{"id":160,"date":"2026-10-28T13:20:31","date_gmt":"2026-10-28T17:20:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/mts\/?p=160"},"modified":"2026-10-29T13:03:28","modified_gmt":"2026-10-29T17:03:28","slug":"canada-and-turkiye-the-prospects-and-limits-of-a-closer-partnership","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/mts\/2026\/canada-and-turkiye-the-prospects-and-limits-of-a-closer-partnership\/","title":{"rendered":"Canada and T\u00fcrkiye: The Prospects and Limits of a Closer \nPartnership"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Canada and T\u00fcrkiye: The Prospects and Limits of a Closer \nPartnership\n <\/h1>\n \n \n \n\n

Michael Shirley, PhD Candidate, 24 October 2026
<\/p>\n\n\n <\/header>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n\n\n

Prime Minister Mark Carney\u2019s October 2026 visit to T\u00fcrkiye marked the first bilateral visit by a Canadian prime minister <\/a>and an effort to expand cooperation between two longstanding North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The trip culminated with Carney and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan announcing a new Strategic Partnership,<\/a> supported by a three- year action plan covering trade, energy, defence, and diplomatic cooperation. The two countries also announced a timetable for free trade negotiations and signed agreements to expand air transport and defence-industrial cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These announcements should be understood as the beginning of a process and not as a fundamental change in bilateral relations. Many of the anticipated economic and strategic benefits remain dependent on subsequent negotiations, commercial investment, and the management of differences between the two countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The visit also raises a broader question concerning how Canada approaches partners whose interests do not consistently align with its own. T\u00fcrkiye is firmly embedded in Western security and economic institutions, but its foreign policy cannot be understood exclusively through those relationships. Its economic ties with Russia, regional security interests, and domestic political developments have periodically complicated relations with its NATO allies. These differences do not necessarily preclude cooperation, nor should they be interpreted as evidence that T\u00fcrkiye is inherently an unreliable partner. For Ottawa, expanding relations with Ankara will require an understanding of where their interests overlap, where they differ, and how those differences can be managed without undermining cooperation elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An Economic Relationship with Room to Grow<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

For Canada, the visit forms part of a wider effort to reduce its dependence on the United States as an export market. Ottawa has set a goal of doubling Canadian exports to non-US markets over the next decade<\/a>, and the proposed free trade agreement (FTA) with T\u00fcrkiye contributes to this objective. Beyond access to the Turkish market itself, Ankara\u2019s commercial relationship with Europe, the Middle East, and Asia could create new opportunities for Canadian businesses seeking to expand their international activities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye has a diversified industrial economy and an established manufacturing base. Its automotive, machinery, and electrical equipment industries are closely connected to European manufacturing networks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, bilateral trade has remained relatively limited. According to Global Affairs Canada, two-way merchandise trade reached approximately $4.3 billion in 2025,<\/a> comprising $1.1 billion in Canadian exports and $3.2 billion in imports from T\u00fcrkiye. Despite increasing nearly 50 percent since 2020, bilateral trade remains modest relative to the size of the two economies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The proposed FTA could help address this limitation. The first round of negotiations is scheduled for 30 November to 4 December 2026, <\/a>with Canada seeking to reduce tariffs, address non-tariff barriers, and improve access to Turkish markets and supply chains. However, an agreement alone will not necessarily generate new trade. Its significance will depend on the extent to which negotiated provisions address the practical barriers encountered by businesses in both countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Agriculture provides one example of an existing commercial relationship that could benefit from further liberalization. Canadian agri-food exports to T\u00fcrkiye totalled approximately $287 million in 2025,<\/a> including $173 million in lentils.<\/a> Yet agriculture received relatively little attention in the leaders\u2019 joint statement compared with energy, defence, and advanced technologies. The Canadian Federation of Agriculture has already identified agricultural tariffs, regulatory procedures, and market access <\/a>as issues that should be addressed in negotiations. <\/a>Greater attention to these established trade relationships could produce more immediate commercial opportunities alongside the pursuit of cooperation in emerging sectors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This raises an important consideration for the proposed FTA. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s relationship with the European Union (EU) is governed in part by a customs union covering most industrial goods<\/a>. Under this arrangement, T\u00fcrkiye is required to align relevant aspects of its tariff and commercial policy with the EU. Consequently, negotiations with Canada will need to account for T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s existing obligations and its partial integration into European markets. While these connections make T\u00fcrkiye an attractive commercial partner, Canadian access to Turkish supply chains should not be confused with preferential access to the wider European market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Opportunities in Energy and Defence<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Energy and defence were among the most prominent areas of cooperation announced during the visit. Both sectors offer opportunities to expand commercial relations, although the prospects for their development differ.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In energy, the joint statement identified liquefied natural gas, nuclear energy, renewable technologies, and critical minerals <\/a>as priority areas. Of these, civil nuclear cooperation has emerged as a particularly concrete opportunity. Canadian engineering firm AtkinsR\u00e9alis has announced plans to conduct a feasibility study <\/a>concerning the potential use of CANDU reactors at T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s proposed Sinop nuclear power plant. However, T\u00fcrkiye is considering several international suppliers, and no Canadian construction contract has been secured.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A successful Canadian proposal could establish a significant long-term commercial relationship involving technology, engineering, maintenance, and potentially local industrial participation. The outcome will depend on technical assessments, financing arrangements, and Ankara\u2019s broader energy priorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The newly announced Defence Sector Partnerships Memorandum of Understanding<\/a> is intended to facilitate cooperation between Canadian and Turkish defence industries. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s experience in uncrewed systems, aerospace, and defence manufacturing offers areas for potential collaboration with Canadian firms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, closer defence cooperation must also be considered in light of the relationship\u2019s recent history. Canada initially restricted military exports to T\u00fcrkiye following its 2019 operation in northeastern Syria.<\/a> Further restrictions followed concerns over the use of Canadian technology<\/a> in Turkish-produced uncrewed aerial vehicles during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Although Ottawa removed its presumptive denial policy in January 2024,<\/a> export permits remain subject to individual assessment and end-use requirements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The expansion of defence-industrial cooperation therefore raises questions concerning technology transfers, end-use assurances, and potential exports to third countries. The agreement does not remove the regulatory and strategic concerns that previously complicated the relationship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Export Development Canada and T\u00fcrk Eximbank also signed an agreement<\/a> to facilitate cooperation on projects in third countries. This could allow Canadian and Turkish firms to collaborate in areas such as infrastructure, transportation, energy, and mining without limiting their activities to bilateral markets. However, the commercial significance of this arrangement will become clearer only as individual projects are identified and financed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Limits of Strategic Convergence<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Canada and T\u00fcrkiye share an institutional relationship through NATO and have common interests in regional security. Nevertheless, T\u00fcrkiye has pursued a foreign policy that combines cooperation with its Western allies and continued engagement with countries whose interests frequently diverge from theirs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Russian-Turkish relationship provides a relevant example. Following Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Ankara restricted passage of belligerent warships through the Turkish Straits under the Montreux Convention <\/a>and continued defence cooperation with Kyiv. At the same time, T\u00fcrkiye did not join the West in sanctioning Russia and instead maintained economic and energy relations with Moscow.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

These policies are sometimes presented as contradictory, particularly when viewed through expectations of solidarity among NATO members. However, they also reflect the different security and economic considerations shaping Ankara\u2019s relations with Moscow and Kyiv. Russia remains an important economic partner while also representing a competitor in several regional security theatres, including the Black Sea and South Caucasus. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s engagement with Russia must therefore be understood alongside its efforts to preserve Ukrainian sovereignty and limit Russian influence in areas where their interests conflict. T\u00fcrkiye is not unique in maintaining different relationships with competing powers. Nor should its foreign policy be reduced to a cultural or civilizational distinction between T\u00fcrkiye and the West. Ankara\u2019s decisions reflect identifiable economic interests, security concerns, and political calculations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Canada, closer relations with Ankara could also serve interests beyond economic diversification. Ottawa has made substantial commitments to European security, particularly through its leadership of NATO\u2019s multinational brigade in Latvia<\/a> and its continued support for Ukraine. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s position on the Black Sea, its responsibilities under the Montreux Convention, and its relationships with both Moscow and Kyiv<\/a> make it an important partner for discussions concerning regional security. Greater engagement with Ankara could provide additional opportunities for cooperation on maritime security, support for Ukraine, and NATO defence planning, even where Canadian and Turkish approaches to Russia differ.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There may also be benefits for Canadian diplomacy beyond Europe. T\u00fcrkiye maintains an active diplomatic role in the Middle East, including in efforts concerning Gaza and regional de- escalation. <\/a>These issues were discussed during Foreign Minister Anita Anand\u2019s meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on 22 October. <\/a>More regular consultations could provide Ottawa with additional opportunities to coordinate on issues where both countries have interests, while improving its understanding of Ankara\u2019s regional priorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The joint statement acknowledged several of these areas including Ukraine, the South Caucasus, and the Middle East, but offered limited detail regarding specific initiatives or mechanisms for managing potential disagreements. The establishment of an annual Strategic Dialogue<\/a> could provide a forum to address these issues, but its significance will depend on whether discussions lead to sustained cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Human Rights and the Limits of Engagement<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The question of closer engagement also extends beyond foreign policy. The leaders\u2019 joint statement explicitly identified human rights, individual liberties, democracy, and the rule of law<\/a> as shared values underpinning the partnership. However, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s domestic political environment presents challenges to this characterization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Human rights organizations have documented restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly, <\/a>pressure on opposition politicians and independent journalists, and the continued detention of individuals despite judgements from the European Court of Human Rights. <\/a>Most recently, Turkish authorities have faced criticism from international human rights groups for their approach toward LGBTQ+ organizations and activists.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ahead of Carney\u2019s visit, Amnesty International called on Canada to address these developments directly, <\/a>including restrictions affecting civil society and the failure to implement European Court of Human Rights judgements. <\/a>During the visit, Carney stated that Canadian officials had raised concerns over LGBTQ+ rights <\/a>with Turkish authorities while emphasizing that diplomatic engagement did not imply approval for a partner government\u2019s policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Engagement and endorsement should remain distinct. Sustained diplomatic contact may offer opportunities to address disagreements but it does not mean that these concerns have been resolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Criticism of Erdo\u011fan\u2019s domestic policies should not extend into a broader judgement concerning T\u00fcrkiye or its population. T\u00fcrkiye has an active civil society and political opposition, and there is meaningful domestic debate over the country\u2019s political direction. Treating the government\u2019s policies as representative of an immutable national character risks overlooking these differences while reducing complex political developments to assumptions about Turkish society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Canada, the question is therefore how concerns over human rights will be incorporated into the developing relationship. The proposed FTA provides one possible avenue. Canada\u2019s published negotiating objectives include labour protections, transparency, responsible business conduct, <\/a>and provisions intended to support internationally recognized standards. These objectives, however, do not address the full range of human rights concerns raised by international organizations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A more substantive partnership need not require agreement on every political issue. Nevertheless, the joint statement\u2019s explicit reference to shared democratic principles creates expectations concerning how both governments will address differences when they arise. The credibility of those commitments will depend on whether they remain part of the relationship as economic and security cooperation develops.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Beginning, not a Transformation<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Many of the visit\u2019s commitments remain preliminary. The proposed FTA has yet to be negotiated, the nuclear opportunity remains subject to a competitive selection process, and the defence agreement has not itself produced identifiable industrial projects. Similarly, the announcement of regular diplomatic consultations has not yet established how the two countries will address disagreements over regional security or domestic political developments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Canada should not treat T\u00fcrkiye as an exception to the international system or assume that disagreements necessarily prevent cooperation. Instead, a closer partnership will require both countries to identify areas of mutual interest while accepting that disagreements will remain. The durability of the relationship will depend partly on how both governments manage those disagreements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The visit may ultimately prove significant less for the agreements announced in Ankara than for the commercial and institutional relationships that develop from them. For now, it has established a framework for cooperation whose practical significance remains to be determined.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n

References<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amnesty International Canada. 2026a. \u201cOp-ed: Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney Must Address Human Rights Crisis in T\u00fcrkiye during Historic Trade Visit.\u201d October 21, 2026. https:\/\/amnesty.ca\/features\/prime-minister-carney-must-address-human-rights-crisis-in-turkiye- during-historic-trade-visit.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amnesty International Canada. 2026b. \u201cT\u00fcrkiye: Release Detained LGBTI Rights Defenders.\u201d October 10, 2026. https:\/\/amnesty.ca\/urgent-actions\/turkiye-release-detained-lgbti-rights- defenders\/.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Canadian Federation of Agriculture. 2026. \u201cSubmission on Potential Canada-T\u00fcrkiye Free Trade Agreement.\u201d September 17, 2026. https:\/\/cfa-fca.ca\/submission\/submission-on-potential-canada- turkiye-free-trade-agreement\/.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cheng, Maria, and Tuvan Gumrukcu. 2026. \u201cCarney Says Canada Raised Issues on LGBTQ+ Rights during Meetings in Turkey.\u201d Reuters<\/em>, October 23, 2026. https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/americas\/carney-says-canada-raised-issues-lgbtq-rights-during-<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

meetings-turkey-2026-10-23\/.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Co\u015fkun, Alper, Alexander Gabuev, Marc Pierini, Francesco Siccardi, and Temur Umarov. 2024. Understanding T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Entanglement with Russia<\/em>. Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, October 15, 2024. https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/research\/2024\/10\/understanding- turkiyes-entanglement-with-russia.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

de Waal, Thomas. 2026. \u201cManaging Montreux: Turkey and the Russia-Ukraine War in the Black Sea.\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace<\/em>, July 1, 2026. https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/europe\/research\/2026\/07\/managing-montreux-turkey-and-the- russia-ukraine-war-in-the-black-sea.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Department of National Defence. n.d. \u201cOperation REASSURANCE.\u201d Government of Canada. Accessed October 24, 2026. https:\/\/www.canada.ca\/en\/department-national- defence\/services\/operations\/military-operations\/current-operations\/operation-reassurance.html.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

European Commission. n.d. \u201cEU Trade Relations with T\u00fcrkiye.\u201d Accessed October 24, 2026. https:\/\/policy.trade.ec.europa.eu\/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region\/countries-and- regions\/turkiye_en.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Global Affairs Canada. 2020. \u201cNotice to Exporters: Export of Items Listed on the Export Control List to T\u00fcrkiye.\u201d Notice No. 992, April 16, 2020. https:\/\/www.international.gc.ca\/trade- commerce\/controls-controles\/notices-avis\/992.aspx?lang=eng.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Global Affairs Canada. 2021. Final Report: Review of Export Permits to T\u00fcrkiye<\/em>. Government of Canada. https:\/\/www.international.gc.ca\/trade-commerce\/controls-controles\/reports- rapports\/exp-permits-turkiye-licences-turkiye.aspx?lang=eng.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Global Affairs Canada. 2024. \u201cNotice to Exporters No. 1108: Export and Brokering of Items Listed on the Export Control List and the Brokering Control List to T\u00fcrkiye.\u201d January 29, 2024. https:\/\/www.international.gc.ca\/trade-commerce\/controls-controles\/notices- avis\/1108.aspx?lang=eng.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Global Affairs Canada. 2026a. \u201cCanada-T\u00fcrkiye Relations.\u201d Last modified October 6, 2026. https:\/\/www.international.gc.ca\/country-pays\/turkiye\/relations.aspx?lang=eng.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Global Affairs Canada. 2026b. \u201cCanada\u2019s Objectives for Negotiations for a Canada-T\u00fcrkiye Free Trade Agreement.\u201d September 21, 2026. https:\/\/www.international.gc.ca\/trade-commerce\/trade- agreements-accords-commerciaux\/agr-acc\/turkiye\/fta-ale\/negotiations.aspx?lang=eng.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Global Affairs Canada. 2026c. \u201cMinister Anand Meets with T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Minister of Foreign Affairs.\u201d October 22, 2026. https:\/\/www.canada.ca\/en\/global-affairs\/news\/2026\/10\/minister- anand-meets-with-turkiyes-minister-of-foreign-affairs.html.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Global Affairs Canada. 2026d. \u201cNotice of Intent to Initiate Negotiations toward a Canada- T\u00fcrkiye Free Trade Agreement.\u201d September 21, 2026. https:\/\/www.international.gc.ca\/trade- commerce\/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux\/agr-acc\/turkiye\/fta-ale\/notice_intent- avis_intention.aspx?lang=eng.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Human Rights Watch. 2026. \u201cT\u00fcrkiye.\u201d World Report 2026<\/em>. https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/world- report\/2026\/country-chapters\/turkiye.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Prime Minister of Canada. 2026a. \u201cPrime Minister Carney\u2019s Historic Visit to T\u00fcrkiye Launches New Strategic Partnership across Trade, Defence, and Energy.\u201d October 23, 2026. https:\/\/www.pm.gc.ca\/en\/news\/news-releases\/2026\/10\/23\/prime-minister-carneys-historic-visit- turkiye-launches-new-strategic.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Prime Minister of Canada. 2026b. \u201cStatement by Prime Minister Carney and President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan.\u201d October 2022, 2026. https:\/\/www.pm.gc.ca\/en\/news\/statements\/2026\/10\/22\/statement-prime-minister-carney-and- president-recep-tayyip-erdogan.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reuters. 2026. \u201cCarney Says AtkinsRealis Is a Contender to Build Nuclear Power Plant in Turkey.\u201d October 23, 2026.\u00a0https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/middle-east\/carney-says-atkinsrealis-is-contender-build-nuclear-power-plant-turkey-2026-10-23\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Prime Minister Mark Carney\u2019s October 2026 visit to T\u00fcrkiye marked the first bilateral visit by a Canadian prime minister and an effort to expand cooperation between two longstanding North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The trip culminated with Carney and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan announcing a new Strategic Partnership, supported by a three- year […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":228,"featured_media":161,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-160","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/mts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/160","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/mts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/mts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/mts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/228"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/mts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=160"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/mts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/160\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":172,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/mts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/160\/revisions\/172"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/mts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/161"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/mts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=160"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/mts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=160"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/mts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=160"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}