UKRAINE: WHEN NATION BUILDING IS CHALLENGED
Lecture structure

- History of Ukraine
- Statistics
- Crisis in Ukraine: looking for the answers
- What lies ahead: nation building 29 years after the Independence
Part 1. History of Ukraine

Kievan Rus’, VIII-XII
Medieval state of north and east Slavs, stretched from the Baltic Sea in the North to the Black Sea in the South and from the headwaters of the Vistula in the west to the Taman Peninsula in the East, uniting the majority of East Slavic tribes.
Kievan Rus’

Grand prince of Kiev
980-1015

St. Sophia Cathedral, XI century
Modernity: Ukraine Between Empires
Renaissance and the territory of Ukraine: Cossack’s Rada

The Zaporizhian Sich (territorial entity in the south part of Ukraine) grew rapidly in the 15th century from serfs fleeing the more controlled parts of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. It became established as a well-respected political entity with a parliamentary system of government. During the course of the 16th, 17th and well into the 18th century, the Zaporozhian Cossacks became a strong political and military force that challenged the authority of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Tsardom of Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and its vassal the Crimean Khanate.
Territorial changes and state borders
Soviet Ukraine: The terror and modernization

Famine in Ukraine 1922, 1932-33, 1946
Holodomor

Street at Kharkiv, 1932
DNEPROGES Construction began in 1927 and the plant started to produce electricity in October 1932. Generating some 560 MW, the station became the largest Soviet power plant at the time and one of the largest in the world. The first five giant power generators were manufactured by General Electric.
Part 2. The Independent Ukraine (Ukrainian History after 1991)

- Post-soviet legacy of new independent countries
- August 24 - Ukraine Independence Day
- 1994 Budapest memorandum on Security Assurances (Ukraine, Russia, UK, USA)
Population: 45 mln (including Donbas and Crimea)

Life expectancy: 74.3 (W) / 62.8 (M)

Population growth rate (average annual %) -0,6%

Intentional homicides (females and males, per 100 000) 2.9/10.1


GDP per capita around 3100 USD
Economy

- National currency Hryvna 27.17 to 1 USD (8 to 1 in 2012)
- Corruption index: 120 out of 180 (Transparency International 2018)
### Top 5 Export and Import Partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Trade (US$ Mil)</th>
<th>Partner share(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>3,943</td>
<td>9.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2,728</td>
<td>6.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,514</td>
<td>5.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,475</td>
<td>5.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2,206</td>
<td>5.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exporter</th>
<th>Trade (US$ Mil)</th>
<th>Partner share(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>7,197</td>
<td>14.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>5,643</td>
<td>11.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5,201</td>
<td>10.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>3,345</td>
<td>6.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>3,204</td>
<td>6.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Ukrainian Syndrome: Corruption, low legitimacy and energy dependence
The Orange Revolution (2004) and EuroMaidan (2013-2014)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0nYAM-Jbfh4

Euromaidan
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xZUzfgTLD4U
Ministry of Interior during the Euromaidan

Berkut (special police force) role in a massacre in Kiev, Winter 2014
Annexation of Crimea
 “Berkut” is coming home
 The flee of Minister Zakharchenko
 “Little Green Man” in town

February 28, armed men — described as local militia — storm two airports in the Crimean Peninsula, in both the Crimean capital of Simferopol and the major coastal port of Sevastopol. This comes a day after another group of men seized Crimea's regional parliament and replaced the Ukrainian flag with a Russian one. On March 1, Russia's parliament approves of President Vladimir Putin's request to send troops into Ukraine to help secure Crimea, saying that they fear for the lives of ethnic Russians. (Al Jazeera)
What is Gray Zone Conflict?

- **Objective**: revise the order of alliances and norms of international conduct.

- States *rely primarily on covert operations* which never pass the threshold of war.
  - Political/Information; Economic pressures; Sub-state actors support; Hybrid tactics (ie cyber space); Gradualism with occasional punctuations (crises).
  - Traditionally only used as auxiliary; backbone of gray zone.

- Conflict onset and termination are *ambiguous*.
  - No declaration of either war or peace.

- Long-term point of victory is *ambiguous*.
  - Only short-term objectives may be overt.

- Gray zone conflicts are exceptionally *resistant to resolution*. 
# Gray Zone Techniques

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gray Zone Technique</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information Warfare</td>
<td>Dissemination of misleading information and propaganda; appeal to diaspora and ethnic ties.</td>
<td>Erosion of political peace and unity within an opponent’s domestic political environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Pressure</td>
<td>State-level economic sanctions and blackmail; significant in cases of asymmetric economic interdependence.</td>
<td>Erosion of the opponent’s key economic sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Support to Sub-State Entities</td>
<td>Material and political support for rebels and local elites through supplies of war materiel.</td>
<td>States’ desire to insulate themselves from responsibility domestically and internationally; insulation from war casualties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradualism</td>
<td>States utilize hybrid warfare techniques (such as cyber) in a gradual manner with only short-term tactical objectives being relatively overt.</td>
<td>Making the final point of victory in the conflict by all parties ambiguous for the opponent; revision of the order of alliances and international norms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gray Zone Technique</td>
<td>Example(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information Warfare</strong></td>
<td>Conflicting representations of the Maidan activists by Russian and Ukrainian media.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Pressure</strong></td>
<td>Sanctions regimes between Russia and West; breakdown of Russian-Ukrainian energy sector ties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material Support to Sub-State Entities</strong></td>
<td>Russia’s material support for the rebels of Luhansk and Donetsk; Ukrainian support for volunteer battalions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gradualism</strong></td>
<td>Use of cyber space by Russia to gradually erode the integrity of military and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine; ‘special’ bilateral relations between Russia and individual E.U states and policymakers (i.e. Italy and Hungary).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO revision of traditional alliance structure in E. Europe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mediation and Crimea

- In comparing Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, there is evidence of a scaling up (e.g. more coercive techniques) of mediation as conflict shifted to Donbas and as it became more intense, complex and bloody.
- Mediators in Crimea remained relatively aloof and facilitative; in Donbas clear evidence of mixed and manipulative strategies.
- Conflict in Crimea saw limited meditation in advance of formal Russian annexation, because 1) limited resistance given by Kyiv 2) Russian forces already present in Crimea through a basing agreement, and 3) Crimea had experience in negotiating autonomy through previous referendums.
- Efforts by Kerry - Lavrov, Poroshenko, OSCE and Merkel all failed.
- Kyiv declared the 2014 referendum illegal claiming that the Ukrainian constitution made no provision for it. The Russian questioned the legitimacy of the Kyiv government’s claim to Crimea, based on precedent, experience, and Crimean sentiment.
- Possible Territorial compromise: Sevastopol, northern Subregions, not considered.
Crimea Mediation (February 20-March 18, 2014)
Donbas: Key Players

- Russian "military advisors" (1500-3000)
- 30,000 separatist forces (1/3 "Russian volunteers")
- Foreign fighters
- Organised criminal networks, Private military companies, Cossacks (in decline)
- VSU (Ukrainian army, special forces and volunteer battalions) (50,000)
- Western military trainers and advisors (2000)
- International pressure and sanctions
- OSCE
OSCE Involvement

- OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) deployed on 21 March 2014.
- Minsk I protocol focussed solely on acceptance of the conditions of a ceasefire, not how to move from a line of separation and control to a politically sustainable outcome.
  - Example: Vladimir Putin interpreted Minsk I as both sides implement a ceasefire; only the Ukrainians would withdraw; Enabling the separatists to maintain de-facto control over Donbas.
  - After these talks failed it was subsequently agreed all heavy weapons were to be moved back by all belligerents, 15km from the front lines
- Meeting with OSCE Feb 11 and 12, 2015: the leaders of the Normandy Format and representatives of LNR and DNR produced a 15-point peace plan because parties failed to uphold that agreement by violating the terms of the ceasefire.
  - Resulted in the signing of Minsk II.
- SMM: Ceasefire has not been honoured since the signing of Minsk I, but line of separation has not changed significantly since Minsk II. Territorial claims are stable while violence has slightly declined, plateauing in 2017.
- By the end of 2017, the OSCE recorded 400,000 ceasefire violations; 4,000 instances of proscribed weapons. December 2017 alone there were an estimated 1,700 violations.
  - Casualties had reached a total of 10,225 (2,500 were civilians)
- The Trilateral Contact Group meets regularly to obtain commitments from all parties to: maintain the ceasefire, withdraw all weapons regulated by Minsk II, allow the SMM unfettered access to disputed territories and to commit to the restoration of basic utilities and critical infrastructure
Mediation: Donbas

- **Direct Russian and US involvement raises the stakes** and influences 1) mediator techniques, 2) likelihood of success and the level of commitment from the opposing parties, necessary to ensure a lasting peace. Subsiding belligerent risk-taking.

Earliest and most concerted mediation attempt to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the war in Donbas was the **meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine**.
This framework was developed by OSCE to facilitate a dialogue through the mediation of an impartial actor and eventually resumed in Minsk I (September 2014) and then Minsk II (February 2015) agreements.

There were several efforts at negotiation by the U.S. Special Representatives for Ukraine, Nuland and Kurt Volker and their Russian Advisor Vladislav Surkov. American side ostensibly negotiating on behalf of Ukraine.
Key Findings

- Key element in the conflict is the **mixed motives and interests of third parties**.
- Russia has exploited this to ensure a diffusion of efforts and focus from the West.
  - Even though the conflict is ongoing, and the situation remains **static since the Minsk Agreements**, cohesion within the West has **deteriorated** from about 2016 onward; some EU policymakers calling for an easing of Russian sanctions.
- Efforts have helped **erode the bloc’s cohesiveness**. Gray zone ambiguities have clearly contributed to **dysfunctions in the Western alliances** and thus make **mediation by actors from that alliance less cohesive** if not less effective.
- The **lack of hurting stalemate** in which the institutionalised process offers a better option than continued fighting.
- There are **risks beyond the higher probability of war and long conflict endurance**.
  - Russia and the West are subsidizing the belligerents’ capacity to absorb the supplementary costs of conflict and to inflict damage on their rivals.
- Support increases both the number of parties who can veto a settlement and the amount of time required to reach a settlement.
Looking Ahead

- **Frozen Conflict**
  - Ukraine joins the club of former Soviet republics with unsolved territorial issues, such as Moldova (Transnisteria) and Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia). Both tilted towards European integration initiatives and both ended up in similar situations as de-facto uncontrolled territories. **Russia beneficiary.**

- **Partition**
  - With prolongation of the negotiations and Kyiv’s unwillingness to consider decentralisation and autonomy, Donbas will continue to build up its pseudo-state structures, drifting away from Ukraine with its “Russkiy Mir” (“Russian world”) ideology. The end goal would be the formation of an independent breakaway state, possibly its eventual incorporation into Russia.

- **Peacekeeping and Autonomy**
  - The deployment of peacekeepers beyond the unarmed OSCE observers scattered throughout the country already (20-60,000 thousand).
  - West wants peacekeepers throughout the separatist territories.
  - Russia argues that peacekeepers should only be deployed on the border between Ukraine and the Donbas region. Ukraine/US want scattering of peacekeepers throughout the Donbas would likely make them more targets rather than intermediaries.
  - Multi-phased approach to peacekeeping deployment to reconcile positions.
  - Peace process needs to be sequenced out with a clear and mutually supported political objective foremost in the minds of its implementers. Placing the burden of implementation on the conflicting parties themselves.
  - UN supported peace process must consider Eastern Ukraine’s long term political prospects as an autonomous entity free to **choose path through free and fair elections.**
President election 2019
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE 2019

OVERALL RESULT

Turnout: 62.8%
Votes: 12,636,317
Counting status: 67.6%*

- Zelens'kyi: 30.5%
- Poroshenko: 16.2%
- Tymoshenko: 13.7%
- Boiko: 11.6%
- Hrytsenko: 7.1%
Thank you

Q&A