2017 FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS
AN ANNUAL REVIEW BY STUDENTS AT THE NORMAN PATERSON SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FOREWORD BY DR. DAVID CARMENT
FOREWORD

BY DR. DAVID CARMENT

For the past few years students in my Canada and International Affairs graduate seminar have been conducting painstaking, fully peer-reviewed and independent assessments of Canada’s foreign policy. This year’s review comes at a crucial point for Canada as the country’s leaders find themselves scrambling in response to Donald’s Trump’s “new style” transaction-based American foreign policy agenda. To suggest that the election of Donald Trump is a catalyzing moment for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau would be an understatement. When elected, Trudeau promised Canadians that he would embark on a course of renewed multilateralism, with a focus on among other things climate change and peacekeeping. Now with so much attention on renegotiating NAFTA, it’s not clear whether the Trudeau government has the energy or the capacity to stay the course on many of if its policy commitments including refugees and a seat on the United Nations Security Council. Trump’s election is a double edged sword. On the one hand, with the perceived disengagement of the USA there may be opportunities for Canada to show leadership in the multilateral arena despite potential drawbacks. On the other hand, there are clear advantages to charting a different course defined by interests closer to home such as Arctic sovereignty, economic growth through immigration and re-engaging civil society in the foreign policy process. In the reviews presented here, covering everything from defence and diplomacy to aid and immigration, my students show that there are clear benefits to mixed strategies - being both the good global citizen through for example strengthened aid and development policies while being mindful that a good working relationship with our neighbour to the South is of benefit to all Canadians. Supported in part by the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal and its affiliate iAffairs Canada, this review would not have been possible but for the hard work of all those students who contributed to its completion. Identified by name below, each should be congratulated for their effort.

David Carment
Editor Canadian Foreign Policy Journal
Fellow – Canadian Global Affairs Institute
AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

“iAffairs Canada, in partnership with the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, is pleased to announce the release of its comprehensive annual foreign policy review. The product of over four months of evaluation, this review covers a range of key issue areas including diplomacy, defence, human rights, terrorism, immigration and refugees. An assessment of past policies and policy recommendations are included.”

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RETURN OF THE HONEST BROKER?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Upon his election victory, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced to the world that Canada is back. Although, Canada had not actually disappeared from the world, the 9.5 years of Conservative party leadership saw a significant decline in Canada’s traditional role on the world stage. This review applies a broad approach to diplomacy to address a changing world where Canada has lost its middle power status, its largest ally and trading partner is turning inward while the world re-aligns itself, and a foreign service that needs to be updated for the 21st century.

To tackle the problems outlined above, this review’s goal is to develop a comprehensive foreign policy strategy that will regain Canada’s middle power status by addressing changes to the instruments of diplomacy: the foreign ministry, Foreign Service and business model. Three objectives were identified to achieve this goal:

• The creation of a planning unit capable of developing the new strategy;
• The development of a comprehensive approach to public diplomacy;
• The revitalization of the Foreign Service.

Taking into account those objectives, this review makes three recommendations:

• Enlarge the capabilities of the Strategic Planning Office of Global Affairs Canada through the addition of both a defense and public diplomacy unit;
• Task the Strategic Planning Office to develop a new comprehensive Foreign Policy strategy, including a whole of government public diplomacy strategy;
• Reform the Foreign Service and increase its effectiveness through strengthening its capabilities.

The implementation of these recommendations will help to adapt the Foreign Service to the specific needs of 21st century diplomacy, promote more efficiently Canadian values and interests, and regain Canada’s role in the world. While it is not yet too late for Canada to change its course, determination and immediate action is needed to end the dark age of Canadian diplomacy. With a return to multilateralism under a banner of responsible conviction, Canada is poised to return to the golden era of diplomacy.
ABBREVIATIONS

ADM: Assistant Deputy Minister
COP21, COP22: Council of Parties 21, 22
CSO: Civil society organizations
DEA: Department of External Affairs
DFAIT: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DM: Deputy Minister
DND: Department of National Defence
FP: Foreign Policy
FS: Foreign Service
FSO: Foreign Service Officer
GAC: Global Affairs Canada
GMAP: Global Markets Action Plan
GoC: Government of Canada
M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation
MFA: Minister of Foreign Affairs
MIDF: Minister of International Development and La Francophonie
MLO: Multilateral Organization
MNC: Multinational Corporations
MND: Minister of National Defence
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NALS: North American Leader’s Summit
ODA: Overseas Development Assistance
PD: Public Diplomacy
PM: Prime Minister
PSCC: Public Service Commission of Canada
SPO: Strategic Policy Office
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
US: United States of America
WWII: World War II

The Canadian Embassy in Washington, DC.
Vince Alongi, Canadian Mission
via Wikimedia Commons user Skeezix1000
PART 1: HISTORY AND POLICY PROCESS

Problems Facing the Nation

Middle Power no More

Canada’s influence has declined around the world and its traditional, self-imposed role of “honest broker” threatened. Under PM Harper, a more assertive approach to diplomacy that played down traditional multilateralism was emphasized as “economic diplomacy” became the impetus of foreign affairs. This shift saw Canadian diplomacy become more confrontational as it was used as an instrument to garner domestic political support or drive the economy. Embassies around the world were closed, particularly in Africa, where Canada now has a diplomatic presence within 37% of the continent. The outcome resulted in the loss of Canada’s traditional place at some multilateral tables and a decline of market share in emerging economies. Canada’s lost bid for a temporary seat on the UNSC in 2010 illuminated this fall, as the UN members rejected Canada’s fervent support of Israel and declining ODA to Africa. Traditional Canadian engagement with MLOs has helped the country define itself, especially against the US and UK, but it has always been grounded in self-interest, as MLOs support a stable global order which further Canada’s national security and economic interests.

Declining Hegemony

Solidarity amongst Canada’s “natural allies” (US, UK, France) has been central to its FP approach since the end of WWII, as Canadian prosperity and security depend on Western power, particularly its continental neighbour, the US. However, since the 2008 Great Recession, chatter about the decline of US hegemony has increased as multiple economic centres manifest in Asia and Latin America. The rising players in the emerging world order converge around a diversity of objectives as MLOs change to reflect this decline of Western institutions and ideals. The developing world, led by China, is ascending as Western pillars like the US, Europe and Japan face stagnant economies and disaffected electorates. Heinbecker sees the future order as a potential era of enhanced cooperation or “zero sum international competition.”

Diplomacy 2.0

Canada was an early leader in the adoption of PD, an approach to diplomacy that uses the tools of public relations, strategic communications, advocacy, cultural promotion, educational exchanges, and media as instruments of soft power to influence another nation through persuasion of ideas and values. After starting strong, Canada’s PD efforts have waned as successive governments have not invested in its necessary tools. Canada has also not yet developed a strategic comprehensive approach to PD, instead a series of uncoordinated programs spread across government departments have accounted for much of the effort. MNCs, CSOs, think tanks, celebrities, private foundations, and private citizens have all become international actors as globalization has made the world smaller and more accessible and present opportunities to increase actors branding the nation. A lack of PD strategy can negatively affect that brand, as seen by Canada’s Indigenous groups who have taken their grievances with the Canadian government to the international stage in an organized “Indigenous diplomacy” effort, that has not been welcomed by those officially representing Canada internationally. A successful Canadian PD strategy should not only adopt a whole-of-government approach but embrace the plurality of voices in international affairs with a whole-of-Canada approach.
Past Policy and Critical Decisive Moments

The post-WWII period has been called the “golden age” of Canadian diplomacy. In the era following Louis St. Laurent’s famous Grey Lecture that defined Canadian FP for much of the 20th century Canada enjoyed success internationally as the DEA was supported in its use of diplomacy as an important instrument of Canadian statecraft by Cabinet.

As the 20th century closed, Canada’s FP practices were unravelling as the world changed and DFAIT suffered a long series of cuts. The last comprehensive articulation of its FP was the 2005, A role of pride and influence in the world. This would have seen the FS shift focus back towards FP, as a promoter of Canadian values and interests, with an agile, transparent, renewed, professional workforce. Before it could be fully implemented the Conservative Party was elected in 2006 and the plans largely abandoned.

The Harper government’s initial FP missteps found its footing when it promoted the use of diplomatic tools for the purpose of “economic diplomacy” under GMAP. The party’s base gave the PM permission to pursue a more militaristic and less internationalist FP as seen in the government’s only attempt to elucidate its FP in 2009, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future. Aid was added to DFAIT, one year after that agency’s budget saw deep cuts in the 2012 Budget. Under PM Harper, the morale of the diplomatic corps fell as did Canada’s reputation with allies and other world actors. Diplomacy and policy work became transactional in nature, while Canada’s FP lost its analysis and international leadership.

The day after his election victory, PM Justin Trudeau claimed “We’re back,” to Canada’s allies in the world, promising a return to a more compassionate, constructive Canada.

Trends

The mandate letter issued to the MFA by PM Trudeau identifies several diplomatic priorities intent on renewing Canada’s traditional role on the global stage. The overarching goal charged to the MFA is renewing global Canadian leadership to advance Canada’s economic and security interests while supporting the Canadian public’s desire to make meaningful contributions to a peaceful and prosperous world. While to-date, the government has seen progress on addressing these priorities, constraints remain.
## Indicators and Constraints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diplomatic priority</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Constraint</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve relations with the US and strengthen trilateral North American cooperation.</td>
<td>First Canadian state visit to US in 19 years, 201652, success on bilateral files.</td>
<td>Uncertainty of FP direction of incoming American administration.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Trilateral NALS progress on climate change and visa issue for Mexican visitors.</td>
<td>Potential renegotiation of NAFTA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure close link between defence policy, FP and national security.</td>
<td>Multiple missions by MDND and MDF to Africa, Mali possible peacekeeping destination.</td>
<td>DND absent from current SPO at GAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-clearance to address border thickening.</td>
<td>Apprehensions about future of NATO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revitalize Canada’s public diplomacy, stakeholder engagement, and cooperation.</td>
<td>Pledge for 600 peacekeepers to UN operations.</td>
<td>Altruism of CSOs and public constrained by security and economic concerns - do not always allow for transparency in PD initiatives.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>New merit-based appointments to 26 missions.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Proliferation of GAC social media.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reenergize Canadian leadership on key international issues and in MLOs.</td>
<td>Bid for temporary seat on UNSC.</td>
<td>Budget cuts impacted capacity of FSO, engagement with younger Canadians; hierarchy contributes to low morale in FS.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government active in climate change talks COP21 and COP22.</td>
<td>Catching up with leaders in climate change will require substantial capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Canada’s educational and cultural interaction with the world.</td>
<td>Changes to Express Entry directed at international students.</td>
<td>Decrease in number of Canadian students studying abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consultations underway to improve supports for Canadian creatives abroad.</td>
<td></td>
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DIPLOMACY
Goals and Objectives

Canadian values are deeply embedded in democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and multilateralism. Driven by those, Canada demonstrated leadership and willingness on numerous opportunities to act for the benefit of others and is perceived by its public as a diplomatic peace-maker. In accordance with its values, Canada’s interests can be decomposed in five entities: national security, political autonomy, national unity, economic prosperity, and principled self-image (identity). Those values and interests must be accounted for in order to establish a FP that truly represents Canada and effectively tackles global challenges.

Therefore, the goal of this review is to develop a comprehensive FP strategy that will regain Canada’s middle power status. To achieve this ambitious, yet direly needed goal, three objectives are crucial:

- The creation of a planning unit capable of developing the new strategy;
- The development of a whole-of-government approach to PD;
- The revitalization of the FS.

PM Trudeau (centre) with Mexican President Peña Nieto and American President Barack Obama, pictured during the North American Leaders Summit in June 2016. Courtesy Presidencia de la República Mexicana
## Key Stakeholders

As the creation of a comprehensive FP strategy touches on various topics and interests, many stakeholders must be considered and involved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Stakeholder</th>
<th>Role and Responsibility</th>
<th>Strategic Interests</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governmental</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PM and Cabinet</td>
<td>- sets the FP agenda</td>
<td>- committed to a renewed multilateral focus85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- held accountable for FP</td>
<td>- enshrine their objectives in the strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- have a larger capability to achieve their goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>- provides military capabilities and strategic planning</td>
<td>- wants to ensure that only goals are stated that can be reached with the capabilities available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- has interests regarding national security and wants those reflected in the new FP strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAC</td>
<td>- coordinates foreign, trade, and development policy</td>
<td>- can increase its effectiveness through a comprehensive approach</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- is better situated internationally having a carved-out mandated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td>- engage in paradiplomatic activities86</td>
<td>- do not want more responsibilities without more leverage / power / money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- crucial for the implementation of international treaties</td>
<td>- have genuine interests in FP, e.g. Québec87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- want to promote their genuine culture and trade interests88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Public</td>
<td>- holds the government accountable</td>
<td>- generally supportive of an active promotion of Canadian values and interests89, 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- pays through taxation for all FP endeavours</td>
<td>- might quickly change its attitude in wake of high costs in terms of both resources and Canadian lives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>- helps to carry out policies91</td>
<td>- better possibilities to expand to new countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- encourages public participation92</td>
<td>- advocate social change</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>- mobilizes support for policies93</td>
<td>- democratize FP policy through consultations94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diasporas</td>
<td>- provide expertise and insights95</td>
<td>- ensuring homeland security and prosperity96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- impose genuine interests on FP agenda97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous People</td>
<td>- enhance legitimacy of Canadian FP</td>
<td>- want to participate in policies that directly affect their living space, e.g. Arctic policy98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- seek recognition and equal participation99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>- supports Canadian aid and trade efforts internationally100</td>
<td>- might be concerned about losses due to policy change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- might have possibilities to expand to new countries</td>
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## Allies and Detractors

<table>
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<th>Party</th>
<th>Strategic Interests</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Allies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global and Multilateral Partners</td>
<td>A more engaged Canada means burden sharing and more expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Has advised policy change and wants to see whether its recommendations will match reality101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mixed</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of Special Interests</td>
<td>Might hope to see improving relations, e.g. with Russia102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Might fear deteriorating relations, e.g. with Israel103</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Detractors</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Opposition</td>
<td>Fears about the Conservative legacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Interest Groups</td>
<td>Might lose the favour of the government, e.g. pro-Israel lobby groups104</td>
</tr>
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President Barack Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper in the Library of Parliament in Ottawa, Canada. Pete Souza courtesy The White House

## Programmatic Needs

Enlarge the capabilities of the SPO of GAC;
Harmonize PD efforts of all departments and issue a whole-of-government PD strategy;
Articulate a comprehensive foreign policy strategy;
Introduce reforms to the FS to increase its capabilities and effectiveness and make it more accessible to the public.
PART III: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Costed Options

Option 1

Task GAC’s SPO with developing a new FP strategy, issue a cross-cutting approach to PD, and introduce moderate reforms to the FS.

Expected Outcome:

The new FP strategy will pave the way for Canada’s return to its former middle power status and enhance the reputation of Canadian FP efforts both domestically and internationally. To keep the costs at a minimum and to accelerate its development, the new FP strategy will be developed internally without full consultations with other stakeholders. The new cross-cutting approach to PD will increase PD efforts of all departments and allow for a loosely coordinated PD strategy. Moderate reforms to the FS, will include a general increase in hiring of FSO's and more professional development opportunities to increase its effectiveness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pros</th>
<th>Cons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tackles all identified problems while cognizant of budget constraints; Easily implementable; No major restructuring necessary.</td>
<td>FP strategy does not represent all stakeholders involved; No whole-of-government approach to PD; Stresses medium-term benefits at the expense of long-term ones; Missed opportunity to leave a lasting Liberal mark on Canadian FP.</td>
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</table>

Option 2

Enhance the SPO's capability to develop a new comprehensive FP strategy, including the first whole-of-government PD strategy, and reform the FS.

Expected Outcome:

Those profound reforms will equip the Canadian FS with both a comprehensive FP strategy and the toolkit needed to execute it. The greater coherence and harmonization of Canadian international endeavours, that fully represents the values and peoples of Canada, will significantly increase Canada’s impact and its reputation globally.
Pros | Cons
--- | ---
Provides a comprehensive FP that will shape Canada’s approach to foreign affairs for years; Significantly increases Canada’s capabilities to act globally in a whole-of-government approach; Makes FP more accessible to the Canadian public thereby increasing public support; Represents a clear commitment making Canadian FP predictable and accountable. | The reforms and restructuring are time-intensive and costly measures both in terms of development and implementation; Its true potential might not unfold until the end of the current legislative period; Concerns might arise due to the new powerful unit.

While both options represent different stages of a cost-benefit calculation and further differ in the time required for their development and implementation, both envision a stronger Canadian FP. Since the first part of this review has illustrated the urgent need for extensive reform of both the FS and the Canadian FP approach in general to prepare Canada for the global challenges of the 21st century, Option 2 is recommended. To support this option, three recommendations follow.

Recommendations

1.1. Expand the capabilities of the SPO of GAC105 through the addition of both a DND and PD unit (see Annex for an exemplary organigramm).

A separate DND unit, recruited directly from the DND, will complement existing capabilities of the SPO which already has at its disposal units dealing with FP, development policy planning, international economic policy, and more. In addition, a separate PD unit will be created through an interdepartmental transfer of public servants already working on PD and a hiring of qualified academic personnel to bring in new ideas. This PD unit will gather and analyse all ongoing PD efforts of relevant Canadian entities, e.g. different departments, provinces, Indigenous People. In this way, the SPO will be capable of developing a new comprehensive FP strategy, which includes a whole-of-government PD strategy, capitalizing on all capabilities available.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Communication</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There will be an increase in costs as the office expands; initial start-up will require cash infusion but as those costs disappear, the office budget should not increase far beyond current levels, notwithstanding inflation and addition of up to ten staff members.</td>
<td>Head of SPO oversees and implements transition, including recruiting of necessary personnel.</td>
<td>Year one: office expansion, integration, mandate development, recruitment.</td>
<td>Communicate first with SPO manager and team, in-person.</td>
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### Costs

Costs will include consultations with stakeholders at home and abroad; electronic means such as video and teleconferencing, online surveys, etc. will be used to minimize costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop consultation parameters, including process, stakeholders and limits to consultee voices.</td>
<td>Year 1: Consultation on strategies to be developed, presented to Cabinet and implemented.</td>
<td>Announce consultations for review to ensure greatest number of voices represented; MFA should conduct tour of traditional media (e.g. newspapers, tv) to tout the consultations. GAC and GoC promote via social media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct internal consultation with FS.</td>
<td>Year 2: Strategies developed and articulated, ready to present to Cabinet and PM.</td>
<td>Engage with CSOs and private partners to determine FP and PD strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct consultation with stakeholders.</td>
<td>Year 3: Strategies implemented using whole-of-government approach.</td>
<td>Keep public abreast of results of consultation. Upon determination of strategy, MFA should also take to media (traditional and social) to announce new FP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop FP &amp; PD strategies.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Use embassies to announce internationally FP and PD strategy to Canadians abroad and encourage involvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement FP &amp;PD strategies</td>
<td></td>
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**Follow on:** Review the impact and topicality of the strategy every two years.

**Impact:** An international strategy that is cohesive and harmonized, with a diversity of actors promoting Canadian brand and interests.

### 2. Reform the FS and increase its effectiveness through strengthening its capabilities.

The FS has seen steady decline since the 1990s resulting in inadequate management, intellectual drift, and an inadequate number of personnel skilled or trained for international work.106 A 21st Century FSO should be able to expertly speak to the transnational issues facing the world, often grounded in science, act in non-traditional manners by adopting PD tools like advocacy, and needs to be more open and accessible to the Canadian public to increase its domestic value.107
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Costs</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase funding to FS to meet international objectives and ensure FS is equipped to engage in PD.</td>
<td>Impact Assessment to internally and externally identify needs; provide baseline data to measure improvements.</td>
<td>Year 1: Conduct Impact Assessment and develop plan to implement findings. SPO investigates regions to expand diplomatic assets.</td>
<td>In-person communication to FS; online anonymous surveys to gather baseline data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase expertise amongst FSOs in areas of transnational importance, especially science: appoint a senior departmental Science Advisor, and establish a Directorate-General of International Science and Technology Policy.</td>
<td>Increase expertise amongst FSOs in areas of transnational importance, especially science: appoint a senior departmental Science Advisor, and establish a Directorate-General of International Science and Technology Policy.</td>
<td>Year 2: Liaise with PD actors on developing professional development opportunities. Public recruitment to fill newly developed roles of expertise. Work with PSCC to investigate recruitment methods to diversify FS and develop 21st century FSO profile. Year 2 report produced.</td>
<td>Communicate with PD partners to initiate professional development opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigate areas and feasibility of expansion/reopening of embassies.</td>
<td>Investigate areas and feasibility of expansion/reopening of embassies.</td>
<td>Year 3: Implement professional development opportunities; encourage expertise development through educational institution partnering. Public recruitment drive to recruit new FSOs.</td>
<td>Public recruitment of FSOs should note attempts to become more representative in non-exclusionary manner: focus on merits of diverse hiring; no group excluded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase professional development opportunities, including exchanges with PD actors and expertise opportunities.</td>
<td>Increase professional development opportunities, including exchanges with PD actors and expertise opportunities.</td>
<td>Year 4: Work with PSCC to develop advancement opportunities for FSOs. Year 4 report produced. Plan for expansion of diplomatic assets complete, taken to Cabinet for approval.</td>
<td>Liaise with appropriate international stakeholders throughout asset expansion. Use opening of assets as branding opportunity in new market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigate and implement methods to ensure FS is representative of nation and different experiences, that maintains high standards and merit-based hiring.</td>
<td>Investigate and implement methods to ensure FS is representative of nation and different experiences, that maintains high standards and merit-based hiring.</td>
<td>Year 5: Interdepartmental transfers limited. Year 5 report produced. Implementation of diplomatic asset expansion.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit interdepartmental transfers and increase opportunities for FSO advancement.</td>
<td>Limit interdepartmental transfers and increase opportunities for FSO advancement.</td>
<td>Follow on: M&amp;E reports produced at two-year, four-year and five-year mark - adjustments to department direction as needed; Year 5 report will make recommendations to PSCC regarding ongoing FSO recruitment. Consultations with PSCC, governmental stakeholders and FS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Impact:** A 21st century FS that owns direction of Department, expertise provides sound analysis for growing transnational concerns, and FS becomes representative of Canadian population and experience.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This review of Canada’s immigration and refugee policy is intended for the Honourable John McCallum, Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). Immigration Minister John McCallum recently announced new targets for the number of immigrants the Government of Canada will allow in 2017.1 In comparison to 2016 targets, Canada will bring in more economic and family migrants and fewer refugees while sustaining the total immigrant target of 300,000. We consider that despite the reduction in refugee targets for the following year, the numbers remain significantly high. This review is devised to complement McCallum’s targets.

Considering the current and ongoing global refugee crisis, it is imperative that Canada uphold its humanitarian commitments as signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. In addition, Canada is facing several demographic constraints impeding its economic potential. It is in McCallum’s interest to delicately balance Canada’s economic needs with its humanitarian commitments.

Addressing both priorities requires improved settlement and integration services. With improved integration, we can ensure a better quality of life for refugees while enhancing their long-term contribution to the economic growth of Canada.

Refugee integration can be improved through a coordinated two-pronged approach which is designed to improve the availability and effectiveness of programs available for refugees both prior to and after arrival in Canada.

This review proposes the following two-part recommendation:

1) Increase the efficiency and effectiveness of IRCC Program 3.1: Newcomer Settlement and Integration:

With better access to and improved effectiveness of integration and settlement services, refugees are provided the proper resources required to become independent and economically productive in Canada. These improvements will reduce the time it takes for refugees to reach income parity with the average Canadian citizen, and it will shorten the period for which refugees are straining Canadian public services. This will also help reconcile Canada’s economic immigration policy with its humanitarian objectives. With better services, refugees are provided the necessary skills to help fill the projected labour supply shortages over the next few decades while enjoying a higher quality of life.

2) Provide enhanced preparatory integration services in country of origin or transit sites:

The Canadian Orientation Abroad (COA) program is Canada’s main overseas program providing integration services for refugees. By improving its capacity and services, it is expected to mitigate the anxiety of approved refugees by improving their preparedness pre-departure. Enhancement in areas such as health, language, and basic education will create a more comprehensive integration service system and tackle primary barriers to the successful integration of refugees in Canadian society.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRCC</td>
<td>Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAR</td>
<td>Government Assisted Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSR</td>
<td>Privately Sponsored Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>Service Provider Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Canadian Orientation Abroad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First Syrian Refugee Family Landed in Toronto  
December 9, 2015  
via Flickr user Domnic Santiago
PART 1: HISTORY AND POLICY PROCESS

Problems Facing the Nation

1) Canada’s stagnant economy

Since recovering from the 2008 financial crisis, Canada’s economy has been stagnant at best. Compounding this issue, Canada is undergoing a significant demographic transition. The natural population growth rate has slowed, owing to an overall aging population and declining fertility rates. Immigration currently accounts for two thirds of Canada’s population growth rate and without it the growth rate would reach zero in twenty years (see Figure 1). Over the next 10 years, Canada’s baby boomers will exit the labour force, resulting in a labour supply shortage of 4.4 million jobs. Projected economic expansion will also lead to an additional demand of 2 million jobs. Over this period, Canada is only projected to supply 4.7 million new labour market entrants, resulting in a significant labour supply shortage.

2) Inefficient integration and settlement services

The longer it takes for newcomers to integrate socially and economically into Canada, the greater the strain on Canadian public services. This also negatively impacts the quality of life for refugees. Compared with the other categories of immigrants, refugees start off at a significant disadvantage. Their entry level income is far below that of skilled economic migrants and the average Canadian citizen (see Figure 2). Refugees also have the most difficult time reaching income parity with Canadians. The average income for refugees reaches $30,000 only after at least 10 years spent living in the country (see Graph 1). This lag is indicative of several inefficiencies in Canadian integration and settlement services.

3) Global issue of forced displacement

The number of forcefully displaced people has increased by more than 50% since 2011 and is projected to continue rising. By the end of 2015, the numbers were staggering: 65.3 million people were forcefully displaced worldwide including 21.3 million refugees (see Figure 3). Canada must continue to uphold its international commitments and meet its humanitarian responsibility of “protecting refugees and people in need of protection.” This refers not only to resettling refugees, but also to ensuring a high quality of life for those already in the country, and for those waiting abroad who have been approved for resettlement.

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES
Past Policy and Critical Decisive Moments

In 1969 Canada acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol establishing a global engagement to provide protection for refugees and seek solutions to their problem. In 1976, UNHCR representation expanded into Canada to support the accomplishment of these roles. Created in the same year, the Immigration Act was Canada’s first federal legislation regulating immigration that included refugees as a classification of immigrants. In 2002, it was replaced by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) which establishes a specific set of objectives with respect to the fulfillment of Canada’s international legal obligations and commitment to assist those in need of resettlement.

Major changes to Canada’s immigration policy were introduced between 2008 and 2012, a period when legislative initiatives increased Ministerial power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiatives introduced by Harper’s Conservative government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These changes attempted to reduce refugee claims, minimize abuses and prevent fraud. “Irregular arrivals” was a new designation for claimants from designated countries of origin and those who arrived in groups. Refugee claimants in these categories were subject to harsher treatment.

2012 to 2015 was a period in which the Canadian government received criticism for its inadequate and slow performance in fulfilling its commitments to the UNHCR, particularly its response to the Syrian refugee crisis.

However, in September 2015, the Liberal Party committed to the resettlement of 25,000 Government Assisted Refugees (GARs) and to increase investment to UNHCR and its activities in Syria. Furthermore, it committed to “invest at least an additional $100 million [for 2016] to increase – without reducing standards – refugee processing, as well as sponsorship and settlement services capacity in Canada.”

By August 2016, 29,970 Syrian refugees were resettled in the country. Meeting its commitments enhanced Canada’s international reputation and reinforced the foundations of its global leadership in refugee policy.
Trends and Indicators

From 2008 to 2015, Canada’s proportion of refugees was only 9% of its total immigration accounting for the lowest levels in the past three decades. Conversely, this percentage came up to almost 20% for the present year (2016) (see Figure 4).

Moreover, Canada has two main programs for the admission of refugees: the government-assisted refugees (GAR) and the privately sponsored refugees (PSR). The latter was launched in 1979 in response to the Indochinese crisis when 60,000 Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotians arrived in Canada. Graph 2 illustrates the trends for these two programs and the major spikes in refugee flows to Canada attributed to world crises.

Both these trends indicate Canada's historic and ongoing commitment to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

It is estimated that about 55,000 to 70,000 Somalis arrived in Canada between 1988 and 1996, contributing to the major spikes within this time period as illustrated in Graph 2. It was reported that Somali refugees were not accorded the same welcome and resettlement support that had been given to refugees from the 1979-1980 Indochinese crisis. Somali refugees in Canada faced numerous settlement difficulties: lack of culturally-appropriate services in the Somali language, inadequate mental health services, barriers to employment, and racial discrimination. In response to these settlement difficulties, several service agencies were established over the years to improve refugee integration to Canadian society. This case highlights the need for continued improvement in settlement services and integration.

Since the 1970s, Canada began providing pre-arrival settlement support for refugees. In 1998, as a response to the Kosovo crisis, the Canadian Orientation Abroad (COA) program was created to enhance Canada’s pre-arrival orientation services. It rapidly expanded and established successful immigrant training operations in several countries including Pakistan, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. These services are integral for successful integration but still require a considerable increase in resources.

Constraints

Political considerations: changes in government priorities directly impact Canada’s approach and response to international refugee crises including refugee targets, budget allocation, and funding for settlement and integration services.

Budgetary: Canada’s decreasing economic performance restricts government funding. Although

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1 COA is an initiative funded by IRCC and implemented by the International Organization for migration (IOM).
the current Liberal government has increased the budget allocated for resettlement and integration services, it is imperative to prioritize funding to certain existing programs than others.

Existence of negative public perception towards immigration.

**Goals and Objectives**

Main Goal: Reconcile immigration & economic objectives with Canada’s humanitarian commitments considering the ongoing global refugee crisis.

1) Improve the effectiveness and quality of integration & settlement services for the benefit of all newcomers to Canada (immigrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers).

2) Maintain McCallum’s economic immigration targets to effectively address increasing labour demand while effectively incorporating all newcomers into Canadian society. Skilled migrants can address Canada’s short-term economic needs while refugees in the long run with proper resources can also contribute to Canada’s economic prosperity.

3) Uphold Canada’s commitment to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Included in Canada’s obligations is the commitment to ensuring refugees the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals with regards to the right to engage in wage-earning employment. The resettlement of more than 25,000 refugees in 2016 was the first step toward fulfilling our commitments. The next and most important step is to ensure that those who are now resettled in Canada, their children, and future generations, will have equal opportunities to succeed, and enjoy a high quality of life.
## STAKEHOLDERS

The stakeholders listed below have an interest in Canada’s immigration/refugee policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Role and Responsibility</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)</td>
<td>Grants citizenship, issues travel documents, facilitates the arrival of immigrants, provides protection to refugees, and offers programming to help newcomers settle in Canada.</td>
<td>Maximize the economic, social, and cultural contribution of newcomers to Canada. Promote multiculturalism and integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB)</td>
<td>Independent administrative tribunal responsible for making decisions on immigration and refugee matters.</td>
<td>Support building the future of the Canadian immigration system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial, territorial, and municipal governments</td>
<td>Collaborate with the federal government to support Service Provider Organizations (SPOs)</td>
<td>Maximize equilibrium in regional labour markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)</td>
<td>Responsible for border services including security screening for immigrants.</td>
<td>Support national security and public safety priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)</td>
<td>Assist in preventing individuals who pose a threat to the security of Canada.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC)</td>
<td>Responsible for developing, managing and delivering social programs and services.</td>
<td>Improve overall quality of life for Canadians.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ALLIES AND DETRACTORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allies</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International organizations such as UNHCR and Amnesty International</td>
<td>Rely on the support of donor countries to fulfil their mandate to protect refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration (IOM)</td>
<td>Ensure orderly and humane management of migration and promote international cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector (Canadian businesses)</td>
<td>Require economic migrants and skilled workers to address labour shortages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Provider Organizations (SPOs)</td>
<td>Third parties that deliver resettlement and integration services, and with sufficient resources may be able to fulfill their mandate of rebuilding the lives of immigrants and refugees and ensure their successful integration into Canadian society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious groups, charities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), diaspora communities, and other community groups such as the Canadian Council for Refugees</td>
<td>CCR is a non-governmental organization which serves to influence the government’s policy on refugee settlement and determination. These groups are committed to the rights and protection of refugees in Canada and around the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic networks such as the International Metropolis Project</td>
<td>Metropolis is an international network of researchers, policymakers, and community groups engaged in identifying, understanding, and responding to developments in migration and diversity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sponsors</td>
<td>Willing to support the integration of refugees within their communities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detractors</th>
<th>Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members of the Canadian public with anti-immigration, anti-refugee views</td>
<td>These groups may impede integration through disengagement and/or vocal opposition to newcomers and proposed policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed and/or low income, marginalized groups within Canadian society</td>
<td>These groups are competing with low/unskilled refugees for the same employment opportunities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PROGRAMMATIC NEEDS

Increase the capability and capacity of the services provided under the following programs:
1) IRCC Program 3.1 Newcomer Settlement and Integration27
2) Canadian Orientation Abroad (COA) (Refugee services)28
Increase IRCC Budget for grants and contributions directed to settlement and integration services, as well as COA
Further IRCC cooperation with provincial, territorial and municipal governments as well as SPOs
Create a communication plan to increase the engagement of civil society
COSTED OPTIONS

Option 1

Increase the efficiency and effectiveness of IRCC Program 3.1: Newcomer Settlement and Integration

Expected Outcome

With better access to and improved effectiveness of integration and settlement services, refugees will be given the proper resources needed to become independent and economically productive in Canada. These improvements will reduce the time it takes for refugees to reach income parity with the average Canadian citizen, and it will shorten the period for which refugees are straining Canadian public services. This will also help reconcile Canada’s economic immigration policy with its humanitarian objectives. With better services, refugees will have the necessary skills to help fill projected labour supply shortages over the next few decades while enjoying a much higher quality of life.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROS</th>
<th>CONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher quality of life for refugees</td>
<td>Requires an increase to IRCC Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce the strain on Canadian public services</td>
<td>Requires coordination and cooperation among several stakeholders including provincial, territorial and municipal governments as well as SPOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees can positively contribute to the labour force and Canada’s economic growth</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

PART III: RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION
Option 2

Provide enhanced preparatory integration services in country of first asylum or transit sites through COA.

**Expected Outcome**

The Canadian Orientation Abroad (COA) program is Canada’s main overseas program providing integration services for refugees (see Figure 5). By improving its capacity and services, it is expected to mitigate the anxiety of approved refugees by improving their preparedness pre-departure. Enhancement in areas such as health, language, and basic education will create a more comprehensive integration service system and tackle primary barriers to the successful integration of refugees in Canadian society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROS</th>
<th>CONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Well-established partnership between the IOM and IRCC (see Figure 6)</td>
<td>Requires increased funding for the IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The IOM possess the necessary know-how for the development and expansion of the proposed services</td>
<td>Requires further coordination and cooperation among several stakeholders such as IRCC, IOM, and supporting human resources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides refugees with advanced and comprehensive pre-arrival preparation sessions</td>
<td>Requires more attention to the management and monitoring of proposed services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Option 3

Incentivize the private sector to employ more refugees.

**Expected Outcome**

As part of Canada’s international obligation to protect refugees, Canada has a responsibility to ensure that refugees are being well-integrated into Canadian society with equal opportunities to prosper. With cooperation and collaboration with the private sector, we can ensure that refugees seeking employment, including the most vulnerable, will have increased employment opportunities. As a result, refugees will become a valued contributor to the labour force and enjoy a higher quality of life.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROS</th>
<th>CONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supports the operations of businesses in need of labour in the short and long-term</td>
<td>Requires increased spending and research in pilot projects in collaboration with businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduces the time needed for refugees to reach income parity with Canadians</td>
<td>Possible criticism from detractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduces the strain on Canada’s public services and supports the country’s long-term economic growth</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES
RECOMMENDATIONS

We consider Option 3 as important for addressing the problems facing the nation and feasible with sufficient funding and collaboration with the private sector. However, at present, we consider the current lags and inefficiencies within integration and settlement services our highest priority and an area that we must address immediately in consideration of current budgetary constraints.

The following two-part recommendation synthesizes Option 1 and 2, and has been designed to improve the availability and effectiveness of programs provided for refugees both prior to and after arrival in Canada. A successfully integrated refugee will be able to become a productive member of the labour force, can help strengthen the Canadian economy, and will enjoy a higher quality of life.

RECOMMENDATION 1.1: Increase the efficiency and effectiveness of IRCC Program 3.1: Newcomer Settlement and Integration.

Both GARs and PSRs are eligible for financial support for a period normally not exceeding 12 months after arriving in Canada. Therefore, they are expected to effectively integrate and become financially independent within one year.

According to the Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights released in December 2016, Newcomer Integration and Settlement services require an increase in resources from the federal government in order to sufficiently address the needs of newcomers, particularly refugees in Canada. The inefficiencies of these programs are contributing to the extended time required for refugees to find employment after their funding has elapsed, thereby contributing to the increased strain on Canada’s public services and a diminished quality of life for refugees themselves.

The following three priorities are recommended by this policy review:

• Improve access to language training (sub-sub-program 3.1.1.1)
• Improve access to child care services (sub-sub-program 3.1.1.2)
• Expand sub-sub-program 3.1.1.2 to include skill training programs for low/unskilled refugees

1) Language Training: Language training programs for all newcomers are delivered through IRCC funded SPOs in each province and territory. These programs are available in both English and French and are fundamental to the successful integration of newcomers. They are currently underfunded resulting in the lack of language classes for low-level English speakers. Depending on the location of settlement, high demand has resulted in long wait lists with some reports indicating a 12 month waiting period for enrolment in English language classes. Without proper language instruction, newcomers especially refugees will not optimize their successful participation in the labour force and may find themselves unemployed indefinitely. An increase in funding in sub-sub-program 3.1.1.1 will improve access to and quality of language classes that will allow newcomers to enroll immediately upon arrival in Canada. This will provide them with the necessary skills for finding gainful employment as quickly as possible.
2) **Childcare:** Many parents with young children find themselves unable to attend language classes or participate in job searches because they do not have access to childcare services. Increased access to free childcare services delivered through IRCC funded SPOs will provide opportunities for both parents to attend language and skill training programs, and to search for employment.

3) **Skill Training:** Labour market integration services are inadequate to meet the challenges faced by unskilled and low-skilled refugees. For example, Ontario’s Bridge Training program is only available to newcomers with a post-secondary degree and international work experience. Increased funding for sub-sub-program 3.1.1.2 with a target of developing specific skill training programs that provide low and unskilled workers with the opportunity to learn new skills will improve their employability after their funding has elapsed. Such programs could train newcomers for employment in various trades and services such as childcare.

The following chart details the considerations for an effective implementation of this recommendation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Communication Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017/2018 Updated budget for Program 3.1.1:</td>
<td>IRCC applies for an increase in funding through the federal budget. IRCC will increase transfer payments to Program 3.1.1: Settlement by 25%.</td>
<td>Early 2017: Secure Funding Increase funding to Program 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 immediately</td>
<td>IRCC must share the objectives and rationale of recommendations with internal departments, provincial/territorial governments, and other stakeholders. IRCC must communicate with Quebec, British Colombia, and Manitoba to ensure that SPO program design and implementation will satisfy Recommendation 1.1. IRCC and designated provinces must communicate with SPOs to ensure necessary program changes and personnel requirements. IRCC must engage civil society to promote a campaign of tolerance and acceptance with the aim of reducing anti-immigration sentiment within the Canadian society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$818,274,818</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(654,619,854 +163,654,964) (see Figure 7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/2018 Updated budget for Program 3.1.2:</td>
<td>IRCC will need to coordinate with Quebec, British Colombia and Manitoba to ensure the allocation of funds, and the design and implementation of programs to target areas.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$379,564,900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(345,059,000 +$34,505,900)</em></td>
<td>Provinces must select and fund SPOs based on their capacity to implement priority programs that cater to the specific needs of newcomers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 2017/2018 Budget for Program 3.1:</td>
<td>All other provinces work under a centralized model. IRCC will be responsible for the funding, design and delivery of services in these provinces.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,263,381,579</td>
<td>SPOs will be responsible for hiring additional language teachers, childcare professionals and specialized industry-specific training personnel tailored to the needs of low-skilled workers.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Follow On
Check the economic performance of refugees for their first year of employment
Evaluate economic performance of refugees at 2 year intervals thereafter
Indicator of success: refugees reach an average income of $30,000 or more 5 years after arrival
(as opposed to 10)
Evaluate program effectiveness through surveys and assess overall refugee satisfaction with integra
tion services

RECOMMENDATION 1.2: Provide enhanced preparatory integration services for refugees in coun
try of first asylum or transit sites through COA.

The current objectives of the program address the necessity of improving refugees’ skills for their
successful transition to a new life (see Figure 8).40

Three main opportunity areas to improve the current COA program have been identified: mental
health, basic education, and language training.41 With this focus, services will be improved and
implemented according to individual participants’ needs.

The current length of pre-arrival services provided by COA for refugees is 3 to 5 days. Considering
the
average delay of 3 months between the time a visa is issued and the time the refugee departs for
Canada, there is an opportunity to extend the program and expand its benefits.

The following chart details the considerations for an effective implementation of this recommenda
tion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Communication Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017/2018 increase budget</td>
<td>IRCC will negotiate with IOM for the calculation of funds.</td>
<td>Early 2017: Secure Funding</td>
<td>Share the objectives and rationale of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for COA based on</td>
<td>IRCC will apply for an increase in funding.</td>
<td>Increase funding to COA from 2017-2019</td>
<td>recommendations with IRCC personnel abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a previous negotiation</td>
<td>IRCC increases transfer payments for COA.</td>
<td>(2-year renewable contract)</td>
<td>and other stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with the IOM and number of</td>
<td>IOM will be responsible for managing, consulting, and seeking IRCC’s approval for</td>
<td>Share objectives with the UNHCR.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refugees participating</td>
<td>their internal implementation of COA services.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(see Figure 9).42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Follow On
Upon arrival in Canada conduct surveys with the support of private sponsors and SPOs to evaluate any improvements in mental health, language and basic writing/reading skills of refugee participants
Evaluate program effectiveness through assessment of refugee satisfaction

Expected Impact of Recommendation 1.1 and 1.2

Providing comprehensive and effective integration services is essential to achieve this review’s primary goals and objectives.

Although Program 3.1: Newcomer Settlement and Integration is available for the benefit of all newcomers to Canada, Recommendation 1.1 is designed to specifically target the high priority needs of refugees. Refugees, particularly the most vulnerable, are typically less educated and require greater assistance to fully integrate into Canadian society. With improvements to the three priorities of Recommendation 1.1, refugees will be better equipped for successful entry into the labour market and find gainful employment. Ideally, they will also achieve income parity with the average Canadian within 5 years instead of 10. The increased employability of refugees will also contribute to Canada’s labour supply shortage by expanding the Canadian workforce, thus contributing to Canada’s future economic prosperity. Moreover, refugees will be financially independent and experience a higher quality of life, fulfilling Canada’s humanitarian objectives.

Moreover, Recommendation 1.2 compliments this initiative. COA’s permanent training sites abroad will provide pre-arrival services for at least 1 month. Improved services in mental health, basic education, and language training will develop refugees’ self-confidence before arriving to Canada.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This review of Canada’s development policy is intended for the Honourable Marie-Claude Bibeau, Minister of International Development and La Francophonie. Its intended purpose is to review Canada’s past development policy, analyze its current policy and make a recommendation to improve the efficacy of Canada’s development assistance.

Canada is facing several problems that are affecting its development policy:
• Increasing appeals for aid internationally
• Increased complexity of global and humanitarian crises
• The difficulty of development in fragile and conflict-affected states
• Ineffectiveness of aid delivery
• And a challenging economic climate domestically.

Together, these problems pose challenges that constrain Canada’s actions when forming policy and implementing programs.

In light of these problems, international best practices, and evidence-based evaluations, Canada’s current policy direction is not the best use of its resources. The best option for Canada to effectively meet its development goals is to restructure development policy to reflect current international assistance trends and issues and Agenda 2030. This suggestion comes with two recommendations:

• Improving aid effectiveness
• Target ODA
• Use the Principles of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States
• And implement a whole-of-government approach for Agenda 2030.

These recommendations will help Canada meet its goals and overcome these problems. By targeting ODA, Canada can better match the type of aid to the country in question to achieve the best results without increasing ODA spending. Implementing the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States will help promote country ownership and nationally-led development, while addressing the complexity of development in regions with poor security. Finally, implementing a whole-of-government approach for Agenda 2030 will create a durable, overarching framework to guide Canada’s development policy and align government departments to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Together, these actions will create a cohesive policy that will deliver aid efficiently and effectively, and achieve Canada’s development policy objectives.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2030 Agenda</td>
<td>Agenda for the Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFATD</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCAS</td>
<td>Fragile and Conflict-Affected States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAC</td>
<td>Global Affairs Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAE</td>
<td>International Assistance Envelope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least Developed Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMICs</td>
<td>Lower Middle-Income Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMO</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSG</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMICs</td>
<td>Upper Middle-Income Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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</table>
While much has been done to alleviate global poverty, Canada, and the world, still face many significant challenges. Appeals to the UN for humanitarian aid have almost quadrupled in 10 years, and crises like climate change and protracted humanitarian conflicts such as Syria have compounded an already complex set of international problems. These problems affect developing countries in a more substantial way, particularly least developed countries and fragile states. The international sphere is also increasingly complex as new donors emerge and the number of non-state actors increases.

Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) have historically lagged behind other categories of states in development. FCAS are the most aid-dependent countries in the world and cannot depend on external financing (such as remittances). Additionally, humanitarian assistance and current development strategies have never successfully targeted the underlying challenges of fragility or conflict. Ongoing instability in these states continue to impede the development goals of Canada and the entire world.

Canada is continuously scrutinized for its aid effectiveness and fragmentation. One of Canada’s most scrutinized policies is its focus on specific priority countries, which critics argue is ineffective.

Canada is also under pressure internally as the economic climate has constrained spending and focuses the public’s attention on domestic priorities rather than international concerns.

The problem of Canada’s aid ineffectiveness in Afghanistan
“The Canadian Council for International Cooperation, as well as many academics, argued that our aid was “securitised” because it was used to advance problematic security-driven strategies, rather than to promote truly democratic governance and sustainable development...Their critiques seem valid for Canada’s aid and [whole of government approach] involvement in Afghanistan, which was highly securitised and not particularly effective, especially in Kandahar” *
Past Policy and Critical Decisive Moments

Canada’s contributions to foreign aid were born out of the reconstruction efforts in Europe following World War II. Canada, and other Western nations, saw expanding development assistance as an opportunity to aid newly emerging countries in the context of decolonization.5 The 1960s witnessed a movement away from a charity-based aid model to an aid model based on partnerships with citizens, organizations and governments of countries in need with the goal of reducing poverty. The UN set a target for developed countries to contribute 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) to aid spending.6 The founding of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 1968 aligned with this new model and goal.

In subsequent decades, Canadian governments attempted to increase Canada’s aid effectiveness by reducing the number of focus areas and decreasing the number of countries receiving aid.7 It was argued that concentrating aid in certain regions or countries enables a donor government to have greater visibility in the region and would increase political sway. However, there has been little evidence to show that increasing focus on countries receiving aid leads to more effective aid delivery and, moreover, may reduce flexibility and responsiveness in the face of an international crisis.8 Canada has never reached the 0.7% of GNI target.9

Upon the election of the Conservative government in 2011, Canada’s development goals underwent another realignment. The government committed to strengthening its relations with private sector actors to promote economic growth and Canadian commercial projects (especially resources-based). Overall funding from 2011 onwards trended downwards. See Figure 1. In 2013, the government decided to merge CIDA with the Department of Foreign Affairs, creating the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) to increase policy coherence and aid effectiveness.10 Effectively, the move signaled the tying together of development funds and trade. However, shuttering CIDA was controversial as it was seen as diluting Canada’s development commitments.11 Canada’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending increased in 2015, to $5.8 billion, or 0.28% of GNI, an increase of 17% from the previous year.12 This upward tick does not reflect an upward trend, but shows a one-time ODA loan from Finance Canada to Ukraine, and a one-time double payment to the World Bank International Development Association.13

The election of a new Liberal government in 2015 has signaled a shift in development policy objectives.14 The 2016 Budget earmarked an additional $256 million over two years on top of the base budget of $4.62 billion for Canada’s International Assistance Envelope (IAE).15
Trends in Policy, Constraints, and Indicators

Trends

The share of ODA for least developed countries (LDCs) has been declining worldwide as external finances are increasing.16 See Figure 2. In 2014, LDCs received 30.3% of all ODA which was a 3.1% drop from levels in 2012.17 The UN argues that 0.15%-0.20% of GNI should be directed to LDCs. Currently eight OECD-DAC members have reached this target, Canada has not.18 It is difficult for LDCs to mobilize domestic resources through taxation, which makes ODA an important resource for a country’s fiscal effort to eliminate poverty.

External finances can be tailored to the needs of recipient countries based on income and development level.19 Donors can then allocate ODA based on relative impact. See Figure 3 to quantify the relative importance of ODA in countries.

Globally, trends in development assistance have been encapsulated in the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These 17 SDGs20 include 169 targets aimed at transforming the world by 2030.21 The SDGs framework could function as an overall guide to Canada’s international development policies.

Figure 2: ODA versus other Forms of External Finances
Additionally, the OECD identified global trends in their high-level fora on aid effectiveness: Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and Busan (2011). Three contemporary principles of aid effectiveness have emerged: ownership, alignment and harmonization. These principles are essential for aid effectiveness and will have a positive development impact.

The New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States (the New Deal) came out of Busan and was developed to address international development assistance in countries’ transitions from conflict and fragility to peaceful states and societies. The strategy was created in the context of the security-development nexus and the need for new ways to deliver aid. The New Deal focuses on three main pillars of development: Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs); a focus on country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility; and building mutual trust to providing aid and managing resources more effectively and aligning these resources for results.
Constraints

Canada’s development policy is constrained in several ways:

- **Budgetary pressure**: Canada is expecting a lower rate of GDP growth than projected, a budget deficit in 2015-16 of $3 billion, and no budget surpluses projected until 2019-20.25 In a constrained economic environment there is pressure to reduce spending on foreign aid and focus on domestic projects.

- **Political considerations**: Each government has identified their own priorities on where to allocate aid resources, thus Canada's ODA may not be focused on countries that need it most.

- **Lack of policy coherence**: Successive governments in Canada have not released an overall guiding theme for aid policies. This lack of direction, in addition to government and ministerial turnover, has created a policy environment lacking cohesion.

- **Efficacy hindered by the lack of knowledge of local customs or conditions**: Each country in need has unique challenges and circumstances. Aid delivery must be tailored to the recipient countries in order to have maximum effect. Furthermore, tying aid to certain outcomes tends to reduce effectiveness and increase transaction costs for recipient countries. 26

Indicators

Some key indicators that can be used to determine the efficacy of Canada’s aid which aligns with this report’s recommendations:

- Progress towards reaching SDGs goals, as updated by the UN27
- Indicators contained within the New Deal28
- Independent OECD reports that measure Canada's aid efficacy
- Peer reviews from other DAC donor countries
- Measure of type of aid going to different kinds of states, i.e. grants to LDCs or loans to LMICs or UMICs.
- Developing transparency reports both at donor and recipient country level
- Number of Canadian managers and officers placed in donor-countries
Goals and Objectives

Canada’s international development policies should reflect Canadian values of inclusiveness, environmental responsibility, accountable governance, promotion of human rights and diversity. The policies should be designed to reduce world poverty, promote peace and security, and save lives. A more stable world is a world where Canada can thrive and help other nations achieve their potential.

Goal 1: Find solutions for delivering aid more effectively and efficiently in the current constrained economic climate and meeting the unique needs of LDCs, LMICs, and UMICs
Goal 2: Set a path to meet commitments to the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Goal 3: Create a cohesive policy environment

Key Stakeholders

There are a number of key stakeholders in international development that have specific roles and interests in Canadian development policy and implementation. The following have significant stakes in this report’s recommendations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Stakeholder</th>
<th>Role and Responsibility</th>
<th>Interests/Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
<td>Non-governmental and non-profit organizations at the international, regional and local levels focused on shared values and interests.</td>
<td>Use policy dialogue, consultations and funding arrangements to hold the government accountable and utilize civil society resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Institutions, Partners and Donor Countries</td>
<td>Work toward a global framework for development that encourages cooperation, effectiveness and best practices.</td>
<td>Sustainable development leads to a prosperous world economy and increased global security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g7+ Group of Fragile and Conflict-Affected States</td>
<td>Give a collective voice to conflict-affected states, and a platform for learning and support between member countries.</td>
<td>Work with international donors to promote country-led planning mechanisms and recommend changes in international assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Government Departments (Finance, Environment and Climate Change, Refugees and Immigration, etc.)</td>
<td>Work cohesively as a government to achieve domestic and international goals and targets.</td>
<td>Overlapping themes such as climate change and refugees necessitates government departments to collaborate in policy creation and implementation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Stakeholders relevant to the broader context of Canada’s development policy include the private sector, aid recipient and partner countries, and development think tanks such as the Canadian Council for International Cooperation.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Allies/Detractors

International development is a global responsibility and Canada engages with international and domestic actors to achieve its development goals.35

Allies

Multilateral and Global Partners: More than one-third of Canada’s ODA is funneled through multilateral institutions that Canada supports to achieve its development mandate of aiding the most vulnerable. In order to ensure effective and efficient delivery of aid, Canada coordinates with and funds institutions such as the UN Development Programme, African Development Bank and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance to ensure timely and impactful results.

Aid Agencies of other Countries: As the development landscape becomes more complex, Canada works with the aid agencies of other donor countries to secure donor harmonization and alignment. For example, Canada is a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), an organization of donor countries which seeks to work cooperatively to meet the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Measures include peer reviews and the adoption of shared strategies, policies and frameworks aimed at increasing development programming capacity.36

Non-Governmental Organizations: Many NGOs engage in activities related to emergency relief, program delivery, development and policy advocacy.37 As an ally to the Canadian government, NGOs act as a channel for Canadian development funds and as a partner in programming as they are experts in their field. Some examples of NGOs that Canada works with are CARE Canada, World Vision and Doctors Without Borders.

Mixed

Special Interest Groups and Diasporas: Special interest groups or lobbyists may attempt to influence policy to meet their own goals and objectives. Development policy could be skewed in an attempt to please these groups.38 However, these groups also provide cultural expertise and access to targeted aid-recipient communities.

Detractors

Corruptive Aid Recipients: Organizations or departments within a recipient country’s government may be corrupt or non-transparent in their use of aid funds.39 This detracts from the overall goal of using foreign assistance to alleviate poverty and promote economic growth.

Canadian Public: The Canadian public, while traditionally supportive of humanitarian intervention, may call into question some of Canada’s development policy spending.

Programmatic Needs

- Deliver aid more effectively
- Commit to implement Agenda 2030 and achieve its goals and objectives
- Ensure policy cohesiveness across governmental departments
- Create a more durable development policy
- Reenergize development programming to be a leader in international development
- Respond to the changing climate of international development
### Recommendations

Considering Canada’s programmatic needs, there are three suggested options:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option 1: Remove humanitarian assistance from GAC Development Department</th>
<th>Option 2: Amend the ODA Accountability Act to have a stronger enforcement mechanism and more stringent reporting standards</th>
<th>Option 3: Restructure development policy to reflect current international assistance trends and issues and Agenda 2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expected Outcome:</strong> Addresses aid effectiveness by separating immediate, disaster relief from long-term, sustainable development.40 Humanitarian assistance is better suited to be coupled with other government agencies, such as Defence. Development would be an autonomous department focused solely on policy and programming within GAC</td>
<td><strong>Expected Outcome:</strong> Use this legislative tool to create stronger enforcement and more stringent reporting standards. This would help increase transparency and aid efficacy. It would also make development policy more durable in the long-term.</td>
<td><strong>Expected Outcome:</strong> Restructuring development policy would address the reality of low levels of ODA and aid effectiveness, and ensure cohesiveness across the government to make Canada a global leader in implementing Agenda 2030.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pro:</strong> Canada’s development department would be an autonomous unit within GAC and free of economic or commercial influences. Humanitarian assistance better integrated into the whole-of-government approach.</td>
<td><strong>Pro:</strong> This is a low-cost option to address political considerations in international development policy. It would also build long-term institutional knowledge of development strategies in government.</td>
<td><strong>Pro:</strong> Creates a durable and cohesive policy framework by taking a whole of government approach to Agenda 2030. Acts as a response to the new dynamics of international development assistance, particularly the challenge of fragile states, by increasing aid effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Con:</strong> Creating a separate Development Department would be expensive for the government. Eliminates potential for policy development that incorporates trade and foreign policy.</td>
<td><strong>Con:</strong> Dependent on political will and enforcement is only as strong as desired. Can be re-amended.</td>
<td><strong>Con:</strong> Puts the control of setting goals outside of immediate government control. Would require a budget increase due to administrative fees.</td>
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In reviewing the costed options, options 1 and 2 are not comprehensive in addressing Canada’s programmatic needs and do not promote long-term effectiveness.

**Option 3, the restructuring of Canada’s development policy to reflect current international trends and issues and Agenda 2030 is the recommended option.**
Costed Options and Policy Alternatives

1. Improve Aid Effectiveness

1.1 Target ODA: It is unlikely that the government will be capable of substantially increasing ODA to the recommended 0.7% target in the current economic climate. However, due to an increase in the flow of remittances, foreign direct investment and private debt portfolio equity, the relative importance of ODA is declining in certain countries but remains imperative for poverty reduction in the LDCs. Therefore, Canada should target their ODA more efficiently by eliminating priority and partner countries and instead, following OECD guidelines, create two categories, Least Developed Countries (fragile and non-fragile) and Lower and Upper Middle-Income Countries.41

Expected Impacts and Follow-ons: Targeting ODA would make aid more effective by providing ODA to countries that need it most to alleviate poverty with maximum impact. This will also help to reduce political considerations when determining ODA targets; it will be harder to engage in bilateral programming with countries based on political interests rather than critical development needs.42 In order to minimize politically motivated decisions among the LDCs, Canada can base its ODA commitments on country-led national assessments, promoting ownership in recipient countries while identifying critical needs that align with Canada’s values. Canada will also benefit economically from engaging in trade with LMICs and UMICs.43

Follow-ons would include evaluating aid effectiveness based on removal of priority and partner countries and analysis on justifying an increase in ODA if aid effectiveness increases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Communication Strategy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The current timeline for this recommendation does not include an increase in ODA.</td>
<td>With the release of the 2016/2017 budget, announce the redistribution of funds to LDCs and to LMICs and UMICs.</td>
<td>While many bilateral programs have extended end dates, beginning in March 2016/2017, cease to renew programming in these countries.</td>
<td>Inform stakeholders that Canada is aligning with Agenda 2030 and focusing on development to those who need it most.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is little cost to implementing this recommendation as it is a restructuring of policy.</td>
<td>Allocate 80% of ODA to LDC fragile and non-fragile states and 20% to LMICs and UMICs.</td>
<td>The expected end date of the majority of current bilateral programming is 2020.44</td>
<td>Inform current priority countries that do not fit into new categories that Canada will engage with them through other avenues such as investment and trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consult with global partners, the UN, NGOs and civil society to determine categorical references are accurate.</td>
<td>2017-2020: begin new aid programming and allocating ODA based on new categories of countries.</td>
<td>Inform Canadian public that Canada is fulfilling its development mandate of focusing on the poorest and most vulnerable.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engage in more trade and investment with LMICs and UMICs.</td>
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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
1.2 Use the Principles of the New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States: Canada needs to improve aid effectiveness in FCASs to enhance its overall aid effectiveness. Canada must ensure that its partnerships have national development strategies and aid aligns with their national policies and objectives. As a donor, Canada needs to be more engaged and undertake a constructive role in using development assistance to aid countries in achieving stability and economic growth. Using the New Deal as guidance, there is an opportunity for better donor harmonization and tailoring strategies to the context of each country. Additionally, Canada should invest in having more qualified development experts in the field, experts in the principles of the New Deal, and engaging more with local communities and leaders.

Expected Impacts and Follow-ons: Expected impacts are a reorientation of policy driven by recipient countries and experts in the field. Aid delivery would be less fragmented and focused on development issues specific to countries and regions. Improved ability to adapt to complex situations and improved results and impact on the ground. Canada could use the New Deal approach, particularly the peacebuilding and statebuilding principles, something of which Canada is known for, to impart Canadian values through development. Other impacts are an engaged civil society, enhanced governance and personal security and justice in recipient countries.

Follow-ons would include continuous training of development staff and active engagement with NGOs, civil society and partner-country staff and government officials.

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<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
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<tr>
<td>There would be some costs in investing in more professionals in the field, but can be offset by hiring cost-effective local contractors and consultants. More risks involved in engaging with fragile states, this could be offset by sharing the risk with other donor countries through harmonized, coordinated programming.</td>
<td>Encourage senior managers and new hires in Ottawa to take positions in the field. Develop specific, internal policy guidance on the principles and implementation of the New Deal. Collaborate with recipient country governments and organizations on New Deal Principles and their implementation. Consult with local NGOs and civil society to build knowledge on local issues and be an active partner in the dialogue process.</td>
<td>Effective immediately with announcement of 2017 Budget. 6 months for development of internal policy guidance and awareness. Pilot countries have already implemented the New Deal framework over the course of 2012-2015. Significant shift in working in FCAS, could take many years to perfect aid delivery and cater Canada’s development policy within the difficult context of FCAS. Predicted timeline: 2017-2027.</td>
<td>Public Service and national recruitment call for development experts with a focus on overseas postings. Educate relevant stakeholders and engage in domestic advocacy to promote and provide clarity on expectations on New Deal participation, including risk-benefit tradeoffs and the commitment to delivering aid differently. Communication campaigns within recipient countries in partnership with civil society and local NGOs to announce Canada’s presence and eagerness to engage with the local community.</td>
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</table>
2. Implement a whole of government approach for Agenda 2030

A coordinated multi-sectoral approach to sustainable development is key to achieving goals because trade, investment, environment and fiscal policies are integral to the process. A whole of government approach also provides the opportunity to integrate domestic and international policy objectives as global sustainable development affects Canadians domestically in terms of security, physical well-being and economic prosperity.

**Expected Impacts and Follow-ons:** A whole of government approach for Agenda 2030 could serve as a durable policy framework for future governments. While it is not possible to bind future governments, implementing a framework that is agreed upon by international partners and stakeholders could increase policy coherence among departments and future governments. Follow-ons would be internal assessments of policy coherence among departments and a review of Canada's contribution to the SDGs indicators.

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<tr>
<td>Some administrative fees for conducting surveys and setting up monitoring bodies.</td>
<td>Integrate the SDGs into departments' appropriate policies and programs. PMO office in charge of national implementation because of its cross-cutting governmental influence. Conduct analysis to identify key issues in policy coherence among departments regarding Agenda 2030. This includes identifying barriers to achieving SDGs. Align departments’ mechanisms for policy coherence in accordance with the spirit and obligations of Agenda 2030. Create and implement a monitoring and evaluation body to ensure adherence.</td>
<td>Other OECD countries have implemented the recommended implementation steps in 3 years. An expected timeline for implementation would be 2017-2020. However, a fully cohesive, functioning, whole-of-government approach could take up to 5 years.</td>
<td>Inform Canadian public of a national goal to achieve SDGs and create campaigns to generate societal commitment. Involve Canadian NGOs and civil society in promotion and implementation of societal commitment to Agenda 2030. Announce consultations with necessary stakeholders for input on implementation and strategies. Launch an internal communication strategy to encourage commitment from personnel working within the departments.</td>
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</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This policy review is intended for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Minister Stéphane Dion, as human rights (HR) fall under the purview of his mandate, as outlined in his Mandate Letter written by the Right Honourable Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.

The United Nations (UN) HR Office of the High Commissioner defines HR today as “rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status,”1 where still many fundamental HR are being violated. Although the definition may have evolved since the inception of the UN, Canada has committed itself to these values for decades, often being one of the original signatories of UN HR treaties and conventions (see Appendix 1). In recent years, however, a disconnect has developed between Canada and its HR priorities, exemplified by persistently objecting to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) while still having not acceded to other HR-related conventions.

Today’s Liberal government has already demonstrated its intent to improve Canada’s HR position, both domestically and internationally. Trudeau, for example, has committed to continuing HR initiatives, such as the promotion of maternal and newborn health, as well as signalling intent to implement the UNDRIP. The Liberal government must bring about its own initiatives and make its own mark in Canada’s HR efforts. Trudeau has already committed to addressing domestic HR violations, which are particularly prominent among Indigenous communities; however international measures to address HR must be taken as well. This report presents three options through which Canada can address this objective while also addressing three primary problems facing the nation, namely:

• Addressing Indigenous rights in Canada through the UNDRIP;
• Inconsistent HR policy in international development / assistance;
• Re-establishing Canada’s position as a global leader of HR.

This report therefore presents three recommendations to improve these problems:

• Redefine the Office of HR, Freedoms and Inclusion (OHRFI) as a coordinating body to create and implement an overarching international HR policy strategy
• Increase resources for coordination and communication between key departments: Development Canada (Dev-Can), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Department of National Defence (DND) on peacekeeping missions and appoint an R2P Focal Point
• Utilize the whole-of-government approach to strengthen Canada’s position at the UN and ensure proper adoption of HR provisions under UN treaties both domestically and internationally

Through the adoption of these measures, Canada can better situate itself within the international HR discourse and be in a stronger position to address HR issues internationally. These recommendations encourage greater coordination both domestically, among federal departments and organizations, and internationally. This would reduce interdepartmental gaps that exist in addressing HR and provide a more cohesive approach to Canada’s intent.
In the spirit of the sacred site, the Manito Ahbee Festival is a gathering that celebrates Indigenous culture and heritage to unify, educate and inspire. via Flickr sser Travel Manitoba
HR violations against women, refugees, the LGBTQ+ community and Indigenous Peoples continue to exist at home. Canada has received significant criticism from HR groups for the contradiction in the HR values Canada claims internationally and the current domestic HR challenges facing Canada’s Indigenous Peoples. Many First Nations reserves, for example, lack the resources and infrastructure for basic services while the federal government has yet to close the gap between reserve and off-reserve communities. While the Canadian government has stated that it will “adopt and implement [the UNDRIP] in accordance with the Canadian Constitution” though, it remains unsigned.

Inconsistent HR Policy in International Development/Assistance

Despite support for HR since the 1970s, the inclusion of specific HR and how they have been promoted in Canadian international development and foreign policy has largely been shaped by party politics. This pattern has created a broad and inconsistent policy direction for the bureaucracy to follow and lessened Canada’s impact in HR, especially during political change in government.

Development Canada (Dev-Can), the development stream of Global Affairs Canada (GAC), was criticized in 2012 for lacking “a clear, top-level statement that sets out its vision for development cooperation,” and this issue of decentralization is still in place. The Discussion Paper for the current International Assistance Review (IAR) reflects this decentralization in the plurality of HR challenges Dev-Can intends to address with development aid.

DND on the other hand, is currently conducting a Defence Policy Review (DPR), where the only reference to HR within the document is in terms of a “Gender-Based Analysis Plus” roundtable discussion, on how Canada could “remain a leader in promoting [HR] and gender equality… in settings where cultural norms differ widely from our own.” This narrow focus of HR does not address the wider HR challenges that peacekeepers encounter in fragile states and conflict zones and has allowed for instances of HR violations by Canadian peacekeepers abroad.

Shifting Global Position and Context

Within the UN, there is significant polarization between its member states on HR issues, calling the legitimacy of certain organs, such as the HR Council, into question. One such point of contention is the institution’s peacekeeping and R2P operations, a primary means of promoting HR on the ground, especially in corrupt and fragile states. Traditionally, Canada has demonstrated diplomatic strength and cooperation with the UN, which greatly diminished under the previous government.

In addition, Canada has had a tradition of supporting UN peacekeeping operations, to which the current government has committed significant resources. To reduce this internal discord and re-establish Canada’s position in the UN, Canada must therefore present a clear strategy outlining which peacekeeping missions and R2P initiatives it will support, as well as a strategy on how to promote fundamental HR in dangerous conflict zones.
Past Policy and Critical Decisive Moments

HR and Related Treaties and Canadian Law

Canada signed the Universal Declaration of HR (UDHR) on December 10, 1948 and has since ratified or acceded to seven out of nine core UN HR treaties (see Appendix 1), where reports are submitted concerning each of their implementation to demonstrate Canada’s continued commitment. Today, the government is committed to “adopting and implementing the UNDRIP in accordance with the Canadian Constitution,” and has also tabled the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), stating its plan to accede to this treaty in 2017. Domestically, Canada’s HR have been codified in the Canadian HR Act, 1977 and in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, which addresses issues of discrimination and are enshrined in Canada’s Constitution.

HR in Foreign Policy

Canada’s foreign policy was identified in 1995 under the Chretien government and promotes three key pillars: prosperity and employment, Canada’s security within a stable global framework, and Canadian values and culture throughout the world. Since then, Canada’s approach to HR has typically been framed by the third pillar, through championing values that promote and protect fundamental HR, as outlined in the UDHR. Every Canadian government has recognized the promotion of HR abroad as a national priority.

Current HR Commitments

The Office of Religious Freedom was established as part of GAC in 2013; it was expanded and renamed OHRFI on May 17, 2016 and will receive a budget of up to $15 million. Canadians have historically viewed peacekeeping as part of the national identity and an integral part in the promotion of fundamental HR. However, Canadians’ enthusiasm for peacekeeping was damaged by controversial missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. The current government has committed $450 million and up to 600 troops and 150 police officers to re-establish Canada’s leadership and contributions to peacekeeping, and has also stated that it will take a whole-of-government approach to address the root causes of conflict. In terms of genocide prevention as codified in Chapter VII of the UN Charter however, there is still a larger role for Canada to play in terms of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, as properly identified by Minister Dion’s office.

Policy Trends - Constraints and Indicators

In the publicly released ministerial mandate letters, the Trudeau government calls for coordination between the Minister of International Development, the Minister of National Defence, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to accomplish several HR policy priorities and rectify some of the problems addressed above during the current Liberal majority government. This coordination provides an opportunity for the development of a broader HR policy strategy. There are several constraints on the current government in fulfilling these priorities however, and indicators as to their current level of success in working towards achieving their HR policy priorities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HR Policy Priorities</th>
<th>Constraints</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Strengthen Engagement at the UN** | - Lost seat on UNSC in 201030  
- Reduced engagement in UN processes and treaties related to HR in the previous government31 | - Bid for 2021 UNSC seat32  
- Prime Minister indicated Canada will win the UNSC seat with renewed focus on HR, particularly for women and girls33 |
| **Peacekeeping Operations** | - Domestic politics could influence mission choices  
- Absence of HR language in DND  
- Previous incidents of HR violations by Canadian peacekeepers34  
- Lack of effective enforcement and oversight mechanism for peacekeepers’ violations35 | - Commitment of $450 million, 600 troops and 150 police officers to peacekeeping missions36 |
| **United Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)** | - Canada has historically been a persistent objector to this treaty  
- Difficult to implement in Canadian law | - Federal government has signalled its intent to adopt and implement the treaty37 |
| **Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)** | - Saudi Arabia: Minister Dion quietly signed arms deal before stating the plan to accede to treaty, diminishing credibility from the accession38 | - Treaty was tabled on June 30, 2016, and the Liberal government intends on acceding39 |
| **Champion of HR** | - Inconsistent and segregated policy direction  
- Previously low levels of funding for and involvement in global HR (see Appendix 2 for example of inconsistent funding of “Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Peace and Security” by DevCan, 2009-2015) | - Independent policy reviews (IAR and DPR)  
- Currently no foreign policy review underway  
- $15 million commitment to OHRFI by Liberal government40  
- Heads of mission include promotion of HR, freedoms, and inclusion in core objectives and commitments41  
- Peacekeeping operations (see above) |
| **Maternal and Newborn Health** | - Previous Conservative government priority  
- Need to refocus and put measurable goals in place42 | - $76 million contribution to UN Population Fund  
- $5 million contribution for contraceptives43 |
Interests and Values

Canadians value inclusive and accountable governance, environmental responsibility, respect for HR and diversity, and view Canada as a generous nation to the world. Canadians have also historically viewed Canada as a champion of HR through peacekeeping efforts, which appears to still hold true. The current government has highlighted that a clear mandate for the advancement of HR is critical for Canada’s re-engagement with the UN. Current HR policy priorities and promoting Canadian interests and values should lead the current government to pursue these goals:

Goals and Objectives

Goal 1: Create a cohesive HR policy strategy which could facilitate a consistent approach to promoting international HR

Goal 2: Re-establish a global presence as a champion of HR, both domestically and internationally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Stakeholders</th>
<th>Strategic Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Government of Canada | - Committed to promote greater international peace and HR, as historically supported by Canadian public48  
- Committed to renew Canada’s duty to UN peacekeeping operations and support rights of women and girls49 |
| Federal Departments / Offices Dev-Can / GAC / DND / OHRFI | - Greater coordination of departments to meet joint interests  
- Increased funding in projects  
- Greater international recognition |
| Minister of International Development | - Mandated to work with the Minister of Foreign Affairs  
- Priorities presented are consistent with Minister’s overarching goal for the provision of humanitarian assistance50 |
| Minister of National Defence | - Mandated to work with the Minister of Foreign Affairs  
- Supports commitment to UN peace operations51  
- Opportunity for greater HR promotion on the ground |
| Provinces | - Impacted by adoption of UN treaties by Federal Government and likely requires the introduction of provincial legislation |
| Canadian Armed Forces and Peacekeepers | - Responsible for the implementation of HR strategies abroad |
| Diasporas | - Most often the first respondents to humanitarian crises  
- Most connected to those experiencing HR violations; through family ties, in country of origin |
<p>| Indigenous Peoples | - Benefit from the adoption of UNDRIP |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allies</th>
<th>Strategic Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| UN     | - Increase number of signatories of treaties promoting HR and their peacekeeping operations  
        | - Greater inclusion of Canada as a historical leader in HR |
| Canadian HR Commission | - Support of HR internationally to lead to the further promotion of HR domestically |
| HR-oriented NGOs | - Would receive greater support and resources from Canada |
| Canadian Legal and Academic Community | - Domestic proponents of HR  
                                          | - Would encourage greater HR engagement |
| Traditional Ally Countries  
  Germany / France / Britain | - A stronger voice for Canada could help Canada’s allies be more effective as well, as seen with Canadian support for France’s initiative to reform UNSC’s intervention process52 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detractors</th>
<th>Strategic Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Countries which have not signed the ATT  
  Saudi Arabia / Russia | - Acceding to the ATT would impact future weapons transaction  
                          | - Increase pressure for non-signatories to sign |
| Private Sector | - May restrict transactions with countries / industries that do not adhere to the same treaties |

**Programmatic Needs**

- Streamline resources in GAC to support activities (such as UNSC seat bid) to re-establish and strengthen Canada’s position at the UN  
- Coordinate an overarching HR policy strategy to ensure consistent HR language and focus across government departments  
- Ensure key departments have adequate resources and appropriate language and policy to address HR challenges in areas of Canadian intervention, especially for peacekeeping missions and genocide prevention, particularly in DND  
- Continued and stable financing of OHRFI with a reworking of its mandate to reflect its position as a coordinating body

Calgarians at the Woman’s March in January 2017.  
via Wikimedia Commons user JMacPherson
To address these programmatic needs and for the Liberal government to bring about its own initiatives and introduce its own HR efforts, there are several options for consideration by the Canadian government. The following table outlines three options.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPTION 1 (Status Quo)</th>
<th>PRO</th>
<th>CON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Individual departmental reviews and guidelines will shape HR policy at each department: Dev-Can pursues objectives in many countries, GAC will strengthen Canada’s position at the UN and will work with DND on peacekeeping missions | - Peacekeeping is still a priority while Canada has impact in multiple countries through various means  
- GAC continues to strengthen Canada’s position at the UN with bid for the UNSC seat | - Individual efforts among departments may not impact root causes of radicalization and governance issues in fragile states  
- Receives continued criticism by international community for not signing UN treaties  
- Canadian HR policy foci subject to future political change |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPTION 2</th>
<th>PRO</th>
<th>CON</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Utilize OHRFI to support decisions for HR development assistance, GAC will strengthen Canada’s position at the UN and will work with DND on peacekeeping missions, with renewed focus on R2P | - Creates a HR-based approach to development in existing Dev-Can countries of priority  
- Canada still working to strengthen its position at the UN and fulfilling its commitment to provide funding and troops to peacekeeping  
- Creates consistent approach to development assistance | - Requires additional resources from within GAC and other departments to support OHRFI policy activities  
- Dev-Can is not effectively integrated to address HR challenges in fragile states where Canada will intervene  
- Canadian HR policy foci subject to some change with politics |
Utilize OHRFI as an interdepartmental coordinating body, create an overarching HR policy strategy for government (particularly for Dev-Can, GAC, and DND) while strengthening coordination on UN peacekeeping missions and use a whole-of-government approach to advance HR agenda at the UN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPTION 3 PRO</th>
<th>CON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Contributes to Canada’s leadership role in HR through traditional means at UN</td>
<td>- Requires more resources from within GAC and other departments to support OHRFI policy activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Creates more coordinated approach in HR policy by bringing government departments together</td>
<td>- Requires higher budget envelopes for coordination and peacekeeping activities to address HR issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ensures a whole-of-government approach to peacekeeping and R2P consistent with Canadian values, particularly in fragile areas</td>
<td>- May require a shift in funding away from previous Dev-Can countries of focus to countries where Canadians are conducting peacekeeping missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consistent approach to HR across departments originating from the OHRFI to reduce variability with future political changes</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

While all three options encourage Canada as a champion of global HR, the third option is the most comprehensive and coordinated approach to ensure the establishment of a HR policy agenda that promotes Canadian values with maximum impact, realized through the following three recommendations.

The Human Rights and Alliance of Civilizations Room of the Palace of Nations, Geneva, the meeting room of the United Nations Human Rights Council. via Wikimedia Commons user Ludovic Courtès
**Recommendations**

**Redefine OHRFI as a coordinating body to create and implement an overarching international HR policy strategy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Current amount dedicated to OHRFI is up to $15 million(^\text{53})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Could require added staff from within GAC: currently 32 staff mostly devoted to policy(^\text{54})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Will require staff and perhaps additional resources from other departments to support and coordinate with OHRFI</td>
</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Introduce new OHRFI mandate to reflect role as interdepartmental coordinating body while maintaining its focus on inclusion and religious freedom, democracy and HR(^\text{55})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Create governance committee (Committee on International HR Implementation Strategy, CIHRIS) to implement new strategy for international HR overseen by OHRFI with Dev-Can, GAC, DND and the Department of Justice Canada (DJC), with other departments represented when specific issues fall under their portfolios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Utilize these foci, OHRFI network and policy expertise to draft an overarching HR policy strategy for whole-of-government</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Announcement of broader mandate for OHRFI in Spring 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strategy consultation with timeline for IAR and DPR: 3 – 4 months in Spring 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assemble the strategy: 3 – 4 months (Summer – Fall 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Announce strategy and begin implementation in Fall 2017 or Winter 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ongoing implementation within departments guided by bi-monthly meetings of the CIHRIS</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Communicate with all departments the need for a coordinated HR policy strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Communicate with Canadian public the whole-of-government approach to HR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Communicate with key allies on new strategy and examine their government strategy and apparatus</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- OHRFI is well-positioned and well-equipped to develop and oversee strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Overarching strategy will provide consistent foci and HR language across government departments with shared priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Specific coordinated efforts, such as peacekeeping missions, will be governed and supported by a HR agenda which guides all government departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Heads of mission and permanent representatives to the UN would be guided by a clear strategy which would support their efforts to promote HR</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Follow On</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Measure degree to which the CIHRIS’ member departments have implemented recommended reforms through reporting mechanisms within the CIHRIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Institute annual review process by OHRFI to identify individual department progress of program implementation and to suggest additional areas of improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- OHRFI to identify any effective new channels of communication and cooperation between departments and work to institutionalize them into the interdepartmental structure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Increase resources for coordination and communication between key departments (Dev-Can, GAC, and DND) on peacekeeping missions and appoint an R2P Focal Point

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Cost</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Already committed $450 million, 600 troops, and 150 police officers to peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- GAC will likely have to shift resources within the department for increased coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Dev-Can may have to shift funding from certain countries of focus to countries where there are Canadian peacekeeping efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Introduction of R2P Focal Point within OHRF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Implementation</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Commit to specific UN missions (for example Mali, as it is already a country of focus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ensure that peacekeepers are fully trained and aware of Canada’s HR agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Utilize Dev-Can funding and networks, and Canada’s peacekeepers on the ground to provide innovative solutions to HR challenges (gender equality, democracy, governance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Announce support for establishment of UN’s investigative body for HR violations of UN peacekeepers and trust fund to support victim services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Create R2P Focal Point position and office within OHRF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Timeline</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Peacekeeping missions expected to be announced by the end of the year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Appoint R2P Focal Point in Spring 2017 in federal budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- DND, GAC and Dev-Can will coordinate on the ground resources (peacekeepers, NGO networks, etc.) through the CIHRIS to develop innovative solutions for HR challenges in selected countries, starting in Fall 2017 or Winter 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Communication</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Communicate to and between Dev-Can, GAC, and DND to address HR challenges and development in conflict zones and fragile states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Communication of new HR approach based on traditional Canadian values to the Canadian public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Communication of new focus to key allies, UN headquarters and countries who supply peacekeepers to the same UN missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Communication of new R2P Focal Point in Budget 2017 announcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Communicate to public and UN of support for investigative body and trust fund for victims</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Expected Impacts</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Greater impact on peacekeeping missions to address root causes of instability and conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Capacity building, especially of governance structures, will be strengthened by a more coordinated approach with Dev-Can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Greater advocacy and focus of R2P in Canadian foreign policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Follow On</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Use Dev-Can review structure to measure success of peacekeeping missions related to HR development goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- OHRF to synthesize input from key departments and guide departments’ successive actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Review Canada’s contribution the Global Network of R2P Focal Points, as seen in their respective reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Utilize the whole-of-government approach to strengthen Canada’s position at the UN and ensure proper adoption of HR provisions under UN treaties both domestically and internationally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Included in OHRFI’s budget to support permanent representatives to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cost of Canada’s bid for a UNSC seat (cost roughly $10 million in 1999 – 2000)62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consider signing final two HR treaties (ICMW and CPED; see Appendix 1) through the lens of the new overarching HR policy strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Ongoing support from OHRFI for permanent representatives for the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Utilize expertise, networks and CIHRIS in the OHRFI to examine HR treaties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Continuously strengthen HR policy and agenda through OHRFI and coordinated peacekeeping efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Focus resources within GAC and DJC to examine final two HR treaties and implications for signature by Fall 2017 or Winter 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Potential signature accession before 2020 (prior to 2021 bid for UNSC seat)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Communication channels created between permanent representatives and expertise in OHRFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Communicate to GAC and DJC establishing division of labour to examine treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Communicate with key stakeholders, allies, and non-signatory countries whether Canada should move forward with the signature for either HR treaty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected Impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Increased focus on HR agenda at the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Signing UN HR treaties would impact our relationships with countries that are parties and non-parties to these treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Increased presence and influence at the UN and chances of winning bid for UNSC in 2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Follow On</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Signature and ongoing implementation of ICMW, CPED, UNDRIP and ATT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- UN representatives would prepare biannual reports for the Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding progress on the HR agenda at the UN and Canada’s contributions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This review is intended for the Honourable Ralph Goodale, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. Its goal is to understand and address the threat that terrorism poses to Canadian society, citizens, values, and national interests. It assesses past policy and works to update Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy. This review acknowledges and aims to confront three central problems:

• The threat of domestic radicalization to violence;
• Returning Canadian fighters from Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere; and the
• Overreliance on hard security measures to the detriment of Canadian values.

To address these issues, this policy review advances four principal recommendations:

• Enhancing the Office of Community Outreach to meaningfully engage with key constituencies and community leaders;
• Resettling and reintegrating returning fighters, in part through the Office of Community Outreach;
• Funding policy-oriented research; and
• Supporting the amendment of C-51 and adoption of C-22;

These recommendations shift policy by addressing terrorism at its social roots. It works to halt radicalization to violence, reintegrate and rehabilitate returning fighters, shifting the focus from disrupting terrorism near its violent end to reducing the factors which support its emergence. The recommendations, restrain, but do not eliminate, Canada’s domestic security, intelligence, and law enforcement capacities. Areas unaddressed in the review should be maintained, such as Canada’s international posture relating to countering terrorism including intelligence sharing, international capacity building programs and operations with key allies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
<td>CBSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms</td>
<td>CCRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Security and Intelligence Service</td>
<td>CSIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Affairs Canada</td>
<td>GAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Community Outreach and Counter-Radicalization Coordinator</td>
<td>Office of Community Outreach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Safety Canada</td>
<td>PSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
<td>RCMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization to Violence</td>
<td>R2V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fundamentally, terrorism challenges the Canadian government to maintain a prosperous and free society while maintaining its security. This challenge emerges from four central problems:

- Attacks and direction for attacks by international terrorist organizations.
- Domestic radicalization to violence.
- The return of individuals who have engaged in violent conflict abroad.
- Promoting security measures to the detriment of Canadian values, rights, freedoms, and community engagement.

The September 11th attacks were a turning point for Canada’s terrorism policies, directly resulting in Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, and the expansion of powers for CSIS and the RCMP through the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act. Shortly after, Prime Minister Martin’s 2004 Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy and 2005 A Role of Pride and Influence oriented Canadian terrorism policy towards international terrorism and contributions to NATO, the UN, the G8, and Canada’s alliance with the U.S. Domestic terrorism was only lightly included by creating the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security.

In 2013, the Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy outlined Canada’s first counter-terrorism policy. It affirmed the international terrorist threat and highlighted preventing, detecting, denying, and responding to domestic terrorism. This policy was bolstered by the 2013 Combating Terrorism Act, which renewed provisions of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act, making joining or training with a terrorist organization unlawful, and increasing sentences for harbouring suspected terrorists.

In 2014, separate domestically radicalized terrorist attacks killed three Canadians. Shortly after, Canada began participating in the aerial bombardment of the Islamic State, and passed the 2015 Anti-Terrorism Act (C-51). C-51 created extensive new powers for intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies, most notably, CSIS. The Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act, passed in the month before the 2015 election, increased the powers of CSIS by authorizing it to act outside of Canada, even in contravention of the law of other states.
The new Liberal government has yet to articulate a comprehensive strategy for addressing terrorism. However, initial discussion indicates a movement towards a mixed focus on the root causes of terrorism and law enforcement measures to counter terrorism.

### Liberal Government: New and Continued Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shift from Security Focus</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Office of the Community Outreach</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation of $35 million over 5 years to coordinate responses to R2V, support community outreach, and relevant research.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **RCMP Terrorism Prevention Program** |
| Raises awareness among Canadians about radicalization to violence and provide training to police officers, community leaders, and families. |

| **Promised Amendments to C-5117** |
| Commitment to re-balance security with the rights and freedoms of Canadian citizens. |

| **Bill C-22 in Parliament** |
| A bill to provide a Parliamentary oversight mechanism in the area of national security. |

### International Initiatives

| Continuing: Counter-terrorism Capacity Building |
| Build capacity of selected governments in the Sahel region, including policing and counterterrorism.18 |

| Middle East Counter-Terrorism Assistance: Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon |
| Refocusing Canada’s mission from aerial bombardment to training, advising, and assisting local security forces, assisting in building resilience, development, humanitarian aid, and stabilization.19 |

| Continuing: Intelligence Cooperation with the U.S., NATO, and 5-Eyes |
| Sharing intelligence related to terrorist threats. |

| Continuing: Multilateral Engagement |
| Engaging internationally to address terrorist financing, intelligence sharing, and controlling arms and weapons of mass destruction.20 |

### Understanding Terrorism and Radicalization

| **Office of Community Outreach** |
| Replacing the Kanishka Project to include research on terrorism and radicalization.21 |

| Continuing: Cross Cultural Roundtable on National Security |
| Bringing community leaders together to discuss national security with a focus on radicalization.22 |
Policy Constraints

Terrorism policy in Canada is shaped by the following constraints.

Canada’s Relationship with the US and International Community

The U.S.-Canada relationship is central to the Canadian economy and foreign policy. This relationship depends on allaying American fears that Canada may become an entrance point for terrorists. As such, robust border and airport security must remain a cornerstone of Canada’s terrorism policy. Similarly, terrorism policies must consider Canada’s relationship with NATO and the UN. Terrorism policies should not reduce Canada’s relevance or be counterproductive to other government objectives.

Canadian Values

Policies addressing terrorism must be consistent with Canadian values. These include multiculturalism, rule of law, democracy, equality, liberty, and the CCRF. These form the core of Canada’s social fabric and are integral to maintaining just and workable intercommunity relationships.

Limited Resources and Planned Budget Cuts

Resources are limited among Canadian agencies and departments dealing with terrorism. In particular, the CSIS budget is projected to be reduced by 24.5 million in 2014-2015. The RCMP budget is projected to remain stable at approximately $2.8 billion until 2018. Furthermore, PSC will reduce funding for National Security by approximately 9 percent between 2016-2018.
Indicators

The following indicators present the nature of the terrorist threat to Canada, outline policy gaps and issues, and suggest areas which can be better addressed.

Origins and Incident of Terrorism

Since the 1960’s, when terrorism in Canada peaked, there have been 1,170 terrorist incidents relating to Canadians at home and abroad, leading to 405 fatalities (See Figure 1 for a trend line of terrorist incidence relating to Canadians).27 Analyzing events after 1990 reveals an average yearly terrorism incidence of 2 events, with a death toll of 0.34 per year.28

This may indicate either a low threat level or a security apparatus capable of thwarting an expansive threat. Since 2002, there have been 20 convictions for terrorism offences and 21 additional charges awaiting trial.29 This provides limited insight, as the nature and severity of these cases is unknown and data is limited or not available to the public. Nonetheless, it is informative to note that terrorism rarely impacts the lives of Canadians, and, according to the Global Terrorist Index, the terrorism threat in Canada is less than in countries such as U.S., France, Australia, and even Finland.30

When terrorists have killed or injured people in Canada they were not directed or conducted by international terrorist organizations.31 The principle terrorist threat to Canada is radicalization to violence (R2V) among Canadian citizens and residents.32 These individuals are not simply victims of terrorist propaganda. Rather, R2V occurs among individuals who are marginalized, have mental health and addiction issues, and live in poverty.33 Though targeting all root causes is impractical, addressing central components, such as social marginalization, has proven valuable.34

Figure 1: Terrorism Incidents Relating to Canadians Since 1960

(CIDB, Descriptive Analysis, 3.)
Returning Canadian Foreign Fighters

In total, 180 Canadians have gone to fight for the Islamic State and other groups. Approximately 60 have returned. These fighters may have undergone training that enhances their threat to Canadian security. However, this threat should not be exaggerated (See Figure 2 for factors which reduce the threat of returning fighters). Many fighters will die, or refuse to return. Furthermore, not all returning fighters travelled abroad to identify with a certain ideology. Many left to aid the Syrian people or fight the Assad regime, for example.

Currently, policy related to returning fighters is limited primarily to their surveillance. This requires significant resources, does little to reintegrate fighters into Canadian society, and fails to utilize the counter-radicalization resource their narratives and stories present. Furthermore, monitoring alone may provoke suspicion, alienation, and radicalization in the individual, and their community.

Imbalance Between Security and Canadian Values, Rights, and Liberties

C-51 provides sweeping powers of disruption, information collection, sharing, and storage, that may conflict with the values, rights, and privacy of Canadians. Further, its expanded definition of terrorism-related acts has criminalized some forms of expression. Disruption powers have moved CSIS from an intelligence to a security organization without additional democratic oversight, this is a concern for democratic values.
Security Focus over Community Engagement

Terrorists do not emerge in a vacuum, they are embedded in wider constituencies. Research suggests that engaging in conciliatory policy paths towards these wider constituencies works to limit R2V.45 This research, and the policy shifts of other states,46 show that there is counterterrorism value to community engagement47 and that “overreaction by the government and security services can actually increase the risk and the appeal of a violent ideology”.48 However, Canada has primarily engaged in ‘repressive’ measures against wider constituencies (See Figure 3). Surveys indicate that Canada has lacked significant community engagement. Canadian Muslims, for example, report a lack of community engagement and a fear of CSIS and the RCMP.49 These communities also report that the emphasis on security measures has led non-Muslim Canadians to perceive them through a securitized lens.50 This compounds social isolation, aggravates R2V and discourages cooperation between communities and the government.51

Canada’s central goal relating to terrorism is to secure Canada’s people and critical infrastructure, while maintaining a prosperous society which protects Canadian values, rights, and freedoms. This goal is facilitated by the following objectives:

Figure 3: ‘Conciliatory’ and ‘Repressive’ Actions by the Canadian Government Towards Four Communities
Goals and Objectives

1. Preventing, detecting, denying, and responding to R2V and terrorist attacks.
2. Reducing the threat of returning fighters and individuals who have been radicalized.
3. Balancing Canada’s security measures with Canadian values and civil liberties.

Values and Interests

These goals and objectives must be consistent with the CCRF and Canadian values of multiculturalism, the rule of law, and democracy. These values form the core of Canadian government, culture, and society and must be the foundation for any counter-terrorism policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government Departments and Agencies</td>
<td>Directly relevant to Canada’s terrorism policy: PSC, CSIS, RCMP, CBSA, GAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial and Territorial Governments</td>
<td>Have a stake in countering terrorism and R2V in the same manner as the federal government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
<td>Have an interest in the laws and policies which affect the rights and freedoms of Canadians and special interest groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Citizens</td>
<td>Interest in security, privacy, civil-rights and liberties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Allies and Detractors

Allies

There are numerous allies who may support the proposed objectives. Provincial, territorial, and municipal governments would support counterterrorism goals that contribute to the security of their constituents. Furthermore, human rights groups, community interest groups, and law societies are likely to support balancing security concerns with Canadian values, rights, and liberties. Many Canadians will support a terrorism policy that ensures security while protecting their values, rights, and liberties.
Detractors

Detractors may include organizations oriented towards a security response to terrorism. In particular, CSIS and the RCMP may disagree with the reorientation of policies away from hard security approaches. Similarly, citizen supporters of ‘hard’ security may object to ‘soft’ policies on terrorism and radicalization.

Programmatic Needs

Facilitating cooperation between stakeholders will be central to the success of the programs. The combined efforts of the various listed organizations are essential to addressing the complex and multilayered threat of terrorism. This cooperation is particularly important between government agencies and civil society organizations.

Nonetheless, the programmatic needs beyond cooperation are modest. Each goal can be achieved within existing departments and institutions and without dramatic requirements to resource allocation.
The following costed options assess two potential policy branches which could be employed to meet the goals and objectives listed above.

**Option 1: Criminality Policy Framework**
Terrorism could be understood primarily as a criminal threat. This policy direction would call for powerful and well-resourced intelligence and law enforcement agencies undertaking heavy surveillance, monitoring, and disruption activities. It would limit some of the security and intelligence apparatus' more controversial powers, so long as limitations are counterbalanced by increased resources. Thus, such a policy orientation would rely on strong law enforcement measures which are consistent with a basic interpretation of Canadian values.

**Pros:** Provides a ‘hard’ stance in line with many perceptions of terrorism as a security issue. Provides ample resources for monitoring, controlling, disrupting, and arresting those suspected of R2V and terrorism, individually and in groups.

**Cons:** The focus on security through law enforcement and intelligence ignores the root causes of R2V and may push individuals and communities away from interacting with the government for fear of directly involving law enforcement. This policy orientation may conflict with a broad understanding of Canadian values and would require a significant resource injection into CSIS and the RCMP to counterbalance a reduction of powers.

**Option 2: Social Health Policy Focus**
Terrorism could be understood as a social health issue which is best at its root causes. This focus would engage communities and organizations beyond a law enforcement capacity. It would seek to address the root influences driving R2V, such as isolation, marginalization, poverty, and mental health issues. By fostering community engagement it would work to not only reduce the driving forces of R2V but also create a system of trust which would facilitate the flow of information between communities and the government concerning potential threats.

**Pros:** In comparison to a hard security approach there is little conflict with Canadian values and the CCRF. These policies focus on long term reduction of terrorism by addressing important root influences, rather than working to simply constrain the incidence of terrorism.

**Cons:** The social health approach risks the perception of being ‘soft’ on terrorism. The public may be disinclined to provide community supports for potentially radicalized individuals. There may be a time lag in which hard security measures have been reduced but community engagement programming has yet to take effect.
Recommendations

This review supports a synthesis of the two costed options, with a focus on the social health policy. This decision to synthesize the two options works to account for the limited, but real, terrorist threat, the benefits of community engagement, and importance of Canadian values. It maintains Canada’s key intelligence and security capabilities while dismantling controversial elements. The following section provides concrete policy proposals directed towards implementing this synthesis.

Enhancing the Office of Community Outreach

Adopt a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to the Office of the Community Outreach to facilitate cooperation among key stakeholders. Enhancing the counter-radicalization potential of the Office of Community Outreach by separating it from the control of the security apparatus. The RCMP should be retained as an active partner in order to facilitate positive interactions between law enforcement and communities, but the Office should be controlled by a broader committee. The focus would be on coordinating counter-radicalization programming, community outreach, and providing non-law enforcement supports and services. This should include engaging with community leaders as ‘gate-keepers’ who can assist in identifying and enrolling ‘at risk’ individuals in counter-radicalization and community engagement programming. Funding will be provided to create programs for engaging meaningfully with vulnerable communities and organizations, fostering two-way flows of information and trust. (See Appendix A for counterterrorism studies from the U.K., Appendix B for de-radicalization in Sri Lanka, and Appendix C for community engagement with Canada’s Tamil diaspora).

Timeline: Spring of 2017 to appoint lead committee. Fall of 2017 to compile best practices and begin programming. Annual reports to assess success and implement changes as necessary.

Implementation: Appoint a committee composed of members from the RCMP, Department of Canadian Heritage, Immigration, Citizenship, and Refugees Canada, members of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, and other community leaders to oversee the Office and create and coordinate programming.

Cost: Provide additional funding to the Office of Community Outreach. More funding would enhance the capacity for engagement.

Follow on: The Office of Community Outreach will collect feedback from community members and leaders, trends in participation, and survey attendees to discuss the program’s impact, value, and potential changes. This will form the basis for policy input and innovation on programming.

Expected Impact: Fostering trust between communities and the Canadian government by distancing the security apparatus but including positive law enforcement participation. Increased community, organizational, and individual utilization of counter-radicalization programming and support, enhanced information flows between government and community, and reduced need for law enforcement intervention.
Resettling and Reintegrating Returning Fighters
Create a formal, rules-based, system undertaken by CSIS, the RCMP, and the Office of Community Outreach by which returning Canadian fighters can be resettled and reintegrated into society. This would include interviews and assessments for individual threat level. If necessary, legal prosecution or rehabilitation and reintegration programs can be undertaken. These rehabilitation and reintegration programs can be operated by the Office of Community Outreach and may be modeled off similar municipal initiatives in Aarhus, Denmark and Montreal.55 (See Appendix B for de-radicalization in Sri Lanka, and Appendix D for counter-radicalization utilizing former fighters in Northern Ireland).

Timeline: Spring of 2017 to begin assessment of returned fighters. Summer of 2017 to identify individuals suitable and willing to engage in counter-radicalization programming. Winter of 2017 to engage returned fighters in de-radicalization and reintegration through the Office of Community Outreach.

Cost: Costs are uncertain. The main cost will involve creating an organization to facilitate the resettlement and reintegration of returning fighters. This may in part be achieved through the enhanced Office of Community Outreach.

Implementation: Link CSIS, the RCMP, and the Office of Community Outreach to coordinate intelligence and policies relevant to returning fighters. This will require creating a joint committee with the responsibility for overseeing inter-departmental coordination of resettlement, counter-radicalization, and assessment programs to determine de-radicalization progress.

Follow on: The success of this initiative can be determined through the number of foreign fighters that have been assessed and enrolled in programs for de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration. Long-term success can be determined by the successful reintegration of individual fighters as ascertained by bi-annual reports.

Expected Impact: The orderly and predictable assessment, resettlement, de-radicalization, and reintegration of Canadians previously engaged in conflicts abroad. From these programs, it is expected that the threat former fighters pose will be reduced, and intelligence on the conflicts and useful testimonies for counter-radicalization initiatives will emerge.

Funding Policy-Oriented Research
Terrorism is a dynamic issue which is constantly evolving. Yet, evidence-based research on which to base policies currently, and in the future, is lacking. Research funding concerning radicalization, terrorism, and emerging issues is necessary to create evidence-based policy.56

Timeline: Funding could be announced in the next available budget.

Implementation: Provide funding to enhance research. In particular, the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security could create a Research Committee consisting of academics, government officials, community leaders, and other professionals.

Cost: Based on Kanishka Project, 10 million dollars over 5 years.

Follow on: Annual assessment of the number and quality of reports that discuss policy for countering radicalization to violence. Assessment of quality can derive from feedback by academics within the broader field of counter radicalization.

Expected Impact: Innovation in the area of understanding and responding to radicalization and terrorism with a focus on evidence-based research and its policy implications.
Supporting the Amendment of C-51 and the Passage of C-22

To support the amendment of C-51 to focus its definition of terrorist acts, particularly concerning advocating and promoting commission of terrorist offences and the definition of terrorist propaganda, and reviewing and clarifying controversial aspects such as disruption powers, peace bonds, and secret warrants. Also, support the passage of C-22 to ensure sufficient democratic oversight of the security and intelligence apparatus.

**Timeline:** Summer, 2017

**Implementation:** Publicly support the amendment of C-51 and the adoption of C-22.

**Cost:** No additional costs, amendments are promised by Liberal government.

**Follow on:** Track the speed of government progress on reviewing, assessing, and potentially amending C-51 and legislation concerning the definition of terrorism. Provide public support for the adoption of C-22.

**Expected Impact:** Progression towards an appropriate balance between the need for security and consistency with Canadian values, rights, freedoms and democratic oversight.

**Communication Strategies**

There will need to be specific communication strategies for two audiences. First, the U.S. will need to be convinced that the shift will neither reduce border and airport security, nor limit Canadian engagement in American and NATO missions. Second, the Canadian public will need to be persuaded that the proposed policies emerge from Canadian values, rights and liberties, and that such options address the social roots of terrorism rather than working to only address its symptoms.

These communication strategies require backgrounders, policy papers, and similar documents by the Minister of Public Safety. Efforts will need to include a media strategy to address press coverage the shift may receive. The Minister will need to ensure that relevant departments engage with the policy and rhetorical shift which surround the new policy orientation.
Canada faces new and emerging challenges in the Arctic Regions. The Department of National Defence must devise a strategy to meet these needs and address current gaps in defense assets and capabilities. Control and surveillance of the Arctic regions remains critical to the mandate of DND and the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty. Canada’s current domestic deployments, as well as ongoing multilateral engagement, have supported Canada’s operations and capabilities in the Arctic to date. However, increased international interest in the Arctic, due to climate change and increased access to Canada’s waterways, suggest that increased attention and investment in this theatre is warranted. As climate change makes the Arctic more accessible, there will be greatly increased demands on Canadian sovereignty. This is a problem that Canada can solve now before it becomes too difficult to solve later.

In order to meet the Government of Canada’s priorities in this regard, this document recommends an augmented Arctic defence strategy, including new resource commitments. Canada should immediately pursue a significant expansion of sea, air, land, and ISR capabilities in Canada’s Arctic regions. The expansion of Canada’s Arctic capabilities will better assert Canadian sovereignty in the North, contribute to shared defence commitments with our allies, and benefit local communities now and in the future.
DND – Department of National Defence
NORAD – North American Aerospace Defence Command
CAF – Canadian Armed Forces
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
DART—Disaster Assistance Response Team
SAR—Search and Rescue
GOC – Government of Canada
CSIS – Canadian Security Intelligence Service
GAC – Global Affairs Canada
DFO – Department of Fisheries and Oceans
CRPG – Canadian Ranger Patrol Group
NSPS – National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy
RADARSAT – Radar and Satellite
CCGS – Canadian Coast Guard Ship
MIL – Military
ISR – Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
PCO – Privy Council Office
PMO - Prime Minister’s Office

The Fourth Joint Mission to Map the Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean by Canada and the US in 2011.
via Flickr user U.S. Department of State
PART 1: HISTORY AND POLICY PROCESS

Problems Facing the Nation

ISSUE

Canada faces new and emerging challenges in its Arctic Regions. The Department of National Defence should devise a strategy to meet these needs in the areas of procurement, and enhanced domestic operations.

RATIONALE

Control and surveillance of Canada's Arctic regions remains critical to the mandate of DND and the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty. Canada's current domestic deployments, as well as ongoing engagement through NORAD, have supported Canada's operations and capabilities in the Arctic to date.

However, forthcoming increased international interest in the Arctic, due to climate change and therefore increased access to Canada's waterways, suggest that increased attention and investment in this theatre is warranted; i.e. as access to the Arctic becomes easier, there will be many more attempts to enter Canadian territory for shipping, tourism and resource exploration. Recent Russian activity in the Arctic further underscores the growing significance of this region in Canada's broader Defence engagement.

BACKGROUND

The world grows more complicated, and as political alliances change their character with major partners adopting new stances on previous positions, Canada must prove its dedication to causes and challenges that are shared amongst its allies. This policy review selects a specific theatre for consideration: the Arctic.

There are two reasons why the Arctic is crucial to Canada's defence policy. As per Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's Mandate Letter to Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan, the Defence Minister is expected to renew Canada's focus on surveillance and control of Canadian territory, especially with regard to the Arctic.

As well, considering the effects of global warming - receding sea ice and more open and accessible Arctic ocean waters, this poses a threat to Canadian Arctic sovereignty, especially with regards to the Northwest Passage, which most other countries consider international waters. In addition, there are numerous resources, such as oil that Canada has yet to mine. Claiming and defending all of this speaks to the issue of continental defence.
The Arctic is a theatre that highlights another challenge facing Canada: bi- and multilateral relations. Through organizations such the Arctic Council, NATO and NORAD there are many facets of international relations that affect the status of the Arctic and Canada’s engagement in resolving outstanding claims to territory.
These are issues for which immediate action must be taken in order to secure long-term goals. With prescriptive and forward-looking action these challenges can be solved before they become more serious and pressing problems.

**Box 1: Facets of Arctic Interaction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHALLENGE</th>
<th>FACETS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercontinental Defence</td>
<td>Control of the Northwest Passage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resource Control and Extraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surveillance of the Arctic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral and Multilateral Relations</td>
<td>NORAD, partnership with United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arctic Council (United States, Russia Norway, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland) + Observers (China, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, India, Japan, Italy, South Korea, Netherlands, Singapore, Poland)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PAST POLICY AND CRITICAL DECISIVE MOMENTS

Canada’s interaction with the Arctic predates 1867. This section therefore provides only the relevant policy events for a modern understanding of the Arctic.

Cold War: *Militarization of the Arctic*
- NATO founded in 1949
- NORAD founded in 1958
- Many early warning systems, submarine activity, ICBMs and long-range bombers, interceptor jet aircraft constantly on standby

Post-Cold War: *Demilitarization of the Arctic*
- Refocusing of priorities away from the Arctic
- Many military installations reduced or removed
- Arctic was demilitarized as funding and focus went to other theatres and threats.

After the Cold War the Arctic was often ignored. It was, and remains a less important area for consideration.

Modern Era: *Refocusing on the Arctic with the Canada First Defence Strategy (relevant portions for the Arctic)*
- Conduct daily domestic and continental operations in the Arctic through NORAD
- Recognition that changing weather patterns are altering the environment, making it more accessible to sea traffic and economic activity
- Retreating ice cover brings increased shipping, tourism and resource exploration
- Potential increase in illegal activity, with implications for sovereignty and security, potentially a requirement for additional military support
- Canada must be able to patrol and defend the airspace of the Arctic, with fighter aircraft and patrol aircraft

It is only with the Canada First Defence Strategy that the Canadian government in recent years has begun to once again pay attention to the Arctic. Far from the militarization that it once encouraged, the Arctic is now regarded as an area where rich deposits of resources are, and as an area where sovereignty must be exercised.

Box 2: Amended list of current Canadian operations in the Arctic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIMPID</td>
<td>Routine domestic surveillance mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NANOOK</td>
<td>Contribution to whole-of-government sovereignty patrols and security exercises usually held in the high and eastern Arctic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEVUS</td>
<td>Maintenance of communications facilities on Ellesmere Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUNALIVUT</td>
<td>Joint sovereignty patrols and security exercises in the high and central Arctic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUNAKPUT</td>
<td>Contribution to whole-of-government exercises emphasizing aid to law enforcement in the North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
<td>Contribution to integrated and coordinated aeronautical and maritime search and rescue services across Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations/current-list.page#details-panel-1424977816603-1
TRENDS IN POLICY, CONSTRAINTS, AND INDICATORS

CURRENT OPERATIONS IN THE ARCTIC

Operations LIMPID, NANOOK, NUNALIVUT and NUNAKPUT are exercises in sovereignty, in defending and patrolling the Canadian Arctic. These are relevant to the sovereignty over the North and are consistent with NORAD and NATO.

GAPS THAT REMAIN

Current operations do not include actions significant enough to maintain complete sovereignty over the Arctic in the coming years. Even with current operations the Arctic will remain an area of contention. There are several gaps that remain:

• A consistent Arctic policy within NATO; Canada stresses that any Arctic operations with allies are ‘bilateral’
• Unresolved claims about the Northwest Passage
• Procurement for Arctic-capable patrol and combat aircraft
• Strategy for adapting to environmental changes and receding ice

Constraints:

• Budget: providing needed materiel and programs will be expensive
• Continued public interest and allowance for defence spending, especially in the Arctic
• Intractability of territorial claims by the United States, Denmark and Russia

Indicators:

• Purchase of new, Arctic-capable fighter aircraft and non-combat patrol aircraft
• Continuing and constant patrols and operations in the North
• Unquestioned sovereignty over the Northwest Passage

THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE

The Northwest Passage is an area of contention between Canada and other states. Several, including the United States, believe that it should be an ‘international strait’ whereas Canada believes it to be internal waters.
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Going forward, Canada’s defence strategy should aim to both remedy existing shortcomings and provide a proactive approach to address emerging threats. Canada has a responsibility to meet this challenge in the most efficient way possible. Any shift in strategy must also reflect Canada’s commitments to its allies.

A) Strategic Objectives

i) Secure Canada’s Arctic territory
   • The climate is changing rapidly due to global warming. This will have far-reaching consequences in a number of areas that need to be addressed. Though the effects of many of these do not fall under the obvious mandate of DND, several of its smaller programs (DART, SAR) engage directly with the issues.
   • Ground thaw is predicted to disrupt existing infrastructure.4
   • Coastal communities may face increased risk of severe weather events.5
   • Receding ice provides increased access to resources.6
   • Traffic is predicted to dramatically increase in northern sea lanes. 7
   • Improved northern access could also be used by foreign military vessels or criminal organizations.8
   • Environmental damage is expected to occur as a result of these changing conditions.9

ii) Update Canada’s Aging Equipment
   • Canada’s current material assets are outdated or limited. The new policy seeks to address capability gaps in all branches of the Forces: land, sea and air.
   • Canada’s procurement system is also inefficient and wasteful. Where possible, Canada must prioritize revamping its current system to reduce costs, and explore novel strategies to fill gaps in defence assets in the short-term.10

B) Alliance Concerns

i) Demonstrate contribution to international security endeavours
   • The new strategy must demonstrate renewed commitment to continental defence to bolster our relationship with the United States.
   • Maintain or increase standing with other cooperative groups (e.g. NATO, Arctic Council).


via Flickr user Jim Mattis.
Box 3: Stakeholders Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Stakeholders</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Citizens</td>
<td>The primary goal of the CAF is to protect Canada and defend its sovereignty. It has a vested interest in ensuring these operations are effective and efficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Indigenous Groups</td>
<td>The Government of Canada will have to build and maintain working relationships with indigenous communities in order to enhance its capabilities on Canada's northern frontier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Defence Industry</td>
<td>The Canadian defence industry relies heavily on the GOC for business. Firms have a vested interest in the quality of the procurement system, as it affects their business.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Governmental Departments and Agencies</td>
<td>Government organizations like DND, CSIS, DFO and GAC all conduct work in our northern region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Stakeholders</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The United States</td>
<td>The United States has a clear interest in maintaining a strong, cooperative continental defence system, as demonstrated in their continued contributions to NORAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
<td>Members of NATO rely on each other for defence and aid in times of need. An increase in Canada’s capabilities adds to the strength of the alliance as a whole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arctic Council and Observer States (listed above)</td>
<td>The Arctic Council works to monitor and conserve the Arctic environment, respond to emergencies and advance sustainable development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ALLIES AND DETRACTORS

Allies

The Government of Canada can expect many of these stakeholders to support the proposed changes to the nation’s defence policy. The Trudeau Liberals campaigned on a promise of maintaining and gradually increasing defence spending, stating, “we will not let Canada's Armed Forces be shortchanged.”11 Furthermore, research has shown that standing up for Arctic sovereignty and the environment has historically been welcomed by voters and is also politically profitable.12 The current GOC can reasonably expect a positive response to the proposed expenditure from its constituents.

Additionally, Canada’s northern indigenous communities are especially well positioned to benefit from the increased investment in infrastructure. The need for new personnel will also provide economic opportunities to those who have been traditionally disadvantaged. Recent consultations have shown that indigenous communities favor a nation-to-nation approach to northern defence and welcome initiatives that benefit local communities and protect the environment.13

From a business standpoint, the Canadian defence industry could benefit enormously from changes to the procurement system. Recent industry participants in a defence consultation roundtable highlighted the problems in dealing with Canada’s convoluted procurement bureaucracy. A fair, open and transparent procurement process will allow firms to work more efficiently with the GOC and a clear national strategy will offer them the ability to anticipate needs and develop capabilities for the future.14

Increased spending will also reassure our international partners that we are committed to the defence or our own territory and maintaining our ability to contribute to shared security goals. In the last few years the U.S. administration admitted frustration with the ‘free rider’ phenomenon.15 Despite Canada’s history of contribution to global security, the newly elected administration has emphasized that allies must meet spending targets.16 Defence investment benefits Canada, and remedies this concern.

Lastly, any positive increase in Arctic engagement directly benefits the capabilities of the Arctic Council.

Detractors

Those with competing claims to the Arctic may object to an increased Canadian presence. The U.S. has historically objected to Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic. Other polar countries like Russia and Denmark have also objected in the past. They may do so again.
PROGRAMMATIC NEEDS

A) Fiscal Needs

Canada will need to commit sufficient resources to these problems in order to meet the nation’s objectives. The current administration has set aside $84.3 billion dollars for defense spending over the next 30 years. These funds are made available when key capital acquisitions need to be made. Though much of the funding is being held until 2020-2021, this plan may be altered depending on project schedules, however this may not be necessary.

Figure 3:

The above analysis has underlined the growing importance Canada’s Arctic regions to its broader continental defence posture, and to the maintenance of partnerships with key allies. Further, this document has outlined the need for an augmented Arctic strategy to meet key strategic objectives, in keeping with the mandate of DND set out by the GOC. Before advancing policy options for consideration, a short overview of ongoing procurement projects with direct application to Canada’s Arctic regions will be provided.
Box 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ONGOING ACTIONS</th>
<th>DETAILS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 5th generation fighter fleet procurement</td>
<td>Re-open competitive process for 5th generation fighter fleet.18 Finalize competitive process for sourcing of 17 fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft, ensuring delivery by 2023.19 Ensure scheduled completion of upgrades to CP-140 Aurora aircraft through the Aurora structural life extension project (ASLEP), and incremental modernization project (AIMP).20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Procure 17 fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Upgrade existing CP-140 Aurora Maritime Surveillance aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SEA:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Complete construction of the S.S. Diefenbaker (2022)</td>
<td>Construction of Canada’s first Polar Class Icebreaker, the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker by 2022. 21 Slated delivery of six ice-capable Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) (the first of which will be deployed 2018) to enable armed sea-borne surveillance of Canada’s waters, including the Arctic. 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Complete AOPS delivery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An August 2016 satellite image shows the Northwest Passage with an almost clear path of open water from the Amundsen Gulf to Baffin Bay, encountering a scattering of broken ice just east of Victoria Island. via Wikimedia commons user Jeff Schmaltz
POLICY OPTIONS

1) Moderate expansion of air and land capabilities in Canada’s Arctic regions

In order to address existing deficiencies in Canada’s Arctic defence posture, DND could pursue a moderate expansion of air and land capabilities. This would result in a marginal improvement in Canada’s ability to respond to critical incidents and activities of concern based on existing surveillance capabilities. Further, this strategy would help Canadian Rangers build capacity in circumpolar regions, and enhance ground-level operational familiarity.

**Policy Option 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIONS</th>
<th>DETAILS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pursue off-the-shelf procurement of twenty 4th generation fighter aircraft</td>
<td>Due to lengthy delays associated with 5th generation fighter procurement, Canada could immediately pursue off-the-shelf procurement of 4th generation aircraft to account for deficiencies in air capabilities until these aircraft are delivered. A small number of the selected aircraft would phase out existing CF-18 deployments in Canada’s north. Selected aircraft would play front-line multi-role capability, deployed from Forward Operating Locations at Inuvik, Yellowknife, Iqaluit, and Rankin Inlet to defend northern Canadian airspace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase 1CRPG reserves and enhance training and capacity building for Canadian Rangers</td>
<td>Increase size of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (Yellowknife) by 500 (to 2350). Improve training and capacity building of Canadian Rangers, including through regular CAF-1CRPG joint exercises.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Pro:** This strategy would enable DND to meet the goals listed in Minister Sajjan’s Mandate Letter. The GOC has stated that a competitive process for the replacement of Canada’s CF-18 fleet will be reopened, and has outlined that it will explore options besides the F-35 initially slated for purchase. Regardless of the eventual outcome of this process, timelines for this line of procurement remain uncertain. In the interim, Canada faces immediate capacity gaps in its air capabilities—including in its Arctic deployment—which could be adequately addressed through the immediate off-the-shelf purchase of a 4th generation aircraft to relieve and augment the CF-18 fleet. In the area of Canadian Ranger augmentation, while not drastically altering the strategic utility of 1CRPG, this strategy would allow DND to fulfill the plan laid out by the government of Canada in terms of quantitative increases. Improving training and capacity building for the Canadian rangers would help to complement reserves increases and past materiel upgrades with new skills-training, including through regular joint exercises with specialized CAF teams.
**Con:** The Canadian Rangers provide valuable ground-level awareness and local knowledge that can be brought to bear in surveillance operations. However, compared to other technologically advanced options for surveillance and response, expanding qualitative or quantitative capabilities of the Canadian rangers would yield relatively little strategic advantage.23

2) Incremental expansion of sea, air, land, and ISR capabilities in Canada’s Arctic Regions

In order to close identified gaps in Canada’s Arctic deployments and capabilities, DND could pursue an incremental expansion of sea, air, land and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. This option would enhance operational capabilities in the north, and would demonstrate Canadian improved leadership in this domain to key partners.

**Policy Option 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>DETAILS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **SEA:** | Immediately procure Large Polar Class Icebreaker  
-Pursue off-the-shelf procurement of 30 4th generation fighter |
| **AIR:** | Pursue off-the-shelf procurement of 30 4th generation fighter aircraft. A number of the selected aircraft would phase out and augment existing CF-18 deployments in Canada’s north (among other fronts). |
| **LAND:** | Increase size of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (Yellowknife) by 1000 (to 2850). Explore the creation of additional distinct Patrol Group Base in Canada’s Arctic region, and domestic rotation of CAF to this location. |
| **ISR:** | Support RADARSAT Constellation Mission  
-DND contribution to RADARSAT Constellation Mission, in partnership with the Canadian Space Agency. Guide application and integration of RADARSAT Constellation with DND Arctic surveillance priorities. |

**Pro:** This strategy would provide an incremental, medium-term plan to fill assessed gaps in Canada’s Arctic defence capabilities. In terms of Canada’s defence and surveillance footprint at sea, this approach would see the expedited purchase of a polar-class icebreaker to complement the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker (currently under construction), scheduled to join the fleet in 2022, barring further delays. Due to downturns in the global oil and gas industry, many used vessels are available at considerable savings. This approach would allow Canada to double its capacity in this area without further implicating the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, and would allow for short-term relief of CCGS Louis St. Laurent, which is nearing the end of its lifespan, and has periodically been taken out of commission for service with no replacement.

Given the likely cost-savings associated with Canada’s altered approach to 5th Generation fighter procurement, a larger purchase of thirty 4th generation aircraft would allow Canada to accelerate the phasing of its CF-18 fleet (and minimize associated upkeep costs), without greatly altering its
likely overall bottom-line. Exploring the potential establishment of a distinct Patrol Group Base in Canada’s Arctic region would help determine if an expanded footprint could augment the Rangers’ existing community-based approach. Finally, providing a DND financial contribution to the RADARSAT Constellation Mission at this early stage would ensure that the Department is able to best harness its military applications in ISR, particularly in regards to the satellite system’s unique capabilities in the Arctic.

**Con:** This option would introduce new resource commitments across Army, Navy, and Airforce branches of the CAF, imposing budgetary pressure and potential strain in other areas. Given the scale of these investments, this approach may garner criticism from the Canadian public. Improvement of Canada’s defence posture in the Arctic could also be perceived by some Arctic Council members and others as signaling increased competition in this region. Providing inter-departmental support to the RADARSAT Constellation Mission (led and administered by the Canadian Space Agency) may also raise concerns regarding inter-departmental control and trajectory of this mission.

3) **Review initiatives / Official Dialogue**

Not all of Canada’s current and anticipated challenges in its Artic regions can be solved by materiel improvements alone. First, Canada’s Arctic reorientation must be supported by an efficient, and competitive procurement strategy. Canada should ensure that just as its military equipment undergoes continuous maintenance and improvement, so too should the process by which this equipment is sourced. Further, given that this strategy outlines the growing potential for competition in Canada’s Arctic, opportunities for defence dialogue with key players should be pursued to complement improvements in Canada’s defence capabilities in this sphere.

**Policy Option 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIONS</th>
<th>DETAILS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Establish Defence Procurement Review</td>
<td>Appoint internal DND committee to undertake critical review of progress of military procurement. Complementing the Defence Policy Review, this initiative would provide an authoritative review to express in plain terms the key challenges presented by the current Defence procurement process from a DND perspective, including the role of Public Works and Government Services Canada, the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, and the National Fighter Procurement Secretariat. Complete needs assessment of Canadian Rangers in both required materiel and geographical assignment. Explore the feasibility of a “Small Group” Military dialogue series between the U.S., Russia, Denmark, and Canada on the future of Arctic cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Conduct needs assessment of Canadian Rangers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Explore Creation of Canada-Russia Mil-Mil Arctic Dialogue Series</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Pro:** This approach would provide an opportunity to voice an authoritative DND perspective on current whole of government procurement approaches, with a view to improving outcomes for end users in the Canadian Armed Forces. Findings of this report would have to be generated based on sound methodology accounting for all relevant levels in the equipment supply chain. A thorough needs assessment of the Canadian Rangers, looking beyond reserves increases alone, would help target new investments and ensure value-added for any new materiel allocations. Given the prospect of increased Arctic competition, a “Small Group” Military-Military dialogue process with key states outside the formal arrangement of the Arctic Council would provide a venue for frank discussion of emerging issues, and provide a forum for dialogue aimed at preventing future conflict between potential competitors.
Con: Other Government Departments involved in Canada’s Defence procurement may view DND’s internal assessment as unwanted and/or threatening, and as a means to cast blame on other parts of the Canadian Government. If pursued beyond the auspices of the Arctic Council, Small Group discussions among states of significance from Canada’s perspective may be viewed as exclusionary, and potentially as undermining the role of the Arctic council as the single preeminent institution in this domain.

RECOMMENDATION

Having weighed the above considerations, this document recommends the adoption of Policy Options 2 and 3, allowing for incremental expansion of sea, air, and ISR capabilities in Canada’s Arctic Regions, and complementary review initiatives and official dialogues.

IMPLEMENTATION AND TIMELINE

Implementation schedules for the various lines of procurement outlined above will differ on a project-to-project basis, and will be updated as appropriate.

EXPECTED IMPACT AND FOLLOW ON

As noted above, the recommended approach is anticipated to have a strong positive impact on Canada’s strategic posture in the context of continental defence. Similarly, it is expected that Canada’s increased defence investment, and improved engagement in this region will positively impact relations with key allies, including the United States, and other NATO partners. Given its stated incremental approach, follow on for this strategy will be essential in order to match subsequent procurement projects and other initiatives to suit new realities of future Arctic environments. This document recommends a biennial review of the implementation of the strategy outlined herein, with an opening for new Arctic procurement proposals at the end of each six-year period.

COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

A comprehensive communications strategy will be coordinated with DND, GAC, PCO, and PMO to increase public awareness of Arctic sovereignty concerns, and reinstate public confidence in the Government of Canada’s Defence procurement process.

Further communications products should be prepared to reinforce key messages regarding Canada’s Arctic engagement among likeminded partners in relevant bilateral and multilateral fora as appropriate.


Chapnick, Adam. “Stephen Harper’s Israel Policy.” In: The Harper era in Canadian foreign policy: Par-


Copeland, Daryl. Science and diplomacy after Canada’s lost decade: Counting the costs, looking beyond. Ottawa: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, November 2015.


DIPLOMACY: ENDNOTES


5  Chase and McCarthy, “Leaked internal report.”


7  Ibid., 5.

8  Ibid, 14.


10  Chase and McCarthy, “Leaked internal report.”

11  Ibid.


13  Ibid.

14  Ibid., 4.


16  Ibid.

17  Ibid., 636.

18  Daryl Copeland, “A foreign ministry for the 21st century? Canada needs more DFAIT and...


20 Ibid., 4.


25 Ibid., 1.

26 O’Shea, “Revitalizing Canada,” 2.

27 Ibid.


31 Potter, “A New Architecture.”


33 Ibbitson, “The Big Break,” 5.

34 Nossal et. al, The Politics, 80.


Ibid.


Ibbitson, “The Big Break,” 9 - 13

Ibid., 14.


Copeland, “Diplomacy, globalization and heteropolarity,” i.


Ibid.


PM Justin Trudeau, “Minister of Foreign Affairs.”


PM Justin Trudeau, “Minister of Foreign Affairs.”


72 Ibid.


75 Maleby, “How to fix,”


85 PM Justin Trudeau, “Minister of Foreign Affairs.”


90 Roland Paris, “Are Canadians.”


92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 Jeffrey Ayres “Civil Society.”


Lackenbauer and Cooper. “The Achilles heel.”


Ibid.

GEDS, “Strategic Policy.”

Mabley, “How to fix.”


Copeland, “Diplomacy, globalization and heteropolarity,” 4 - 5.

Derived from: GEDS, “Strategic Policy.”
Figure 1: Natural vs Migratory Population Growth Rate

Chart 1: Annual average growth rate, natural increase and migratory increase per intercensal period, Canada, 1851 to 2061

Note: Data from 1851 to 2011 is observed and data from 2011 to 2061 is projected.

Figure 2: Average Entry Employment Earning by Immigration Category
Figure 3: Trend of Global Displacement & Proportion Displaced

Figure 4: Refugees as a Share of Total Canadian Immigration
Figure 5: About the COA Program

GLOBAL FOOTPRINT

☑ COA operates 20 permanent training sites
☑ COA is active in over 35 countries and 50 locations every year
☑ COA regularly plans and delivers mobile orientation missions
☑ COA reaches between 30% and 50% of all refugees resettling to Canada
☑ COA builds on IOM's global footprint to provide services where needed
☑ COA is able to deliver orientation in challenging environments
   (2015-16: 8 refugee camps + border area in Lebanon)
☑ COA is one of many pre-arrival programs implemented by IOM
   (20+ programs including Australia, United States, Norway, Germany, etc.)

CANADIAN ORIENTATION ABROAD (COA)
CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS (1998 – 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Participants Trained</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Economic Immigrants</th>
<th>Family Class Immigrants</th>
<th>Caregivers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Participants</td>
<td>Number of Participants</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number of Participants</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>8,222</td>
<td>8,222</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>4,949</td>
<td>4,949</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>7,432</td>
<td>3,759</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>4,121</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>9,582</td>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>3,808</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>12,681</td>
<td>3,591</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>4,856</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>11,906</td>
<td>4,774</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>6,220</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-06</td>
<td>13,100</td>
<td>2,912</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>4,656</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-07</td>
<td>13,031</td>
<td>3,625</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>4,561</td>
<td>34%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td>14,029</td>
<td>4,374</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>4,799</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>13,225</td>
<td>5,205</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>13,800</td>
<td>5,558</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>5,126</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>13,104</td>
<td>6,415</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>3,954</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>13,945</td>
<td>6,001</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>4,672</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>11,261</td>
<td>4,650</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>3,943</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-14</td>
<td>11,981</td>
<td>7,432</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>2,636</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-15</td>
<td>14,034</td>
<td>8,172</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>2,275</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015-16</td>
<td>14,040</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>3,679</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>202,811</td>
<td>92,332</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>60,321</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Figure 7:** Human Resources and Budgetary Financial Resources ($) - Program 3.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FTEs</td>
<td></td>
<td>368</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>1,174,026,452</td>
<td>1,174,026,452</td>
<td>1,065,220,715</td>
<td>1,062,214,554</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8: COA Program Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Program</th>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>2016–17 Planned Spending</th>
<th>2017–18 Planned Spending</th>
<th>2018–19 Planned Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1: Settlement</td>
<td>FTEs</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>655,360,163</td>
<td>654,619,854</td>
<td>653,957,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1.1: Language Training</td>
<td>FTEs</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>301,895,942</td>
<td>301,356,588</td>
<td>301,017,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1.2: Community and Labour Market Integration Services</td>
<td>FTEs</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>355,664,221</td>
<td>353,263,466</td>
<td>352,939,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2: Grant to Quebec</td>
<td>FTEs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>345,059,000</td>
<td>345,059,000</td>
<td>345,059,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.3: Immigration Loan</td>
<td>FTEs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>1,249,441</td>
<td>1,249,853</td>
<td>1,250,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.4: Resettlement Assistance Program</td>
<td>FTEs</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>172,357,848</td>
<td>64,292,028</td>
<td>61,947,994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Program Objectives**

**Fiscal Year**

- **2007-2008**
  - Salary: $105,002
  - O&M: $16,611
  - Contribution Agreement: $825,515
  - Total: $931,177

- **2008-2009**
  - Salary: $127,987
  - O&M: $16,611
  - Contribution Agreement: $1,742,389
  - Total: $1,868,987

- **2009-2010**
  - Salary: $110,394
  - O&M: $16,611
  - Contribution Agreement: $1,771,555
  - Total: $1,898.93

- **2010-2011**
  - Salary: $111,499
  - O&M: $16,611
  - Contribution Agreement: $1,732,945
  - Total: $1,844,144

- **Total**
  - Salary: $455,532
  - O&M: $41,003
  - Contribution Agreement: $6,063,240

**Active engagement and integration project**

- **Salary**: $45,118, $38,161, $38,405, $121,665
- **O&M**: $5,400, $5,400
- **Contribution Agreement**: $749,643, $960,961, $971,341, $2,681,045
- **Total**: $794,751, $1,004,523, $1,009,746, $2,890,230

**Canadian immigration integration program**

- **Salary**: $122,162, $122,162
- **O&M**: $5,400, $5,400
- **Contribution Agreement**: $3,075,294, $3,075,294
- **Total**: $3,197,456, $3,197,456

Source: Financial information from program representatives and initiative contribution agreements.
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES: WORKS CITED


28 Canadian Orientation Abroad (COA). “About COA”, IOM/COA, 2016. http://www.coa-oce.ca/our-work/about-coa/: The Canadian Orientation Abroad (COA) program is an overseas orientation initiative funded by Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in over 40 countries across the globe. COA is offered to visa-ready migrants to Canada, including refugees, economic immigrants, and family class immigrants.


INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: ANNEX

A: New Liberal Government Development Priorities

In line with the Liberal government’s commitment to consultation with the Canadian public, several focus areas of development assistance have materialized and will likely dictate future ODA allocation. These focus areas include:

- Health and rights of women and children
- Clean economic growth and climate change
- Sustainable development and water
- Inclusive and accountable governance, peaceful pluralism, respect for diversity and human rights, including the rights of women and refugees
- Responding to humanitarian crises and the challenges faced by refugees and displaced populations

Taken from: http://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/assets/pdfs/iar-consultations-eai-eng.pdf.

B: UN Sustainable Development Goals

C: List of some indicators associated with the SDGs

Health and rights of Women and Children
- Number of countries with equality provisions in law, rates of female participation in government/governance structures
- Rates of sexual violence

Clean economic growth and climate change
- Rates of global unemployment
- Rates of deforestation, sea-level increases, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere

Governance, pluralism, diversity and human rights
- Number of countries with human rights institutions or laws
• Efficacy and number of cases seen before international tribunals and courts
Peace and security
• Rates of international and non-international armed conflicts
• Monitor failed or failing states
Responding to humanitarian crises and the needs of displaced populations
• Response rate to crises and funding amounts raised
• Number of refugees or displaced persons accepted in Canada

D: List of some indicators associated with the New Deal
• Fragility assessments
• Levels of institutional stability
• Global-level assessments of aid delivery
• Rate of donor-country engagement in process
• Cost-effectiveness and implementation-time analysis

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: WORKS CITED


A-Question-of-Focus.pdf.


14 See Annex A for priorities identified by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau


17 ibid.


20 See Annex B for Sustainable Development Goals.


INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

lic/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the_new_deal.pdf.


27 See Annex C for SDG indicators

28 See Annex D for New Deal indicators

29 Global Affairs Canada. International Assistance Review.

30 ibid.


35 Global Affairs Canada. Key Development Partners.


39 Ibid.


Sinclair, John. “Is Canada ready to be a better development cooperation partner?”

OECD. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action.


Appendix 1: UN Treaties and Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core International Human Rights Instruments</th>
<th>Year (introduced - entry into force)</th>
<th>Canada’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)</td>
<td>1966 - 1976</td>
<td>acceded: 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)</td>
<td>1984 - 1987</td>
<td>signed: 1985 ratified: 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW)</td>
<td>1989 - 1990</td>
<td>not signed or ratified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED)</td>
<td>2006 - 2010</td>
<td>not signed or ratified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other UN Treaties

| UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) | 2006 - 2007 | agreed to implement in 2016 |
| Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) | 2009 - 2014 | expected to accede in 2017 |

Appendix 2: Government Contribution to Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Peace and Security (in millions of $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Peace and Security</th>
<th>Total International Assistance</th>
<th>Percent of Total International Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014-201569</td>
<td>153.80</td>
<td>3741.61</td>
<td>4.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-201470</td>
<td>120.69</td>
<td>3757.67</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-201371</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td>3446.32</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-201272</td>
<td>21.30</td>
<td>3932.65</td>
<td>0.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010-201173</td>
<td>48.54</td>
<td>3591.94</td>
<td>1.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009-201074</td>
<td>41.71</td>
<td>3575.00</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HUMAN RIGHTS: ENDNOTES


41 Ibid.


Appendix A:

The United Kingdom’s Experience with Counterterrorism and Community Engagement

The Impact of Hard Security Measures on Community Isolation

A recent study concerning British Counter Terrorism Strategy, can provide insight into the Canadian context. The study found that the British system’s strong security focus has fostered feelings of suspicion, fear, and alienation among minority communities. These feelings work against community engagement with law enforcement and intelligence agencies and so reduce the flow of information concerning potential radicalization to violence. Furthermore, these feelings are themselves at the root of radicalization to violence. As such, ‘hard’ security efforts may in fact foster the radicalization to that they work to eliminate. An additional consideration addressed by the paper is that the security focus promotes Islamophobia by orienting the public conversation and interaction with Islamic communities towards security issues. This exacerbates the isolation felt by Islamic communities and feeds into radicalization to violence. Though research in this area is limited in the Canadian context, similar factors may be at work in light of the similar hard security orientation and a lack of community engagement.


The Value of Community Engagement through Community Leaders

Another study out of the United Kingdom found that community engagement and rehabilitation require an understanding of the affected societies and communities at risk of producing terrorists and extremists. It requires the governance and community structures to partner in creating platforms for community engagement and terrorist disengagement and de-radicalization. In particular, it found that engaging with key community leaders as legitimate and respected ‘gate-keepers’ to the community was a fruitful method of engaging with a community. In light of these findings, and the limited level of radicalization to violence in Canada, such programs provide cost effective methods for addressing terrorism in Canada.


Appendix B:
Prospects of De-radicalization Programs: 2009 marked the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), ending a civil war that had begun in 1983. After their defeat, a significant number (11,664) former combatants, many of whom were deeply indoctrinated and possessed strong fanaticism were enrolled in the Sri Lankan’s governments 6 + 1 model rehabilitation program. This program was based significantly off of Singapore’s de-radicalization program and emphasized changing violent behaviors through encouraging different thought patterns and avoiding disengagement. The model used psychosocial, vocational, educational and creative therapies in conjunction with cultural, social, religious, spiritual, recreational and community rehabilitation components conducted by the Ministry of Rehabilitation. The program also included 40 vocational training courses and resulted in the reintegration of 11,044 prisoners in 2012. The program strongly influenced participants’ ideological convictions and Sri Lankan’s reintegration and rehabilitation program is considered to be one of the most successful programs in the world.


Appendix C:

Community Engagement and Canada’s Tamil Diaspora

Community Engagement with Canada’s Tamil Diaspora: During the civil-war in Sri Lanka, ethnic Tamil’s living in Canada faced systematic extortion by the LTTE for war taxes to support their war effort. Central to understanding and controlling this extortion was the government’s relationship with Canada’s Tamil community. In a study of second-generation members of Canada’s Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora, Kalyani Thurairajah found that the community’s feeling of belonging to Canada and negotiation of ties was dependent upon several factors including the tolerance and understanding of the country of settlement, personal experience in the country of settlement, and political climate of the homeland. Diasporic communities, particularly second-generation members’ loyalties to the settlement country are dynamic and the country of settlement must foster a robust connection with the community and provide a space to allow them to engage with their identity. This negotiation of loyalties and engagement between the Tamil community and broader Canadian society was a central component of combating the extortion of the Tamil community by the LTTE in Canada.

Northern Ireland’s Prison to Peace Program

Northern Ireland’s “Prison to Peace” Anti-Violence Campaign Through Former Fighters

Experiences with former Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), and Ulster Defence Association fighters in Northern Ireland are illuminating in this area. In an effort to limit the number of youths seeking to join violent groups in Northern Ireland, the “Prison to Peace” program was created. This initiative brought demobilized fighters into schools in order to discuss their involvement in violent organizations and to dissuade the youths from joining such organizations or engaging in violence. Their primary method at these events is not to ‘delegitimize’ the violence they engaged in, such attempts proven ineffective in light of the deep commitments held by the youths as well as the former fighters themselves. Rather, the program focused on ‘deglamourizing’ the violence. In order to accomplish this, the former fighters ‘frame’ their narrative’s of civil conflict and violence in a manner that ignores the legitimacy of the cause, and instead focuses on the ineffectiveness and destruction which emerge from violent means. This, and similar programs, have met with considerable success and could be utilized in relation to returning fighters from Islamic State and other organizations. The particular results of this program have included significant reduction in youths agreeing with the use of violence, an increase in those willing to engage in political processes, reduced the number of youths who blamed ‘the other side’ for the violence and issues, facilitated a considerable increase in respect for the police, and increased the emphasis youths placed on civil-rights rather than national identity.


Parliament of Canada. Anti-terrorism Act (An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts) Statute of Canada. 2015, c. 2.


TERRORISM: ENDNOTES

1 Section 83.01 of the Criminal Code defines terrorism as an act: committed “in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause” with the intention of intimidating the public “…with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act.” Activities recognized as criminal within this context include death and bodily harm with the use of violence; endangering a person’s life; risks posed to the health and safety of the public; significant property damage; and interference or disruption of essential services, facilities, or systems. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 83.01.


3 RCMP, Youth Online and At Risk: Radicalization Facilitated by the Internet. 2011, 3.

TERRORISM


9 Public Safety Canada, Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 2013, 2.

10 Ibid., 14-15.


12 Anti-terrorism Act, 2015 (Bill C-51) S.C. 2015, c. 2.


19 Ibid.


27 CIBD Descriptive Analysis, 2015: 3.

28 Global Terrorism Database. Region, North America; Country, Canada; Timeframe, 1960-2015.


31 Global Terrorism Database. Region, North America; Country, Canada; Timeframe, 1960-2015.


33 RCMP, Youth Online and At Risk: Radicalization Facilitated by the Internet. 2011, 6; Bartlett, Birdwell, King “The Edge of Violence: Tackling Homegrown Terrorism Requires a Radical Approach” 2010: 37-41.


36 Ibid.


39 Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq, Policy Paper (Washington, DC: Brookings Institu-
Numerous studies have noted the importance of separating social health interventions from the security apparatus. Though this does not necessarily mean that law enforcement and other organizations must be kept out of programming, it does mean that any interactions between law enforcement and social health interventions should be based around providing positive experiences for those involved, and not be directly related to law enforcement and security goals. As such, policies of bringing RCMP officers to meet students or community events outside of their strict law enforcement capacity could be allowed and may serve valuable community engagement goals. A
study noting the value of such initiatives, and the importance of separating social intervention from law enforcement initiatives is: Bartlett, Birdwell, King “The Edge of Violence: Tackling Homegrown Terrorism Requires a Radical Approach” 2010: 133.


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**DEFENCE: ENDNOTES**

1 See Glossary (p.20) for all acronyms


5 Colin Shultz, ‘Arctic Climate warming leads to increased storm surge activity,’ in American Geophysical Union 94.16 (2013).


9 Ibid.


23  Teeple, Nancy, “Canadian Arctic Procurement” Simon Fraser University, Fall 2010. pp. 1-20.

