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Letter from the Editors

This 15th Volume of the *Paterson Review of International Affairs* stands as yet another testament to the value of graduate research, and the importance of providing a platform for emerging scholars at this level. This year our team worked through several dozen submissions, selecting five superior articles through a double-blind peer-review process, and finalizing these in consultation with subject matter experts. What results is a sampling of articles from outstanding graduate students from leading institutions across North America. We are delighted to showcase their work in this edition.

This year's volume includes five articles addressing a broad range of subject matter, each constituting an important addition to existing literature. Michael Murphy examines measures of "coup-proofing", drawing on a case-study analysis to explore the effect of various approaches on military effectiveness in intrastate wars. Natasha Robin offers important insights on preventative peacekeeping, looking at UN efforts in Macedonia as a model for subsequent interventions. Sean Winchester advances a robust quantitative study exploring the determinants of maritime piracy, in particular the role of geography and state fragility. Shashanth Shetty and Ryan Winch provide comprehensive analysis of the wide-ranging effects of US corn subsidies, contributing broader commentary on accelerated interconnectivity, and the implications this trend holds for domestic policymakers. Finally, Nathan Seef looks at contemporary challenges to traditional conceptions of state authority, examining the role of police in environments where the domain of security provision is increasingly contested.

The Editors-in-Chief would like to extend our sincere thanks to the contributors, associate editors, blind reviewers, and expert reviewers whose efforts made this journal possible. We would also like to thank administrators of APSIA member institutions and other Universities who assisted in disseminating our call-for-papers, as well as Princeton University's *Journal of Public and International Affairs* for its continued collaboration. We also wish to thank the staff at the Norman Paterson School for the administrative support offered throughout the development of this volume, and the sustained funding that has ensured the continuity of this journal.

Adrian Swietlicki, Dan Barber, & Ehsan Torkaman-Zehi
Editors-in-Chief

A Deal with the Devil?: Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Civil War Conflicts

Michael Murphy

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Abstract:

In recent years, a body of literature has emerged which links the adoption of strategies to prevent military coups with an increased risk of civil war. However, to date little research has been undertaken linking these “coup-proofing” measures with military effectiveness in intrastate wars, leaving open the question of whether coup-proofing constitutes a self-defeating strategy. This paper helps fill this gap by testing six hypotheses using two cases: the Ivorian civil war of 2003-2011; and the Northern Uganda civil war in the 2000-2006 period. This paper finds support for the proposition that while coup-proofing exerts a negative impact on military effectiveness in intrastate conflict, the specific methods states choose to coup-proof shape the magnitude of this effect. The findings presented here link a number of specific coup-proofing techniques with lower effectiveness while also suggesting that certain combinations of techniques prove more problematic than others. The paper concludes by examining policy implications, suggesting that donor states seeking to develop functioning security sectors should target the most problematic combinations of coup-proofing techniques, reform procurement and recruitment practices, and take into account the incentives facing leaders of weakly institutionalized states in order to craft reforms that can secure elite buy-in.

Introduction

The recent advance of Islamic State militants in Iraq has raised questions about how an Iraqi military benefitting from significant American investment in training and equipment could collapse so spectacularly in such a short period of time. One claim made by observers is that this collapse was a product of coup-proofing.¹ These observers argue that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki's efforts at coup-proofing insulated his regime from the threat of a coup, but undermined military effectiveness by leaving it internally divided, and lacking in training, motivation and readiness.²

Yet, the empirical basis for these claims is underdeveloped at best. While the literature has established a link between coup proofing strategies and civil war onset, there has been little study of the relationship between coup-proofing and military effectiveness in intrastate conflict. This leaves a significant gap in our understanding of the impacts of coup-proofing, one which raises questions not only about assessments of the dynamics in the Iraqi conflict, but more generally about the incentives facing rulers of weakly institutionalized states, and whether these strategies are ultimately a Faustian bargain. A better understanding of the relationship between coup-proofing and civil war military effectiveness will shed light on these issues, with important implications for Western states engaged in security sector reform efforts and security partnerships to combat international security threats.

With this in mind, this article seeks to examine the relationship between coup-proofing and military effectiveness in civil wars. This paper argues that while coup-proofing undermines military effectiveness in civil wars, the severity of these deficits is contingent on the types of coup-proofing measures used and how these measures are implemented. This argument will be presented in six sections, the first two outlining the logic of coup-proofing and reviewing the literature on the impact of coup-proofing on military effectiveness. The following two sections will outline the cases of Uganda and Ivory Coast, followed by an examination of the trends evident in these cases. This paper will then conclude with a discussion on policy implications, with a particular focus on implications for security sector reform efforts and security partnerships aimed at combating international security threats.

The Logic of Coup-Proofing

In recent years, scholars have found links between the risk of coups and civil wars. This body of literature argues that leaders of weakly institutionalized states face internal security dilemmas with their fellow elites.³ In order to protect against the threat from rival elites and ensure their political survival, leaders of these states will seek to dissuade coup attempts and reduce the likelihood of successful coups through strategies which divide, co-opt, weaken or exclude potentially disloyal elements. However, such actions come at the cost of higher risk of rebellion due to weaker militaries and exclusion-related grievances.⁴ This creates a dilemma for leaders of these states: risk their removal from power by elites within government, or reduce this risk and subject the state to a destructive civil war. This dilemma is compounded by the effects of coup-proofing on the affected militaries. While coup-proofing strategies such as the creation of multiple, parallel military forces (counterbalancing), buying military loyalty, or exclusionary recruiting practices reduce the likelihood of coup onset and/or success,⁵ these practices have been linked to reduced military effectiveness in times of interstate conflict.⁶ This trend has also been observed in existing case studies of civil wars. For example, Powell finds that Zairian President Mobutu extensive coup-proofing produced a weak military which ultimately collapsed in the face of a rebel advance during Zaire's civil war.⁷ Similarly, Gaub presents evidence that the Gadhafi regime in Libya collapsed in part because "as a result [of coup-proofing], the Libyan military had turned into a hollowed out pillar of the regime, incapable [...] of acting against the upheaval of 2011."⁸ While these cases are only two examples of the negative effects of coup proofing, they provide an indication of the impacts coup-proofing can have on militaries facing insurgent challenges.

The question, then, is why do leaders of states engage in coup-proofing? For one, coups pose a more immediate threat to regime survival, particularly in states where coup risk is high. While coups

occur rapidly, conclude quickly, and involve elites with access to state power, civil wars pose much more distant threats, occurring over longer periods, and often in the peripheries of the state. Thus as a short term strategy, coup-proofing would seem to offer an effective way to maintain power. However, even as a longer-term strategy, there are indications that coup-proofing may not be as problematic as first thought. In a large-n study of 151 states covering the period from 1962 to 2008, Powell found that while the counterbalancing of military units raises the risk of civil war onset, purges do not.⁹ Borrowing the logic of Fearon and Laitin,¹⁰ this suggests that insurgents see counterbalanced militaries comprised of various, competing military units as less capable than militaries coup-proofed via purges of “unreliable” soldiers. This implies that different coup-proofing strategies have varying impacts on military effectiveness, indicating that how a regime coup-proofs may have implications for battlefield performance.

Coup-Proofing Measures and Military Effectiveness in Civil Wars

To understand how coup-proofing strategies impact military effectiveness, it is necessary to first understand the concept of effectiveness. According to Risa Brooks, military effectiveness is the “the capacity to create military power from state’s basic resources,”¹¹ and is comprised of four dimensions. First, effective militaries must demonstrate integration, aligning their tactics to support their operations within a theatre, and in turn demonstrate that these operations support broader strategic goals. Integration also requires that militaries ensure their recruitment, training and procurement choices align with doctrine and strategic goals.¹² A second dimension of effectiveness is the responsiveness of a military to the threats it faces. Responsive militaries are able to identify new threats, exploit the weaknesses of their opponents, quickly and flexibly respond to battlefield events, and critically reflect on their own weaknesses with an eye to improving capabilities and/or tailoring tactics and doctrine to minimize their vulnerability.¹³ The final two dimensions of effectiveness are the skill of the soldiers – including their ability to carry out military maneuvers, employ new technology, level of motivation – and, finally, the quality of their equipment.¹⁴

However, in studying civil conflicts, this macro-level framework is insufficient. As Florence Gaub notes, civil wars challenge the authority and legitimacy of the incumbent government, raising questions among citizens (including potential combatants) about who is the rightful ruler of the state.¹⁵ This creates unique pressures which can lead to individual desertion and even disintegration and defection of entire military units. This is not to say that macro-level attributes are unrelated to micro-level processes. For example, poor performance associated with poor macro-level fundamentals can also lead to problems at the unit level. Such dynamics are evident in reports from the Syrian Civil War, where coup-proofing measures have undermined the fighting capacity of regular army units and in turn contributed to Syrian army defeats by rebel forces in the first part of 2015,¹⁶ prompting increasing problems with desertion among communities with strong ties to the regime.¹⁷ But desertion and disintegration occur for a wide range of reasons not directly linked to effectiveness,¹⁸ necessitating examination of these issues when assessing military effectiveness in intrastate war.

Working from this understanding, it is possible to explore the relationship between various coup-proofing strategies and effectiveness. Coup-proofing measures come in two forms: 1) those which hinder the capability of militaries; and 2) those which alter their disposition toward the regime.¹⁹ The most commonly discussed types of coup-proofing measures, upon which this paper will focus are structural coup proofing, ethnic stacking and the distribution of patronage, with the former falling in the counter-capability category of coup-proofing measures and the latter two falling in the disposition-altering category.

Of these, structural coup-proofing methods are among the most detrimental to effectiveness. Structural coup-proofing measures seek to alter the structure of the military to impede coup attempts, and include measures such as counterbalancing, creating multiple chains of command to limit the ability of soldiers to coordinate a coup, and maintain intelligence agencies designed to monitor military activity.²⁰

Such measures undermine effectiveness in a number of ways. The creation of parallel units and multiple chains of command limits battlefield coordination, reducing overall military responsiveness and integration.²¹ Further, in his study of Middle Eastern militaries, Quinlivan notes a tendency for units within structurally coup-proofed militaries to have deficits in skill and equipment quality, often a result of trusted units receiving better training and the bulk of military resources.²² Such units are also often deployed in a manner which advances regime preservation rather than military success, thereby failing to achieve maximum capability in the field, producing poor integration and responsiveness. In civil wars, these deficits can lead to poor performance and can produce poor morale, leading to increased desertion and disintegration as Gaub observes in the case of Libya in 2011.²³

H1: States which introduce greater numbers of structural impediments to coup-execution should be less effective than states who utilize fewer such measures.

Existing literatures suggests, however, that coup-proofing measures focused on altering disposition have more mixed impacts on effectiveness. Identity-based recruitment and promotion practices result in lower skill levels by privileging perceived loyalty over ability. These deficits have been found to be particularly large where militaries are purged along identity lines, robbing militaries not only of skilled soldiers and skilled commanders required to ensure integrated and responsive militaries.²⁴ However, Michael Makara's study of military performance during the Arab Spring finds that militaries recruited along communal lines demonstrated greater loyalty to their respective regimes when faced with protests and armed challenges.²⁵ Thus while identity-based stacking of the military has negative impacts on macro-level performance, it may lead to greater loyalty among those with strong identity ties to the leadership of the state.

H2: States with militaries characterized by greater levels of ethnic exclusion should demonstrate lower levels of effectiveness than those with lower levels of exclusion, with purged militaries showing the greatest deficits.

H3: Units who have strong identity-based ties with the state leadership should demonstrate lower rates of desertion and disintegration than militaries or units who do not share such ties with the leadership.

Similarly, the impact of patronage on effectiveness is not clear-cut. While patronage in the form of military spending or equipment can increase the skill and quality of a military, other forms of patronage have insidious effects on effectiveness. As Desch demonstrates in the cases of military governments in Brazil and Argentina, militaries engaged in political administration and economic activity begin to develop distorted corporate identities which results in greater factionalism, undermining their motivation and organizational coherence, and hence their skill, integration and responsiveness.²⁶ Moreover, as Peter Feaver notes, patronage measures work only as long as the state is able to provide resources, a capacity often reduced in the face of rebellion, which in turn can lead soldiers to abandon the regime.²⁷

H4: Militaries given patronage in the form of higher military spending will be more effective.

H5: Militaries involved more directly in political administration and/or economic activity will be less effective than militaries who are less involved in political administration or economic activity.

H6: States who remove incentives to their militaries during/prior to combat will see higher rates of desertion and disintegration.

These six hypotheses provide an important starting point for our understanding of the impact of various coup-proofing strategies on civil war military effectiveness. However, it may also be that certain patterns of measures interact to undermine effectiveness. Thus, in addition to testing the six hypotheses, the following sections will attempt to derive an understanding of how various measures might interact to impact military effectiveness during a civil war.

Empirical Analysis

To explore the impact of impact of different coup-proofing strategies on military effectiveness in civil wars, this paper will look at two cases: the Ivory Coast civil war of 2002-2007 and 2011, and the Northern Uganda Insurgency during the 2000-2005 period. These cases were chosen for a number of reasons. First, both cases occur in weakly institutionalized states, in which an internal security dilemma is likely to be present and there are incentives for elites to engage in coup activities to gain access to power.²⁸ Second, both cases share similarities on key factors identified by Biddle and Long as influencing military effectiveness, including raw material power, political institutions, and human capital.²⁹ This helps to control for the possibility that variation in other factors may explain observed differences in military effectiveness independently of the civil-military arrangements of the two states. The two cases share similarities on some factors thought to shape the course and outcomes of civil wars, including similar levels of state reach, external support for rebels provided by a neighbouring state, a relative lack of rough terrain, and a roughly similar geographic area and population size.³⁰ This allows the paper to control for factors which may shape battlefield performance independently of military effectiveness.

This is not to say these cases are perfect matches. There are notable differences in the relative strength of the rebel groups in each case, and French intervention in the Ivorian case complicates this analysis. However, as will be discussed later in the analysis, these differences have relatively minor confounding impacts on this analysis.³¹ Finally, both cases are characterized by coup-proofed militaries, but demonstrate variance in the techniques used to achieve this effect. This provides sufficient variation to examine the plausibility of the six hypotheses above and explore potential associations between various coup-proofing measures and military effectiveness. It also provides a strong test of the overarching argument of this paper: if one case is characterized by markedly greater military effectiveness, then it would illustrate that *how* a state coup-proofs matters, rather than just simply *whether* a state engages in coup-proofing. Using the macro- and micro-level framework laid out above, in which effectiveness is defined based on five characteristics – the integration, responsiveness, skill and quality of the military forces, and the occurrence of desertion and defection – the following cases will examine how various coup-proofing arrangements impact effectiveness and ultimately battlefield performance.

Ivory Coast: The Dangers of Coup-Proofing

Though historically free of coups and rebellions, Ivory Coast has seen a surge of political instability over the last two decades. With Houphouët-Boigny's death and the transition from one-party rule under Henri Konan Bédié, Ivorian politics became increasingly divided on ethnic lines with elites from groups originating in the south seeking to exclude northerners to advance their political fortunes. At the same time, the state experienced a growing economic crisis.³² The result has been the instability seen in recent years. The contested election of 1995, which excluded the leading northerner, Alassane Ouattara, gave way to the coup of 1999 led by junior officers which installed Gen. Robert Guei as leader. Guei was replaced by Laurent Gbagbo following another round of disputed elections in 2000. This was followed by a mutiny in 2002 by units loyal to Guei slated to be demobilized. This mutiny quickly evolved into a civil war between Gbagbo's military and Northern-based mutineers, with French military forces intervening to prevent a further rebel advance and to enforce a ceasefire.³³ The resulting war ended in 2007, when the Ouagadagou agreement produced a power-sharing government. However, this agreement collapsed following the 2010 election, which saw both Ouattara and Gbagbo claim victory.

This crisis ended with the pro-Ouatarra's forces launching an offensive, capturing the country in a manner of weeks in March 2011.³⁴

Coup-Proofing in Ivory Coast

While Ivory Coast's historical record of political stability is an anomaly among African states, the state of its civil-military relations is rather familiar, characterized by patterns of distrust and thorough coup-proofing. Historically, the Ivorian government relied upon France's guarantee of regime security against internal and external threats. The French backed this commitment with the deployment of approximately 600 French marines to Abidjan, the capital of Ivory Coast.³⁵ The Ivorian government also relied on the counterbalancing of its forces, utilizing the Gendarmerie and the Presidential Guard, a unit made up solely of President's co-ethnics, to provide a counterweight to the army.³⁶ According to Pilster and Boehmelt, the Ivorian military was consistently among the most counterbalanced militaries in the 1990s, ranking as the thirteenth most counterbalanced military in the world in 1999.³⁷ The Ivorian government also sought to co-opt senior officers, earmarking 30% of all district leadership positions for senior officers, and providing these officers opportunities to earn income via parastatal corporations, with significant military involvement in road construction and infrastructural development, agricultural management and the national airline.³⁸

However, the years leading up to and during the civil war saw several major changes to the dynamic of civil military relations in Ivory Coast, and to the coup-proofing apparatus employed by the Ivorian state. For one, the French commitment to intervene in the internal affairs of its African clients began to weaken in the 1990s.³⁹ Further, the role of the military in state affairs became less prominent, as liberalization saw military officials removed from positions in civil administration and parastatal companies.⁴⁰ Beginning with Bédié, the role of the military from that of administrator to an instrument of repression against popular uprisings. This shift was also accompanied by growing ethnicization of the military, which saw an increasing reliance on the stacking of key units and positions with co-ethnics and purges of "disloyal" elements.⁴¹ It also saw a growth of factionalism, particularly following the 1999 coup, which saw the proliferation of units independent of the chain of command, often with responsibilities for regime preservation and internal repression. This factionalism contributed to a general breakdown in military discipline.⁴²

Under Gbagbo, the state relied on several coup-proofing strategies to preserve his rule against an internally divided and heavily politicized military. First, like his predecessors, Gbagbo relied heavily on purges of disloyal elements with ties to both the Guei regime as well as Northerners thought to be allied to Alassane Ouattara.⁴³ Gbagbo also emphasized counterbalancing of military units, favoring the Gendarmerie and the Presidential Guard as well as the Anti-Riot Brigade of the Police, comprised primarily of co-ethnics.⁴⁴ Moreover, to support the war effort, Gbagbo began to raise military spending which grew from \$173 million in 2001 to \$420 million in 2009, reversing the historical underfunding of the military.⁴⁵ This went to support an expansion of the military recruited from "loyal" ethnic groups, payment of bonuses to military officers to buy loyalty and to purchase equipment including new fighter jets and combat helicopters.⁴⁶ He also provided support to youth militias, who he called on to fight civil wars and to maintain internal security as a counterbalance to the army.⁴⁷ These strategies served to insulate Gbagbo from some of the civil-military turbulence experienced by his predecessors.

Impacts of Coup Proofing on Military Effectiveness in the Ivorian Civil War

The general consensus is that the Ivorian military was ineffective during the civil war period of 2002 to 2011. Scholars of Ivorian politics describe the Ivorian military as "poorly equipped, with insufficient arms, training and motivation to fight,"⁴⁸ suffering from deteriorated command and control,⁴⁹ and characterized by a "total disintegration of cohesion."⁵⁰ These assessments are reflected in the Ivorian military's record on the battlefield, which shows an ineffective Ivorian military in the early days of the conflict as the main rebel group, the MPCCI (Mouvement Patriotique de Cote d'Ivoire) seized and held

territory in the north of the country. Likewise, in the west of the country, where two smaller rebel factions emerged in October 2002, reports indicated that early engagements saw the Ivorian security forces desert, removing their uniforms and fleeing.⁵¹ However, the Ivorian military also had some success, driving rebels out of several cities with the backing of youth militias, mercenaries and Angolan soldiers.⁵² Nonetheless, in March and April 2011, the Ivorian military witnessed the complete disintegration of all but its most elite forces. Not only was the military unable to crush the rebellion on the battlefield as political officials demanded, it ultimately could not even preserve the regime; a clear indication of its ineffectiveness.⁵³

Coup-proofing played a significant role in making the Ivorian military ineffective. Beginning with the structural coup-proofing measures undertaken by the Ivorian state, it is clear that the military's effectiveness was reduced by efforts to counterbalance the regular army with "loyalist" units. As noted above, these measures led resources to be diverted away from regular army units to units deemed more loyal such as the Gendarmerie, undermining the quality of units charged with defending key installations, such as the Bouake base. Gbagbo's reliance on a small group of elite units also undermined his ability to respond to battlefield events and to achieve strategic aims. The elite units employed by Gbagbo were relatively small, numbering approximately 2000 to 3000 out of a total force of 55 000 at the time of the 2011 offensive.⁵⁴ Moreover, during the offensive in 2011, these forces were deployed as a reserve force to protect Abidjan,⁵⁵ leaving unreliable troops guarding the frontlines and limiting the military's ability to respond to the offensive. This highlights the poor integration of force development and organization with strategic (preservation of the regime against the rebel threat) and operational aims (stopping the rebel offensive) and the limited ability to respond to the collapse of the military in 2011. Thus while these units were effective in staving off the final victory of the rebel forces until the intervention of French and UN forces against Gbagbo, they had little prospect for reversing the offensive.

The ethnic purges conducted by the Guei and Gbagbo regime also undermined the effectiveness of the Ivorian military, albeit in a less direct manner. Military purges of officers and units thought to be loyal to political rivals from different ethnic groups prompted the initial mutiny, and provided a corps of experienced, trained officers – some formerly associated with elite units – to the MPCJ rebels, robbing the force of skilled officers. This trend was exacerbated by the defection of approximately 20% of Northern-based units to the rebels at the outset of the conflict, motivated by concerns about ethnic exclusion.⁵⁶ This forced the military to rely upon poorly trained (albeit motivated) militias whose members were used primarily as "cannon fodder" in battle in the early years of the conflict.⁵⁷

Perhaps the greatest negative impact was that created by the state's historical cooptation strategy. By making the military an administrative body, the Ivorian state was able to maintain a military which was underfunded, underequipped and quite small. This was further enabled by the guarantees provided by the French which ensured that the need for a stronger Ivorian military to deter threats was unnecessary. While this limited the military's ability to launch a decisive coup, it also undermined the quality of equipment available to the Ivorian military. Highlighting this reality, estimates indicate that prior to the onset of the war 80% of the military budget was spent on salaries.⁵⁸ This in turn had negative impacts on the war fighting capabilities of the military. For example, at the outset of the war in 2002 only three of the Ivorian military's 50 armored vehicles and six of its 21 aircraft were operational, highlighting the equipment deficits facing the Ivorian military and undermining the ability of the Ivorian military to recapture rebel-held Bouaké in 2002.⁵⁹ Moreover, these measures undermined force development, limiting recruitment and turnover of soldiers. This distorted the force structure of the military, creating a small force filled with older and less motivated soldiers,⁶⁰ undermining its ability to achieve operational goals of holding territory in the face of the emergence of new rebel forces in the western part of Ivory Coast.⁶¹ As a result, the Ivorian military was characterized by poor quality, skill and integration of operational aims (control of territory) with military capabilities (lack of rank and file soldiers and suitable equipment).

In response to many of these shortcomings, the Ivorian state employed strategies such as the aforementioned increase in military funding to provide equipment and economic bonuses as well as recruiting militias and mercenaries to overcome the ineffectiveness of the Ivorian military. While such strategies proved useful in some cases and highlight the responsiveness of the Ivorian military, in the end they exacerbated the ineffectiveness of the military. For example, economic co-optation strategies such as the payment of bonuses, while successful initially in motivating soldiers to fight for the regime, ultimately proved ineffective when sanctions dried up and morale dropped precipitously. This drop in morale further was exacerbated by the large payments received by mercenaries, rumored to be as high as \$2000 per day, undermining unit cohesion and playing an important role in the collapse of the Ivorian military in 2011.⁶²

Evidently, the coup-proofing strategies of the Ivorian state contributed to the ineffectiveness of the military. The analysis above shows these strategies had negative impacts on the quality, skill, responsiveness and integration of the military, while also undermining unit cohesion and leading to the disintegration of the Ivorian military. Years of deliberate neglect, cooptation, and counterbalancing produced a divided force characterized by low levels of skill and quality, rendering the force ill-suited for combat against a capable opponent. In this respect, the coup-proofing strategies of the Gbagbo regime proved to be a Faustian bargain.

Uganda: Escaping the Effectiveness Trap?

Sparked by the victory of Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) in 1986 following the five year Ugandan Bush War and the subsequent fear of ethnic cleansing by the Acholi supporters of the deposed government, the Northern Uganda insurgency is one of Africa's longest running conflicts. Since the late-1980s, the Lord's Resistance Army has been the face of this insurgency. Supported for many years by Sudanese government, the LRA – notorious for its gratuitous violence and reliance on abductions of children to supply with recruits – has seen ebbs and flows in its campaign, reaching its peak in Northern Uganda in 2002-2003 but also narrowly avoiding defeat in the early 1990s and suffering serious setbacks since 2006 when it was driven into the Congo.⁶³

Coup-Proofing in Uganda: Museveni's Strategies of Control

Historically, Uganda has been a quintessential example of an unstable state. This includes more than a dozen coups and attempted coups between independence in 1962 and 1986.⁶⁴ Yet, since 1986 Uganda's civil-military relations have been remarkably stable with only one coup attempt by the Ugandan military (UPDF).⁶⁵ This is a testament to the efficacy of Museveni's coup proofing apparatus which has created an era of civil-military peace.

Museveni relies on three primary coup-proofing strategies which have formed the backbone of Ugandan civil-military relations for much of his rule. The first of these is a reliance upon structural coup-proofing. This includes significant counterbalancing within the security apparatus, with the Uganda security sector comprising more than thirty organizations and a dozen militias.⁶⁶ This includes the Presidential Guard Brigade (PGB), an elite unit recruited from Museveni's sub-clan, who protect the President from internal threats. Museveni also relies on two security agencies, the External Security Organization (ESO) and the Internal Security Organization (ISO) to monitor the security apparatus for signs of coup plots.⁶⁷ These measures are augmented by a senior officer corps in the military which is disproportionately comprised of Museveni's Banyankole co-ethnics. Lindemann finds that in 2007, Banyankoles made up 43.5% of senior UPDF officers despite only comprising 10% of the Ugandan population.⁶⁸ Banyankole dominance was even more pronounced at the highest levels where all but one of the six Commanders of the UPDF since 1986 have been Banyankoles.⁶⁹ Thus despite recent policy changes including the banning of ethnic identification within the UPDF and regional quotas to ensure representative recruitment, ethnic considerations continue to play an important part in Ugandan civil-military relations.⁷⁰

Uganda also relies on economic and political patronage to keep the military in line. UPDF officers are an important part of Museveni's patronage network and are granted 10 seats in the Ugandan Parliament.⁷¹ The UPDF's leadership is intimately tied to ruling regime, often campaigning for Museveni during elections campaigns.⁷² The UPDF is also provided with significant opportunities for enrichment primarily at the level of senior commanders. For example, scholars have alleged that the corruption in procurement processes have been tolerated by Museveni to ensure the loyalty of key officers within the military establishment. Likewise, members of the UPDF have been given opportunities to engage in war-profiteering, as seen in campaigns in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan.⁷³ These opportunities have allowed senior officers to expand their business interests by illegally harvesting natural resources and providing equipment and services to the UPDF during its deployment. Finally, the UPDF has been allocated a sizeable budget, officially set at 2.7% of GDP, well above the target set by donor states.⁷⁴ Together with structural and ethnic-based coup proofing tactics, these measures have worked to create civil-military stability in Uganda.

Impacts on Effectiveness on the LRA Counterinsurgency Campaign (2000-2006)

From 2000 to 2006 the UPDF showed varying levels of effectiveness, ranging from being largely ineffective in containing and defeating the LRA insurgency to modest effectiveness, ultimately leading to the retreat of the LRA from Uganda. During the first phase of this period (2000-2004), UPDF suffered from problems with desertions, exacerbated by a lack of adequate equipment, unmotivated and undermanned units and a combined arms strategy ill-suited for defeating the elusive LRA given the shortcomings of the UPDF in mobility, manpower and intelligence.⁷⁵ These shortcomings were on display in the failed cross-border Operation Iron Fist in 2002 and 2003. While the UPDF succeeded in destroying the LRA's bases, it failed to eliminate LRA fighters, who retreated into Northern Uganda and unleashed violence across the North of Uganda which the UPDF was unable to stop. However, the performance of the UPDF improved in the subsequent years. By 2005, LRA units were experiencing increased attrition and were forced into smaller, less active groups during Operation Iron Fist II. The military was able to drive the LRA out of the Teso region it expanded into in 2002. This culminated in the LRA withdrawing from Northern Uganda in early 2006.⁷⁶

Many of the deficits in the effectiveness of the UPDF can be traced to the coup-proofing measures put in place by Museveni to protect the regime against internal threats. For one, efforts at structural coup-proofing undermined the effectiveness of the military. The creation of multiple institutions to counterbalance and monitor each other impaired coordination of operations against the insurgency, undermining integration. In this regard, Feldman recounts a telling anecdote in which UPDF soldiers coaxed an LRA rebel to defect, only to have ISO personnel operating in the area – responsible for providing intelligence on rebel activities – shoot and kill the defector.⁷⁷ Similarly, observers have implicated poor coordination and intelligence-sharing between regular UPDF units and local defence militias (LDUs) employed by the UPDF as a cause of ineffectiveness. This is illustrated in the case of the LRA's attack on the Barlonyo where hundreds of civilians were killed in an attack on an IDP camp due to a failure by the UPDF to provide warnings to the LDU about a planned attack and slow response times tied to inadequate communication between the LDU and UPDF forces.⁷⁸ This demonstrated poor integration and responsiveness of counterinsurgent forces. Further, the favoring of elite units has also robbed the regular forces of resources, diverting 30% of the defence budget to the PGB, away from frontline forces while deploying the bulk of PGB forces to locations of political rather than military importance.⁷⁹ These challenges contributed to problems with the integration, responsiveness, skill and quality (by the diversion resources) of counterinsurgent forces.

Similarly, ethnicization also had impacts on the UPDF's effectiveness though less directly than in the case of structural coup-proofing. First, as noted in the literature reviewed above, ethnic exclusion and politicization are associated with sub-optimal promotion practices which undermine responsiveness by

leading to poor strategic assessment. Such dynamics are apparent in the Uganda case, where the Banyankole-dominated senior officer corps – appointed because of perceived loyalty – has been criticized for lacking strategic vision and management skills necessary to achieve military success.⁸⁰ Second, the ethnic makeup of the military comprised primarily of non-Acholis exacerbates distrust between the Acholi population and the government. This manifests itself in low morale, with many UPDF soldiers reticent to risk their lives in what is viewed as an intra-Acholi conflict.⁸¹ Such indifference is seen in reports that the UPDF responded to less than 10% of all LRA attacks on Acholi civilians between June and December of 2002.⁸² Thus there are indications that ethnic exclusion is *associated* with ineffectiveness, even if the causal mechanisms remain unclear.

Finally, while political cooptation had little impact on effectiveness, the regime's economic cooptation strategies had significant negative impacts on the military. While the UPDF received a large share of the budget, corruption among senior officers consumed 25% of the defence budget, leaving the Ugandan military without adequate transport, helicopters, or food rations due to corruption in procurement processes.⁸³ This greatly undermined the quality of equipment and soldier morale, leaving the UPDF outgunned by the LRA and ill-suited for the offensive operations desired by Museveni due to insufficient mobility to pursue guerilla fighters (poor integration).⁸⁴ Likewise, the war effort was undermined by a "ghost soldier" scandal in which commanding officers exploited poor record keeping to pocket the salaries of soldiers who had left the military. The impacts of this scandal are outlined in the testimony of the Commander of Operation Iron Fist to the Ugandan Parliament:

It is a very disheartening phenomenon when one considers a unit supposed to have a strength of 736 officers and men having only strength of 250 or so, (...) This means that the missions [...] cannot be successfully executed in operations; our units suffer unnecessary casualties at the hands of the enemy. This over stretching of personnel has resulted in operational fatigue, low morale and desertion of troops.⁸⁵

This illustrates the impacts of maintaining loyalty of senior officers via corruption, undermining the skill (morale and operational fatigue), integration and unit level cohesion of the UPDF during operations against the LRA. Moreover, the involvement of officers in war-profiteering extended deployments in the Congo in order to facilitate illegal resource exploitation.⁸⁶ This limited the resources available to the UPDF and even when troops were pulled from the DRC, they were redeployed immediately, leaving them suffering from operational fatigue and low morale.⁸⁷ The end result was lower skill, lack of integration and reduced responsiveness.

Yet while there are clear indications that the coup-proofing measures of the Museveni regime undermined the effectiveness of the UPDF, the Ugandan military did ultimately improve its performance. The shift in performance took place at the same time as the UPDF undertook a modernization process which increased recruitment standards and a willingness to acknowledge and address instances of corruption, including computerizing the pay system to address the problem of ghost soldiers.⁸⁸ This process also saw the acquisition of new equipment such as helicopters which proved decisive in improving the mobility of the UPDF, allowing the UPDF to pursue the LRA more effectively.⁸⁹ These reforms would be expected to increase the UPDF's basic skill and quality, and created a force more suited to a combined arms strategy (better integration). The emergence of LDUs after 2002 also proved beneficial to effectiveness. While the emergence of LDUs added to coordination challenges faced by the UPDF, they also possessed greater ability to garner intelligence due to their local connections, allowing them to more effectively target LRA units including killing several key LRA field commanders.⁹⁰ This improved the overall skill of the UPDF while both strategies illustrate the ability to assess and address shortcomings (responsiveness) on the UPDF's part. This demonstrates that generating military effectiveness in some areas – and battlefield success – is possible for coup proofed militaries, indicating that coup-proofing is not always a Faustian bargain.

The Cases in Comparative Perspective: Trends in Coup-Proofing and Effectiveness

From examining these two cases, a number of trends can be identified. First, it is clear that coup-proofing does not have a uniform impact on military effectiveness across time and space. The case studies above indicate that although Uganda's coup proofing strategies induced issues with equipment quality, unit morale and the development and execution of strategy, the Ugandan military was ultimately was able to address some of these which contributed to improved results on the battlefield. By contrast, the Ivorian military was plagued by internal divisions, a lack of equipment, manpower and adequate force development practices and ultimately a fundamental inability to sustain military operations as an entire force, requiring reliance on elite units, militias, and mercenaries to carry out the military's core functions. While the Gbagbo regime was able to mask these deficits and achieve some success against weaker rebel groups in 2002 and 2003, the underlying deficits in skill, quality, integration and responsiveness ultimately led to the collapse of the Ivorian military and the fall of the regime. Thus while both cases were characterized by coup-proofing-related ineffectiveness, it is clear that the mere act of coup-proofing did not produce uniform impacts on effectiveness across the cases.

This finding accords with the argument of this paper that the specific coup-proofing strategies leaders choose and how they implement said strategies determines the severity of these deficits. Turning to the hypotheses outlined above, a number of interesting observations can be made from this data as to how various measures impact effectiveness (see Table 1 below).

Table 1: Evidence for the Six Hypothesis

Hypothesis	Support?	Evidence
Hypothesis 1	Weak	(+) High levels of structural coup-proofing in both cases and sub-optimal effectiveness across all dimensions in both cases. (-) UPDF effectiveness improved despite high levels of counter-balancing, including addition of militia forces.
Hypothesis 2	Weak to Moderate	(+) Ivorian military had higher levels of exclusion, including ethnic-based purges and saw significantly lower effectiveness than the moderately exclusionary UPDF. (-) Exclusion had little direct impact on effectiveness in the Ivorian case.
Hypothesis 3	Strong	(+) Units recruited from Gbagbo's ethnic group did not disintegrate, unlike regular Ivorian units.
Hypothesis 4	Strong	(+) The well-funded UPDF was more effective than the underfunded Ivorian military in the 2002-03 period.
Hypothesis 5	Moderate (Political) Weak to Moderate (Economic)	(+) Ivorian military was more integrated into civil administration and was more ineffective than UPDF. (-) Both UPDF and Ivorian military were part of the political patronage network of ruling elites. (-) UPDF officers given greater opportunities for corruption and profiteering, yet UPDF was more effective than the Ivorian military. (+) Opportunities for corruption negative impacted macro- and micro-level effectiveness of UPDF.
Hypothesis 6	Strong	(+) Withdrawal of economic incentives led to a mobilization failure among soldiers in Ivory Coast.

For one, structural coup-proofing is not as damaging as first thought. Indeed, the UPDF was more effective despite having comparable levels of counterbalancing to the Ivorian military and internal

monitoring. Thus while structural measures hampered integration, responsiveness, skill and quality in both cases, they cannot explain the variation in effectiveness across the cases. There is also only modest support for the second hypothesis, with the highly exclusionary Ivorian military less effective than the UPDF, which targeted exclusionary practices to ensure key units and senior officers remained homogenous. However, the Ivorian case suggests that exclusionary practices and purges may impact battlefield performance more by facilitating rebel mobilization and fighting capacity than by undermining military effectiveness, raising questions as to whether the association between ethnicization and effectiveness is spurious. At the same time, the performance of ethnicized elite units in Ivory Coast demonstrates that ethnic congruence of units with political elites reduces the risk of desertion and disintegration.

The cases above also provide mixed evidence for the hypotheses of a negative effect of patronage and co-optation on battlefield effectiveness. While there is a clear association between political cooptation and lower effectiveness in the Ivorian case, it must be noted that senior officers in both the UPDF and the Ivorian military were recipients of political patronage, indicating that the mere politicization of a military force is not sufficient to significantly undermine effectiveness. Rather, the cases indicate that only where political cooptation involves deep integration of the military into the political and administrative spheres, implemented in a manner which distorts the military's martial identity, does such cooptation have negative effects. Further, the Ivorian case illustrates that this occurs through indirect processes resulting from these distortions in corporate identity such as underfunding and inadequate force development, factors not evident in Uganda. Likewise, the impact of economic patronage does not appear to be decisive. While the UPDF's extensive system of patronage via opportunities for corruption and profiteering clearly had significant negative impacts on the integration, responsiveness, skill and quality of the UPDF and contributed to desertion problems, the UPDF remained globally more effective than the Ivorian military whose access to economic patronage was more constrained. Finally, the notion that removal of incentives will produce desertion or disintegration is supported by the Ivorian case.

Before concluding, this paper must mention the interaction of various coup-proofing strategies and the role of adaptation strategies in ameliorating the effects of coup-proofing. On the first count, these cases suggest that it is the interaction of various coup-proofing strategies, rather than any single strategy, that determines military effectiveness – a point backed by the lack of strong relationships between any single coup-proofing measure and effectiveness (with the exception of underfunding), despite clear variations in effectiveness and consequently battlefield performance. In the context of cooptation, underfunding, reliance on loyal units and extreme exclusion which produced a motivated foe, the Ivorian military was unable to adapt to overcome deficits stemming from these measures. By contrast the UPDF, with its superior financial resources was able to weather the negative effects of structural coup-proofing and economic co-optation via corruption. This illustrates that how leaders construct their coup-proofing apparatus can moderate or exacerbate deficits in military effectiveness. On the second point, these cases demonstrate that states are able address the shortcomings resulting from coup-proofing without dismantling their coup-proofing apparatuses. In both cases, states relied on militias to augment their military capabilities with mixed success. Likewise, the UPDF example shows that modernization efforts can help address basic issues such as equipment quality and improve performance even in coup-proofed militaries. This indicates that coup-proofing does not automatically produce a completely dysfunctional security sector, though short of significant reform, sub-optimal military effectiveness is likely to remain a problem for coup-proofed states.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

While coup-proofing measures exert negative effects on military effectiveness in civil wars, the methods states choose to coup-proof can shape the magnitude of these effects. While different measures are associated with only moderate effects on military effectiveness, the evidence in this paper provides

some indications that combinations of measures, rather than individual measures, have the greatest impact. The cases explored in this paper provide strong indications that underfunding has a significant negative impact on effectiveness, and that ethnicization can improve cohesion in ethnicized units while undermining overall effectiveness. They also implicate co-optation strategies, which distort military corporate identity and facilitate egregious corruption, as being highly problematic. These findings support the notion that not all forms of coup-proofing are equally detrimental and the idea that coup-proofing is not necessarily a Faustian bargain. Contrary to accepted wisdom, coup-proofing must be seen as a rational strategy undertaken by elites in weakly institutionalized states which balances competing threats to leadership survival posed by coups and civil wars.

This paper makes an important contribution to a growing literature on the topic of coup-proofing and military effectiveness by highlighting the importance of specific coup-proofing arrangements in shaping military effectiveness and providing insight into the logic behind the choices made by leaders to coup-proof. This is not to say that this paper offers the definitive answer to the question at hand. Problems regarding control of certain factors remain, most notably the relative capabilities of the rebel groups considered.⁹¹ This paper examines only two cases which constrains this paper's ability to conclusively determine how various measures interact to produce deficits in effectiveness and how certain constellations of coup-proofing arrangements shape military effectiveness. Nonetheless, this paper provides an important first step in establishing an empirical foundation for assessing claims about the impact of coup-proofing on military effectiveness in civil wars. This builds upon a growing body of work on the strategic logic of leader survival.⁹² Future research will need to focus on additional case studies to further develop an understanding of which combinations of measures are most detrimental to effectiveness and explore how leaders employ adaptation strategies to address the shortcomings of their coup-proofed militaries. Future research will also benefit from richer data for quantitative analysis. At the time of publication, measures of coup proofing are limited to a measure of counterbalancing which examines the number of fighting organizations within a military, ignoring other forms of coup-proofing.⁹³ Better metrics of various coup-proofing will enable quantitative analyses to assess how various measures – and various combinations of measures – shape military effectiveness and conflict outcomes.

The findings of this paper have a number of important policy implications. For one, while security sector reform envisions improvements in both the delivery of security and accountability of security forces,⁹⁴ donors and security partners can encourage reforms similar to those seen in the Ugandan case as a first step to broader reforms. By enhancing the effectiveness of forces through improved procurement and recruitment practices and anti-corruption efforts, donors can ensure partner states are capable of addressing security threats. Moreover, in the most severe cases of ineffectiveness, donors could encourage the raising of militia and other security forces to augment capabilities as a short-term solution. In addition, donors and security partners should focus their energy on reforming the most problematic forms of coup-proofing. While additional research is needed, this study suggests external partners should focus their attention on states characterized by high levels of structural coup-proofing, exclusionary practices and distorted corporate identities. As seen in Ivory Coast, and more recently in Iraq, these militaries are the most ineffective in combatting non-state actors.

This paper also suggests that undertaking modest reforms which attenuate dysfunctional aspects of the militaries related to procurement and soldier well-being could have significant impacts on overall effectiveness in certain contexts. Given the focus placed on the security sector in conflict and post-conflict situations by donors, these lessons are crucial for taking the initial steps to developing capable security forces. Finally, external partners must consider the incentives facing leaders of weakly institutionalized states when attempting to implement reforms. Given that coup-proofing is a rational strategy driven by political imperatives in weakly institutionalized states, reforms are unlikely to be made without pressure. External partners will need to utilize leverage and in some cases make compromises, as seen in Western acquiescence to continued high levels of defence spending by Museveni, to secure buy-in from elites.⁹⁵ External partners should also encourage the long-term development of democratic

institutions and norms such as military non-intervention in politics to reduce the need for coup-proofing. Ultimately, it is by reducing the internal security dilemma, which encourages coup-proofing in the first place, that security sector dysfunction arising from disordered civil-military relations will be resolved.

Endnotes

¹ Coup-proofing refers to a broad range of policy measures that can be taken to reduce the likelihood of coup attempts and/or successful coups (though not necessarily structural coup risk) and prolong regime survival.

² Joshua Keating, "Iraq's Built-to-Fail Military," *Slate Magazine*, June 19, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014, http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/06/19/how_maliki_s_paranoia_created_iraq_s_dysfunction_al_military.html. See also Yasir Abbas and Dan Trombly, "Inside the Collapse of the Iraqi Army's 2nd Division," *War on the Rocks*, July 1, 2014, accessed August 30, 2014, <http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/inside-the-collapse-of-the-iraqi-armys-2nd-division/>, and Erica DeBruin, "Coup-Proofing for Dummies: The Benefits of Following the Maliki Playbook," *Foreign Policy*, July 27, 2014, accessed June 3, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2014-07-27/coup-proofing-dummies>.

³ See especially Phillip Roessler, "The enemy within: Personal rule, coups, and civil war in Africa." *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (2011), 300-346, and Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 2010).

⁴ For a more detailed discussion of the incentives to seize power through coups, and an explanation of the relationship between coups and civil wars, see Roessler. "Enemy Within," 308-317.

⁵ The notion that coup proofing reduces coup attempts and/or the likelihood of success finds empirical support in a number of studies. For examples, see: Johnathan Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 6 (2012), 1017-1040, and Erica De Bruin, "Does Coup-Proofing Work: Evidence from Developing States," (Unpublished Manuscript, 2015), accessed June 27, 2015, <https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/163740/5a831bd2-e6a5-4405-9641-a4114a431f9a/Website%20version.pdf> and Tobias Böhmelt and Ulrich Pilster, "The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes," *International Interactions* 41, no. 1 (2015), 158-182. Coup-proofing does not, however, lower the underlying risk for coups or the incentives facing elites to violently challenge leaders in weakly institutionalized states, see Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 5 (2003), 594-620 and Holger Albrecht, "The Myth of Coup-Proofing: Risk and Instances of Military Coups d'état in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950-2013," *Armed Forces & Society*, Online First (2014), accessed June 27, 2015, <http://afs.sagepub.com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/content/early/2014/08/08/0095327X14544518.abstract>.

⁶ Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Böhmelt. "Coup-proofing and military effectiveness in interstate wars, 1967–99." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011), 331-350.

⁷ Johnathan Powell, "Coups and Conflicts: The Paradox of Coup-Proofing," (PhD diss, University of Kentucky, 2012), 147-151.

⁸ Florence Gaub, "The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-proofing and Repression," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 2 (2013), 235-237.

⁹ Johnathan Powell, "Coups and Conflicts: The Paradox of Coup-Proofing," (PhD diss, University of Kentucky, 2012), 155-162.

¹⁰ Fearon and Laitin argue rebellion occurs where states lack capacity to deter rebellion. See James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 37, no.1 (2003), 88. If one coup-proofing tactic were associated with higher rates of conflict onset than another, this would suggest that the former tactic would have a greater negative impact on military capacity and effectiveness than the latter tactic. In this light, there is reason to believe structural coup-proofing is more detrimental than ethnic exclusion.

¹¹ Risa Brooks, "Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions and International Forces on Military Effectiveness," in *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness*, ed. Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley, (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 9.

¹² *Ibid.*, 10-11

¹³ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

¹⁵ Florence Gaub, *Military Integration After Civil Wars: Multiethnic Armies, Identity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 118-120

¹⁶ For a discussion of Syria's coup proofing apparatus, see Michael Makara, "Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring," *Democracy and Security*, 9, no. 4 (2013), 347-350. Syria's coup-proofing apparatus has been cited as a primary limitation of Syrian military forces in the Syrian Civil War, see Christopher Kozak, "An Army in All Corner": Assad's Campaign Strategy in Syria, Middle East Security Report 26, (Washington: Institute for the Study of War, 2015), 12-13.

¹⁷ See Hassan Hassan, "Assad is Losing His Troops," Daily Beast, June 21, 2015, accessed June 27, 2015, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/21/the-druze-abandon-assad.html>, for a discussion of desertion among the Druze community.

¹⁸ Gaub, "Military Integration," 118-120. See also Theodore McLaughlin, "Desertion, Terrain and Control of the Home Front in Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no.8, 1419-1444.

¹⁹ Peter Feaver. "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999), 222.

²⁰ James Quinlavin, "Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," *International Security* 24 no.2 (1999), 133. See also Powell, "Determinants," 1021.

²¹ Timothy Hoyt, "Social Structure, Ethnicity and Military Effectiveness," in Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley (Eds.) *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness*, (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 72-73.

²² Quinlavin, "Coup-Proofing," 165

²³ Florence Gaub, "Libyan Armed Forces," 235-237.

²⁴ Dan Reiter, and Alan Stam. "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3 (1998), 259-277.

²⁵ Michael Makara, "Coup-Proofing, 353.

²⁶ Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2001), 103-111.

²⁷ Peter Feaver, "Civil Military Relations," 228.

²⁸ While there is no single indicator by which to determine if a state is weakly institutionalized, both cases are characterized by personalistic, neopatrimonial rule, and limited prospects for peaceful, orderly, and constitutional transfers of power at the time of observation, factors which incentivize elites to pursue

coups. For data indicating both states were personalistic at time of observation, see Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set," *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 2, 313-331.

²⁹ See Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 4 (2004), 525-546, for a list of factors thought to shape effectiveness. See CINC scores from J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19-48, for measure of national capability. See Monty Marshall and Keith Jagger, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010," Political Instability Task Force, retrieved August 2, 2015, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>, for data on political institutions. See United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Reports: 1990-2014," United Nations Development Programme, retrieved August 2, 2015, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/global-reports>, for data on human capital.

³⁰ For information on factors linked to civil war dynamics, see Jeffrey Dixon, "Emerging consensus: Results from the second wave of statistical studies on civil war termination," *Civil Wars* 11, no. 2 (2009), 121-136.

See Helge Holtermann, "Explaining the Development–Civil War Relationship," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29, no. 1 (2012), 56-78 for indicator of state reach. For data on external support, see data from David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, "It takes two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53, no. 4 (2009), 570-597. Terrain in both cases is not highly mountainous, see Halvard Bulhaug, Scott Gates, and Päivi Lujala, "Geography, rebel capability, and the duration of civil conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (2009), 544-569. Both states are moderately large in area and population by African standards, with the Ivory Coast somewhat larger by area, but smaller by population.

³¹ See David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, "It takes two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53, no. 4 (2009), 570-597. See especially notes 53 and 90 for explanation of minimal impacts of these factors.

³² Arnim Langer, "Horizontal inequalities and violent group mobilization in Côte d'Ivoire," *Oxford Development Studies* 33, no. 1 (2005), 30-33.

³³ *Ibid.*, 33-35.

³⁴ Bruno Charbonneau, "War and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International Line," *International Peacekeeping* 19, no. 4 (2012), 516-520.

³⁵ Boubacar N'Diaye, "Not a miracle after all... Côte D'ivoire's downfall: Flawed civil-military relations and missed opportunities," *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 33, no. 1 (2005), 95

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 97.

³⁷ Data from Pilster and Boehmelt, "Coups-Proofing," 331-350. 1999 is the last year for which data is available.

³⁸ N'Diaye, "Not a Miracle," 103. See also Lansana Gberie and Prosper Addo, *Challenges of Peace Implementation in Côte d'Ivoire: Report on an Expert Workshop by KAIPTC and ZIF*, ISS Monograph Series, (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 15

³⁹ N'Diaye, "Not a Miracle," 98-103

⁴⁰ G.A. Kieffer, "Armée Ivoirienne: Le refus de déclassement," *Politique Africaine* 78 (2000), 30-32

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- ⁴¹ For a review of the effects of Bédié's policies, including politicization and ethnicization, on civil-military relations, see G.A. Kieffer, "Armée Ivoirienne," 30-40
- ⁴² Azoumana Ouattara, "Le coup d'état de décembre 1999 ou la fin de l'« exception militaire ivoirienne » : les mutations de l'armée ivoirienne depuis 1960," in *Côte d'Ivoire: La réinvention de soi dans la violence*, ed. Francis Akindes, (Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA), 193-194.
- ⁴³ N'Diaye, "Not a Miracle," 112. While little data exists on the ethnic make-up of the Ivorian military during Gbagbo's rule, Arnim Langer finds that the pre-2005 governments under Gbagbo included no Yacoubas, the largest Northern ethnic group, among Ministerial level officials. This contrasts with average representation of above 10% during the rule of Houphouët, Bédié, and Guei, see Arnim Langer, "Horizontal inequalities and violent group mobilization in Côte d'Ivoire," *Oxford Development Studies* 33, no. 1 (2005), 40.
- ⁴⁴ International Crisis Group [ICG], *Côte d'Ivoire: No Peace in Sight*, Africa Report no.82, (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004), 7
- ⁴⁵ For military spending figures, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], "The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database," *SIPRI Publications*, Retrieved 25 July 2015, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database
- ⁴⁶ Arthur Boutellis, *The Security Sector in Côte d'Ivoire: A Source of Conflict and a Key to Peace*, (New York: International Peace Institute, May 2011), 5.
- ⁴⁷ Karel Arnaut, "Corps habillés, Nouchis and Subaltern Bigmanity in Côte d'Ivoire," In *African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks*, edited by Mats Utas 78-100, (Londres: Zed Books, 2012), 79-83.
- ⁴⁸ Jennifer Hazen, *What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Civil War*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 143.
- ⁴⁹ Boutellis, Security Sector, 5.
- ⁵⁰ Raphael Ouattara, "Cote d'Ivoire," in eds. Alan Bryden and Boubiar N'Diaye, *Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities*, (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2011), 80.
- ⁵¹ Global Security.org, "Ivory Coast Conflict: 2002," Global Security.org, retrieved July 23, 2015, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ivory-coast-2002.htm>
- ⁵² ICG, *The War is Not Yet Over*, Africa Report no.72, (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003), 17-18
- ⁵³ The presence of the French military greatly limited the military activity after late-2002 in the North, and May 2003 in the West, until 2011. Thus there are some limitations in this paper's ability to assess the Ivorian military's effectiveness, particularly vis-à-vis the strongest faction of rebels, the northern-based MPCJ. However, the Ivorian military demonstrated ineffectiveness where battles did occur, suggesting the French intervention was not the cause of Ivorian ineffectiveness or poor battlefield performance.
- ⁵⁴ Christophe Boisbouvier, "Côte d'Ivoire: les secrets d'une offensive éclair," *Jeune Afrique*. April 8, 2011, accessed September 4, 2014, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTAJA2621p010-013.xml/0/>.
- ⁵⁵ Rukmini Callamachi and Marco Chown Oved, "Entrenched Ivory Coast Leader calls for Resistance," *USA Today*, April 2, 2011, accessed September 4, 2014, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-04-02-ivory-coast_N.htm.
- ⁵⁶ Boutellis, Security Sector, 4
- ⁵⁷ ICG, *The War*, 17.

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⁸³ *Ibid.*, 16. See also Cline, LRA, 77-78, and Mwenda and Tangri, "Military Corruption," 539-552.

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⁸⁶ ICG, *Understand*, 16, and Schomerus, "They forgot," 137-139.

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Lessons Learned from UNPREDEP: Preventive Peacebuilding in Macedonia

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Abstract:

In 1992, amid the backdrop of the Yugoslav breakup and the ensuing conflict, the small, newly independent state of Macedonia became host to the United Nations' first-ever preventive peacebuilding mission, UNPREDEP. The mission is often considered a successful example of preventive peacekeeping by scholars, and a study of its case offers several valuable lessons for future missions, as well as cautions to note regarding potential constraints future preventive UN deployments may face.

Introduction

In 1992, amid the backdrop of the Yugoslav breakup and the ensuing conflict in Bosnia and Croatia, the small, newly independent state of Macedonia became host to the United Nations' first-ever preventive military peacekeeping mission. This was the first time in history that the United Nations Security Council authorized a multi-national preventive deployment mission of civilian and military components to the field "before an imminent outbreak of hostilities."¹ Any deployment that seeks to prevent rather than resolve conflict runs up against a counterfactual dilemma, as it is virtually impossible to positively prove the success of any preventive mission if no conflict does, in fact, break out. Despite this limitation, the international community was able to summon the political will to authorize this novel conception of U.N. force, partially as a result of its previous failures to do so in Bosnia and Croatia. The Macedonian deployment, called UNPREDEP, is widely considered to be a successful example of preventive peacekeeping, and a study of its case offers several valuable lessons for future missions, as well as cautions regarding possible constraints future deployments may face.

I. Historical Background

Macedonia is a small, landlocked South Balkan country, bordered by Albania to the west, Bulgaria to the east, Greece to the south, and Serbia and Kosovo to the north. According to a 1994 census, the population identified as 66.5 percent ethnic Macedonians, 22.9 percent ethnic Albanians, and 10.6 percent Turks, Serbs, Roma, and others.² Although a 'Macedonian' national consciousness began to develop in the late-nineteenth century, Macedonia only emerged as a territorial entity in 1946 when Josip Broz Tito, president of Yugoslavia, established Macedonia as one of six republics comprising the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This marked the moment when the present territorial state "receive[d] its first lasting legal and political foundation"³ However, before 1991, Macedonia had never before had its own sovereign government. Considering this fact, it is all the more remarkable that Macedonia was the only republic to emerge from the breakup of the Yugoslav federation as a multiethnic democracy without experiencing a period of violent conflict.⁴

In 1991, federal Yugoslavia began a process of violent disintegration. Slovenia and Croatia were the first states to announce their secession, triggering violence between national forces and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), directed from Belgrade by Slobodan Milošević. As the centrifugal forces of nationalism and newfound independence accelerated in Yugoslavia, Macedonia found itself in a difficult position. Macedonia was poor and "heavily dependent on federal redistributive policies, so...[Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov was] not inclined to secede."⁵ However, with Belgrade's jingoist nationalist rhetoric intensifying, and the outbreak of armed hostilities between Belgrade and Slovenia and Croatia, Gligorov concluded that unless Macedonia seceded, it would be reduced to a minority in a Serb-dominated rump Yugoslavia.⁶ Thus it seems that "Macedonia's own independence was impelled more by external forces than by native nationalism."⁷

Macedonia held a referendum on independence in September 1991, in which 95% of the population voted in favor of secession from Yugoslavia, although Macedonian Albanians and Serbs boycotted the referendum. Macedonia declared independence in November 1991. Michael Lund explains that newly independent Macedonia faced four major threats: fear that the local Serb population could lobby Belgrade to 'recover' Macedonia in pursuit of a Greater Serbia; strained relations with Bulgaria and Greece over irredentist concerns, and, in the case of Greece, antipathy over Macedonia's name; domestic tensions between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians; and a fear of instability to the north in Kosovo, where a large refugee flow could trigger Macedonian instability.⁸

Although similar declarations of independence from other former Yugoslavian republics triggered a violent response from Belgrade, there was no immediate violence in Macedonia for several major reasons. First, Macedonia shrewdly pursued a foreign policy of 'active neutrality' toward its neighbors, pledging friendly relations with all. Moreover, the former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren

Zimmerman, reported that Milošević let Macedonia go without a fight because he thought Macedonia would eventually want to reintegrate with Serbia: “Left economically dependent and exposed to the depredations of what were known as the ‘three wolves’ (Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece), Macedonia would crawl back to Serbian protection”—the fourth wolf.⁹ Finally, by spring 1992, Belgrade was fighting wars in Bosnia and Croatia, so Belgrade withdrew all JNA installments, troops, and weapons that had previously been in Macedonian territory for mobilization on its other fronts. The fact that Macedonia was left without any weapons or defense infrastructure whatsoever may have helped it avoid violence in the long run, if it was seen as less threatening by neighbouring states and domestic minorities.

II. Case study of UNPREDEP intervention

The prevention of further conflict and violence has always guided United Nations peacekeeping missions. However, the establishment of a peacekeeping force to Macedonia in 1992 is the first example in U.N. history of deployment *before* the outbreak of violence appeared imminent. Bjorkdahl ascribes much of the credit for this novel conceptualization of peacekeeping to the 1992 “Agenda for Peace” report by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, which strongly emphasized the idea of conflict prevention. Against the backdrop of the Agenda for Peace report, the Security Council was able to reach consensus on the necessity of violence prevention measures in Macedonia, “to avoid the risk of a wider war in the former Yugoslavia and to provide the U.N. with a much-needed success story in the region.”¹⁰

Even more important than the conceptual and normative opening provided by the Agenda for Peace report was the horrific war taking shape in nearby Bosnia in 1992, the details of which were playing out on television screens across the Western world. The international commitment to Macedonia almost certainly stems from the international community’s perceived failures in Bosnia. In December of 1991, before the outbreak of violence in Bosnia but after violence was already underway in Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović implored the U.N. to station preventive peacekeepers in Bosnia along its borders with Croatia and Serbia, ahead of the European Community’s recognition of Croatia and Slovenia’s independence (which Izetbegović correctly guessed would goad Belgrade into further violence).¹¹ Despite the fact that the U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia backed this proposal, “U.N. leadership...took the traditional if puzzling line that peacekeepers are used after a conflict, not before.”¹² However, by the time Macedonian President Gligorov made the same plea to the United Nations in November 1992, for a U.N. peacekeeping force to be deployed to Macedonia, the international community had mustered the political will to accept his request for the unprecedented mandate of a U.N. multilateral preventive deployment.

The U.N. Security Council authorized a preventive deployment of military, civilian, and administrative personnel, along with a civilian police force, on 11 December 1992.¹³ The Secretary-General initially proposed a 700-troop battalion for Macedonia as an extension of the U.N. peacekeeping force already on the ground in Croatia, UNPROFOR.¹⁴ This initial deployment was essentially meant to ensure Macedonia’s territorial integrity by deterring any violence along its borders with neighbouring states and prevent it from becoming embroiled in the broader Yugoslav conflict. The U.N. was able to mobilize the preventive force quickly, as there were already U.N. peacekeepers on the ground in neighbouring Bosnia, and the mission arrived in Macedonia in January 1993, only a month after the mandate was issued. An initial interim deployment of Canadian peacekeepers arrived in Macedonia from Bosnia in January 1993 while waiting for the ‘permanent’ troops from Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden to arrive. The force became fully operational in March 1993. In June 1993, the U.S. made an unsolicited offer to add 300 troops to the Macedonian force,¹⁵ in an effort to underscore its commitment to the Balkan region and Europe in general after its dismal failures in Bosnia.

UNPREDEP’s initial mandate was to patrol the Macedonian side of the 240-km Serbian border and the 180-km Albanian border, report any threatening developments, and “by its presence, deter such threats from any source, as well as help prevent clashes which could otherwise occur between external

elements and Macedonian forces, thus helping to strengthen security and confidence in Macedonia.”¹⁶ It is important to note that, in its initial incarnation, UNPREDEP’s mandate was solely focused on preventing threats from external actors rather than from preventing domestic, ethnically motivated violence.

As internal tensions between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians rose, however, UNPREDEP’s civilian mandate was strengthened, including good offices functions: “UNPREDEP’s tasks comprised both a trip-wire function along the border similar to traditional peacekeeping and a nation-building function to deal with internal tension between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, a contrast to traditional peacekeeping.”¹⁷ Following reports highlighting rising internal political tensions from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Henryk Sokalski, UNPREDEP was given an explicit mandate to focus on Macedonia’s internal issues in 1994. It was this crucial mandate that may well have been a decisive factor in the long-term relative success of UNPREDEP.

Security Council Resolution 908 of 31 March 1994 “encourage[d] the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia...to use his good offices as appropriate to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in that Republic.”¹⁸ The broad, open-ended wording—leaving it to the discretion of the SRSG what, exactly, should constitute “appropriate” use of his offices—gave the mission the flexibility it needed on the ground to ensure cooperation with local parties and other prominent organizations within the region, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). His good offices functions also included “confidence-building between the Slav Macedonian and Albanian communities, providing assistance to humanitarian organizations, and giving support to state and non-state actors engaged in improving the country’s infrastructure.”¹⁹

Although Thierry Tardy argues that UNPREDEP’s good offices and mediation components were relatively marginal and less effective when compared to similar functions of multidimensional peace operations that followed in the 2000s,²⁰ it is clear that these mission components still played a positive and significant role in Macedonia. UNPREDEP became an important mechanism for fostering dialogue and encouraging restraint on the part of various factions within Macedonia.²¹ SRSG Sokalski and UNPREDEP’s staff members relied largely on innovation, as there was no prior template for a preventive peacekeeping mission (notwithstanding more ‘traditional’ peacekeeping elements like the border patrol). The mission worked to establish “contacts between high-ranking military authorities of Macedonia’s Ministry of Defense, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s General Staff, and relevant ministries in Albania,” as well as coordinating very closely with the OSCE Spill-over Monitor Mission.²²

When a dispute about an Albanian-language university in Tetovo turned violent in 1995,²³ UNPREDEP “provided political assistance and helped to calm the situation by its physical presence.”²⁴ Lund argues that UNPREDEP’s most significant impact, however, was “snuffing out sparks of potentially violent border incidents...However innocuous seeming, even initially small-scale incursions with no larger intent might have unleashed a train of events leading to wider hostilities between Macedonians or Albanians and Serbs.”²⁵

In the last several years of its mandate, UNPREDEP’s presence was caught somewhere between the wishes of the Security Council’s five permanent members—the United States, Russia, the UK, France, and China—and the inertia of regional events. By November 1996, the Security Council, under pressure from Russia, resolved to begin downsizing the mission within six months, with a view to concluding it.²⁶ However, following explosive turmoil in Albania in 1997, the downsizing was frozen. This may have perversely decreased the chances for interethnic conflict in Macedonia, at least for a short period: “when political authority broke down in Albania in March 1997, annexation by Albania lost its attraction [for the Macedonian Albanian minority].”²⁷ In December 1997, the Security Council voted to terminate the mission in August 1998. However, following the escalation of conflict in neighboring Kosovo over the summer of 1998, UNPREDEP’s mandate was extended yet again, until February 28, 1999. This time, when UNPREDEP’s mandate was up for renewal again, China vetoed any continuation

of the mission, citing existing peace and stability in the country and a need to divert resources elsewhere.²⁸ (Macedonia had also recently angered China by establishing diplomatic and trade relations with Taiwan, although Chinese officials denied the veto was related to the Taiwan issue.²⁹)

However, Chinese *realpolitik* notwithstanding, most observers did agree by 1999 that Macedonia had achieved a degree of “stability that signified a successful transition to peaceful co-existence and multi-ethnic democracy.”³⁰ However, the conflict across the border in Kosovo intensified less than a month after UNPREDEP pulled out, as NATO began its bombing campaign. The Kosovo war had an enormous impact on Macedonia, as over 260,000 Kosovar refugees spilled over its borders—roughly 11 percent of Macedonia’s entire national population.³¹ This huge influx of refugees and a Greek trade embargo,³² combined with the loss of Macedonia’s primary trading partner, Serbia—which was suffering from international sanctions and being bombed by NATO—brought the Macedonian economy to the brink of collapse. Transit routes for exports were suddenly much more costly as the fastest and cheapest route was through Serbia, from which Macedonia was now severed. The treatment of refugees and the overall economic strain further increased ethnic tension between Albanians and Macedonians.

Conflict erupted in Macedonia in 2001 between the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) and Macedonian security forces, leaving 200 dead. The conflict, which was contained mainly in the northern, majority-Albanian towns of Macedonia, ended later the same year with the Ohrid peace agreement. NATO then deployed a 3500-troop disarmament mission for one month between August and September of 2001. The operation, entitled ‘Operation Essential Harvest,’ was designed “to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their weapons.”³³ Following this large one-month deployment, there were two smaller NATO stabilization deployments (Operation Amber Fox and Operation Allied Harmony) which, taken together, ran from September 2001 until March 2003.³⁴

III. Judging the success of UNPREDEP in Macedonia

UNPREDEP is widely held to be, on balance, a successful example of preventive peacekeeping and peacebuilding.³⁵ The creativity and flexibility the mission used in pursuing its mandate is all the more remarkable when one considers that it was the first ever preventive deployment undertaken by the U.N. and the international community. The mission was successful in translating reports of ethnic tension on the ground into a flexible interpretation of its mandate that facilitated interethnic dialogue and conflict resolution, thereby likely reducing the likelihood of civil conflict. However, the evaluation of any preventive force necessarily encounters the problem of a counterfactual: “How can one prove that the absence of mass violence or incursions from hostile neighbors was attributable to a preventive intervention on behalf of the international community?”³⁶ As outlined above, however, there were several border incursions by Serb forces which UNPREDEP helped to defuse, and it is not difficult to imagine these minor infractions potentially ballooning into a more violent conflict. To counter these risks, the international community, notably UNPREDEP and the OSCE mission, were “uncharacteristically proactive in reducing the risks of conflict from several threatening external and internal disputes.”³⁷ The eruption of interethnic violence in 2001, after UNPREDEP had ended, may indicate that similar violence may have erupted during the 1990s if UNPREDEP had not been in place.

However, one major issue with UNPREDEP was that the extensive interethnic dialogue it facilitated and the power-sharing agreements it brokered both helped to ossify identities in Macedonia along ethnic lines. Here we encounter another counterfactual, as other regional examples suggest that this may have happened even if UNPREDEP had not been in place. Regardless, UNPREDEP did nothing to positively engender non-ethnic politics within Macedonia.³⁸ Lund writes that preventive diplomacy has had unintended ‘King Midas’ effects: “by acknowledging certain groups’ grievances, third parties raised their expectations and increased the incentives to continue nationalist political causes through ethnic mobilization, while failing to undercut or circumvent local tendencies to ethnicize all domestic and foreign policy issues.”³⁹ He argues that prevention, at its core, must alter the incentive structures driving

politics, by “fostering new domestic social and economic interests and organized groups, creating broad stakes in participating in the international system, and helping build self-regulating national dispute management processes and interstate relations.”⁴⁰ This radical alteration of incentive structures may, however, be too much to ask of the first-ever preventive deployment in U.N. history.

A look back at the decade since UNPREDEP and NATO troops left Macedonia gives some understanding of the preventive deployment’s success, in the opinion of authors surveyed herein. While ethnicized identities persist, both the Macedonian and Albanian populations are represented in the country’s multi-party electoral system, and use the system to pursue interests and vocalize grievances.

IV. Implications for future UN preventive peacekeeping deployments

The overall success of UNPREDEP presents a good opportunity to extract lessons for future preventive peacekeeping deployments. However, it must be noted that UNPREDEP seems to have benefited from a convergence of fortuitous factors, both internationally and relating to its mission.

The first lesson for future preventive action is that *local/national consent* or invitation is crucial. It was vital that Macedonian President Gligorov first request that the UN stage the innovative mission; UNPREDEP was viewed by all parties to the potential conflict as neutral and legitimate. Ostrowski observes that, “unlike so many other U.N. missions, Macedonia bears a striking example of near total support among the government and population for the mission’s presence.”⁴¹ There is no doubt that a ‘preventive’ mission imposed by the international community without local actors’ consent would exacerbate an ongoing conflict, if it were ever approved by a Security Council that would almost certainly be at an impasse over violations of sovereignty. Since it is unlikely that many leaders in near-conflict situations will actively seek out a U.N. preventive force, as President Gligorov did, this is a highly important limiting factor.

The second major lesson UNPREDEP offers is the strong benefit a *clear, flexible mandate and strong leadership* offers. The wording of the 1994 Security Council mandate for the Special Representative to use his good offices ‘as appropriate’ allowed “the mission to encompass a range of preventive activity extending far beyond what was originally conceived for the force.”⁴² Similarly, Tardy argues that UNPREDEP’s success can be attributed to the clarity and realistic nature of its mandate—“monitoring a border mainly through the deployment of military observers.” Moreover, the additional mandated tasks, such as the mediation and good offices function, did not “undermine the clarity of the primary mandate.”⁴³

A third factor in UNPREDEP’s success was the mission’s *active involvement with other organizations*, particularly the OSCE’s Spill-Over Monitor Mission, and local and international non-governmental organizations. SRSG Sokalski writes that what “UNPREDEP did...was foster these partnerships [between organizations] and integrate their distinct and overlapping functions into an appropriate peace operation.”⁴⁴ Moreover, Bellamy and Williams note that the close institutional attention to Macedonia and the cooperation of various international actors on the issue helped ensure that when conflict did break out in 2001, it was relatively short-lived. “Having a web of international institutions” was vital to the ultimate prevention of greater conflict in Macedonia, because in situations where “one is unable to prevent conflict (as was the case with the UN after the Chinese veto), others are able to take on this role.”⁴⁵ The close institutional cooperation between UNPREDEP, the OSCE, the EU, the US, and NATO meant that even after the termination of UNPREDEP’s mandate, continued international institutional engagement with Macedonia was ensured.

A final factor in UNPREDEP’s success was the *international community’s demonstrated level of commitment* to Macedonia, insofar as major actors had significant political will to “invest material and ideological resources in conflict prevention” in Macedonia’s case.⁴⁶ Once the Security Council mandate was passed in 1992, the U.N. acted very quickly to put the force in place. As mentioned above, the first

interim troops were deployed from the mission in nearby Bosnia within less than a month, and the full civilian and military deployment was operational in less than three months. The fact that UNPREDEP grew out of an existing peacekeeping mission in the region is of vital importance to note for future deployments. Bellamy and Williams find it highly unlikely that UNPREDEP would have been deployed had it not emerged from UNPROFOR and in the context of the regional conflagration in Yugoslavia.⁴⁷ This does not make UNPREDEP a *sui generis* case, however; similar risks of regional spill-over exist around the world. For example, one could imagine a small preventive force deploying from the UN mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO) to Burundi to help prevent the worsening of violence related to upcoming elections, and to prevent an influx of refugees from further destabilizing the DRC.

The involvement and commitment of great powers also undoubtedly bolstered the UNPREDEP's effectiveness: the U.S. enhanced the deterrent element of the mission when it deployed 300 of its own troops, unsolicited from the Secretary General, to join UNPREDEP troops. The fact that any "attack posing a threat to U.S. forces would almost certainly engender a forceful response, and the significant risk therein of a more extensive engagement with the American military in Yugoslavia, was an underlying reality clearly not lost upon outside parties."⁴⁸ The U.S. signalled its strong commitment when Secretary of State Warren Christopher said "the U.S. is not likely to leave its troops in Macedonia undefended. You can be sure of that."⁴⁹

Any future preventive deployments are likely to face significant constraints that UNPREDEP was fortunate to avoid. Harnessing sufficient political will from the international community is surely the most difficult challenge. Preventive deployment and the political will that must go into it is made "all the more difficult by the concept's inherent conundrum: the impossibility of proving a negative. If its application in a particular instance is wholly successful, it will by definition eliminate any proof that such measures were needed in the first place."⁵⁰ Macedonia benefitted from the unique circumstances of the Yugoslavian breakup. The international community, which had already rejected a Bosnian request for preventive peacekeepers and then watched in horror as the country descended into violence, was extremely eager to avoid 'another Bosnia'. This meant that international media was also more focused on the region than it would likely be in other pre-conflict situations. The stark comparison between UNPREDEP in Macedonia and UNPROFOR in Bosnia also highlights that UNPREDEP did not suffer from many of the shortcomings that have plagued peacekeeping missions throughout the UN's history. Aside from the obvious—that UNPROFOR was deployed amidst large scale violence, while UNPREDEP was not—the mission in Bosnia "furthermore suffered from a lack of resources, an unrealistic and ambiguous mandate, a faltering commitment of contributing states, and weak consent of the parties."⁵¹

Political will to intervene preventively was also driven by several realpolitik motivations. The case for preventive peacekeeping in Macedonia was uniquely appealing from an American perspective: "a peacekeeping doctrine was emerging that held that American troops should be used only where they could make a difference." The situation in Bosnia had "no clear line...between warring combatants," and the U.S. felt it was a losing situation. However, in Macedonia "there were no hostilities between Macedonia and Serbia, so a clear line for deterrence could be drawn."⁵² Moreover, the U.S. would not be infringing on any state's sovereignty, since Macedonia had solicited the intervention. U.S. involvement also blunted European criticism that America was unwilling to put boots on the ground. Finally, the U.S. security establishment felt a strong need to prevent any south Balkan violence that would risk entangling Turkey and Greece—two antagonistic NATO members—just as the security alliance was determining what role it should play in a post-Cold War Europe. The unfortunate reality in assessing other potential preventive conflict deployments is that if major powers do not see a security interest for themselves at play, they will be much more resistant to intervention.

Conclusion

Although the success of the UNPREDEP mission in Macedonia owes much to fortuitous international factors—most importantly, the unlikely yet forceful mobilization of international political will and host country consent—several major lessons, highlighted above, can still be gleaned. These lessons include: the need for local/national consent to deployment; the necessity of a flexible mandate and strong leadership, which fostered a productive intra-ethnic dialogue in Macedonia; close coordination with any other international organizations on the ground, which meant the international community could remain effective even after UNPREDEP’s withdrawal; and the necessity of a demonstrated level of commitment on behalf of the international community.

Following UNPREDEP’s success, the concept of conflict prevention has made its way into the United Nations’ normative framework,⁵³ and now figures more prominently in discussions surrounding conflict. Although the 1992 Agenda for Peace highlighted the importance of conflict prevention, the norm continued to develop under Secretary General Kofi Annan, notably with the Brahimi Report in 2000 and Annan’s 2001 *Prevention of Armed Conflict* report, which highlights the utility of the preventive approach.⁵⁴ There exists, however, a need to situate the preventive deployment within a spectrum of preventive activities in which nearly all peacekeeping missions are engaged. If, as Bellamy and Williams point out, peacekeeping operations are understood to “encompass [all or any] action aimed at arresting the escalation” of conflict that has already broken out into armed hostilities, then the number of examples is high,⁵⁵ since nearly all UN missions seek to prevent further deterioration into conflict. However, if a preventive deployment is more narrowly conceived, and is meant to prevent the actual initial outbreak of armed conflict, then there are very few existing examples, and UNPREDEP represents the only case where a military deployment has been mandated before the outbreak of *any* hostilities in that country.⁵⁶ While it is clear that the political will for preventive deployments may be extremely difficult to muster, it seems to be a worthwhile endeavor. In terms of “human and material resources, prevention is less costly than cure.”⁵⁷ Moreover, the relative success of Macedonia as a multi-ethnic, multi-party democracy demonstrates that “a preventive operation can be an incubator in which newly independent or newly stable states can develop.”⁵⁸

Endnotes

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⁴ *Ibid.*, 173.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 175.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 176.

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⁹ Warren Zimmerman, “The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” *Foreign Affairs* 74:2 (March/April 1995).

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¹² Zimmerman.

¹³ See UN Security Council Res. 795, on the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” 11 December 1992. <http://UNscr.com/en/resolutions/795>

¹⁴ Initially, the deployment was known as UNPROFOR-Macedonia, given that it was an extension of UNPROFOR. However, on March 31, 1995, the name of the preventive force in Macedonia was changed to the “United Nations Preventive Deployment Force” (UNPREDEP). For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the Macedonian peacekeeping mission across the entire time of its deployment (1992-1999) as UNPREDEP. I feel it is a permissible simplification as the mandate of the deployment did not change when the name was changed.

¹⁵ “U.S. Says It Will Send 300 troops to Balkan Republic To Limit Strife.” Elaine Sciolino, *The New York Times*, 11 June 1993.

¹⁶ “Report of the Secretary-General on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” UN document S/24923, 9 December 1992.

¹⁷ Bjorkdahl, 218.

¹⁸ United Nations Security Council Resolution 908 (1994). S/RES/908, 31 March 1994. See article 12.

¹⁹ Bellamy and Williams, 163.

²⁰ Tardy, 506.

²¹ Bjorkdahl, 218.

²² Ostrowski, 811, 815.

²³ A northern Macedonian town near the Kosovo border, with a majority Albanian population.

²⁴ Ostrowski, 816.

²⁵ Lund, 196.

²⁶ United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1082: The Situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” S/RES/1082 (1996). 27 November 1996. <http://UNscr.com/en/resolutions/1082>

²⁷ Lund, 182.

²⁸ United Nations Press Release, “SECURITY COUNCIL FAILS TO EXTEND MANDATE OF UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT FORCE IN FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA.” SC/6648, 25 February 1999.

²⁹ “Taiwan criticizes China UN veto.” *BBC News*, 26 February 1999. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/285835.stm>

³⁰ Bjorkdahl, 221.

³¹ See Freedom House, “Macedonia” in *Freedom in the World* 1999, and ICG Report N° 67.

³² The Greek trade embargo had been imposed over a dispute related to Macedonia’s name.

³³ “Operation Essential Harvest.” NATO website. <http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tfh/home.htm>

³⁴ <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-025e.htm>

³⁵ Sokalski, Lund, Ostrowski, Bellamy and Williams, and others all agree that UNPREDEP was quite successful, in that it played an “important role in facilitating Macedonia’s relatively peaceful transition from communism to sovereign independence and democracy.” (Bellamy and Williams, 163).

³⁶ Sokalski, xiii.

³⁷ Lund, 204.

³⁸ Ibid., 204.

³⁹ Ibid., 174.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 174.

⁴¹ Ostrowski, 850.

⁴² Ibid., 819.

⁴³ Tardy, 507.

⁴⁴ Sokalski, 216.

⁴⁵ Bellamy and Williams, 165.

⁴⁶ Bellamy and Williams, 165.

⁴⁷ Bellamy and Williams, 168.

⁴⁸ Ostrowski, 822.

⁴⁹ “U.S. Says It Will Send 300 troops to Balkan Republic To Limit Strife.”

⁵⁰ Ostrowski, 798.

⁵¹ Tardy, 507.

⁵² Lund, 193.

⁵³ Bjorkdahl argues that UNPREDEP provided the United Nations with a post-Cold War opportunity for ‘norm diffusion’, 214.

⁵⁴ Bellamy and Williams, 158.

⁵⁵ Bellamy and Williams, 160.

⁵⁶ Note, however, that there are several other similar missions, although often they have been deployed after a peace agreement, to supervise elections. Take, for example, the MINURCA, a UN mission in Central African Republic, or EUFOR, an EU mission to DRC.

⁵⁷ Ostrowski, 801.

⁵⁸ Sokalski, 217.

Maritime Piracy: The Connection between Favourable Geography and State Fragility (2000-2009)

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Abstract:

Maritime piracy has re-emerged as a serious threat to global shipping over the past decade and has led to repeated calls for action from the international community. This study seeks to contribute to the debate over appropriate policy responses by explaining why some states experience more incidents of maritime piracy than others. It uses self-reported incident data from the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Centre to explain variation in the frequency of piracy incidents in all 147 countries with a seacoast between 2000 and 2009. The results of this study suggest that favourable geography is a significant driver of cross-sectional variation in maritime piracy. However, this effect seems to be more pronounced in states with low levels of institutional fragility than it is in states with high levels of institutional fragility. The implications of this finding are that pirates in highly fragile states can succeed without the assistance of favourable geography, whereas those in less fragile states rely more heavily on the advantages inherent in their physical environments. Global efforts to counter maritime piracy should focus, therefore, on states with high fragility and weak capacity rather than on states with favourable geography.

Introduction

Maritime piracy suppresses billions of dollars' worth of trade every year and has the potential to cause immense human suffering.¹ Its re-emergence as a serious threat to global shipping over the past decade has led to repeated calls for action by the international community. In response to these calls, a variety of different policy actors have implemented counter-piracy initiatives around the world. Some of these initiatives have attempted to deter pirates through the use of military force, whereas others have focused on alleviating the underlying causes of piracy. The problem with both of these approaches is that we currently lack a clear understanding of what causes maritime piracy in the first place. The piracy literature does an excellent job of identifying variables that contribute to piracy *onset*, but it has not had as much success explaining variation in the *frequency* of incidents observed off the coasts of individual states.

This lack of clarity has led to the formulation of the following research questions: Why do some states experience few incidents of maritime piracy, whereas other states experience many? Is there something unique about the small number of states that experience dozens of pirate attacks each year? Or can most incidents of maritime piracy be explained using the same core set of variables? I argue that favourable geography is a significant driver of cross-sectional variation in maritime piracy, particularly in states with permissive institutional environments. This argument is intuitively appealing, since it is difficult to imagine the occurrence of large amount of piracy in areas that are not geographically suitable, but it has yet to be assessed using sufficiently detailed geographic variables. The remainder of this paper proceeds in the following manner: Section I reviews the relevant literature; Section II expands on the chosen theoretical framework; Section III describes the data; Section IV presents the estimation technique and models; and Section V discusses the estimation results.

Section I - Literature Review

Growing interest in the threat posed by maritime piracy has led to the recent emergence of a field of 'piracy studies' within the academic community. The research pursued by scholars in this field has taken on three basic forms: investigations into the causes of modern piracy and its various practices; studies of international responses to piracy, particularly its legal forms; and attempts to place contemporary piracy into a broader historical, theoretical and normative context.² For the purposes of this study, we will mainly be drawing on the literature that discusses the causes of modern piracy and its practices. Much of the early work in this area focused on South East Asian piracy,³ but attention has now shifted to piracy off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea.⁴

Recent studies have attempted to test the insights derived from these regional case studies by using quantitative methods. One of the earliest attempts to use this approach looked at a sample of African littoral countries and concluded that state failure was a necessary, but not sufficient, indicator of maritime piracy.⁵ Later studies pick up on this indicator and demonstrate that the relationship between state failure and piracy is actually "hump-shaped" rather than linearly increasing.⁶ They argue that this relationship is due to the fact that even criminals need minimal levels of law and order to function effectively. These findings nicely complement earlier work by Justin Hastings, who uses the same basic idea to develop a theory regarding variation in the sophistication of maritime hijackings.⁷ He argues that weak states are more problematic for the international community than failed states because their relatively well-developed market and transportation infrastructure allows pirates to conduct larger numbers of sophisticated attacks. A later article by Ursula Daxecker and Brandon Prins, however, uses a more comprehensive dataset to directly refute the idea that improving the quality of a state's governance will increase local levels of piracy.⁸

In addition to measures of state fragility, a number of other explanatory variables have been demonstrated to correlate with incidents of maritime piracy. These include the value of local fisheries

production,⁹ learning-by-doing and skill accumulation,¹⁰ price changes in labour and capital intensive commodities,¹¹ and favourable geography. For this last variable, a clear consensus has yet to emerge regarding which specific aspects of geography are the most important. Some studies find that coastline length is a significant predictor of piracy,¹² whereas others do not.¹³ Other studies have suggested that further aspects of geography may be important, such as a state's distance to major sea-lane chokepoints, total number of deep-water ports, proximity to shipping lanes, or ratio of coast-to-land area,¹⁴ but their relative significance has yet to be assessed in an empirical study.

Two recent articles by Ursula Daxecker and Brandon Prins synthesize the findings of these earlier studies in an attempt to clarify the main causes of maritime piracy.¹⁵ In their first article, Daxecker and Prins cluster major causal variables identified in earlier studies into six 'concept' categories: state weakness, state fragility, economic opportunity, geography, regime type and other controls. They then use the best performing variables from each category to develop two distinct models, one for pirate attacks and one for hijackings, and demonstrate their ability to predict the onset of maritime piracy through in-sample and out-of-sample analysis. Although the end results of their analysis is persuasive, the authors' use of a binary dependent variable limits the power of their models to predicting where piracy is likely to occur, rather than providing an indication of how many attacks are likely to take place. In their second article, Daxecker and Prins make up for this shortcoming by developing a model that explains variation in the overall number of pirate attacks using two key variables: institutional strength and the availability of alternative economic opportunities. They test their argument using event-count data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and reveal the expected positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate for state fragility and the expected negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate for the value of local fisheries.

The cumulative effects of these two articles has done much to consolidate, and advance, the academic community's understanding of maritime piracy but there are still several areas that deserve further exploration. This article attempts to contribute to this effort by highlighting two areas that are worthy of additional research. Firstly, it proposes to evaluate the accuracy of accepted explanatory variables by testing them in the context of a new dataset.¹⁶ The data are similar enough to those used in other studies that these variables should return the expected coefficient estimates but they are also different enough that comparable results would bolster the strength of previous findings. Secondly, it introduces additional geographic variables into established models in order to clarify the connection between physical geography and maritime piracy. Since the significance of geography has been the subject of contradictory findings in recent studies, it is hoped that the introduction of these extra variables will help to illuminate the true nature of any underlying relationship.

Section II - Theoretical Framework

Physical geography is one of the key variables that makes it possible for pirates to carry out attacks. It helps to provide would-be pirates with access to victims, determines the ease with which passing ships can be approached and affects the probability of being caught and punished.¹⁷ The most common proxy for the presence of favourable geographic conditions has typically been the length of a country's coastline. The theoretical argument behind this variable is that long coastlines provide pirates with safe havens and offloading points for stolen cargo. As noted above, however, this measure has resulted in statistically significant findings in some studies but not in others. In an attempt to clarify this relationship, I use the World Vector Shoreline (WVS) database to construct an indicator of coastline length that is based on more detailed measurement data than contained in the commonly cited CIA World Factbook.¹⁸ The added level of detail should make it possible to more accurately differentiate between coastlines that are relatively smooth and those that contain small, pirate-friendly coves, inlets or bays.

The length of a country's coastline has important theoretical connections to levels of maritime piracy but it is only one of many possible indicators of favourable geography. I intend to also assess the significance of four other geographic variables: distance to the nearest maritime chokepoint; proximity to high-traffic sea lanes; number of deep-water sea ports; and coast-to-land area ratio. The first two variables help to provide a general indication of whether local pirates have access to favourable hunting grounds. Close proximity to major shipping lanes provides pirates with plenty of potential victims and nearby maritime chokepoints, such as the Straits of Malacca or Suez Canal, makes it easier to catch them. The third variable, number of deep-water sea ports, expands on this picture by serving as an indicator of domestic shipping traffic. It also helps to identify the presence of individuals who potentially possess the skills required to pilot a ship and launch a successful pirate attack. The final variable, coast-to-land area ratio, provides a rough measure of how easy it is to access a country's interior from the coast. States with a lower coast-to-land-area ratio should reduce the risks associated with piracy by making it easier to distribute stolen cargo once it has been offloaded.

Hypothesis 1: Maritime piracy is more common in states with favourable geography than it is in states without favourable geography.

Daxecker and Prins note that the causal processes contributing to the onset of piracy may be different from those that explain the actual number of attacks.¹⁹ If we accept the hypothesis that high levels of piracy may be caused by different factors than low levels of piracy, then the next logical step is to determine which variables might be responsible for this variation. I propose that favourable geography is a significant driver of high-frequency attacks but not of low-frequency attacks. The basic intuition behind this argument is that permissive institutional environments may arise in any country, but only those countries with the necessary physical endowments will allow local pirates to exploit them to their fullest. If true, this argument suggests that highly fragile countries without favourable geography should experience less pirate attacks than highly fragile states with favourable geography. To test this argument, a measure of state fragility is interacted with the five different geographic variables identified above.

Hypothesis 2: The frequency of maritime piracy incidents in high-fragility countries with favourable geography is larger than in high-fragility countries without favourable geography.

Section III - Data

This study takes the state-year as its primary unit of analysis. Information on the dependent variable – named “*piracy*” – is derived from the *Maritime Piracy Annual Data* (MPAD), a new dataset focused on the causes of contemporary piracy.²⁰ It uses self-reported incident data from the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB/PRC) to count the number of piracy incidents emanating from all 147 countries with a seacoast during the period 2000-2009.²¹ The resulting sample consists of panel data, based on 10 annual observations per country, and includes a total of 1 470 observations. Of this sample, a total of 373 observations include at least one or more incidents of maritime piracy per state-year. Limitations in some independent variables reduce the total sample size to 952, with observations spanning 119 countries. This reduction is primarily due to a lack of data for most of the world's island microstates, none of which experienced a piracy incident during the ten-year period under consideration.

Measures of physical geography are the main explanatory variables of cross-sectional variation in the frequency of maritime piracy incidents. These are primarily sourced from the MPAD and include a variety of external and internal factors that are theoretically linked to *piracy*. Favourable external factors consist of proximity to a major shipping lane and distance to the nearest sea lane chokepoint. Favourable internal factors include the number of deep water ports in a country, the ease with which pirates can

access a country's interior, and the shelter afforded by a longer coastline. Preliminary statistical tests, including basic correlation, Pearson's chi-squared tests of independence and t-tests for equal means, suggest that all five geographic variables are related to *piracy*.

Measures of previously identified explanatory variables are used to control for unrelated variation in *piracy* from state to state. These include general indicators for population size and economic opportunity in coastal regions, as well as specific indicators for state power and state fragility. The indicator for state power is based on the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score assigned to each country by the Correlates of War (COW) project. This variable is widely used in the piracy literature because it provides a general measure of a state's ability to suppress pirate activities at sea and ashore. A measure of state fragility is also included due to the strong empirical and theoretical connection between weak or failed states and *piracy*. This variable is based on the State Fragility Index and Matrix scores assigned to each country by the Centre for Systemic Peace. Scores can range from a low of 0 (i.e. no fragility) to a high of 25 (i.e. extreme fragility). Some of the models in this study use the 0-25 ranking of fragility, whereas others interact a qualitative measure of low, medium or high fragility with the five geographic variables described above. For further information on the variables used in this study, see the detailed descriptions provided in Annex 1 below.

Section IV - Estimation Technique

The core models presented in this article were estimated using a generalized estimating equation (GEE) with a negative binomial specification and an AR(1) error structure. GEE models are useful when working with panel data because they use population-averaged approaches to correct for correlation between clusters of observations.²² In this case, a negative binomial specification is used to account for overdispersion in the dependent variable and an AR(1) error structure is used to correct for autocorrelation. An alternative approach would have been to use a negative binomial model with fixed effects. This option was not chosen because too many observations end up being dropped from the model due to a lack of variation in the dependent variable.²³

Model 1 attempts to replicate recent findings on the causes of maritime piracy by testing the effects of all major control variables identified in the relevant literature. The results of this initial estimation are vital to establishing the validity of Model 2 and Model 3 because the count data used to construct *piracy* have yet to be formally evaluated in a published study. A successful attempt at replication would return positive coefficient estimates for *coastline*, *population*, *regional trade* and *state fragility*, and negative coefficient estimates for *fisheries value* and *state strength*.

Model 2 progresses beyond simple replication and begins to test the significance of novel geographic variables. These novel variables include *maritime traffic*, *ports*, *coast/land* and *chokepoint distance*, as well as the more refined measure of coastline length derived from the WVS database. For Hypothesis 1 to be confirmed, the first three variables are expected to return positive coefficient estimates and the fourth variable is expected to return a negative coefficient estimate.

Model 3 moves one step further and begins to test for the possibility of an interactive effect between state fragility and favourable geography. It does this by interacting the five geographic variables included in Model 2 – namely, *ports*, *maritime traffic*, *coastline*, *coast/land* and *chokepoint distance* – with a binary measure of 'low' or 'high' *state fragility*. The third possible interactive term, medium, is left out of the final model in order to avoid completely replicating the non-interacted versions of each geographic variable. For Hypothesis 2 to be confirmed, we would expect to see a clear distinction between the paired interaction terms, as well as positive coefficient estimates for *HfragXcoastline*, *HfragXcoast/land*, *HfragXports* and *HfragXtraffic*. In addition, negative coefficient estimates should

appear for *HfragXchokedist* and insignificant results should be reported for the five ‘low’ fragility interactive terms.

Section V - Model Estimation and Discussion of Results

The results for Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 are presented below. The dependent variable for all three of these models is *piracy*. *Piracy* is a count-data variable characterized by over dispersion and zero-inflation. It is presented in its untransformed form, despite being heavily right-skewed, due to the lackluster results of various transformation efforts. All other variables included in these models are presented in their normal form unless otherwise indicated.²⁴

The results of Model 1 demonstrate that the piracy incident data derived from the MPAD is capable of replicating results achieved by similar quantitative studies. All six control variables return coefficient estimates with the expected sign and very high levels of statistical significance. We should feel confident, therefore, in proceeding with the proposed attempt to innovate on existing causal models by introducing new geographic variables. Of note, the use of a GEE model to run these estimations means that coefficient estimate size should be interpreted as an indication of the average influence that each independent variable has on piracy across the population as a whole.

Table 1 – The Relationship between Maritime Piracy and Favourable Geography

	(1) Piracy		(2) Piracy		(3) Piracy	
Coastline	0.336***	(4.92)	0.0889	(0.92)	0.528***	(5.09)
Population	0.507***	(6.52)	0.651***	(7.15)	0.490***	(7.25)
Regional Trade	0.225**	(2.41)	0.0532	(0.57)	0.189***	(2.60)
Fisheries Value	-0.539***	(-5.63)	-0.524***	(-4.60)	-0.645***	(-3.79)
State Strength	-20.83***	(-4.07)	-16.29***	(-3.62)	-16.99***	(-4.95)
State Fragility	0.142***	(7.98)	0.168***	(8.35)	0.146***	(5.80)
Maritime Traffic			-0.385**	(-2.05)	-0.356*	(-1.71)
Ports			0.0837	(0.69)	-0.155	(-0.94)
Coast/Land			0.385***	(4.78)	0.128	(1.60)
Chokepoint Distance			-0.000217***	(-3.86)	-0.000124	(-1.47)
LfragXcoast					-1.298***	(-4.53)
HfragXcoast					-0.135*	(-1.65)
LfragXcoast/land					1.075***	(4.91)
HfragXcoast/land					0.0366	(0.38)
LfragXchokedist					-0.000904***	(-3.41)
HfragXchokedist					0.000106	(1.09)
LfragXports					1.481***	(2.95)
HfragXports					0.256	(1.37)
LfragXtraffic					1.644*	(1.69)
HfragXtraffic					0.00881	(0.03)
Constant	-14.83***	(-5.50)	-10.30***	(-4.01)	-14.59***	(-7.18)
Observations	952		944		944	
Countries	119		118		118	
Wald chi2	198.8		253.2		450.9	
p-value	3.49e-40		1.13e-48		5.24e-83	

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The introduction of four additional geographic variables in Model 2 provides some preliminary evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. Three of the new geographic variables produce the expected coefficient estimate sign and two of these, *coast/land* and *chokepoint distance*, are statistically significant. The results for the fourth variable, *maritime traffic*, are unexpected because they indicate that proximity to a busy shipping lane is actually negatively correlated with piracy incidents. This relationship does not match with most anecdotal accounts of piracy but it could be indicative of a greater propensity to prey on local fishermen and traders, rather than larger cargo ships.²⁵ The loss of significance for two control variables, *coastline* and *regional trade*, is also unexpected but this relationship returns to normal in the final model. Nonetheless, it is clear from the results of this model that favourable geography does play a role in explaining cross-sectional variation in the frequency of maritime piracy incidents.

The results of Model 3 provide a mixed-amount of support for a significant relationship between state fragility and favourable geography. First of all, it is important to note that all six control variables continue to return the expected coefficient sign and level of statistical significance. *State strength* appears to be the single biggest contributor to piracy suppression across all three models, which matches well with common sense explanations of piracy. When we factor in the interactions between fragility and geography, however, a somewhat more puzzling picture begins to emerge. Although it is immediately clear that low, medium and high levels of *state fragility* interact with geography in a significantly different manner, the nature of that interaction appears to be more-or-less the opposite of what was predicted. The number of ports in a country, for example, does little to explain piracy in medium or high fragility states, but it is positively correlated with piracy in *low* fragility states. Similarly, the coefficient estimate signs and levels of significance associated with *LfragXcoast/land* and *LfragXchokedist* are exactly what we expected to see in high or medium fragility states, rather than low fragility states.

The picture that emerges from these results is that, entirely contrary to expectations, geography appears to play more of an enabling role in low fragility states than it does in high fragility states. The insignificant coefficient estimates returned for most of the 'high' fragility interaction terms provides little support for Hypothesis 2. Although puzzling at first glance, this finding may indicate that pirates in low fragility states require favourable geography to be successful whereas pirates in high fragility states can be successful regardless of their physical environment.

Robustness tests

In order to help strengthen the results of Model 3, two basic robustness tests were also performed. Firstly, measures of GDP and GDP per capita were inserted into Model 2 and Model 3 in order to determine if they might reverse the negative coefficient reported by *maritime traffic*. Since wealthier countries are likely to experience high volumes of shipping off their coastlines, it is possible that focusing on fisheries values, rather than overall state wealth, resulted in a case of omitted variable bias. Once tested, it appears that measures of GDP per capita and GDP do little to enhance the explanatory power of the model and have no effect on the coefficient estimate associated with *maritime traffic*. Secondly, a dummy variable to account for the outlier case of Somalia is inserted into Model 3. Since Somali pirates were responsible for a disproportionate number of piracy incidents during this period, it is possible that the results of this model contain some bias as a result of Somalia's unique political, economic or geographic characteristics. As reported in Model 4, the presence of a Somalia dummy variable does influence the results of Model 3 slightly but the overall interpretation remains fairly consistent. Geography is still more important in terms of significance and coefficient estimate size for low fragility countries than it is for high fragility countries, although the new-found significance of *HfragXchokedist* and *HfragXports* removes the stark contrast present in Model 3.

Table 2 – Robustness Tests

	(3) Piracy	(4) Piracy		
Maritime Traffic	-0.356*	(-1.71)	-0.363*	(-1.73)
Ports	-0.155	(-0.94)	-0.190	(-1.14)
Coastline	0.528***	(5.09)	0.420***	(3.95)
Coast/Land	0.128	(1.60)	0.148*	(1.82)
Chokepoint Distance	-0.000124	(-1.47)	-0.000381	(-0.45)
Population	0.490***	(7.25)	0.608***	(8.63)
Regional Trade	0.189***	(2.60)	0.251***	(3.33)
Fisheries Value	-0.645***	(-3.79)	-0.543***	(-3.11)
State Strength	-16.99***	(-4.95)	-17.94***	(-5.17)
State Fragility	0.146***	(5.80)	0.0673**	(2.52)
LfragXcoast	-1.298***	(-4.53)	-1.299***	(-4.53)
HfragXcoast	-0.135*	(-1.65)	-0.196**	(-2.34)
LfragXcoast/land	1.075***	(4.91)	1.027***	(4.75)
HfragXcoast/land	0.0366	(0.38)	0.131	(1.31)
LfragXchokedist	0.000904***	(-3.41)	-0.00101***	(-3.79)
HfragXchokedist	0.000106	(1.09)	0.000212**	(2.14)
LfragXports	1.481***	(2.95)	1.499***	(2.98)
HfragXports	0.256	(1.37)	0.431**	(2.23)
LfragXtraffic	1.644*	(1.69)	1.373	(1.45)
HfragXtraffic	0.00881	(0.03)	-0.161	(-0.54)
Somalia			3.115***	(6.12)
Constant	-14.59***	(-7.18)	-15.98***	(-7.59)
Observations	944		944	
Countries	118		118	
Wald chi2	450.9		457.8	
p-value	5.24e-83		9.16e-84	

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this paper suggests that favourable geography is a significant cause of cross-sectional variation in the frequency of maritime piracy incidents. It appears to play more of an enabling role in low fragility states than it does in high fragility states, but this finding is likely due to the ability of pirates in high fragility states to succeed regardless of their physical environment. The overall implications of this analysis are that global efforts to combat maritime piracy should focus on states that are highly fragile and militarily weak. The influence of geography is significant, but it matters less in the kinds of states that are likely to experience large amounts of pirate attacks each year.

Future research should seek to determine whether favourable geography interacts with state strength in the same way that it interacts with state fragility. To aid in this endeavour, it would be useful to develop a more nuanced indicator of state strength. Current measures rely too heavily on the aggregation of military and economic variables, which makes it difficult to isolate the causal relationship between state strength and maritime piracy. The construction of a variable that distinguishes between

army and naval personnel, or that accounts for the number of vessels possessed by local navies and coastguards, would increase our understanding of this relationship. It would also help to inform future capacity building initiatives by making it possible for state-level governments and international donors to distinguish between the relative effectiveness of land versus sea-based counter-piracy capabilities.

Annex 1 – List of Dependent and Independent Variables

Variable	Form	Description	Data Source
Piracy	Normal	A variable counting the number of pirate attacks attributed to nationals of the country during a given calendar year	Maritime Piracy Annual Data (via International Maritime Bureau)
Coastline Length	Log	Coastline length in kilometres.	Maritime Piracy Annual Data (via CIA World Fact Book)
Population	Log	The country's total reported population.	Maritime Piracy Annual Data
Regional Trade	Log	Value of a region's imports and exports in millions of current US dollars.	WTO figures (via replication data for Daxecker and Prins, "Insurgents of the Sea.")
Fisheries Value	First Difference of Log	Fisheries production values in millions of current US dollars for fish, crustaceans and mollusks.	FAO fishery statistics (via replication data for Daxecker and Prins, "Insurgents of the Sea.")
State Strength	Normal	A Composite Index of National Capability using various measures of hard military power.	Correlates of War
State Fragility	Normal	A measure of annual state fragility, effectiveness and legitimacy derived from Polity IV data.	Centre for Systemic Peace
Maritime Traffic	Normal	A dummy variable indicating whether a sea-lane carrying at least 5,000 ships per annum passes off of the country's coastline.	Maritime Piracy Data (via 2007 shipping data presented in Kaluza, et al. 2010)
Ports	Log	A variable counting the number of deep-water sea ports in a country.	Maritime Piracy Annual Data
Coast/Land	Log	A country's ratio of coastline length (in	Author's Calculation (via CIA World Fact Book data included in the

		metres) to land area (in square kilometres).	Maritime Piracy Annual Data)
Chokepoint Distance	Normal	The distance, in nautical miles, from the country's nearest deep water port to the nearest sea-lane chokepoint.	Maritime Piracy Annual Data (via Port-Distance Calculator: http://www.world-ships.com/?p=dist.htm)

Note – Interactive variables were generated using the following scores from Polity IV's measure of state fragility data: "low" fragility = 0-4; "medium" fragility = 5-12; and "high" fragility = 13-25

Endnotes

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¹⁸ The measurement data contained in the WVS database was gathered at a consistent scale of 1:250 000. This scale indicates that every centimetre on a map corresponds to 2.5 kilometres on the ground. It offers an improvement over the data used by related studies on maritime piracy, because the CIA World Factbook neglects to mention the scale at which its measurements were taken or whether the same scale was used for each country. A careful comparison between the measurement data from both sources reveals that the coastline lengths in the WVS database are consistently longer than those contained in the Factbook. Since surveyors measure across the mouth of coastal indents that are smaller than their basic unit of measurement, this discrepancy suggests that the Factbook figures were conducted using a less-detailed scale. Therefore, the coastline figures from the Factbook are less well suited to a study of piracy because they fail to account for additional pirate refuges and offloading points.

¹⁹ Daxecker and Prins, “The New Barbary Wars,” 1-22.

²⁰ Coggins, “Global patterns of maritime piracy,” 605-617.

²¹ The IMB uses three different types of ‘incidents’ when calculating their numbers (i.e. suspicious vessel, attempted attack and successful attack) and does not distinguish between attacks made in territorial waters and those made on the high seas. Several studies have noted the danger of relying on self-reported data,

particularly with regard to its tendency to underestimate incidents involving smaller vessels, but the IMB nonetheless remains the standard source of piracy data in academic and policy circles.

²² Alan E. Hubbard et al., “To GEE or Not to GEE: Comparing Population Average and Mixed Models for Estimating the Associations Between Neighbourhood Risk Factors and Health,” *Epidemiology* 21, no. 4 (2010): 467-468.

²³ The potential explanatory power of some of the model’s independent variables is also minimized when using a negative binomial model with fixed effects because many of them do not exhibit sufficient temporal variation. The adoption of a GEE model with a negative binomial specification allows for the correction of these two problems and also produces results that are more consistent with theorized causal mechanisms.

²⁴ The variables for *coastline length*, *population*, *regional trade*, *ports*, and *coast/land* are all presented in their logged form, whereas the variable for *fisheries value* is given as the first difference of log in order to avoid unit heterogeneity.

²⁵ Although plausible, preliminary attempts to test this hypothesis have not proven promising. Event-level evidence from the Maritime Piracy Event Data (MPED) indicates that pirates typically target larger ships. Carrier vessels, for example, account for 25.37% of all attacks, general cargo for 19.02%, container ships for 15.38%, and tankers for 14.96%. It is not clear whether all of these vessels were engaged in international trade at the time of the attack (i.e. general cargo could indicate domestic as well as international vessels) but fishing vessels barely account for 4% of the total. Additional research is necessary to determine whether this is reflective of the true underlying relationship between *traffic* and *piracy*, or simply a reflection of bias in the IMB/PRC piracy figures due to the fact that larger ships tend to file attack reports more often than smaller ships.

Cornplexity: The Complex Nature of American Corn Subsidies in a Globalized World

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Abstract:

Corn subsidies were first enacted in the United States during the 1930s in response to the Great Depression. These policies were designed to overcome the challenges posed by the economic downturn through providing financial assistance to American farmers who had been put out of work. Accordingly, they were designed to be national policies, and were not intended to suit today's globalized policymaking environment. Despite this, these subsidies, in much the same form as when they were enacted, remain in place today and are having much broader effects than were originally envisioned. This paper will elaborate on these effects and will examine the diffuse effects of corn subsidization on spheres as diverse as global health, energy policy, the expansion and vitality of the agri-meat business, and food security.

Introduction

Since the inception of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) in 1933, American policymakers have continued to pass “farm bills” on a regular basis, bills that have provided substantial subsidies to American farmers.¹ These subsidies were created during an era that preceded modern globalization, and they have continued to be renewed by the American Congress, even following dramatic changes to the policymaking landscape that have occurred over the past several decades. Chief among these changes has been the increased level of interconnectivity between nations, allowing for national policies to have a significant global impact. Despite the increasingly controversial nature of the subsidies and the growing opposition to their renewal in their current form, these Acts continue to have an entrenched place in the policy sphere.²

Policies enacted in a tightly-knit world demonstrate how localized policies can have an impact nationally, regionally, and globally. Modern agricultural policies in the United States (US), specifically the subsidization of grains such as corn, provide a clear example of this phenomenon and thereby make for a relevant case study. The US policies on agriculture are especially important due to both their hegemonic status and their massive agricultural output. In 2013, the United States grew over 32% of the world production of corn, making their policies related to corn highly influential in setting prices and influencing global corn markets.³ While agricultural subsidies in the US were initially intended to assist American farmers through the Great Depression, their path dependent nature, as well as intense lobbying by farm interest groups, has ensured their continuation and expansion.

This paper will be broken down into three sections: Historical Contextualization, Complex Interconnectivities, and Implications for Policymaking. In “Historical Contextualization,” the history of agricultural subsidies in the US will be presented to contextualize the circumstances under which corn subsidies were enacted. This will also be used to provide a contrast with the current policymaking landscape. In “Complex Interconnectivities,” the diverse impacts a single policy can have in the contemporary policymaking environment will be demonstrated. The unintentional ramifications that stem from a nationally-minded, rather than a globally-minded, policymaking perspective will be examined in detail through a demonstration of the effect of the local on the global. While this section will touch on important issues such as biofuels and international trade negotiations, these topics have been extensively discussed elsewhere and the focus instead will be on less obvious implications of subsidies to emphasize the breadth of their impacts.⁴

Finally, in “Implications for Policymaking,” this paper will map out the implications of the previous sections for the future of policymaking itself. Focusing primarily on the repercussions of increased complexity in the practice of public policy, this section will attempt to elucidate the main issues encountered in creating effective policy, such as path dependency, and non-linearity. This section will additionally provide tentative solutions to these issues in the hopes that this will begin a discussion about how best to address and resolve these issues. Complexity, for the purposes of this paper, will be used to refer to the effects of policies that are increasingly beyond the scope of policymakers to control or predict. This is because, in today’s globalized world, the higher degree of technicality and specialization, the increased level of connectivity between systems, and the greater amount of informational inputs required to make decisions, have all meant that unforeseen consequences arise easily and therefore policymakers must increasingly think globally to create effective public policy.

Historical Contextualization

Grain subsidies in the US originated as a part of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. The AAA passed through Congress in 1933, marking the inception of the first comprehensive farm bill.⁵ In 1932 the net income of farmers had fallen to less than one third of what it had been in 1929 so the AAA was introduced with the goal of “restoring farm purchasing power”.⁶ This was accomplished through a

subsidy program that worked to reduce surpluses of a number of agricultural products such as corn, wheat, cotton and milk. The bill also had the stated goal of protecting consumers from excessive price increases. Desired price levels, which could aid farmers without excessively raising food prices for consumers, were determined using baseline prices from 1909-1914.⁷ While the US Supreme Court deemed parts of this Act unconstitutional in 1936, the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936, as well as the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, supplemented it soon afterwards, ensuring the Act's continuity.⁸ These Acts expanded the goals of the original AAA to include preventing soil degradation and working towards income parity between farmers and non-farmers. These goals, conceived well before the rise of modern globalization, were targeted specifically at domestic American farms and were not intended to have a global impact. As a result of Roosevelt's agricultural policies, farm incomes increased 50% from 1932 to 1935 and soil quality slowly improved.⁹

Since 1933, farm bills have become an important part of American agricultural policy, being passed approximately every five years. Despite over eighty years of change since the enactment of the original bill, the goals and methods outlined in the AAA set precedents that continue to have a strong influence today. The policy prescriptions set out in the bill include provisions designed to encourage farms to specialize in crops instead of diversifying, to focus on supply management rather than rural social reform and to downgrade the necessity of incentives for farmers to consider the environmental impacts of agriculture.¹⁰ Most significantly, the focus on supply management has led to the expansion of agricultural subsidies, especially for grains such as corn. These increases resulted in over \$92 billion USD in subsidies for American corn farmers between 1995 and 2010.¹¹

The goal of these subsidies is to reduce the risks for American farmers, as farming is an inherently risky profession. Policymakers enact subsidies to stabilize agricultural markets, mitigating some of the risk involved, and ensuring the continuing prosperity of American farmers.¹² Farmers each year have to make risky decisions (choosing the best seeds, deciding which crop to plant, or determining which pesticides to use) that have a significant impact on annual crop yields. Furthermore, risks farmers have no control over, such as extreme weather events, the availability of labour, the fluctuation of commodity prices, and the price of energy, can negatively impact profitability. Subsidies, both direct (e.g. payments to farmers) and indirect (e.g. government funding of research and development), are designed to assist in overcoming the uncertainty created by these factors.

As more farm bills have been passed, increasing both the total number of provisions and the amount of overlap between specific provisions, American farm policy has grown increasingly complex. The variety of policy spheres that are influenced, the number of crops included in the legislation and the confusing overlaps between different farm bills have made it difficult to understand the "scope and impact of this legislation."¹³ To pass farm bills today, policymakers need the support of broad coalitions. Lobbyists from a wide variety of interests such as farm groups, public health officials, conservation groups, rural development advocates and commodity associations each have input in the policymaking process.¹⁴ This results in farm bills regularly being omnibus bills that account, to varying degrees, for each group's interests.

The complexities present in creating farm bills extend well beyond domestic U.S. politics. Since 1933, there have been major changes to agriculture, global trade and international relations that have dramatically altered policymaking processes. Globalization has contributed to the internationalization of markets for agricultural goods. Consequentially, there has been a steadily increasing flow of agricultural products across borders. Additionally, these complexities have led to increased overlap between different spheres of policy making, leading to policies having diffuse impacts that are often difficult to observe or immediately quantify. Policymakers today cannot assume that domestic policies will only have localized impacts as the complexities of global agricultural markets and international trade ensure that policies enacted in one geographic region influence others as well.

Complex Interconnectivities

While the influence of American corn subsidization policies is now global, the impacts of these policies can still be difficult to accurately assess. The lack of any overt causal linkages means that it can be difficult to determine the definitive impact of corn subsidies on a particular policy area, given that a wide array of factors may also be influential. Through analyzing a mix of qualitative and quantitative measures on a variety of issue areas, rather than a simple analysis of the amount of corn produced and its price, many of the broader impacts of this subsidization can be identified. Corn production in the US in 2014, for example, set a record high with a harvest of 13 billion bushels, implying that subsidizing corn is accomplishing its goal of encouraging farmers to plant corn.¹⁵ This success is easy to measure (by bushels produced) but the larger impacts on a global scale are much more difficult to simplistically quantify.

There are several dimensions related to food security that policymakers should note when creating policy. These dimensions demonstrate the intertwined nature of the various multi-sectoral systems that utilize corn as a major product. In the context of food security, these alternate uses add stressors to an already fragile system. Therefore, it is important to recognize that while these dimensions are oftentimes categorized separately, they are all occurring simultaneously and often result in feedback loops being created between them.

The multiple new uses for corn complicate its status as a source of food, and, as a consequence of subsidization, this effect is further compounded. The discovery and increase in alternate usages for corn, such as ethanol, high-fructose corn syrup, and animal feed, has resulted in a spike for the demand of corn, which is what has been attributed to the dramatic rise in the pricing of corn in recent years.¹⁶ While the effect of subsidization has prompted an increase in the supply of corn, lowering its price, and resulting in the creation of a market distortion that shifts market equilibrium from its natural state, the situation is more complicated when discussing corn subsidies. Artificially lowering the cost of corn for uses other than food has led to an increased demand from buyers intending to utilize corn for things other than human consumption. With the growth of the biofuel industry, this has become hugely problematic as the quantities of corn purchased by ethanol producers has been substantial enough to drive up prices dramatically.¹⁷ Corn subsidies that lowered the cost of corn at their inception have now motivated other industries to use it, raising its price above what many consumers have anticipated paying.

Consumers in impoverished areas, or even those above the poverty line who face budgetary restrictions, are dependent on minimal fluctuations in food prices. For these consumers, price fluctuations can be a substantial threat to their food security. In some cases, the increased global demand for corn has caused prices at the local level to double. In 2006 US corn prices rose from \$2.80 to \$4.20 a bushel over several months.¹⁸ The effect this had on Mexico, which imports roughly 80% of its corn from the US, was catastrophic. The approximately 50 million people living in poverty in Mexico at the time were unable to adjust and protested, prompting Mexican President Felipe Calderon to introduce price caps on corn based products.¹⁹ The example of Mexico is demonstrative of the broader impact on countries that are currently net importers of food, many of whom are today increasingly located in the Global South.

Additionally, the cost of corn-based animal feed has an important role in setting meat prices. The rise in the pricing of corn has resulted in an overall increase in the price of corn based-feed.²⁰ As a result of the lifecycle promoted by the commercialized livestock industry, this feed is considered an irreplaceable staple by most meat producers. Corn-based feeds allow livestock to become fatter and grow more quickly than they would if alternative feeds were utilized, providing a strong incentive for farmers to continue using corn-based feed.²¹ Accordingly, the higher feed valuation has not resulted in a switch to cheaper alternatives or even less corn-based feed purchased. The price increase in feed has instead been

matched in sharp spike in the global pricing of chicken, dairy, eggs, pork, beef and turkey, resulting in a decline in overall production.²²

It is important to note that some of the alternative components of animal feed include ingredients affected by corn as well, such as soybean meal, and when the pricing of these components increase as a result of corn subsidies, these costs get transferred to animal feed purchasers, raising the price of agri-meats. The FAO's annual feed stock report made note of this growing trend, and highlighted the nearly 150% increase in the global price of animal feed between the years of 2006 and 2011.²³ The report makes clear the potential long-term negative impact for global food systems as a whole that rising animal feed prices can have.

The impact of corn subsidies on agri-meat extends beyond pricing and production issues. They also have an impact on the nutritional value of meat.²⁴ The vast majority of chicken, pigs and cows are raised for consumption on a corn-fed diet.²⁵ For meat producers, a corn-fed diet has a lot of advantages over traditional grass or grain diets. The primary benefit is that it decreases the amount of time needed to fatten the animals for slaughter, while also raising the carcass yield percentage.²⁶ For producers wishing to grow and slaughter as many animals as possible, a corn-fed diet provides a competitive advantage. Thus, in the switch from small-scale farms to large-scale industrial agri-business, many producers chose to abandon the practice of grain/grass feeding altogether. Most cattle today, as a result, are mainly fed in concentrated complexes called feedlots.

The primary concern with this method of raising livestock is that most farm animals have not evolved with a capacity to handle a corn-fed diet. The stomachs of cattle, for example, are designed primarily to digest grass and many cows do not possess the stomach lining needed to live healthily while eating a corn-based diet. As a result, many cattle raised on corn feed become prone to health conditions like diarrhea, ulcers, liver disease, and a weakened immune system.²⁷ In comparison to grass-fed animals, corn-fed animals tend to be: higher in both overall fat and saturated fats, lower in beneficial omega-3 fats, four times lower in vitamin E, lower in conjugated linoleic acid (CLA), and more susceptible to dangerous pathogens like *E. Coli*.²⁸ As a result, the ultimate effect of this policy has been to promote a systemic change in the quality of meat provided by the agri-meat industry. Consequentially, consumers today are eating meats that are significantly less healthy than those consumed by previous generations.

Even as American corn subsidies have contributed to a global oversupply of corn, increasing the incentive for farmers to raise expensive corn-fed livestock, they have simultaneously contributed to the declining nutritional value of meat globally. While those producing meat would already be facing pressure to speed up their livestock's growth through feeding them corn, the low price of corn provides an additional incentive and thus, are a contributing factor to this phenomenon. Consumers continue to encounter fluctuating meat prices, and are provided less nutritional sources of meat, a result of agricultural subsidies that were supposed to increase food security and protect American farmer's income. The impact of this policy is far removed from the original goals of corn subsidization, demonstrating once again how diffuse the impacts of policy making in the modern world can be and how difficult it is for contemporary policymakers to determine all the impacts their policies will have in an interconnected environment.

Another dimension of corn subsidization is its broader effect on adjacent markets. The incentives provided by the subsidization of corn have resulted in a slow increase in the prices for food crops that serve as dietary substitutes for corn when its price rises.²⁹ Large gaps in the market get filled by alternative products, but the shortage in reasonable compensation and increased demand drives the price much higher than normal. For example, demand for wheat increases as corn prices increase, leading to a decline in the use of corn as a food product and an increase in the usage and the price of wheat.

Instances of increasing crop pricing can and have spiraled out of control in several cases. For example, the rapid rise in corn prices in 2006 mentioned above has been linked to a corresponding cascade effect on other foods in Mexico in the same time period. In particular, Mexican-produced white corn, a staple ingredient in tortilla flour, doubled in pricing that year, as industrial users of subsidized yellow corn were driven by high prices to seek out this cheaper variety, lowering the total amount available for locals and driving up the price of the remaining white corn.⁵⁰ The ultimate effect was the supplanting of food patterns that had been utilized by many Mexicans for generations.

Mexico is a prime example of the many ways in which US corn subsidization policy has had international effects. In addition to being impacted by the rising price of corn, trade disputes have also arisen between the US and Mexico. Mexico's primary grievance with the US is that American subsidies have exposed Mexico to the dumping of subsidized corn into their marketplace. Dumping is the practice of market producers exporting products, such as corn, to other countries at prices that are below the cost of production.³¹ Mexico, prior to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), had relied on tariffs to protect domestic corn farmers by enabling the government to artificially raise the price of imported corn. NAFTA forced Mexico to remove their import tariffs on corn, while simultaneously allowing the United States to continue to subsidize domestic corn producers.

The result has been the price of American corn has fallen below the price of Mexican corn, encouraging Mexican companies to import cheap American corn. Mexican farmers consequently lost over \$1 billion USD yearly between 1997 and 2005, with over half of these losses being sustained by corn farmers specifically, resulting in "a crushing blow to struggling smallholders."³² Since the inception of NAFTA and the beginning of widespread American dumping, over 2.3 million Mexicans have left the agricultural sector to seek other ways of attaining their livelihood.³³ While this cannot be seen as entirely attributable to American dumping, it is clear that the dumping has had a major impact on this shift. Thus, while policymakers who signed NAFTA were intending to create more equality between Canada, the US and Mexico, corn subsidization in the US ensured this did not occur as planned. Following the inception of NAFTA, American corn subsidies led to increasing inequality between Mexican and American agriculture, leading to huge monetary and job losses for Mexican corn farmers.

Food price volatility has resulted from dumping as well as increasingly complex financial instruments used in agricultural markets. There had been a rise in speculative buying and selling in agricultural commodities markets in the years leading up to the Global Financial Crisis and this trend continues today. Large amounts of investment money flowed into commodities markets, especially after the 2007 Financial Crisis, making other types of investments more risky.³⁴ At the time, the cereal industry, with its extensive reach in other commercial sectors and an established funding baseline to offset costs, appeared to be a safe investment. Ultimately, this inflow of cash contributed to a gradual increase in the price of corn, as a surge of investment drove up demand.

However, the trend has also contributed to rapid and unpredictable fluctuations internationally. The commodity futures market is massive, and given the level of interconnection between the various sectors in which corn is an integral component, any small changes in one sector can have rapid, cascading effects on another sector.³⁵ A high return on ethanol investments, for example, can lead to upward spillover in the corn-feed sector and vice versa.³⁶ Furthermore, low inventories, partly due to biofuels, make such speculation more profitable for financial investors who gain from large-scale supply purchases and short-term price movements.³⁷ The broader effect of the linkages between finance and agriculture has been the heightened potential for sudden swings in price volatility. This has jeopardized the day-to-day functioning of many dependent communities, primarily located in the Global South, who subsist on low food prices and who are unable to adjust to rapid price swings.

Thus far it has been shown that international trade, agricultural markets, public health and food security have all been impacted by American corn subsidies. However, the complex impacts of these policies are even larger and more diverse, as a plethora of environmental consequences have also resulted from corn subsidization. As subsidies artificially lower the cost of growing corn for farmers, it becomes more profitable for them to switch to monoculture corn production.³⁸ Farmers have little incentive to grow non-subsidized crops when they make more money, guaranteed by an extensive insurance program, when they grow corn. This provides farmers both with stability and increased profits, giving them the incentive needed to ignore the environment or even actively contribute to environmental degradation.

While the land conversion pressures are primarily limited to US farms, our current interconnected food regime results in this effect having a larger, global impact on crops and land availability in other parts of the world. When a large amount of land is converted from soybean production towards large-scale corn production, the net effect is a decrease in total soybean production.³⁹ Its immediate economic effect is a higher price for soybeans, but there is a larger effect on land use that ultimately jeopardizes the utility of the land itself. There is evidence to suggest a larger decline in arable land due to the denigrating practices tied to monoculture corn production.⁴⁰

Corn is a row crop that, due to the large amounts of fertilizers and pesticides used in the production process, contributes immensely to soil erosion and water pollution. Corn farming has become a major cause of nitrogen runoff – in effect creating dead zones like the vast swath in the Gulf of Mexico, which has been attributed mainly to US agribusiness.⁴¹ Previously, corn and soybeans were grown in tandem in order to counter this runoff, but as corn became a more profitable investment farmers increasingly abandoned corn-soybean rotation cropping, in favour of corn monocultures.⁴² While larger commercial farms tend to be more of a factor in the decline of arable land, the effect is usually more impactful on small-scale family farms. Those who plant corn monocultures in order to stay competitive ultimately can only expect their land to maintain its arability for a couple of generations.

There are dietary and health impacts also tied to the shift towards mono-cultural farming. The shift towards increased corn production has meant that American farmers have increasingly fewer incentives to grow fruit and vegetables. Insurance subsidies for farmers are significantly more generous for farmers growing grains than for farmers growing other crops and, thus, those looking to insure their crops are encouraged to grow corn.⁴³ Threats such as cold snaps, flooding and energy price fluctuations are much less of a concern for farmers whose crops are insured by the government, providing them with increased financial stability.

The lack of incentivization provided for other crops has been tied to public health concerns, particularly to the average American's increased caloric intake (by about 300kcal) between 1985-2000.⁴⁴ Of these 300kcal, 46% of the increase has come from refined grains such as corn. This increase has resulted largely from the low price for food producers to produce these products, and these low costs are passed onto consumers as low prices. While also lowering the price of corn by discouraging farmers from planting fruits and vegetables, the price of these healthy foods has risen. In 2003, for example, twice as many fruits and vegetables were imported to the US as were exported.⁴⁵ This lack of supply within the US has led to increased prices of fruits and vegetables both in America and globally, discouraging consumers from selecting these healthy foods as a major source of their caloric intake.

There are additional health implications beyond the rising price of nutritious foods. Global health analysts have noted the alarming rise in diabetes worldwide, and have struggled to understand the factors that have contributed the most to the epidemic.⁴⁶ There are estimated to be over 350 million people worldwide with diabetes, and a high proportion of that number is located in the developing world.⁴⁷ As traditional food patterns become supplanted by sugar intensive diets, the Global South's sugar intake has

increased dramatically.⁴⁸ The result of this has been a significant rise in the incidence of diabetes over the past several decades.

High fructose corn syrup (HFCS) (also known as Glucose-Fructose) is a caloric sweetener made from corn. It serves as the main alternative to pricier sucrose sugar and is a common component in many processed foods.⁴⁹ The use of HFCS has spiked in the past thirty years, thus corresponding roughly to the dramatic increase in the prevalence of obesity in America. This overlap has caused some medical professionals to directly tie the expansion of HFCS to America's growing obesity crisis.⁵⁰

While the medical community remains divided on the extent to which HFCS contributes to the prevalence of diabetes internationally there have been numerous studies that have attempted to definitively establish links between the two.⁵¹ Starting with Bray et al., a number of scholars have argued that fructose sugars are particularly detrimental to metabolic health and that a consistent intake of fructose sugars increases the likelihood of being diagnosed with Type-2 diabetes.⁵²

These claims are supported by a growing body of empirical evidence. For example, Goran et al.'s study on country-level differences in the global access to HFCS found that fructose sugars played a huge role in the discrepancies between obesity and diabetes levels in individual countries.⁵³ Specifically, Type-2 diabetes was found to be higher in countries with high HFCS availability as compared to countries with a lower availability.⁵⁴ In fact, the difference in prevalence was the same, and in some cases greater, after adjusting the results to account for population and gross domestic product by country, despite the fact that most of the countries observed demonstrated great similarity in obesity rates, as well as sugar and caloric availability. The results reify suggestions that global diabetes levels are partially caused by the processed food industry's usage of HFCS and that therefore, any step towards tackling diabetes needs to account for the use of High Fructose Corn Syrup.⁵⁵

Implications for Policymaking

Through an investigation of the various policy areas impacted by corn subsidies, it has been shown that globalization has substantially changed the way policies impact the world. The vast interconnectivity nations are faced with has both enlarged the issue areas and information channels that policy makers must contend with, and simultaneously, has broadened the scope of the effects that a nationally prescribed policy can have. In spite of this, policymakers often continue to adopt a domestic frame of mind when practicing their craft. While policymakers still have a responsibility to create policies that are foremost concerned with maintaining the welfare of their nation, they can no longer ignore the role globalization plays in intertwining their prescriptions locally with large-scale effects globally.

Dimensional limitations notwithstanding, there is a real incentive for policymakers to adopt a global mindset when creating policy prescriptions. This incentive exists because in our tightly-knit world, negative ramifications can spread easily and quickly. These consequences occur within countries, as well as internationally, as evidenced throughout this article. Policymakers looking to maximize benefits to their constituencies therefore must be aware of not just local inputs to policy outcomes, but also international inputs, so that they can maximize benefits attained from policies that are created. Policymakers, especially those beholden to the electorate, will experience the best policy outcomes, and therefore the best opportunity to impress the electorate, through being aware of international interlinkages and incorporating this knowledge into the formulation of policies.

Even if the effects of an enacted policy are experienced miles away, the density of the linkages that today connect our globe mean that there is always potential for these effects to influence circumstances closer to home. Policymakers who adopt a strictly nationalist perspective will be unequipped to handle the pressing policy issues that are likely to emerge in the 21st century. Those with a

broader view will better appreciate the need to reconstitute the craft of policy making to suit current circumstances.

What would a more globally cognizant perspective on policy making encompass? Broadly speaking, it would require the policy maker to be more aware of the limitations and hurdles that they might encounter in crafting policy that is suitable for a globalized atmosphere. Policymakers, unaccustomed to thinking globally rather than nationally, are likely to come across a number of difficulties in making that transition. Two hurdles in particular seem especially pertinent to discuss. The phenomena of path-dependence and non-linearity are two concepts that policy makers must become better acquainted with, in order to better understand and appreciate the inherent complexity of policy in a globalized setting. The next section will serve to illustrate and elaborate on these two concepts, while the discussion of “smart” policy that follows will serve to demonstrate methods of contending with these phenomena.

In transforming contemporary policy practice to be more globally conscientious, it is prudent to revisit older policies. Policies can be interpreted as path dependent “if initial moves in one direction elicit further moves in that same direction”.⁵⁶ Path dependent policies created before the acceleration of globalization over the past several decades are often difficult to alter, despite the fact that they are not well-suited to the globalized world. Once a policy is put in place, the choices related to that policy in the future are constrained in some form.

Constraints are notably present for policymakers when they are dealing with agricultural subsidies. The subsidies have been in place for so long that farmers have become dependent on them and have created an increasingly powerful lobby in the United States for protection. For example, in 2008, in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis, the US congress tried to reduce subsidies by \$10 billion USD over five years.⁵⁷ Both then-President George W. Bush and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi backed this plan, but the subsidy reductions did not occur. Lobbyists acted as a significant constraint on policy makers, making subsidy reductions difficult to enact. Farm lobbyists spend over \$80 million USD each year to maintain subsidies and as their reduction seemed imminent in 2008 they began to convince an increasingly large number of Members of Congress to vote again the reductions.⁵⁸ The lobbying effort was highly effective and while some reductions did occur, subsidies were “essentially left intact.”⁵⁹

The growth in the size and efficacy of the farm lobby to block change, exemplifies the larger problem of path dependency that policymakers need to work to overcome. Constraints that emerge from the path dependent nature of policies, prevent public policy from being tailored to the modern world and thereby can often be detrimental to public policy’s efficacy. Agricultural subsidies were created during the Great Depression, in a period where protecting the jobs of small farmers and ensuring affordable food for Americans was the highest priority. Today these subsidies lead to effects such as poor nutrition, food price volatility, and job losses resulting from the dumping of corn abroad. It is only possible to make policies that best accomplish their goals when they engage with the realities that are currently present. Policymakers therefore should note the inadequacies of these policies to the realities that are present so they can better cater to current realities.

It is also necessary to address the increasingly complex nature of contemporary policy-making in a global setting. This paper has sought to prove the growing incidence of complexity within public policy, by demonstrating how a policy producing seemingly beneficial effects on a national level, can have a causal effect in producing unintended, often negative, outcomes globally. This disconnected causal chain demonstrates the trait of “non-linearity”, a rare occurrence in the practice of policy before globalization’s emergence.⁶⁰

With non-linearity, small changes at the sub-system level can have large effects, while large changes in the system may not have much effect at all. In this sense, a nationally derived policy can continue to corrode the integrity and stability of the global, while this gradual decay in the global might not seem to have much or any effect on the national.⁶¹ The issue facing contemporary policy makers will be to account for this trend in their prescriptions. Modern day issue areas can no longer be segmented by borders or be addressed without paying consideration to the underlying and interconnected linkages at hand. Policymakers, at least those intending to create optimal public policy, are today required to look at the global effects their policies could have, as well as local or national effects. They would need to advance and practice policy in a wholly new way.

“Smart Policy,” as advanced by Igor Ivanov, would take these issues and limitations into account, and would aid in creating globally-minded policymakers.⁶² While Ivanov’s prescriptions are primarily aimed at policymakers who specialize in foreign relations, they can be adapted and drawn upon to produce relevant domestic policy prescriptions, as well. A “Smart” policy that would be better fitted for our globalized atmosphere would enshrine three general principles in the practice of policy making.

1) Resisting the temptation to pursue opportunistic, short-term gains to the detriment of international stability.⁶³ Any policymaker that recognizes that increasing integration is unavoidable is likely to understand why short-term gains are so dangerous. Ill-thought out opportunism can jeopardize the cohesiveness of the global system and ultimately, easily rebound. It is necessary to inoculate policymakers with a long-term mindset that appreciates the delicate fragility that holds the system together.

2) Policymakers should learn to separate their policy agendas from the “pull” of domestic forces.⁶⁴ This does not mean ignoring the input of the domestic, rather it requires expanding one’s inputs to account for the global. The needs of the domestic political class have tended to dictate the nation’s policy objectives even when there has been a foreign component involved, making this requirement more difficult in practice than as a concept, as it stands today, the dictates of the domestic class weigh too heavily on the course of policies, whose broader effects they are usually insulated from and whose ramifications they have little knowledge of. Policymakers cannot be partisan in this; they must learn to represent long-term interests of “all significant political, social, and economic groups that have a stake [in the issue].”⁶⁵

3) A “Smart” policy would engage both the international community and international experts in order to better understand and account for the ramifications of their policies.⁶⁶ Policymakers are still transitioning into a globally-oriented frame of mind. Until such a time that they are acclimated to the growing realities of globalism, it remains necessary to fill that gap in knowledge. Though likely to be opposed at first, in many ways, cross-sectoral integration can be highly beneficial for all involved. Academics and experts can help to bring innovations in thinking to policymakers, while policymakers can make practical the abstract ideas academics espouse.

An example of this could be the facilitation of conferences to encourage the interaction of policymakers and academics, or it could involve academics being brought into policymaking discussions more often to inform policymakers about the broader consequences of their actions, and to provide contextualization within a global contact. This type of increased interaction would improve the flow of knowledge between academia and policymakers, allowing new ideas to permeate policymaking circles more rapidly.

While it has been made evident that a paradigm shift in policymaking is required, the feasibility of such an initiative remains its biggest obstacle. Very few contemporary policies have pre-emptively sought to fully incorporate a global mindset into the policy making process. While many past

governments have been cognizant of and reactive to the global ramifications of national-level policy making, much of the activeness on the part of these governments has been influenced by larger bodies and few governments are concerned by ramifications beyond their immediate regional spheres. Moreover, most changes are applied far too late to have any meaningful impact on the costs imposed by errant policy making. Policymakers must be made more aware of the benefits of situating oneself globally *prior* to the development and implementation of policy. Even if they are unable to account for all the potential consequences of a particular policy initiative, they will be, at minimum, better equipped to deal with the most overt ramifications, if those potentialities arise.

Several real world examples support the assertion that the global community is already headed towards a more globally aware policymaking mindset. The recently growth in the importance of global issues, such as climate change, has pushed national and sub-national policy makers to re-evaluate the way in which public policy is conducted. It is no longer uncommon for parallel legislation to be developed in several countries simultaneously on particular issues.⁶⁷ Global climate change legislation, featuring the majority of countries around the world exacting somewhat coordinated national level policies to solve a global problem, is one situation where this growing phenomenon is visible. While this still remains a far cry from the development of a “global mindset,” it does reflect that policy-makers are becoming more conscious about, and more responsive to, the impacts of the globalized world and that policies are increasingly being coordinated by policymakers operating across national borders.

There has also been a corresponding resurgence in interest about mitigating the effects of globalization at the supra-national level. International organizations and international NGOs, such as the United Nations, are striving to better understand “localized effects” and to better utilize “local knowledge.”⁶⁸ This results from the realization that, in many cases, policies are only successful if they can be adapted to specific local or regional settings. Recognizing that the needs of their constituents may be uneven, supra-national organizations have begun taking the first step towards addressing disparities. Efforts such as this to better understand and account for the effects of the global on the local will lead to more nuanced and more effective public policy being enacted in the years ahead.

Finally, on a sub-national level, some instances exist of policy-making becoming disconnected from the restrictiveness of national and supra-national categorization altogether. Advances in technology have aided the development of networks of policy-makers, frequently organized around specific issue areas and often professionally distanced from the state apparatus.⁶⁹ Through using the internet, smart phone applications and other technology, policymakers can independently connect with one another - unimpeded by the strictures of borders and state. The processes utilized by these “epistemic communities” provide one blueprint for trans-national policy-making, and the information generated by these communities already serves as the basis for observable transnational policy development. Through growing these communities, and increasing linkages between policymakers operating around the world, a global mindset can be better developed. Through this, policymakers will increasingly be able to identify and understand international linkages and the complex impacts that national-level policies can have across borders, hopefully resulting in better public policymaking.

Conclusion

Policymaking in the globalized world is more difficult than ever before due to the variety of factors that must be considered when creating effective policies. Policymakers during the Great Depression, who created the AAA originally, were able to confine their policy’s impacts largely within US borders. This enabled them to expect a more linear cause and effect response to policies they enacted. The lessening importance of borders in the modern world has meant that a plethora of variables from outside any country’s borders can now have a serious impact within them, and also that, as is the

case with corn subsidies, policies created within one nation's borders can have impacts that spread far beyond them.

Corn subsidies policies are path dependent and demonstrate characteristics indicative of non-linearity. As a result, they have impacts beyond their intended goals, while they remain difficult to alter or remove. This presents a challenge for policymakers. Accordingly, policymakers must update their approach to creating public policy so that it corresponds with the realities of the modern world. While all the ways in which policymaking could be improved were not addressed here, definitive problems have been identified, and hopefully from this, policy practitioners will be able to identify areas to further improve upon current practices. Above all else, policymakers need to understand the complexities inherent in their field and work to account for as many variables as possible. If they can succeed in doing this, public policy that today is often ineffectual or strays from its intended goals, as is the case with American corn subsidization, can be made more effective, helping to improve public policy globally and make all societies better places to live.

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Competing for Control: The Fragmentation of Police and Security

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Abstract:

This paper addresses concerns that the nation state has lost its monopoly as the provider of maintaining order within its own borders. The growing presence of security threats that occur within the state but originate beyond it, coupled with the increasing presence of security providers that are private or, in some ways, separate from the authority of the state has diminished the state's ability to provide security and order. This paper addresses two competing observations of the state and their respective policy implications. The first is 'nodal governance' that diminishes the role of the state as a provider of security. The second is 'anchored pluralism.' The argument presented is that the state is uniquely placed to use its symbolic and normative power as an anchor to effectively steer the provision of security. Maintaining within the territorial boundary of the state is, in the current context, far more readily achievable but creating effective mechanisms above and between states is needed to enable the fragmentation of policing at the transnational level to be effective. The increased policing capacity of states must be coupled with effective security governance.

Introduction

Since the middle of the 20th century there has been a slow but considerable restructuring of the conception and practice of state – or police – force within Western industrialized countries resulting in complex division of labour in policing and security.¹ This division of labour has transferred to, among others, private individuals and organizations, public volunteers, supranational powers, and nongovernmental organizations. As a result of this growing division of power, Crawford argues “[a] pluralized, fragmented and differentiated patchwork has replaced the idea of the police as the monopolistic guardians of public order.”²

However, Crawford is not entirely accurate with his characterization of police. While the police have certainly lost their near monopoly as providers of public order, they have not been replaced as the most significant provider of security within the state. To address Crawford’s argument, this paper will be structured as follows: first, I will begin with a brief look at the history of modern police. Second, I will explore the current understanding of plural policing as a concept separate from the state. Third, I will explain the relationship between the state and police. Specifically, an analysis of ‘nodal governance’³ and ‘anchored pluralism’⁴ will be conducted in order to determine which better captures the current power of the state and police in plural policing, and their relation with the public at large. Finally, I will end with a look into transnational policing and policing beyond the state. Ultimately, I conclude that the police continue to play a strong role in the maintaining of public order within the nation state. They have lost their near monopoly but their role, as an extension of the state, and their symbolic power is still predominant in the ‘fragmented and differentiated patchwork’ of policing.

Brief History

Before moving forward it would be prudent to identify what is meant by the terms ‘police’ and ‘policing.’ For the purposes of this paper the ‘police’ will refer to a professional force, in uniform or otherwise who are hired, paid, and directed by the government as agents authorized to use diverse means restricted to the other members of society, to uphold a specific sociopolitical order.⁵ ‘Policing’, in a pluralized sense, is a set of activities and processes that may be performed by professionals or ordinary people at the local level through networks of both formal and informal social control.⁶

The formal state directed police force as the primary vehicle for maintaining public order is a relatively new idea. Much of what we consider to be the function and form of policing originated in England in the early 19th century. Prior to 1829 and the formation of the Metropolitan Police, a large portion of police work was divided among private individuals and organizations in the UK.⁷ Members of the community affected by crime sought help through private groups or individuals.

While the state directed police force has been able to place itself as the bedrock of security provision, the fragmented nature of security provision that characterized policing at this time did not suddenly dissipate. There was a level of continuity in the structure of policing arrangements in the developments following 1829.⁸ Although there was variation across Europe at the time, generally, the police began as a broad form of governmentality covering a multitude of duties from securing food supply to licensing manufacturing enterprises.⁹ This broad power of policing gradually turned inward enabling the state “to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society in the name of the common interest or general will.”¹⁰ It is this power that has come under question in a globalized world where common interest is increasingly defined by transnational forces. We are now in a system in which the bedrock of national sovereignty is being eroded in a multitude of ways, and it must be ascertained if the rule of law and the provision of security is, or ought to be, immune from such erosion.

Identifying Plural Policing in a Modern Context

It should be noted that it is not the aim of this paper to argue whether the pluralization of policing is indicative of late-modern or postmodern governance.¹¹ Amongst proponents of both perspectives there

is agreement that a pluralization of policing is currently taking place in many areas of the industrialized world and nation states are, and have been for decades, relinquishing power.¹² It is based on this consensus that this paper will build upon. The aim is to identify the place of plural policing in a contemporary context and the concurrent role the police and state play in the process of pluralization. Using the definition of police outlined in the above section, the key notion for the argument presented is the link between the police and the direction of the government. However, before explicating this link, focus must now be put on identifying plural policing as a concept without relation to the state.

Bayley and Shearing note that with the end of the police's monopoly and rise of pluralization, policing has become available through an increasing number of *private* providers.¹³ Unfortunately, the research on privatization suffers from what Brodeur terms the 'watershed syndrome'.¹⁴ This is both the tendency to overstate the facts and their significance and the formal primacy of the numbers and what they indicate.¹⁵ Further, as research in private policing and plural policing grows it has become clear that it is problematic to think of pluralized policing, in today's context, as a simple dichotomy between public and private, state and non-state.¹⁶ This section will address the former dichotomy and the next section will address more completely the complexity of Crawford's above argument.

To progress past a misunderstanding of this dichotomy the manifestation of privatization in plural policing ought to be explored. The classification between public and private policing is increasingly blurry. Public policing has integrated private techniques within their framework. As an example, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) seek out contracts by using promotional material 'selling' their services to take advantage of an increasingly lucrative market.¹⁷ Private security is a dynamic concept that has now manifested in several ways including the penetration into private markets by public police, private funding of public police, administrative techniques incorporated into the public police from the private sector and the privatization of security knowledge.¹⁸ Policing, increasingly, may also be achieved through technologies such as bugging devices, surveillance cameras and so on, available for large scale or personal use.¹⁹ Clearly, *inter alia*, the privatization of policing is at the very least occurring.²⁰

Pluralization has also been a feature of the public police system. Plural policing can also take the form of specialist policing with specific mandates that target specific crimes or offences committed in a defined location or by state departments with other functions.²¹ Pluralization has also flowed downwards and increasingly become the responsibility of the individual²² and/or a specific locality i.e., gated communities.²³ To understand policing as simply a dichotomy of private and non-private does not fully capture the complex process of pluralization. Here the discussion has revolved around 'pluralized policing' but it is important to recognize that tendency for the literature to use multiple terms including, "...the mixed economy of policing, plural policing, the extended police family, security partnerships and policing networks" to describe similar processes.²⁴

With respect to the state, it has been found that with varying degrees of involvement on behalf of the government, plural policing networks exist in more-or-less awkward mosaics that are often poorly constructed, overlap in their mandates and foster competition and mistrust among one another.²⁵ This is a signal of another concurrent development within the changing conception of policing: finding an appropriate role for the police.²⁶

Recalling the above understanding, the police in the broadest sense are directly linked to the state. The concern then becomes determining the best methods of governing the multiplicity of institutional forms that are now involved in the production and delivery of policing with a diminishing monopoly of power on behalf of the state.²⁷ Some assert that as policing becomes more pluralized and divided among multiple sites of security production, the importance of the state declines.²⁸ This would be to fall into the problematic understanding of pluralization as a 'state and non-state dichotomy' that does not represent the complexity of relationships between the state and policing. The role of the state in the governance within its territories is distinctive.²⁹ Further, the state remains, for the foreseeable future, uniquely able to "...secure, legitimate, coordinate, effective and equitable policing...."³⁰

The Role of the State: Nodal Governance and Anchored Pluralism

The state, and by extension the police, no longer have a complete monopoly over guarding the maintenance of order. Within the context of security and policing it would be clumsy to ‘throw out the state’ and get excited over the idea that the ‘state is passé.’³¹ Regarding the state in this manner brings with it policy recommendations that drastically change the institutional form of the state rather than if the state is regarded as a point of higher authority in the provision of policing and security. However, before completely dismissing this position of the state as having lost its significance in the governance of security, the factors and form of the argument ought to be considered.

Often, the argument surrounding the ‘withering state’ is in response to the changing nature of crime within and outside of the state.³² Criminal networks are becoming far more fluid making it difficult for the traditional Westphalian order to control these fluid and reflexive networks.³³ In response, one solution sought by the state has been to create transnational policing networks but the focus remains the role of the state and its police in maintaining order within its territory.

These fluid criminal networks are, in part, a product of globalization.³⁴ Importantly, globalization transforms spatial organization and social relations that affect distant localities.³⁵ This has been described, with reference to the transformation of organized crime, as globalization operating within the local.³⁶ This process of globalization has also had an effect on crime outside of organized crime in localities within the same state. In a comparative study of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, Pakes found that despite their close geographical proximity and position within the same state each city faced different and unrelated crime problems which was most likely a result of global trends above the state affecting the problems beneath the state.³⁷ It may seem that the state is incapable of controlling crime with global trends passing through its boundaries. However, understanding the subnational processes, within the jurisdiction of the state, becomes as important as the supranational processes.³⁸

With pluralization occurring both above and below the state, academics have attempted to understand and explain the appropriate role of the state in governing within the multiplicity of security and policing networks. One approach has been to understand the role of the state in a model of ‘nodal governance.’³⁹ Shearing and Wood explain, “[w]ithin a nodal conception of governance, no set of nodes is given conceptual priority. Rather, the exact nature of governance and the contributions of the various nodes to it are regarded as empirically open questions.”⁴⁰ This line of argument attempts to move away from state-centered conceptions of security governance. Within this conception the police and the state are one node amongst the many nodes aligned horizontally – with no clear authoritative structure – and are collectively charged with policing and security functions. To conceptually attempt to move away from the state as being central, Shearing and Wood had to re-imagine how the public, police and state interact with one another.⁴¹

With growing access to distant localities through technology, advances in transportation, and other factors of globalization individual identities are no longer found specifically within a geographical community but rather each individual has multiple layers of community and identity spanning over multiple localities.⁴² In nodal governance it is important to move away from the notion of citizens and move towards understanding the relationship between the public and the state as denizens.⁴³ A denizen occupies a specific place within the regulatory domain of a governmental node but does not necessarily identify with that political community within that node.⁴⁴ Shearing and Wood argue the affiliations, rights, and expectations of individuals are better captured with the notion of denizen.⁴⁵ This incorporates an understanding that each individual receives multiple layers of governance and communal space but fails to recognize the qualitative difference between the state and police compared against other forms of policing. These differences lie in the relative symbolism, regulatory position and generalist mission of maintaining order of the state.⁴⁶ The police and the state are entrusted with security when the stakes are higher as exemplified, in one instance, by the decision of the Canadian government post-9/11 to de-

privatize security from airports.⁴⁷ Further, nodal governance does not recognize the importance of security as a social good, the role it plays in creating an active citizenry and the necessary and ‘virtuous role’ the state plays in providing security.⁴⁸

An opposing conception of the role of the state in governing policing is found within the idea of anchored pluralism. The point of departure for anchored pluralism is to understand security as a ‘thick’ public good.⁴⁹ This “recognizes the strong mutuality and reciprocity required amongst those who make up the ‘social environment...’”⁵⁰ Further, *effective* security provision is a good that creates the very idea of ‘publicness;’ it is both the producer and product of social bonds and forms of trust that are requisite for a democratic, political community – or publicness.⁵¹ The aim is to connect the state and citizen in a process of civilizing security by fostering and maintaining political communities.⁵² The role of the individual inside the state is not that of a passive denizen. Rather, the citizen is directly involved in the process of democratic creation of security in a less individualistic understanding of the social environment towards an understanding that fosters social bonding. The result is a conception of governance and the state as the ‘anchor’ of collective security in pluralized system. Loader and Walker summarize anchored pluralism arguing:

The state...should remain the anchor of collective security provision, but there should be as much pluralism as possible both, internally, in terms of the constitutional inclusiveness, representativeness and minority and individual protection mechanisms of the democratic and administrative processes through which the aspiration of collective security is reflected upon and pursued and, externally in terms of the recognition of the appropriate place of other sites of cultural and regulatory production above, below and otherwise beyond the state.⁵³

The point to stress is the position of the state in the governance of security ensuring security provision. It is not simply a node that is part of a horizontal network providing one layer of security provision. This recognizes the distinct nature and ability of the state to interact with its citizens and provide security. As an example, Skinnis notes that anchored pluralism in relation to pluralization in police custody – when an individual is arrested and pending a decision on their case – is more suitable in dealing with complex and contentious matters that occur in this setting.⁵⁴ Anchored pluralism allows the state to “...act as an arbiter in decisions about security, thereby retaining [security] as a public good.”⁵⁵ Ultimately, a state steers its policing objectives allowing a pluralistic system to carry out those objectives as efficiently as possible.

Pluralization is occurring in policing and security. Therefore the state and, by extension, the police have lost their monopoly on maintaining order. This loss however, does not signal the loss of significance of the state and police in policing its own territory, as suggested by nodal governance, but instead their changing role within a pluralized system. To regard the state in this way would be to go down a policy path that would be detrimental to the governance of security within the state. Before moving onto policy considerations a clear picture of transnational policing is required. Thus far, the discussion has largely been around the position of the state and the police in policing within the state amongst a multiplicity of security providers. Another important factor in the pluralization and fragmentation of policing is the role of other sites of regulatory production ‘above’ and ‘otherwise beyond’ the state.

Transnational Policing

Along with pluralization below the state there has been a transfer of security provision from the nation state to international institutions.⁵⁶ The transnational policing discussion in this paper is limited but aims to simply note its dimension in the current context of plural, fragmented and the differentiated patchwork of policing. Transnational refers to activities that cross boundaries without being necessarily affected by them.⁵⁷ This is linked with a common observation among many scholars that the international system is breaking apart and national sovereignty and boundaries are becoming increasingly more fluid.⁵⁸

Similarly, transnational policing or ‘global policing,’ is the capacity to use coercive and surveillance powers across, and unaffected by, global boundaries.⁵⁹

In contrast to power within the state, power in the world system is polycentric.⁶⁰ This is in reference to considerations of international institutional power rather than asserting a specific notion of international power polarity. Consequently this discussion follows many assumptions of a constructivist view of international relations.⁶¹ The assumption is the international system is anarchical but places emphasis on security being a collaborative effort in producing international social norms through institutions and relationships. This assumption dismisses the idea that states are responsible for their own security. The significant challenge for transnational policing initiatives is to agree on the nature of those institutions in the face of strong norms of sovereignty.

In this polycentric system there is no universally recognized source of authority and the policing field is fragmented.⁶² This fragmentation is in part due to the social and cultural significance of policing within each nation state that molds global policing.⁶³ Gerspacher and Dupont observe one proposed solution is to move away from state-centered, vertical approaches of transnational policing to a more horizontal approach.⁶⁴ Little has been said about how this would form or what mechanisms would be utilized to regulate such a system. The challenge for global policing is to form a universal source of policing authority. The nation state, with regard to its own sovereignty, is uniquely placed as a normative provider of anchored power. Conversely, a universal authority would allow for a more anchored approach to transnational policing issues creating a far more democratic and involved process.

There are significant challenges to creating this sort of international policing system. Nations are reluctant to give up power over the provision of policing within their territory. For example, the member states of the European Union faced with political enlargement, have negotiated opt-outs in security provisions regarding sensitive issues that are argued to be the purview of the national rather than the supranational.⁶⁵ There exist many barriers to creating a universal source of authority in global policing. Among many there are barriers of language, structure of policing systems, issues of trust between police forces and states, and misperceptions of malpractice amongst police in other countries.⁶⁶ This has resulted in institutions like Interpol and Europol being largely networks for information sharing rather than effective, hierarchical points of authority.⁶⁷ Interpol and Europol can hardly direct or force states to divulge information that is often regarded as necessary for national security.

However, Europol has experienced real gains in power over the behaviour of states within its mandate.⁶⁸ This may signal a move, in Europe at least, towards creating a regional body that could be a point of universal authority allowing for an anchoring of responsibility over security. The current state of affairs has not yet attained this due to multitude barriers and the influence of nation states. Currently, it appears that nation states are experiencing a transference of policing and security above and beyond their territory. In spite of this they have not lost their influence in the regulation and governance of security.⁶⁹

Limitations and Policy Recommendations

Admittedly, the above exploration of plural policing, security provision, and legitimacy of the security provider has been rather rigid in its distinctions between sub-national and transnational and has solely focused on situations where the legitimacy of the state, and its subsequent legitimate ability to provide security, is scantily up for debate. It is important to note, however, that the state is hardly the only place one can participate in the democratic process of policing. The state has precipitously lost its position as the sole provider in many states as seen where communities look to local private security companies for security at the domestic level or organizations like NATO for security at the supranational level.⁷⁰ In extreme but not rare cases –outside the purview of this exploration – communities look to organized crime groups or warlords as the legitimate provider of security.⁷¹ The fluidity of security as a commodity is far less rigid than the discussion above has allowed for.⁷² This is a definite limitation of the above

discussion which warrants further exploration in future attempts at capturing the complexities in modern policing, but the above discussion is important to understand how the state can lead the security market.

Further, this paper insists that the state is uniquely placed to provide security within its own territory in the face of the fragmentation of policing. Critics of this position may rightly point out that countries in some cases have diminished their position on security through the signing of international treaties that allow other states to dictate domestic laws and policies. For example, these may include foreign investment protections agreements (FIPAs) where foreign states can dictate domestic policies under certain circumstances. For example, Canada has signed FIPAs with countries that are invested in oil extraction on aboriginal lands and have significant power to in protecting their investment. Further, much remains to be seen on how the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is written. At the time of writing, the agreement has yet to be made public, but can have significant implications on cyber security and sovereignty.

Without diving into the immense complexities of the international legal system, entering into international agreements and treaties may shift the ability of the state to be the provider of security. With that being said, international agreements have opt-out, reservation, and arbitration systems that all parties to the agreement can participate in. These systems are still constructed in a system where the state is the principal actor and can dictate the path forward. A clear group that has the power to circumvent or challenge this system are the aptly named 'transnational capitalist class' whose narrow interests are not confined by arbitrary territorial boundaries.⁷³ While we may have to question state sovereignty and the level of erosion occurring, as it stands the state currently is in the greatest position to effectively coordinate, dictate, and provide security.

As for policy considerations, given the vast conceptual territory covered in this paper it would be helpful to outline general policy strategies. These will be placed contextually, in this instance, using Canada as an example. Canada is a great example because it is a country that brings to the forefront some of the issues faced in this paper due to its increasing policing capacity and its involvement in contested international agreements.

The first, and most vital, step for policymakers in ensuring control of security provision is to open up the conversation to the public. Policing as a thick public good requires the state to engage the citizens for which they are responsible in the process of policing. Without the inclusion of citizens, the ability of effectively administrating any authoritative policing function is diminished. The early 21st century has seen a massive increase in the capacity of different forms of policing with an increasing level of opaqueness.⁷⁴ The increased capacity has also seen a concurrent diminished capacity to provide social goods like health, education, and welfare of their populations.⁷⁵ These are some of the consequences of the continuing use of enemy-creation and folk devilry in response to global 'threats.' Democratic policing as a whole has seen an alarming downturn. In order to provide a point of centralized authority and effectively wield the unique position of the state to anchor security provision, the state must engage with the population they are seeking to protect.

In Canada, following 9/11 the federal government drastically increased the power of centralized security apparatuses including, *inter alia*, the RCMP, CSIS (Canadian Security Intelligence Service), and the CBSA (Canada Border Services Agency) that radically diminished the power and ability of municipal and provincial police forces to direct their own policing.⁷⁶ This has reversed the trend towards more diverse, decentralized, and pluralized policing forces in Canada. Concerned by existential global threats, the Canadian government legislated for more centralized political control and did not seek to include as much pluralization as possible at all levels. For Canada, the federal government ought to adopt a policy that allows for as much transparency as possible to bring policing, in its current form, back to a more effective place as a thick public good engaging the wider citizenship. Unfortunately, Canada under the

Harper government degraded the value of citizenship, reduced access to the conversation in democratizing policing, and lost its ability to steer security in an effective direction. The state, and policing in general, has suffered from an inability to govern crime and have had a greater tendency to manage crime, or crime fear.

Within the need to be open, accountability is another vital component of effective plural policing. Democratic accountability structures must be in place to ensure that the police are acting in the public's interest. Canada, unfortunately, in response to the increasing blurriness of crime in a globalized world has created organizations like CBSA that have little accountability and wield extensive powers.

Finally, states must recognize their place in the current transnationalized world in both how it relates to crime and the global governance system in general. The state is increasingly layered with other levels of governance and transnational forces and states must resist the urge to grip onto notions that the nation state is impermeable. To this end, states must implement mechanisms of collaboration both within and beyond the state to the greatest extent possible. Be it more comprehensively funding points of information sharing like Interpol or Europol or signing onto treaties and agreements that allow for effective communication and collaboration. Without such mechanisms in place, the nation state will be left adrift in a world where crime, war, and social identity is fluid.

Conclusion

Police, as defined as those linked to the state, are uniquely placed in the pluralization of policing. Placing the role of the state as the anchor in the provision of security best reflects in the current context its symbolic power and ability to maintain order amongst policing networks and the public. Both within and beyond the state the process of pluralization of security and policing has taken place. The state has witnessed a growing multiplicity in the providers of security beyond the police through privatization, nongovernmental organizations, enhanced technology, increased responsibilities for citizens and the processes of pluralization beyond the state. The state has evidently lost its near monopoly as the 'guardian' of maintaining public order. However, the state and police have not lost their significant influence and power in resolving complex issues of policing and security and ought not to be regarded as a horizontal node in the patchwork of policing. Centralizing authority is not the solution without a concurrent and robust effort to engage the public in the creation of policing structure.

Endnotes

¹ A. Crawford, 'Plural policing in the UK: Policing beyond the policy' in T Newburn (ed), *Handbook of policing* (Willan Publishing 2008) 147. The discussion that follows is based on nations that have, what would reasonably be understood as, effective control of their official policing organs.

² *Ibid.*, 147.

³ C. Shearing and J. Woods, 'Nodal governance, democracy, and the new 'denizens'' (2003) 30(3) *Journal of Law and Society* 400.

⁴ I. Loader and N. Walker, *Civilizing security* (Cambridge University Press 2007) 193.

⁵ D.H. Bayley and C.D. Shearing, 'The future of policing' (1996) 30(3) *Law and Society Review* 586; J.P. Brodeur, *The policing web* (Oxford University Press 2010) 140.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 148.

⁷ L. Skinns, *Police custody: Governance, legitimacy and reform in the criminal justice process* (Willan Publishing 2011) 134.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 134.

⁹ J. Sheptycki, 'Transnational policing and the makings of a postmodern state' (1995) 34(4) *British Journal of Criminology* 614.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 615.

¹¹ I. Loader, 'Consumer culture and the commodification of policing and security' (1999) 33(2) *Sociology* 374; R. Reiner, 'Policing a postmodern society' in T. Newburn (ed) *Policing: Key readings* (Willan Publishing 2005) 692.

¹² I. Loader (1999), 374.

¹³ D.H. Bayley and C.D. Shearing (1996) 588.

¹⁴ J.P. Brodeur (2010), 259.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 260, 261.

¹⁶ A. Crawford (2008), 175.

¹⁷ G.S. Rigakos, *The new parapolice: Risk markets and commodified social control* (University of Toronto Press Incorporated 2002) 46.

¹⁸ J.P. Brodeur (2010), 257-8.

¹⁹ A. Crawford (2008), 148.

²⁰ J.P. Brodeur (2010), 258.

²¹ A. Crawford (2008), 148.

²² T. Newburn, 'The future of policing' in Newburn (ed), *Handbook of policing* (Willan Publishing 2008), 827.

²³ A. Crawford (2008), 175.

²⁴ L. Skinns (2011), 134.

²⁵ A. Crawford (2008), 174.

²⁶ D.H. Bayley and C.D. Shearing (1996), 595.

²⁷ I. Loader, 'Plural policing and democratic governance' (2000) 9(1) *Social & Legal Studies* 323.

²⁸ R. Reiner (2005), 688.

²⁹ A. Crawford, 'Networked governance and the post-regulatory state? Steering, rowing and anchoring the provision of policing and security' (2006) 10(4) *Theoretical Criminology* 458.

³⁰ I. Loader and N. Walker, 'Policing as a public good: Reconstituting the connections between policing and the state' (2001) 5(1) *Theoretical Criminology* 10.

³¹ A. Crawford (2006), 458.

³² K.F. Aas, *Globalization & crime* (Sage Publications 2007), 143.

³³ N. Gerspacher and B. Dupont, 'The nodal structure of international police cooperation: An exploration of transnational security networks' (2007) 13(1) *Global Governance* 361.

³⁴ K.F. Aas (2007), 143.

³⁵ B. Bowling, 'Transnational policing: The globalization thesis. A typology and a research agenda' (2009) 3(2) *Policing* 150.

³⁶ D. Hobbs, 'Going down to the glocal: The local context of organised crime' (1998) 37(4) *The Howard Journal* 407.

³⁷ F. Pakes, 'The comparative method in globalised criminology' (2010) 43(1) *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology* 19. Pakes found that Amsterdam was rife with crime that is driven by external forces. This include large trafficking rings, whether it be humans or drugs. Rotterdam, however struggles with pettier crime that is likely a result of the faltering industrial sector in that region creating large swaths of unemployed people. This is also a result, generally of global forces of trade and consumerism.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 20.

³⁹ C. Shearing and J. Wood (2003), 400.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 404.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 400.

⁴² J. Young. "Critical criminology in the twenty-first century: Critique, irony and the always unfinished" in K. Carrington and R. Hogg (ed) *Critical criminology: Issues, debates, and challenges* (Willan Publishing 2002) 264.

⁴³ C. Shearing and J. Wood (2003), 400.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 406.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 411.

⁴⁶ A. Crawford (2008), 150.

⁴⁷ J.P. Bordeur (2010), 308.

⁴⁸ I. Loader and N. Walker (2007), 7.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁵⁰ N. Walker 'The problem of trust in an enlarged area of freedom, security and justice: A conceptual analysis' in M. Anderson and J. Apap (ed) *Police and justice co-operation and the new European borders* (Kluwer Law International 2002) 21.

⁵¹ I. Loader and N. Walker (2007), 8.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 193.

⁵⁴ L. Skinns (2011), 160.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 160.

⁵⁶ B. Bowling (2009), 150.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 152.

⁵⁸ C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, and P. Aall, 'The Center Cannot Hold: Conflict Management in an Era of Diffusion' in C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, and P. Aall (ed) *Managing Conflict in a World Adrift* (Centre for International Governance Innovation 2015), 3.

⁵⁹ B Bowling and J. Sheptycki, *Global Policing* (Sage Publications 2011) 8.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁶¹ See A. Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics' (1995) 20(1) *International Security* 71-81.

⁶² B. Bowling and J. Sheptycki (2011), 133.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁶⁴ Gerspacher and Dupont (2007), 361.

⁶⁵ N. Walker (2002), 28.

⁶⁶ M. Anderson, 'Trust and police co-operation' in M. Anderson and J. Apap (ed) *Police and justice co-operation and the new European borders* (Kluwer Law International 2002) 41.

⁶⁷ N. Gerspacher, 'The role of international police cooperation organizations: Beyond mandates, toward unintended roles (2005) 13(3) *European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice* 419.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 428.

⁶⁹ K.F. Aas (2007), 143.

⁷⁰ I. Loader and S. Percy, 'Bringing the 'Outside' in and the 'Inside' out: Crossing the Criminology/IR divide,'(2012) *Global Crime* 13(4), 215.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 216.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 217.

⁷³ L. Sklair, *The Transnational Capitalist Class*. (Oxford: Blackwell 2001).

⁷⁴ J. Sheptycki, 'Criminology and the Transnational Condition: A Contribution to International Political Sociology' (2007) *International Political Sociology* 399.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 400.

⁷⁶ Council of Canadian Academies, 2014. *Policing Canada in the 21st Century: New Policing for New Challenges*. Ottawa (ON): The Expert Panel on the Future of Canadian Policing Models, Council of Canadian Academies, 151.

