

**EURR 5101/PSCI 5112  
RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS - ACTORS AND PROCESSES**

**This course will be held in class and online:  
Time: Thursday 18.05 – 20.55  
Please check location on Carleton Central**

**Note:** Students are not required to purchase textbooks or other learning materials for this course

**I General information**

Instructor: Professor Piotr Dutkiewicz  
Office Hours: Thursday 17.00-18.00  
Loeb Bld. C-679 and online  
Email: [piotr.dutkiewicz@carleton.ca](mailto:piotr.dutkiewicz@carleton.ca)

**II Course description**

The course will examine the evolution of Russian domestic politics and society since the collapse of the Soviet Union until winter 2025. The themes discussed include the transformation of Russia's political system, changes in the behavior of political elites, the evolution of Russia's social structure, and federal-regional relations.

**III Course Format**

This course will be delivered mostly in person but one – maximum - two classes may be delivered online.

**IV Learning outcomes**

Russia's international behavior (including war in Ukraine) overshadows a complex and dynamic domestic evolution. The war itself also creates its own domestic political, economic and social dynamics. The purpose of the course is to critically examine key processes in Russian domestic politics and society since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and to explore a complex evolution of the interplay of the Russian political, social, and institutional system at the federal and regional levels.

**V Texts/ Readings**

Most required readings (journal articles and book chapters) will be available in electronic format via the Ares Course Reserves system. Compulsory readings assigned for all students are marked with an asterisk (required readings \*). There are also suggested additional readings (without mark \*). Most of these optional supplemental readings are also available online. It is advisable for a given week's presenters to read additional readings as well.

If you find that a required reading is not available for a given week, please notify the instructor immediately.

For details regarding the materials placed on reserve in MacOdrum Library, please visit:  
<http://www.library.carleton.ca/services/library-reserves-faculty-and-instructors/ares>.

## VI Evaluation at a glance

Course evaluation	%
Seminar participation	25
One (short – 12-15 min. max.) presentation in class and a short (5-6 pp.) discussion paper	30
Strategic Policy Analysis	30
One (short) critical comment on a suggested video	15
Total	100

There will be *no final examination*. For the evaluation details, please see below.

## VII Evaluation in detail

### COURSE REQUIREMENTS

- **Seminar participation:** Regular weekly attendance is **compulsory** for this class. Unexcused absences will reduce the participation mark for the course, which can have a pronounced impact on the course grade. Students will be graded based on attendance, the quality of regular contributions to the class discussion, and, most importantly, demonstrated **familiarity with required course readings**. Each student will be evaluated according to these criteria during each seminar session.
- **Discussion paper:** The paper should address specific issues (considered as main arguments in the required readings) selected by the student from the required readings for the week. Its length should be **5-6 pages** (typed, double-spaced, 12-point font). The paper should contrast, critique, and analyze the required readings offering a concrete argument with respect to the given question. The instructor may specify additional reading(s) beyond what is needed for the week to enrich your discussion. Clarity and conciseness are essential; the paper should **NOT** simply describe or reiterate the readings but critically assess them. The paper should be submitted electronically to the instructor for the respective session by 10 a.m. each WEDNESDAY before the class presentation on Thursday. **The presenter of the discussion paper must perform on the agreed day and time.**
- **Discussion paper presentation:** All students will present their discussion paper to the class (dates will be assigned after the first meeting). In the presentation of their discussion paper, each student should focus on the critical arguments made within the written discussion paper, drawing on examples from the readings where appropriate. The student should be prepared to present the ideas verbally in a presentation of a **maximum of FIFTEEN minutes**. Presenters should **NOT** simply read the written paper. PPT slides are a welcome component of the presentation, but they are not obligatory. The discussion paper and presentation will be evaluated based on the **coherency of the argument, presentation form**, the effectiveness of communication, and demonstrated familiarity with and reflection on course readings, with a combined grade for the oral and written components. **Please note: Neither the paper nor the oral presentation should provide lengthy summaries of course readings.**
- **Strategic / Predictive policy analysis:** The paper shall analyze the potential trajectories of Russian domestic policy's development in one of the critical areas chosen by the student. The areas can either be

based on the seminars' topics (e.g., migration, social change, regional policy etc.) or address issues not mentioned explicitly in the course outline. **In the latter case, the student shall contact the course instructor to get his authorization prior to preparing the paper.** The consent shall be received **no later than two weeks before** the deadline for the paper's submission (that is the last seminar). The predictive policy analysis shall thoroughly analyze the current state of a specified area's policy, identify the crucial factors impacting (or likely to be impacting) the policy's development, and reflect the student's assumptions (suggestions, expectations) regarding the policy's evolution. The paper shall be no longer than **five to six (max.) pages** (typed, double-spaced, 12-point font). The student might want to provide recommendations for improving (altering) state policy. The course instructor will give more information about the assignment in early February (ie. Report's structure, main themes etc.).

- **Critical comment (1 page) on suggested video:** Pick up ONE video related to an area of your interest (**all links are provided** in this syllabus – after each reading list). After watching it, please evaluate it in a one-page review. The comment shall critically evaluate the video's clarity, key message, potential bias, and main conclusion suggested to the viewer. **The deadline for this assignment is March 24, 2025. I will gladly accept earlier delivery throughout the January 14 – March 24, 2025, period.**

**Submission, Return, and Grading of Term Work:**

Written assignments must be submitted directly to the instructor according to the guidelines in the course outline. Alphabetical grades will show final standing in courses. The system of grades used, with corresponding grade points, is:

Percentage	Letter grade	12-point scale	Percentage	Letter grade	12-point scale
90-100	A+	12	67-69	C+	6
85-89	A	11	63-66	C	5
80-84	A-	10	60-62	C-	4
77-79	B+	9	57-59	D+	3
73-76	B	8	53-56	D	2
70-72	B-	7	50-52	D-	1

**Late Penalties and Failure to submit assignments:**

Any student who fails to hand in the discussion paper will receive a failing mark in the course. Penalties for late assignments will be as follows:

Discussion paper: late assignments will have an immediate deduction of 15% (on a 100% scale) and 3% for each day late.

Students absent on the date of oral presentations or commentary will receive a “0” unless a valid medical (or equivalent) excuse is provided. Advance notice should be provided to the instructor.

**VIII General reading recommendations**

The following titles might be helpful to those **with little or no prior experience studying Russian politics.** Please, contact the course instructor if you have any further questions.

1. **Aleksashenko, Sergey.** *Putin's Counterrevolution.* Brookings Institution Press. 2018.
2. **Dutkiewicz, Piotr and Richard Sakwa, (eds),** *Social History of Post-Communist Russia,* Routledge (London & New York). 2016.

3. **Gelman, Vladimir.** *Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes.* University of Pittsburgh Press. 2015.
4. **Laruelle, Marlene and Radvanyi, Jean.** *Understanding Russia: The Challenges of Transformation.* Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2018.
5. **Sakwa, Richard.** *Russian Politics and Society.* Routledge. 2020.
6. **Routledge Handbook of Russian Politics and Society.** Edited by Graeme Gill. Routledge. 2023.

## IX Course schedule

### WEEK 1, Jan. 9, 2025 INTRODUCTION

1. Explanation of requirements and contents of the course.
2. Intro-Minilecture – War in Ukraine and “Grand Split” – remarks on the New International Order.
3. Discussion of academic resources.
4. Selection of seminar’s presenters.

### WEEK 2, Jan. 16, 2025 RUSSIA AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION (From Yeltsin to Putin)

The demise of the Soviet Union caused the emergence of the new Russia led by President Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin's rule was marked by dramatic events turning the period of the 1990s into one of the most challenging and turbulent periods in Russian history. The war in Chechnya, drastic impoverishment of the citizens, and troubled transition from a "planned economy" seriously affected Russia's much anticipated "democratic turn" and forestalled the ascendance of Vladimir Putin.

#### **ROLE GAME !**

#### **Weekly goals:**

- Identify the main trajectories of Russia's evolution in the 1990s.
- Identify events that defined the Yeltsin era.
- Analyze whether President Yeltsin was capable of shaping democratic society.
- Discuss whether Russia's internal problems of the 1990s predetermined the choice of Putin as Yeltsin's successor.

#### **\* Required readings:**

**Gill, Graeme.** "A new turn to authoritarian Rule in Russia?" *Democratisation*, 13, no. 1 (2006): 58-77.

**Kagarlitsky, Boris.** *Russia under Yeltsin and Putin: Neo-Liberal Autocracy.* Pluto Press. 2002.  
Chapter 10. The Putin Regime. 251-279.

**Hill, Fiona, and Clifford G. Gaddy** , Chapter 2: Boris Yeltsin and the Time of Troubles . *Mr. Putin : Operative in the Kremlin.* Paperback edition. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015.

\*Available at CU Library, but not online.

**Barnes, Andrew**, Three in One: Unpacking the ‘Collapse’ of the Soviet Union. *Problems of post-communism* 61, no. 5 (2014): 3–13. <https://doi-org.proxy.library.carleton.ca/10.2753/PPC1075-8216610501>

**McFaul, Michael**. Yeltsin’s Legacy. *The Wilson Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (2000): 42-58.

**Robinson, Neil**. *Russia: a state of uncertainty*. Routledge. 2001.  
Chapter 3. Russian politics under Boris Yeltsin. 69-101.

**Shevtsova, Lilia**. *Russia lost in transition: the Yeltsin and Putin legacies*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2007.

Chapter 1. Boris Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Who Preserved Tradition. 1-24.

### Videos:

**Frontline: After Gorbachev's USSR (1992)**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C1j-vEqIClw>

**25 Years Ago: The Day the Russian White House Was Shelled**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3PJuIVIZ72k>

**Boris Yeltsin Historic Address to U.S. Congress**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HwemQR59wbw>

**Vladimir Putin's Early Political Life – the fifth estate**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXhYoypVDT8>

**Russia in the late 1990s: Apartment bombings that accelerated Vladimir Putin's rise to power.**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=arwGPwLXRw>

**WEEK 3, Jan. 23, 2025**

### GOVERNANCE AND REGIME EVOLUTION

(Who rules Russia and how)

From Yeltsin's moderate and cautious attempts at democratization, Russia made a noticeable turn to authoritarianism under President Putin. President Putin's early rule was defined by the strengthening of the "vertical of power" ["*vertikal' vlasti*"], narrowing federalization, and arbitrary expansion of the state's interference in private affairs. President Putin's third term was a turning point in Russia's shaping as a full-fledged authoritarian state. Constitutional amendments of 2020 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 further accelerated the regime’s orientation toward preserving power, eliminating opposition and controlling society.

### Weekly goals:

- Identify the transformation of the regime during Putin's first terms.
- Evaluate the changes in regime dynamics after Putin's comeback in 2012.
- Analyze the main attributes of the Russian regime and its evolution.
- Assess the credibility of Sakwa's view of Russia as a "dual state."
- Discuss the potential dynamic for the regime's transformation.
- Discuss Kolesnikov's assessment of Russia's transition to hybrid totalitarianism.

**\* Required readings (pre-2022)**

**Russia. *The challenges of transformation.*** Edited by Piotr Dutkiewicz and Dmitri Trenin. New York University Press. 2011.

Piotr Dutkiewicz, Chapter 1. Missing in Translation: Re-conceptualizing Russia's Developmental State. 9-40.

**Casula, Philipp.** "Sovereign Democracy, Populism, and Depoliticization in Russia." *Problems of Post-Communism* 60, no. 3 (2013): 3-15.

**Tom Parfitt,** Interview with Gleb Pavlovsky (*New Left Review*).  
<https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii88/articles/gleb-pavlovsky-putin-s-world-outlook>

**Sakwa, Richard.** *The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession.* Cambridge. 2011.

Chapter 1. The dual state in Russia. 1-51.

**Stanovaya, Tatiana.** "The Putin Regime Cracks." *Carnegie Moscow Center.* May 2020.  
[https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Stanovaya\\_Putin\\_Elite-Final.pdf](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Stanovaya_Putin_Elite-Final.pdf).

**\* Required readings (post-2022):**

**Kolesnikov, Andrei.** "Putin's War Has Moved Russia from Authoritarianism to Hybrid Totalitarianism." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.* April 19, 2022.  
<https://carnegiemoscow.org/2022/04/19/putin-s-war-has-moved-russia-from-authoritarianism-to-hybrid-totalitarianism-pub-86921>.

**Andrei Kolesnikov,** CARNEGIE RUSSIA EURASIA CENTER, 2023, "Wait and See: How Ordinary Russians Are Adapting to the New Reality."

<https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90327>

**Additional readings:**

**Pavlovsky, Gleb.** "Russian Politics Under Putin. The System Will Outlast the Master." *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 3 (2016): 10-17.

**Shevtsova, Lilia.** *Russia lost in transition: the Yeltsin and Putin legacies.* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2007.

Chapter 8. The *Siloviki* in Power. 97-103.

Chapter 9. Oligarchy as Myth and Reality. 104-112.

**Videos:**

**Al Jazeera: Who is Vladimir Putin?**

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DFBjck8S\\_Y](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DFBjck8S_Y)

**Understanding Putinism**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mOJt3tjOCco>

**From spy to president: The rise of Vladimir Putin**

**WEEK 4 (Part 1&2), Jan. 30, 2025**

**Part 1. CIVIL SOCIETY**

(Civic activism as a governmental counterweight)

The steady entrenchment of authoritarianism intensified the imminent strengthening of state control. Arguably, civil society became the state's primary target. The Russian authorities consistently enhanced administrative and criminal liability measures and introduced two notorious concepts to tame regime opponents: "foreign agents" and "undesirable organizations." Simultaneously, Russia's judicial system became affected by the transformation of the Russian regime. The cases of Yukos, Pussy Riot, Ivan Golunov, Dmitri Muratov and many others demonstrated the covert connection between the judiciary and the executive power.

**Weekly goals:**

- Evaluate the state's vision of civil society and its role.
- Formulate the main obstacles to civil society's development (formal and informal).
- Discuss how the state tries to promote its agenda through state-owned or state-backed organizations.
- Assess the harmful consequences of the "foreign agent"/"undesirable organization" designations.

**\* Required readings (pre-2022):**

**Janet Elise Johnson and Aino Saarinen**, Twenty-First-Century Feminisms under Repression: Gender Regime Change and the Women's Crisis Center Movement in Russia, *Signs*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Spring 2013), pp. 543-567 (25 pages). <https://doi.org/10.1086/668515>

**Coleman, Heather J**, Translating Canadian Models: International Partnerships and Public Policy Reform in Russia. *Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (March 2009), pp. 25-52

**Piotr Dutkiewicz and Vladislav Inozemtsev (eds.)**. *Democracy versus Modernization, A Dilemma for Russia and for the World*. Routledge 2012

Chapter 9 - G. Pavlovsky, Democracy and How it is used in Russia. pp. 97-110

**Hemment, Julie**. "Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and Potemkin NGOs: Making Sense of Civil Society in Post-Soviet Russia." *Slavic Review* 71, no. 2 (2012): 234-260.

**Henderson, Sarah L**. "Civil Society in Russia. State-Society Relations in the Post-Yeltsin Era." *Problems of Post-Communism* 58, no. 3 (2011): 11-27.

**Lipman, Maria**. "At the Turning Point of Repression. Why There Are More and More "Undesirable Elements" in Russia." *Russian Politics & Law* 54, no. 4 (2016): 341-350.

**Chebankova, Elena**. *Civil Society in Putin's Russia*. Routledge. 2015.

Chapter 5. State-sponsored civic associations in Russia: systemic integration or a 'war of position'? 99-117.

Chapter 7. Grassroots movements in modern Russia: a cause for optimism? 140-163.

**\* Required readings (post-2022):**

**Sundstrom, Lisa McIntosh, Henry, Laura A., and Sperling, Valerie**. "The Evolution of Civic Activism in Contemporary Russia." *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* (2022): 1-23.

**Lipman, Masha and McFaul, Michael**. "Managed democracy" in Russia. Putin and the Press." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* (2001) 6, no. 3: 116-127.

**Yefanov, Aleksander and Tomin, Vitaly.** "The Significance of Protest Mood in Forming a Developed Civil Society in Russia." *Russian Politics* (2022) 7, no. 1: 147-165.

**Goode, J. Paul,** Russia's Ministry of Ambivalence: The Failure of Civic Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Russia." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 35, no. 2 (2019): 140–60. <https://doi-org.proxy.library.carleton.ca/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1547040>

#### Videos:

##### **Russian civil society development in dynamics**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DdszmYDER18>

Vice News: Nationalism or Nothing: Life in Modern Russia  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w56s1tTS9io>

##### **Round Table of Russian Human Rights Defenders and Media recognised as Foreign Agents | Live on 22.11**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tqBywLePG1A>

## **Part 2. STATE CONTROL**

(How the Russian state manages society)

Under President Putin, the state started to view civil society's activities as a threat. As mentioned in the previous week, the state made apparent attempts to minimize the influence of civil society on Russian society. The state not only prohibited or restricted civil society's activities but likewise began promoting its agenda through the network of loyal state-owned or state-backed organizations.

#### **Weekly goals:**

- Find out how the Russian state uses the law to counter dissent.
- Identify how the Russian state blocks or prohibits activities of civil society.
- Analyze the influence of Russia's war against Ukraine on the state control dynamic.
- List the main characteristics of Russia's criminal justice.
- Discuss the extent of independence of the Russian judicial system.

#### **\* Required readings (pre-2022):**

**Brechenmacher, Saskia.** *Civil Society under Assault. Repression and Responses in Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia.* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2017.

Chapter 1. Delegitimization and Division in Russia.

**Ledeneva, Alena.** "Telephone Justice in Russia." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 24, no. 4 (2008): 324-350.

**Lipman, Maria.** "Dissent, its Persecutors, and the New Russia." *New Perspectives* 30, no. 1 (2022): 6-18.

**Soldatov, Andrei.** "From the "New Mobility" to the KGB." *Russian Social Science Review* 61, no. 6 (2020): 442-451.



**\* Required readings (post-2022):**

**Mariya Y. Omelicheva**, *Repression Trap: The Mechanism of Escalating State Violence in Russia*. Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS, 2022.  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/repression-trap-mechanism-escalating-state-violence-russia>

**Russell, Martin**. "Foreign agents' and 'undesirables.' Russian civil society in danger of extinction?" *European Parliamentary Research Service*. March 08, 2022.  
[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729297/EPRS\\_BRI\(2022\)729297\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/729297/EPRS_BRI(2022)729297_EN.pdf).

"No to war. How Russian authorities are suppressing anti-war protests." *OVD-Info*. Last modified April 14, 2022. <https://reports.ovdinfo.org/no-to-war-en#1>.

**Videos:**

**PBS: How Russia is trying to control history in bid for geo-political strength**  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHBgdXEPuWQ>

**Russia: how Putin is silencing his opponents**  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NrV0UegeuM>

**Почему в России пыгают / Why They Torture People in Russia**  
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E\\_2Vy9B8hic](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E_2Vy9B8hic)

**WEEK 5, Feb. 6, 2025**

**Part 1. War in Ukraine – Russian Domestic Consequences**

War in Ukraine is changing Russian politics and society in many ways. Despite data coming from opinion polls there is deeper recognition of how ongoing war is influencing lives of Russians.

**Required readings:**

RAND Institute Consequences of the War in Ukraine: A Bleak Outlook for Russia  
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/02/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-a-bleak-outlook.html>

**New Yorker**: Russia one year after the invasion of Ukraine.  
<https://www.newyorker.com/news/essay/russia-one-year-after-the-invasion-of-ukraine>

**Tatiana Stanovaya**, *Putin's Age of Chaos: The Dangers of Russian Disorder*, August 8, 2023  
[file:///C:/Users/PiotrDutkiewicz2/Desktop/Putin%E2%80%99s%20Age%20of%20Chaos\\_%20The%20Dangers%20of%20Russian%20Disorder.html](file:///C:/Users/PiotrDutkiewicz2/Desktop/Putin%E2%80%99s%20Age%20of%20Chaos_%20The%20Dangers%20of%20Russian%20Disorder.html)

**Intigam Mamedov and Piotr Dutkiewicz** (2023), *Russia under sanctions: the case of a “complex contestation” draft chapter*, pp. 1-22 (will be provided via mail).

Andrei Kolesnikov, (2023) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Wait and See: How Ordinary Russians Are Adapting to the New Reality*  
<https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90327>

## Video:

### Life in Russia 14 months after the Ukraine invasion - BBC News

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IB\\_rtHBGaS8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IB_rtHBGaS8)

## Part 2. Yevgeny Prigozhin's mutiny – why and with what consequences.

On 23 June 2023, the Wagner Group, a Russian government-funded PMC, staged a full-scale rebellion after a period of tensions between the Russian MoD and the then-leader of PMC Wagner, Y. Prigozhin. We will analyze background, motives and follow up of this extraordinary event in Russian Civil-Military relations.

## Required readings:

**Marlene Laruelle and Richard Arnold**, Russia's Paramilitarization and its Consequences

*PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo* No. 839, April 2023, George Washington University

<https://www.ponarseurasia.org/russias-paramilitarization-and-its-consequences/>

**Gould-Davies, Nigel**. The Wagner Revolt: Implications for Russia, Lessons for the West." *Survival (London)* 65, no. 4 (2023): 25–30.

<https://doi-org.proxy.library.carleton.ca/10.1080/00396338.2023.2239053>

**Tatiana Stanovaya** (2023), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Why Yevgeny Prigozhin Had to Die*.

<https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90436>

**Tatiana Stanovaya**, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Beneath the Surface, Prigozhin's Mutiny has Changed Everything in Russia*.

<https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90275>

## Video:

Wall Street Journal: Prigozhin Is Dead: A Timeline of the Wagner Boss Since His Failed Mutiny

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FqBoGooBUL0>

## WEEK 6, Feb. 13, 2025

### IDEOLOGY

(What views drive Russia's politics)

Communist ideology was prevalent in the Soviet Union and dictated the norms and rules of everyday life. Article 6 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution stated that the Communist Party was the "leading and guiding force of Soviet society." Any grain of dissent or disagreement with the general Party line was harshly penalized. With the fall of the USSR, the new Russia did not inherit the communist tenets of its predecessor. The 1993 Constitution prohibited the imposition of any state ideology. However, many scholars believe that the presidency of Vladimir Putin is marked by the emergence and entrenchment of a distinct state-imposed ideology claiming its dominant role.

## Weekly goals:

- Contrast different views on Russia's ideology.
- Identify what ideological currents influence decision-making.

- Analyze the ideology behind Putin's speeches of 2014 and 2022.
- Discuss the role of antifascist and anti-Nazi discourses in Russia.
- Model the ideological tenets of modern Russia.

**\* Required readings (pre-2022):**

**Laruelle, Marlene.** *Is Russia Fascist? Unraveling Propaganda East and West.* Cornell University Press, 2021.

Chapter 3. Antifascism as the Renewed Social Consensus under Putin. 43-61.

Chapter 5. The Putin Regime's Ideological Plurality. 84-99.

Chapter 6. Russia's fascist Thinkers and Doers. 100-120.

**Lewis, Charlie.** "Contemporary Russian Messianism under Putin and Russian Foreign Policy in Ukraine and Syria." *Slavonic and East European Review* 98, no. 3 (2020): 531-559.

**Putin, Vladimir.** "Article by Vladimir Putin "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians." *Kremlin*. July 12, 2021. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>.

**Suslov, Mikhail.** "Russian World" Concept: Post-Soviet Geopolitical Ideology and the Logic of "Spheres of Influence"." *Geopolitics* 23, no. 2 (2018): 330-353.

**Umland, Andreas.** "Alexander Dugin and Moscow's New Right Radical Intellectual Circles at the Start of Putin's Third Presidential Term 2012-2013: The Anti-Orange Committee, the Izborsk Club and the Florian Geyer Club in Their Political Context." *Europolity* 10, no. 2 (2016): 7-31.

**\* Required readings (post-2022):**

**Doris, Andrew and Graham, Thomas.** "What Putin Fights For." *Survival. Global Politics and Strategy* 64, no. 4 (2022): 75-88.

Andrei Kolesnikov, The End of the Russian Idea: What It Will Take to Break Putinism's Grip  
*Foreign Affairs*, 2023

[https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/vladimir-putin-end-russian-idea?mkt\\_tok=ODEzLVhZVS00MjIAAAGNvMCv4HZDiSMCLm67g4qSrG83SD2v\\_o8kNtKp8m2wv\\_bHpSVWj4fGQ8b18W6A-M0OWIt1J-uT5zk4yQA38ALisA4WIdaJ3F0tLrDKH](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/vladimir-putin-end-russian-idea?mkt_tok=ODEzLVhZVS00MjIAAAGNvMCv4HZDiSMCLm67g4qSrG83SD2v_o8kNtKp8m2wv_bHpSVWj4fGQ8b18W6A-M0OWIt1J-uT5zk4yQA38ALisA4WIdaJ3F0tLrDKH)

**Laruelle, Marlene.** "Making Sense of Russia's Illiberalism." *Journal of Democracy* 31, no. 3 (2020): 115-129.

**Garner, Ian.** *Z Generation: Into the Heart of Russia's Fascist Youth.* Chapter 3-5 La Vergne: Hurst Publishers, 2023

<https://web-s-ebSCOhost-com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmx1YmtfXzM0NTU2MjNfX0FO0?sid=a0ff8c9-09a3-440a-9fc5-833665dc05a7@redis&vid=0&format=EK&lpid=navPoint-9&rid=0>

**Additional readings:**

**Abalov, Alexander and Inozemtsev, Vladislav.** "Russia: The Everlasting Empire?" *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 13, no. 3 (2019): 329-338.

**Chebankova, Elena.** "Ideas, Ideology & Intellectuals in Search of Russia's Political Future." *Daedalus* 146, no. 2 (2017): 76-88.

**Feklyunina, Valentina.** "Soft power and identity: Russia, Ukraine and the 'Russian world(s)'." *European Journal of International Relations* 22, no. 4 (2016): 773-796.

**Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz.** "The Pussy Riot affair and Putin's demarche from sovereign democracy to sovereign morality." *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 42, no. 4 (2014): 615-621.

#### Videos:

**Alexander Asmolov:** «If the enemy does not exist, we will create the enemy» // «Skazhi Gordeevoy»  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CL9bigv1hek>

**Aleksandr Dugin:** 'We have our special Russian truth' – BBC Newsnight  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGunRKWtWBs>

**Vladimir Putin's Speech on Ukraine and US Foreign Policy and NATO - 24 February 2022, ENG Subtitles**  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1qS6J-WbTD8>

#### WEEK 7, Feb.27, 2025 SOCIETY

(Russia's societal evolution and society's structure)

Russian society has been undergoing massive transformation since the middle of the 1980s. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave birth to multiple internal conflicts and peculiarities, resulting in interethnic, interpersonal, and (at times) interterritorial disputes. The turbulent history of Russian society calls for a multi-tangled portrait reflecting its multi-ethnic and multi-confessional structure. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights of specific categories of Russian citizens, namely, women and sexual minorities.

#### Weekly goals:

- Identify the main attributes of modern Russian society.
- Describe the process of Russian society's evolution in post-Soviet times.
- Specify distinct changes in Russian society which occurred during Putin's era.
- Evaluate how the annexation of Crimea influenced patriotic feelings among Russians.
- Discuss Russian society's perception of sexual minorities and its reasons.
- Discuss the consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for Russian society.

#### \* Required readings (pre-2022):

***The Social History of Post-Communist Russia.* Edited by Piotr Dutkiewicz, Richard Sakwa, Routledge. 2016.**

Chapter 7. The Russian roller coaster: Changes in social structure in the post-communist period. 148-168.

Chapter 8. New Russia: The evolution of Russian public opinion, 1989-2014. 151-184.

**Berls Jr., Robert E.** "Civil Society in Russia: Its Role under an Authoritarian Regime, Part III: The Leader and Society: Prospects for Change." *The Nuclear Threat Initiative*. July 13, 2021.

<https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/civil-society-russia-its-role-under-authoritarian-regime-part-iii-leader-and-society-prospects-change/>.

**Byzov, Leontiy.** "Conservative Trends in Contemporary Russian Society. Origins, Content, and Prospects." *Russian Social Science Review* 59, no. 1 (2018): 39-58.

**Chebankova, Elena.** *Political Ideologies in Contemporary Russia*. McGill-Queen's University Press. 2020.

Chapter 9. Feminism. 230-259.

**Greene, Samuel A. and Robertson, Graeme.** "Affect and Autocracy: Emotions and Attitudes in Russia after Crimea." *Perspectives on Politics* 20, no. 1 (2022): 38-52.

**Gulevich, Olga, Osin, Evgeny, Isaenko, Nadezhda, and Brainis, Lilia.** "Scrutinizing Homophobia: A Model of Perception of Homosexuals in Russia." *Journal of Homosexuality* 65, no. 13 (2018): 1838-1866.

**Sanina, Anna.** "Patriotism and Patriotic Education in Contemporary Russia." *Russian Social Science Review* 59, no. 5 (2018): 468-482.

**Studin, Irvin.** *Russia: Strategy, Policy and Administration*. Palgrave Macmillan. 2018.

Chapter 7. The Social Structure of Russia. 75-86.

#### \* Required readings (post-2022):

**Kolesnikov, Andrei.** Carnegie. As War Rages, Russian Society Has Assumed the Fetal Position (2023). <https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88938>

**Dubrovsky, Dmitry.** "War and the academic community in Russia." *Baltic Worlds* 15, no. 1-2 (2022): 38-44.

**Stoner, Kathryn.** "The War in Ukraine: How Putin's War in Ukraine Has Ruined Russia." *Journal of Democracy* 33, no. 3 (2022): 38-44.

**Yudin, Greg.** "Do Russians Support Putin?" *Journal of Democracy* 33, no. 3 (2022): 31-37.

#### Additional readings:

**Berend, Ivan T.** *History Derailed. Central and Eastern Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*. University of California Press. 2003.

Chapter 5. Social Changes: "Dual" and "Incomplete" Societies.

**Chimenson, Dina, Tung, Rosalie L., Panibratov, Andrei, and Fang, Tony.** "The paradox and change of Russian cultural values." *International Business Review* 31, no. 3 (2022): 1-11.

#### Videos:

**Broken Ties | A film by Andrey Loshak**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5qmQs2LbnaE>

**Nikolaj Epple: In this hierarchy, force is more important than values.**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T7UEcXDZiWU>

## Russians Are Snitching on Friends and Relatives Who Oppose the War

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z3Z174zEnC8>

**WEEK 8, March 6, 2025**

### **OPPOSITION**

(Who opposes the Russian state)

During Yeltsin's era, systemic opposition was a genuine counterweight to the presidential authority. The parties present in the State Duma represented a broad range of political ideologies, namely, far left (CPRF), far right (LDPR), and liberal left (Yabloko).

In 1996, the CPRF's leader Gennady Zyuganov was close enough to win the presidential race against acting President Yeltsin. Over the years, especially during the latest terms of President Putin, systemic opposition was getting less autonomous from the state. The actual center of opposition (until winter 2022) shifted toward its "non-systemic" form. As a response, the Russian state turned from moderate cohabitation with the opposition to severe resistance and greatly restricted its activities. In the last section we will analyze the current evolution of the so called "exiled" opposition.

#### **Weekly goals:**

- Analyze the manifestations of modern Russia's protest activity.
- Discuss the obstacles created by the state for opposition activists.
- Evaluate the state's general reaction to oppositional movements.
- Discuss the figure of Alexey Navalny as a prominent opposition leader.
- Discuss the existing potential for protests amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the worsening living conditions.

#### **\* Required readings (pre-2022)**

**Denisova, Anastasia.** "Democracy, protest and public sphere in Russia after the 2011-2012 anti-government protests: digital media at stake." *Media, Culture & Society* 39, no. 7 (2017): 976-994.

**Gelman, Vladimir.** "The Politics of Fear: How the Russian Regime Confronts Its Opponents." *Russian Social Science Review* 61, no. 6 (2020): 467-482.

**Glazunova, Sofya.** "Four Populisms" of Alexey Navalny: An analysis of Russian non-systemic opposition discourse on YouTube." *Media and Communication* 8, no. 4 (2020): 121-132.

**Koesel, Karrie J. and Bunce, Valerie J.** "Putin, Popular Protests, and Political Trajectories in Russia: A Comparative Perspective." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 28, no. 4 (2012): 403-423.

**Laruelle, Marlene.** "Alexei Navalny and challenges in reconciling "nationalism" and "liberalism." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 30, no. 4 (2014): 276-297.

**Lewis, David G.** *Russia's New Authoritarianism. Putin and the Politics of Order.* Edinburgh University Press. 2020.

Chapter 5. Defining the Enemy. 100-116.

***Systemic and Non-Systemic Opposition in the Russian Federation.*** Edited by Cameron Ross. Routledge. 2016.

Chapter 6. The Systemic Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes: A Case Study of Russian Regions. 121-138.

### \* Required readings (post-2022)

**Mateeva, Ana.** The Conversation, Despite the war, Russia is still part of Europe – for a lasting peace both sides need to remember that.

<https://theconversation.com/despite-the-war-russia-is-still-part-of-europe-for-a-lasting-peace-both-sides-need-to-remember-that-206414>

**Pavlova, Uliana.** "Putin Is the Only Leader They've Known. And They're Done with Him." *POLITICO*. July 04, 2022. <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/07/russians-putin-fleeing-00023482>.

**Busygina, Irina and Paustyan, Ekaterina.** "Ready to Protest? Calculating Protest Potential in Russian Regional Capitals." *PONARS Eurasia*. June 05, 2022. [https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Pepr779\\_Busygina-Paustyan\\_June2022.pdf](https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Pepr779_Busygina-Paustyan_June2022.pdf).

**Petrov, Nikolai.** "Putin's support from Russian society may decline fast." *Chatham House*. March 05, 2022. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/03/putins-support-russian-society-may-decline-fast>

### Additional readings

**Lansky, Miriam and Suthers, Elspeth.** "Putin versus Civil Society: Outlawing the Opposition." *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 3 (2013): 75-87.

### Videos:

**DW Crushed by Putin: Russia's threatened opposition | DW Documentary**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FpagEEgDKB8>

**Alexey Navalny's last word in the court**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ReFQzzHnEo>

**What young supporters of Navalny survive in Russia. "The age of disagreement," episode 1.**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TeDHRVN9NQ8>

**The Assassination of Boris Nemtsov: Kremlin's Biggest Critic**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vM04zNbsaJg>

**What are Russians risking by protesting Putin?**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qd8NdcqSBr8>

### WEEK 9, March 13, 2025

#### ECONOMY

(Russia's economic transformation)

The fall of the Soviet Union called for the reconstruction of an existing economic system. The transition from "planned economy" to "market economy" became a tough challenge for Yeltsin's administration. Russia's economic transformation caused severe societal turbulence and drastically lowered the Russian citizens' quality of life. During President Putin's first terms, the Russian economy witnessed a revival largely impacted by growing oil prices. Still, it was severely injured by the repercussions of the 2008 global economic crisis and crippled by the sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea. Expanding tensions with the West required restructuring the Russian economy and reorientation to other partners. The 2022

invasion of Ukraine caused further intensification of sanction pressure and the departure of major brands from Russia. As of now, the consequences of sanctions are seemingly unpredictable as the unfolding of Russia's war will have a decisive role in determining the survival of the Russian economy.

#### **Weekly goals:**

- Identify the main challenges faced by Yeltsin's administration.
- Analyze the hardships caused by Russia's transition from a "planned economy" and their social impact.
- Discuss the role of oligarchs in 1990s Russia.
- Discuss the changes in the Russian economy under Putin.
- Analyze the economy's response to sanctions imposed since 2014.
- Model the economic consequences of the war against Ukraine and the sanction wave of 2022.

#### **\* Required readings (pre-2022):**

**Aslund, Anders and Snegovaya, Maria.** "The impact of Western sanctions on Russia and how they can be made even more effective." *Atlantic Council*. May 03, 2021. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/The-impact-of-Western-sanctions-on-Russia-and-how-they-can-be-made-even-more-effective-5.2.pdf>.

**Dutkiewicz Piotr and Richard Sakwa,** (eds), *Social History of Post-Communist Russia*, Routledge (London & New York), 2016; Chapter 3 (pp.41 – 58)

**Ellison, Herbert J.** *Boris Yeltsin and Russia's Democratic Transformation*. University of Washington Press. 2007.  
Chapter 3. Building a New Economy. 179-223.

**Guriev, Sergei and Andrei Rachinsky.** "The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19, no. 1 (2005): 131-150.

**Lanskoy, Miriam and Myles-Primakoff, Dylan.** "The Rise of Kleptocracy: Power and Plunder in Putin's Russia." *Journal of Democracy* 29, no. 1 (2018): 76-85.

**Volkov, Vadim.** *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism*. Cornell University Press. 2016.  
Chapter 5. The Privatization of the Power Ministers.

#### **\* Required readings (post-2022):**

**Laruelle, Marlène, and Jean Radvanyi.** Chapter 5: The Economy, *Russia: Great Power, Weakened State*. Second edition. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2023.  
[https://web-s-ebsohost-com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmx1YmtfXzM2NjQyMzdfX0FO0?sid=d35967b5-d7dd-4c20-bf0e-6d921e2d951b@redis&vid=0&format=EB&lpid=lp\\_115&rid=0](https://web-s-ebsohost-com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmx1YmtfXzM2NjQyMzdfX0FO0?sid=d35967b5-d7dd-4c20-bf0e-6d921e2d951b@redis&vid=0&format=EB&lpid=lp_115&rid=0)

Rationale: 2023. Updated book. Excellent overview of the Russian economy in the context of sanctions etc. but using historical context i.e. from period of shock therapy to the contemporary period.

**“The Costs of Russia’s War Are about to Hit Home.”** *The Economist* (London) (2023).  
[https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A766847973/AONE?u=ocul\\_carleton&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=b8abc20c](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A766847973/AONE?u=ocul_carleton&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=b8abc20c)

Rationale: Sept. 2023. Short, good, contemporary overview of the delayed effect of sanctions.



**Demarais, Agathe.** Don't Trust Russia's Numbers. *Foreign Policy Magazine* (March 2023). [https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=b7102b11-9ef1-4755-9769-577751207ba8&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A67S4-XXN1-JCMN-Y0CR-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=484244&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=hmnyk&earg=sr0&prid=004a5f9e-8dfb-438b-952f-4f734f8ff1cf](https://advance.lexis-com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crd=b7102b11-9ef1-4755-9769-577751207ba8&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A67S4-XXN1-JCMN-Y0CR-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=484244&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=hmnyk&earg=sr0&prid=004a5f9e-8dfb-438b-952f-4f734f8ff1cf)

**Efremov, Sergey.** "Four Months of Sanctions: The State and Prospects of the Russian Economy." *Italian Institute for International Political Studies*. July 21, 2022. <https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/four-months-sanctions-state-and-prospects-russian-economy-35843>.

**Liadze, Iana, Macchiarelli, Corrado, Mortimer-Lee, Paul, and Juanino, Patricia Sanchez.** "The Economic Costs of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict." *National Institute of Economic and Social Research*. March 02, 2022. <https://www.niesr.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/PP32-Economic-Costs-Russia-Ukraine.pdf>.

**Pertsev, Andrey.** "Is Russia prepared for an economic crisis?" *Meduza*. March 16, 2022. <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/03/16/is-russia-prepared-for-an-economic-crisis>.

**Starostina, Yulia.** "Secret Economy: What Hiding the Stats Does for Russia." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. July 01, 2022. <https://carnegieendowment.org/eurasiainsight/87432>.

#### Videos:

**Inside Russia's Difficult Transition to Capitalism**  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OAx6C0FJdHU>

**Has Russia's economy really recovered? | VideoLab | ABC News**  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NKSz5O417zE>

**Are sanctions against Russia working? | DW Business Special**  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yG4MwjWfuFM>  
Rationale: Sept. 2023 vs. existing DW video in the syllabus.

**TV Rain/Dozhd: Wartime Sanctions: What is their effect on the Russian economy? Explained**  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mwXGb9Y8rdQ>

**Study shows: Western sanctions take a heavy toll on Russia's economy | DW News**  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSoJDIBdglM>

#### WEEK 10 (Part One) , March 20, 2025

##### REGIONS

(Is there a disparity among Russian regions?)

Russia's regions vary widely in terms of economic and social development. President Putin's administration abruptly stopped the scarce federalization attempts of the 1990s. The current model of federalism does not provide for broad self-determination or self-governance of Russian regions and makes them dependent on

the state authorities. The federal government exercises vast control over the distribution of resources among the regions and can manually interfere with the regions' activities.

#### **Weekly goals:**

- Discuss the model of federalism under President Yeltsin.
- Analyze the change in state's attitude to regions' autonomy change under President Putin.
- Discuss and evaluate the causes of regional disparity.
- Discuss the credibility of Prof. Zubarevich's model of "four Russias."
- Analyze the case of Chechnya as a unique example of self-governance within Russia.
- Specify the primary goals of Russia's Arctic policy.

#### **\* Required readings:**

**Maria Lipman and Nikolay Petrov, (eds.),** *Russia 2025 - Scenarios for the Russian Future*. Palgrave Macmillan 2013 - **Natalia Zubarevich,** *Four Russias: Human Potential and Social Differentiation of Russian Regions and Cities*. pp. 67-85

**Kahn, Jeff.** "The Parade of Sovereignties: Establishing the Vocabulary of the New Russian Federalism." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 16, no. 1 (2000): 58-89.

**Lazarev, Egor.** "Laws in Conflict: Legacies of War, Gender, and Legal Pluralism in Chechnya." *World Politics* 71, no. 4 (2019): 667-709.

**Rumer, Eugene, Sokolsky, Richard, and Stronski, Paul.** "Russia in the Arctic – A Critical Examination." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. March 29, 2021. [https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Rumer\\_et\\_al\\_Russia\\_in\\_the\\_Arctic.pdf](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Rumer_et_al_Russia_in_the_Arctic.pdf).

**Stepan, Alfred.** "Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2000): 133-176.

**Studin, Irvin.** *Russia: Strategy, Policy and Administration*. Palgrave Macmillan. 2018.  
Chapter 5. Russian Federalism. 57-64.  
Chapter 6. The North Caucasus. 65-74.  
Chapter 13. Russia's Arctic Strategy. 135-144.

**Zakharov, Nikita.** "Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions." *European Journal of Political Economy* 56 (2019): 39-61.

*Politics in the Russian regions*. Edited by Graeme Gill. Palgrave Macmillan. 2007.  
Chapter 3. Collaborative or Hegemonic? Tatarstan and Conflicting Visions of Federalism in Putin's Russia. 78-107.

*Russia's Regions and Comparative Subnational Politics*. Edited by William M. Reisinger. Routledge. 2012.  
Chapter 1. Studying Russia's Regions to Advance Comparative Political Science. 25-48.

#### **\* Required readings (post 2022)**

**Gusev, Alexey.** *Carnegie Politka* (April 2023). Why Russia Won't Disintegrate Along Its Regional Borders <https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/89581>

#### **Additional readings:**

**Blochliker, Hansjorg and Durand-Lasserre, Olivier.** "The drivers of regional growth in Russia: A baseline model with applications." *OECD*. December 10, 2018. [https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/the-drivers-of-regional-growth-in-russia\\_9279f6c3-en](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/the-drivers-of-regional-growth-in-russia_9279f6c3-en).

**Video:**

**Why Russia is Building an Arctic Silk Road**  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyy9usF7ohE>

**WEEK 10 (Part two)**  
**MIGRATION**

(Who migrates to and from Russia)

Migration flows were severely restricted in Soviet times. Even Soviet citizens were prohibited from arbitrarily changing their residence. In contrast, the new Russia ranks as one of the top destinations and origins of global migration. Likewise, the country became one of the regional centers of labor migration, with workers coming mainly from the former Soviet republics. The war against Ukraine accelerated the emigration of Russian citizens and impacted the intensity of migration from neighboring states.

**Weekly goals:**

- Analyze the main types of migration to and from Russia.
- Evaluate Russia's attractiveness for labor migrants.
- Discuss the manifestations of xenophobic and racist attitudes in Russian society.
- Discuss the causes of Russians' hostility (unfriendliness, caution) toward migrants.
- Model the change of migration dynamic amid Russia's war against Ukraine.

**\* Required readings (pre-2022):**

**Aleshkovskii, Ivan, Grebenyuk, Aleksandr, Kravets, Viktor, Maksimova, Anastasiya.** "Foreign Migrants in the Russian Labor Market: The Estimate of Their Overall Number and Their Contribution to Russia's GDP." *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast* 12, no. 6 (2019): 197-208.

**Gudkov, Lev and Pipiya, Karina.** "Xenophobia, Racism and Antisemitism Parameters in Present-Day Russia." *Levada Center*. Accessed August 25, 2022.  
<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Submissions/WJC-Annex3.pdf>.

**King, Elizabeth J., Dudina, Victoria, and Dubrovskaya, Svetlana.** "'You feel sick, you get sick, you still keep going': Central Asian female labor migrants' health in Russia." *Global Public Health* 15, no. 4 (2020): 544-557.

**Kubal, Agnieszka.** *Immigration and Refugee Law in Russia*. Cambridge University Press. 2019.

Chapter 1. Socio-Legal Perspectives on Immigration and Refugee Law in Russia. 1-14.

Chapter 2. Immigration and Refugee Law in Russia: An Overview of the Legal Environment. 15-33.

Chapter 4. Everyday experiences of Russian Immigration Law: The Entry Bar Case Study. 60-77.

**Lebedeva, Nadezhda and Tatarko, Alexander.** "Multiculturalism and immigration in post-Soviet Russia." *European Psychologist* 18, no. 3 (2013): 169-178.

**Nikiforova, Elena and Brednikova, Olga.** "On labor migration to Russia: Central Asian migrants and migrant families in the matrix of Russia's bordering policies." *Political Geography* 66 (2018): 142-150.

**Studin, Irvin.** *Russia: Strategy, Policy and Administration.* Palgrave Macmillan. 2018. Chapter 23. Population and Migration. 257-268.

**\* Required readings (post-2022):**

**Margarita Zavadsкая.** “The War-Induced Exodus from Russia.” *FIIA Briefing Paper* 358. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, March 2023.

<https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/the-war-induced-exodus-from-russia?read>

Rationale: Contemporary. On topic of out-migration due to war. Short.

**Talanova, Daria.** The great Russian brain drain: At least 270 scientists and top university professors have resigned and left Russia following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. *Novaya Gazeta* (Aug 2023).

<https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/08/19/the-great-russian-brain-drain-en>

**"Russia as a Country of Origin."** *European Union Agency for Asylum.* June 2022.

[https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2022-06/2022\\_06\\_CIR\\_Russia\\_Origin\\_EN.pdf](https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2022-06/2022_06_CIR_Russia_Origin_EN.pdf)

**Videos:**

**The hidden life of labor migrants in Russia / Redaktsiya**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yq-JJGv8Dk>

**How war is changing Russia’s population | DW Business Special**

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMk\\_ZxrrJOs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gMk_ZxrrJOs)

**Week 11, March 27, 2025**

**QuoVadis Russia?**

**Russia 2024 – 2025. What May the RF Look Like**

The goal of this seminar is to attempt to evaluate what may happen in the short to medium time frame in the Russian Federation (regardless of the outcome of the Russian invasion in Ukraine). In other words, to answer the question “what happens next?” from the following perspectives:

1. We will evaluate social support for the current regime/war in Ukraine; how and why Russians support/oppose the war.
2. New power dynamics: a) Prigozhin factor (i.e., how to maintain monopoly of power) b) can Putin rely on current elites; new “power centers”.
3. New forms of political/social repressions.
4. Demographic challenges (aging population, weaker labor force, emigration etc.).

\*Required readings:

**Tatiana Stanovaya** , Russia’s Other War: The Administrators Versus the Revisionists - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

<https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90814>

**Alexandra Prokopenko**, Putin Is Betting On a New Class of Asset Owners to Shore Up His Regime

<https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90543>

**Tatiana Stanovaya**, Putin’s Age of Chaos -The Dangers of Russian Disorder, August 8, 2023

**WEEK 12 (Part one & two), April 3, 2025**

**Roundtable and consultations**

**Part I. Evaluating (presenting) policy papers/ discussion.**

In this class, participants/students will present short Policy Papers on improving critical aspects of Russian state management, NGO capacity, revamping the economy, etc. Students will be given brief guidelines on preparing such a paper. Each student shall contact the instructor to discuss a topic and sources for this presentation/paper in advance.

**Part II. Consultations and free questions/discussion on current events in Russian domestic politics.**

## Political Science Course Outline Appendix

### REQUESTS FOR ACADEMIC ACCOMMODATION

You may need special arrangements to meet your academic obligations during the term. For an accommodation request the processes are as follows:

#### Student Mental Health

As a university student, you may experience a range of mental health challenges that significantly impact your academic success and overall well-being. If you need help, please speak to someone. There are numerous resources available both on- and off-campus to support you. Here is a list that may be helpful:

#### Emergency Resources (on and off campus):

<https://carleton.ca/health/emergencies-and-crisis/emergency-numbers/>

#### Carleton Resources:

Mental Health and Wellbeing:

<https://carleton.ca/wellness/>

Health & Counselling Services: <https://carleton.ca/health/>

Paul Menton Centre: <https://carleton.ca/pmc/>

Academic Advising Centre (AAC):

<https://carleton.ca/academicadvising/>

Centre for Student Academic Support (CSAS):

<https://carleton.ca/csas/>

Equity & Inclusivity Communities:

<https://carleton.ca/equity/>

#### Off Campus Resources:

Distress Centre of Ottawa and Region: (613) 238-3311 or

TEXT: 343-306-5550, <https://www.dcottawa.on.ca/>

Mental Health Crisis Service: (613) 722-6914, 1-866-996-

0991, <http://www.crisisline.ca/>

Empower Me: 1-844-741-6389,

<https://students.carleton.ca/services/empower-me-counselling-services/>

ood2Talk: 1-866-925-5454, <https://good2talk.ca/>

The Walk-In Counselling Clinic:

<https://walkincounselling.com>

#### Academic consideration for medical or other

**extenuating circumstances:** Students must contact the instructor(s) of their absence or inability to complete the academic deliverable within the predetermined timeframe due to medical or other extenuating circumstances. For a range of medical or other extenuating circumstances, students may use the online self-declaration form and where appropriate, the use of medical documentation. This policy regards the accommodation of extenuating circumstances for both short-term and long-term periods and extends to all students enrolled at Carleton University. Students should also consult the [Course Outline Information on Academic Accommodations](#) for more information. Detailed information about the procedure for requesting academic consideration can be found [here](#).

**Pregnancy:** Contact your Instructor with any requests for academic accommodation during the first two weeks of class, or as soon as possible after the need for accommodation is known to exist. For accommodation regarding a formally-scheduled final exam, please contact Equity and Inclusive Communities (EIC) at [equity@carleton.ca](mailto:equity@carleton.ca) or by calling (613) 520-5622 to speak to an Equity Advisor.

**Religious obligation:** Contact your Instructor with any requests for academic accommodation during the first two weeks of class, or as soon as possible after the need for accommodation is known to exist. For more details [click here](#).

#### Academic Accommodations for Students with

**Disabilities:** The Paul Menton Centre for Students with Disabilities (PMC) provides services to students with Learning Disabilities (LD), psychiatric/mental health disabilities, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), chronic medical conditions, and impairments in mobility, hearing, and vision. If you have a disability requiring academic accommodations in this course, please contact PMC at 613-520-6608 or [pmc@carleton.ca](mailto:pmc@carleton.ca) for a formal evaluation. If you are already registered with the PMC, please request your accommodations for this course through the [Ventus Student Portal](#) at the beginning of the term, and no later than two weeks before the first in-class scheduled test or exam requiring accommodation (*if applicable*). Requests made within two weeks will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. For final exams, the deadlines to request accommodations are published in the [University Academic Calendars](#). After requesting accommodation from PMC, meet with me to ensure accommodation arrangements are made. Please consult the PMC website for the deadline to request accommodations for the formally scheduled exam (if applicable).

**Survivors of Sexual Violence:** As a community, Carleton University is committed to maintaining a positive learning, working, and living environment where sexual violence will not be tolerated, and its survivors are supported through academic accommodations as per Carleton's Sexual Violence Policy. For more information about the services available at the university and to obtain information about sexual violence and/or support, visit:

<https://carleton.ca/equity/sexual-assault-support-services>.

**Accommodation for Student Activities:** Carleton University recognizes the substantial benefits, both to the individual student and for the university, that result from a student participating in activities beyond the classroom experience. Reasonable accommodation will be provided to students who compete or perform at the national or international level. Write to me with any requests for academic accommodation during the first two weeks of

class, or as soon as possible after the need for accommodation is known to exist.

### PETITIONS TO DEFER

Students unable to write a final examination because of illness or other circumstances beyond their control may apply within **three working days** to the Registrar's Office for permission to write a deferred examination. The request must be fully supported by the appropriate documentation. Only deferral petitions submitted to the Registrar's Office will be considered. [See Undergraduate Calendar, Article 4.3](#)

### INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Student or professor materials created for this course (including presentations and posted notes, labs, case studies, assignments and exams) remain the intellectual property of the author(s). They are intended for personal use and may not be reproduced or redistributed without prior written consent of the author(s). Permissibility of submitting substantially the same piece of work more than once for academic credit. If group or collaborative work is expected or allowed, provide a clear and specific description of how and to what extent you consider collaboration to be acceptable or appropriate, especially in the completion of written assignments.

### WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT ACADEMIC PENALTY

The last day to withdraw from full fall term and fall/winter courses with a full fee adjustment is **September 30<sup>th</sup>, 2024**. The last day for a fee adjustment when withdrawing from winter term courses or the winter portion of two-term courses is **January 31, 2025**. The last day for academic withdrawal from full fall and late fall courses is **November 15, 2024**. The last day for academic withdrawal from full winter, late winter, and fall/winter courses is **March 15, 2025**.

**WDN:** For students who withdraw after the full fee adjustment date in each term the term WDN will be a permanent notation that appears on their official transcript.

### OFFICIAL FINAL EXAMINATION PERIOD

Fall courses: **December 9-21, 2024**. Winter and Fall/Winter courses: **April 11-26, 2025** (may include evenings & Saturdays or Sundays)

**For more information on the important dates and deadlines of the academic year, consult the [Carleton 2024-2025 Calendar](#).**

### GRADING SYSTEM

The grading system is described in the Undergraduate Calendar section [5.4](#).

### ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

Academic integrity is an essential element of a productive and successful career as a student. Students are required to familiarize themselves with the university's [Academic Integrity Policy](#).

## PLAGIARISM

The University Senate defines plagiarism as "*presenting, whether intentional or not, the ideas, expression of ideas or work of others as one's own.*" This can include:

- any submission prepared in whole or in part, by someone else, including the unauthorized use of generative AI tools (e.g., ChatGPT);
- reproducing or paraphrasing portions of someone else's published or unpublished material, and presenting these as one's own without proper citation or reference to the original source;
- submitting a take-home examination, essay, laboratory report or other assignment written, in whole or in part, by someone else;
- using ideas or direct, verbatim quotations, or paraphrased material, concepts, or ideas without appropriate acknowledgment in any academic assignment;
- using another's data or research findings;
- failing to acknowledge sources through the use of proper citations when using another's works and/or failing to use quotation marks;
- handing in "*substantially the same piece of work for academic credit more than once without prior written permission of the course instructor in which the submission occurs.*"

Plagiarism is a serious offence that cannot be resolved directly by the course's instructor. The Associate Dean of the Faculty conducts a rigorous investigation, including an interview with the student, when an instructor suspects a piece of work has been plagiarized. Penalties are not trivial. They can include a final grade of "F" for the course.

### RESOURCES (613-520-2600, phone ext.)

Department of Political Science (2777)	B640
Loeb	
Registrar's Office (3500)	300 Tory
Centre for Student Academic Success (3822)	4 <sup>th</sup> floor
Library	
Academic Advising Centre (7850)	302 Tory
Paul Menton Centre (6608)	501
Nideyinàn	
Career Services (6611)	401 Tory