



CARLETON MODEL  
**NATO**

**2021**

**MNATO**

BACKGROUND GUIDE

PARTNERSHIPS AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY COMMITTEE

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- Extraction of Natural Resources in Contested Maritime Zones
  - Migrations Resulting from Environmental Challenges
  - Gender, Race and European Stability

## Introduction: The Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC)

The Partnerships and Cooperative Security Committee (PCSC) is the politico-military committee responsible for all NATO's outreach programs on a wide range of political and security-related issues with non-member states. Specifically, there are six European Union (EU) member states which have declared their non-alignment with military alliances, and are not NATO members. These are Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. Additionally, NATO also has partnerships with many non-EU member states, including Switzerland, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Serbia, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Belarus. The PCSC develops relations on the basis of common values, reciprocity, mutual benefit and respect.

The history of the PCSC is somewhat ambiguous. Prior to 2010, it was called the Political and Partnerships Committee (PCC). In 2010, the PCC absorbed all the responsibilities of the Political Committee as a result of internal committee restructuring. However, in 2014, NATO decided to re-establish the Political Committee to stand on its own, and the PPC's role was expanded, and its name changed to the PCSC. At present, the PCSC committee meets in various formats—with partners in NATO's regionally specific partnership frameworks (i.e. the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), in “at 30” meetings among Allies, in “30+1” format (with all NATO Allies and an individual non-member state), and in “30+n” formats (with all NATO Allies and multiple non-member states).

## Topic I: Extraction of Natural Resources in Contested Maritime Zones

### *Introduction*

Propelled to the agenda by resource appraisals, the Arctic is one of few places that continues to lure the prying eyes of governments, researchers, and journalists alike.

For most of human history, the Arctic has been too cold, too distant, and too dangerous for the intense exploitation required to extract natural resources. But the Arctic Ocean is warming faster than any place on earth.<sup>1</sup> The Arctic icecap is already less than half the size it was 50 years ago,<sup>2</sup> slowly making way for exploration in the region and the opening of the Northwest Passage, a sea route connecting Asia to Europe that explorers sought for centuries to no avail.

During the Cold War, the Arctic held a prominent place in the political and military standoffs between the United States and the USSR.<sup>3</sup> The Arctic was home to the Russian Northern Fleet and two-thirds of Soviet-built nuclear submarines.<sup>4</sup> After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 1987 Murmansk Initiative<sup>5</sup> attempted to transform the Arctic from being a military zone into an international zone of peace.<sup>6</sup> As a result, the relevance of the Arctic region in geo-political affairs significantly decreased.<sup>7</sup>

However, climate change has renewed the scramble for territory now that the Arctic Ocean will open to regular marine transportation and exploration of its lucrative natural-resource deposits in the future.<sup>8</sup> The area above the Arctic Circle is full of sedimentary basins and continental shelves that hold enormous oil and natural gas resources.<sup>9</sup> The United States Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic contains about 13 percent of the world's undiscovered conventional oil resources and 30 percent of its undiscovered conventional natural gas resources.<sup>10</sup> Growing accessibility, at least for

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<sup>1</sup> "Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic, 2017." Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme. Arctic Council. (2017), <https://www.amap.no/documents/download/2909/inline>.

<sup>2</sup> Renee Cho. "How the Warming Arctic Affects Us All." *Earth Institute Columbia University*. (December 6, 2012), <https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2012/12/06/how-the-warming-arctic-affects-us-all/>.

<sup>3</sup> Gerald E. Connolly. "NATO and Security in the Arctic." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Political Committee. (October 7, 2017): 1-2. [NATO and Security in the Arctic - NATO PAwww.nato-pa.int › download-file › 2017 - 172 PCTR 1...](https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file/2017-172-PCTR-1...)

<sup>4</sup> Ibid: 1.

<sup>5</sup> In 1987, the Murmansk Initiative was launched by Mikhail Gorbachev, the eighth and final leader of the Soviet Union, and comprised a variety of foreign policy proposals promoting peace in the Arctic region.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> There is and can be no definite number of years that scientists ascribe to melting ice caps.

<sup>9</sup> "Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle." United States Geological Survey. <https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf>.

<sup>10</sup> Hobart M. King. "Oil and Natural Gas Resources of the Arctic." *Geoscience News and Information*. <https://geology.com/articles/arctic-oil-and-gas/>.

several months of the year, will allow increased military use of the Arctic, and cut distances between Asia and Europe by one third.

Arctic re-emergence has not come without tensions over land access, water and natural resources. Tensions between Russia and NATO Allies as well as increased engagement from non-Arctic states like China, threaten to destabilize the Arctic. Since 2007, Russia has gradually expanded its military presence and infrastructure in the Arctic.<sup>11</sup> Not only did Russian President Vladimir Putin order regular air patrols over the Arctic Ocean, but Russian military bases have been reopened in the Arctic region, where complex military exercises are regularly held.<sup>12</sup> N NATO Allies have conflicting views about Russia's increasing military presence in the Arctic, especially as Russian intentions remain unclear.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, while China is not accepted as an Arctic state and has, therefore, been excluded from Arctic politics, senior Chinese government officials are explicit about wanting to exploit the sea lanes on the Northwest Passage as they open up.<sup>14</sup> For example, it has built partnerships in the region to ensure that it will have a say in Arctic affairs in the future, and even included its plans for maritime cooperation under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).<sup>15</sup> Both Russia and China's actions are relevant to the security interests of NATO allies as developments in the region have an impact on the political and economic stability of its territory.

### **NATO's Role**

During the Cold War, the Arctic maritime region was a top security concern for NATO due to its strategic significance in the conflict.<sup>16</sup> After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO's dispute with the other Warsaw Pact countries (Albania, Bulgaria,

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<sup>11</sup> Heather A. Conley and Caroline Rohloff. "The New Ice Curtain: Russia's Strategic Reach to the Arctic, A Report of the CSIS Europe Program." CSIS: Center for Strategic International Studies. (August 2015): 9. [https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\\_files/files/publication/150826\\_Conley\\_NewIceCurtain\\_Web.pdf](https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/150826_Conley_NewIceCurtain_Web.pdf).

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Gerald E. Connolly. "NATO and Security in the Arctic." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Political Committee. (October 7, 2017): 1; Conley and Rohloff: 112.

<sup>14</sup> Connolly: 8.

<sup>15</sup> The BRI is a colossal modern-day Silk Road, which is a collection of development and investment initiatives that expand from East Asia to Europe, thereby boosting international trade and stimulating economic growth.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid: 4.

Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania) settled, causing the security threat to dissolve<sup>17</sup> and the region experienced very little tension or security concerns for the next twenty years. However, this changed due to a warming climate and intensifying geopolitical competition for natural resources and territorial control.<sup>18</sup> The NATO Alliance, specifically the members who border the Arctic (Canada, Norway, United States, Denmark, and Iceland), have escalating security concerns about the presence and interests of Russia, China and other non-Arctic countries in the contested region.

Russia has adopted aggressive strategies to defend what Moscow believes to be their Arctic territory in an attempt to capitalize on the available untapped resources and gain regional control. It has increased its presence by constructing six military bases in the Arctic region, complete with modernized military technology.<sup>19</sup> In 2015, Russia called the Northern Fleet to full alert by mobilizing more than 45,000 troops as a show of strength against other Arctic states and NATO.<sup>20</sup> NATO views such actions as a threat to regional stability, as it raises tensions with other Arctic states, and threatens the already fragile relationship between Russia and the United States. As tensions are high, it is prudent for NATO to also monitor the activities and interests of China, particularly considering its steadily improving relationship with Russia.<sup>21</sup>

At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO reaffirmed its pledge to bolster its position in the Arctic region by increasing security at its borders in order to defend and deter any threats from NATO territory.<sup>22</sup> This was a direct response to Russia and other non-Arctic countries' interest and presence in the contested Arctic region. NATO has since continued its situational awareness of the region in order to help foster a secure and cooperative nature for the alliance and the greater region.<sup>23</sup> However, to date, NATO has heightened its military presence in the Arctic, while still remaining cautious not to put

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<sup>17</sup> NATO. "What Was the Warsaw Pact?" Accessed January 5, 2021.

[https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified\\_138294.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified_138294.htm).

<sup>18</sup> Lanteigne, Marc. "The Changing Shape of Arctic Security." NATO Review. Nato Review, June 28, 2019. <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/06/28/the-changing-shape-of-arctic-security/index.html>.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid: 4.

<sup>20</sup> Conley and Rohloff: 112.

<sup>21</sup> Lanteigne: 4.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid

<sup>23</sup> Ibid: 4.

forth any provocative measures that could spark sudden conflict with Russia or other states.

### ***Going Forward***

While icecaps in the Arctic have not yet fully melted, non-Arctic states and non-NATO members have demonstrated an interest in increasing their presence in, and engagement with, the Arctic, its natural resources, and the Northwest Passage. As the strategic relevance of the Arctic continues to increase, the Alliance cannot afford to delay assessing its approach to mitigating tensions over the region and, ultimately, maintain stability. The United States and Russia, the Arctic's two central powers, differ strongly on key issues pertaining to the Arctic's future, including the legal status of the Northwest Passage. This is compounded by the strengthening relationship of Russia and China, the latter of which has repeatedly stated that it would settle for no less than a voice in Arctic affairs. As such, there is tremendous potential for destabilization, a dangerous security dilemma that NATO may have the capacity to unwind before it escalates beyond control, considering its role as a pillar of Euro-Atlantic security.

While NATO should increase its situational awareness in the Arctic, whether or not it should create an "Arctic committee" or "working group" has yet to be discussed. NATO's involvement in the Arctic could have the adverse impact of diluting the influence of Arctic states. As the largest military organization worldwide, its involvement risks 1) encouraging the participation and engagement of non-Arctic states that are concurrently NATO members, and 2) being perceived as an ongoing threat against Russia. Arctic decision-making may also not benefit from the 25 NATO member states that are not Arctic states, and may have competing interests. This could cause internal divisions within NATO rather than dilute existing geopolitical tensions in the Arctic.

### ***Guiding Questions***

1. Should NATO permanently control the security of the Arctic maritime region? If so, what would this look like? If not, who should?
2. The United States and Russia share an important regional objective: greater international cooperation in the Arctic (specifically in the Arctic Council). Can the

3. How should NATO address the growing security concerns that Russia puts forth?  
Are military and political means suitable tools?
4. What economic, political or military interests does your country have in the Arctic region?

# "Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic

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[https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified\\_138294.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified_138294.htm)

## **Further Reading**

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"Understanding the Future Arctic Security Environment: Applying NATO Strategic Foresight

Analysis to Canadian Arctic Defence and Security." North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (2020). <https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/20-Sept-15-NAADSN-Canadian-Arctic-Security-Strategic-Foresight-Analysis-2020-DRAFT-FOR-DISCUSSION-2.pdf>



## Topic II: Migrations Resulting From Environmental Challenges

### Introduction

NATO, like all intergovernmental organizations, is not immune to the threats that climate change poses to humanity. Droughts, famine, storms and flooding are all increasing in frequency and intensity as global temperatures rise.<sup>24</sup> No precedent exists for the scope or magnitude of anthropogenic climate change<sup>25</sup> and its effects. While NATO is primarily concerned with political and military affairs,<sup>26</sup> climate change has altered the way people conceive of and understand peace and security. Many NATO member states have identified climate change as an accelerant of instability<sup>27</sup> and, by default, an obstacle to both international peace and security.

In the last decade, a range of summit declarations, speeches and documents have supported the view that NATO's mandate falls within the scope of combating climate change.<sup>28</sup> On September 28, 2020, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg explained in a virtual speech why NATO, despite being a politico-military alliance, should be concerned with climate change.<sup>29</sup> His reasons were multifold. First, climate change makes the world a more dangerous place for everyone.<sup>30</sup> Second, unlike a military attack, climate

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<sup>24</sup> William Nordhaus. "Climate Change: the Ultimate Challenge for Economics." *American Economic Review*, Vol. 109, Iss. 6, (2019); Nicholas Stern. *Why Are We Waiting? The Logic, Urgency and Promise of Tackling Climate Change*. Cambridge: MIT Press. (2015); "Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report." Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change." Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2014): 2, [https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR\\_AR5\\_FINAL\\_full\\_wcover.pdf](https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf);

"Compendium of IOM's Activities in Migration, Climate Change and the Environment." IOM: International Organization for Migration. (2009): 17, [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/compendium\\_of\\_ioms\\_activities.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/compendium_of_ioms_activities.pdf).

<sup>25</sup> Anthropogenic climate change is defined as sudden- and slow-onset environmental disasters caused by human activities such as greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide emissions.

<sup>26</sup> "About Nato." North Atlantic Treaty Organization, <https://nato.usmission.gov/our-relationship/about-nato/>.

<sup>27</sup> Shiloh Fetzek. "The Alliance in a Changing Climate: Bolstering the NATO Mission Through Climate Preparedness." *The Center for Climate and Security*, Vol. 37, (2017): 1, available at [https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/the-alliance-in-a-changing-climate\\_bolstering-the-nato-mission-through-climate-preparedness\\_briefer-37.pdf](https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/the-alliance-in-a-changing-climate_bolstering-the-nato-mission-through-climate-preparedness_briefer-37.pdf).

<sup>28</sup> "Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Emerging Security Risks, Lloyd's of London." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (October 1, 2009), [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions\\_57785.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_57785.htm); "NATO Stresses Climate Change Impacts on Security." International Institute for Sustainable Development. (September 10, 2014), <http://sdg.iisd.org/news/nato-stresses-climate-change-impacts-on-security/>.

<sup>29</sup> "NATO and the security implications of climate change: Virtual speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (September 28, 2020), [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_178355.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_178355.htm).

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

change cannot be completely prevented, which makes it more difficult for military forces to keep citizens safe.<sup>31</sup> Finally, all individuals have a responsibility to collectively combat climate change and protect the natural environment for future generations.<sup>32</sup> As the Alliance's main goal is to maintain stability, and climate change destabilizes the international community, combating anthropogenic climate change has become increasingly important for NATO.

Climate change presents a host of complex and unpredictable national security challenges. One of them is climate migration, which is driven by a range of environmental factors, including sudden-onset environmental disasters like hurricanes, tsunamis and earthquakes and slow-onset environmental disasters like desertification, sea level rise and coastal erosion. Climate change has already significantly decreased agricultural output and undermined water availability in many locations around the world,<sup>33</sup> driving communities with low adaptive capacity to migrate elsewhere. Low-lying islands and coastal areas may become permanently flooded or damaged,<sup>34</sup> leading to migration without the potential for return, recovery or reintegration. Since the 1990s, scientists and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have continually warned the international community that the greatest single impact of climate change could be on human migration.<sup>35</sup> While it is difficult to make predictions about how communities will adapt to climate change and the resulting repercussions of climate migration, existing predictions are dire. Future forecasts for mass climate migration vary between 25 million and 1 billion environmental migrants by 2050,<sup>36</sup> with 200 million being the most widely

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Tyler H. Lippert. "NATO, Climate Change and International Security: A Risk Governance Approach." *Pardee Rand Graduate School*. (2016): 103.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid: 19, 114.

<sup>35</sup> "Compendium of IOM's Activities in Migration, Climate Change and the Environment." IOM: International Organization for Migration. (2009): 9.

<sup>36</sup> Carlotta Weber. "Climate Refugees and Climate Migration." *Green European Foundation*. (2019): 24, [https://gef.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Climate-paper\\_FINAL.pdf](https://gef.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Climate-paper_FINAL.pdf).

repeated prediction.<sup>37</sup> The latter would mean that one in every 39 persons in the world could be displaced by climate change within just 30 years.<sup>38</sup>

It is clear that climate migration hinders stability in a myriad of ways—by undermining economic growth, increasing the risk of conflict, increasing pressure on urban infrastructure and services, and leading to poorer health, educational and social indicators among climate migrants themselves. All these unintended, albeit massive, effects will lead to increasing global instability and, hence, may necessitate NATO intervention.

### **NATO's Role**

NATO first recognized environmental challenges as potential threats to security in 1969.<sup>39</sup> In response, NATO established the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) to address the adverse impacts of environmental problems on the quality of life of member states' citizens and the stability of member states. As a scientific research committee, CCMS developed mechanisms to share information on environmental, technical and scientific capacities between military and non-military communities through pilot studies, short-term projects, conferences, workshops and roundtable discussions.<sup>40</sup>

Since then, the Alliance has developed a variety of initiatives that address climate change. In May 2010, the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) was established to address a growing range of non-traditional crises and emerging security challenges and consequences for NATO. Yet the ESCD's vision, principles and main deliverables make no mention of climate change. In November 2010, climate change was institutionalized through the Strategic Concept for Defense and Security of the Members

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<sup>37</sup> Oli Brown. "Climate change and forced migration: Observations, projections and implications." *Human Development Report*. United Nations Development Programme. (2007): 5, 20, 21.

[https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/climate\\_forced\\_migration.pdf](https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/climate_forced_migration.pdf)

<sup>38</sup> The 2021 global population is approximately 7.8 billion.  $7.800,000,000/200,000,000=39$ . *Worldometer*. "Current World Population." Available at <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/>.

<sup>39</sup> Amar Causevic. "Facing an Unpredictable Threat: Is NATO Ideally Placed to Manage Climate Change as a Non-Traditional Threat Multiplier?" *Connections*, Vol. 15, No. 2, (Spring 2017): 72.

<sup>40</sup> "The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society." North Atlantic Treaty Organization, <https://www.nato.int/events/0110eapc/english/txt-15.htm>.

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The purpose of the Concept is to “guide the next phase of NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners.”<sup>41</sup> While there are 38 Articles in the Concept, climate change is only mentioned once in Article 15, which is as follows:

Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.<sup>42</sup>

This demonstrates that, while NATO has acknowledged that climate change is a security threat for more than a decade, it was not yet a priority for the Alliance.<sup>43</sup> However, in 2014, NATO exhibited a desire to explore smart energy applications for military use. NATO adopted the Green Defense Framework, which develops NATO’s capacity to become more energy efficient and environmentally sustainable in its own operations, “while saving resources and enhancing operational effectiveness, where feasible.”<sup>44</sup> It also provides a platform to share information on best practices and technologies to improve national Green Defence efforts between Allies, as well as with partner states, other international organizations and industry.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> “Active Engagement, Modern Defence Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (November 20, 2010): par. 1, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_68580.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm).

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, Article 15.

<sup>43</sup> Years later, in June 2016, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stressed that “NATO is not the first responder to climate change. We are a military alliance, but partly everything that can make military vehicles, military equipment more energy efficient will be good both for the environment but also for the sustainability of the armed forces. So energy efficiency, less energy dependence of the armed forces is good for both the armed forces as armed forces and for the environment. And that’s actually the thing we can do as an alliance.” Shiloh Fetzek. “NATO Secretary General: Climate change is also a security threat.” *The Center for Climate and Security*. (June 9, 2016), <https://climateandsecurity.org/2016/06/nato-secretary-general-climate-change-is-also-a-security-threat/>.

<sup>44</sup> “Green Defense Framework.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (February 2014): 2.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid: 2-3.

2015 marked the first time that NATO officially recognized the disruptive impacts of climate-induced migration in its Framework for Future Alliance Operations.<sup>46</sup> It states that:

Mass human migration caused by demographic, environmental, economic or political change or armed conflict will exceed the ability of governments to protect and provide services for their resident populations. This uncontrolled migration will increase the potential for inter-ethnic, cultural, racial and religious tensions.<sup>47</sup>

It goes on to explain the reasons for mass migration, namely the compounding effects of multiple instabilities (i.e. epidemic, poverty, inequality, political oppression, climate change or natural disaster), the ways migrants will travel, and the loss of control by state governments over migration flows as a security issue on the rise.<sup>48</sup> This document demonstrates that climate change began to be perceived as a “Threat Multiplier,”<sup>49</sup> which not only threatens to exacerbate conflicts within and between states, but directly intervenes with NATO’s capacity to maintain international peace and security.<sup>50</sup> While NATO is beginning to acknowledge the severity and magnitude of anthropogenic climate change and its multifaceted effects, it has yet to publish a document or statement about what its role will be in managing migration flows in order to mitigate the potential risks caused by urban population growth, accelerating climate-related disasters, and political unrest.

## **Going Forward**

Today, anthropogenic climate change is drawing unprecedented international attention, as it is a non-traditional threat that compounds pre-existing instabilities. NATO

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<sup>46</sup> “Framework for Future Alliance Operations: August 2015.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2015), <https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/ffao-2015.pdf>

<sup>47</sup> Ibid: 59.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid: 59-60.

<sup>49</sup> It was not until 2015 that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 427 on Climate Change and International Security acknowledged that “climate change-related risks are significant threat multipliers that will shape the security environment in areas of concern to the Alliance and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.” Available at <https://www.actu-environnement.com/media/pdf/news-25462-resolution-otan-2015.pdf>.

<sup>50</sup> Allied Command Transformation. “Strategic Foresight Analysis: 2017 Report.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2017): 67.

has responded by developing the Framework for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO), a planning document that builds on the Strategic Foresight Analysis, which provides trend analysis of the future security environment up until 2035. It has accelerated the pace of a “green” NATO with improved energy efficiency and trial alternative energy technologies through the Smart Energy Initiative and the adoption of the Green Defense Framework. NATO is gradually doing more to integrate climate change into its crisis management and disaster response work. Despite this, migration resulting from environmental challenges has received very little attention.

Climate-related security risks, particularly migration, are especially present in several regions of concern to NATO: the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Many leaders in NATO member states are aware that drought in Syria played a role in exacerbating environmental, financial and social instabilities in the years leading up to the Syrian conflict and subsequent refugee crisis.<sup>51</sup> Future projections for the MENA region suggest frequent and widespread heat and drought, which has the potential to spur conditions that support extremist non-state armed groups, and serve as an additional push factor for migration.<sup>52</sup> In the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, climate-related disasters have the capacity to stall or even reverse development gains,<sup>53</sup> which will put a dent in resolving existing security challenges in the region. Examples include violence in northern Nigeria, Mali and Somalia.<sup>54</sup> Developing strategies to manage climate-induced migration crises in these regions will simultaneously enhance the operational resilience of NATO forces and encourage member states to integrate climate risks into intelligence assessments and national security and defense strategies.

NATO has, to an extent, focused on responding to environmental crises, instead of anticipating and preparing for them. The Framework for Future Alliance Operations and Strategic Foresight Analysis serve as stepping-stones to expanding internal expertise on climate risks and will need to continue incorporating awareness of the changing geo-strategic landscape into NATO’s strategic planning initiatives. Preparing for climate-induced migration will bolster NATO resilience and ensure that military forces are able to

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<sup>51</sup> Fetzek (2017): 4.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid: 2, 4.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid: 4.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

respond adequately to non-traditional threats like anthropogenic climate change. In doing so, it will avoid the higher costs of entirely responding to them after the fact.

### **Guiding Questions**

1. How should NATO run interference in mass cross-border human migration caused by an amalgamation of factors, including anthropogenic climate change, if at all?
2. What actions can NATO take to prevent the adverse impacts of rapid urban population growth caused by mass climate-induced migration?
3. The Alliance is fixated on national and bilateral relations and threats. Is it time to create a Climate Alliance Treaty Organization, as suggested by Associate Professor Ibrahim Al-Marashi at California State University? Or would the creation of a committee focused on climate migration suffice?
4. Combating anthropogenic climate change will require efforts from every state worldwide. However, the states that most contribute to climate change in the form of greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide emissions are member states, with the exception of contemporary China and India (28 percent and 7 percent of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions respectively<sup>55</sup>). What is NATO's responsibility in mitigating future emissions by NATO member states? Are NATO's efforts (e.g. [Smart Energy Agenda](#)), which contribute to the Green Defense Framework, sufficient?
5. How is your country prepared to combat anthropogenic climate change? How do its efforts contribute to, or oppose, NATO's efforts?

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## Topic III: Gender, Race & European Stability

### *Introduction to Race & European Stability*

Historically, race has been a divisive factor within our world, despite the known value and strength that diversity and inclusivity have the power to cultivate. Throughout periods of European instability, racial tension has acted as both a catalyst of instability and fuel for conflicts. There have been multiple ethnically rooted conflicts that caused European instability and required NATO military intervention. Between 1992 and 1995, the Bosnian War involved conflict between its multiethnic population (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) of what was previously known as Yugoslavia. Now referred to as a genocide, the ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity were primarily Serb-led, and targeted Muslim Bosniaks.<sup>56</sup> The Kosovo crisis of 1998 to 1999, too, was the result of ethnic clashes between Serbians and Kosovar Albanians. The Serbs forced the Kosovar Albanians out of their homes and inflicted mass violence in acts largely considered deplorable.<sup>57</sup>

### *NATO's Role in Race & European Stability*

NATO has used military means as a tool for intervention in circumstances where human suffering needed to be averted or stopped. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that this is a last resort action, at the moment that all other diplomatic measures fail. Cases where NATO has used military intervention to bring stability to parts of Europe include, but are not limited to, Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. The interventions were successful in putting an end to human suffering, but are still considered to be controversial within the international community.<sup>58</sup> The controversy stems from the international debate over the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

The Bosnian War required international intervention from the United Nations and NATO for the violence to cease. In 1995, NATO launched two different air strike operations. The second was successful in bringing the Serbs to the negotiating table, thus

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<sup>56</sup> NATO. "Operations and Missions: Past and Present." NATO, June 11, 2018.  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_52060.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm).

<sup>57</sup> Ibid: 53.

<sup>58</sup> Evans, Gareth. "The Responsibility to Protect." NATO Review. Nato Review, December 1, 2002.  
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ending the war.<sup>59</sup> However, the war endured for three long years, resulting in a genocide against the Muslim Bosniaks. NATO acted on the foundation of the Responsibility to Protect, because previous peaceful appeals from the United Nations were unsuccessful.

In March of 1999, NATO began the Operation Allied Force, which involved airstrikes as a response to the ethnic conflict that unfolded in Kosovo. Without the Security Council's approval, NATO chose to act and follow the foundation of the Responsibility to Protect, as diplomatic efforts had failed. The intervention was successful, resulting in the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and the safe return of refugees and displaced people.<sup>60</sup>

### ***Introduction to Gender & European Stability***

Previously, gender has been excluded from peace and security operations, as men have historically dominated those fields. However, in recent decades, a shift in this narrative has occurred as the gender equality and feminist movements have grown in strength and numbers. Like other international actors and organizations, NATO recognizes the importance of gender representation and perspective. Women and men have unique and multifaceted, experiences, observations and ideas about how peace, security and stability can be realized.<sup>61</sup> The diversity in perspective that was previously devalued is now being recognized as a tool to strengthen peace and security operations. The NATO Secretary General recently stated that “diverse armed forces are strong armed forces,”<sup>62</sup> supporting the view that diverse perspectives promote cross-cultural cooperation and gender equality. This strategy can be used to foster increased stability within the Alliance and specific regions that have a history of being divisive in nature.

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid: 53.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid

<sup>61</sup> NATO. “Women, Peace and Security.” NATO, October 29, 2020. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_91091.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91091.htm).

<sup>62</sup> NATO. “NATO and Women, Peace and Security: Strength Is in Gender Diversity and Equality.” NATO, October 16, 2020. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_178803.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_178803.htm?selectedLocale=en).

## ***NATO's Role in Gender & European Stability***

In October 2000, the Women, Peace and Security Agenda was launched in addition to the United Nations approval of Security Council Resolution 1325. Since then, NATO has and continues to recognize the crucial role that women contribute to peace and security.<sup>63</sup> In 2007, NATO's first policy on Women, Peace and Security was constructed by allies and partners of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The policy was founded on the principles of integration, inclusiveness and integrity.<sup>64</sup>

NATO's dedicated commitment to gender equality adds strength to the Alliance and stability to its member states, partners, and their territories. NATO has expanded women's participation at all levels, while decreasing the gendered aspects of working operations. In doing so, it encourages Alliance members to recruit more women into their country's militaries.<sup>65</sup>

## ***Going Forward***

While gender and race have proven to be divisive factors within our societies, they also have the capacity to act as stepping-stones to cross-cultural strength, gender equality and international stability. The Alliance is working towards mitigating both instability and security threats. Going forward, NATO members should continue to use the strengths of diversity to deter instability and conflicts. Ethnic and racial clashes are impossible to deter entirely. However, the principles of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and previous NATO interventions prove that the Alliance is capable of resolving conflict through both diplomatic and military measures. Similarly, continuing to include women in peace and security operations will serve as a model for member states to follow. This will maintain and strengthen the principles of the Women, Peace and Security policy of integration, inclusiveness and integrity, and simultaneously uphold the PCSC's pledge to reciprocity, mutual benefit and respect.

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid: 58

<sup>64</sup> Ibid

<sup>65</sup> Ibid: 59

## **Guiding Questions**

1. What could NATO have done differently during points of instability caused by ethnic and racial clashes?
2. In relation to the R2P, does the outcome of military intervention outweigh the ethical costs and violations of state sovereignty?
3. What is your country's position on the role gender plays in peace and security? What roles do women have in your country's military? How might NATO's acknowledgement that "more women equals a stronger force" impact your country's military strategy going forward?

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