-speaking race in a memo to Nehru in 1937. In addition, it called for the following: (i) the transfer of Sylhet to Bengal; (ii) a 20-year ban on all Bengali immigration to the Brahmaputra Valley; and (iii) strict naturalisation regulations for local Bengali immigrants.

In the years that followed partition, particularly in light of the census results of 1951, the Assamese leadership's attitude toward Muslim immigrants temporarily changed, 'whereas the influx of Hindu Bengali refugees remained a cause of concern for the Assamese leadership' (Barpujari (ed.). 1999; 2004a; 2004b). Since the turn of the century, Assam's politics have focused heavily on the issue of immigration, which was fostered by the colonial state and a sizable portion of the Assamese-speaking gentry until the early nineteenth century (Guha 1977; Kar 1990; Barpujari (ed.). 1999; 2004a; 2004b). The Ahom consciousness that envisioned a pan-ahomization of Assam continued to pinch the Bangla/Bangia speaking Surma-Barak Valley.

ASC

Source

Barpujari, H.K. (ed.). 1999. *Political History of Assam, Volume I*. Guwahati: Publication Board Assam.

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Beh Dkhar (Khasi term)

Hindu Bengalis from East Bengal and the Sylhet District (now in Bangladesh) moved in large numbers to Shillong, Meghalaya, as a result of the Partition (India). The Assam government provided new homes for the Bengali Hindu refugees in Shillong's Them Rynjah (R.R Colony) and other neighbourhoods. Around this time, people moved there from all over Nepal and India, including Punjabis, Marwaris, and Biharis. The native Khasi tribes started to accuse the Dkhars of being to blame for their rising unemployment, poverty, and the taking of 'tribal lands.' The growing hostility was frequently directed at Bengalis. *Beh Dkhar*, which means 'chase the Dkhars away,' was the catchphrase of the ethnocentric Khasi organisations Khasi Students Union and Hynniewtre National Liberation Council against the non-tribal migrants of the state in 1979, at the height of Assam's anti-foreigner movement.

ASC

Source

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Belonging

As an interdisciplinary concept, "belonging" has been contextualized as "spaces of belonging" (Mills 2006; Nelson 2007), "places of belonging" (Nelson and Hiemstra 2008), "landscapes of belonging" (Trudeau 2006), or "sites of belonging" (Dyck 2005; Toloa-Kelly

2006). The discourse on belonging differentiates two positions. The first, from the purview of the nation-state, where the norms and contours of belonging are instituted from above, necessitates a top-down approach. The second, conversely, a bottom-up conceptualization, signifies the ways in which individuals perceive their belonging in terms of their association with a particular environment, community, or even the nation. Here, belonging becomes inherently rooted in the way individuals subjectively perceive their own connections, attachments, and relationships to a specific surrounding. The first conceptualization results in a hierarchical understanding of belonging; the second privileges an understanding of belonging that is multilayered and overlapping. For those in a nation-state, belonging is constantly mediated by membership within the territory of the nation. The characteristic traits of a nation are presupposed to be determined by its collective nature. Those belonging to the nation are legally included by the state through provision of citizenship, while others not opting for citizenship are either excluded or left to languish in the peripheries. In addressing which individuals qualify to belong in the various territorial spaces of specific nation-states, some scholarly postulations focus on the affiliation connecting citizenship and the notion of belonging (see Hopkins 2007; Clark 2008).

Belonging can be conceptualized in myriad ways: it can be looked at from an individual's standpoint or from a collective perspective of group identity. A particular degree of tension can arise when an individual could relate and define their belonging in relation to multiple entities. This highlights the fluid and diverse nature in which the sense of belonging is internalized. In many cases, the state's territorialized notion of belonging is juxtaposed to the realization of the everyday life of people as citizens. Thus, belonging gets entwined with identity, recognition and everyday citizenship. The way in which one relates to one's own identity and reciprocates to others recognizing his identity in their everyday interaction shapes their belonging to a particular place. In other words, these routine interactions are instrumental in shaping one's sense of belonging and constitute one of the primary domains in which citizenship is expressed, realized or even refused (Mee and Wright 2009). In the context of South Asia, citizenship emerges as the indispensable factor in rooting a notion of belonging within the contours of the prescribed norms of membership. The proximity of one's natural and social attributes with the conjured imaginary national homogeneity is fallaciously understood as the primary basis on which belonging is founded. The state

centric understanding of 'belonging' is tethered to the idea of membership in such a way that citizens who 'belong' to a specific territory are recognised and accepted as the members of that state, both politically and legally. The very existence of refugees challenges the established notion of belonging anchored on citizenship in a state. In the post-colonial shaped countries of South Asia, "state formation process" facilitated the creation of "boundaries of belonging" by providing rights to its citizens and simultaneously excluding others (Chowdhury, 2018: 20). This reiterates the necessity to engage in the state building process in individual countries vis-à-vis their citizenship rights, so as to determine how their exclusion both from country of origin and/or country of refuge impact their repatriation. 'Belonging' for a refugee is then conceptualised with respect to their affinity and linkage with 'home' that in turn causes the configuration/ re-configuration of the refugee identity during exile.

NC

Source

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Belonging

It is a concept enmeshed with several notions, for instance, home, roots, waiting to belong, hoping to belong, and then there are scales and phases of belonging. It is very difficult to read belonging as a separate analytical category because it is so tied up with other concepts like how stateless people will relentlessly try to *belong* somewhere, and even for refugees, it is ultimately belonging somewhere what matters the most. This conception of belonging is often derived from the acceptance of territorially bounded states as the norm. This has produced binaries like here/there and the idea of 'root' in analysis of migration studies. This therefore further leads to thinking or treating migrants as the '*other*' or as a threat to the national identity, even when some of them have lived for generations within that country. The most haunting question faced by nomads, floating people or the ones who are displaced is *where do they belong*. The question as to *who belongs* therefore is contentious and often remains as a political dilemma that has been studied through the themes of migration, citizenship, and membership in the modern nation state. The concepts of home or belonging hence can hardly be studied in isolation without referring to belonging- be it physical, emotional, or psychological, or for camp refugees through empowerment. Each of these concepts needs separate mention and unpacking but belonging is somewhat linked to all of them. It is through their quest to belong that stateless people or refugees become empowering individuals. They become resilient and carve out their way to life and survival. The time of becoming self-resilient for refugees in a camp like space is also one of belonging.

SS

Bidesiya (Bhojpuri Term)

Bidesiya or Bidesia is a form of folk theatre usually performed in the northern and eastern part of India (especially in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh). According to historian Brahma Prakash, Bidesia/Bidesiya is the name of a popular song genre. The name was taken from a famous play named Bidesia. The play narrates the plight of a migrant labourer, Bidesi, who is newly married but has to leave the village to go to Calcutta (now Kolkata) to earn his livelihood. Currently, Bidesiya is known as the theatre of migrants or indentured labours. The theatrical performance of Bidesiya has a strong depiction of labour and migration. Since both Bihar

and Uttar Pradesh are the main source of cheap manual labour. Therefore, the significance of performance is more or less intact.

The history of Bidesiya/Bidesia goes back to the early nineteenth to late twentieth century when people from these two states went to the big cities of colonial India. They came to Kolkata, which was the main capital city of the colonial administration. These people migrated (some time forcefully) abroad for a better income. The term Bidesiya was used for the person who left home and resided abroad (Bides) for livelihood purposes. The term primarily referred to the indentured labourers who migrated mostly to the Caribbean countries for sugarcane plantation.

In Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, Bidesia stands for the culture of migrants. It has been performed in the form of folk songs. Bhikhari Thakur, one of the well-known litterateurs in Bhojpuri literature, coined this term and made the performance popular among the villages in Bhojpur (Western part of Bihar and Eastern Part of Uttar Pradesh). The migrants who went to Assam to work in the tea gardens and to Kolkata for working in the factories or merchant houses, are also known as Bidesiyas at a point of time. Dhananjay Singh, an eminent scholar in Bhojpuri history, marked Bidesiya as one of the important cultural mediums to understand the struggles of the indentured labours or coolie labours. Some of the Bidesiyas, as Singh said, still performed in different rituals in Fiji.

According to Brahma Prakash, the performers of a Bidesiya performance are usually men. Young male actors played the female roles in the performance. All the characters represent the material quality of being. Praksah also commented that the “Bidesi is not merely a name, but the quality of being a personification of the migrant labours.”

RKS

Source

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Biometrics

Biometrics refers to the self-generated method of identifying a person via the measurement of peculiar physiological or behavioral characteristics such as fingerprints, face, iris, retina, or ear features. It also indicates “biometric identifiers”, which are the pieces of information that encode a representation of a person’s distinctive biological make up (e.g., fingerprints, retinal scans, or voice scans, bone scans, facial recognition, and DNA analysis). Biometric scanning refers to the method through which biometric measurements are procured and entered into a computer system with the objective of employing the measurements to substantiate or look for individual identity. Some governments have introduced the use of bio metrics as an improved security measure in issuing passports, visas, or residence permits. In other words, biometric technologies using digital representations of bodily characteristics to identify individuals have become an institutionalised method of registering and recognizing persons, thereby establishing their right to cross borders. This technology, either in isolation or in combination, is applied in multiple settings to measure body characteristics as well as identify, corroborate and classify individuals. They are frequently being used in the realm of border control and national security as a means of registering and corroborating the identities of migrants and asylum-seekers to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate movement. This variant of border control is premised on the rationale that biometric technologies are neutral and objective as ‘bodies do not lie’ (Aas 2006), but are dependable and ‘stable, unchanging repositior[ies] of personal information’ (Magnet 2011: 2). This is fundamentally different from the social identities that evolve in human lives, identities that are flexible, altering, relative and incomplete. Thus it has been observed that border control in contemporary times assume the form of ‘automated regimes of biometric classification’ separated from human interaction and the more ‘nuanced judgements of justice, fairness and legitimacy’ that may arise as a result of real interactions between human beings (Aas 2006; Wilson 2006: 102; Olwig et al. 2020) Biometric identification methods are dependent on *recognition*, but a large number of migrants are unregistered, nullifying the basic principle of recognition. Moreover, biometrically based identities may be contested or, alternatively, animatedly employed as people use them for unintended activities.

As a result of the use of biometric technologies, according to Gates we are witnessing ‘a reconfiguration of identity, the attachment of new meaning and new practices to what identity is and to how it works’ (Gates 2011: 16–17; see also van der Ploeg 1999; Aas 2006). In anthropology, the concept of identity usually indicates its social aspects, particularly ‘the groups a person belongs to, who he or she identifies with, [and] how people establish and maintain invisible but socially efficient boundaries’ (Eriksen & Pijpers 2017: 153). The inherent, unwavering identity implicit in biometric technologies contends with anthropological perceptions on identity as myriad, active and adaptable, a mixture of ‘multiple incoherent and unstable selves’ (Griffiths 2015: 1). When employing biometric technologies to connect body parts, biometric data and identities in conjunction, the multiple notions of identity are frequently forsaken. Thus, the difference between the prosperous and layered identities entrenched in, and emanating from, social life and the ascribed biometric identities premised on biological characteristics becomes less marked. To prevent this merger, the term *IDentity* has been envisaged to indicate identity based on data sets established and registered through biometric means. These data sets have been referred to as ‘virtual selves’ (Whitson & Haggerty 2008) and ‘data doubles’ (Haggerty & Ericson 2000: 611).

These two fundamentally different readings of identity – as either an indisputable, irreversible identity that biometric technology attempts to unearth, or a malleable, reversible personal identity that evolves from social life – can be traced to contradictory understandings of borders. Biometric technologies render the automated regulation and control of border crossings, possible. In actuality, borders are not distinct physical lines of demarcation separating territories, contrarily, as Donnan and Wilson observe (2010: 7), ‘countless points of interaction, or myriad places of divergence and convergence’. Borders are points of both separation and engagement, divergence and attachment, and as such they are sites of interface, interaction and discontent, precisely because of their shared nature. (de Certeau 1984: 127). Borders, then, are omnipresent and formed contextually by a myriad of interfaces constituting many places, actors, and objects, inclusive of biometric technologies.

In exceptional cases, borders are confined to the meeting points between regions or nation states or to sites which serve as passage that, once left behind, are devoid of their control on human mobility. With the emergence of biometrics as well as ID cards and the consequent intensification of managing mobility, in the words of Lyon, “the border is everywhere” and “the experience of being counted as an insider or an outsider can be reproduced anywhere” (Lyon 2004). Borders are removed from their territorial linkage and become both intrinsic and extrinsic, conceived in great distance from the original national borders (Olwig et al. 2020). The body, in a way, becomes the fundamental obstacle to movement (Aas 2006; Amoore 2006). In keeping with Agamben’s concept of biological data as ‘identity without the person’ – biological characteristics with which the person is closely linked yet with which the person cannot identify in any way (2011) – biometric technologies do not merely codify bodies, at the same time, they delink them from the person, constituting, an *IDentity* without the person or, an *IDentity* without identity.’ (Olwig et al. 2022)

PS

Source

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Boat People

The term boat people describes refugees who attempt to escape violence and persecution by setting to sea in fishing trawlers, rubber boats, ships etc to seek safety in nearby countries. However, refugees seldom flee on water for the entire route of their escape. In many cases, refugees use boats only for a specific segment of their journeys. Yet, the term boat people draws attention to the specific conditionalities of flight by sea. As Missbach and Hoffstaedter (2022) write on the Rohingya boat people in Asia, the sea becomes an anti-place for life and is used by states to employ a necropolitics towards migrants and refugees. Migrants and refugees are often actively deterred from reaching a country’s maritime jurisdiction and shores through an increased militarisation and securitisation of the sea (Garelli and Tazzioli 2019; Pugh 2004). The appearance of the term boat people is closely linked to Vietnamese refugees fleeing their home country by boat in the context of the Vietnam War. However, the term experienced a comeback in the discussion surrounding the 2015 Andaman Sea Crisis and an increasing number of refugees trying to reach Australian shores. Further, around the same time, the term also gained relevance in the EU context as an increasing number of migrants and refugees trying to reach Europe via the Mediterranean Sea (Moretti 2018, pp. 240-243).

MJN

Source

Hoffstaedter, G., and Missbach., A. 2022. "Graves beyond the waves: enforced strandedness and the impossibility of place-making in the Andaman Sea." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*: 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2022.2110457>.

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Boat Refugees

Since May 2015, the term 'Boat people' has garnered a lot of attention both internationally and within South Asia. The media was full of news reports of boats full of migrants in search for asylum. In South and Southeast Asia, the Rohingya refugees were in the news throughout 2015 and then continuously since then for fleeing their terrible camp conditions from Myanmar and Bangladesh in risky flotillas that most often led them to either death or, even worse, smuggling-trafficking nexus and torture in high seas and border-detention camps. After 2015, 2020 was also a landmark year for boat migrations in the high sea. UNHCR notes that in 2020, five years on from 2015's boat crisis in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea, when thousands of Rohingya in distress at the sea were denied asylum or lifesaving amenities, the situation at the sea has come to the same alarming point once again. 2020 has been marked out as the deadliest year on record for the Rohingya crossing the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. The pandemic has made the situation far more complicated. Due to more stringent border restrictions, many have been left stranded in the sea for days before being rescued. While deaths have been more rampant and normal than survival among migrants who have crossed raging high seas amidst dire uncertainties, migration has remained consistent. The Bay is of paramount importance in international politics. Politically, culturally and in trade, the sea plays a crucial role in boosting interconnectivity and mobility in Asia, binding South and Southeast Asia into an integrated whole (Amrith 2015). The entire region has grown economically, promoting the economy of states like Malaysia and Thailand, resulting in a massive flow of Labour and Capital. Illegal migration has also increased simultaneously in precarious conditions. There is an uncanny resemblance of the Rohingya exodus with that of the Vietnamese boat people in the mid-1970s.

The Vietnamese had also sought refuge in Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia and Malaysia before being accepted by Europe, North America, and Australia. The term 'boat people' was coined at this time while describing the escape of Vietnamese people from communist rule following the Vietnam War. The Vietnamese also fled in small boats, most often wooden fishing boats, after the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979. Before the Vietnamese Boat crisis in the mid-1970s (as explained under the keyword 'Boat People', no other incident of people fleeing in boats to seek asylum had drawn worldwide attention. More than a million people fled Indochina after the war and many perished either by drowning or at the hands of the pirates. The survivors were accepted as refugees in the USA, Canada, and Southeast Asian countries in the late 1970s and 1980s. The 'Boat for Vietnam' Committee was formed on 27 November 1978, when more than 160 prominent Parisians signed an appeal to stop the exodus. The crisis was alarming, since with each passing day more and more boats were reaching Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Hongkong. Refugee camps were already full when the Malaysian vice-president suddenly announced his country would not accept any more refugees and pushed 76,000 boat people back to the sea. To ensure greater and more binding protection, and more resettlement commitments worldwide, from western countries like the USA, an international convention was organised in Geneva after the first phase of the Vietnamese crisis, aiming to solve the crisis.

SS

Source:

Amrith, S. 2015. *Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The Furies of Nature and the Fortunes of Migrants*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

***Bhogonia* (Assamese/Asamiya Term)**

Bhogonia means 'one who fled' in Assamese. It is a common term for people who leave their native homes, villages, or other locations in search of safety elsewhere. According to local legend, during the Mughal invasion of 1661, when Aurangzeb's Bengal Subahdar or Bengal general Mir Jumla II reached Ahom Kingdom's capital Garhgaon on March 17, 1662, Ahom King Swargadeo Sutamla (1648-1663) alias Jayadhwaj Singha fled to Namrup. Sutamla is known as the Bhogonia Raja or Bhagania Raja, which means 'one who fled' in local

parlance. Historically, the Assamese pejorative connotations of the word 'Bhogania' have included connotations of ridicule, inferiority, and social stigma. More specifically, if placed in the context of the shame that followed the *Treaty of Ghilajharighat 1663*, which ended the conflict between the Mughals and the Ahoms. Aside from the monetary loss, the treaty required Sutamla to send his six-year-old daughter Romoni Nangsen Gabhoru to the Mughal Imperial Harem in Dhaka (capital of Bengal Subhah). Romoni was rechristened Rahmat Banu Begum after converting to Islam and married Qutb-ud-Din Muhammad Azam alias Azam Shah, Aurangzeb's third son, in 1668. This background provides the source for the ingrained collective memory that ranges from unease to anxiety regarding the Muslim population of Assam.

ASC

Source

Bhuyan, S. K. 1957. *Atan Buragohain and His Times: A History of Assam, from the Invasion of Nawab Mir Jumla in 1662-63, to the Termination of Assam-Mogul Conflicts in 1682*. Guwahati: Lawyers Book Stall.

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Bongal (Assamese/Asamiya Term)

In Assam, the term 'Bongal' refers to the Bengali-speaking population. There is a history of prejudice and hostility towards the Bongal people that has contributed to the term's negative connotations. Bongal is a term mentioned in the *Buranjis* to refer to people who are not native Ahom speakers but who live to the west of the Ahom kingdom. Bengal Subah or Bangala, the name of the Mughal province that included modern-day Bengal, is a possible etymological ancestor of the word. According to local legends, the Ahom general Lachit Borphukan referred to the Mughals as Bongals. The meaning of the word Bongal has changed over time in that the British were known as 'Boga Bongal' (white Bongal) during Colonial times. When the British arrived in Assam after the Yandaboo Treaty with their entourage of bureaucrats and native Bengali speaking Babus (lit., officials/clerks), they were initially referred to as Bongals, along with the Bengali Hindu immigrants to Assam. Post partition of the subcontinent, the term has come to encompass the category of illegal, unofficial, problem-causing Hindu Bengali-speaking Bangladeshi nationals.

Source

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Bongal Kheda (Assamese/Asamiya Term)

The Sylheti speaking enclaves in Assam have remained the eyesore for the Ahom/Axom/Ahomiya/Axomiya who rallied on the idea of 'Assam for Assamese' and the implementation of the Assam Official Language Act (ALA) 1960 and the Bangal/Bongal Kheda (lit., 'Oust the Bengali') campaign. Gopinath Bardoloi, the chief minister of Assam, was heavily criticised by the Assam Pradesh Congress Committee for not objecting to the inclusion of the *thanas* of Sylhet (Bangladesh) in Assam (Dasgupta 2001:351). While historical evidence indicates that political leaders and a segment of the public in Assam supported the amalgamation of the entire Sylhet with Pakistan before and after the referendum, it is perhaps less well known that a similar strategy was used in Cachar. Although there was no referendum held in Cachar, which has a large Hindu population, the idea of its incorporation into Pakistan and Sylhet was still discussed in the public (Bhattacharjee 1989b; Dasgupta 2001).

Perhaps revisiting the conditions of the complex cartographic exercise that resulted in the partition could aid in understanding the braided knots. To ensure Tripura's territorial

connections with India, the Boundary Commission appended three and a half *thanas* from the Sylhet district to India. Radcliffe's decision accordingly carved out 709 square miles of Sylhet, and a truncated Karimganj was re-incorporated in Assam, India. With the bulk of Sylhet's territory merging with East Bengal to create East Pakistan, Assam's relief was understandable (Bhattacharjee, 1989a; Bhattacharjee, 2009). Partition for Assam served a dual purpose: while on the one hand, it ensured Sylhet's ouster, on the other, it made East Bengal (along with Sylhet) an officially foreign entity named East Pakistan (Dass, 1980; Bhattacharjee, 1989b; Chakraborty 2004; Dasgupta 2008). For historical and logistical reasons, the Hindu Bengalis of Sylhet turned to Assam in three significant flows 1946, 1947-1948, and 1950 (Dasgupta 2001; Bhattacharjee in Bhattacharjee & Dev (ed.), 2006; Bhattacharjee, 2009). Many came over and settled in Shillong; the administrative headquarters of Assam. The AG office in Shillong and the posts of the *barababu* (head-clerk) in government offices were held by Sylheti clerks. Their relatives and friends followed these babus. Sylhet's twin sister, Cachar district in Assam, witnessed large population inflows between 1947-48 and in the 1950s following communal riots in East Pakistan and the circulation of memories of loss and trauma (Chakraborty 2002, 2004; Chakraborty 1996).

ASC

Source

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Border

The formal meaning of border is, "side, edge, boundary or part of it." It denotes the edge around a thing. In its widespread prevalent meaning, it is a cartographic institution of demarcation, identification, enclosure, delimitation, and protection. Therefore, border relates to the concept of boundary. It is also connected with another word in the same family of meanings, namely, frontier.

Yet, border and its associated sense of a boundary making exercise goes beyond marking a territory. It is present in all aspects of our social life – gender, family, landed property, caste, race, ideas, everything. It figures as a commonplace in social understanding and is an analytic tool to make sense of the social world. It also shows how territory and its associated institutions work together as an assemblage of power. In this way, while we traditionally think of borders as inscribed onto maps in which discrete territories are separated by lines and colours, this imagination is never clean and without complications. This is because, borders also denote passages - of people, information, money, commodities, and cultural and social artefacts. In short, a border indicates *crossing, passing* – to be allowed or disallowed.

Border and border crossing are not new as inseparable twins. They are as old as written history, or at least the history of the modern time. Border is increasingly monopolising our attention to state and international formations, not because of its association with human mobility, but because of the political significance of the concept of migration in our time.

Crossing indicates mobility, yet mobility is achieved only by crossing. In this way, mobility is translated into acts of migrating across borders. Also, to note in this connection is the fact that the relation between the two concepts – border and crossing – points to a third notion. The notion is of citizenship.

Border safeguards citizenship, crossing of borders by aliens endangers it. In the beginning, we associated citizenship with rights and the sovereignty of the people. Today it is a mark of identity. Borders make the construction of this identity possible. Language, ethnicity, religion, tribe, clan, caste, occupation, nationality – each of these produces a border. One of the strongest of these markers is the territorial identity produced by a border. The citizen will have the right to cross the border and leave for another country, and will have the right of return; and the immigrant can only enter a country lawfully and stay lawfully, because the immigrant is not a citizen.

There are, of course, various qualifications to this situation, such as a refugee's claim to asylum, or dual citizenship, agreement on free movement, etc., but even then, border remains the most salient marker of an identity along with its associated institutions, such as the borders of the European Union and the European border protection agency, FRONTEX. Borders, boundaries, identity, and transgression – these form the backdrop against which the history of human mobility is written. Yet as we can see, the institution of citizenship is bound with the related issues of globalisation, borders, mobility and migration, and *de jure* and *de facto* statelessness. The stateless, the refugees, and millions of illegal labouring immigrants who have crossed the border are what Hannah Arendt famously called those who do not have the right to have rights.

In order to safeguard the citizens who are to be “protected by boundary making exercises”, borders are at times externalised. It means that border guarding exercises are undertaken far beyond the borders - in other countries, at times in other continents. In this way, borders are externalised. Various modes of surveillance and prevention ranging from digital, financial, political, and diplomatic ones to the military are undertaken by states to externalise borders. In this way, migrants and refugees are prevented from embarking on journeys to the bordered entities before they have reached the actual borders of a state or continent.

Besides all these, border has one more feature. Borders and mobility produce the “borderlands.” The idea of borderland has affinity with that of frontier. Borderland does not mean boundary between countries, rather it points to a frontier region expanding between settlements belonging to two state territories. As the usage of the term indicates, a border zone is one where different sets of peoples come into contact, trade, etc. Borderland is thus imprecise, a gradual shift from one state control to another. The significance of the term “borderland” in understanding the relation between borders and mobility is immense. People of borderlands are not migrants; they are denizens of the borderlands. Histories of Asian countries straddling the Mekong, Brahmaputra, and Gangetic deltas are replete with such borderlands. One can also note the emergence of such borderlands in sub-Saharan Africa in the century following the Berlin Congress of 1884. Some say, people of borderlands are the “nowhere” people. Some say they are simply illegal migrants. In this way, border and its associated terms indicate graded territoriality and graded assemblages of power which are built on settlements, mobility, life, economy, and apparatuses of rule. In short, border does not mean a seamless space within the bordered space separating it from another seamless space outside. It is a contentious term congealed in the opposite act of crossing.

Finally, the acuteness of the contentious nature of the institution of border can be sensed from the fact that border, a cartographic reality, is often produced by violent conflicts between states, empires, and kingdoms, and in turn exacerbates these conflicts. The border is thus a violent institution. This is clearest in cases where the border is an act of partitioning a territory – such as erstwhile United India, Korea, Ottoman Turkey, or Palestine. Many countries were given borders in such deliberate acts of partitioning a continent such as Africa. These borders have displaced, over decades, thousands of people, perpetuated conflicts and engendered endless violence.

Seemingly an institution of security, border produces more insecurity. Its relation to forced migration is one of the most pressing questions of global governance of our time.

RS

Border Surveillance

Border surveillance activities conducted at the physical borders – air (airports), sea (sea, lake, river ports) and land borders (land, railway) – of the State aimed at regulating the entry

(or the intention to enter) and departure of persons, animals and goods to and from the State's territory, in exercise of its sovereignty. The legislation, policies, plans, strategies, action plans and activities related to the entry into and exit of persons from the territory of the State, comprising detection, rescue, interception, screening, interviewing, identification, reception, referral, detention, removal or return, as well as related activities such as training, technical, financial and other assistance, including that provided to other States.(OHCHR 2014: 5) For the forced migrants, international borders hold special significance. As per the 1951 Refugee Convention, a forced migrant can become an asylum seeker once they have crossed an international border.

Border surveillance measures serve a variety of purposes, ranging from enforcing customs, sanitary and/or biosecurity regulations to restricting migration. While some borders are open and there is little surveillance as these borders are unguarded, others (including the vast majority of borders between countries as well as some internal borders) are subject to some degree of control and may be crossed legally only at designated checkpoints. Border surveillance is mounted to control border crossings whether they are of goods or people. In the 21st century surveillance is intertwined with intricate systems of travel documents, visas, and increasingly complex policies that vary between countries.

States and rulers have always regarded the ability to determine who enters or remains in their territories as a key test of their sovereignty. In the context of South Asia, border surveillance and control is mentioned in Arthashastra. At present, border surveillance is a very important means of controlling state territory and keeping forced migrants away. Huge amounts of money is paid to agencies such as Frontex to keep out unauthorised migrants into Europe from Asia and Africa.

PB

Source

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders. 2014.
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Migration/OHCHR_Recommended_Principles_Guidelines.pdf

C

Camp in South Asia

By elaborating on the tangibility of colonial history and imperial practices, Samaddar explains how the nature of colonial state, decolonization and partition has set the ground for the process and response to forced migration in post-colonial states of South Asia. Causative analysis of forced migration in South Asia (among other factors such as natural disasters, climate change, development induced) significantly showcases the negative impacts of post-colonial state building that attempts to carve homogenous populations by relegating different cultural/ethnic/religious minorities to the margins of the state forcing them to migrate (Chowdhory 2018). The centrality of refugee camps as spatial sites that shelter the undesirable is even more pertinent in the context of South Asia, where the shared post-colonial history of the countries has conjured a distinct socio-cultural milieu in which the forced migration needs to be analysed.

Despite not being a part of the 1951 refugee convention or not having a concerted regional framework for refugee protection, countries in the region, like India, let the vulnerable forced migrants enter their territory. This tacit consent for admission and basic protection offered to the refugees on entering the borders is based on the performative practices of hospitality grounded on the principle of humanitarianism (Chowdhory, Poyil and Kajla, 2019). But refugee camps become effective instruments for the nation-state to enforce a 'segregated protection' that prevents the refugees from being integrated into the host society. Closed refugee encampments in South Asia spatially materialize two concepts at its core- segregation and exclusionary protection. In a nation-state global order arbitrated through borders and territories, the camp excludes the refugee by admitting him into the space it occupies. The prevalence of closed encampment structures in the south can be traced back to the imperial administration practice of the government in British India. The seeds of spatial segregation were laid by the British Empire by promoting administrators to institute the material conditions necessary for the forceful internment of potentially threatening groups of people in colonies. This was in turn based on their racial and cultural attributes, effectively creating the category of "other". This colonial temperament of segregating and amassing many vulnerable 'others' in camps remains as the characteristic trait for South Asia's refugee protection approach.

The post-colonial history of countries like India have seen a simultaneous situation of refugees who self-settle outside the camps. This situation in South Asia is remarkably different from that of the global North, which currently sees the urbanisation of refugee settlements manifesting as “camp-cities”, “camp spaces” or even “virtual cities” from their earlier version of closed institutional encampments. Evolving from the concept of containment, the ‘partition refugee camps’ had become sites of short-term emergency aid and assistance centres which addressed the forced migration in the aftermath of partition. For South Asia, the history of refugee camps is entwined with the account of forced migration across the borders at the instance of the mutation of the colonial space to two distinct nation-states based on religious identity. Arguably the narratives of this migration were not homogenous in nature. The inherent variations in gender, caste and class had occasioned diverse experiences of partition for each person who migrated across the border, to their new homeland. The relatively affluent migrant population self-settled in residential areas with proper housing and adequate facilities, whereas the socio-economically deprived sections settled in the tents and camps erected in different parts of the city. The bulk of these partition refugees, irrespective of their pattern of refugee settlement (camps or outside camps) were effectively integrated into the nation-state through recognition and citizenship and signifies the *guilt of the nation-state* in creating them.

NC

Source:

Chowdhory, N. 2018. *Refugees, Citizenship and Belonging in South Asia- Contested Terrains*. Singapore: Springer.

Chowdhory, N., Poyil, S.T. and Kajla, M. 2019. “The idea of protection: norms and practice of refugee management in India”, *Refugee Watch*, 53: 36–54.

Census Town

The Census of India defines Census Town (CT) as a town which is not statutorily notified and administered as a town, but whose population has attained urban characteristics. Other than a town notified under the law as a statutory town by the respective State or Union Territory governments and have local bodies like a municipal corporation, municipality, town panchayat, cantonment board, notified town area committee, etc., irrespective of

their demographic characteristics; any other town fulfilling the following criteria are enumerated as a Census Town in the 2011 Census of India – (a) a minimum population of 5,000, (b) at least 75 per cent of the male main working population engaged in non-agricultural activities, and (c) a population density of at least 400 persons per square kilometres (Tiwana 2020, 120). Since there are limitations to the criteria or indicators used for categorising the groups or levels of workforce in different sectors of the economy, estimates of the numbers of Census Towns, and enumeration become complex. Thus, Census towns in India are mostly settlements with urban characteristics, not uniform, but in transition, retaining rural features as well, and experiencing both a natural increase of population and migration from rural areas. Rural-urban migration is crucial to the growth of population in Census Towns and is triggered by the low returns of income from agricultural performance in the surrounding rural areas compared to the higher returns from the non-agricultural, industry and allied and service sectors in urban areas.

SD

Source

Government of India. 2011. *West Bengal District Census Handbook: Bardhaman, Series 20, Part XII-A*. New Delhi, India: Directorate of Census Operations.

Pradhan, Kanhu Charan and Shamindra Nath Roy. 2018. "Census Towns in India: Current Patterns and Future Discourses." Centre for Policy Research: Policy Engagements and Blogs. June 5, 2018. <https://cprindia.org/census-towns-in-india-current-patterns-and-future/>.

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Child Trafficking

Child trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation. (OHCHR 2000). Article 3 of the Trafficking Protocol stipulates that: "[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in persons" even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article" (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime adopted on 15 November 2000, entered into force 25 December 2003). Child trafficking is usually for taking advantage of a child, including through: economic exploitation and any

work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development; exploitation for illicit drug production and trafficking; sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, specifically the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity, the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices and the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials; and the abduction of, sale of or traffic in children, or any other forms of child exploitation.(OHCHR 1989)

Usually children can be abducted before they are trafficked. Sometimes children are abducted for organ harvesting. Under international law, protection against abduction is set forth in Article 35 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ((adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3) that stipulates "States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form". (OHCHR 1989)

PB

Source

Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 25 December 2003) 2237 UNTS 319, Art. 3(c). <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/protocol-prevent-suppress-and-punish-trafficking-persons>

Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, Arts 32, 34 and 35. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child>

Chhit-Mahal

Chhitmahals or enclaves were one of the most complicated territorial disputes in South Asian history of migration and border studies. According to the experts on border studies, the word 'enclave' first appeared in the Treaty of Madrid (1526). According to the treaty, "an enclave has been defined as a piece of land of a country surrounded by another country. According to recent experts in migration and border studies, enclaves may be accessible from the mainland through an alien or foreign territory.

Chhitmahal or Chhit-Mahal is the Bengali term of the word enclave. The birth of the enclaves in the Indian subcontinent can be traced to the history of the medieval period (16th -18th centuries) when a lot of small pieces of land of small landlords (Zamindar) were

surrounded by the territory of other landlords. The medieval history of Bengal witnessed several clashes between the land lords due to the take over of the ChhitMahals. The emergence of Chhit Mahals on the India Bangladesh border also originated from the same. The princely state of Cooch Behar and the landlords of Jalpaiguri, Rangpur and Dinajpur exchanged lands among themselves. The conflicts between local Mughal chieftains and the Princely State of Cooch Behar were also causes behind the creation of some enclaves. The partition of Bengal made confusions to demarcate the enclaves in the territories of India and Pakistan (later Bangladesh). The Boundary Commission led by Sir Cyril Radcliffe demarcated borders between two newly emerged countries on the basis of district maps rather than field surveys. As a result, the commission located Chhit Mahals as a part of a district in one state but originally located on the other side of the border.

Therefore, the districts of Cooch Behar and Jalpaiguri in West Bengal (India) hosted the Bangladeshi enclaves (51) and Panchagarh, Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari and Kurigram districts in Bangladesh hosted the Indian enclaves (111). The total population of the enclaves in both India and Bangladesh was approximately 51,860 (37,550 in Bangladesh and 14,310 in India). The inhabitants of those Chhit Mahals were mostly Namashudras or low caste group farmers. All of them had to depend on their land, therefore they were stuck to that place where their piece of land was.

Several accords have been signed to settle the (The Nehru -Noon Accord of 1958, The Indira-Mujib Agreement in 1974 and The Tin Bigha Agreement in 2011) complex identity of the enclaves. The final settlement came in 2015 when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed a pact with his counterpart Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh to exchange the Chhit Mahals between the two countries. However, the precarious life of the inhabitants of the Chhit Mahals still remains.

RKS

Source

Chowdhury, D. 2018. *Identity and Experience at the India-Bangladesh Border: The Crisis of Belonging*. London: Routledge. 90-95.

Van Schendel, W. 2002. "The Stateless in South Asia: The Making of the India-Bangladesh Enclaves." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 61, no. 1: 115-147. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2700191>

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<https://bengali.indianexpress.com/general-news/came-to-this-country-and-lost-everything-the-story-of-life-suffering-to-the-residents-of-chhitmahal-301745/>

Cities of Refuge

The idea of a city of refuge is variously expressed in names such as, sanctuary city, solidarity city, or simply open city. The common characteristic of these cities is that they open their gates to refugees and other shelter seekers. Such cities have come into prominence in the background of the inability of states to provide protection to people who are victims of political persecution, or displaced due to global challenges like environmental disasters, or in many ways forced to move due to exclusionary policies, denial of basic freedoms, and outright hostility and violence. Where nations fail, the motto is, the city can claim competence and act in providing shelter. While in a fundamental sense, sovereignty will remain as the foundation of a State, cities by becoming proactive in devising policies and offering hospitality, create the cosmopolitan ethic or help in the realisation of cosmopolitan citizenship. The idea of a city of refuge is sought to be actualised through a wide range of locally specific policies, institutions, and authorities. Sometimes, during periods of refugee crisis when states increasingly closed borders, local authorities sought to open them, as in cities like Florence, Naples, and Parma in Italy.

Some people think that these practices of welcome strengthen local sovereignty and create a new identity around a city. Law, culture, and local democracy interact with each other to create this new identity of a person belonging to a city, and not an abstract citizen. It also gives a specific cosmopolitan identity to a city.

The idea of a city of refuge is drawn probably from the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament where there was a provision for six cities of refuge. In these six cities, someone who had unintentionally committed murder could go and take refuge, and thus would not be subject to blood revenge. This practice was described as refuge or sanctuary. Revenge would not be practised by or in these cities. Uncertainties remain as to the actual existence of cities, or the rules of sanctuary. Besides, there has been discussion about whether such cities in history opened their doors to only visitors or allowed immigrants also.

Uncertainties or ambiguities like this mark the later history of the cities of refuge also. For instance, Immanuel Kant (in *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*) made a distinction between the right to residence and the right to visitation. The late French philosopher Jacques Derrida, in an address in 1996 in Strasbourg to the International Parliament of Writers, noted (in *Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*) the distinction made by Kant as he

confronted one of the most pressing issues of our time, namely asylum rights and its relation with an ethic of hospitality. Questions are also asked: Should relocation cities be termed as cities of refuge? Do practices of relocation, assimilation, or integration of refugees take away from the ethic of hospitality? Or, does not the idea of a city of refuge ignore the already contentious history of a city acting as the battleground of settlers and migrants and a place where countless stateless and immigrant people have already arrived to make a living without waiting for any administration to turn a city as one of refuge? It has also been noted that, while providing temporary shelter to asylum seekers, cities, through local ordinances, restrict the movement of asylum seekers. Municipalities can exercise in this way *de facto* control over the freedom of movement of refugees. Likewise, protection may be accompanied by other practices of inequality and denial.

A few years back, pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation, one hundred “resilient cities” were lined up (“Global Migration: Resilient Cities at the Forefront” 2017) to tackle the global refugee crisis. Urban resilience was defined as the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow, no matter what kinds of “chronic stresses and acute shocks” they experience. “Chronic stresses” weaken the fabric of a city on a daily or cyclical basis, and such stresses include high unemployment, inefficient public transportation systems, endemic violence, and chronic food and water shortages. “Acute shocks” such as earthquakes, floods, disease outbreaks, and terrorist attacks are sudden sharp events that threaten a city. Thus, it is argued, cities of refuge must be resilient cities.

However, cities do what they can, not because their national governments have directed them to do so, but often against national governments or independent of these governments, cities are pressed by circumstances to devise policies to provide hospitality, and make arrangements. These stories of hospitality are marked invariably with conflicts and contentions. Thus, cities like Kolkata, Karachi, Bangkok, Nairobi, Istanbul, Johannesburg, or Mumbai have been marked by practices of both accommodation and discrimination. Often, rights and justice are far cries in this complex world of humanitarian policies and the brutal imperative of sheer survival. The idealist image of a “city of refuge” is in contrast with the brutal reality, namely, that urban spaces are marked with the materiality of control and contests, and that space for migrants and refugees is not given benevolently by city fathers

and mothers, but that it is often an outcome of the persistent presence of the migrant in the city.

RS

Source

“Global Migration: Resilient Cities at the Forefront,” 2017, <http://www.100resilientcities.org/turning-migration-challenges-into-opportunities-to-build-resilience/>

Climate Justice

Climate change does not affect everyone equally. Its effects are disproportionate and uneven. Often, those who have the least contribution to climate change end up suffering the worst and, hence, to mitigate the challenge, the idea of climate justice has emerged so that the ways of dealing with climate change can be distributed evenly through common but differentiated responsibilities. “Climate Justice” is a term, and more than that, a movement, that acknowledges climate change can have differing social, economic, public health, and other adverse impacts on underprivileged populations and tries to address it as an ethical and political issue rather than merely an environmental one. It is built around the idea of ensuring equitable solutions to all stake holders who suffer from the exigencies of climate change in terms of development and human rights. Climate Justice recognises the disproportionate impact of climate change on low-income communities and communities of colour around the world, the people and places least responsible for the problem. It seeks solutions that address the root causes of climate change and, in doing so, simultaneously address a broad range of social, racial, and environmental injustices. Climate Justice seeks to inspire models such as food sovereignty, common property like forest or water management, and energy democracy in order to support local communities in developing their own solutions and allow them to benefit directly from local climate action.

DC

Source

Adams, B. and Luchsinger, G. 2009. *Climate Justice for a Changing Planet: A Primer for Policy Makers and NGOs*. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ngls20092_en.pdf

Climate Migrants

People who have to leave their homes or place of dwelling because of climate stressors like floods, erosion, droughts, changing weather patterns, etc. The IOM specifically stresses on the need to distinguish between climate refugees and climate migrants. “Refugees” is a legal term, whereas the Refugee Convention of 1951 does not recognise climate stressors as a persecuting agent.

According to the IOM, the term climate migrants stresses the need to define human mobility in the context of climate change and environmental degradation. Climate migration is generally internal and the migrants mostly remain under the protection of their own state. They do not necessarily have to cross borders or seek international or third-party help. Such migration is not forced and often has a slow onset process. It can also be a matter of choice for some. However, sudden events like flash floods, cloud bursts, wild fires, etc., can also lead people to migrate instantaneously at times. Frequent cyclones, salinity intrusion in Bangladesh, flash floods or droughts in various parts of India, the Pakistan floods in 2022, etc., are a few instances of how climate stressors or changing weather patterns can lead to the displacement of people in areas where these occur. Rapid urbanisation in South Asia could be another factor that could exacerbate the climate crisis and lead to more people getting displaced in the region.

DC

Source

5 facts on Climate Migrants. 2015. United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security. 26 November 2015.

<https://ehs.unu.edu/news/news/5-facts-on-climate-migrants.html>

Podesta, J. 2019. “The climate crisis, migration, and refugees.” *Brookings*, July 25, 2019.

<https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/>

Climate Refugee

The origins of the term Climate Refugee are attributed to American Environmentalist Prof Lester Brown, who in 1976 defined the term as “people that are forced to leave their home due to changes in the environment around them, compromising their well-being and livelihood”. (Brown 1976) However, the term started being used as a category within the refugee and climate change discourse in the 1980s when the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) expert Essam El- Hinnawi (1985) defined climate- or environmental-

refugees as people who have been “forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of marked environmental disruption”. (Hinnawi 1985)

In most cases, the terms climate refugee and environmental refugees have been used interchangeably. It is widely believed that climate change affects people inside their own countries and typically creates internal displacement before it reaches a level where it displaces people across borders. According to the UNHCR, there may be situations where the refugee criteria of the 1951 Convention or the broader refugee criteria of regional refugee law frameworks could apply. People may have a valid claim for refugee status, for example, where the adverse effects of climate change interact with armed conflict and violence. Regardless, the term “climate refugee” is not endorsed by UNHCR, and it is more accurate to refer to “persons displaced in the context of disasters and climate change.” The term and those displaced across borders owing to climate change do not have any formal validity within borders, and further disenfranchise the already displaced as they often take shelter in places at the margins and are vulnerable to climate change.

SD

Source

Brown, Lester R. 1976. *Twenty-Two Dimensions of the Population Problem*, Washington D.C.: Worldwatch Inst., 102 .

El-Hinnawi, E. 1985. *Environmental Refugees*. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, 4

Collective Expulsion

Any measure compelling non-nationals, as a group, to leave a country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual of the group. The prohibition of collective expulsion is expressly embodied in several international human rights treaties. At the universal level, Article 22(1) of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families ((adopted 18 December 1990, entered into force 1 July 2003) 2220 UNTS 3), stipulates that “migrant workers and members of their families shall not be subject to measures of collective expulsion. Each case of expulsion shall be examined and decided individually”. Article 4 (prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens) of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights states: “Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited”. “Collective expulsion,” can mean to be any measure compelling aliens, as a

group, to leave a country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group. In the context of Europe, collective expulsion is used largely against Asian and African people.

On 5 January 2002, in the case of *Conka vs. Belgium*, Slovakian nationals of Romany origin, said that they had fled from Slovakia where they had been subjected to racist assaults with the police refusing to intervene. They had been arrested with a view to their expulsion after they had been summoned to complete their asylum requests. They complained, in particular, about the circumstances of their arrest and expulsion to Slovakia. (ECtHR 1999)

On 23 February 2012, in *Hirsi Jamaa and Others vs. Italy*, Somalian and Eritrean migrants travelling from Libya who had been intercepted at sea by the Italian authorities and sent back to Libya lodged a case. The applicants complained in particular that they had been subjected to collective expulsion prohibited by Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. They also submitted that they had had no effective remedy in Italy in that respect. The Court found that the applicants had fallen within the jurisdiction of Italy for the purposes of Article 1 (obligation to respect human rights) of the Convention: in the period between boarding the ships and being handed over to the Libyan authorities, the applicants had been under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities. In this case, the Court was required, for the first time, to examine whether Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention applied to a case involving the removal of aliens to a third State carried out outside national territory. It observed in particular that the notion of expulsion, like the concept of “jurisdiction”, was clearly principally territorial but found that where a State had, exceptionally, exercised its jurisdiction outside its national territory, it could accept that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by that State had taken the form of collective expulsion. (ECHR 2022)

PB

Source

Andric v Sweden App no 45917/99 . ECtHR. 23 February 1999, paragraph 1.
'Collective expulsions of aliens – Factsheet,' European Court of Human Rights, 2022.
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Collective_expulsions_ENG.pdf

Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)

It is a principle within the United Nation's Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that acknowledges different capabilities and differing responsibilities of individual countries in addressing climate change. The principle of CBDR is enshrined in Earth Summit 1992, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The principle balances, on the one hand, the need for all states to take responsibility for global environmental problems and, on the other hand, the need to recognise the wide differences in levels of economic development between states.

CBDR resolves a tension between two older notions of environmental governance. On the one hand, the idea of a "common responsibility" spoke directly to the notion of "common heritage of mankind," acknowledged by a 1967 UN resolution that had first emerged as an expression of concern for the loss of natural resources belonging to all (especially maritime, such as whales and tuna). The 1992 UN negotiations were organised around the four key themes of climate change, deforestation, desertification, and biodiversity degradation – environmental problems whose global repercussions brought home the need for a collective response, which needed in turn to be grounded in a common responsibility. In legal terms, CBDR describes the shared obligation of two or more states toward the protection of a particular environmental resource.

At the practical level, CBDR emerged at the 1992 conference as a compromise between the positions of developed and developing countries with regard to environmental protection and inclusivity. At the ethical level, it is an expression of general principles of equity in international law. It recognises the historical correlation between higher levels of development and a greater contribution to the degradation of global environmental resources, such as water and air, and enables the sharing of responsibility accordingly. It establishes that developed countries, which had been able to develop for longer times unimpeded by environmental restrictions, now need to take a greater share of responsibility. However, CBDR is not unanimously accepted among developed countries.

DC

Source

Epstein, Charlotte. "Common But Differentiated Responsibilities."
Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/common-but-differentiated-responsibilities>

Commutation

Commutation is short term migration in which an individual travels or moves from his or her house in the morning to a distant place, mostly the workplace or a site of work or income generation, and returns home in the evening or night or over a week. Commutation may be considered as daily migration or weekly migration and it may be from both rural areas to urban areas known as rural-urban commutation and from urban to urban areas, i.e. urban-urban commutation. Rural-urban commutation is a daily movement of a large number of people from rural areas to nearby urban centres that provide work, better opportunities of income generation and higher wages. Most people involved in rural-urban commutation work in urban areas and consume, spend, and invest their total earnings in the rural areas. A commuter is observed to generally cross over the rural-urban fringe, traversing the urban agglomeration towards the central city and into the city centre for specific functions. Employment opportunities outside the boundaries of the city of residence, wage differentials between rural-and-urban, as well as urban-and-urban, shift in the location of formal or informal manufacturing sector from urban to suburban areas, are all causes of commutation.

SD

Source

Bhatt, V., S. Chandrasekhar, and A. Sharma. 2020. "Regional Patterns and Determinants of Commuting Between Rural and Urban India." *Indian J Labour Econ.* 63. no. 4: 1041-1063. [10.1007/s41027-020-00276-9](https://doi.org/10.1007/s41027-020-00276-9).

Chandrasekhar, S., and Poornima Dore. 2014. "Internal Migration in India: Setting the Context." *Urban India* 34: 1-8.

[researchgate.net/publication/309477638_Internal_Migration_in_India_Setting_the_Context](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309477638_Internal_Migration_in_India_Setting_the_Context).

Thomas, Isabelle, Arnaud Adam, and Ann Verhetsel. 2017. "Migration and commuting interactions fields: a new geography with community detection algorithm?" *Belgian Journal of Geography*, no. 4: 1-17. <https://doi.org/10.4000/belgeo.20507>.

Yadava, Kedar N.S., Shri K. Singh, and U. Kumar. 1991. "Commutation and Migration: Patterns, Expectancies and Consequences." *Genus* 47, no. 3/4: 133-57. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29789067>.

Conurbation

In 1915, the British sociologist and urban planner Patrick Geddes, in his published work 'Cities in Evolution', argued that urban sprawl was a result of over-separation between cities and their suburban areas on the one hand, and on the other side, also resulted in the

concentration of resources, functions, and means of production and services that had locational advantages. Such a concentration of urban development and human activities that result in population concentration and growth along with sprawl of infrastructure in the form of urban expansion that emerges as a continuous stretch of urban landscape is a conurbation. Conurbation connotes an area or urban corridor with a collective and co-existence of human activities together with the dynamics of industrial processes and economic activities. Fawcett in 1931 asserted that conurbation is a place of continuous urban areas that are not separated by rural lands. The terms such as aggregates of local authority area, metropolitan region, urban area, population agglomérée, used in different countries throughout the globe, refer to the characteristics of conurbation, denoted as a concentration of urbanised areas that have a higher concentration of population, urban functions and urban landscape.

SD

Source

Fang, Chuanglin, and Danlin Yu. 2017. "Urban agglomeration: An evolving concept of an emerging Phenomenon." *Landscape and Urban Planning* 162: 126-136. <https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0169204617300439?token=AC412000B75FF8B5D5191188B6C6F001761B6C9F6D406B497EF725A0EB4B6445B991BAE1059313B33C1A6F5D3E720C6E&originRegion=eu-west-1&originCreation=20221212044616>

Fawcett, C. B. 1932. "Distribution of the Urban Population in Great Britain, 1931." *The Geographical Journal* 79, no. 2: 100-113.

Geddes, P. 1915. *Cities in Evolution: An Introduction to the Town-Planning Movement and the Study of Cities*. London, UK: Williams and Norgate.

Contested Citizenship

Citizenship, according to the Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, is a legal status that means a person has the right to live in a state and the state cannot refuse their entry or deport them. Apart from that, citizenship can also be identified as a subjective feeling of identity and social relations of reciprocity and responsibility. According to Migration Observatory, citizenship is described through the words like 'loyalty', 'values', belonging and 'shared cultural heritage'. Thus, citizenship has been considered as a right. (The Migration Observatory 2011)

The idea of contested citizenship had been first used by the Ruud Koopmans, Paul Stathams, Marco Giugini and Florance Passy's book on the same name. According to that book immigration and minority integration politics sometimes raised questions by some person or

a group for the interest of the majority ethnic community. Persons who belonged from the idea of minority ethnic community faced the consequences of living in a majority ethnic country. Their culture and ideology have been compromised under the domination of the majority groups. As a result, these minority groups got citizenship but, they had a lot to compromise.

The situation in South Asia is more crucial due to the recent developments in politics. The atrocious attitude towards minorities made society more violent. The partition and impractical creation of borders made the situation more crucial.

RKS

Source

Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M. and Passy, F. 2005. *Contested Citizenship*. Minneapolis, MN and London: University of Minnesota Press.

The Migration Observatory. March 2011.

<https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/reSources/primers/citizenship-what-is-it-and-why-does-it-matter/>)

Coolie Labour Songs

The word 'coolie' has been used by the Europeans for unskilled labourer or porter, usually in or from the Far East hired for low subsistence wages. The so-called coolie trade began in the late 1840s as a response to the labour shortage brought on by the worldwide movement to abolish slavery. The coolies were hired from the colonies of the European powers. India was one of the major sources. According to the historians of South Asia, most of the coolies were hired from the north and eastern states in India (Uttar Pradesh and Bihar). A number of people were also hired from the South. Although the idea of indenture and indenture culture was mostly related to the coolies from the North and Eastern part of India who had migrated to the Caribbean Islands.

These indentured labourers who travelled from India to Caribbean Island and other places took their songs and music along with them. The songs are made in memory of the ancestral village, the family they left behind.

RKS

Source

Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Coolie." Accessed on October 2022.
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/coolie-Asian-labourer>.

Singh, Dhananjay. 2016. Indian Institute of Advanced Studies: *Pravasi Shram ka Itihaas-Maukhik Shrot: Bhojpuri Loksahitya* (Oral History of Migrant Labours: Bhojpuri Folk Literature), Shimla. 64-69.

Cultural Assimilation

Assimilation is a much-contested notion whereby, on entering a new country, immigrant groups are encouraged, through social and cultural practices and/or political machinations, to adopt the culture, values, and social behaviour of the host nation in order to benefit from full citizenship status. In this view of assimilation, over time, immigrant communities shed the culture that is embedded in the language, values, rituals, laws, and perhaps even religion of their homeland, so that there is no discernible cultural difference between them and other members of the host society. This idea is in stark contrast to multiculturalism, where ethnic and religious groups maintain strong links to their cultural heritage, and it is indeed understood that these differences contribute to the rich diversity of a successful society. The most commonly understood form of assimilation is that of cultural assimilation. This involves ethnic groups taking on the cultural signifiers of the host nation. Here minority groups are expected to adapt to the everyday practices of the dominant culture through language and appearance as well as via more significant socioeconomic factors such as absorption into the local cultural and employment community. It is agreed that, in this regard, assimilation becomes easier for the children of immigrants who are invariably socialized and educated in the culture and history of the dominant society from a young age.

The idea became popular in the United States from the beginning of the twentieth century. The new immigrants were encouraged to Americanise in order to achieve social stability, economic success and minimize the communal problems. The advocates of assimilation theory believe that the conflicts between different communities should be reduced when they come under one belief system. Thus, the belief of the majority gradually got prominence over the cultural practices of the minorities. The emergence of the Nazi racist ideology was one of the perfect examples of a forceful cultural assimilation.

Cultural assimilation played a crucial role in state formation in South Asia after World War II. While the process of decolonization played an important role in building the fundamental ideas of a “nation-states” on one hand, the same process brought bitter fights in terms of

race, religion, language, dialect and ethnicity on the other. The communal conflicts between Hindus and Muslims during the partition of India in 1946-47, the linguistic conflict in the then East-Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1952 and the civil war between Sinhala and Tamils in Sri Lanka in 1983 are examples of forceful cultural assimilation in the South Asian region. Apart from inter-country conflicts, South Asian countries also witnessed various intra-regional conflicts since 1950s. The conflicts caused an influx of large number of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and stateless persons all over the region.

RKS

Source

Norwalk Community College Library. "Assimilation.", <https://norwalkcc.libguides.com/c.php?g=572609&p=3998124>. Accessed on October 2022.
United States Holocaust Museum, "Nazi Racism." *Holocaust Encyclopaedia*. <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/nazi-racism>. Accessed on October 2022.

Mohammad-Arif, Aminah and Christine Moliner. "Introduction. Migration and Constructions of the Other: Intercommunal Relationships amongst South Asian Diasporas." *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal (SAMAJ)* 1: 1-21. DOI: 10.4000/samaj.136.

Ghuman, Paul A. Singh. "Ethnic Identity and Acculturation of South Asian Adolescents: A British Perspective." *International Journal of Adolescence and Youth* 7, no.: 227-247, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02673843.1998.9747826>

Cultural Oppression

Norms and patterns that perpetuate implicit and explicit values that guide or bind individuals and institutions; the cultural perspectives of dominant groups are imposed on individuals by institutions, and on institutions by individuals.

According to Andrew Kernohan, cultural oppression is "the social transmission of false beliefs, values, and ideals about how to live, and the attitudes, motivations, behavior patterns, and institutions that depend on them". Kernohan notes that cultural oppression can be both personal and social. A person can easily be culturally oppressed by everything that is expressed in our culture, from what one sees on television, and from society's expectations (Kernohan, 1998). Cultural oppression is a kind of social control that affects every aspect of a minority group such as African Americans in the US, Uighur Muslims in China, Rohingyas in Bangladesh etc.

Gender plays a major role in this oppression. The recent regulations-imposed on women in the name of religion, rituals, obscenity etc. by the ruling patriarchy in the countries in South Asia is one of the classic examples of cultural oppression.

RKS

Source

Hall, Lena E. 2004. *Dictionary of Multicultural Psychology: Issues, Terms and Concepts*, "Cultural Oppression." London, Sage. 45.

Evans, Alice. "How Women in East Asia became much freer than their sisters in South Asia in just a century", *Scroll.in*, March 22, 2017. <https://scroll.in/article/989239/how-gender-equality-in-east-asia-advanced-far-ahead-of-south-asia-in-just-a-century>.

Cultural Relativism

Defines the view that any particular culture can be understood and judged by the standards, behaviours, norms and values within the culture and not by anything outside.

The term was first mentioned in American anthropologist Robert Lowie's book titled *Culture and Ethnology* (1917). The American Philosopher Alain Locke mentioned the term in the *Oxford Dictionary* in 1924. However, the story of the rise of the concept is usually attributed to the work of well-known anthropologist Franz Boas and his students. Boas was the first one who distinguished the idea of cultural relativism from racial theory, which was one of the important studies to understand anthropology in the nineteenth century.

In 1979 and 1982, a debate emerged between the advocates of cultural relativism and universalism. The success of neo-liberal economic development in the countries of Europe and Asia reemphasized to bring back the idea of individual human rights. Efforts have been undertaken to reconcile the diverse notions of human rights for the purpose of establishing a new grounding for the claims to universalism.

Indian anthropologist Kamala Visweswaran severely criticised the patriarchal notion of cultural relativism in South Asia. Writing on the issues of gender-based asylum cases and the condition of human rights, she said that the patriarchal understanding of culture is one of the important tools for intervention or advocacy in most of the South Asian countries. According to Visweswaran, the emergence of gender-based asylum might be a good example in the category of political asylum, but the patriarchal mentality should be changed to make it truly successful. She gave examples of sexual violence in the camps in different South Asian countries. According to a recent report on communal conflicts in South Asia,

cultural relativism has also been misused to provoke the citizens of the majority community against the minorities, immigrants and stateless people.

RKS

Source

Open Education Sociology Dictionary, "Cultural Relativism."

<https://sociologydictionary.org/cultural-relativism/>. Accessed on October 2022.

Pollis, Adamantia. "Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism", *Human Rights Quarterly* 18, no. 2: 316-344. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/762507>

Visweswaran, Kamala. "Gendered Sates: Rethinking Culture as a Site of South Asian Human Rights Network", *Human Rights Quarterly* 26, no.2: 283-511.

https://www.jstor.org/login/oauth/google?workflow_name=institution_finder&destination=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20069735

D

D-Voter

Acronym of Doubtful Voter, D-Voters are people whose citizenship is doubtful or is under dispute. Doubtful voters are not eligible to cast their vote in elections as their Indian citizenship is not confirmed. They are also barred from contesting elections in the country. The marking as doubtful voter is a temporary measure and cannot be prolonged. A decision in a definite period of time must be taken. If the person is found to be an illegal migrant or a foreigner, they are sent to detention camps and deported depending on the documents presented. A D-voter is a category of voters in Assam disenfranchised by the government allegedly for lacking proper citizenship credentials. There are six detention centres in Assam with a capacity to hold more than 3300 people. Classifying individuals as doubtful voters took place in Assam during the revision of electoral rolls in 1997 by the Election Commission of India. As many as 3.13 Lakh people were marked doubtful in the draft voters' list. Later, in the electoral rolls, they were marked as doubtful voters even after local verification. As of October 2019, as per a Lok Sabha answer, there were around 1.13 Lakh people were marked as D-Voters in Assam, of which more than 70,000 were females.

DC

Source

“D-Voter”. n.d. Government of Assam. <https://www.nrcassam.nic.in/faq09.html>
“Last ‘D-Voter’ Walks Out of Assam Detention Centre”.2021. *The Hindu*. May 30,2021.<https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/last-d-voter-walks-out-of-assam-detention-centre/article34683391.ece>

Dkhar (Khasi Term)

Non-Khasi residents of Meghalaya are referred to as ‘Dkhar’ by the Khasis. It was not intended to be offensive, but some people took offence. Anyone who is not Khasi is referred to as Dkhar. In common parlance, the term refers to prosperous Bengali Hindu settlers from Bengal (Calcutta, Sylhet, or Mymensingh) or Bengali Hindu refugees from former East Pakistan.

In common parlance, a ‘Dkhar’ is a non-Khasi person. The Khasi tribes, namely the Pnars, Wars, and Bhois, have a family name ‘Dkhar,’ which is often shortened to ‘Khar’. As a result, someone with the surname ‘Dkhar’ or ‘khar’ could be a Khasi or a non-Khasi. The term

'Dkhar' was first used to refer to a Khasi clan that welcomed members of mixed Khasi and non-Khasi ancestry into Khasi culture. The Khasi referred to the Europeans as 'White Dkhar' during their initial engagement with the Colonial Raj. However, the term gradually came to refer to non-Khasi people who lived in the plains outside of Khasi territory. The influx of non-native Hindu Bengalis from Calcutta, Dhaka, and Sylhet to Shillong, the Colonial Raj's capital in the eastern borderlands, reinforced the image of the Dkhar as people who came from somewhere else into the sacred spaces of the Khasi people. The location of these new arrivals, such as Laban, a formerly sleepy farming hamlet, became shorthand for Dkhar. The Bengali Hindu settlers were dubbed Dkhars, a derogatory term for foreigners, due to their status as strangers in the Khasi Hills.

ASC

Source

Gurdon, P. R. T. 1975. *The Khasis*. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications.
Mawrie, H.O. 1981. *The Khasi Milieu*. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company.
Roberts, Rev. H. 2005. *A grammar of the Khasi language*. New Delhi: Mittal publications.
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Digital Activism or Transnationalism

Two years of pandemic have ushered in significant changes in how refugees build their networks across continents. In fact, the digital boom or revolution in cyberspace has helped refugees build their networks to strengthen their collective identity. This idea also provides insights into Anderson's imagined communities (2006) and Hall's framework of Diaspora and Cultural identity formation. Hall argues that diasporic communities constantly reproduce themselves through transformation and difference (1990:236). Marino (2015:6: 11) also talks of 'digital togetherness' in this context, while explaining the need of refugees to stay connected and propose their voice digitally in the absence of physical outlets. He mentions the instance of Rohingya refugees, for whom, being 'active' has been synonymous with being present online through various social media platforms. This has helped them to organise online workshops as well and spread awareness. In a workshop conducted in Nepal in May 2022, noted scholar Sandro Mezzadra said how access to digital instruments is crucial for migrants in detention centres. Use of artificial intelligence, digitisation of borders, boom of 'digital labour' most of whom are migrant labour in professions like food delivery

apps that have increased from the time of the pandemic have been useful tools for migrants to consolidate and organise themselves.

SS

Source

Anderson, B. 2006. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso Books.

Hall, S. 1990. Cultural Identity and Diaspora. In J. Rutherford (Ed.), *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference* (pp. 222-237). London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marino, S. 2015. "Making Space, Making Place: Digital Togetherness and the Redefinition of Migrant Identities Online." *Social Media + Society*, 1, no.2.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305115622479>

Dis-ease

A portmanteau combining the words 'dis' and 'ease' to suggest the discomfort experienced by a person who has been displaced as a result of climate change or other environmental concerns. It is a condition that a person experiences while living in a new habitat. The condition is characterised by the constant remembrance of the physical surroundings that they have left behind and the inability to go there anymore.

DC

Dominant Culture

Dominant culture is one whose values, language, and ways of behaving are imposed on a subordinate culture or cultures through economic or political power. This may be achieved through legal or political suppression of other sets of values and patterns of behaviour, or by monopolizing the media of communication.

South Asia is a classic example of this domination. There are innumerable examples where people have forcefully migrated due to their inability to accept the cultural tradition of the majority communities. Culture is understood here as the identity of the people and those who propose alternative thoughts and meanings. Political and religious conflicts also played a major role in establishing the domination. It suppresses the idea of a multicultural society and tries to impose authoritarianism over democracy.

RKS

Source

A Dictionary of Sociology, 3rd Ed, "Dominant Culture."

<https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095725838>

Croissant, Aurel and Christoph Tinn. "Culture, Identity and Conflict in Asia and Southeast Asia." *Research Paper on International Culture Dialogue*. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2005. https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Presse/imported/downloads/xcms_bst_dms_26529_26530_2.pdf

E

Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism broadly refers to ethnic self-centredness and self-importance. This attitude could lead an individual to believe that their own culture or way of life is the correct way of living. It could also result in hostility towards other cultures. Ethnocentrism is therefore the tendency to view one's own group, the 'in-group', as the archetype and all the other groups, the 'out-groups', with reference to this ideal. The in-group's boundaries are defined by one or more observable characteristics such as language, accent, physical features or religion, indicating common descent. While initially used in anthropology, the term is now used widely in sociology, psychology, political science, economics and markets, among other disciplines.

The term was first coined by American Sociologist, William Graham Sumner. In his book, *Folkways: A study of the sociological importance of usages, manners, customs, mores and morals* (Boston; 1906), Sumner discussed the concept of group fighting. Every ordinary person was born into a particular culture and has learned ways of living that include customs, beliefs and values. Sumner believed that the evolution of warfare was due to ethnocentrism and xenophobia. Tanking queue from Sumner's idea on "Ethnocentrism", the violence against marginal communities, the idea of spreading hatred in the name of food habits, cultural practices or rituals, the majoritarian idea of citizenship and love for country are common phenomenon of showing "Ethnocentricism" in South Asian countries. The conflicts, both communal conflicts and conflicts in border areas, political unrest, rise of separatism happen due to "ethnocentric" ideas of majority communities. Activists from South Asia in the recent past expressed their concern about the current nature of "ethnocentrism" which may affect the human rights situation of the region.

RKS

Source

Santham, Radhika. "Ethnocentrism". *The Hindu*, February 3, 2022.

<https://www.thehindu.com/society/ethnocentrism/article38369090.ece>

Antigudi, N. "Ethnocentrism." In *Encyclopaedia of Child Behaviour and Development*, ed. S. Goldstein and J.A. Naglieri (Boston MA: Springer, 2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-79061-9_1035. Accessed on October 2022.

“Growing Up, Growing Together’: Activists Across South Asia Resolve To Work for Better Tomorrow”, *The Wire*, December 31, 2021. <https://thewire.in/south-asia/growing-up-together-activists-south-asia-human-rights>.

Ethnocultural

Cultural practices that relate to the ethnic identity of a person/group of people. Ethnicity played an important role in defining the idea of ‘ethnocultural’, that is based on the preservation of language, culture and family of a certain community.

The term was popularly used to define some studies in the “American Political History” in the 1960s and 1970s. According to Allan G. Bogue’s understanding of new political history, the term ‘ethnocultural’ has been used to enhance the understanding of “America’s Political Past”. Joel H. Silbey, another well-known American Political Scientist, advised to use the term to define the racial political history in the nineteenth century America. So, it has been clear that “Ethnocultural” or Ethnoculturalism (the noun form of Ethnocultural) has been used to define political ideas based on cultural practices of a particular ethnic group.

It has been used to define the nationalist politics in South-East Asia, particularly in Singapore and Myanmar in the 1990s and 2000s. The term became popular in South Asia to mark the political identity of the majority community. According to Mohammad Amin Mir and Zulafqar Ahmed, conflicts in South Asia may be classified into two categories. First, are internal conflicts between people that are localised in nature. These conflicts may be called intrastate conflicts, like the Chakma problem in Bangladesh, the Muhajir problem in Pakistan and the recent communal conflicts in India. Second are interstate conflicts like the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka, water disputes among various countries in the region. The term “Ethnocultural Nationalism” has been used to segregate the minorities, especially the immigrants or citizens from different religious communities who live in a specially marked area (or ghettos).

RKS

Source

The Cambridge Dictionary (English), “Ethnocultural”, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/ethnocultural>. Accessed on September 2022.

Formisano, Ronald P. “The Invention of Ethnocultural Interpretation.” *The American Historical Review* 99, no. 2: 454-455, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2167285>

Michael, Boris. Book review of the Constructing Singapore: Elitism, Ethnicity and the Nation Building Project, by Michael Barr and Zlatko Skrbis, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 28, no. 4: 133-137, <https://doi.org/10.1177/186810340902800407>

Mir, Mohd. Amin and Zulafqar Ahamed. "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: Impediments in Regional Integration." *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 24, no. 3: 10-19. <https://www.istor.org/stable/48590640>

Foreigners' Tribunal

The Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 was issued by the Central Government under Section 3 of The Foreigners Act, 1946. It is applicable to the whole country. Major amendments to the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 were undertaken in 2013. The last amendment was issued in May, 2019. All these orders are applicable to the whole country and are not specific to any state. The Tribunals are quasi-judicial bodies, to determine if a person staying illegally is a "foreigner" or not and are comprised of judges and advocates..Advocates not below the age of 35 years of age with at least 7 years of practice (or) Retired Judicial Officers from the Assam Judicial Service (or) Retired IAS of ACS Officers (not below the rank of Secretary/Addl. Secretary) having experience in quasi-judicial works constitutes the Tribunal. Based on the tribunal's decision, the officer must add or delete the names of doubtful citizens. Currently, there are 100 Foreigners' Tribunals in Assam that deal with cases under the Foreigners Act and that of D- voters.

DC

Source

"Foreigner's Tribunal." n.d. Government of Assam: Home & Political. Accessed 7 December 2022. <https://homeandpolitical.assam.gov.in/portlets/foreigners-tribunal>

"Foreigner's Tribunal." Press Information Bureau: Government of India: Ministry of Home Affairs. Accessed 7 December 2022.

<https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=190360>

Freedom of Movement (Right to):

In human rights law, a human right includes three basic elements: freedom of movement within the territory of a country and to choose one's residence, the right to leave any country and the right to return to one's own country. Under human rights law, the right to freedom of movement does not entail a right to enter and to remain in a State which is not the individual's own country, except when the State has an obligation to admit the person under international law (e.g. in application of the principle of non-refoulement).

Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ((adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171) describes this right as follows: “(1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence; (2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own; (3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant. (4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country”.

As noted in the Human Rights Committee’s No. 27: “The wording of article 12, paragraph 4, does not distinguish between nationals and aliens (‘no one’). Thus, the persons entitled to exercise this right can be identified only by interpreting the meaning of the phrase ‘his own country’. The scope of ‘his own country’ is broader than the concept of ‘country of his nationality’. It is not limited to nationality in a formal sense, that is, nationality acquired at birth or by conferral; it embraces, at the very least, an individual who, because of his or her special ties to or claims in relation to a given country, cannot be considered to be a mere alien. [...] The language of Article 12, paragraph 4, moreover, permits a broader interpretation that might embrace other categories of long-term residents, including but not limited to stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of the country of such residence. Since other factors may, in certain circumstances, result in the establishment of close and enduring connections between a person and a country, states parties should include in their reports information on the rights of permanent residents to return to their country of residence” (Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27: Freedom of Movement (Article 12) (1 November 1999) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, para. 20).

Many post-colonial countries, such as India, , have enshrined in their constitution the right to move. Every citizen of India has the right under Article 19 (1) (d) and (e) of the Indian Constitution to move freely across India’s territory and to reside and settle in part of it. This right is subject to reasonable

PB

Source

Adapted from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948)
UNGA Res 217(A), Art. 13.

'Key Migration Terms,' IOM, <https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms>

G

Gentrification

Gentrification surfaces from the combination of demographic and economic changes accompanying sustained reinvestment in inner urban areas. The phenomenon encapsulates a change in the social character of the neighbourhood that affects shops, restaurants, places of worship, and public spaces. Gentrification in a narrow sense as the occupation and renovation or upgradation of dwellings in working-class inner city neighbourhoods by the middle-classes, was identified by sociologist Ruth Glass in 1964, based on her observations in North London; Neil Smith elaborated a broader concept of urban transformation based on the experience of New York in the 1980s. Defined more as a return of capital investment than simply a change in the class position of residents, the interpretation encompasses new buildings, planning, and changes in tax codes and urban governance, new forms of consumption, and wider cultural shifts linked with neoliberalism (Dartmouth College Library, n.d.). Gentrification has been conceptualised in advanced capitalist countries with well-established private property regimes, whereas the primary forms of urban displacement in India (as in much of the South) involve the production of private property through urban enclosures. Texts around the world define gentrification in varied milieu. While mass slum demolitions in Chile, Pakistan, and India, as well as forced displacements in China, are at times considered as gentrification, the conversion of informal housing into high-rise apartments in Seoul is classified as a state-driven, redevelopment-induced form of gentrification. Gentrification assumes that the land in question is converted for a higher and better use. It is also described as a back to the city movement by the new middle class, a move precipitated by shifting consumer sources for inner-city living.

Disinvestment is often considered a necessary condition for the onset of gentrification. Gentrification hence is defined as the spatial expression of the reinvestment in neighbourhoods that have experienced historical disinvestment or a cycle of delinquency whereby property maintenance, property value, and occupancy rates spiral downward in close relationship to each other. Gentrification consists of a spatial re-concentration of capital driven by reinvestment. Series of returns in the flow of capital, rehabilitation of existing housing stock and spatial re-concentration of capital and people are characteristics

of gentrification. Gentrification may not always be responsible for replacing the original inhabitants, particularly working-class people; instead, increasing residential property values and rents along with spiralling businesses may be considered causes that displace original residents with affluent new residents. Gentrification is a socio-economic urban phenomenon that either directly or indirectly replaces the residences in low-income neighbourhoods with affluent ones. Though gentrification brings in re-investment, the rising costs of living and changing cultural landscape may make it difficult for long-time residents to adjust to the changes, thus displacing the minority communities.

SD

Source

Dartmouth College Library. n.d. A Definition for Gentrification. Accessed November 1, 2022. https://researchguides.dartmouth.edu/human_geography/gentrification.

Ghertner, D. Asher. 2014. "India's urban revolution: geographies of displacement beyond gentrification." *Environment and Planning A*, no. 46: 1554–1571. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1068/a46288>.

Kapoor, Sahil, and Tejwant Singh Brar. 2022. "Rethinking Transit-Induced Gentrification to Redefine Urban Policies in India." *South India Journal of Social Sciences* XXII, no. 1: 259-268. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361052028_RETHINKING_TRANSIT-INDUCED_GENTRIFICATION_TO_REDEFINE_URBAN_POLICIES_IN_INDIA.

National Geographic ReSource Library. n.d. Gentrification. Accessed November 29, 2022. <https://education.nationalgeographic.org/reSource/gentrification>.

Girmitiya

Slavery was formally abolished in the British empire with the Abolition of Slavery Act of 1833. This caused a scarcity in the flow of cheap and forced labour necessary to keep the profitable plantation system in different parts of the empire functioning. The system of indentureship in sugar colonies was put in place to replace the labour of the enslaved persons. Under the system of indentureship, a South Asian (primarily a resident of India) entered into an agreement under which they would be paid a fixed salary, transport to the colonies, and ration for a five-year period in exchange of contracted labour in the colonies. The indentured workers were referred to as girmitiyas, developed from the word girmit, which itself is an abbreviation of the English word agreement.

Workers were sent to work on sugar, cotton and tea plantations, as well as in railway projects in Mauritius, Fiji, British Guyana, Ceylon, Natal, Trinidad, Malaysia, Uganda and Kenya. Between 1834 and 1920, about 2 million people were shipped to these colonies. The

journey to their destination on board ships were often similar to that of earlier slave passages, the working conditions harsh and relentless, often involving physical punishment. The condition of indentureship has been considered as a new form of slavery, while other commentators have stressed on the element of agency and empowerment demonstrated by the indentured workers in choosing to leave their poverty and famine-stricken homes. The condition of the indentured woman in sugar colonies was a rallying point for Indian nationalists, including M. K. Gandhi in the fight against British colonialism. While some workers returned to India after their contracts ended, many, especially those in Fiji, Mauritius, the Caribbean islands and Suriname, stayed on, creating the community of which they were now and integral part.

SB

Girmit/Girmitiya

The term 'girmitiya' is derived from the term *Girmit*, a mispronunciation of the English word, agreement, and refers to the more than one million labourers from British India who migrated to the British colonies in the Indian and Atlantic oceans like Fiji, Mauritius, Jamaica South Africa, Guyana and Suriname among others. Following the abolition of slavery in the British Empire in 1833, the shortage in labour supply was met with indentured emigration from various parts of North India, primarily present-day Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Indian labourers, hoping for higher wages in plantations, better employment opportunities and living and working conditions, were willing to participate in this arrangement. What followed was months-long, dangerous journeys on old slave ships, often infested with infectious diseases and death. Upon reaching foreign lands, workers were made to live in slave barracks, paid very little, and did not have access to legal frameworks under which they could get grievances redressed. The girmitiyas were also called Jahaji, or people of the ship, drawn from the ships which carried them to faraway lands.

The agreement for indentured workers was for a fixed number of years, but most of the labourers never returned. *Girmitiyas* were not technically enslaved people as per law but were deceived or tricked into working as slaves or poorly paid labourers in countries far away from their native land. While most had signed five-year contracts to qualify for a free return passage to India, the Girmitiyas were required to stay in Fiji for another five years. The idea behind this provision was that they would re-indenture or break their links with the homeland and

remain back in Fiji, thereby providing for the labour needs of the colony. But few re-indentured: most engaged in farming to support their livelihood and began raising families.

MJ

Government-in-Exile

A government-in-exile is a government that claims power and sovereignty over a people and territory in resistance to a hegemonic power which effectively reigns over the territory and people. Governments-in-exile are commonly without inter-/national legal recognition and “operate from the territorial jurisdiction of a host state” (McConnell 2013, p. 969). Hence, they raise key questions to the nature of statehood, sovereignty, and territory, complicate questions regarding statelessness, and bring the binarism between conceptualisations of a refugee and citizen into crisis (McGranahan 2018; McConnell 2013 & 2009). The concept of a government-in-exile is strongly related to the history of Tibetan refugees. After their displacement from Tibet to South Asia, the Tibetans established a government-in-exile in Dharamsala, India under the tutelage of the Dalai Lama and in resistance to the forced assimilation and integration into the Chinese nation-state. The Tibetan Government-in-Exile offers its own administrative services, legislature, and executive regarding exiled Tibetans which it considers its citizens (McConnell 2013, pp. 974-978). As such, governments-in-exile act like a state without having effective power over territory. They act as territory-less polities, attempting to govern the people who are considered to belong to the ‘nation’. In 2021, Burmese exiled and hiding politicians also formed a government-in-exile or a “government-in-hiding” (Moe Thuzar and Htet Myet Min Tun 2022: 5) - the National Unity Government (NUG) – which stands in opposition to the military’s coup, claiming legitimacy and advocating for instituting democracy and federalism in Myanmar through policy pronouncements online (Moe Thuzar and Htet Myet Min Tun 2022: 3-6).

MJN

Source

McConnell, Fiona. 2013. “Citizens and Refugees: Constructing and Negotiating Tibetan Identities in Exile”. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 103, no. 4: 967–83. DOI: 10.1080/00045608.2011.628245.

———. 2009. “Governments-in-Exile: Statehood, Statelessness and the Reconfiguration of Territory and Sovereignty.” *Geography Compass* 3, no. 5: 1902–1919. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2009.00274.x>.

McGranahan, Carole. 2018. “Refusal as Political Practice: Citizenship, Sovereignty, and Tibetan Refugee Status”. *American Ethnologist* 45, no. 3: 367–79. DOI: 10.1111/amet.12671.

Moe Thuzar, and Htet Myet Min Tun. 2022. "Myanmar's National Unity Government: A Radical Arrangement to Counteract the Coup." *ISEAS Perspective* 8: 1–25. [https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ISEAS Perspective 2022 8.pdf](https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ISEAS_Perspective_2022_8.pdf).

H

Home

The concept of home is essentially tied with belonging, although belonging is an important and much discussed subject in migration and forced migration studies. There are experts who argue that home is a central notion to migration studies, however, it still has not been mentioned as much as it deserves as a concept. Yet, home attains a very significant meaning so far as refugee narratives are concerned. Undeniably, refugees are known by the loss of their homes. It is also interesting how the notion of home is not fixed but fluid and keeps on changing with time and context. The foremost quest of anyone who is disposed of their land and belongings to a refugee camp like situation is the struggle to claim back their belongings, but it could also instill a new sense of belonging with the idea of a 'home' changing through time and spaces. In 'Home but not at home', Nichole Constable explores the shifting notion of home for diasporic women. The perpetual quest to seek the forlorn home lost in time and yet to feel more comfortable, liberty and 'at home' in eking out a living in the new place is a struggle that is characteristic of diasporic women even more than men. Nasreen Chowdhory deftly puts forth her contention in this debate by distinguishing between the 'home' and the 'homeland'. She argues that in exile, the feeling of unity among refugees comes from their shared past of the 'homeland' and belonging is tied with this.

SS

Host Community

The term host community denotes a variety of actors who receive refugees and migrants. While not excluding the state as a host to refugees, the term draws attention to civil society actors, such as I/NGOs and local people, hosting refugees. As such, the term shifts the focus from policy making towards situated practices of refugee reception. It also emphasizes the relations and negotiations between refugees and local hosts. Rather than focusing solely on the issues that refugees face in displacement, it stresses the struggles of refugees and hosts in relation to each other. The term is hence strongly connected to discussions surrounding refugees' hospitable and hostile reception in host communities in connection to issues of livelihood, the provision of humanitarian support, and cultures of hospitality (Missbach 2017). As such, the reception of refugees is framed within questions regarding the limits of hospitality – the provision of conditional and unconditional hospitality – and its defining

opposite – hostility (Derrida 2000: 3). In Asia, the focus on host communities and hospitable practices is especially relevant as a broad legal framework in recognition of refugees is often missing. Instead, issues of refugee recognition tend to be roughly covered by immigration or citizenship laws and given according to ideas on refugees' national and religious non-/belongings. (Hedman 2008: 358-370; Raheja 2018:339-343).

MJN

Source

Derrida, Jacques. 2000. "Hostipitality." *Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities* 5, no. 3: 3–18. DOI: 10.1080/09697250020034706.

Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. 2008. "Refuge, Governmentality and Citizenship: Capturing 'Illegal Migrants' in Malaysia and Thailand." *Government and Opposition* 43, no. 2: 358–383. DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2008.00258.x.

Missbach, Antje. 2017. "Facets of Hospitality: Rohingya Refugees' Temporary Stay in Aceh." *Indonesia* 104: 41–64. DOI: 10.1353/ind.2017.0010.

Raheja, Natasha. 2018. "Neither Here Nor There: Pakistani Hindu Refugee Claims at the Interface of the International and South Asian Refugee Regimes". *Journal of Refugee Studies* 31, no. 3: 334–52. DOI:10.1093/jrs/fey013.

Humanitarian Actors

Humanitarian actors are a wide range of organizations, agencies and inter-agency networks that all combine to enable international humanitarian assistance to be channelled to the places and people in need. While providing material assistance to people in need has existed throughout history, the modern concept of humanitarian aid and humanitarian actors emerged only in the mid-twentieth century. It was initially understood exclusively about war and armed conflict. In the years following the end of World War II, there was a sudden and unprecedented growth of non-governmental organizations, and gradually, many of them began focusing on the so-called third-world countries. The actions of these organizations are guided by critical humanitarian principles: humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality.

The humanitarian actors include UN agencies, the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Humanitarian Coalition member agencies, military institutions, local government institutions and donor agencies. These actors engage with various interventions ranging from rescue, relief and resettlement in situations like a disaster, internal displacement, violent conflict, forced migration, statelessness, etc. It helps the national government and local organizations by providing

immediate relief and shelter, improving sanitary conditions, nutritional status, camp management, etc. The diversity of expertise and experiences of a multitude of actors and approaches can help minimizing the distress if their activities are organized in a planned way and complementary manner.

MJ

Indentured Labour

Following the abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire in 1833, the indentured labour system was instituted. It was a system of bonded labour to recruit workers for sugar and tea plantations and rail construction projects in the British colonies of West Indies, Fiji, Mauritius and Ceylon. The system of the indentured labour force was shaped by the colonial expansion of Europe. It was activated due to the arduous socio-economic conditions in the countries where indentured labourers came from. Etymologically, indenture means a legal contract that reflects or covers a debt or purchase obligation. Historically, indentured labour was a form of labour recruitment for the plantation colonies of the British Empire based upon a voluntary work contract. Between 1834 and 1920, approximately 1,500,000 indentured labourers, of whom 85% were from India, were sent to British colonies, one third to Mauritius, one third to the British West Indies, and the rest to Natal. Indentured labour was deemed significantly different to slavery because the system was voluntary, and the labour contract specified wages, work and living conditions, and arrangements for transportation to and from the country of employment. Yet, labour exploitation was a common practice in indentured labour, just like slavery. The employers of indentured took full control over the labourers employed. The labourers became unfree as their labour power could be used, exchanged or even sold at will. The will and consent of the concerned labourers were completely ignored.

MJ

Integration

Both the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol foreground the importance of the integration of refugees. While the Convention enumerates social and economic rights designed to assist integration, Article 34 of the Convention calls on States to facilitate the “assimilation and naturalisation of refugees”. Immigrant integration refers to the incorporation of new elements (immigrants) into an existing social system. Integration is often understood as a multi-dimensional concept. Structural integration, including socio-economic aspects of integration referring to education and employment, is only one part of the integration of refugees and immigrants into the host society. Equally important are the social and cultural aspects of integration,

referring to cultural adjustment, shared norms and social contacts of immigrants with natives. Most often, structural and cultural aspects of integration complement one another. As a complex process, integration requires effort by all the parties concerned. The preparedness on the part of refugees to adapt to the host society without having to forego their cultural identity is essential for integration.

On the other hand, a corresponding readiness on the part of host communities and public institutions to welcome refugees and meet the needs of a diverse population is required. The gradual integration process comprises distinct but interrelated legal, economic, social and cultural dimensions, which are essential for refugees' ability to integrate successfully as fully included members of the host society. There is no "one-size-fits-all" approach to integration.

MJ

Indentured Labour

Indentured labour, or *engagisme* (in French), originated in Europe in the thirteenth century but became common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The system is distinguished into two periods with unique characteristics. First, it involved approximately 300,000 European indentured servants working in plantations and manufacturing from the seventeenth century to the 1830s (Stanziani 2013). Still, the role of indentured Europeans was overshadowed by enslaved Africans during the second half of the seventeenth century. Then, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, imperial powers revived the indentured labour system to solve the problem of labour shortages after the abolition of slavery and legal obstacles to the use of convict labour, *corvée* labour, or indigenous labour. More than two million indentured labourers from Asians, Africans, and Pacific islanders (Stanziani 2013) went to a variety of places in the Americas, to islands in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, to Australia, and parts of East and Southern Africa to work in plantations, mines, and manufacturing.

Under the indentured system, the capitalists usually recruited labourers via intermediary agents to work for a particular time (usually three to five years). The employer was legally obliged to provide labourers with fixed wages, medical care, and other stuff. The labourer could either renew his/her term of employment or return to his/her native land (Kumar 2017). However, it was not free labour because the worker's freedom "was temporarily frozen by his/her contractual obligations" (Kumar 2017:8) after he/she signed the contract.

The employees had to attach to their employers for a certain period. They could not change their employers, kind of work, or workplace without having the permission of their employers and authorities. Any breach of the contract would result in criminal punishment. As such, many studies consider the indentured system as a new form of slavery (Hu-DeHart 2019; Tinker 1974), second slavery (Hoerder 2002) or a disguised continuation of that abolished institution (Northrup 1995).

According to these analyses, “regardless of their culture of origin, the recruitment of contract labourers involved deception and force” (Hoerder 2002, 376). Workers were taken captive and moved to foreign nations against their will after being deceived and misinformed by recruiters about the nature of employment on plantations. These circumstances “gave rise to unflattering nicknames such as “blackbirding” in the South Pacific (Churchward 2013/1888), the “pig trade” in China(Jung 2005), and the “coolie trade” in India” (Northrup 1995, 5). The indentured labourers were, thus, depicted as the largely passive and unconscious victims of over-arching systems of exploitation (Hoerder 2002; Northrup 1995).

On the contrary, other academics contend that indentured migration brought significant economic, social, and cultural advantages. According to P.C.Emmer (1986), many labourers viewed the government-supervised indentured system’s long-distance migration stream as an “escape hatch” to escape the economic and social issues at home. It differs significantly from slavery and forced labour because “indentured emigration was usually the result of choice made by the intending emigrant himself, albeit not always based on rational grounds” (Emmer 1986:187). The terms negotiated in their contracts were supposed to comply with the general provisions of the law. Crucially, for Emmer, the indenture system provided for the poor peasants to transcend oppressive, poor, debt, previously rigid social-cultural parameters (Emmer 1986).Moreover, unlike slaves, indentured labourers (*engagés*) had the right to return home (Stanziani 2013).In addition, in principle, if indentured labourers were mistreated and abused, they had the right to go to court and denounce it. Finally, unlike enslaved people, the contract of engagement was not passed down from parents to their children in the case of indenture. Although parents’ debts were transferred to their children, they did not bind their children to their parents’ master. They, in

particular, have their own property, as opposed to slaves, who have no property of their own.

Whatever the name and interpretation, this indentured labour system prevented economic bankruptcy due to labour shortages in plantations, mines, and factories. It also motivated poor peasants and the working class in Africa and Asia to migrate to search for paid work. Thus, the 19th century witnessed large-scale movements of indentured workers from one country to another under the monitoring eyes of empires.

In French colonies, the history of French engagisme dates back to the 17th century, “when French migrants moved to America, mainly to Quebec, under the so-called trente-six mois” (Tappe 2016, 115). Then, the abolition of slavery and the legal obstacles to using convict labour have been a cause of some difficulties in the development of the French colonies. Hence, the new prescription to meet the economic needs of the Colonial Empire of 1850 was the encouragement of the immigration of free labourers to replace the position of slavery. Regulations for labour and transportation of both white and colored workers were established by a Decree of March 27, 1852. However, this decree could not be applied to European immigrants. Since these men were “frightened by the prospect of police control and hard regulations.” Therefore, there remained only an appeal for the French government to the standard reservoirs of labour from the Far East, India, and Africa. Still, the absence of regulations between 1848 and 1858 transformed mass recruitment from these countries into a disguised slave trade that led to a series of protests, legitimate protests. As a result, the French empire had to regulate Conventions between its colonies and sign the conventions with other empires, which authorized the departure of the coolies. For example, the French Government signed with Great Britain for the recruitment of some thousands of Indians for Reunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Guiana (July 1, 1861), and with Portugal, for the recruitment of Kaffirs on the Mozambique Coast for Reunion (June 23, 1883). Notably, the governments would denounce the Convention whenever they felt it was necessary ((Besson 1927). The precarious cooperation with other empires to recruit labour forced the French government to find a different way. The best solution would be to intensify mutual assistance between colonies, typically the case between Indochina and the French colonies of the Pacific (Tahiti, New Caledonia, and the Condominium of the New Hebrides) (Besson 1927)

At the end of the nineteenth century, Indochina was shaped to “became not only the heart of the French empire but was also the jewel of the French overseas empire and her “balcony on the Pacific.” (Matsuda 2005, 140) Based on the French government’s consideration, Indochina would shape the Oceanic colonies through the leverage of the Banque de l’Indochine and the Tonkinese and Annamite workers sent to labour-poor settlements in New Caledonia and the New Hebrides” (Matsuda 2005, 140). The Governor-General of Indochina’s support and the establishment of the Ballande facility, a direct transport route between Indochina and the Pacific Islands, was set up, resulting in the constant influx of Vietnamese labourers. From the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century, above 22,000 Vietnamese people signed five-year contracts to work in the remote Pacific islands of the French empire. The appearance of Vietnamese labourers opened the dawn of a new era for this area: “We can mark this blessed year with a white stone, a turning point in New Hebridean history because it endowed us with a steady recruiting of labour. [Likewise] we could say new blood that the great French colony of the Far East transfused to the New Hebrides archipelago” (Bonnemaison 1986, 69).

It is important to note that indentured labour was mainly reserved for poor peasants in colonial countries where the government of colonies was not representative of the indigenous people. It was a colonial government geared toward imperial interests and ambitions. Hence, migration policies, regulations, and methods not only reflected the macro-plans of the empire but also pointed out the dominant theory of the government. Notably, the state and the authorities’ responsibilities in managing indentured workers in each country were diverse, depending on each government’s characteristics and attitudes. Most studies on British Indian migrants to British Guiana (Mangru 1987), Trinidad, Mauritius, and the Caribbean (Roopnarine 2011, 2014), conclude that it was “free” labour (Valdez 2020, 908). On the contrary, research on engagés in the French Empire revealed the French colonial government’s heavy intervention and surveillance over its subjects.

In French Indochina, the role of management and domination of power over the workers was expressed as the penetration of the French colonial government in each stage and all aspects of migrant labour activities (Trang 2022). It was a party to the negotiation, a regulator, and an agent to restrain or promote the flow of labour migration. The government was also the deciding factor in determining the number, sex ratio, and

recruitment location for licensed companies instead of allowing companies to hire freely. Agencies managing inhabitants were also responsible for monitoring the recruiting and transporting of workers. The French government sponsored the labour force located on the territory of another country through its representatives (interpreters, health forces, labour inspectorates). Whether employees had a problem with their employer or employment contract, they would bring it up with these representatives, not directly with the employer. Hence, the Vietnamese indentured labour migration to the Pacific was seen as a product of the French state's macro strategy rather than a free transaction between employers and employees.

*--Vietnam during the French colonial period--Vietnamese labour migration to the French colonies and establishments in the Pacific Islands in the late 19th to mid-20th centuries

NTT

Source

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Integration

While the right to return is always a basic right of migrants and refugees but often that becomes impossible under certain conditions. Therefore, for all displaced people who are unable to return to a formal home, like climate refugees whose homes might have been destroyed completely or the region is affected beyond recovery, there are several options that could be considered as alternatives. One such option is local integration. Ideally, three options are offered as durable solutions- local integration, third party resettlement and voluntary repatriation. In the context of the middle east, Palestinians should have the option of local integration and, in the context of South Asia, the Rohingyas should also have this option, but unfortunately, that has not been the case.

SS

Internally Displaced Persons

Internally displaced persons (IDPs), has been defined by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. "There were 55 million internally displaced people across the world by the end of 2020, 48 million as a result of

conflict and violence. In India, the figure stood at 9,29,318 displaced people. Out of this, the number of IDPs due to violence and conflict stood at 4,73,000 as of December 2020. Since Independence, India has time and again witnessed bouts of violent clashes amongst communities which have led to large-scale displacement -- exodus of the Kashmiri Pandits in 1989, the violence in the Northeast, including the Nellie massacre of 1983, the exodus of Bru tribes from Mizoram in 1997, the Gujarat riots of 2002, the anti-Sikh riots of 1984, the Muzaffarnagar riots of 2013, and the recent clashes in Northeast Delhi -- the list of internally displaced people living in camps and awaiting justice is long. In the words of Rajya Sabha MP Prof. Manoj K Jha "Rehabilitation and compensation for those internally displaced due to conflict and violence should definitely be high on the priorities of both the union and the state governments. Dealing with this kind of displacement will require a different approach though. First - there's the question of justice. If such groups and communities cannot access justice, then any attempt to compensate or rehabilitate will be incomplete or inadequate." The phenomenon of internal displacement represents a case where the place of displacement and that of re-location are situated within the same country and, in some cases, within the same region. There are two important elements in the IDP definition: the movement is involuntary and takes place within national borders. IDPs are thus distinct from individuals who can remain safely in their place of residence but have opted to depart on their own free will, without coercion. IDPs are also distinct from refugees because they have not crossed an internationally recognized territorial border, and thus do not require a special legal status as a result of being outside their country and without its protection. IDPs are entitled to all the rights and guarantees as citizens and other habitual residents of their country.

In accordance with this definition, internal displacement is generally the consequence of an armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations, and natural or human-made disasters. This is, however, not an exhaustive list, as indicated by the words "in particular". The phrase "as a result of or in order to avoid the effect of" also recognizes that persons may be internally displaced after suffering the effects of coercion or in anticipation of such effects. In accordance with the IDP displacement - though assumed alarming proportions, especially in recent years, has hardly received any attention worth its name in popular circles. There is no denying the fact that the issue of internal displacement

is yet to acquire the kind of legal standing - whether national or international, that is usually accorded to the external one - particularly of the refugees. Secondly, whereas India's role as a refugee - receiving country has been widely acclaimed both within the country as well as abroad, her role in generating refugees has been of marginal significance compared to that of some of her next-door neighbours. This, however, does not leave any room for complacency, and the pressures on the state to adopt certain pre-emptive and corrective measures are now formidable. There is indeed, reason to believe that the state's attitude towards immigrants has also been considerably hardened in recent years. Thirdly, it is difficult - if not impossible in some cases, to make a watertight distinction between these two types, for much of what we call, internal displacement is externally induced and has international spillovers, at least in the neighbouring region. Thus, the 'foreigners' of 'Bangladeshi' origin who got themselves haphazardly settled in such public places as reserve forests, railway tracks, coalfields etc. in Assam were subjected to another round of displacement as soon as the government decided to clear these areas and restore them as public facilities. Contrariwise, many of the Nepalese people living in various parts of north-eastern India for generations together were suddenly sought to be branded as 'foreigners' and subject to harassment due to a spate of severe anti-foreigners' with the effect that a good many of them were compelled to leave their ancestral homes and make their way to Nepal via the district of Darjeeling, West Bengal. The point is that the issue of external migration cannot be properly understood independently of its internal dimension.

SD & SBRC

Ethnicity-Related Displacement

On the one hand, we know of such cases in which an ethnic community lays its exclusive claim to what it defines as its 'homeland' or the ground that it is 'native' to the land and, by the same token, stages a campaign for deporting those who according to it, are outsiders and, therefore, have no right to settle there. Both the Shiv Sena movement in Maharashtra during the 1960s and the Assam movement at the turn of the 1970s illustrate the point. On the other hand, and very unlike these cases, we may refer to a second type in which displacement does not take place in such a planned and organized manner and, besides, the probability of return on the part of the displaced to their places of origin is very high.

SD & SBRC

Border-Related Displacement

Sometimes, the disputes over borders between two (or more) states within the Indian Union are so pronounced that they often turn into major border skirmishes and the bordering villages are immediately evacuated at the instance of the contending states. At the same time, conflicts over the border between two nation-states (like India and Pakistan) - at times metamorphosed into full-scale wars, have been responsible for major population displacements in such sectors as Poonch, Rajouri etc. in the West.

SD &SBRC

Externally Induced Displacement

As external immigrants pour in, they put pressures on land, cause unemployment, create environmental hazards and foment inter-ethnic tensions by way of disturbing the existing demographic balance and thereby posing a grave threat to the language and culture of the native people. As a consequence, they fall prey to the explosive nativist outbursts and become soft target of torture, repression, deportation and even death.

SD &SBRC

The Potentially Displaced Persons

It is necessary to make a separate category of the potentially displaced persons in order to refer to those who are invalid or infirm, or people suffering from terminal illnesses, orphaned children or widows who are too weak to migrate from one place to another and a significant segment of people who are left behind for they are too poor to meet the minimum costs of migration. They are displaced from homes and are forced to continue to live in their places of origin even when it is not safe for them to do so.

SD&SBRC

Source

Das, S., and Basu Ray Chaudhury, S. 1998. "Population Displacement in India: A Critical Review." *Refugee Watch*, no. 4

K

Khilonjia Musalman (Assamese/Asamiya Term)

'Goriya-Moriya Muslims' of Upper and Middle Assam are locally called the '*Khilonjiya*'. These categories are the assimilated Muslims who trace their roots to the Sultanate and Mughal invasions. Many scholars have referred to them as Assamese Muslims or Old Muslims. They claim residence in contemporary Assam from the pre-colonial days. The Goriya's trace their roots from Gaur (lit. Bengal), in particular to the thirteenth century Khalji Sultanate Bengal. The Moriya's claim descent from the captured soldiers of the Mughals in 1523. They were named 'moriya' (lit., beaters, twisters, in Assamese) because they specialised in brass making- a craft that required considerable skills in hammering/beating metals.

The BJP-led government in Assam approved the designation of five Muslim sub-groups as '*Khilonjia Musalman*' or indigenous Assamese Muslims on July 5, 2022, to distinguish them from Bengali-speaking or Bengali-origin Muslims who are frequently referred to as '*Miyas*'. The various 'Assamese Muslim' communities (*Syed, Goriya, Moriya, Deshi, and Julha*) had requested recognition as distinct, indigenous groups and the issuance of identification documents from a government-appointed 'Subcommittee on Cultural Identity.'

ASC

Source

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Komagata Maru

Komagata Maru was a Japanese ship chartered by Gurdit Singh, a Sikh entrepreneur based in Singapore. In 1914, the Canadian federal government had placed two restrictions on Indian immigration to Canada. Their journey from place of travel to Canada needed to be continuous and the immigrants needed to have \$200 on them upon arrival. Both were conditions unlikely to be met by immigrants from India. The Komagata Maru contained 376

passengers, of which only 22 were allowed to embark in Vancouver. The ship was forced to sail away from Canada by the Canadian navy which accompanied the ship all the way to Budge Budge (having been denied entry into Singapore) near Calcutta. In Budge Budge the passengers were met by the police who wanted them to board a train directly to Punjab. When Gurdit and others refused, the situation quickly escalated, leading to shooting by the Calcutta and Punjab forces and the Royal Fusiliers. Between 26 and 40 people were killed, 211 passengers were put in prison. 62 passengers were sent to Punjab while Gurdit and 27 others escaped.

The tragic incident of Komagata Maru attests to the racist immigration policies of the British empire, which regularly refused immigration to persons of Indian origin through acts such as the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, Foreigner's Ordinance etc. These legislations and suspicions were also in reaction to the Indian immigrants' success in coordinating and consolidating their anti-colonial struggles.

Historian Subhas Ranjan Chakraborty considers the tragedy of Komagata Maru to be an antecedent of the contemporary global phenomenon of statelessness, in which "They were not admitted to Canada and they were not allowed to move freely in India. They were the boat people, floating in the sea, for more than six months in search of land. When they found land, they also found bullets."

SB

Source

Chakraborty, S.R. "The Tragic Journey of the Komagata Maru." (n.d)

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M

Medicalized Borders / Medicalization of Borders

The notions *medicalized borders* and *medicalization of borders* refer to bordering processes that implement biomedical means to control the mobility of humans, animals, plants and commerce. (This piece considers only human mobility). The related notion of *sanitary borders* was initially shaped by the historical sciences that provided pioneering works on the role of public health policies of nation-states, international authorities and empires in governing human mobility and regulating trade on the European continent (Chircop and Martinez 2018). Such studies have greatly contributed to investigating quarantine and lazarettos at border areas.

The research on medicalization of borders is interdisciplinary and largely influenced by the cultural history of medicine, the “spatial turn” in humanities, and the interdisciplinary field of border studies. The approaches of these research areas triggered epistemological shifts in the understanding of both borders and medical power in controlling societal processes and social actors. With respect to the former, the spotlight was thrown on cultural and symbolic significations of space and the understanding of borders in relational terms (Weidenhaus and Löw 2017). Scholarship suggests emphasising bordering processes as social relations rather than narrowing borders to being predominantly geographical and state-territory demarcations. Furthermore, bordering processes go beyond a bipolar logic of exclusion-inclusion and reveal negotiations of the borders’ porosity between diverse actors that include but are not limited to state or/and supranational authorities and other actors such as professionals in health politics or/and border control, civil agents, local societies border crossers themselves, etc. With respect to medicalization, scholarly concepts draw on Foucauldian approaches to territory, power, disease discourses and norms of social control (Foucault 1991, 2007) and lay out the important role of medicine in shaping social relations in modernity and postmodernity. In the words of Nikolas Rose, “medicine has been bound up with the ways in which, since the end of the eighteenth century, the very idea of society has been brought into existence and acquired a density and a form” (Rose 1994, 54).

Alison Bashford’s work has exercised a remarkable impact on research of the medicalisation of borders, illuminating the multifaceted correlations between medical knowledge, power

relations and bordering processes across time and in different historical contexts: in colonialism, empires, nation-states, international relations, and the global era of epidemics and pandemics (Bashford and Hooker 2001; Bashford 2006, 2004, 2016). The concept of medicalization of borders has been further enriched by scholars who address the entanglement of health–disease with the logic of global security and especially biosecurity in national, international, and global regimes of securitization, especially from the 1990s onwards (Elbe 2010; Lakoff 2017; Lakoff and Collier 2008).

In their edited volume Trubeta, Promitzer and Weindling (2021, 3) suggest three types of technologies for controlling human mobility to prevent the spread of disease on the European continent, in history and the present: quarantine (including lazarettos at the maritime and inland borders), containment in camps, and the selection of migrants and border crossers by biomedical means. All these biomedical technologies reveal the porosity of the borders and their filtering function as an apparatus of control, selection, and classification of potential border crossers, as Étienne Balibar (2002) has shown in previous publications.

Implementing biomedical technologies for controlling movement and selecting migrants can deterritorialize or externalize and so multiply borders (Muller 2010). Virtual deterritorialization of the border occurs in the case of biosecurity and through biomedical and biometric surveillance technologies. Externalization is typical for processes related to selecting migrants in that the medical screening of the would-be migrants takes place not in their target countries but elsewhere, most frequently in their countries of origin. Historical examples of externalizing medicalized borders include the recruitment of Jewish settlers from Eastern Europe to Palestine under the British Mandate (after World War I; see Davidovitch and Zalashik 2006) and the recruitment of labour forces (*Guestworkers*) in Central European countries after World War II (Topp 2014). In both cases, health certification was a precondition for migration and was issued in their countries of origin.

By contrast, containment of border-crossers to prevent disease or/and forced cleansing rituals at the border areas relate to the territorialising function of the border. Besides quarantine, another classic example in this respect is Ellis Island, the main Collecting Point of Migrants to the USA for a century (1852-1954), where migration policies were interwoven with public health policies, and migrants were racialized and exposed to medical screening

and physical-anthropological measurements. Forced cleansing rituals in the form of “disinfecting showers” were usual practices at the Mexican-US-American borders, especially at the beginning of the 20th century when migration and health policies in the USA became increasingly interlinked. The historian Natalia Molina (2011) points out the racializing role of such practices of disease prevention: “Disease, or just the threat of it, marked Mexicans as foreign, just as much as phenotype, native language, accent, or clothing” (Molina 2011).

According to The Lancet Commissions (2018), “[s]uspicion against migrants as carriers of disease is probably the most pervasive and powerful myth related to migration and health throughout history”. Refugees have not remained untouched by these prejudices. At the European borders, the medical screening of refugees and migrants originating in the Global South and the former colonies brings to the fore racialization in the bordering processes of selection. As Sevasti Trubeta (2021) puts it, racialization turns up in the treatment of refugees and migrants as potential carriers of contagious diseases that allegedly derive from the Global South and threaten the Global North. This is exemplified in the ritualized inspection of rescued border crossers at the European maritime borders. Trubeta terms this kind of racialization “medicalized racism” meaning “a racism that writes the narrative of migration in terms of pathogenic germs” (Trubeta 2021, 16) that are thought to be endemic in the Global South and, thence, in a racist logic, immanent in the bodies of the migrants and refugees originating in the Global South whose mere presence threatens the Global North.

ST

Source

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Migrant Culture

According to eminent folk life scholar and Cultural Anthropologist Alan Gailey, the folk-life study defines that the concept of culture, in some cases work as a "structuring or set of rules which through performance generate manifestations. Therefore, when people migrate, the culture migrates with them through the goods they are carrying. These goods are the representations of their past cultural performance. As Alain Gailey said that "cultural ideas can be spread very quickly and effectively."

'Migrant Culture' must be distinguished from migration of 'a culture'. The former is a recognizable phenomenon (both primary and secondary) at the level of individual cultural traits, or complexes of fundamentally associated traits. It mostly applied for the minority

communities in South Asia who migrated from their country or place of origin to another for different kinds of socio-economic and political reasons. They move from one place to another with their cultural practices. It includes rituals, religious practices, food habits, music, theatrical performances and languages/dialects. These cultural practices of their origin changed with the frequency of migration and their struggle for survival.

RKS

Source

Alan Gailey, "Migrant Culture." *Folk Life* 28, no. 1. Accessed on October 2022.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/flk.1989.28.1.5>.

Moria (Camp)

The name of a small village on the Greek island Lesbos became renowned worldwide after its association with a refugee camp (hotspot) which was established close to this village: "Moria" came to stand symbolically for a notorious camp on the European borders where refugees and migrants lived in extremely precarious conditions waiting to get registered and move away from the island.

The hotspot Moria was opened in September 2013 and was officially designated a *Reception and Identification Center (RIC)*. The first residents were families and male refugees who had previously stayed in the self-administrated open centre called "PIKPA" which had operated under the auspices of civic society since the autumn of 2012. Some days after Moria's opened, it was visited by a monitoring delegation comprising a Greek deputy and representatives of local civic agencies and the local university (including the author of this piece). During the inspection visit, the delegation met the Major General in charge, who justified the establishment of the hotspot as necessary to enable the local population to "feel safer" and to provide the arriving migrants and refugees with accommodation and care. At the same time, he reasoned that the high security arrangements and the surrounding fence were intended to "inhibit riots" among the hotspot residents (Trubeta 2015). At that point in time, construction work was still in progress; a detention centre and a deportation centre were in the planning stage. According to the Major General, after completion of the construction work, the hotspot would have a total capacity for hosting at least 700 people.

Reaction to the new camp came some weeks later from the transnational activist network “Welcome to Europe” (w2eu), which published a report on 20 October 2013 entitled, “No to a new Pagani: The detention camp on Lesbos/ Greece near Moria is the Pagani of the Troika!” (w2eu 2013). Pagani was a detention centre for undocumented border crossers operating on Lesbos from 2003 to 2009 (Alberti, 2010.). It closed after detainees’ protests demanding improved conditions in the centre and their immediate release. The protests triggered inspections by UNHCR delegations in October 2009, resulting in the centre’s subsequent shutdown (UN News 2009).

The early prediction of “Welcome to Europe” (w2eu) came true in the next years. Moria made headlines because of the residents’ appalling living and housing conditions, initially during the Summer of 2015, when the arrivals to Lesbos increased significantly (Deutsche Welle, 2015), but foremost after the EU-Turkey Agreement was signed on 18 March 2016, stipulating that “All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey.” (European Council, 2016). Given that the arrival of refugees and migrants via Turkey to Lesbos did not cease after this Agreement and the registration process stagnated, the hotspot soon became overcrowded. The NGO Sea-Watch reported in 2017: “In light of the EU-Turkey deal, Moria has become a prime example of Europe’s new refugee policy of exclusion. Once a place of transit, Lesbos has turned into an open-air prison for thousands of refugees seeking a better life. [...] At current, Moria is severely overcrowded – with 5000 people spilling out of facilities built for only 2300. Numbers are increasing rapidly with more than 120 refugees arriving daily” (Sea Watch, 2017). As the number of people arriving increased in the next months, the camp’s population settled in the area surrounding the camp leading to its de facto expansion and the worsening of living and hygienic conditions. In its 2019 annual report, dedicated to the situation in Moria, the “Watershed Foundation” (2019) illustrated the centre’s lack of basic infrastructure.

Given that children residing in the camp were excluded from regular education, the camp’s residents initiated a self-organized school, the “Wave of Hope for the Future (WHF)”, was founded by Zekria Farzad, a refugee journalist from Kabul (Farzad 2022). Over time, the WHF was expanded and included further educational initiatives in other camps in Greece. The young refugee, Parwana Amiri (2020), wrote her “Letters to the World from Moria”

where she describes her experience as a minor (and later young) female refugee in the camp of Moria, which have been translated and published in several languages.

Human rights organizations warned about the worrying situation of the camp's population, especially women and children who comprised a third of all residents at the end of 2017, according to estimations of Dr. Alessandro Barberio (2018), from the Doctors without Borders. Human Rights Watch (2016) and UNICEF (2019) warned about the overcrowded children's area and pointed out that the planned facilities in the camp for children and families were inadequate.

At that time, there were repeated incidents of children and women attempting or committing suicide and self-harm in the camp and frequent severe and fatal accidents and injuries to residents. Doctors without Borders and other non-governmental organizations appealed for the emergency evacuation of vulnerable residents. The local NGO "Coexistence and Communication at the Aegean Sea" (Synyparxi kai Epikoinonia sto Aigaio) pointed out in a letter to the Greek Prime Minister, published in the local newspaper "Lesvosnews", on 9 January 2020, that there were 1070 children in Moria at that time; 400 were living inside the camp in appalling conditions while the rest were lost among the 20,000 refugees and immigrants in the makeshift slums surrounding the camp, that expanded daily.

A fire destroyed the camp during the night of 8-9 September 2020. Residents were accused of having set the fire, and four young male refugees and two male minors were convicted of intentional fire-raising and sentenced to ten- and five-years imprisonment, respectively. The court acknowledged no mitigating circumstances on the defendants' behalf apart from the ages of the youngest two.

Following the fire, the population of the hotspot was transferred to another camp in Lesvos, named Kara Tepe, which was then unofficially designated "Moria 2" or "new Moria".

The end of the camp at Moria was not the end of the hotspots on Lesvos. Given Lesvos's role as an entrance gate to the EU, its relevance for the EU-border regime remains unchanged, regardless of whether the camp is called Pagani, Moria, or something else. In the context of the European border-regime this Aegean Island has been turned from a transit location to a prison that hinders refugees and migrants from reaching Central European countries. This is especially true when one considers that another new hotspot

called Vastria, funded by the EU, has been constructed on Lesbos, in an area with access difficulties and will commence operations as a closed camp in 2023.

ST

Source

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Muhajir(n)/ Mohajir

Muhajir/Mohajir is an Urdu term. It means a migrant or a refugee whose decision to leave their homeland is directly related to the preservation of their faith. A Muhajir is someone who performs the act of 'Hijrat', which comes from Arabic and connotes "separation, migration, flight, specifically the flight of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Madina. The term united the refugees on religious grounds and gave them a common cause; having sacrificed their homeland to be part of Pakistan to protect their faith, they believed that the state should give them special status.

After the emergence of two nations. India and Pakistan through a violent history of partition, a significant number of Muslims emigrated or were out-migrated from the territory that became the Dominion of India and later the Republic of India. In the aftermath of partition, a huge population exchange occurred between the two newly formed states. UNHCR estimates 14 million Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs were displaced during the partition; it was the largest mass migration in human history. Many spoke Urdu, or dialects of the language such as Dakhani, Khariboli, Awadhi, Bhojpuri, Mewati, Sadri, Marwari, and Haryanvi and became commonly known as Muhajirs. Over a period of a few decades, these disparate groups sharing the common experience of migration, and political opposition to the military regime of Ayub Khan and his civilian successor Zulfikar Ali Bhutto evolved or assimilated into a distinct ethnic grouping.

According to historian Ayesha Jalal, the creation of Pakistan was a contradicted state from the beginning. "The territorial contours of the Muslim homeland ensured that there were nearly as many Muslim non-citizens outside as there were Muslim citizens within. The contradictions were not addressed, far less resolved and has been one of the principal fault lines in Pakistan's quest for an identity that is Islamic yet also national." According to Jalal, the architects of Pakistan were hesitant about their coreligionists in Indian territory. Therefore, the geographical location of the Indian Muslims migrated to Pakistan became the main definer to get the citizenship rights in a "Muslim state created on the basis of a non-territorially defined Muslim nation".

The sense of alienation among the Muslim migrants from India began a movement to claim themselves a separate ethnic group. The movement began with the All-Pakistan Muhajir Student Organisation (APMSO) in 1978. Later, the movement made their own organisation,

Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) in 1984. They declared Muhajirs a separate cultural group. The MQM made an alliance with the Pakistan People's Party, led by Benazir Bhutto in, 1988 to fight against the military dictatorship. Gradually, they transformed their identity and turned toward a discourse of class and justice. The MQM won 7 seats in the National Assembly of Pakistan in the 2021 election.

RKS

Source

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N

Nepali Foreigners

The Nepali/Gorkha community in the North Eastern states of Assam and Meghalaya were branded as 'foreigners,' 'aliens,' and 'outsiders' due to ethnic clashes that occurred between the majority local population and the minority Nepali/Gorkha in the mid-1970s. Although the initial focus of the Assam movement, which was led by the AASU (All Assam Students' Union) between 1979 and 1985 on the issue of 'foreigners,' was on Bangladeshis, the Nepali/Gorkha were also forced to flee their homes and undergo the ordeal of being stateless due to the AASU's strict interpretation of citizenship laws. Consequently, thousands of Nepalese names were summarily removed from electoral rolls during intensive revisions prior to the 1985 General Elections in Assam. As a result, the Nepali/Gorkha population in the area experienced a decline in their 'degree of citizenship' and an increase in their 'degree of statelessness.' The horrific events and trauma suffered by the Nepali/Gorkha in Assam were also experienced by the Bodo people during their uprising. The All-Bodo Students' Union (ABSU), similar to the AASU, began an ethnic cleansing operation against the Nepali/Gorkha in the interior of the districts of Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Nalbari, and Darrang in order to prove the majority of the Bodos.

ASC

Source

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Non Refoulmer

The most important and basic right for refugees is the right to be not subjected to *refoulement*. The prohibition on refoulement is part of the customary international laws. It

provides a basic protection under international human rights, refugee, and customary law. Moreover, article 33[1] of the 1951 Refugee Convention also clearly states that refugees or asylum-seekers cannot be returned to the territory where their lives are under threat. This refers not only to the country of origin from where they are fleeing, but also includes the territory where they might face a threat to security- 'Rescued persons who do not meet the criteria of the 1951 Refugee Convention definition of a 'refugee', but who fear torture or other serious human rights abuses or who are fleeing armed conflict may also be protected from return to a particular place (*refoulement*) by other international or regional human rights or refugee law instruments. States have a moral obligation under international human rights to uphold the principle of non-refoulment. Three international human rights instruments – Art 3 of the UN Convention against torture, Art 8 on the UN Declaration on the protection of all persons from forced disappearance and principle 5 of the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of extra-legal- include provision of refoulment if a person is at risk of suffering human rights violations that the articles seek to protect. Although India is not a signatory of the 1951 convention, it is still party to a number of international treaties that protect human rights, like UDHR and hence protection of refugee rights also applies to her. However, there are many instances when there have been serious attempts to limit the scope of this provision in India. A recent case in point is Rohingya refugees and the attempts of host countries in South Asia to deport them back to Myanmar. In India, in such an instance, the High Court of Manipur allowed seven Rohingya to travel to New Delhi and seek protection from the UNHCR. The court ruled that 'the far-reaching and myriad protection afforded by Article 21 of our constitution, as interpreted, and adumbrated by our Supreme Court time and again, would indubitably encompass the right of non-refoulment'.

SS

NRC

The National Register of Citizens (NRC) is a register containing the names of all genuine Indian citizens. At present, only Assam has such a register. The NRC in Assam is basically a list of Indian citizens living in the state. The citizens' register sets out to identify foreign nationals in the state that borders Bangladesh. The process to update the register began following a Supreme Court order in 2013, with the state's nearly 33 million people having to

prove that they were Indian nationals prior to March 24, 1971. In Assam, one of the basic criteria was that the names of an applicant's family members should either be in the first NRC prepared in 1951 or in the electoral rolls up to March 24, 1971. Other than that, applicants also had the option to present documents such as refugee registration certificate, birth certificate, LIC policy, land and tenancy records, citizenship certificate, passport, government issued licence or certificate, bank/post office accounts, permanent residential certificate, government employment certificate, educational certificate and court records. The updated final NRC was released on August 31, with over 1.9 million applicants failing to make it to the list.

DC

Source

“NRC”. n.d. Government of Assam. . Accessed 13 December 2022. <https://nrcassam.nic.in/>
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O

Orderly Migration

IOM defines orderly migration as “the movement of a person from his or her usual place of residence to a new place of residence, in keeping with the laws and regulations governing exit of the country of origin and travel, transit and entry into the host country.” This definition underlines the State’s right to regulate entry as a basis for being able to ensure migrants’ proper treatment, granting rights, enforcing law, managing relationships with host communities.

The concept of orderly has a long history in multilateral consultations, professions and commitments on migration. In 2004, states agreed that they must find ways to manage migration more effectively, to make it safe, orderly, and beneficial for migrants and societies, as part of the International Agenda for Migration Management (IAMM). The chairman’s summary of the 2006 UN General Assembly High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, states that “national strategies to address the impact of international migration on development should be complemented by strengthened bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation. Participants considered that such cooperation was needed to promote legal, safe and orderly migration, reduce irregular migration and improve the chances of reaping the full benefits of international migration.”(HLD, 2006) Seven years later, during the 2013 High Level Dialogue on Migration, States recognized “the need for international cooperation to address, in a holistic and comprehensive manner, the challenges of irregular migration to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration, with full respect for human rights.” (HLD,2013) Member States further advocated for the inclusion of migration in the negotiation of the post-2015 development agenda (now the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development).

PB

Source

Summary of the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development 2006, A/61/515, Para. 18.

Declaration of the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development 2013, A/RES/68/4, Para. 5.

P

Pacific Solution

In contemporary times, in most instances, boat people have been asylum-seekers in need of refuge. Historically, people taking to the sea looking for a safe asylum, also known as 'boat people', have been perceived as a threat— countless incidents of pushing back vessels refusing shelter by nation states into the high seas, testify to this. There always has been a tendency to perceive 'boat people' as a threat – countless incidents of pushing back vessels back into the high seas testify to this. For instance, Australia has time and again expressed intolerance towards 'boat people' arriving there. It flouted maritime rules by ordering the *MVTampa* to return to sea in dangerous weather conditions. This was a landmark event in the history of the boat people's migration that made Australia review its policy regarding disembarkation of boats and providing asylum to the people on board. This policy was known as the 'Pacific strategy' or 'Pacific solution' with countries like New Zealand, Nauru, Papua New Guinea and Indonesia being parties to it. It was introduced in 2001 by the then Australian Prime Minister. It however, went through modifications in later years. According to this, asylum seekers henceforth will be directed to Pacific Island States, including Nauru and Papua New Guinea, for processing. On 26 August 2001, M.V. *Tampa*, a Norwegian container ship, rescued 433 asylum-seekers from a boat [the *Palapa*] which was sinking between Indonesia and Christmas Island within Australian maritime jurisdiction. The captain of *Tampa* was informed by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority about the *Palapa*. However, *Tampa* was not allowed to dock at an Australian port and was redirected towards the island of Nauru. Over the next few months, New Zealand accepted 150 people from the *Tampa*. Despite being a party to several maritime conventions, and under obligation to provide asylum to refugees as per the 1951 refugee convention, Australia had violated several rules regarding the *Tampa*.

SS

Partition

The phenomenon of forced migration has close relation with the act of partitioning territories. The modern history of colonial empires and nation states is replete with incidents of partition and resultant massive population displacements. The burden of a

partition continues through subsequent decades, in some cases close to a century. In history there is rarely a clean partition.

Partition means the act of parting and thus the state of being parted, a division, such as the partition of Korea or India or Palestine. Interestingly, the word “partition” carries a manifold resonance which is of significance for our understanding of forced migration. Partition is a noun, something that divides, for instance, an interior dividing wall (the person sat behind a glass partition) as well as a verb that indicates the act of dividing (for instance, a country) into two or more territorial units with separate political status. Moreover, partition indicates a superior force that awards, dictates, and imposes a partition of a territory. Thus, a partition may describe an act by a legal order of dividing up an estate, a property, and a resultant forced sale. Ownership of property lends power to the legal authority to effect a specific division of a land. The result is a partition, which may be in kind (thus assets and population) or territory (the classic case being the conference on the Partition of Babylon that divided the territories of Alexander the Great in 323 BC), by allotment (of land), and at times of proceeds by sale.

The implications of the act are to be found in the consequences of partitions of countries – such as the ever-disputed nature of the border making exercises of partitions, and divisions of populations, territories, homes, occupations, and societies. The divisions of populations create the divided peoples, such as the Kurds in South eastern Turkey-Northern Iraq-Northern Syria-North western Iran region of West Asia. After WWI, the Treaty of Lausanne set the boundaries of modern Turkey, leaving Kurds without any state of their own and compelled to live with minority status in all of the new countries. The history of the Kurds thereafter is one of genocides, rebellions, and forced migration. Similar is the case of the indigenous people in the Western Sahara region of North Africa. They became a divided population following the withdrawal of Spain from the region and the partition of Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania.

The act of partition is often legitimised as the “unavoidable” and “final solution” of an acute conflict. Yet ironically the same act produces recurring conflicts over assets (most notable is over water resources, say, a river), populations, territories, and boundaries. The disputing parties, as if led by a remorseless logic, cannot take the path of reconciliation. They follow the path of conflict to the point of death even at the cost of peace and their own well-being.

Thus, partitions aiming to achieve pure national states out of pluri-ethnic or pluri-national societies reproduce or multiply in time and space. Cities are also partitioned as part of the same process (Nicosia, pre-1989 Berlin). Most of the time, these partitions are extremely violent acts, and the violence of a partition continues. Thus, Indian partition was followed by a border war, successive communal riots, followed by other numerous border conflicts and wars – and through all these massive migration flows. More than one million people died and between fifteen and twenty million people were displaced. Boundary delimitation becomes difficult and turns into a violent, contentious process. In the course of time, borders are mined and militarised. All these are in search for a “right” kind of territory with a “right” kind of population. The attractiveness of purity creates the inexorable option of partition for the policy makers in search of a solution to a persistent conflict. In some cases, population exchange is part of the solution. The situation reminds us of the German playwright Bertold Brecht’s play, *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* (1948), where by the order of an eccentric judge a child whose custody is disputed is put in a chalk circle and the woman who can pull out the child from the circle (even if that means injury and harm to the child) would be granted custody.

In other words, the sovereign power ordering partition, the disputing parties accepting the award, the succeeding authorities carrying the legacy and onus, and the populations involved – all carry the burden of partition. There is no one to own responsibility of the act. Displacement and forced migration of masses of population are two of the major consequences of the act. Continuing migration flows become a legacy of dismemberment. Indeed, it can be said that successive partitions leading to population displacements and mix up of various population groups, made and remade political maps of a continent like Europe. Thus, repeated partitions of Poland by the Habsburg monarchy, Prussia, and Russia in the latter half of the eighteenth century leading up to the Congress of Vienna in 1815 led to many Poles leaving ancestral lands.

There are other equally known cases of partitions – such as of the partition of the Ottoman Empire (1918-1922), Ireland (1921), Germany (1945), India (1947), the UN Plan for partition of Palestine (1947), Korea (1948), break-up of Yugoslavia (1991-92), the Balkan wars and partition of Bosnia based on the Dayton Agreement (1995), followed by the suggested partition of Kosovo, and finally the dissolution and partition of the Soviet Union (1991).

One of the most infamous cases of partition and consequent border making exercises in history was the General Act of the Berlin Conference (1884-85). Today this is known as the scramble for Africa. The Act laid down the basic framework for colonisation and trade in Africa. It was preceded by several bilateral agreements between the colonial powers. With the initiative and support from Portugal and Britain, the German Chancellor Bismarck invited representatives of 13 nations in Europe as well as the United States to take part in the Berlin Conference in 1884 to work out a joint policy on the African continent. The properties occupied by Belgian King Leopold's International Congo Society, were confirmed as Society's property. The 14 signatory powers would have free trade throughout the Congo Basin and the region around Lake Malawi. The Principle of Effective Occupation was introduced, and any fresh act of taking possession of any portion of the African coast was to be notified by the power taking possession, or assuming a protectorate, to other signatory powers. The General Act also made stipulation for definition of regions in which each European power had an exclusive right to pursue the legal ownership of land. Historians have termed the Berlin Conference as the formalisation of the "Scramble for Africa". W.E.B. Du Bois wrote in 1943, "the partitioning of Africa after the Franco-Prussian War..., with the Berlin Conference of 1884, brought colonial imperialism to flower" enabling extraction of wealth from the continent ("The Realities of Africa: European Profit or Negro Development?", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1943). Walter Rodney, the late Guyanese historian, carried forward the argument in *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1972).

Wars result in similar partitions. For example, during WWI, the secret Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916) between the United Kingdom and France became the foundation of the dissolution of Ottoman Turkey through mutual agreement on spheres of influence and control over its territory and its eventual partition. The process produced one century of border conflicts, zones of interventions of great powers, and inter-state wars in West Asia. Many think that the migration of thousands upon thousands of people from the war-torn region to Europe carries the lineage of the accord on the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Arab nationalism was the child of this mixed lineage of imperial partition and incipient nationalist identity.

In all these, two things stand out: One, partition of a *society* is the kernel of a partition of *territory*, while partition of a territory carries the logic of partition of a *property* with a legal

ownership. People, villages, families, cities, water-bodies, rivers, lives, and histories – all are divided as assets. The consequence is population displacement and migration flows. Second, much of the history of nationalism is enmeshed in the history of partitions often imposed by colonial powers. In the secret and not so secret history of the birth of the nations, there is a continuing chronicle of partitions, massacres, displacements, and forced migration of masses of human beings.

The twentieth century is considered by some as the century of partitions. Future historians may well ponder over the wasted possibility of a dialogic alternative that could have averted the humanitarian disasters of innumerable deaths, massive population shifts, and untold suffering of generations to come.

RS

Passport & Visa

A passport is a document issued by the competent authority in a State identifying a person as a national of the issuing State, which is evidence of the holder's right to return to that State. Electronic passport also known as e-passport or biometric passport is a passport with an electronic chip which contains the same information that is printed on the passport's data page (e.g., the holder's name, date of birth and other biographical information) and a biometric identifier, such as a digital photograph of the holder or a fingerprint. In Western traditions, passports have been used for foreign travel purposes, not as domestic identity documents. "The passport is the accepted international certificate or evidence of nationality, although its evidentiary value is prima facie only." (IOM 2019)

"A Visa refers to an endorsement by the competent authorities of a State in a passport or a certificate of identity of a non-national who wishes to enter, leave, or transit through the territory of the State that indicates that the authority, at the time of issuance, considers the holder to fall within a category of non-nationals who can enter, leave or transit through the State under the State's laws." (IOM 2019) International practice is moving towards issuance of machine-readable visas which comply with ICAO 105 Glossary on Migration (International Civil Aviation Organization) standards, printed on labels with security features. A visa establishes the criteria of admission into, transit through or exit from a State. "The visa requirements of an individual's travel outside his or her country will depend on the

agreements between the State of whom he or she is a passport holder and its international agreements with the transit and destination States. The types of visas that are issued vary from State to State, and may have differing labels, but generally include: student visa, tourist visa, workers visa, marriage visa, visitor visa, business travel visa, and medical visa.” (IOM 2019)

PS

Source

International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration; IOM, UN Migration, 2019. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf

Pem (Migrate); Pem Lut (In-Migrate); Pem Chhuak (Out-Migrate) (Mizo/Lushai/ Duhlian Terms)

Pem is the Mizo word for migration, shift, or movement from one place to another. Migration (*pem*) was culturally associated with shifting agriculture (Jhum) and shifting or changing allegiance to Chiefs among the *Zo hnahtlak* (Zo people). Lorrain and Savidge defined *Hnamchawm* as ‘the common people, all except those belonging to the ruling clan’ in their *Grammar and Dictionary of the Lushai Language*. The Zo society was dominated by the *Hnamchawm* (lit., Commoners). They were a diverse group made up of various clans and occupational types. They were the second tier of the three-tiered Zo world. There was little a chief could do once he had lost the trust of his villagers. Despite the risks of abandonment, such as the perils of the jungle and the uncertainty and/or embarrassment that awaits a refugee, the villagers’ loss of hope in leadership and the prospect of a better future invariably prompted them to out-migrate (*Pem Chhuak*) to another location (in-migrate, *Pem Lut*) (Chakraborty 2017).

ASC

Source

Chakraborty, Anup Shekhar. 2017. ‘The story of two estranged lovers ‘Lianchhiari and Chawngfianga’: Some reflections on the power positions from the ‘Kuki-Chin-Mizo Oral Narrative’. *Manwa Katha- Journal of Adivasi (Tribal) and Folklore Studies*, Vol. IV, No.1 September.

Lorrain, James Herbert & Savidge, Fred. W. 1898. *Grammar and Dictionary of the Lushai Language (Dulien Dialect)*. Shillong: The Assam Secretariat Printing Department. p. 160.

Pre-Exilic

The term suggests how the dispersal of refugee groups from their original homeland occurs in different historical phases. It also points to a strong sense of the danger of forgetting the location of origin. Even though the Tibetan refugees are in a 'Stateless' situation (Samuel 1982), the very prospect that they may never return home creates a more intensified yearning for the homeland (Basu 2018, 202). In the Tibetan case, the presence of pre-exilic Tibetan hosts who have varied affiliations to Tibetan culture, like the Bhutias in Darjeeling town and recognition of the fact that the current situation of Tibetan refugees is a result of past (pre-1950) migrations and eventual settlement of Tibetans in the region directs attention away from viewing the migration of Tibetan refugees as a one-time, linear phenomenon (Basu 2018). Instead, migration of ethnic groups into a region inhabited by co-ethnics at different times facilitates the building of a discrepant cosmopolitanism that encourages spontaneous or self-settlement of refugees in towns or camps and the construction of a pan-Buddhist identity among past, present and future migrants in the region. The becoming of refugee diasporic identities results in the differentiation and diversification of the refugee community dispersed across spaces on the basis of their movements, affiliations or identity groups back home and among hosts.

SB

Source

Basu, Sudeep. 2018. *In Diasporic Lands: Tibetan refugees and their Transformation since the Exodus*. Hyderabad: Orient BlackSwan

Samuel, G. 1982. Tibet as a Stateless Society and Some Islamic Parallels. *Journal of Asian Studies* 4, 2: 215-229.

Performativity of 'Hospitality' by the State

The crossing of boundaries by individuals obliquely generates conceptualization of hospitality as the process spatially creates the categories of 'host' and 'guest' by virtue of the side of the border they belong to. As this passage across borders is "everyday practice", it provides a semblance of 'universality' to the concept of hospitality. Even though the extension of hospitality might be deeply entrenched in the cultural practices of many nations, the modalities of laws involved, regulations made and restrictions imposed create an inherent diversity in the way it is practiced. What then is common regarding hospitality is the varying degrees of inclusion and exclusion that application of hospitality creates through

permitting total unrestricted entry and access compared to relative degrees of closure. Hospitality constantly negotiates the spatial factor whereby 'being inside' is privileged over 'coming from outside' where inside and outside are constantly positioned against each other. This brings us to Derrida's conceptualization where, he projects the 'law of unconditional hospitality' that permits complete openness compared to the 'laws of hospitality' that conditions access to entry through rules, norms and regulations. If one is permitting unconditional inclusion, the second is creating conditioned inclusion and in its fullest, exclusion. The transgression of borders permitted by the hospitality of the state creates 'zones of coexistence in the inside' between insiders and permitted outsiders. The use of "laws of hospitality" to different groups of permitted outsiders' manifests in the abstract creation of 'good outsiders' and 'bad outsiders' where the state wields significant power in differentiating between the good and the bad. Derrida in "Of Hospitality" brings about a linkage between hospitality and the sovereign power of the state. The assertion of sovereignty by the state can be seen in the way 'laws of hospitality' are formulated, while it is the humanitarianism that stipulates 'the law of unconditional hospitality'. Without the assertion of sovereignty then, the state will not be able to provide the protection and resources that is required to extend the hospitality. Thus, the conditional laws of hospitality became a prerequisite to ensure the unconditional law of hospitality. Baker in *The Politics of Hospitality* opines that this co-existence of conditional and unconditional, then becomes a "double law" that are the two poles of hospitality that often determines a pragmatic poise by even acting in two different tangents such that it "defy dialectics". This conceptualisation of hospitality does not limit us to binaries/ dualisms where the rights of the state are at loggerheads to the rights of the refugee individual. In contrast to the 'fixed' notion of state in the rights discourse, hospitality offers a notion of state that is permeable to the varying degree of negotiations and concessions that happen between the 'host' and the 'guest'. Hospitality befalls as a normative idea that roots the refugee practices which determine the relations between the host and the guest, which govern the ethical reaction that an outsider receives on crossing the border.

Judith Butler's normative conceptualisation of performativity can be applied in the state behaviour where the state tries to conceive, enact and propagate the pre-existing idea it tends to represent. Scholars like David Campbell and Cynthia Weber have located the

constitution of states as subjects within the framework of performativity. Weber negates the idea of sovereignty as an ontological reality in Performative States where she opines that the state tries to create legitimacy through performing sovereignty. These scholars take the application of performativity in a different realm where the political identity of the state is being constantly shaped by the constitutive actions that it performs. Drawing from Butler's idea, one could propose that performativity of the state also manifests in the way it enacts the principle of hospitality through its concerted response of providing refuge to various groups of people over the time. Accordingly, the state is constructing a pre-constituted idea of hospitality by acting out the individual policy response to different refugee groups. The 'conditional laws of hospitality' when enacted by the performative state, then reflects an ad-hoc nature of response towards the refugees who come into the state. The state executes, performs and reiterates the norms of hospitality to indicate humanitarianism as the objective reality. States like India lack an institutionalized legal scaffold for regulating the large plethora of asylum seekers and refugees within its territory. India, being a non-signatory to both the 1951 refugee convention and the 1964 protocol, has resisted the necessity to maintain a national legislation for maintaining and protecting the refugees within its territory. Normatively, India has opened its borders to a large segment of the population who flee their homelands due to violent conflicts, political unrest and fear of persecution. An analysis of the treatment meted out to various asylum seekers over the period of time shows the ad-hoc approach opted by Indian government based on various domestic legislations like The Passport (Entry of India) Act, 1920, The Passport Act 1967, The Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939, The Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Foreigners Order, 1948. The differential treatment of refugees can be considered to be a case of state engaging in a performative idea of hospitality(practiced by the Indian state in terms of providing differential aid and assistance to the refugee groups) which in turn is based on the principle of humanitarianism.

NC

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

While the concept of trauma, shock, and nostalgia are seen as predecessors, it was as recently as 1980 when the term Post Traumatic Stress disorder first appeared in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) published by

the American Psychiatric Association. The diagnosis and its eventual definition are associated with the Vietnam War veterans diagnosed with psychological symptoms in the 1970s. The APA defines PTSD as “an anxiety problem that develops in some people after extremely traumatic events, such as combat, crime, an accident or natural disaster.”

In the context of refugee studies, the mental health of those seeking refuge has been a matter of concern. People often try to escape persecution, disruptions and wars; most of them have experienced torture, trauma and loss. Many refugees have been victims of violence and rape or have seen their family and friends tortured or killed. As a result, many refugees experience Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Children and adolescents within the refugee population often have a higher incidence of PTSD. The language and cultural barriers and biases tend to hinder the identification of the condition and the development of a therapeutic relationship. Studies find the increased prevalence of PTSD and depression in refugee populations for many years after displacement.

MJ

“Protection” in South Asia

It is imperative to understand the trajectory of protection that evolved in the subcontinent during the colonial period and its postcolonial imprints later. Though migration was frequent in the colonial period, such mobility was used prominently to meet the needs of the empire. The movement of migrant labour across the border to work in the plantations, or for imperial military expeditions, was in alignment with the imperial motive of appropriating the colonial resources for the benefit of the crown. Hence, the notion of protection or sanctuary was irrelevant in such population flows. The strategic alliances given to rulers of princely states and petty kingdoms also were not, per say, deemed to be the protection necessitated by the practices of political sanctuary. The consolidation of erstwhile imperial borders to the territory of an independent nation was coherent with the transition of ‘colonial subject’ to the ‘political subject’ of a sovereign nation-state (Samaddar, 2015). But unlike the homogeneous western nation-state, the newly independent nation states formed out of the violent partition of erstwhile empire had created splintered identities with multiple faultlines along ethnicity, language and culture. This pre-empted an ambiguous belonging for these political subjects who internalised the territorial borders of their new nation-states as sacrosanct. The construct of citizenship

facilitated the perpetuation of the “territorial gaze” of distinguishing between ‘us’ and ‘them’ depending on the side of the border one was located. The vestiges of the same colonial legacy is instrumental in understanding how our citizenship law was a temporal and spatial project that tried to imbibe the essentialities of a modern nation-state which was habituated to ‘exclude and limit’ rather than to ‘include and embrace’ (Chowdhory, Poyil & Kajla, 2019). GCR, which is, in its essence, only a logical extension to the existing protection regime, then requires a post-colonial rumination as it lacks an attempt to revamp and reconfigure the protection regime from the specific reality of the global south. Satvinder Juss (2013) rightly postulates that the post-colonial critique of international legal refugee framework exposes the asymmetric power relation between the ‘coloniser’ and the ‘colonised’, where even the coloniser have essentially co-opted the notion of ‘other’ in their constant effort to distinguish themselves from the colonized subject- only to be perpetuated in multiple forms of power relations even now. Eurocentric bias of international protection regime mediated by the global north “classifies, discriminates and differentiates” the refugee as “West’s ‘others’” (Juss, 2013:318). The reciprocal relation of “post-colonial power” with “principle of responsibility” is what defines the contours of the refugee protection regime for countries that are caught up in the “margins of international system (Samaddar 2017:48). Samaddar (2017) argues the need for a “post-colonial framing of responsibility” as the existing legal description of refugee does not take into consideration the “decolonisation, partition, structural reforms, environmental disasters neoliberal development” and nation-building of various countries of global south.

The affinity for various primordial identities like ethnicity and religion is significant in the constitution of citizenship and this needs to be introspected through a post-colonial lens to understand how the very same citizenship that is vital for political inclusion becomes vital in segregation, differentiation and repudiation even for refugees who seek protection. The protection regime for refugees in India still conflates them with foreigners through the *Foreigners’ Act, 1946* which, is an overt illustration of how the colonial past still shapes and appraises the post-colonial present of these South Asian countries (Chowdhory, Poyil & Kajla, 2019). When analysed empirically, it can be ascertained that the determination of the refugee status by these nations more than often is not based on the variables of legal refugee frameworks, or not by an impartial assessment of distinctions and concerns of

various individual asylum seekers per se, but rather on a case to case basis of their collective identity of nation/community/religion by heavily weighing in the kinship affinity or strategic relations with the country of origin of these refugees. While the claimant Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka without valid travel documents were accorded refugee status in India, same was not given to the Sikhs and Hindus who fled Afghanistan. As Samaddar (2003) points out, refugee policy for any country is an account of how it “takes care and limits care” to a segment of people who are not its citizens. So having a concerted refugee policy or not having one at all is just a reflection of how any nation state wields and extends its power to include and exclude.

NC

Source

Chowdhory, N., Poyil, S.T. and Kajla, M. 2019. “The idea of protection: norms and practice of refugee management in India”, *Refugee Watch*, 53: 36–54

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Protection Space

Protection space denotes a space that refugees have carved out for themselves in negotiation with a variety of hosts and actors of the humanitarian sector and refugee regime to receive protection in the absence of a legal status and its accompanying rights as refugees. Protection space is often characterized by the de facto integration of refugees and their partial/informal access to the labour market and limited public services. It is not a physical space but a space of negotiation through variegated protection strategies and livelihood mechanisms. However, the constitution of protection space and the level of de facto integration is dependent on a variety of factors relating to the individual refugees at hand. Time spent in displacement, knowing the local language/s, social networks, and good rapports with local officials all influence a refugee’s protection space. The scope of protection spaces hence differs across a wide range. Yet, in general, protection spaces serve as an “intermediate, available solution” (Cheung 2012, 51) while waiting for, or in absence of, the materialization of de jure local integration, repatriation, or resettlement. As such,

protection space stands for refugees' agency in developing effective strategies to receive protection amidst a so-called "solutions impasse" (Cheung 2012,55) while it also acknowledges the incomplete security and safety refugees can create and receive in countries with a punitive migration control system. The emergence of the term protection space is closely related to UNHCR's observation on refugees' living situations in urban areas. While in its 1997 policy paper, UNHCR still considered urban refugees generally as a problem, taking a hard stance on them, it finally recognized urban refugees' needs for protection in its 2009 policy change. This was the first time that UNHCR used the notion of protection space and included ideas and practices that had already been established before its policy (Crisp 2017). Hence, protection space as a notion demonstrates the importance of paying attention to refugees' practices and not solely policy driven refugee protection to support and facilitate more durable solutions to displacement.

MJN

Source

Cheung, Samuel. 2012. "Migration Control and the Solutions Impasse in South and Southeast Asia: Implications from the Rohingya Experience". *Journal of Refugee Studies* 25, no. 1: 50–70. DOI:10.1093/jrs/fer048.

Crisp, Jeff. 2017. "Finding Space for Protection: An Inside Account of the Evolution of UNHCR's Urban Refugee Policy." *Refuge* 33, no. 1: 87–96. *HeinOnline*, <https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/rfgcjr33&i=89>.

R

“Radcliffe Line”

British lawyer Cyril Radcliffe was entrusted the responsibility of drawing the boundary between India and Pakistan in the east and the west, as the Chairperson of the Bengal Boundary Commission and the Punjab Boundary Commission. Radcliffe was a successful civil servant who had not set foot in India before July 8th, 1947, while the date for transfer of power was set as August 15. British poet W. H. Auden satirized the proceedings of the commissions and Radcliffe’s role in them as “But in seven weeks it was done, the frontiers decided, /A continent for better or worse divided.” With two legal experts per head nominated by the Muslim League and the Congress for each of the boundary commissions, the people entrusted with dividing the territory of British India had little expertise and knowledge about how to execute the boundary award. Nevertheless, the Radcliffe line was revealed on 17th August 1947, two days after Pakistan and India declared their independence, Parts of the Nadia district in West Bengal had originally been awarded to East Pakistan, and changed afterwards. While the commissions’ stated objective was to divide the provinces on the basis of the contiguous majority areas of the three religious’ groups (Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs), Radcliffe was accused of prioritising economic concerns. The Radcliffe line also privileged existing administrative boundaries, not natural ones (like rivers or hills). The Partition of British India along the Radcliffe line was witness to large scale forced migration of people on both sides of the border, violence, unrest, displacement and death.

SB

Source

Chester, L. 2002. “The 1947 Partition: Drawing the Indo-Pakistani Boundary.” *American Diplomacy*. <https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2002/02/the-1947-partition-drawing-the-indo-pakistani-boundary/>

Raltlan (Mizo/Lushai/ Duhlian Term)

The Mizo word for migration against one’s will is *raltlan*. The root words of *raltlan* are ‘*ral*’ (lit., to be at war, to war against, fighting men) and ‘*tlan*’ (lit., to run, to take shelter); ‘*tlanbo*’ (lit., to run away, to escape); ‘*tlan chhuak*’ (lit., to run out, to escape). It refers to ‘those who flee’ their native places in order to seek refuge elsewhere as a result of local

insecurities or conditions that pose a risk to their existence, particularly in times of war or conditions that are analogous to war. The Burma mi (Chin, Burmese) are the quintessential example of *raltlan* to the *Zo hnahtlak* (lit., Zo/Mizo people). Reversely, during the twenty-year MNF-led insurgency (1966-86), the Zo/Mizo from Mizoram represented *raltlan* when they crossed over to Chin Hills, Myanmar, in search of safe-zones. The displaced tribes (ethnically related to the Zo people) from the Chittagong hydro-power projects, as well as security clashes between Bangladeshi security forces and armed ethnic forces, are also referred to as *raltlan* by the Zo people in Mizoram. The Chakma tribes who enter Mizoram from Bangladesh in search of safety are referred to as 'foreigners,' or 'Chakma foreigners' not *raltlan*.

ASC

Source

Lorrain, James Herbert & Savidge, Fred. W. 1898. *Grammar and Dictionary of the Lushai Language (Dulien Dialect)*. Shillong: The Assam Secretariat Printing Department. p. 168.
Times of Mizoram. 'Burma (Myanmar) Raltlan'. Aizawl. March 30, 2021.

Reception Centre

The reception centre is a location with facilities for receiving, processing and attending to the immediate needs of refugees or asylum-seekers in a country of asylum. It is usually the first point of contact. The use of designated 'reception centres' where experts can provide a range of services is beneficial to manage reception arrangements for large groups and also in locations with frequent arrivals of asylum seekers and migrants. The services of the reception arrangements are provided to all persons, regardless of status, to ensure their welfare until their referral to appropriate processes and procedures. For the new arrivals, the qualified staff at these reception centres meet their immediate needs. For officials and authorities, the centre provides an organised setting allowing them to target their responses effectively. Reception centres have two crucial goals in the immediate period following arrival. They address the basic material and psycho-social needs of all arrivals. This includes accommodation, food, clothing, and any medical services. The second goal is to distinguish between various categories of people, including refugees, asylum seekers, persons seeking international protection and those with other specific needs. Depending on the particular

situation, however, smaller group homes, community placements or private accommodation may be more appropriate than large reception centres.

MJ

Refugee and Partition

In the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is defined as: a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of their nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection of that country". This meaning was limited to the "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951", a meaning that follows the concerns of Western democracies in the aftermath of the war, when the limited numbers who managed to flee were automatically granted asylum» (Chimni 2000: 270-277). While in practice the definition of refugees is at stake, its application has (also) reached an unexpected situation, as the refugees from partitions were initially an unpredicted consequence that resulted from decolonization. In any instance, the main question that has to be considered is the relationship between the concept of refugee and the specific legal status inside the framework created by the postcolonial states. As a consequence, different developments of the use and the meaning of the term share a common core relating to the fact that "The regularised system of international protection came in the wake of the development of a unified notion of unilateral sovereign capacity - of the States - to grant asylum" (Samaddar 2003, 40).

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The use of the word refugee has always been confusing, but in the particular situation of the partition and nation-building the 'myth' of the 'nation' has been used with a selective attribution as a kind of honour related to the fact of being part of this process. For example, in Pakistan, from the arabic meaning of 'emigrant', in Pakistan the term Mohajir literally means “a person who has moved into Pakistan as a result of Partition or for fear of disturbances connected therewith”, but the term is commonly referred “to those who came from the rest of India and choose to settle in Sindh” and not to others that fit the first definition, such as the East Punjabis. Leaving aside the specific dimensions of the bureaucratic presence of the Mohajir, what is relevant here is the construction of the Mohajir myth as part of the post-Partition nation building: “the sense of systematic discrimination, -...- the myth that they are creators of Pakistan and are therefore more Pakistani than the Sindhis and others, -...- the myth that all those who crossed the Refuges and Partition in a Migrants' World borders suffered great personal loss and sacrifice for the new country”(Bose 2001).

Yet, this same 'honour' has not been conceded to others who also crossed the borders. Thus, the myth creates new commonalities that leave others outside. This is consistent with the long history of nation building; the myth of a common past, common sufferance and common experience has been traced back to the 18th century by the main historians of nationalism (Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1990). Thus, we can observe how the role played by the notion of the new 'old' Pakistani identity in post-partition Pakistan nationalized the partition's refugees. Conceptual accounts of the relationship between the nation, the State, and the role of its subjects, shows that the process of creating state sovereignty goes together with the bordering/defining of geographical and political spaces: along with

physical borders, citizenship is the legal mark of a political border that crosses the internal space of a state. The link between the state and the nation is the background for the construction of an ethnic core for the nation that reinvents the past in terms of imagined communities, and constantly produces the other as a counterbalance (Mezzadra 2007; Anderson 1983; Balibar - Wallerstein 1991). This is the political and geographical framework in which the partition refugees could be situated.

From the point of view of historical reality, partition refugees in the Asian subcontinent are the outcome of political and institutional processes that happened during a defined time. Although Partition continues to reveal its fruits with time, formally it happened with the creation of India and Pakistan, and then of Bangladesh. Unlike other kinds of refugees, one can say that the nationalization of an area relegated them to a very particular condition, in which the right to return sometimes seems meaningless, as the very reason for their migration was the creation of nationally homogeneous states. The historical narratives of the nation, moreover, has a part for partition refugees as well, by giving them a role in the new nation, and often leading them to be overwhelmed by the nationalized narrative of their condition. At the same time, Partition refugees are different from other refugees and migrants partly because they (although not all of them) are scheduled to become part of the construction of the new nations.

Looking through the wider lens of a nation's history, we can say that all refugees, at some point and in some instances, are part of the nation-building process because they are defined exactly by the semantics of the nation. What makes a difference for partition refugees is their double identity: they are not only part, but internal to the space of the nation precisely because they are external to it. In this sense, we can state that partition generates a complicated process in which the other that is necessarily part of the nation building duplicates into an external other and an internal one: the external other being the refugee of foreign nationality, the internal one being the refugee of the same nationality.

Partition is "the nationalist resolution of a nationalist problematic", in the sense that it splits the state in order to save the logic of the state; it divides the nations in order to save the logic of the nation (Bianchini – Chaturvedi – Ivekovic – Samaddar 2005). What is left aside in this process is the political other with respect to the nation-state logic, and the political community (and subjects) that exceed the space of the nation-state. Although refugees'

rights originated inside this space, its internal logic and its very process, in most instances, makes the enjoyment of those rights difficult. Put in this way, while the language of the nation produces the light of a sense of nationalist belonging and the images of these rights, the refugees are trapped in the shadow of this light. In some instances, we can say that the truth of their condition (and their subjectivity) is deleted, or erased from the view of the nation itself. What makes a substantial difference between refugees and other migrants is that refugees are legally trapped in this shadow, and the paternalistic state defines its own virtue and rightness vis-a-vis the refugees, particularly in South Asia and in India, where the goodness of the state is considered part of its biography (Samaddar 2001).

Partition itself must be seen as an ongoing process, a process which, since it creates its own logic, transforms, and transfigures social realities and the meanings of political discourse. The concepts of responsibility and reparation, for example, show their elusiveness in the context of Partition, because in the new dimension their meaning becomes unclear. The pretension of control of political meaning that is embodied in the nation crashes in this “sensitive frontier between the truth of the nation and the political knowledge that critiques it” (Bianchini – Chaturvedi – Ivekovic – Samaddar 2005, 11). The construction of internal hierarchies has been a fundamental element of the European State system since the beginning, as shown in historical accounts of the colonial world. This has been reflected in the history of Partitions in the post-colonial world, through the nationalization of the movements that occurred during this period (Banerjee in Samaddar, eds 2003: 69-105). Young states, as Samaddar explains, ‘can survive only on the basis of a continuing and permanent agenda for building an ‘ethnic core’ and thereby marginalizing the others’, ... migrants and refugees share a common condition as they «always remain on the margins of the system -...- but they are required to define the system» (Samaddar 1999, 41-44).

*The term partition is laden with multiple meanings: while it refers to the “infamous event” of the partitioning of Indian sub-continent, partition is also a political logic that “reshapes states and mind” as in Bianchini – Chaturvedi – Ivekovic – Samaddar 2005.

GG

(Adapted from Grappi, G. 2004. “Refugees and Partition in a Migrants’ World.” *Refugee Watch*, no. 35: 64-72.)

Source

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso.

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Refugee Diaspora

The term refugee diaspora describes refugees as transnational communities that are spread over several countries due to forced dispersal. What distinguishes refugee diasporas from other diasporas is a sense of unsettledness and the relevance of travel and (forced) movement in continued displacement. Van Hear (2006) writes about refugee diasporas that transnationality has become somewhat of a fourth (en)durable solution to refugees in prolonged displacement. Refugees often continue to move after initial displacement but also consolidate themselves in places of refuge, creating complex relations between its members, and its hosts, to not only escape violence and persecution but also to create a better livelihood for socio-economic survival. As such, it is refugees' divergent journeys beyond initial displacement which produces them as a refugee diaspora with its multitude of transnational connections, livelihood strategies, and conditions of/for settlement. Like Van Hear, Wahlbeck (2002) equally argues for the importance of viewing refugees through the prism of transnationalism and diaspora as it highlights the dual orientation and distinct relations of refugees with the society of origin and of (temporary) settlement. According to him, refugee diasporas' most important social ties are not formed in the hosting country but in the refugees' country of origin. These transnational ties are maintained through communication, travel, and media - driving a discourse on and politics of national

recognition while reflecting political allegiances that originate in the homeland. In other words, the concept of refugee diaspora emphasizes the community's transnational relations across various and divergent localities which constitute them as political agents and which influence their (temporary) settlement in displacement.

MJN

Source

Van Hear, Nicholas. 2006. "Refugees in Diaspora: From Durable Solutions to Transnational Relations". *Refugee* 23, no. 1: 9–15. <https://doi.org/10.25071/1920-7336.21338>.

Wahlbeck, Oesten. 2002. "The Concept of Diaspora as an Analytical Tool in the Study of Refugee Communities". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28, no. 2: 221–38. DOI: 10.1080/13691830220124305.

Refugee Diaspora

The term "refugee diasporas" is based on a "conceptualization of refugeeness and diasporicness that is rooted not only in the flight and rehabilitation of refugee groups but also in the making and unmaking of diasporic identities through the daily practices of living of refugees over time in one or several host societies" (Basu 2018, 2). The term refugee alludes to a politico-legal identity arising out of persecution and cross border movements of individuals and groups, whereas the diaspora is a cultural and symbolic identity assumed by those who are prepared to stay in their society of arrival. Refugee diaspora, placed syntagmatically, encompass a semantic domain that recognizes hybridity, transnationalism, immigration, integration, homing, transformation, dispersal and return (Tololyan 1991). How refugee diasporics while formulating and reformulating their identities take advantage of the opportunities available to citizens while negotiating with the extraordinary pressure to assimilate into the host society is brought to clear relief. A hyphenated term like refugee diasporas takes not only the individual accounts of refugee identity into focus but also articulates the alternative refugee subjectivities that run counter to or aligned with diasporic consciousness. Theorizing any refugee group becoming diasporic in orientation, serves to bring out the dilemmas, paradoxes and parallels between citizenship, nationality, territorialisation, sovereignty, patriotism, race, xenophobia, dwelling and dislocation related to forced migrants and their hosts in space and time. Using refugee diaspora conjointly alerts us to the pitfalls of using either of the terms too expansively and uncritically.

SB

Source

Basu, Sudeep. 2018. *In Diasporic Lands: Tibetan refugees and their Transformation since the Exodus*. Hyderabad: Orient BlackSwan

Tololyan, Kachig. 1991. 'The Nation-State and its Others: In Lieu of a Preface'. *Diaspora* 1, no. 1: 3–7

Refugee online

Refugee online refers to the site or platform where not only are personal, aesthetic and political visions communicated but what also gets aired at these sites, as for instance with Tibetan refugees, are the agnostic struggles waged virtually by refugees vis-a-vis their significant others through claims and counter-claims to symbolic and material resources. The proliferation of a vibrant media interactive spaces among lay Tibetans in Tibet and in the diaspora has reinvigorated the Tibetan movement in the face of Sinicization of Tibet. The online sites allows for the creation of social bonds among refugees and their hosts across spaces and their access to virtual modes of communication, rituals, texts traced to a specific place in their homelands or the diaspora. The profanity of the Tibetan attitude to information is witnessed in the critical exchanges and dissemination of information that occur in the social media spaces, serving as an index of the emergence of a vibrant democracy in exile. In a mediatized context, the dynamics of exile leads specifically to the preservation of the intangible cultural heritage of Tibet in the digital domain for posterity. Through media, Tibetans' home and homeland are unhooked, made portable and in search of new spaces, imaginings, homing desires in the continuous ebb and flow of refugees living in an unequal world.

SB

Regular Migration

Regular migration is defined as migration that occurs through recognized, and authorized channels. The regularity of migration does not only refer to the method used to cross a country's border, as migrants can enter into a country through regular channels, but find themselves in an irregular situation after a certain period. In reality, distinctions between migrants in regular and irregular situations are rarely clear. Migrants may come to a country in a regular manner and later become 'irregular' due to administrative overstay. This may be due to no fault of the migrant herself, but instead to unclear or overly bureaucratic

migration procedures, discrimination, or practical barriers such as high visa renewal costs, language barriers and lack of access to legal aid or environmental, health or other crises. Such overstay affects migrants from all countries and at all socio-economic and educational levels. Members of the same family may even hold a different status in a country and such status can regularly change throughout the course of one's migration and/or stay. For the minority of migrants who do arrive irregularly, it is important to note that such irregular arrival can be justified, for example in the case of irregularly arriving migrants seeking protection from persecution and from *refoulement* by transit countries. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is, for example, seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid travel document. For regular migration to any state, a valid travel document is a necessity. Defining regular and irregular migration has been the subject of considerable debate. Terms such as legal/illegal, with proper documents, undocumented, non-documented, and authorised/unauthorised migration can have different connotations in national policy debates. Also, policy makers urge migrants to go through regular channels with travel documents because irregular migration is often associated with criminal activities. The international Bill of Human Rights enshrines principles of non-discrimination and equality. For migrants, whether arriving through regular or irregular channels, should be have non-discriminatory access to all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights with only two limited exceptions as to the right to vote and take part in public affairs, and the right to freedom of movement within a country. All other human rights should be enjoyed equally and without discrimination by all people under the jurisdiction or effective control of the State, including migrants in irregular situations. Any differential treatment between nationals and non-nationals, or between non-nationals with different migration status, must be lawful, proportionate and pursue a legitimate aim. An attempt to define different classes of migrants with different classes of rights other than those explicitly allowed within the International Bill of Human Rights would be contrary to these core values of universality, equality and non-discrimination.

PB

Source

OHCHR, Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Migration/GlobalCompactMigration/RegularAndIrregular.pdf>

Religious Exiles

Religion lies at the foundation of any exilic experience, tracing back to the dispersal of Jews from Babylon, reflected in the Deuteronomic writings onward. Indeed, the world today, as Peter Berger notes, is 'as furiously religious as it ever was and, in some places, more so than ever' (Berger 1999, 3). The Diaspora is no exception to this trend. Indeed, diaspora studies still lack a proper understanding of religion as a major element of the diasporic experience. "As a sociological concept in Diaspora Studies, diaspora is a religious concept mainly in terms of religion as an identity rather than as having doctrinal import" (Posman 2016, 181). Identifying religions with an ethnic identity tied to a country or to a specific geographical territory, which they consider to be endowed with sacred features, has been the preoccupation of the proponents of the idea of a religious diaspora. Judaism, Sikhism, Hinduism, Islam and even Zoroastrianism are religions for which the idea of a religious diaspora can be accepted, as they also designate an ethnic identity and refer to a sacred territory that they idealize and long for and to which they strive to return, at least at the discursive level. The existence of a mythical territory, a diasporic consciousness, and a longing to return allows for these religiously oriented exilic communities to be considered as diasporas. Such a prospect has far reached implications in fostering cultural nationalism, majoritarianism, xenophobia, zealotry and authoritarianism in places of origin and arrival of migrants and exiles.

SB

Source

Berger, Peter, ed. 1999. *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent religions and World Politics*. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company

Posman, Ellen. 2016. "Home and Away: Exile and Diaspora as Religious Concepts". In *Intersections of Religion and Migration. Issues at the Global Crossroads*, edited by Jennifer B. Saunders, Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Susanna Snyder: 175–94. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Remittances

Remittance is derived from the word 'remit', which means 'to send back'. It refers to money sent or transferred to another party, usually overseas. When migrants send home part of their earnings in either cash or goods to support their families, these transfers are known as

workers' or migrant remittances. Remittances represent household income from foreign economies arising mainly from people's temporary or permanent movement to those economies. Remittances include cash and non-cash items that flow through formal channels, such as electronic wire, or through informal channels, such as money or goods carried across borders. Migrant remittances have been growing rapidly in the past few years and represent the largest foreign income source for many developing economies. The International Monetary Fund, the leading provider of international remittance statistics, defines remittances as the sum of two main components- "Compensation of employees" and "personal transfers". Employees' compensation refers to remuneration for labour input to the production process contributed by an individual. Personal Transfers consist of all current transfers in cash or kind made or received by resident households to or from non-resident households.

Remittances can be sent within countries and not just across borders. These are called internal remittances. Furthermore, not all remittances are of financial or in-kind nature. Social remittances are "the ideas, behaviours, identities and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending country communities" (Levitt, 1998: 927). Social remittances include innovative ideas, valuable transnational networks, knowledge, political values, policy reforms and new technological skills. Evidence from household surveys shows that remittances increase savings and asset accumulation and help smooth income and consumption. Remittances enhance household well-being.

MJ

Responsibility

Through the entire period of the emergence of nation states, the idea of responsibility was framed along the axis of global governance. Wars, not surprisingly, provoked arguments of responsibility, something that victorious kings, princes, nations, and states demanded of the vanquished. Responsibility gradually came to imply accountability – accountability for imposing wars on societies, inflicting massive loss of human lives and property, destroying dignity and rights of individuals, groups, and races, instituting discrimination at every level of life, enslaving, and uprooting and displacing entire populations. All these came to be known as crimes under international law. The Nuremberg Principles (1947) listed the

codified idea of responsibility as accountability. With the Nuremberg Principles the high noon of international responsibility arrived.

Thus, close on the heels of the Nuremberg Principles, nations agreed on the four Geneva Conventions (1949) which in the course of defining the laws of war further clarified the principle of responsibility. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, commonly known as the Genocide Convention (1951) was the first human rights treaty that declared genocide as a crime and obligated state parties to pursue enforcement of its prohibition. Conceived largely in response to WWII that had witnessed atrocities on an unimaginable scale, such as the Holocaust or the Nazi occupation of Eastern Europe, the Convention outlawed massacres of indigenous communities and religious minorities which had marked the history of colonialism. The Convention defined genocide as any of five "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." These five acts were: killing members of the group, causing them serious bodily or mental harm, imposing living conditions intended to destroy the group, preventing births, and forcibly transferring children out of the group. The Convention further criminalized complicity, attempt, or incitement of its commission. All perpetrators were to be tried regardless of whether they were private individuals, public officials, or political leaders with sovereign immunity.

By this time, the UN had already adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to support the relief and human development of Palestinian refugees was established in 1949. The Geneva Convention for Refugee Protection followed in 1951. We all know how the emerging rights discourse that enjoined upon state parties to observe civil and political rights and subsequently social and economic rights developed further. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), Convention on Child Rights (1989), and other declarations of human rights and the duty of the states to observe those rights were milestones in this process. The Biological Weapons Convention, formally known as "The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction" was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into

force in 1975. It supplemented the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which had prohibited only the use of biological weapons. Likewise, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly known as the Chemical Weapons Convention, came into effect in 1992.

These conventions laid down the path of an inter-linked development of two principles of a responsible power: respecting rights and observing obligations. Responsibility on a global scale was conceptualised in this way.

Yet in this post-war period stretching up to our time, American napalm bombing of Vietnam, bombing of Iraq and embargo on its economic life resulted in deaths of thousands of Iraqi children, bombing of Afghanistan, NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the dirty wars and foreign interventions in Latin America, numerous military coups backed and approved by Great Powers, and several other gross violations by aggressive and interventionist powers happened leading to massive losses of human life and displacement of millions.

In this milieu, “responsibility to protect” became infamous as a doctrine of responsibility as it increasingly used the ruse of responsibility to subjugate sovereign nations of the developing world. It had however, begun on an innocuous note.

After WWII, countries strove to create a new world order. Its basis would be respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of a country. To preserve peace and defend human rights, the United Nations periodically organized multinational peacekeeping forces to work in coordination with local governments. The turn came in the 1990s with the advent of a neo-liberal world order, when after a series of conflicts including the Rwandan genocide and the Balkan wars many pressed for a redefinition of the notion of global responsibility. In 2005 the UN members endorsed the “responsibility to protect” doctrine, which states that countries have a fundamental sovereign responsibility to protect their citizens. If they fail to do so, that responsibility devolves on the global order to take steps to protect those vulnerable people, in the process violating the sovereignty of the relevant country if needed. In other words, countries acting under UN auspices can use all means necessary including military intervention to prevent large-scale loss of life.

The real nature of the doctrine revealed itself in 2011 in Libya’s civil war, when humanitarian intervention evolved into a regime-change operation.

The evolution of humanitarian intervention showed the strong traces of the colonial past. As an instance we may mention the place of Ottoman Turkey in British imagination in the nineteenth century, as Britain consistently invoked a “concert of Europe” against Ottoman Turkey on the ground of latter’s inability to protect Christian subjects. Britain’s Prime Minister Gladstone’s inflammatory rhetoric in his “Bulgarian Horrors” pamphlet was legitimized by his humanitarian perspective. French operations in Africa or NATO’s bombardment in Serbia carried the colonial lineage of intervention on humanitarian grounds. The chief feature of the colonial and neo-colonial practice of power is that while power is justified in the name of its burden of responsibility, power does not have to account for the consequences of its exercise. Great Powers may provoke, unleash, or support wars, but they will not be responsible for displacements.

A stark instance of this discriminatory history is that while the International Criminal Court (ICC) established by the Rome Statute (1998) is hailed in the West as the ultimate institution of international justice, the United States opted out of it as it had to save its soldiers engaged in various interventionist wars from possible charges of war crimes. The US is one of the few countries in the world that voted against the treaty. The ICC faces objections to its jurisdiction, accusations of bias, Eurocentrism¹, and racism. These objections are around the question of fairness of its case-selection, trial procedures, and doubts about the effectiveness of ICC.

RS

Right to Return

Legally, this right is considered as a bedrock of the international refugee conventions. Every refugee has the right to return as enshrined in the international covenants existing to protect refugee rights. Article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that, “everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) under its provisions of the right to freedom of movement (Article 12) has two basic features- one is the internal freedom of movement within the country (12 (1)), and the other is the external movement between states and the right to leave one’s own country (12 (2)) and most importantly, the right to enter one’s ‘own country’ (12 (4)). While theoretically the right to return exists, in practice often this becomes redundant, or the changed situation often turns

out to be unfavourable for the returnee migrants or refugees. This happened, for instance, in South Asia, after the great Indian partition of 1947. The newly created states of India and Pakistan had then failed to ensure the condition of a safe return for the returnee migrants in both sides of the border and the returns were fraught with communal tensions. This apart, there are situations when the practical implementation of this right becomes almost an impossibility. For instance, climate refugees or development induced displacements, in which cases a return becomes almost impossible. Nonetheless, the theoretical acceptance of the right has positive implications for displaced vulnerable groups as it ensures that they have a place to call 'home'.

SS

Rural-Urban Fringe

In 1951, the American land economist H. M. Meyer defined the rural-urban fringe for the first time as a transition zone between the city and the rural agricultural area where both rural and urban practices present a mixed land use pattern. Rural-Urban fringe refers to the interface zone between the urban industrial, commercial space in the city and the rural agrarian landscape where rural land use and occupational pattern are replaced by new urban land usage. Located well within the urban sphere of influence, the fringe is characterised by a wide variety of land use, including dormitory settlements, housing of middle-income commuters who work in the central urban area. Suburbanisation takes place at the municipal boundary of the rural-urban fringe. Scholars have used different terms for the understanding and explanation of the fringe area. Wissink in 1961 used the term 'suburb'. Burgess called it a 'peripheral zone'; the Census of India has used the term 'Out Urban Area', the term 'Rural-Urban Continuum' has also been used. The evolution of the term goes back to J.H. von Thunen in 1826, when the city was described as surrounded by a system of concentric belts of land use. Indian scholars such as R.L. Singh, has called it a rural land with urban phenomena. M.M.P Sinha has defined the rural-urban fringe as a narrow zone with varying width outside the political boundaries of an urban unit which is neither urban nor rural in character. It is characterised by the constant influx of new territory within the urban realm, while purely rural settlements in this peripheral zone of urban influence shed their traditional character and tend to change their pattern of livelihood and habitation.

Source

Lal, H. 1987. *City and Urban Fringe: A Case Study of Bareilly*. New Delhi, India: Concept Publishing Company.

Ramachandran, R. 1989. *Urbanisation and Urban Systems in India*. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press.

Thakur, Binda. 1991. *Land Utilisation and Urbanisation: The Rural-Urban Fringe*. New Delhi, India: Deep and Deep Publications.

S

Safe Migration

There is no common definition for the concept of “safe migration.” When using the term, it is important to understand that a migrant can be in an unsafe situation while or after having migrated through regular channels; and conversely, a migrant can be in a situation that is both safe and irregular. “Safe migration” is not a static concept. The situation of migrants can change from safety, to lack of safety throughout the various phases of their migratory process. Moreover, while the concepts of ‘orderly’ and ‘regular’ migration have a normative character, the concept of “safe migration” primarily concerns the well-being of migrants. Safe migration may mean that the migrants are protected from any risks related to their health, legal status or life at all the stages of the migration process (in the countries of origin, transit and destination).

Migration features as a key cross-cutting theme in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. SDG 11, target 10.7 calls for States to “facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies,” all within Goal 10 on reducing inequalities. Through this goal and its contingent target, States acknowledge that good migration governance is a key element for safer, more orderly and more regular migration. This premise is further developed in the Report of the former Special Representative of the Secretary General on Migration, Peter Sutherland, which found that to achieve the commitment of facilitating safe, orderly and regular migration, “States need sound policies that: (a) protect migrants; (b) give them the chance to migrate legally and safely; and (c) ensure that, once they have emigrated, they can play a full part in the society and economy they have joined.” (SG on Migration 2016) Creating conditions to enable safe migration, first of all, means advocating for the rights of migrants to have decent work and living conditions. It also means migrants have access to social and health services.

PB

Source

Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration, 2016. A/71/728, paragraph 18.

‘Safe Migration,’ AFEW, <https://afew.org/safe-migration/#:~:text=Safe%20migration%20means%20that%20the,origin%2C%20transit%20and%20destination>).

Self-settled Refugees

Self-settled refugees are those who have lived outside the permanent settlements that are specially built under the rehabilitation scheme for refugees. It has been claimed that self-settlement is inevitable for two reasons. “Firstly, all refugees could not possibly be accommodated in organized settlements because of insufficient funds. Secondly, organized settlements have largely failed to achieve the objective of economic self-sufficiency: the so called land settlements have been unable to provide enough land for the settlers to make a living and “wage earning” settlements provide only seasonal employment” (Kok 1989, 420). The use of adoptive labels by the self-settled refugees are at times prompted by fear of repatriation or deportation to refugee camps. Using identity signs or documents are part of the strategy of invisibility adopted by self-settled refugees to avoid the prospect of embarrassment or harassment among hosts. This comes close to the UNHCR’s definition of integration as “the process by which the refugee is assimilated into the social and economic life of a new national community” which is clearly unsatisfactory and tautological, as it merely replaces the term to be defined with another word presumed to be synonymous. Barbara Harrell-Bond’s definition is more suggestive here as it anticipates the mutuality of self-settledness and integration in referring to “a situation in which the host and refugee communities are able to co-exist, sharing the same resources – both economic and social – with no greater mutual conflict than that which exists within the host community” (1986, 7).

SB

Source

Harrell-Bond, B. E. 1986. *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Kok, W. 1989. “Self-settled Refugees and the Socio-economic Impact of their Presence on Kassala, Eastern Sudan.” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 2, no. 4: 419–40

Social Networks

Migrants, especially forced migrants, are seriously dependent on their social networks. For migrants, social networks are crucial for finding jobs and accommodations, circulating goods and services, and psychological support and continuous social and economic information in

the destination areas. Social networks often guide migrants into or through specific places and occupations. Some of the most compelling results to emerge from recent research on migration have come in explaining “chain migration”—the tendency for past migration to be strongly associated with further migration. Chain migration unfolds as the costs and risks of migration decline or the returns to migration increase for members of a contextual unit, such as a community. People from a single nation, region, and even community come to dominate certain industries in migrant destination areas. Further, migration can be conceived of as a cash-intensive process whereby low-status households that do not migrate initially will eventually gain access to migration and its benefits. Early movers tend to come from the higher strata of a community, as household wealth may buffer prospective migrants against the costs and risks associated with moving. Over time, social networks reduce the costs and risks of migration for an increasing share of the population, and to a progressively representative cross-section of the community. That is when forced migrants increasingly use those networks for migration.

One critical factor in the transmission of migration opportunities between communities may be the strength of connection to social peers living outside the community of origin. Migrants maintain contact with people in their places of origin through correspondence and sending remittances. Newer, less expensive, and more efficient modes of communication and transportation allow migrants to maintain contact with their families in their native home and with their original culture. Dimensions of social position and power, such as the class profile of the network, have been shown to have a considerable conditioning impact on migration processes.

Social ties in pre-migration networks are related to factors affecting which people migrate, the means of migration, the destination (including locality, accommodation, and often specific job), and future prospects for physical and occupational mobility. Interaction across political borders that are geographically porous and linguistically familiar stimulates access.

PB

Source

Vartika Sharma, Lopamudra Ray Saraswati, Susmita Das, Avina Sarna eds. Migration in South Asia: A Review (Population Council India, New Delhi, 2015)

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08970ed915d3cfd000246/61263_Desk-review.pdf

Solastalgia

Coined by Prof. Glenn Albrecht, the term is used to understand the impact that changes in the environment generally have on mental health. While defining the term, Albrecht notes, Solastalgia has its origins in the concepts of 'solace' and 'desolation'. Solace is derived from *solari* and *solacium*, with meanings connected to the alleviation of distress or to the provision of comfort or consolation in the face of distressing events. Desolation has its origins in *solus* and *desolare* with meanings connected to abandonment and loneliness. *Algia* means pain, suffering or sickness. In addition, the concept has been constructed such that it has a ghost reference or structural similarity to nostalgia so that a place reference is embedded. Hence, literally, solastalgia is the pain or sickness caused by the loss or lack of solace and the sense of isolation connected to the present state of one's home and territory. Any context where place identity is challenged by pervasive change to the existing order has potential to deliver solastalgia. The most poignant moments of solastalgia occur when individuals directly experience the transformation of a loved environment. The factors responsible for Solastalgia can be both natural like floods, droughts, etc., and artificial like war, mining, gentrification of cities, etc. It is the homesickness one gets when one is still at home.

DC

Source

Albrecht, Glenn. "Solastalgia: A New Concept in Health and Identity." *Australasian Psychiatry*. 15 no. 1: 41-55. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10398560701701288>

Statelessness

In a world of nation-states, it is ironical to see 'stateless' people. It is case of glaring omissions or contradiction at international level, where several millions are denied citizenship or nationality. South Asia is riddled with such challenges of statelessness and exclusion. Statelessness is a profound violation of human rights of an individual and remains to be one of the most pressing humanitarian issues of the twenty-first century. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly states that (1) "Everyone has the right to a nationality" and that (2) "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality." Despite this guarantee, people in all parts of the world face the prospect of living without nationality/

citizenship and its foreseen rights, hence, lacks the security and protection under the state that citizens take for granted.

South Asia is riddled with culture, history, colonial experience, migration, state succession, citizenship, birth registration, etc. with root causes of statelessness. Stateless people are amongst the most vulnerable in the world, often denied enjoyment of rights such as equality before the law, the right to work, education or healthcare.

Article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954 Convention) defines a 'stateless person' as someone "*not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law.*" Statelessness arises in a variety of contexts. It occurs in migratory situations, for example, among some expatriates who lose or are deprived of their nationality without having acquired the nationality of a country of habitual residence. Most stateless people, however, have never crossed borders and found themselves in their "own country". Their predicament exists *in situ*, that is in the country of their long-term residence, in many cases, the country of their birth. For these individuals, statelessness is often the result of problems in the framing and implementation of nationality laws.

Despite advances in international law regarding the protection of stateless persons, India has been reluctant to incorporate them into national legislation. Thus, it is not surprising that there is a dearth of data regarding statelessness in India. Some of the causes of statelessness are as follows:

- (i) Decolonisation led to partition of British India and the creation of two sovereign States: India and Pakistan. This caused a large-scale mass migration of approximately 12 to 14 million people who became displaced on either sides.
- (ii) One such specific category as part of partition refugees are still called as 'West Pakistan Refugees' in Jammu and Kashmir, they are getting settled now post State reorganisation and revoking of articles 370 and 35A of Indian Constitution.
- (iii) Decolonisation also affected the legal status of many Indian-origin people in Sri Lanka during colonial times as plantation workers, and were rendered stateless upon Independence in 1948.
- (iv) Amongst them, a section of them are in India named as Uphill Country Tamils among the Sri Lankan Refugees in India since 1983.
- (v) Currently in the State of Assam, several lakhs of people are being rendered as

stateless or 'D' voters (euphemism for doubtful voters) through the new census registration scrutiny. In addition, the recent National Register Census has announced nearly 40 lakh people do not qualify to be citizens, in other words they are stateless people.

- (vi) The Bhils are a category of nomadic migratory tribal people trapped between the borders of India and Pakistan
- (vii) Chakmas and Hejongs also face discrimination and are living in the state of statelessness
- (viii) People living in Indo- Bangladesh borders prior to the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) signed in 2015, lived in statelessness conditions and continue to face difficulties even after getting citizenship on papers.
- (ix) Added to this is a potential new category of NRC excluded people in Assam state.

PKM

Statelessness

Before delving into the origin and meaning of the term, it is important to mention that statelessness can be understood through two paradigms – one, through its legal or theoretical meaning and implications. The second is through its practical manifestation, that is, how statelessness is experienced by the ones living it. Does being stateless mean being devoid of an identity? or do people marked as 'stateless' deny its core of rootlessness and fight it through their agentive discourses? As often, but not always, statelessness leads to forced migration or situations of protracted refugeehood, rendering one the status of a 'refugee'. The difference between the two categories is crucial to mention because that indicates why the life of a stateless person who is also a refugee, is more complex. Concerns with stateless population was prevalent during the decade of the 20s, following the First world war, when many people were rendered stateless in the wake of the international passport system in 1920. It was after the end of the second world in 1954, that we saw the definitive emergence of the meaning of the term 'Stateless'. Although international laws have provided some parameters that try to explain and protect people from being devoid of nationality, many times stateless people who need asylum have been denied so (Batchelor: 1998). The Rohingyas are a case in point. They are both stateless and recognized by the UNHCR as refugees, but they hardly are given refugee rights in the camps of both India and

Bangladesh where they live in large numbers as stateless refugees. The situation is further complicated by the fact that neither country is signatory to the international conventions. The 1954 and 61 together with a few regional conventions, form the bedrock of the international legal framework to address statelessness. Statelessness, defined simply as devoid of any nationality, can be manifested through different forms and has been most often defined through a legalistic framework. The recognition of statelessness as an integral component of the broader debate concerning refugees is also embodied in the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. This lens however is not adequate to explain the legal paradoxes that stateless people like that of the Rohingya are faced with in contemporary times because statelessness is not always about refugeehood induced by border crossings. The office of the United High Commissioner for Refugees has been officially mandated to help 'stateless refugees' since its establishment on 1 January 1951. The 1954 and later 1961 conventions on the other hand, have provided for several resolutions that empower the UNHCR to assist the non-refugee stateless people. While the vulnerability in both these cases are of equal and paramount significance, the precarity of the stateless refugees is undeniable. Things get even worse for them if refuge is sought from countries who are not parties to these conventions, like most countries in South Asia plagued severely by postcolonial volatile, blurred lines as international borders. Scholars like Judith Butler argues how both spatiality and temporality are important indexes in understanding statelessness, where there might not be neatly outlined points of arrival and departures. Extending this further, scholars like Samaddar, Basu Ray Chaudhury and others have noted citizenship as an important parameter in understanding contemporary instances of statelessness.

SS

Statelessness (in a decolonized context)

In the context of decolonisation, statelessness is understood less as a positive definition that sets down complete conditions towards a legal definition of the phenomenon. Statelessness is seen more as refraction of a reality known as citizenship. It can be defined only based on a kind of displacement of a reality – the reality of state, nationality, citizenship. Therefore, the postcolonial commentaries on statelessness are studies of permanent incompleteness – a reality that always seems to fall short of a hyper-reality, and therefore the ideal reality of

citizenship, entitlements, legal protection, full proof identity, solemn recognitions by courts of law, and the avowals by the State. Statelessness is thus more a situation, a condition, or a set of conditions that make what can be called a limit situation – limit of a situation or condition called citizenship. If the subject of the State is the citizen, the stateless is the alien. Population movements, in particular forced population movements, are seldom purely state-to state business. They often have regional dimensions. Thus, in discussions on statelessness, the regional dimension of the problem, such as in the case of the Rohingya refugees, cannot be ignored. The regional dimension of the problem was ignored in analyses of the Bay of Bengal crisis of 2015 involving the boat people – the Rohingyas and Bangladeshis. In recent years, as Rohingyas have fled in large numbers to neighbouring Bangladesh, India, Thailand, and Malaysia, and some even tried to reach Australia, the regional dimension of the issue of statelessness has become clearer.

Population groups can become stateless for a variety of reasons, including inequitable laws (such as marriage laws), transfers of territory between countries, flawed or discriminatory administrative practices, lack of birth registration, and withdrawal of citizenship rights. Conservative estimates of the current number of stateless persons in the world range from about 11 to 15 million who live without a nationality – in a legal limbo. One of the main reasons why people are denied or deprived of nationality, and thus rendered stateless, is racial or ethnic discrimination. For instance, in Mauritania for blacks (1989), in Estonia for ethnic Russians (after 1991), many ex-Yugoslavs (after the Balkan War (in the 1990s), South Bhutanese in Bhutan (in late eighties and nineties of the last century), and in recent times for Rohingyas. In 2014, the UNHCR launched a campaign to end statelessness by 2024. Most situations of statelessness were found to be direct consequence of discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, or gender. The largest stateless population of the world is in Myanmar where more than one million Rohingyas have been refused nationality. Statelessness affects the enjoyment of all the rights which is often taken for granted, for instance the right to work, the right to vote, the right to welfare benefits and a child's right to education. Statelessness exacerbates poverty, creates social tensions, breaks up families and can even fuel conflict. Stateless people are not recognized as nationals by any country and deprived of the rights most people take for granted. They often live on the margins of

society where they are vulnerable to exploitation. It prevents people from moving, and increases their chances of arbitrary arrest or detention with no adequate remedies.

International law provides a framework for action in respect of the stateless. Yet, despite the existence of two significant legal documents, viz., the 1954 UN Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the situation remains grim. Article 1.1 of the 1954 UN Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, defines a stateless person as “a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.” The 1954 Convention establishes minimum guarantees in areas such as education, health care, employment and identity as well as travel documents. While it does not oblige states to provide nationality for stateless persons in its territory, it asks them to facilitate naturalization. The 1961 Convention sets out important safeguards that can be incorporated into nationality laws to prevent statelessness, for example, in relation to acquisition of a nationality at birth or loss of nationality on marriage, or as a result of prolonged residence abroad. In addition, international human rights law plays a significant and complementary role. Its guarantees apply to all persons, with very few provisions restricted to nationals alone. Key human rights standards include the obligation to ensure birth registration, the prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of nationality, guarantees of equal treatment for women in relation to nationality laws and protection against arbitrary detention. Yet as said, despite these and other global initiatives new risks of statelessness have emerged. The level of ratification of the UN statelessness conventions is low. Statelessness in fact points to a major weakness in international law on refugees.

Statelessness has emerged as a serious issue in several postcolonial regions. Not just Myanmar, the citizenship laws of the postcolonial states of India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, moving from *jus soli* to *jus sanguinis*, are highly influenced by the self-perception of the “majority” who claimed to constitute the “nation”. Ethnic bias, cultural, linguistic, religious prejudices, gender discrimination and political concerns of the emerging ruling elite shaped the policy for granting as well as denying citizenship. On the other hand, the international community’s engagement with the problem of statelessness is rather recent. The major weakness of international protection mechanism for stateless persons is non-applicability of international law within the sovereign jurisdiction of states, where most stateless persons

live. The states control their borders, frame the immigration policies and decide who should be allowed to enter its territory and who should be rejected. The present immigration laws, policies and practices of most states do not make a distinction between stateless persons and other migrants.

As mentioned above, statelessness in the postcolonial age has as much to do with citizenship as to migration, while the conventional definition of statelessness links it to refugee-hood. Yet, as the instance of the Rohingyas showed, the situation of postcolonial statelessness cannot be understood without referring to the game of citizenship, which is acquiring greater and greater stake in the dynamics of power. There is a similar possibility of statelessness in the Indian northeast through disqualification of massive number of people (about 1.8 million) in course of a national citizenship registration drive. The final version of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in the Indian state of Assam was published on 31 August 2019. Disowned by India and without ties to any other country, a significant number of those excluded from the NRC are thus rendered stateless. This has created a precarious situation involving protracted detentions of those branded as “foreigners”. The NRC process has serious implications in terms of international human rights laws, while India has not signed the two key instruments on statelessness – the 1954 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. In the legal game of citizenship, the onus to prove themselves as citizens was on the residents, not on the state.

Ken MacLean, in a recent study, drawn from the concept of “lawfare” elucidated by Brooke Goldstein reveals how laws and judicial systems have been systematically used to achieve strategic military and political end as in the Rohingya case. Achieving a nationalised citizenry is one such strategic end. The Indian case, in many ways similar to the case of the Rohingyas in Myanmar, indicates that statelessness may have less to do with being a refugee rather with the politics of citizenship. It may be perceived as a case of abandonment and violence wherein from a case of citizens at home and immigrants abroad with no de jure existence, the situation in this case is that of citizens at home as well as aliens too at home at the same time. The State can be said to have abandoned some, in other words, citizenship has abandoned some, dropped some of the people out of its world. They then constitute a sub-class people, who must labour to exist, and must periodically undergo punitive measures

like confinement in jails, detention camps, internment settlements, and if they manage to escape, then they have to face deportation that is forcible return.

It is important to note the fundamental displacement in the significance of statelessness. It is significant not because it is a derivative of refugee-like condition, but an extension, or a subtraction of citizenship in a manner that will make the separation of the citizen and the non-citizen complete. Admittedly, these two invocations are related, and the relation between being a derivative of refugee like condition and that of citizenship is complex. As a way of solving the riddle it may be contended, “Refugees who have a nationality at all are ‘*de jure* refugees’, whereas refugees who do not have nationality are ‘*de facto* stateless.” Race, religion, and resources (the three R) became factors in production of statelessness. Similar to “refugee and refugee like situation” there now exist situations of “statelessness and *de facto* statelessness”.

In the context of the worldwide shift from *jus soli* to *jus sanguinis*, the task of giving a positive definition of statelessness (that is legally providing a positive definition of statelessness) is becoming difficult. Central Asia, West Asia, South Asia, some countries in Africa – in all these regions and places, citizenship and nationality rights are increasingly under different restrictions and qualifications. Everywhere there now exists a sub-population – a sub-national population consisting of disenfranchised minorities, immigrant groups, trafficked groups in labour and sex, and population groups in the protracted situation of camp internment - which works as subaltern labour but without the free juridical status of citizenship. This is a fleet-footed population or a mobile labouring army, situated at one end of population distribution range, exemplifying the uneven and hierarchical situation of national populations throughout the world. As a global population group, its characterization as “stateless” tells only a formal a story - that too half - of sub-existence. It is a predatory situation causing maximum dispossession, best evidenced in the lives of urban refugees, and comparable to the penal existence of groups in islands and colonies in the nineteenth century. Refracted from citizenship rights, the condition of statelessness is therefore a gray zone. Yet the borderland existence of a vast illegal population in various countries with no state to look forward to for protection indicates the possibility of spaces other than the nationalized ones. The bilateral agreements such as the Sri Lanka-India accord on Indian Tamils of Sri Lanka (known as Srimavo-Shahstri Pact, 1964),

or the conferring of citizenship by the Nepal government of the foothills people of Nepal, known as Nepalis of Indian origin, and several other such instances reveal the gray zone between citizenship and statelessness, which conveys the possibility of other spaces.

RS

Sylheti Bidekhi-Phoreigner (Assamese/Asamiya Term)

The Sylheti people are embroiled in identity conflicts as a result of their inclusion in coinages like Tiritiya Bhuvan (Third World), Ishan Bangla (North-East Bengal), and Barak Banga (Barak Bengal), as well as their rejection of the concepts of probashi Bangali (Bengalis outside of their ancestral, territorial Bengali homeland), and Bahirbanga (Bengal outside territorial Bengal, Bengali diaspora). The Barak Valley's Sylheti Bangla speakers object to attempts to generalise different Bengali identities by creating the probashi Bangali and Bahirbanga. The Bangla-speakers in southern Assam have time to time, negotiated their marginality vis-à-vis the Assamese, the greater Bengali community and, of course, the Indian state. Hindus and Muslims in the area are still fighting back against labels like '*Bidekhi*', '*Phoreigner*', and *bahirormanuh* (lit., outsiders, in Assamese), *Bohiragoto* (lit., alien, immigrant, in Assamese) that some Assamese have wrongly and illegally attached to them due to their historical background. Furthermore, the Muslim peasants of the Barak Valley who speak *Bangia* have suffered the most. They exist on the periphery of society and are frequently confused with the infamous 'illegal immigrants' of Assam, sometimes intentionally and sometimes mistakenly (Bhattacharjee 2013; Guha 1972, 1977). The complex relationship shared with Bengalis and Assamese continued to affect the acceptability of the Sylheti presence in Cachar amidst the emerging muscular Ahom/Axom identitarian awareness through the 1970s (Hussain 1993; Goswami 1997).

ASC

Source

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T

The Best Interest of the Child

The principle of “the best interest of the child” is implemented through Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which provides that “in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, the court of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. The ‘Best Interests’ rules include both government policy making related to children as well as decisions made about children on an individual basis.

In the assessment of “the best interest of the child,” the child’s view, identity, the situation of vulnerability, their right to health and education, the preservation of the family environment and maintenance of relationships have to be considered. This is a non-exhaustive list of considerations as the principle is flexible by nature and requires states to assess the necessary considerations on a case-by-case basis. The principle as a fundamental, interpretative legal principle, requires that “if a legal provision is open to more than one interpretation, the interpretation most effectively serves the child’s best interests should be chosen. The rights enshrined in the Convention and its Optional Protocols provide the framework for interpretation” (Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2013). This requires that a decision's possible impact (positive and negative) has to be evaluated. States can be held accountable as they are obliged to substantiate and prove the explicit consideration of “the best interests of the child” and how it has been respected in any decision concerning children.

In the context of refugees and asylum-seekers, children make up more than half of the world’s refugees. Many of these children might spend their entire childhoods away from home and sometimes separated from their families. They might carry the trauma of having witnessed or experienced violence and are often at risk of abuse, neglect, violence, trafficking or military recruitment. It is essential to safeguard the child's best interest in such situations, to help children rebuild their lives.

MJ

The State in Statelessness

The state is central in the making and unmaking of a stateless person. The forms of 'state' rendering one stateless, can be conceptualized as an 'absence of the state' in *de-facto* statelessness, 'excess of the state' in *de-jure* statelessness or even the 'abandonment by the state' causing denial of protection for its citizens, that manifests as everyday experience of statelessness for many. In principle, the state has been the cornerstone of the neo liberal politics, and the supremacy of such a sovereign authority is primarily established by the Westphalian order. This primacy and authority of the state is theoretically legitimated by the social contract theory, though with considerable criticisms on the count of the inclusivity of parties to the contract. In the post Westphalian order, the complexities caused by the two world wars in a largely Eurocentric discourse brought considerable changes to the standing of the state in the international legal sphere. This initially discounted the parallel evolution of state with respect to colonialism- the separate, yet simultaneous existence of the imperial state/ colonial state brought about considerable recalibrations and inter linkages between state, subject, membership and rights. As opined by Ranabir Samaddar, the intersection of neo-liberal transformation, colonial relations and post-colonial politics has accentuated the ways in which statelessness has caused the huge trans-border movement of populations in South Asia and other regions.

Adopting an interdisciplinary framework, one can theoretically examine the phenomenon of statelessness from the vantage point of legal, political and socio-anthropology. From the point of legality, statelessness depicts the interweaving of nationality & citizenship laws that distinguishes a citizen from that of a non-citizen. Hannah Arendt's legalistic lens suggests that the state does not consider the stateless worthy to be subjected to any law of the land. Scholars like Blitz see "right to have rights" as a restrictive paradigm that presumes statelessness to be tethered to the reformation of laws on nationality; rather than perceiving statelessness as structural concern. Paula Banerjee says that statelessness and citizenship are seen as a part of the same grid where the 'other' of a citizen is not a refugee or an individual with dual/multiple citizenship, but a stateless person. It is imperative to go beyond the dualistic assumptions of citizen/non-citizen, to understand the constitution of *everyday statelessness* by the state itself in its myriad forms. The reductionism ignores the importance of lived experience of statelessness of many who have legal status of citizenship

but struggle for status. This is explicit in the case of de facto statelessness or quasi statelessness. As seen in Caia Vlieks work, different spatialities in which an individual experiences statelessness causes “in-situ statelessness” within their own country or an ex-situ situation, when it accounts for the experience of those who had migrated and became refugees.

NC

Thoa Khalsa

Thoa Khalsa was a small Sikh Majority village located near Rawalpindi in present day Pakistan. It occupies an important space in the history and memory of the partition of British India because of the deaths by suicide of around ninety Sikh women who chose to kill themselves in order to protect the honour of their community in the face of anticipated rape, abduction and religious conversion. The partition of British India resulted in the largest recorded forced migration of people in Punjab and Bengal regions, accompanied by spectacular and mass violence. Women were abducted (in *The Other Side of Silence* Kamala Bhasin and Urvashi Butalia estimate that approximately 75,000 women were abducted on both sides of the border), raped and murdered by people of another community—and murdered or encouraged to die by suicide by member of their own family and community. Butalia records the narrative of Bir Bahadur Singh whose father had moved from their Muslim majority residence to the Sikh majority Thoa Khalsa, where they came under attack. The father killed his daughter, Bir Bahadur’s sister because he feared she may be raped and/or converted. Women who killed themselves were hailed as martyrs, unafraid of death, the “death-defying sisters of Rawalpindi”. Some survived (such as Basant Kaur, not because they did not jump into the well, but because the well was already too full of bodies to drown anyone else. This incident underscores the layers of patriarchal violence that play out on women’s bodies, especially in contexts of forced displacement and conflict. Women’s bodies are viewed as repositories of family/ community’s honour, which can be violated and therefore needs to be protected even at the cost of death. The Thoa Khalsa incident has been fictionalised in Bhasham Sahni’s Hindi novel *Tamas* (1984), Govind Nihalani television series of the same name (1987) and Sabiha Sumar’s 2003 film *Khamosh Pani*.

SB

Source

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"Toba Tek Singh"

Saadat Hasan Manto's Urdu short story "Toba Tek Singh" was published in 1955, translated in English and many Indian languages multiple times since then. Fictionalizing the moment of transfer of lunatics between the newly formed nation of India and Pakistan, along religious lines (like the transfer of prisoners and unaccompanied women believed to have been abducted), the story focuses on Bishan Singh, a peaceful inmate of Lahore asylum who only remembers his home, Toba Tek Singh. As the other inmates try to make sense of the newly formed nation of Pakistan and Hindustan and the arbitrariness of borders and belongings, Bishan Singh wants to be where Toba Tek Singh is. But governmental logic prompts that a Sikh lunatic's natural residence must be in India. In the moment of transfer at the border, Bishan Singh finds out that Toba Tek Singh is after all in Pakistan, and falls down in the no man's land between the two countries. "Toba Tek Singh" is the most recognizable and read story set in the backdrop of the partition of British India in 1947. Manto, with his emphasis on the most marginalized sections of society (the sex worker, the lunatic, the destitute) emerges as a powerful and poignant chronicler of the partition, now mythologized for the charges of obscenity he faced and defended during his lifetime, his drinking and early death. The story's adaptation by innumerable film and theatre practitioners owes much to Manto's satirisation of the arbitrariness of the Radcliffe line, the cold rationality of bureaucratic process and the lack of responsivity of political leaders through the speech and actions of the lunatics in the asylum.

SB

Source

Manto, S.H. and Naqvi, T. 2007. "Toba Tek Singh," *Mānoa, Crossing Over: Partition Literature from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh*, 19, no. 1: 14-19 (6 pages) [stor.org/stable/4230517](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4230517)

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Trafficking

Human Trafficking is defined as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of people through force, fraud or deception to exploit them for profit. Men, women and children of all ages and backgrounds can become victims of this crime, which occurs in every region of the world. The traffickers often use violence or fraudulent employment agencies and fake promises of education and job opportunities to trick and coerce their victims. Refugees and other forcibly displaced people are more at risk of being trafficked. Those forced to flee their homes and land, leave behind familiar surroundings, lose their community support networks and face social and cultural isolation. They very often lack access to essential resources, security and livelihood opportunities.

In many cases, displaced persons may also lack regular status and legal protection. These and other factors make refugees and other forcibly displaced people easy targets for traffickers, who prey on the precariousness of their situation to exploit them. Human trafficking is also related to the smuggling of persons. Smuggling becomes trafficking if the victim is exploited by being held for ransom to be paid through forced labour or sex work. Many persons fleeing conflict, violence or persecution are also compelled to move irregularly to seek protection. For this, they often resort to the services of smugglers. In these circumstances, refugees are particularly vulnerable to being trafficked or falling victim to serious crimes and human rights violations. According to the Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020, Migrants make up a significant share of the detected victims in most global regions: 65 per cent in Western and Southern Europe, 60 per cent in the Middle East, 55 per cent in East Asia and the Pacific, 50 per cent in Central and South-Eastern Europe, and 25 per cent in North America. The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons is the world's primary legal instrument to combat human trafficking. In India, the Immoral Trafficking (Prevention) Act, 1956 (ITPA) is the legislation to prevent trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation.

MJ

U

Unaccompanied Minors/Children

An “unaccompanied child” is a child separated from both parents and other relatives and is not being cared for by any other adult who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so. Separated children, however, include children accompanied by other adult family members. While fleeing wars and conflicts, thousands of children become separated from their families & relatives. Some children travel alone, sent ahead by their parents in a desperate attempt to ensure their children’s survival; others are orphaned. When an armed conflict or other disaster occurs, many children become separated from their parents or caregivers. Because their status is seldom straightforward, they are referred to as ‘separated’ or ‘unaccompanied children rather than orphans.

According to the UNHCR, around 40% of the displaced are children. At the risk of violence, abuse, neglect, exploitation and military recruitment, many unaccompanied and separated children have no access to necessities such as food, clean water and shelter. These children form one of the most vulnerable groups in these situations, often deprived of care and protection. Most can be reunited with parents, siblings, extended family members or other adults they know and are willing to provide for their care. The arrangements to meet the needs of unaccompanied minors includes their protection. The enjoyment of rights stipulated in the Child Rights Convention is not limited to children who are citizens of a state party and must, therefore, if not explicitly stated otherwise in the CRC, also be available to all children – including asylum-seeking, refugees and migrant children – irrespective of their nationality, immigration status or statelessness. In many cases, the next step is family tracing and exploring the reunification of children with their families and relatives while protecting the best interest of the child.

MJ

Urban Agglomeration

Urban agglomeration is a highly developed spatial form of integrated cities. The concept of urban planning refers to spatial clustering of cities. The British urban scholar Ebenezer Howard had proposed the concept of the ‘town cluster ’in his book *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*, as early as 1898 (Fang, and Yu 2017, 126-127), which facilitates the understanding of the attributes of urban agglomeration. The Census of India delineates

urban agglomeration as units of analysis that are not functional, but instead are significant due to attributes such as demography, composition of population, density, political boundaries. Urban agglomerations are defined by spatial contiguity. A settlement or more than one settlement in contiguity; an area or region or high population concentration of varied classes, with a high density of dwellings, vehicles, roads, railways, means of production, banking and commerce facilities of different degrees. An urban agglomeration is also an extended city or town area comprising the built-up area of a central place and suburbs linked by a continuous urban area. The term 'unité urbaine' meaning a continuous urbanised area is used by The National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) to describe an urban agglomeration.

SD

Source

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V

Vai (Mizo/Lushai/ Duhlian Term)

The dictionary meaning of the term 'Vai' is 'a foreigner, a Hindustani'. The influx of the 'Vai' in contemporary Mizoram has a strong colonial connection. According to the Statistical Handbook of Mizoram 2008, the 'Vai' population in Mizoram, which includes Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, and others, is 40,817, with 10,099 Muslim. The issue of the 'Vai' in Zo and Mizo society has long been a source of contention, and it continues to play a role in the people of this region forming their sense of self-identity. The category known as the 'Vai' is still one against which the Zo consciousness fortifies itself. The 'Vai,' also known as the 'Others' in Mizoram, are divided into four groups based on their religious affiliation: 'Hindu Vai,' 'Muslim Vai,' 'Christian Vai,' and 'Vai Piangthar,' which translates to 'new borns' or 'converts.' It is also known as 'Vai chhia,' which translates to 'bad 'Vai,' and 'Vai thra,' which translates to 'good 'Vai,' respectively. The first group consists of Sylheti Bengali speakers who speak Silchar or Cachar as their first language. People with lighter skin tones, such as the 'Vai' of North India and other parts of the world, naturally fall into the second category. As a result, the word 'Vai' is associated with racial connotations. The politics of otherization are so pervasive and powerful that even common, often unremarkable aspects of daily life, such as fragrance, smell, or aroma, or even colour, are labelled as 'Vai rong' (Vai colour), 'Vai rim' (Vai smell; not aroma; not fragrance), or 'Vai rim' (Vai smell; not aroma; not fragrance). The influx of the 'Vai' into modern Mizoram over the years has resulted in a greater degree of economic interaction between the 'Vai' and Zo/Mizo, particularly Zo/Mizo women (Chakraborty 2012).

ASC

Source

Chakraborty, Anup Shekhar. 2012. 'Construing And Gleaning The Vexing Notion Of The 'Outsider' In Mizoram: Pre-Statehood To Post-Statehood Times', *QUEST- The Journal of UGC Academic Staff College, Nainital, Kumaun University*. Volume 6, Issue. 2. 14 May. pp. 297-304.

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Vai Bandh (Mizo/Lushai/Duhlian Term)

'Vai Bandh' is the most frequently sought mechanism for 'Regulating Citizenship' and controlling the flow of Vai in Mizoram via the ILP regime. These 'Vai Bandhs' are frequently preceded by notices to non-tribals to leave Mizoram. Defying the diktat is met with physical assaults and mob rage; unsurprisingly, the victims are petty migrant labourers, mostly from Cachar and Bihar, who are locked up by the police. 'The 'Vai Bandhs' instil such fear in the 'Vai' that they stock up on food and everyday commodities to deal with the diktat', which may last as long as the Nexus of Patriarchy wants them to be invisible. The 'Vai Bandh' is clearly a systematic process of making the 'Vai' invisible and the Zo/ Mizo the visible majority. This attempt to restrict or limit the visibility of outsiders or problem people while making 'genuine citizens' visible is an interesting example of regulating people and marking their mobility by bracketing them into the frame of 'legal'-'illegal' (Chakraborty 2008).

Following Vai-Bandh, women, either as individuals or as organisations, along with the YMA, KTP (Khristian Thalai Pawl), and other such organisations, visit these lock-ups and offer eggs, bread, and tea to those who bore the brunt of mob fury. From a communal standpoint, this action can be interpreted as perpetrators of violence taking on the role of healers. It is an undeniable fact that in any society, the realms of men and women are always clearly defined. Traditionally, women are 'reserved' the role of healer, while men justify violence in the name of protection. Thus, women are not directly involved in their men's actions and may even disagree with them, but given their operating environments, they frequently follow their men's decisions. Women are also the best targets for 'hurting your enemy where it hurts the most' because of their high moral standards. Furthermore, as a subtle means of evoking their sympathies and creating a more human face, women may be entrusted with the responsibility of caring for the captured. The message conveyed by these contradictory actions demonstrates the Mizo's willingness to allow the 'Vai' to exist within limited spaces in exchange for total acceptance of Zo/Mizo community decisions (Chakraborty 2012).

ASC

Source

Chakraborty, Anup Shekhar. 2008. 'Manufacturing of Spaces: The 'Others' in Zo/Mizo Politics.' *South Asian Journal of Socio-Political Studies (SAJOSPS)*. Vol.9 No.1. July-December. pp.39-43.

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Viraha

In the cultural landscape of Bidesiya, there is a story of separation. The story in bidesia song/performance told the story of separation between the migrant worker and his family and the land. The aesthetics of separation in Bidesia is based on constant emotional trauma, suffering, hope, desolation, love, complaint, longing and separation. At a psychological level, it is both melancholy and mourning. The songs that highlight the separation, agony, anger, pain and lust of the wives of the migrant labour are popularly known as Viraha. Viraha songs describe the social condition of women in the families of migrant labourers. These songs are usually sung by the male characters who play the female part in the Nautanki or Bidesiya performances. The songs tell that how the women in a migrant worker's family are psychologically affected and sexually harassed by the elder/younger male members of the family or the village.

RKS

Source

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Vulnerability

The concept of "vulnerability" has assumed a critical place in academic writings, policy-making, humanitarian discourse, migration studies and debates on asylum. (Gilodi, and Nienaber 2022). The notion of "vulnerability" and "vulnerable groups" is progressively being employed in migration and asylum related studies and debates. The terms are widely used in international humanitarian aid models and legal documents by pivotal international organizations like the UNHCR and IOM, as well as in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants adopted by the UN in 2016 (Flegar, 2018; United Nations, 2016 ;Heidbrink, 2020; Hruschka & Leboeuf, 2019; Monno & Serreli, 2020; Ní Raghallaigh and Thornton, 2017; Sözer, 2020). Of use in a plethora of fields and for multiple objectives, vulnerability is usually considered to be a self-explanatory situation or occurrence (Brown et al., 2017; Cole, 2016; Flegar, 2018; Hruschka and Leboeuf, 2019; Turner, 2019). An oft used explication of vulnerability defines it as "an internal risk factor of the subject or a system that is exposed

to a hazard and corresponds to its intrinsic tendency to be affected, or susceptible to damage” (Paul 2014, 1).

With respect to migration, vulnerability is generally referred to categorize migrants in distinct groups grounded on specific features, without clarifying how the concept is theoretically comprehended or explicated (Sözer, 2019, 2020; Turner, 2019). In the context of migration, vulnerability is also interpreted in terms of risk. For instance, the Glossary on Migration of the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2019) explicates a Vulnerable Group as “Depending on the context, any group or sector of society [...] that is at higher *risk* of being subjected to discriminatory practices, violence, social disadvantage, or economic hardship than other groups within the State. These groups are also at higher risk in periods of conflict, crisis, or disasters”. Thus, constituting a vulnerable group connotes being at greater risk than people belonging to other groups within a particular administrative and legislative entity: *the State*. But, the kind of risk involved is not explicated definitively, it could be perilous in multiple ways.

As a notion, vulnerability connotes exposure to and susceptibility to some kind of distress. There are diverse categories of distress, connoting that varied sectors use the concept in varied ways. (e.g., vulnerability to food insecurity, vulnerability to perils, vulnerability to distress, violence and exploitation, vulnerability to rights abuse). Within a migration framework, vulnerability implies the restricted ability to escape, contend with, survive or regain strength from harm. This restricted ability is the consequence of the peculiar exchange of individual, household, community, and structural traits and circumstances. Vulnerability emanates from a plethora of intertwining and co-existing personal, social, circumstantial, and structural causes. For instance, in crisis or catastrophe, afflicted communities, individuals and groups may have dissimilar range of vulnerability, varying according to their exposure to perils or to hazards of neglect, discrimination, abuse and exploitation. The intensity of exposure is governed by the interface of multiple factors: their social and demographic traits, their abilities (incorporating knowledge, networks, access to resources, access to information and early warnings, etc.), their sites (in a camp, in a spontaneous settlement, in a transit centre, at the border, etc.) and the catastrophe-driven causes have repercussions for them (for instance, separation, loss and lack of

resources and scope, discrimination in availability of help.) (IOM, Guidance Note on How to Mainstream Protection across IOM Crisis Response, 2016 IN/232, 6–7).

According to the IOM glossary (IOM, 2019) “Migrants who are unable to effectively enjoy their human rights, are at increased risk of violations and abuse and who, accordingly, are entitled to call on a duty bearer’s heightened duty of care”. This explication of vulnerability seems to be in line with the conclusions of Peroni and Timmer (2013), who have studied the way in which the European Court of Human Rights has become progressively reliant on the use of “vulnerable groups” in its declarations to ensure the protection of human rights of marginalized groups, consisting of migrants and specially asylum seekers. Hruschka and Leboeuf (2019) emphasize on migration governance, “the notion of ‘vulnerability’ acknowledges that those forced to flee and seek protection are exposed to higher risks of enduring human rights violations.” Therefore, both explications are inclined towards connecting a state of vulnerability to *structural* circumstances or situations rather than on *individual* traits.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) in its report to the Human Rights Council underlines that: “the vulnerable situations that migrants face can arise from a range of factors that may intersect or coexist simultaneously, influencing and exacerbating each other and also evolving or changing over time as circumstances change” (HCHR, Principles and practical guidance on the protection of the human rights of migrants in vulnerable situations, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Addendum (7 February 2018) UN Doc. A/HRC/37/34/ Add.1, para. 12). The HCHR further explains that: “[f]actors that generate vulnerability may cause a migrant to leave their country of origin in the first place, may occur during transit or at destination, regardless of whether the original movement was freely chosen, or may be related to a migrant’s identity or circumstances. Vulnerability in this context should therefore be understood as both situational and personal” (ibid., para. 13). Finally, the High Commissioner report also recalls that: “migrants are not inherently vulnerable, nor do they lack resilience and agency. Rather, vulnerability to human rights violations is the result of multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination, inequality and structural and societal dynamics that lead to diminished and unequal levels of power and enjoyment of rights” (High Commissioner for Human Rights, Principles and Practical Guidance on the Protection of the Human Rights of Migrants in

Vulnerable Situations, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights Council (3 January 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/37/34, para. 12.)

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W

Waiting

The pandemic perhaps has taught us to understand and appreciate the phrase and phase of 'waiting' better than to just think of it as 'time waste'. Many scholarly articles have come throughout this period to unpack waiting and relate it to migration studies or camp scenarios. Waiting is an ontological notion. In a stagnant camp scenario, it is interesting to note how waiting spaces out, when time is often denoted as 'stuck'. We are aware of the rich literature existing on refugee camps where most often refugee lives are described as 'living in a limbo' as if there is existential stuckedness. Hence, life, waiting, time, and hope are closely linked with each other. Waiting can also be a way or form of life. Waiting, thus, has remained a perpetual condition in their lives, as a way of life. They live in waiting, for a change, but again to not change what they have already built in the last few many years in Bangladesh. Waiting to get back and yet waiting to not let go. Scholars like Shahram Khosravi argue that waiting is also tied with the technique of delaying. Refugees are often kept in waiting, through a circular motion of delaying as they need to start from scratch again. "Dialectical relation between the now and the not-yet- generates hopeful visions and practices. Even in the form of daydreaming, these practices are agentive." Protracted periods of waiting are also an aging process as we see in the case of the registered Rohingyas in Bangladesh.

SS

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Dominant Culture
Ethnicity-related Displacement
Ethnocentrism
Ethnocultural
Externally induced Displacement
Foreigners' Tribunal
Freedom of Movement (right to)
Gentrification
Government-in-exile
Host community
Indentured Labour (South-East Asian Perspective)
Integration
Khilonjia Musalman(Assamese/Asamiya term)
Komagata Maru
Medicalized Borders/ Medicalization of Borders
Migrant Culture

Moria (Camp)
Muhajir(n)/ Mohajir
Nepali foreigners
NRC
Orderly Migration
D-Voter
Passport & Visa
Pem (Migrate) (Mizo/Lushai/ Duhlian terms)
Pem Lut (In-migrate) (Mizo/Lushai/ Duhlian terms)
Pem Chhuak (Out-migrate) (Mizo/Lushai/ Duhlian terms)
Pre-exilic
“Protection” in South Asia
Protection space
Radcliffe Line
Raltlan (Mizo/Lushai/ Duhlian term)
Refugee and Partition
Refugee Diaspora
Refugee Diaspora (South Asian Perspective)
Regular migration
Religious exiles
Rural-Urban Fringe
Safe Migration
Self-settled refugees
Social Networks
Solastalgia
Sylheti Bidekhi-Phoreigner(Assamese/Asamiya term)
Thoa Khalsa
“Toba Tek Singh”
Urban Agglomeration
Vai (Mizo/Lushai/ Duhlian term)
Vai Bandh (Mizo/Lushai/Duhlian term)
Viraha
Vulnerability
Waiting