



CARLETON UNIVERSITY  
DEPARTMENT OF  
**PHILOSOPHY**

**COLLOQUIUM SERIES**



\* All talks will be held on Fridays in Room 218 Paterson Hall at 11:30 am unless otherwise noted \*

\* Please visit our website at <http://www.carleton.ca/philosophy/> for detailed abstracts \*

**"Immorality and Meaning in Life"**

**David Matheson**

**Carleton University**

In her discussion of Bernard Williams's critique of impartial morality, Susan Wolf suggests that thoroughly immoral activities cannot realize meaning in life because they are entirely lacking in the sort of objective value on which meaning (in her view) partly supervenes. In the first half of this talk I explain why the argument Wolf suggests becomes unconvincing once we accept the pluralism about final value that I favour: on this pluralism, although thoroughly immoral activities may be entirely lacking in objective moral value, it doesn't follow that they are entirely lacking in other sorts of objective value. In the second half of the talk I then sketch an alternative argument for the claim that thoroughly immoral activities cannot realize meaning in life. Whatever we make of my alternative argument, its plausibility is at least not undermined by acceptance of the pluralism that I favour.

**Friday, October 6, 2017**  
**Room: 218 Paterson Hall**  
**Time: 11:30 a.m.**