



EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL

Topic A: HUMAN TRAFFICKING

In 2015 alone, human traffickers are estimated to have earned up to \$6.6 billion worldwide, and contributed to escalating the number of migrants entering Europe.¹ They have employed tens of thousands from sub-Saharan Africa to Scandinavia – a trend that is predicted to continue and expand throughout 2016. Human trafficking poses many risks for NATO member states as well as other European, African and Central Asian states. Often profits go directly into funding terrorism and organized crime, and the increase in demand has led to more experienced, professional and efficient human trafficking capacities. At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO initiated a zero-tolerance policy on human trafficking. However, the industry has grown, making it more difficult to stop the movement of terrorists, control migration flows, end sex trafficking, and ultimately maintain control of borders.

Today, as a result of actions by Germany, Greece and Turkey in February, 2016, NATO has a maritime force in the Aegean Sea to conduct reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal human trafficking and smuggling networks, with support of Turkish and Greek authorities and the EU's Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex. NATO's Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 is operating in the territorial waters of Greece and Turkey, as well as in international waters with its maritime and air assets.² The imperative for the Alliance to act is increased by the gaps in the EU's primary counter-

¹ "NATO Needs a Human Trafficking Strategy," The NATO Association of Canada. August 21, 2016.

Accessed: <http://natoassociation.ca/nato-needs-a-human-trafficking-strategy/>

² "Standing NATO Maritime Group Two conducts drills in the Aegean Sea," NATO, February 27, 2016.

Accessed: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_128657.htm.

trafficking mission Operation Sophia, which has been cited as unable to effectively disrupt smuggler's boats.³ While NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has noted that illegal trafficking is down and networks lines cut, Turkey is currently seeking an end to mission. However NATO currently sees no end date for the mission.

Stoltenberg has said that it is the "human trafficking and the criminal networks that are fueling this [migrant] crisis."⁴ In fact, Italian Mafia groups have partnered with Nigerian drug lords, and longstanding organized criminal groups from the Balkans have shifted towards the lucrative enterprise of human trafficking, expanding their European bases and smuggling networks in Syria, Lebanon, and across North Africa. Turkish crime groups in border areas are exploiting the labor of Syrian male refugees, and many more face labor trafficking in Europe as they struggle to find legitimate work. The trafficking of migrants by these organized crime groups disrupts established immigration policies of destination countries and often involves human rights abuses. Profiteers of the migrant crisis have increasingly included terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State which has generated a reported \$323 million from human trafficking.⁵

Though NATO has crafted a human trafficking strategy in addition to the current Aegean Sea operations, the concept has largely not been revisited. The 2016 Warsaw Summit communiqué did not mention human trafficking or the multidimensional threats it poses to the Alliance's security. Human trafficking now serves three main purposes for terrorist groups: generating revenue, providing fighting power, and subjugating hostile populations. For terrorists, human trafficking is a dual-use crime like drug trafficking and kidnapping: it not only generates revenue, but it decimates communities.

Turkey was a prime transit route for human traffickers for many years. However, southern European authorities report that traffickers now prefer Tunisian and Libyan routes to transit their human cargo instead of Turkey. Turkish authorities are aware that most of the human smuggling – which takes place in Turkish waters – is connected with the terrorist organization Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Turkey has historically remained a key transshipment point for drug trafficking because of its desirable geographical location connecting Europe to Asia.

Prior to the current migrant crisis the majority of human trafficking victims detected in Europe have come from the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. There are also large numbers from China and South America, and North and West Africa. The problem of human trafficking is not only a migrant issue or even a criminal justice issue. It involves broader social issues, including labour, urban management, immigration and foreign policies. Moreover, terrorist entities are directly involved in drug and human trafficking through extremely well organized networks from South America to North Africa, Europe and Central Asia, thus financing their armed attacks. The persistence of human

³ "NATO Needs a Human Trafficking Strategy," The NATO Association of Canada. August 21, 2016.

Accessed: <http://natoassociation.ca/nato-needs-a-human-trafficking-strategy/>

⁴ "NATO Secretary General welcomes expansion of NATO deployment in the Aegean Sea," NATO, March 6, 2016. Accessed: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_128833.htm.

⁵ "NATO Needs a Human Trafficking Strategy," The NATO Association of Canada. August 21, 2016.

Accessed: <http://natoassociation.ca/nato-needs-a-human-trafficking-strategy/>

trafficking in NATO countries threatens their internal security, social stability and feeds into the profits of those wishing harm upon both NATO members and partners.

Questions for Discussion:

- 1) How has the threat of human trafficking developed in regard to Euro-Atlantic partnership countries? What efforts have been successful in the past and how can they be used in the future?
- 2) How can the root causes of human trafficking be identified and addressed, and how can they be tackled by EAPC and NATO in general?
- 3) What are the options moving forward for EAPC partner states in light of the continued operations in the Aegean Sea? For example, is the current zero-tolerance policy sustainable?

Further Reading:

“Human Smuggling and Trafficking into Europe: A Comparative Perspective”
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/human-smuggling-and-trafficking-europe-comparative-perspective>

Andrew Pratt. “Human Trafficking: The Nadir of an Unholy Trinity,” *European Security* (2004) 13:1-2, 55-71.

“Pathologies of Security Governance: Efforts Against Human Trafficking in Europe,”
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.654.4725&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

“Human Smuggling and Trafficking: An International Terrorist Security Risk?”
<https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/human-smuggling-and-trafficking-an-international-terrorist-security-risk>

“Irregular migration, state security and human security”
https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/gcim/tp/TP5.pdf

“United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto”

<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html>

(Particularly for definitions of trafficking vs smuggling)

Topic B: COMBATTING RADICALIZATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

In recent years, there have been terrorist attacks in Belgium, France, Germany, and other allied countries. The result of these demonstrates the inability of states and the EU to prevent all attacks on civilians while also raising questions regarding the approach to combatting terrorism and radicalization. To this point, many of these attacks have been carried out by local radicalized European youths, and therefore a refocus on citizen integration with European states is needed.

NATO's 2014 publication, "The Home Game", discusses many of the issues and strategies around countering violent extremism, in particular the type of role that NATO can play. Ultimately, its role is limited, as countering violent extremism and de-radicalization programs are largely constructed at the national level. However, especially given the openness of European borders and the ease of travel between allied countries, defense against locally radicalized individuals is only as strong as the weakest link. NATO has yet to explicitly identify combatting radicalization as in its previous communiques or resolutions. Individual countries have developed their own programs with varying levels of success such as United States' Countering Violent Extremism strategy and Britain's Prevention strategy.⁶ Countries like Belgium have had a particularly challenging time trying to institute effective counter radicalization programs.

The need to combat terrorism and the homegrown terrorist threat was recognized by NATO in its 2010 Strategic Concept when it stated:

Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, area of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increase the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks.⁷

In addition to this recognition, Article 4 of the Washington Treaty specifies that member nations may consult and coordinate when matters of security are concerned.⁸ In particular, it is important to note the threat of homegrown violent extremism in the past. Such events include the 2004 bombing in Madrid, 7/7 attacks in London, the November 2015 Paris attacks, the March 2016 Brussel bombings, the July 2016 Nice attacks in France, and continued threats today. In addition to these homegrown threats, there

⁶ Adrienne Ou. "Hearts and Minds: A Comparison of Counter-Radicalization Strategies in Britain and the United States," Cornell International Affairs Review Vol. 11 No. 2. 2016. Accessed: <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1413/hearts-and-minds-a-comparison-of-counter-radicalization-strategies-in-britain-and-the-united-states>

⁷ The "Home Game" Countering Violent Extremism within NATO, 2

⁸ The "Home Game" Countering Violent Extremism within NATO, 2

have been a multitude of responses – both hard and soft – to the issue of radicalization, and European citizens leaving to fight for terrorist groups. ‘Hard’ measures have included stripping citizens of access to social welfare in Belgium, revoking nationality in the UK or Netherlands, and confiscating passports in Denmark.⁹ Likewise, there are also ‘soft’ approaches to radicalization and countering violent extremism.

Denmark has a unique approach which relies on ‘soft’ measures which takes an ‘inclusive’ model, which according to the European Parliamentary Research Service, allows an individual approach to preventing radicalization or at reintegrating those affected. The methods included in such an approach are: mentoring schemes, vocational training, and psychological support to address post-traumatic stress.¹⁰ Furthermore, Denmark has adopted the Aarhus model, which means foreign fighters receive employment and treatment for injuries instead of the method of preventive arrests in the UK.¹¹ Likewise, France has, since January 2015, attempted an online campaign to provide counter-narratives to extremist propaganda and Germany attempts to tackle counter-radicalization at the school and consultation levels.¹² However, there are many reasons for radicalization.

There are many factors that may drive individuals towards radicalization, however they do tend to occur in one of two ways. The first are those that *push* individuals towards seeking out radical and extremist views. These include economic factors such as: lack of opportunities, poverty, unemployment, inequality, and corruption. Additionally there are social factors like marginalization, discrimination, and restricted social mobility. There may have been prolonged and unresolved conflicts, creating security vacuums in their lives and instability with deep-rooted grievances. Politically, many may have experienced poor governance, violations of human rights, or rule of law issues like repressive policies or excessive surveillance.

Secondly there are those factors which *pull* individuals towards violent extremism. These can include individual backgrounds and motivations, as well as negative experiences with state institutions. Furthermore, collective grievances and victimization can play a major role, particularly in terms of perceived oppression, subjugation, and in many cases, foreign intervention. There is also often a distortion or misuse of beliefs, political ideologies, and ethnic or cultural differences. Finding a resonating message by a charismatic leadership or on a social network can also be the pulling factor that leads individuals to radicalization. The pulling factors can be most potent in prisons where there is harsh treatments and conditions, gang activity, a lack of security, and drug use.

Ultimately, groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State use a combination of religious literalism and conspiracy politics to create their anti-Western ideologies.

⁹ “Foreign Fighters: Member States’ responses and EU action in an international context”, *EPRS - European Parliamentary Research Service*, 8

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, 9.

These ideas include the beliefs that democracy is man-made and only extremist understandings of God's law should be enforced; that violent jihad is a Muslim obligation until "God's law" is manifest; that those who die pursuing it, including suicide bombers, are martyrs; and that the greatest obstacle to Islam's dominance is the modern West, led by the United States.¹³

Until these types of ideologies are defeated or a counter narrative accepted, radicalization will continue despite these groups suffering defeats in combat.

The European Parliament summarizes the threat well:

While some of these challenges are typical of law enforcement and intelligence cooperation (e.g. limited information-sharing), others are new and perhaps require a hybrid response combining instruments more typical of foreign policy, development or psychology. This is particularly the case for countering the narratives of terrorism, which often exploits grievances rooted in the foreign policy decisions of other countries; or undermining the credibility and resources of terrorist organizations that mimic state functions by providing public services or security.¹⁴

The threat posed by foreign fighters motivated to carry out an attack is multifaceted. Not only do they present a threat in and of themselves, but they are well positioned to inspire and motivate others to join them. Additionally, the skills and experience they bring back with them increases their effectiveness. Since 2011, over 6,600 foreign fighters from the West have been radicalized and left to join the Islamic State. 30% of the EU's departed have already returned. Historically, returnees continue to participate in terrorist related activities at a rate of 1 in 9, however given the scale and nature of the foreign fighters within ISIL, they are expected to be more numerous and dangerous than in the past. Selected fighters may have received training in fundraising; radicalizing, recruiting and training others; planning; and carrying out attacks. Returnee attacks have a higher likelihood of success and are deadlier than those without that experience. Therefore, even if radicalized individuals decide to return from participating in a terrorist organization, the threat they pose will continue to be serious. As such, de-radicalization is crucial to the safety of EAPC countries.

Questions for Discussion:

- 1) How can EAPC members work collaboratively in combatting radicalization and countering violent extremism? How can cooperation between NATO and EAPC members be further strengthened?

¹³ "A Global Venture to Counter Violent Extremism" *Policy Innovation Memorandum* No. 37, Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed: <http://www.cfr.org/radicalization-and-extremism/global-venture-counter-violent-extremism/p30494>

¹⁴ "United Nations response to violent extremism", *Briefing European Parliamentary Research Service*, 2.

- 2) What initiatives can NATO encourage to better reach target audiences as a measure of tackling ideology?
- 3) How can EAPC members contribute to surveillance cooperation and facilitation for a more effective data and intelligence sharing strategy?
- 4) What type of reintegration strategies should be formed by EAPC member countries to handle returning fighters?

Further Reading:

The “Home Game” Countering Violent Extremism within NATO.
<http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=711>

“Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism”
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/257913.pdf>

“Counterterrorism Lectures 2015: The Rise Of Isil.”
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus148_CT7.pdf.
(See in particular pieces by Clint Watts, David Gersten and Hedieh Mirahmad)

“Turning Point: A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism”
Center for Strategic & International Studies November 2016. Accessed November 2016:
<https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point>

“United Nations response to violent extremism” *Briefing European Parliamentary Research Service*:
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/582025/EPRS_ATA\(2016\)582025_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/582025/EPRS_ATA(2016)582025_EN.pdf)

“Foreign Fighters: Member States' responses and EU action in an international context”
EPRS -European Parliamentary Research Service:
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-548980-Foreign-fighters-FINAL.pdf>

Topic C: NATO EXPANSION IN THE BALKANS

In 2016, the Euro-Atlantic integration of Western Balkan countries has continued despite a majority of the countries having faced war within the last twenty-five years. The issue of integration into the Euro-Atlantic alliance is crucial for NATO security and geopolitical purposes. Thus, both the European Union, NATO, and its allies, have constructed paths for these states to integrate politically, economically, and militarily upon various conditions.

Of vital importance in the Balkans is the establishment of security and stability. This is a role in which NATO can have a hand. NATO has worked with countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Montenegro, and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to enlarge their role within NATO and move towards membership. Other Balkan states like Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia can serve as examples for these aspirant countries in their path towards accession. Each aspirant country has their own set of domestic political issues and agendas which they have to address while meeting NATO requirements.

NATO has had an open door policy in regards to European countries that wish to undertake the obligations and commitments of membership. This “open door policy” is described in Article 10 of its founding treaty and requires the consensus amongst NATO members to allow a country to join the alliance. Currently, there is only one country which has been formally invited to join the alliance: Montenegro.

Montenegro was invited in December 2015 by NATO, which led to the signing of the Accession Protocol for Montenegro on May 19, 2016. Following this, the state was given ‘Invitee’ status once the 28 Allies ratified the Accession Protocol. The ratification by the Allies would mean that Montenegro can accede to the Washington Treaty and have full rights and access to decision making powers as other Allies. However, the road to NATO integration has not been a straight forward path for the Balkan country. In 2016, there has been much protest from its citizens which have been anti-NATO, but also anti-government. This is potentially a security concern as it has been shown recently that Russia attempted to support a coup in Montenegro^[1].¹⁵ This attempt by Russia to sow domestic instability should be considered by NATO and its allies as a threat. Montenegro is of further geostrategic importance as it is positioned within a region where Russia has actively tried to undermine Western interests. While Montenegro is in the formal stages of finalizing its accession, other countries like FYROM and Bosnia-Herzegovina have additional steps to complete prior to reaching similar stages in the accession process.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is a country which has experienced massive war in the 1990s, and has been a significant target for NATO and the European Union (EU) to help stabilize politically and militarily. In 2006 it joined the Partnership for Peace, and has been part of Intensified Dialogue with NATO since 2008. However, Bosnia-Herzegovina has suffered setbacks in its attempts to join the Membership Action Plan since the Office of the High Representative – an office established by the Dayton Accords treaty – would have to be removed. The need for the removal of this office is to assure that defense property is centralized, and not fragmented in favor of the two constitutional and legal entities: Republika Srpska, and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nonetheless, there are areas of cooperation between BiH and NATO that can be utilized. For example, NATO cites areas like peacekeeping and crisis-management; counter terrorism intelligence exchange; and defense and security sector reform. NATO’s reputation has also faced

¹⁵ “Fingers pointed at Russians in Alleged Coup Plot in Montenegro”, *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/26/world/europe/finger-pointed-at-russians-in-alleged-coup-plot-in-montenegro.html>

challenges from domestic elites within BiH. The president of the Bosnian entity Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, has continually threatened with secession from BiH, and has had said that he would hold a referendum on NATO accession which undermines the central state authorities' wish to cooperate with NATO and integrate. Furthermore, Milorad Dodik has been a strong supporter of Russia, and even lobbied the state to veto a UN Security Council resolution calling the Srebrenica Massacre a genocide. Once again, like Montenegro, Russia has continued to play a role in destabilizing a NATO aspirant country.

The last country in the Balkans which wishes to join the alliance is FYROM. The FYROM has been a part of NATO's Partnership for Peace since 1995, and joined the Membership Action Plan in 1999. Similar to BiH's case, NATO and the FYROM have mutual areas of interest, including security cooperation, defense and security sector reform, and civil emergency planning. However, there are also deep concerns regarding FYROM's political issues, particularly regarding the state of democracy within the country. There have been numerous protests this year which demonstrate the displeasure towards the government, and there have been various scandals over widespread government surveillance of political and religious leaders, journalists, and private citizens. To this point, Freedom House has determined that the current status of the Press is "not free".¹⁶ [3] These are worrying indicators for a state that wishes to join the alliance, and pose potential security and stability issues in a region which has seen consistent attempts by Russia to undermine Western interests. Another hurdle for the FYROM is the issue of its name. Greece currently finds it inappropriate, and insists on it changing as a requirement to enter the alliance.

In sum, NATO expansion in the Balkans will be a required strategy for the alliance as it attempts to build a peaceful and prosperous Europe. The various aspirant countries face numerous accession challenges. Although these can be overcome with NATO coordination, they still require serious political compromise to achieve mutually beneficial goals. The only state in the Balkans which does not wish to join NATO is Serbia. However, despite the grievances the government of Serbia has with the past NATO intervention in the 1990s, it has reassured NATO it would still cooperate with it on various mutually beneficial security fronts.

Questions for Discussion:

- 1) In what ways can NATO and EAPC states assure that the Balkans remain a stable and prosperous region?
- 2) How can the EPAC maintain dialogue to ensure that there is a reduced risk of conflict in the Balkans and maintain peaceful cooperation between the Republic of Kosovo and Serbia?

¹⁶ "Macedonia", Freedom House,
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/macedonia>

- 3) Due to the growing refugee crisis and the use of this region as a path to Europe for refugees, how can EAPC countries assure that security is maintained but human rights are also respected?

Further Reading:

“North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Enlargement”
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm#

“Relations with Montenegro”
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49736.htm?selectedLocale=en#

“Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina”
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49127.htm

“Relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48830.htm?selectedLocale=en

“Macedonia”, Freedom House,
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/macedonia>

“Fingers pointed at Russians in Alleged Coup Plot in Montenegro”, *New York Times*,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/26/world/europe/finger-pointed-at-russians-in-alleged-coup-plot-in-montenegro.html>