



CARLETON UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF
PHILOSOPHY

COLLOQUIUM SERIES



* All talks will be held on Fridays in Room 218 Paterson Hall at 11:30 am unless otherwise noted *

* Please visit our website at <http://www.carleton.ca/philosophy/> for detailed abstracts *

"Knowledge of and in action"

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While engaged in intentional action, an agent generally knows what she is doing and why she is doing it. In this paper I ask what is so interesting about this knowledge, how an agent comes by this knowledge, and why we should consider it knowledge. I find knowledge of action interesting for two reasons. First, knowledge of action shares a certain distinctiveness with an agent's knowledge of aspects of her mind more generally. I elucidate this distinctiveness in terms of the agent's authority with respect to this knowledge. Second, knowledge of action plays a critical role in the execution of an important class of intentional actions. Regarding the latter two questions, I offer an account of an agent's knowledge of action that is based in that agent's practical reasoning. Drawing on work by Tyler Burge, I argue that an agent comes by her knowledge via the judgments she makes while engaged in practical reasoning, and that these judgments often qualify as knowledge because the agent is entitled to make them, where this entitlement is grounded in and explained by the rationality of the process of control into which these judgments fit, and the agent's skill at carrying out the process.

Friday, December 1, 2017
Room: 218 Paterson Hall
Time: 11:30 a.m.