{"id":94065,"date":"2024-10-17T14:29:54","date_gmt":"2024-10-17T18:29:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/newsroom.carleton.ca\/?post_type=cu_story&p=94065"},"modified":"2025-08-19T09:37:01","modified_gmt":"2025-08-19T13:37:01","slug":"mozambique-next-president-challenges","status":"publish","type":"cu_story","link":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/news\/story\/mozambique-next-president-challenges\/","title":{"rendered":"Mozambique’s 2024 Elections: 9 Major Challenges That Will Face the Next President"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\n Mozambique's 2024 Elections: 9 Major Challenges That Will Face the Next President\n <\/h1>\n \n <\/header>\n <\/div>\n\n \n <\/path>\n <\/path>\n <\/svg>\n <\/div>\n\n \n\n <\/div>\n<\/section>\n\n

This article is republished<\/a> from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. All photos provided by The Conversation<\/a> from various sources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

David Matsinhe<\/a> is an adjunct professor in African Studies at Carleton University.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The incoming president of Mozambique faces an array of interconnected problems deeply rooted in historical, socioeconomic and political dynamics. He must balance meeting immediate needs with long-term structural change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 9 October 2024<\/a> general election was Mozambique’s seventh since multiparty elections were introduced in 1994<\/a>. The results are expected to be announced within two weeks<\/a> from the poll date. International media<\/a> reports indicate that the ruling Frelimo and its presidential candidate Daniel Chapo<\/a> are poised for a landslide victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is likely to be confirmed by the electoral commission even though local media<\/a> have pointed to widespread and brazen ballot stuffing and fake observers, among other irregularities<\/a>, in favour of Frelimo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Frelimo<\/a> has been in power since independence in 1975<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Can the resource-rich but impoverished nation of 35 million<\/a> expect a redirection of policies and strategies under Chapo to address its multifaceted crises?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chapo (47) was born after independence<\/a> and promises to act with integrity<\/a>. But the old guard placed him in power to protect and promote their interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mozambique’s crises stem largely from systemic corruption<\/a> under Frelimo. It has prioritised political elites over national welfare. Its decades of mismanagement, embezzlement and patronage have left institutions weak and unable to address<\/a> pressing social and economic issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Post-election challenges for new president<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The country is fragmented. The government has neglected the development of inclusive, accountable governance and equitable infrastructure. Regional disparities are the result. This is especially so in Cabo Delgado province, where disenfranchised citizens have become vulnerable to extremist groups<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This lack of unity and long-term planning has created a fragile state unable to withstand mounting internal and external pressures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a Mozambican social scientist and human rights specialist<\/a>, I have spent my adult life wrestling with my country’s complex economic, social, cultural and political dynamics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mozambique stands at a critical point. The new president of Mozambique must confront the deep-rooted challenges with determination and comprehensive reforms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In my view, the new leader faces nine key challenges. These are a deep economic crisis, an Islamic insurgency in the north, climate change, drug trafficking, unemployment, corruption, poor infrastructure, kidnappings and unpaid public sector salaries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Economic crisis in Mozambique<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Mozambique’s economy has deteriorated, primarily because of structural imbalances and a dependence on extractive industries. GDP growth has declined sharply, from 7% in 2014 to 1.8% in 2023<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Slower growth has resulted in over 62% of Mozambicans living in poverty<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A public debt crisis was worsened by the \u201chidden debt scandal<\/a>\u201d: the discovery in 2016 of US$2 billion in previously undisclosed debts the government had guaranteed without the knowledge of parliament<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This has limited the state’s capacity to invest in education, health and sanitation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Economic revival must be accompanied by targeted interventions to promote inclusive growth. All Mozambicans must benefit from economic activities to alleviate poverty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Insurgency & the role of the president<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Since 2017<\/a>, extremist groups have used local grievances and regional disenfranchisement to destabilise northern Mozambique. Over 4,000 people have died. Nearly a million have been displaced<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The conflict is rooted in socio-economic inequalities, made worse by the extraction of natural gas and rubies. Global and local actors compete for control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The new president’s role in mediating this crisis requires nuance. He must address the historical marginalisation of Cabo Delgado while balancing military and developmental responses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He must also write a new chapter in the country’s deplorable<\/a> human rights record. This is marked by widespread violations of the right to life, physical integrity, freedom from arbitrary detention, and freedoms of expression, assembly and the press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Climate change crisis<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Climate change intersects with Mozambique’s vulnerabilities<\/a>. The country has been repeatedly struck by increasingly devastating severe cyclones, such as Idai and Kenneth in 2019<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Deforestation<\/a> has made it more fragile, reducing its capacity to mitigate flood and erosion risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The new president will need to put in place policies that incorporate mitigation and adaptation strategies. He will also need to secure multilateral cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Drug trafficking in Mozambique<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Drug trafficking networks have entrenched themselves. Porous borders, weak governance structures and endemic corruption have made Mozambique a corridor for heroin and cocaine trafficking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime<\/a> estimates that US$100 million worth of heroin<\/a> passes through Mozambique annually. This fuels informal economies that sustain political patronage networks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tackling the problem requires stronger state institutions. It also requires regional and global collaboration to disrupt the transnational flow of narcotics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unemployment<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Joblessness stands at over 70%<\/a>, affecting youth in particular. Youth disenfranchisement<\/a> risks perpetuating cycles of poverty, social instability and potential radicalisation<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Policies promoting vocational training and entrepreneurship are essential. So is investment in labour-intensive sectors, such as agriculture and manufacturing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Corruption<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Pervasive corruption<\/a> erodes public trust and stifles economic innovation. New efforts to combat corruption must go beyond superficial reforms. They must uproot the power structures that sustain these systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Poor infrastructure<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Infrastructure is in disrepair<\/a>. Urban roads are crumbling, public services are inadequate and electricity blackouts are frequent. Rural regions lack basic services such as clean water and healthcare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The next president of Mozambique will need to launch an ambitious infrastructure overhaul to improve living conditions and stimulate economic growth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kidnappings<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Kidnappings, especially targeting the wealthy and business people, have created widespread fear and instability<\/a>. The crime disrupts business operations and deters foreign investment, further harming economic growth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The high-profile nature of kidnappings suggests collusion between criminal networks and law enforcement as well as inefficiencies in the justice system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The persistence of kidnappings reflects broader governance issues. These include limited state capacity to respond effectively to organised crime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unpaid public servants in Mozambique<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Delays in salary payments for public servants<\/a> have worsened economic and social problems. The delays reduce public workers’ purchasing power. This has affected household consumption and local economies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Morale among employees is sapped, harming productivity and eroding trust in government institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The new president of Mozambique must make public sector reforms. This includes auditing finances, improving revenue collection, enforcing fiscal discipline, promoting merit-based appointments, implementing probity laws, strengthening anti-corruption bodies, and diversifying the economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The future of Mozambique rests on the ability of its next leader to address these profound and intertwined crises. It’s a huge task.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whoever it is will have to break from the Frelimo mould, reverse the damage done and set the country on a new path of clean governance, peace and inclusive economic growth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\nCarleton Newsroom<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The incoming president of Mozambique faces an array of interconnected problems deeply rooted in historical, socioeconomic and political dynamics. He must balance meeting immediate needs with long-term structural change. The 9 October 2024 general election was Mozambique\u2019s seventh since multiparty elections were introduced in 1994.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":410,"featured_media":94068,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"cu_story_type":[1623],"cu_story_tag":[],"class_list":["post-94065","cu_story","type-cu_story","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","cu_story_type-expert-perspectives"],"acf":{"cu_post_thumbnail":"blueprint"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/cu_story\/94065","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/cu_story"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/cu_story"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/410"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/cu_story\/94065\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":94077,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/cu_story\/94065\/revisions\/94077"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/94068"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=94065"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"cu_story_type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/cu_story_type?post=94065"},{"taxonomy":"cu_story_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/carleton.ca\/news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/cu_story_tag?post=94065"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}