BALKANS: OLD TRAUMAS AND NEW COMPLICATIONS

Mostar old bridge
Tito’s epoch
Yugoslavia in the end of Socialism:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Birth rate (per 1000; 1987)</th>
<th>Per capita national income (YU dinars; 1987)</th>
<th>Illiteracy rate[^a]</th>
<th>Index of egalitarianism[^b]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>2,101</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>2,702</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>1,291</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>4,828</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1,871</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vojvodina</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>2,502</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v = 34%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A slide from sporadic and spontaneous ethnic violence into organized interrepublic civil war is also a danger, but it is unlikely during the period of this Estimate. Serbia’s commitment of resources to pacification of the Albanians in Kosovo will constrain its ability to use military means to bring Serbian minorities in the western part of the country under its direct control. The Serbs, however, will attempt to foment uprisings by Serb minorities elsewhere—particularly in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina—and large-scale ethnic violence is likely.

The United States will have little capacity to preserve Yugoslav unity, notwithstanding the influence it has had there in the past. But leaders from various republics will make claims on US officials to advance their partisan objectives. Federal and Serb leaders will emphasize statements in support of territorial integrity. Slovenes, Croats, and Kosovars, however, will play up US pressure for improved performance on human rights and self-determination. Thus, Washington will continue to be drawn into the heated arena of interethnic conflict and will be expected to respond in some manner to the contrary claims of all parties.

The Soviet Union will have only an indirect influence—for example, through multinational forums—on the outcome in Yugoslavia. The Europeans have some leverage, but they are not going to use it to hold the old Yugoslavia together. Most of them, including the Germans, will pay lip service to the idea of Yugoslav integrity, while quietly accepting the dissolution of the federal state.
First phase: late Soviet period

- Strong national mobilization, accommodated by Republic Communist Party
  - Strong minority counter mobilization; ethnic conflict likely (possible Soviet intervention)
  - Weak minority counter mobilization; ethnic conflict unlikely (possible Soviet intervention)
- Weak national mobilization, blocked by Republic Communist Party
  - Ethnic conflict unlikely (low possibility for Soviet intervention)
DIFFUSION AND ESCALATION OF SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET ETHNIC CONFLICTS (SHALE HOROWITZ)

Second phase: Soviet collapse

- **Strong minority counter mobilization; ethnic conflict likely (possible Soviet intervention)**
  - Democratic regime, with nationalist government; Ethnic conflict likely

- **Weak minority counter mobilization; ethnic conflict unlikely (possible Soviet intervention)**
  - Democratic regime, with nationalist government; Ethnic conflict unlikely

- **Ethnic conflict unlikely (low possibility for Soviet intervention)**
  - Authoritarian regime more likely, without strong nationalist preferences; Ethnic conflict unlikely
DIFFUSION AND ESCALATION OF SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET ETHNIC CONFLICTS (SHALE HOROWITZ)

Third phase: Post-Soviet period

Democratic regime, with nationalist government; Ethnic conflict likely

Escalation likely to be immediate; diffusion to “related” neighbors unlikely

New escalation or diffusion unlikely
History

- Kosovo battle, June 15 (St. Vitus day) 1389
Milosevic and Karadzic
Srebrenica massacre  July 11-22, 1995

- Role of UN peace forces UNPROFOR
- NATO involvement “Operation Deliberate Force”
- Implementation for further UN peacekeeping missions
- The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia concluded that the killings at Srebrenica, compounded by the mass expulsion of Bosniak civilians, amounted to genocide.
Dayton Accords December 15, 1995

- **Article I: 9. Composition.** Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (hereinafter "the Entities").

- **Article V: Presidency** The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three Members: one Bosniac and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska.

- **Unique presidency**

- **The High Representative** (since 2009) is an international civilian overseer of the Dayton peace agreement with authority to dismiss elected and non-elected officials and enact legislation.
Transformation of territory of Former Yugoslavia
New era: Balkans and EU

Western Balkans and the EU

- **Slovenia**: Member since 2004
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina**: Applied for EU membership in February 2016
- **Croatia**: Member since 2013
- **Serbia**: Candidate country since 2012
- **Kosovo**: Association agreement on hold since 2013 on account of some EU countries not recognizing Kosovo as an independent state
- **Montenegro**: Candidate country since 2010
- **Albania**: Candidate country since 2014
- **Macedonia**: Candidate country since 2005

Source: European Commission