The Canada-EU Security & Defence Partnership

Opportunity, Risks & Uncertainties

White Paper

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Disclaimer

This White Paper is intended to stimulate discussion on important issues related to Canadian defence policy. The opinions in this White Paper solely represent the views of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of other members of the Expert Group on Canada-US Relations or the organizations of which both the authors and other members of the Expert Group are members.

Executive Summary

The Canada-EU Security and Defence Partnership (SDP), signed in June 2025, represents a landmark effort to deepen military, industrial, and technological collaboration between Canada and the European Union. The agreement aims to reduce Canada's reliance on U.S. defence suppliers, open access to Europe's vast defence market, and foster joint innovation and procurement.

This report estimates the potential economic gains from the agreement in terms of market access, industrial growth and strategic diversification. At the same time, it offers a comprehensive risk analysis of this ambitious agreement and finds that achieving the partnership's full potential is highly uncertain as a result of various fiscal, political and implementation obstacles on both sides of the Atlantic.

Fiscal Constraints

- *Canada*: Meeting the commitment to raise defence spending from 1.37% to 2% of GDP—and to 5% by 2035—will require tens of billions in new annual outlays. This comes amid rising debt, a limited discretionary budget, and competing social priorities. Achieving and sustaining these targets risks fiscal instability, especially if economic growth underperforms or political support wanes.
- *EU*: Many EU countries face similar or greater fiscal challenges. The Stability and Growth Pact and new EU fiscal rules impose strict limits on deficits and debt. While temporary flexibility is allowed for defence spending, highly indebted nations may find it insufficient, and the scale of required increases is likely unachievable for most without deep cuts elsewhere or politically fraught tax hikes.

Political and Structural Obstacles

- *Canada*: Decades of underinvestment have left the Canadian Armed Forces with equipment shortages and procurement delays. Political resistance, bureaucratic inertia, and public ambivalence about defence spending further complicate efforts to meet NATO and EU expectations. US may constrain or thwart the pivot to EU markets.
- *EU*: Divergent national interests and fiscal capacities threaten unity. Spain, for example, has publicly rejected the 5% target as "disproportionate," committing only to 2.1% of GDP. Such rifts could undermine collective EU efforts and limit the scope of joint projects.

Implementation Hurdles

- Both sides face administrative and logistical hurdles in aligning procurement standards, integrating supply chains, and ensuring timely delivery of new capabilities.

While the SDP offers significant strategic and economic promise, its success is far from assured. Fiscal realities, political resistance, and structural challenges on both sides will likely slow or limit progress toward the ambitious goals set out in the agreement. Only sustained political will, fiscal discipline, and effective coordination can overcome these obstacles to realize the partnership's full potential.

Introduction

The Canada-EU Security and Defence Partnership (SDP), signed in June 2025, marks a major turning point in Canada's approach to both national security and economic growth (see Appendix 1). For decades, Canada has relied heavily on the United States for its defence needs, with about 75 percent of its military procurement coming from south of the border. This has left Canada vulnerable to shifting U.S. policies and trade tensions, as seen in recent years. The new agreement with the European Union is designed to change that dynamic by opening up access to a much broader range of defence suppliers, technologies, and investment opportunities across 27 EU countries. The partnership is not just about buying more military equipment; it is also about building a more resilient, innovative, and self-reliant Canadian economy that can weather global uncertainties.

By meeting its NATO targets, Canada will be spending more on defence—moving from about 1.37 percent of its national income to 2 percent in the near term. The government has also committed to a 5 percent annual expenditure by 2035. This increase isn't just a number on a page; it represents a massive infusion of investment into Canadian industries, from aerospace and artificial intelligence to mining and clean technology. For ordinary Canadians, this potentially translates into tens of thousands of new jobs, especially in regions like Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia where manufacturing and mining are already strong.

When combined with the increases in defence spending, the benefits of the new partnership are significant. By working more closely with the EU, Canada stands to gain not only from direct defence contracts but also from being integrated into Europe's vast supply chains. The EU's own defence spending would likely exceed $1 trillion by 2035 under the 5% of GDP benchmark, and Canadian companies would now have a seat at the table for these lucrative projects. This means more exports, more innovation, and more opportunities for Canadian workers and businesses.

The partnership also includes provisions for joint research in emerging technologies like hydrogen energy and advanced manufacturing, which can help position Canada as a global leader in clean tech and digital industries, and research and development in Arctic security technologies. Mining firms will see new demand for critical minerals like lithium and nickel, which are essential for Europe's booming electric vehicle industry.

Economic Analysis

If it is successfully implemented, the projected benefits of the agreement, will be economically significant. Estimating the economic impact of the SDP by integrating it with the anticipated gains of proposed defence spending targets and sector-specific growth drivers projects additional GDP gains (see Appendix 2).

Under the baseline scenario (no partnership), Canada's GDP growth remains at 1.0–1.8% annually through 2036, constrained by U.S. trade volatility and demographic challenges. The 2% defence spending scenario—aligned with NATO's target—adds 0.2–0.4% to 2025 GDP and 0.3–0.5% by 2036, fueled by a $20B/year stimulus and access to the EU's SAFE procurement program.

The more ambitious 5% spending target ($150B/year by 2035) generates a 0.9–1.2% GDP lift by 2036, amplified by a 1.5× Keynesian multiplier effect that captures job creation and supply-chain activity. EU co-investment contributes an additional 0.7–1.0% GDP growth if it is successfully implemented via joint procurement, SAFE loans and leveraging the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 initiative to scale industrial capacity. These estimated findings are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Economic Impact Projections (2025–2036)

GDP Growth Scenarios

Scenario	2025 GDP Impact	2036 GDP Impact	Key Drivers
Baseline (No change)	**1.0–1.8%**	**1.0–1.8%**	**U.S. trade volatility, demographic constraints.**
2% Defence Spending	**+0.2–0.4%**	**+0.3–0.5%**	**$20B/year stimulus; SAFE procurement access.**
5% Defence Spending	**+0.5–0.8%**	**+0.9–1.2%**	**$150B/year stimulus; critical minerals/digital trade integration.**
EU Co-Investment	**+0.3–0.6%**	**+0.7–1.0%**	**Joint procurement, SAFE loans, industrial policy alignment.**

Critical minerals and digital trade act as force multipliers in this model. Minerals exports—projected at 12–15% annual growth—are anchored by the Canada-EU critical minerals partnership and digital trade harmonization for ICT goods and services under CETA expansion, accelerating cross-border tech integration.

Defence diversification drives 0.8% GDP growth by reducing U.S. dependency from 75% to 40%. These sectoral gains rely on policy enablers: bilateral SAFE access by 2026 and CETA expansion for critical minerals, both essential to convert spending into sustained economic momentum.

The potential sector specific benefits are as follows:

- **Defence Industry**: 0.8% GDP growth from reduced U.S. dependence (75% → 40% by 2036).
- **Critical Minerals**: $15B annual exports by 2036 (lithium, nickel).
- **Job Creation**: 2,431 jobs per $1B in defence spending (CGAI).

Some Important Caveats

While the agreement looks promising in terms of its potential economic benefits, these projections should be interpreted cautiously with several important caveats in mind:

- **Financing and Macroeconomic Impact:** The actual effect of increased defence spending on GDP will depend heavily on how the spending is financed. If funded by higher taxes, the impact may be muted or even negative, especially if the taxes are distortionary. The analysis assumes debt-financed spending and some slack in the economy, but even then, upward pressure on interest rates is likely. If there is no slack, increased spending may simply reallocate resources within the economy with limited impact on overall GDP growth.
- **GDP Level vs. Growth:** The estimates referenced are for increases in the level of GDP, not for sustained GDP growth. For example, if GDP is 1% higher in 2036 due to these measures, the annual GDP growth rate is only about 0.1% higher per year. Continuous, permanent increases in GDP growth would require ever-increasing spending, which may not be sustainable in a deeply uncertain economic environment and ongoing trade wars.
- **Trade Balance Effects:** The net benefit from increased trade with the EU may be limited if Canada is required to import as much from the EU as it exports. In such a scenario, the net impact on Canadian GDP could be minimal.
- **US Defence Imports:** The US currently imports significant defence material from Canada (e.g., LAVs). If Canada shifts procurement to the EU and reduces purchases from the US, it is reasonable to expect that US imports from Canada could decline, negatively affecting Canadian defence exports and jobs.
- **European Fiscal Realities:** There is already considerable skepticism about whether Europe can afford the scale of defence spending increases that are being discussed, especially given demographic challenges and fiscal pressures. Political realities in Europe may make it difficult to sustain high levels of defence spending, particularly as populations age and budget priorities shift and the same is true in Canada.

Implementation Risks

This initiative also faces additional risks rooted in stakeholder reliability, U.S. countermeasures, and other implementation hurdles (see Appendix 3 for more details of the risk assessment).

European Union member states pose a critical risk through their role in ratification. A number of key EU countries—including France, Italy, and Poland—still haven't ratified the foundational CETA trade deal years after its provisional implementation. This precedent suggests that nationalist politics or bureaucratic inertia could delay or derail the new defence pact's procurement provisions. Without unanimous approval, Canada's access to the €150 billion SAFE fund and joint projects, e.g., in Arctic defence and security, could potentially stall.

In addition, many EU member states face significant risks in meeting a 5% of GDP defence spending target because of entrenched fiscal constraints and political challenges. For most countries, such a dramatic increase would require either deep cuts to other public spending or substantial tax hikes, both of which are politically sensitive and could undermine fiscal sustainability. Existing EU fiscal rules—such as the Stability and Growth Pact—impose strict limits on deficits and debt, forcing governments to make difficult budgetary trade-offs if defence spending rises sharply. This situation is particularly acute for highly indebted countries, where the scope for additional borrowing is limited and rising debt costs further constrain fiscal flexibility.

Internal divisions have already emerged, as seen in Spain's decision to opt out of the 5% target. The Spanish government argued that such a high level of defence spending would be "disproportionate and unnecessary," committing instead to reach only 2.1% of GDP. Spain's stance highlights broader tensions within the EU, where some member states are unwilling or unable to match more ambitious defence commitments, raising the risk of fragmentation and undermining collective efforts to strengthen European security.

Canadian provincial governments are another weak link, particularly in delivering critical minerals for EU supply chains. British Columbia's mining sector, for example, has seen projects delayed by 2–3 years through regulatory delays and Indigenous consultations. Canada has substantial export potential for critical minerals like nickel and lithium, but failure to streamline permitting could jeopardize its ability to supply international markets, including in the EU. Tens of billions in economic opportunity are at stake if investment and permitting do not keep pace with demand.

The Canadian federal government also faces risk in delivering on its own commitments to raise defence spending to 2% or even 5% of GDP. Canada has consistently ranked near the bottom of NATO members for defence spending, reaching only 1.37% of GDP in 2024 and facing both political and fiscal resistance to major increases. If Parliament or future governments fail to sustain the necessary funding, Canada's ability to participate fully in joint procurement and industrial projects with the EU will be undermined. In addition, Canada's defence spending plans have historically been subject to major procurement delays. The Parliamentary Budget Officer has highlighted a "high likelihood of delays" and underspending in major equipment procurement, which further complicates efforts to meet NATO benchmarks.[1]

While the agreement is ambitious and has strong political backing at the top level, these critical points—EU member state ratification, provincial regulatory action, and federal budget commitments—are the most likely to see failure or delay. Each is influenced by domestic politics, competing interests, and historical precedent, making them the most vulnerable links in the chain of delivering on the partnership's promises

Additionally, the U.S. government looms as a disruptive external actor. Canada currently directs 75% of its defence spending to U.S. firms. Reducing this to 40% by 2035 could trigger tariffs or sanctions. Major U.S. defence firms with operations in Canada or those which seek to do business in Canada may lobby against Canadian diversification.

U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITARs) severely constrain Canadian firms' ability to pivot to EU markets. ITAR's "Canadian exemption" (§126.5) permits limited technology transfers to Canada but explicitly blocks re-exports to third countries like EU members. These restrictions affect all U.S. allied countries, including Canadian defence contractors or US subsidiaries with operations in Canada, unless proper export licenses are obtained, creating somewhat of a catch-22: Canadian firms risk U.S. sanctions if they prioritize EU partnerships but lose competitiveness if they maintain the status quo.

Developing sovereign capabilities, especially in AI and space tech, to reduce ITAR exposure, as urged by some Canadian security analysts, offer another long-term set of risk mitigation tools.

Despite these hurdles, the overall policy implications are clear. The partnership is a bold step toward making Canada less dependent on any single ally and more integrated into a broader network of like-minded democracies. It recognizes that economic security and national security are now inseparable, especially in a world where supply chains, technology, and resources are increasingly strategic. By investing in its own industrial base and forging stronger ties with Europe, Canada is taking measures to safeguard its sovereignty and potentially create new engines of economic growth that will benefit Canadians.

[1] Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, "Planned Capital Spending under Canada's Defence Policy: 2024 Update, Parliamentary," February 28, 2024. Available at: https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/publications/RP-2324-025-C--planned-capital-spending-under-canada-defence-policy-2024-update--depenses-capital-prevues-titre-politique-defense-canada-mise-jour-2024.

Conclusion

In summary, the Canada-EU Defence Security Partnership is about much more than military hardware. It is a comprehensive strategy to turn defence spending into a driver of economic renewal, job creation, and technological leadership. It offers Canada a chance to become a key player in the transatlantic security landscape, potentially reduce its vulnerability to U.S. policy swings, and leverage its natural resources for greater global influence. However, the success of this ambitious plan will ultimately depend on coordinated action by governments and industry, strong leadership and an effective risk mitigation strategy, all of which may be difficult to deliver in the current fiscal and political environment.

Appendix 1: Key Provisions of the Recent Canada-EU Security and Defence Partnership

The Canada-EU Security and Defence Partnership agreement, signed in June 2025, marks a significant expansion of transatlantic cooperation. Below is a summary of its key provisions, as supported by official statements and news coverage:

1. Comprehensive Security and Defence Framework

- Establishes a high-level political framework for deepened cooperation in security and defence between Canada and the European Union.
- Commits both parties to annual security and defence dialogues involving top officials to maintain strategic alignment and address emerging threats.

2. Defence Procurement and Industrial Cooperation

- Lays the groundwork for Canada's participation in the EU's major defence procurement initiatives, notably the ReArm Europe Plan and the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument dedicated to joint procurement.
- Launches negotiations for a bilateral agreement to allow Canadian defence companies to participate in EU joint procurement projects, with the aim of making procurement more efficient, affordable, and diversified.
- Explores the establishment of an administrative arrangement between Canada and the European Defence Agency.

3. Enhanced Operational and Strategic Cooperation

- Commits to expanded collaboration on crisis management, military mobility, and coordinated naval activities, especially in regions of mutual interest such as the Arctic and Indo-Pacific.
- Reinforces Canada's participation in EU missions and operations and supports further collaboration within the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework.
- Canada will post a dedicated defence representative to the EU to facilitate ongoing coordination.

4. Focus on Emerging Security Domains

- Expands joint efforts in cybersecurity, countering foreign interference, combating disinformation, and developing outer space policy.

- Promotes cooperation on non-proliferation, disarmament, and counterterrorism.

5. Support for Ukraine and NATO Alignment

- Both parties reaffirm their commitment to supporting Ukraine and to improving Canadian military mobility in Europe.
- The agreement complements NATO commitments, aiming to deliver on capability targets more quickly and effectively, and to enhance interoperability among allies.

6. Digital and Economic Security Integration

- The defence agreement is part of a broader agenda that includes launching negotiations for a Digital Trade Agreement and aligning regulatory frameworks on cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and digital standards.
- Both sides agree to step up cooperation on critical raw materials and supply chain security.

7. Long-Term Strategic Alignment

- The partnership is designed to evolve, with provisions for ongoing dialogue and adaptation to new security and technological challenges.
- It is explicitly positioned as a move to diversify Canada's defence relationships beyond reliance on the United States, reflecting a strategic pivot towards Europe.

Summary Table of Key Provisions

Provision Area	**Details**
Defence Procurement	Joint procurement (ReArm Europe, SAFE), industrial cooperation, EDA arrangement
Operational Cooperation	Crisis management, military mobility, naval activities, PESCO, defence rep in EU
Emerging Security Domains	Cybersecurity, disinformation, space policy, counterterrorism, non-proliferation
Support for Ukraine/NATO	Enhanced support for Ukraine, interoperability, NATO capability targets
Digital/Economic Security	Digital Trade Agreement talks, AI and cybersecurity cooperation, supply chain security

Strategic Alignment	Annual dialogues, evolving partnership, reduced US dependency, long-term cooperation

Appendix 2: Model and Methodology for Quantifying Economic Impacts of the SDP

The economic impact projections in this paper are derived from macroeconomic modeling, sector-specific multipliers, and defence expenditure targets. Below is a detailed narrative of the equations, assumptions, and data sources used.

Core Equations

1. **Defence Spending Calculation**:

$$\text{Annual Defence Spending} = \text{GDP} \times \text{Target Percentage}$$

   - **Variables**:
     - **GDP**: Projected using Bank of Canada models (1.8% annual growth).
     - **Target Percentage**: 2% (NATO baseline) or 5% (ambition).
   - **Example (2036)**: $5\backslash\%\ \text{Spending} = \$\mathbf{3.86}\text{T} \times \mathbf{0.05} = \$\mathbf{193}\text{B CAD}$

2. **Keynesian Multiplier Effect**:

$$\text{GDP Impact} = \text{Defence Spending} \times \text{Multiplier } (1.5\times)$$

   - **Assumption**: Every dollar spent generates $1.50 in economic activity via supply chains, jobs, and ancillary industries
   - **Source**: Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) and RBC Economics

3. **Sector-Specific Contributions**:
   - **Critical Minerals Export Growth**: $\text{Export Value} = \text{Base Exports} \times (\mathbf{1} + \text{Annual Growth Rate})^{\boldsymbol{t}}$
     - **Annual Growth Rate**: 12–15% (e.g., lithium, nickel).
   - **Digital Trade Efficiency**: $\text{Regulatory Cost Reduction} = \text{Base Costs} \times (\mathbf{1} - \mathbf{0.07} \text{ to } \mathbf{0.10})$

Methodology and Assumptions

1. **GDP Baseline**:
   - **2025 GDP**: $3.1 trillion CAD (Bank of Canada).
   - **2036 GDP**: $3.86 trillion CAD (compounded at 1.8% annually).
   - **Adjustments**:
     - U.S. trade volatility.

        - Demographic constraints (aging population).

2. **Defence Spending Targets**:
    - **Current Spending (2025)**: 1.37% of GDP ($42.5B CAD)
    - **2% Target (2032)**: Requires $81.9B CAD (Parliamentary Budget Officer).
    - **5% Target (2036)**: $193B CAD.

3. **Multiplier Selection**:
    - **1.5× Multiplier**: Conservative estimate based on:
        - CGAI's empirical analysis: Capital spending has a 2.17× multiplier, operational spending 2.0×.
        - RBC's sectoral adjustment: Higher than private-sector averages due to domestic industrial linkages.
    - **Discount for Delays**: 25% reduction applied to major equipment spending (PBO).

4. **EU Integration Variables**:
    - **SAFE Procurement Access**: Enables joint Canada-EU projects (e.g., Arctic security).
    - **ReArm Europe Plan**: $875B USD collective EU spending by 2036

Data Sources

Variable	Source
Canada GDP	Bank of Canada, Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO)
Defence Spending Targets	NATO declarations, *Our North, Strong and Free* (ONSAF)
Multipliers	Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI), RBC Economics.
Critical Minerals Data	EU Battery Demand Projections, CETA Expansion.
EU Defence Spending	ReArm Europe Plan, European Commission.

Appendix 3: Failure Probability Analysis

The stakeholder failure probability analysis below employs a structured risk assessment methodology that combines qualitative evaluation with historical precedent analysis. The approach begins with systematic risk identification, where each stakeholder group (EU member states, Canadian provinces, U.S. government, Canadian defence industry) is evaluated based on their critical role in delivering partnership commitments such as ratification, permitting, procurement access, and industrial adaptation. The model then applies predefined qualitative scales: an impact scale measuring potential to derail partnership objectives (Low/Medium/High) and a likelihood scale with probability ranges of "Rare" (0-15%), "Occasional" (15-35%), and "Frequent" (35-50%+). This framework provides a standardized basis for comparing risks across different stakeholder categories.

The probability assignments are anchored through historical precedent weighting, where documented policy failures inform the risk calculations. For example, EU ratification failure probability (25%) draws directly from CETA's 8-year ratification deadlock, where 10 of 27 EU countries still haven't ratified despite provisional application since 2017. Provincial permitting risks (35%) are derived from British Columbia's mining sector delays, with projects estimated at C$38 billion facing 2-3 year regulatory bottlenecks. U.S. retaliation probability (40%) incorporates Trump-era trade threats and historical responses to defence procurement diversification. The model employs a risk matrix approach where stakeholder failure probability equals a function of historical failure rates, structural constraints, and political volatility, with validation through triangulation across multiple data sources including policy implementation studies, industry reports, and government assessments.

1. **EU Member States**
    - **Failure Probability**: 25–40%
    - **Key Risk**: Ratification delays due to nationalist political opposition in critical EU states (e.g., Hungary's Fidesz, Poland's Law and Justice). Ten EU members—including France, Italy, and Poland—still haven't ratified the foundational CETA trade deal, signaling resistance to deeper integration. Without unanimous approval, Canada's access to the SAFE procurement fund stalls, blocking joint projects.
    - **Historical Precedent**: CETA's 8-year ratification deadlock demonstrates institutional inertia in the EU.

2. **Canadian Provincial Governments**
    - **Failure Probability**: 35–50%
    - **Key Risk**: Permitting bottlenecks for critical minerals projects. British Columbia alone has over 60 mining proposals (estimated at C$38B) delayed by regulatory confusion, Indigenous consultations, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. This directly threatens Canada's ability to supply the EU with lithium/nickel for batteries.

- **Evidence**: BC's permitting timeline is 2–3× slower than Ontario's, risking Canada's export targets. Without federal intervention, projects may be delayed or not go forward.

3. **U.S. Government**
- **Failure Probability**: 40%
- **Key Risk**: Retaliatory tariffs or sanctions if Canada shifts defence procurement from U.S. to EU suppliers. Currently, 75% of Canada's defence spending goes to U.S. firms; reducing this to 40% by 2036 could trigger trade warfare.
- **Catalyst**: U.S. defence industry lobbying historically influences Washington's responses to procurement diversification.

Honorable Mention: Canadian Defence Industry
- **Failure Probability**: 25–30%
- **Key Risk**: Inability to adapt to EU procurement norms. Companies are optimized for U.S.-style "off-the-shelf" purchases but lack experience in the EU's early-stage co-development model (e.g., Franco-German Future Combat Air System). U.S. export controls on dual-use tech further constrain their EU market entry.

Why These Stakeholders?
- **EU States**: Require unanimity among 27 sovereign nations, creating veto-point vulnerability.
- **Provinces**: Mining permits involve layered provincial/federal/Indigenous jurisdiction, creating friction.
- **U.S.**: Geopolitical self-interest in retaining Canadian dependency.
- **Industry**: Structural misalignment with EU defence-industrial practices.

Mitigation Levers
- **EU Ratification**: Fast-track "SAFE accession clauses."
- **Provincial Permits**: Federal override powers for "national security" projects.
- **U.S. Retaliation**: Tri-lateral tech-sharing offers (e.g., NORAD modernization).

Highest-Risk Summary: Provincial regulators (mining permits) and EU holdouts (CETA precedent) pose the gravest threats to the partnership's export and job targets. Without urgent federal-provincial task forces and EU diplomatic surges, these stakeholders could derail the entire framework.

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Methodological Notes

- **GDP Projections**: Bank of Canada models (1.8% annual growth) adjusted for U.S. trade volatility.
- **Multiplier Effect**: 1.5× Keynesian multiplier (RBC Economics), discounted for implementation delays.
- **Risk Probabilities**: Derived from historical policy failures (e.g., CETA ratification delays, U.S. trade retaliation precedents).
- **Sector Impacts**: Modeled via CETA historical data (+0.4% GDP) and EU battery demand forecasts.

Endnote: All sources accessed June 26, 2025. URLs are functional as of this date.

Expert Group on Canada-US Relations

The Expert Group on Canada-U.S. Relations is focused on developing the key elements of a comprehensive Canadian strategy for Canada-U.S. relations. Its work is supported by The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, and the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

Co-chairs

The Honourable Perrin Beatty, PC, OC, is a director and business advisor. He is the former President and CEO of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and served as minister in seven different portfolios, including the Treasury Board, National Revenue, Solicitor General, National Defence, National Health and Welfare, Communications and External Affairs.

Fen Osler Hampson, FRSC, is the Chancellor's Professor and Professor of International Affairs at Carleton University and President of the World Refugee & Migration Council. A graduate of the University of Toronto, the London School of Economics and Harvard University, he is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and the author and co-editor of some 48 books on Canadian foreign and economic policy and international relations.

Members

Thomas d'Aquino Thomas d'Aquino is the Founding CEO and Distinguished Life Member of the Business Council of Canada, formerly known as the Canadian Council of Chief Executives. He is also a founder and Chair Emeritus of the North American Forum and has served as a director of several of Canada's leading global enterprises. He has also served as Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Canada and Professor of International Trade and Business Transactions at the University of Ottawa Law School. He is the author of the #1 national best-seller *Private Power Public Purpose*.

Louise Blais served as Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations from 2017 to 2021 and was responsible for the 2030 Agenda and the campaign for the Security Council. She also served on the UNICEF Executive Board with a $7 billion budget where she was elected Vice-Chair in 2019. She was appointed co-facilitator by the President of the UN General Assembly for the resolution of the 31st Special Session on COVID-19. She began her career as an Art Theft Analyst at Interpol. She then served as Program Manager for the National Archives Development Program from 1992 to 1996 before joining the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1992. Abroad, she was first posted to the Washington Embassy, then to Tokyo and Paris. During her 5-year mandate in France, she and the team at the Embassy were responsible for preparing the Canadian participation at the G8 Summit in Deauville and the G20 in Cannes. In Ottawa, she held the positions of Director of Public Diplomacy and Executive Director of Human Resources Management with over 2,000 rotational employees around the world.

Carlo Dade is the Director of International Policy at the University of Calgary's School of Public Policy. He was previously founder and Director of Trade and Trade Infrastructure Policy Research Centre at Canada West Foundation. Among other accomplishments, he contributed significantly to the development of a national trade infrastructure plan and the renewal of Canada's trade corridors.

Laura Dawson the Principal Program Manager (Americas) at Amazon Web Services Institute at Amazon Web Services. Named one of Canada's Top 100 foreign policy influencers by the Hill Times in 2014, Dawson is a speaker, writer, and thought leader on Canada-U.S., NAFTA, TPP, and international trade issues. Previously, she was Director of the Wilson Centre's Canada Institute, served as senior advisor on economic affairs at the United States Embassy in Ottawa and taught international trade and Canada-U.S. relations at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. Dawson continues to serve as Emeritus Advisor at Dawson Strategic, which provides advice to business on cross-border trade, market access and regulatory issues. She is a Fellow at the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute and serves on the board of the Council of the Great Lakes Region.

Heather Exner-Pirot is a Senior Fellow and Director of Energy, Natural Resources and Environment at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Ottawa, Special Advisor to the Business Council of Canada, Research Advisor to the Indigenous Resource Network, and Global Fellow at the Wilson Centre in Washington D.C. She has twenty years of experience in Indigenous, Arctic and resource development and governance. She obtained a PhD in Political Science from the University of Calgary in 2011. Exner-Pirot sits on the boards of the Saskatchewan Indigenous Economic Development Network and the Canadian Rural Revitalization Foundation. She is a member of the Canadian Defence and Security Network and a Network Coordinator at the North American and Arctic Defense and Security Network. She is the Managing Editor of the Arctic Yearbook (an international, peer-reviewed annual volume), a member of Yukon's Arctic Security Advisory Council, and the former Chair of the Canadian Northern Studies Trust.

Martha Hall Findlay is the Director of the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary and the former Chief Sustainability Officer, then Chief Climate Officer for Suncor Energy and former President and CEO of the Canada West Foundation.

Jonathan Fried is a senior adviser with the Albright Stonebridge Group in Washington, D.C., and adviser to Independent Economics Consulting in London, United Kingdom. Prior to his retirement from the government of Canada, he was coordinator for international economic relations and concurrently the personal representative of Prime Minister Trudeau for the G20 from 2017 to 2020.

Lawrence L. Herman is an international trade lawyer with Cassidy Levy Kent LLP (Ottawa & Washington) and Herman & Associates (Toronto). He previously was a member of Canada’s mission to the UN and the GATT and has advocated cases before the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT), NAFTA panels and Canadian courts.

Meredith Lilly, Ph.D., is a full Professor and Simon Reisman Chair in International Economic Policy at Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. Her research focuses on North American trade relations, Canada’s trade diversification strategy, economic sanctions, and the use of research evidence in policy making. Prior to her appointment at Carleton, she served as Foreign Affairs and International Trade Advisor to Canadian Prime Minister Stephen HarperShe is a member of CD Howe Institute’s International Economic Policy Council, a non-resident scholar at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, an Advisory Board member for the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, and serves as the Academic Partner for Canada’s delegation to the North American Forum.

Gary Mar is President and CEO of the Canada West Foundation and the former President and CEO of the Petroleum Services Association of Canada (PSAC. He has had broad experience in government having served as a Member of the Legislative Assembly in the Province of Alberta from 1993-2007 and held several senior Cabinet portfolios.

Marie-Lucie Morin in the Vice-chair of the Board, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. She served as Executive Director for Canada, Ireland, and the Caribbean at the World Bank from 2010 to 2013. Before joining the World Bank Ms. Morin pursued a 30-year career in the Federal Public Service. She was appointed National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister and Associate Secretary to the Cabinet (2008 – 2010); previously served as Deputy Minister for International Trade and as Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2003 -2008). During the earlier years of her career with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ms. Morin completed assignments in San Francisco, Jakarta, London, and Moscow. She was appointed Ambassador to the Kingdom of Norway with concurrent accreditation to the Republic of Iceland (1997 – 2001). Ms. Morin was awarded the Governor General’s 125th Anniversary of the Confederation of Canada Medal, was named Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur in 2012 and became a member of the Order of Canada in 2016.

Vice-Admiral (Retired) Mark Norman retired from the Royal Canadian Navy in the rank of Vice-Admiral in August of 2019 after over 39 years of service. Norman started his naval service as a reserve diesel mechanic in 1980 and rose through the ranks to be the Vice-Chief of Defence. His military career has seen him serve at sea domestically and internationally, command a warship, the Canadian Atlantic Fleet, and ultimately the Royal Canadian Navy itself. Since retirement, Norman has applied his energy to a variety of pursuits including as Champion for the Royal Canadian Benevolent Fund, Senior Defence Strategist at Samuel Associates, contributing to the important debate about security and defence issues in Canada as both a fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and as a member of the Conference of Defence Associations Board.

Vincent Rigby is the Slater Family Professor of Practice and formerly the McConnell Visiting Professor for 2022-2023 at McGill University. He recently retired from Canada's Public Service after 30 years in senior posts in a variety of departments and agencies across government, including the Privy Council Office, Global Affairs Canada, Public Safety, the Department of National Defence and the former Canadian International Development Agency.

Colin Robertson is a former Canadian diplomat and Vice President and Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and hosts its regular Global Exchange podcast. He is an Executive Fellow at the University of Calgary's School of Public Policy, a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University and a member of the Defence Advisory Board of the Department of National Defence.

Tim Sargent is a senior fellow and director of the Domestic Policy Program at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. He is also a distinguished fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, a Waterloo-based think-tank that addresses significant global issues at the intersection of technology and international governance. Prior to joining MLI, Sargent was deputy executive director at the Centre for the Study of Living Standards. He also spent 28 years in the federal government, where he held deputy minister and associate deputy minister positions at Fisheries and Oceans, International Trade, Finance, and Agriculture and AgriFood, as well as senior positions at the Privy Council Office. At Fisheries and Oceans, he oversaw passing and implementation of major overhauls of the Fisheries Act and the Oceans Act, and the Canadian Coastguard's multi-billion-dollar fleet renewal plan. At International Trade, he oversaw successful negotiations for the Canada-US-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Partnership for Trans-Pacific Trade (CPTPP). Sargent has a PhD in Economics from the University of British Columbia, an MA in Economics from Western University and a BA (Econ) from the University of Manchester.

John Weekes is an international trade policy adviser, experienced in trade agreements, and the settlement of trade disputes. From 1991 to 1994 he served as Canada's chief negotiator for NAFTA and was ambassador to GATT during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and chair of the GATT Council in 1989 and chair of the Contracting Parties to the GATT in 1990.