

A Protocol for Secure Public Instant Messaging (Extended Version)*

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Abstract. Although Instant Messaging (IM) services are now relatively long-standing and very popular as an instant way of communication over the Internet, they have received little attention from the security research community. Despite important differences distinguishing IM from other Internet applications, very few protocols have been designed to address the unique security issues of IM. In light of threats to existing IM networks, we present the Instant Messaging Key Exchange (IMKE) protocol as a step towards secure IM. A discussion of IM threat model assumptions and an analysis of IMKE relative to these using BAN-like logic is also provided. Based on our implementation of IMKE using the Jabber protocol, we provide insights on how IMKE may be integrated with popular IM protocols.

1 Introduction and Overview

Instant Messaging (IM) is a popular Internet based application enabling individuals to exchange text messages instantly and monitor the availability of a list of users in real-time. Starting as a casual application, mainly used by teenagers and college students, IM systems now connect Wall Street firms [15] and Navy warships [14]. The Gartner Group predicts that IM traffic will surpass email traffic by 2006 [49]. A survey report from the Radicati Group suggests that 85% of businesses use public IM services but only 12% use security-enhanced enterprise IM services and IM-specific policies [26].

The basic protocols currently used in popular public IM systems (e.g. AOL, Yahoo!, MSN and Google Instant Messenger) are open to many security threats [35]. Relying solely on SSL-based solutions – the most common security protocol of corporate IM systems – for security in public IM services has major limitations, e.g., messages may not be *private* when they go through the IM server [27]. The shortcomings of public and business IM protocols highlight the need of a secure IM protocol.

Contributions. We present a novel protocol called Instant Messaging Key Exchange (IMKE) for *strong* authentication and *secure* communications (see Table 3 for definitions) in IM systems. IMKE enables mutual strong authentication

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between users and an IM server, using a memorable password and a known server public key. IMKE provides security (authentication, confidentiality and integrity) for client-server and client-client IM connections *with* repudiation. Although pairs of users generally share no secret between themselves, IMKE enables secure and private communications among users through a trusted IM server, without revealing the contents of users' messages to the server.

An analysis of the protocol in terms of security using a BAN (Burrows-Abadi-Needham)-like logic [13] is provided.¹ The protocol has also been tested (with no flaws found) by the AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) formal analysis tool [1]. IMKE may be implemented using any well-known public key cryptosystem (e.g. RSA, ElGamal, elliptic curve) that supports encryption, without requiring any additional special constraints (unlike e.g. SNAPI [33]) for a safe protocol run.² In contrast, the majority of existing Password Authentication and Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols which require no known server public key are based on Diffie-Hellman (DH)-based key agreement; these must be carefully implemented to avoid many known attacks which exploit the structure of many choices of parameters in DH-based key agreement (e.g. [31], [32]). Although IMKE has been designed as a secure IM protocol, it may also provide an alternative to other two- and three-party PAKE protocols (e.g. EKE [6]) beyond IM. IMKE may be used in server-mediated peer-to-peer (P2P) communications as well.

We have implemented a prototype of IMKE using the Jabber open-source IM protocol [48], and measured the execution performance. Although implementing IMKE requires changing both the IM server and the IM client, our implementation provides evidence that IMKE may be integrated with existing public IM protocols without a large implementation effort, and keeping underlying messaging structures intact.

Scope. Some vendors provide IM services for mobile devices. The Short Messaging System (SMS) was created as part of the Global System for Mobile (GSM) Communications Phase 1 standard. IM in mobile devices, SMS, IRC, group chat, and chat rooms (see [35] for definitions) are beyond the scope of this paper.

IM systems with message logging on the server side is a required feature at some organizations (e.g. financial firms for regulatory reasons, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [53]). The idea of *mobile* IM, introduced by Issacs *et al.* [25], is establishing a foothold on major messaging systems; AIM supports login from multiple devices at a time to enhance user mobility. These features, although useful, are out of scope of this paper.

Our main focus is the (one-to-one) PC-to-PC messaging, which is the dominating feature of all IM systems. IM services mainly targeting corporate users, such as Yahoo! Business Messenger, are not fully analyzed in this paper (in

¹ We do not claim to give a full proof of the security of IMKE, and in fact, such a paper would be more appropriate for a conference other than Financial Cryptography and Data Security.

² However, general requirements for secure choice of public key parameters must of course be fulfilled (e.g. see [2]).

part because complete documentation of security features in these products is not publicly available). As the default IM clients discussed here are mainly Windows based, Windows is generally implied to be the underlying operating system (OS) when another is not explicitly mentioned.

Security and privacy issues related to IM can be categorized as technical and social. Technical threats arise from inherent system design and implementation bugs. Social issues include: divulging sensitive information to strangers or competitors using IM, impacts of IM on personal relationship and workplace, etc. We deal only with the technical issues of IM (keeping usability in context).

Organization. The sequel is organized as follows. §2 outlines motivation for IMKE and related work. In §3, we briefly discuss threats considered in IMKE, and list terminology, end user goals, and long- and short-term secrets of IMKE. The protocol messages are discussed in §4. §5 provides our IM threat model and a partial security analysis. The analytical performance of IMKE is discussed in §6. Implementation issues are briefly discussed in §7. §8 concludes.

2 Motivation and Related Work

We now discuss the motivation for IMKE, similarities and differences of IMKE with existing secure IM protocols and two- and three-party PAKE protocols.

Relationship of IMKE to Pluggable and Independent Secure IM Protocols. A *pluggable* security protocol – i.e. one that is implemented in a third-party client “add-on module” without requiring any changes to popular IM clients and servers – could easily be deployed at the client-end in addition to default IM clients. Therefore several initiatives, e.g., Off-the-record messaging [9], Gaim-e [40], have been taken to make IM secure using pluggable security protocols. Limitations of those proposed to date include: client-server messages remain plaintext, and the requirement of long-term client private keys, whose secrecy must be maintained.

Independent secure IM protocols developed in practice, e.g., Secure Internet Live Conferencing (SILC) [46], iGo Incognito [24], do not appear to have been peer-reviewed in an academic sense, nor designed to be integrated with popular IM protocols. A lightweight protocol which can easily be embedded into existing IM protocols (by IM service providers, changing both the IM client and server) seems practical to achieve security without limiting usability or requiring a large implementation effort. We propose IMKE to achieve such objectives. Although IMKE requires changes in both the client and server software, users do not need to maintain or *carry* any long-term public key. IMKE also secures client-server IM communications.

Relationship of IMKE to Two- and Three-Party Protocols. IM is essentially a three-party system. The IM server’s main role is to enable trusted communications between users. In traditional models, the third-party is often considered a *disinterested* party [5]. In contrast, the IM server plays an active role in users’ communications (e.g. forwarding users’ messages). Therefore we

take advantage of the presence of an active IM server in IMKE, e.g., by using the server as a trusted public key distribution center for clients.

Another major difference of IMKE with other three-party systems is that, although the IM server in IMKE helps establish a secure session between two clients, the server does not know the session key shared between the clients. This is a desirable property for consumer IM networks; users may want their conversations to be inaccessible to the IM server even though they must trust the server for login, sharing user profiles, etc.

In a typical three-party case, two users start a session³ only when they need to communicate. The IM scenario is a bit different in the following way: users authenticate themselves only when they login to the IM server; then users initiate sessions with other online users whenever they wish to – i.e. logging in to the IM server does not necessarily precede IM sessions (e.g. text messaging, file transfer).

Two-party PAKE protocols that use a known server public key (e.g. [23], [30]) have similarities with IMKE. These, as well as two-party password-only protocols (e.g. [6]) may be transformed into a three-party protocol in the following way [11, p.267]: run two two-party protocols between the server and each of the users; then use the established secure channel to distribute communication primitives, e.g., public keys among users, thereby providing the communicating users a secure channel. The advantage of this approach is that several PAKE protocols are well-scrutinized, and some even come with *proofs* of security. However, we are interested in more efficient practical protocols, whereas these solutions may require up to three extra messages per protocol run – one for sending a client’s public key to the server and two for verifying the public key. Also, even minor modifications to an existing protocol may invalidate its security attributes (not to mention any related security proofs).

Relationship of IMKE to EKE and Similar Protocols. IMKE has similarities in setup and goals with many PAKE protocols related to or inspired by EKE [6], especially with those that use a known server public key. We now highlight some of these similarities and differences, with focus on the PAKE phase (see §4) of IMKE.

An effective way to break many implementations of EKE is the *partition attack* [6], [12]: a special class of the offline dictionary attack, where an adversary tries to partition the password-space into feasible and infeasible sets by using information gathered (passively, from the wire) from a protocol run; the correct password may be recovered from the feasible set of passwords in logarithmic time after observing a limited number of valid protocol runs. If the protocol contains verifiable text, then a partition attack can be mounted. As a public key usually contains distinct redundancy, many implementations of EKE (mainly RSA-EKE) are susceptible [44]. IMKE avoids this general class of risk by not using the password as a cryptographic key.

When a password is encrypted using a known public key, generally *confounders* or random nonces are used to avoid offline dictionary attacks. In many

³ i.e. authenticating themselves to a trusted server, and each receiving a server-generated client-client session key.

variations of these protocols, data being encrypted using a public key may not always fit into one block; so in actual implementations, these protocols may require multiple public key encryptions (and subsequent decryptions). In contrast, IMKE always encrypts small (e.g. 128-bit) random numbers in public key operations, which always fit into one block of any public key cryptosystem.

An important idea behind IMKE is the following. We avoid the number theoretic relationships between a public key and a password, mainly to avoid security issues in this regard. IMKE uses a known server public key to encrypt a random (session) key (e.g. 128 bits) and uses that key to encrypt the (weak) user-password and the user's dynamic public key. This enables IMKE to avoid the partition attack because to discover redundancy in a public key, now the attacker must search for the correct session key which is generated from a large key space instead of the relatively small password space. Also, as clients' public keys are generated dynamically for every login attempt, users do not need to maintain their own long-term public keys.

In summary, the design of IMKE is inspired by following considerations: (1) existing IM security solutions are inadequate to address IM threats; (2) existing PAKE protocols do not directly fit into the IM communications model; and (3) a lightweight security protocol, which can conveniently be embedded into popular IM protocols without breaking underlying messaging structures, is essential for a greater integration.

Comparison of IMKE with other IM Implementations. We now compare our IMKE implementation (see §7) with selected other secure IM implementations. The metrics of our comparison are:

- *Strong PAKE* (whether the authentication mechanism is a *strong* password protocol; see Table 3 for definition);
- *C-C Message Protection* (whether the client-to-client message authentication and encryption are supported);
- *C-S Message Protection* (whether the client-to-server message authentication and encryption are supported);
- *Mobility* (whether users can log in to the IM server with only a password);
- *Repudiation* (whether users can repudiate a message);
- *No Client Change* (whether the requirement of any extra client-side software other than the IM client is avoided, or whether the IM client can be used unmodified); and
- *No Server Change* (whether the requirement of any changes to the IM server is avoided).

We compare SSL/TLS based enterprise IM clients (e.g. Reuters Messaging), AIM using client certificates, IMSecure/Trillian (self-signed certificates), Off-the-Record (OTR) Messaging (requires long-term signature keys), GPG-based Gaim-e, and SILC with IMKE. No documentation was found for Gaim-e except its open-source implementation. We do not include iGo Incognito in our comparison for the lack of documentation. Table 1 summarizes the comparison of IM implementations.

	Strong PAKE	C-C Message Protection	C-S Message Protection	Mobility	Repudiation	No Client Change	No Server Change
SSL/TLS			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
AIM Cert.		✓				✓	✓
IMSecure		✓			✓		✓
OTR		✓			✓		✓
Gaim-e		✓			✓		✓
SILC		depends*	✓		depends*		
IMKE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		

* SILC supports client-to-client message authentication and encryption, and repudiation, depending on client settings.

Table 1. Comparison of IM implementations

From the above discussion, the distinguishing features of IMKE are:

1. It is the only IM protocol to support strong PAKE although all IM protocols rely on passwords.
2. It secures client-client and client-server messages.
3. Although it requires changes in both the client and server software, the users do not need to maintain or *carry* any long-term public keys or certificates.
4. IMKE is not a *messaging* protocol. It does not specify anything beyond security attributes of an IM protocol. We argue that IMKE can be embedded into existing IM protocols without breaking the underlying messaging structures. This claim is supported by our implementation (§7), which offers an example of embedding IMKE with the XML-based Jabber protocol.

3 Setup for IMKE

In this section, we discuss threats considered in IMKE. We list the notation and terminology used, end user goals, and long- and short-term secrets for IMKE.

3.1 Threats Considered in IMKE

Table 2 summarizes significant IM threats and whether a threat is addressed by IMKE. We defer a more concrete discussion of the IM threat model to §5.1. Details of these threats are discussed elsewhere (see [34]).

IM connections generally involve a client and a server, or two clients. Most IM threats arise from these connections being easily compromised. IMKE aims to provide security (confidentiality, authentication and integrity protection) for all IM connections. Impersonation attacks based on compromised connections are also prevented in IMKE. The security related goal of availability is beyond the scope of our work – i.e. denial of service (DoS) attacks against IM clients or the server are not fully addressed by IMKE. However, IMKE helps the server and clients to limit the extent of these attacks. Replay of captured messages (from

<i>Threats</i>	<i>Addressed by IMKE</i>
Connection security	✓
Denial of service (DoS)	Partial
Replay of messages	✓
Impersonation of IM users	✓ ^a
Propagation of IM worms	Partial ^b
DNS spoofing to setup rogue IM servers	✓
Insecure default settings on IM clients	✗
Sharing IM features with other applications	✗
URI handlers (<code>aim</code> , <code>ymsg</code>)	✗
Plaintext registry and archived messages	✗

^a Assuming no theft of users' passwords, including, e.g., through the use of keyloggers.

^b IMKE helps complementary techniques (e.g. throttling file transfer and URL messages, and challenging the sender of a file or URL message with an automated Turing test; see [36] for details) to be more effective by securing IM connections.

Table 2. Threats to IM and those addressed by IMKE

an ongoing session or older sessions) is also detected in IMKE. An attacker may spoof DNS entries in a user machine (the local DNS cache) to redirect all communications to a rogue IM server. IMKE prevents this attack from being successful by authenticating the IM server to the users by using a password, and verifying the known server public key (online).

Default settings can be dangerous, if not set appropriately. Sharing IM features with other applications increases user-interactivity; nevertheless, it introduces significant security risks. Custom URI handlers may open up new methods of scriptable attacks on IM systems. Plaintext registry values and archived messages may expose security sensitive information to malicious programs. IMKE provides no protocol level protection against these attacks.

3.2 Notation, Goals and Secrets

In this section, we specify notation and terminology (Table 3), secrets, end-user goals in IMKE.

A password (user-chosen, generally assumed to be weak) is shared between an IM server and a user. This is the only long-term secret for users and they choose their initial passwords during the IM account setup (using an out-of-band method). A user may change the password whenever he/she wishes to do so. The server stores original passwords.⁴ The other long-term secret is the IM server's private key (for decryption). A server public key generally remains valid for a

⁴ In many password-verifier based PAKE protocols (e.g. A-EKE [7], SRP [55]) the server stores only an image (*verifier*) of a password to minimize the impact of the password-verifier file exposure. However, such a disclosure allows feasible brute force attacks on passwords [55]. Generally, verifier-based protocols require more computation than their plaintext variants; Boyd and Mathuria [11, p.248] note this feature as "not necessarily a significant advantage".

A, B, S	Two IM users (<i>Alice</i> and <i>Bob</i> respectively), and the IM server.
ID_A	User ID of A (unique within the IM service domain).
P_A	Password shared by A and S .
R_A	Random number generated by A .
KU_A, KR_A	A 's per-login public and private key respectively.
$\{data\}_K$	Symmetric (secret-key) encryption of $data$ using key K .
$\{data\}_{E_A}$	Asymmetric (public-key) encryption of $data$ using A 's public key KU_A .
X, Y	Concatenation of X and Y .
K_{AS}^s	Symmetric (s) session (encryption/decryption) key shared by A and S .
K_{AS}^m	Symmetric MAC key shared by A and S (m is short for MAC).
$[X]_{AS}$	MAC output of data X under key K_{AS}^m .
<i>"Strong" password protocol</i>	A passive or active attacker should be unable to gather enough information to launch an offline dictionary attack even if a relatively <i>weak</i> password is used [6].
<i>Secure communications</i>	Communications where authentication, integrity and confidentiality are achieved.
<i>End-to-end security</i>	Securing messages cryptographically across all points between an originating user and the intended recipient.
<i>Repudiation</i>	A way to ensure that the sender of a message <i>can</i> (later) deny having sent it. Some [9] believe this is important for casual IM conversations.
<i>Forward secrecy</i>	The property that the compromise of long-term keys does not compromise previously established session keys.

Table 3. Notation and terminology used in IMKE

long time (a year or more), and a key renewal is done by a client-update, i.e. by sending users the updated key when they attempt to log in. Clients' private keys (for decryption), session keys, and MAC keys are short-term secrets in IMKE. We assume that IM clients are installed with the digital certificate of the IM server (or the certificate is embedded in IM clients).

End-user Goals. The following are the security-related goals (from end-users' perspectives) in IMKE. Terms denoted by asterisk (*) are defined in Table 3. Fulfilling the end-user goals corresponds to the threats we consider in Table 2. We outline how IMKE achieves these goals in §5.

- G1. Assurance of server's and clients' identities to the communicating parties without exposing clients' passwords to offline dictionary attacks.
- G2. Secure communications* between a client and the IM server.
- G3. Secure communications for messages directly sent between clients (cf. G5).
- G4. Forward secrecy and repudiation.*
- G5. End-to-end security* for messages that are relayed through the IM server.
- G6. Detection of replay attacks on clients and the IM server.

4 The IMKE Protocol

We now introduce the IMKE protocol, along with a discussion on protocol messages. We defer a more specific security analysis of IMKE messages to §5.2.

An IM session (e.g. text messaging) between two users is established in the following phases. A and B first authenticate to the server S , then S distributes A 's public key to B and vice-versa, and then the users negotiate a session key to follow an IM session. Table 4 summarizes the protocol messages for these phases. Assume for now that f_i denotes a one-way cryptographic hash function (publicly known, see further discussion below). We describe the protocol messages in the following way: (1) the password authentication and key exchange, and client-server communications, and (2) client-client communications.

<i>Phases</i>	<i>Message Labels</i>	<i>Messages</i>
Authentication and Key Exchange	$a1$	$A \rightarrow S : ID_A, \{K_{AS}\}_{E_S}, \{KU_A, f_1(P_A)\}_{K_{AS}}$
	$a2$	$A \leftarrow S : \{R_S\}_{E_A}, \{f_2(P_A)\}_{K_{AS}}$
	$a3$	$A \rightarrow S : f_3(R_S)$
Public Key Distribution	$b1$	$A \leftarrow S : \{KU_B, ID_B\}_{K_{AS}^s}, [KU_B, ID_B]_{AS}$
	$b2$	$B \leftarrow S : \{KU_A, ID_A\}_{K_{BS}^s}, [KU_A, ID_A]_{BS}$
Session Key Transport	$c1$	$A \rightarrow B : \{K_{AB}\}_{E_B}, \{R_A\}_{K_{AB}}$
	$c2$	$A \leftarrow B : \{R_B\}_{E_A}, \{f_6(R_A)\}_{K_{AB}}$
	$c3$	$A \rightarrow B : f_7(R_A, R_B)$

Table 4. Summary of IMKE messages (see Table 3 for notation)

4.1 PAKE and Client-Server Communications

In the PAKE phase, A and S authenticate each other using the shared password P_A , establish a secret session key, and transport a verified dynamic public key from A to S . The server's public key is verified *online*, using e.g., the *public password* method [23], whereby users verify the hash of the server public key represented in plain English words. Then the login process between A and S proceeds as follows:

1. A generates a dynamic public/private key pair (KU_A, KR_A) , and a random symmetric key K_{AS} , and then encrypts K_{AS} with the server's public key. A sends message $a1$ (see Table 4 for message labels) to S .
2. S calculates $f_1(P_A)$ independently (S looks up P_A using ID_A), compares it with the corresponding value received from message $a1$, and disconnects if the two quantities are unequal. Otherwise, S generates a random challenge R_S and responds with $a2$.
3. A calculates $f_2(P_A)$ independently and compares it with the corresponding value received from message $a2$, and disconnects if the two quantities are unequal. Otherwise, A calculates the session key (encryption key) K_{AS}^s and MAC key K_{AS}^m as in (4.1), and responds with $a3$.

$$K_{AS}^s = f_4(K_{AS}, R_S), K_{AS}^m = f_5(R_S, K_{AS}) \quad (4.1)$$

4. S independently calculates $f_3(R_S)$ and compares it with the quantity received in message $a3$. If they mismatch, S disconnects; otherwise, S also calculates K_{AS}^s and K_{AS}^m as in (4.1). S now indicates A a successful IM client login using a message of the form (4.3).

After authentication, a client and server communications include, e.g., a server sends a user's contact list, a client requests to communicate with other users. To exchange data, A and S use:

$$A \rightarrow S : \{ClientData_A\}_{K_{AS}^s}, [ClientData_A]_{AS} \quad (4.2)$$

$$A \leftarrow S : \{ServerData\}_{K_{AS}^s}, [ServerData]_{AS} \quad (4.3)$$

Caveats. The functions f_1 and f_2 must differ; otherwise, if an attacker can replace KU_S in A 's system (assuming the client machine is compromised, and the server public key is improperly verified⁵), he can deceive A without knowing P_A , i.e. the attacker can make A *readily* believe that she is communicating with the legitimate server. Nevertheless, even when f_1 and f_2 differ, replacing KU_S with the attacker's public key in a user's machine enables an offline dictionary attack on P_A . Having different f_1 and f_2 makes the attacker's active participation in the protocol harder.

R_S and K_{AS} must be large enough (e.g. 128-bit) to withstand an exhaustive search. A must encrypt KU_A in message $a1$. Otherwise the following attack may succeed. Suppose an adversary generates a new private-public key pair, and is able to replace KU_A with the fraudulent public key in message $a1$; this enables the adversary to decrypt R_S in $a2$ and send a correct reply to S in $a3$. Hence, IMKE requires the secrecy of A 's public key in the PAKE phase. Examples of secret "public keys" exist in the literature (e.g. [22], [8]). At the end of the PAKE phase, A and S zero out K_{AS} and R_S from the program memory to help in achieving forward secrecy (see §5.3).

The duration of the session key (K_{AS}^s) should be set carefully. This is important for clients in an *always-connected* mode, wherein clients stay logged in to S for a long period of time (e.g. days or weeks). A new session key should be negotiated after a certain period (e.g. a couple of hours) depending on the expected security level and size of the session key (e.g. a shorter period for 80-bit keys than 128-bit keys) to reduce consequences from cryptographic (e.g. brute-force) attacks on the key. To do so, A and S exchange two random values K_{AS1} and R_{S1} in the following way and generate the new session key and MAC key as before (cf. (4.1)). Either A or S can begin the key renewal process. The initiator must stop sending any messages before the new keys are established.

$$A \rightarrow S : \{\{K_{AS1}\}_{E_S}\}_{K_{AS}^s}, [\{K_{AS1}\}_{E_S}]_{AS} \quad (4.4)$$

$$A \leftarrow S : \{\{R_{S1}\}_{E_A}\}_{K_{AS}^s}, [\{R_{S1}\}_{E_A}]_{AS} \quad (4.5)$$

⁵ e.g., in the *public password* method [23], a user may approve a wrong sequence of English words by mistake.

4.2 Client-Client Communications (Direct and Relayed)

Client to client communications include, e.g., server mediated/relayed messages, file transfer, audio/video chat. If A wants to send $ClientData_A$ to B (both must be logged in to S), she first sends her request to communicate with B to S (using message type (4.2)), and then the messages below follow:

1. A and B receive the other party's current dynamic public key from S through messages $b1$ and $b2$. Note that B and S authenticate each other and derive K_{BS}^s and K_{BS}^m in the analogous way described above for A .
2. Having each other's current public key, A and B exchange messages $c1$, $c2$ and $c3$. Then A and B derive the session key K_{AB}^s and MAC key K_{AB}^m :

$$K_{AB}^s = f_8(K_{AB}, R_B), K_{AB}^m = f_9(R_B, K_{AB}) \quad (4.6)$$

3. Now, A sends $ClientData_A$ to B :

$$A \rightarrow B : \{ClientData_A\}_{K_{AB}^s}, [ClientData_A]_{AB} \quad (4.7)$$

Caveats. Although client-to-client connection setup messages ($c1$, $c2$ and $c3$) can be exchanged directly between A and B , we suggest they be relayed through the server using messages (4.2, 4.3) – i.e. with the additional encryption and MAC – to reduce threats from DoS attacks on clients. However, while relaying the setup messages, a malicious IM server can launch a typical man-in-the-middle attack in the following way. When A notifies S that she wants to communicate with B , S generates a public key pair for B and distributes the rogue public key to A , and vice-versa. Now S can impersonate A to B and vice-versa, and thereby view or modify messages exchanged between the users. Apparently, if users exchange the connection setup messages directly, this attack could be avoided; but, if A and B get each other's network address for direct communication from S (which is the most usual case), then this attack is still possible. The attack is made possible – albeit detectable (see below) – by the facts that, (1) pairs of users do not share any long-term secret, and (2) they do not use any authenticated (long-term) public key. Note that, this is an *active attack* where the server needs to participate in a protocol run online.

In general, IM accounts are anonymous, i.e. users can get an IM account without giving explicit identification information to the server.⁶ Therefore, the motivation to launch the aforementioned man-in-the-middle attack against random users appears less rewarding for the server. In a public IM service, if the server launches this attack against any pair of users, the attack could be exposed, e.g., if that pair attempts to verify their (per-login session) public keys through, e.g., a dynamically updated web site or another service. In contrast, if using SSL (see §1), the server has direct access to end-user content, and such an attack is not necessary. Complex methods, e.g., the *interlock* protocol [47], may

⁶ From the IP address of a particular user, the server may be able to retrieve the user's location in many cases (e.g. [43]), and thereby associate an IM account to some (albeit indirect) identifying attributes of a real-world user.

also be considered to expose an intruding server. An area of future research is how to reduce the trust assumptions required on the server, and yet still have an efficient relaying protocol.

At the end of the session key transport (i.e. after $c3$), A and B also zero out ephemeral values R_A , R_B and K_{AB} from the program memory. Message (4.7) is used to send $ClientData_A$ directly from A to B . For relaying data through the server, the same message type can be used. If two clients communicate for a long time (in a session), they may re-negotiate a session key (and a MAC key) in a similar way as described for the client-server key renewal.

5 Security Analysis

In this section, we provide a partial BAN-like (Burrows-Abadi-Needham [13]) analysis intended to provide a baseline of confidence in the security of IMKE. The setup for our analysis, and other security properties of IMKE are also discussed. While BAN analysis is somewhat informal in certain aspects and is well-known to have shortcomings (e.g. [10]), it is nonetheless helpful in explaining the reasonings behind security beliefs of protocol designers, and often leads to security flaws being uncovered. However, a more rigorous security analysis as well as a *proof* of security of IMKE using alternate (non-BAN) techniques (e.g. Bellare-Rogaway [4]) would be preferable to provide supplementary confidence. (Note however, that such a proof does not necessarily guarantee security; see Koblitz and Menezes [28] for an interesting analysis of *provable security*.) We thus consider the BAN-like analysis to be a first step.

As an important additional confidence-building analysis step, we have had the protocol tested using the AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) [1] formal analysis tool. The AVISPA tool claims to be a push-button, industrial-strength technology for the analysis of large-scale Internet security-sensitive protocols and applications. The tool did not find any attack against IMKE.

5.1 Setup for the Analysis

Table 5 lists definitions used in the IMKE analysis (borrowed in part from Burrows et al. [13]). Table 6 lists the technical sub-goals of IMKE which are, although idealized, more concrete and specific than the end-user goals (recall §3.2), and are of the type which can be verified from a BAN analysis point of view. The analysis in §5.2 shows how IMKE achieves the technical sub-goals, and leading to the end-user goals. We also provide operational assumptions and an informal IM threat model for IMKE.

IM Threat Model and Operational Assumptions. A *threat model* identifies the threats a system is designed to counter, the nature of relevant classes of attackers (including their expected attack approaches and resources, e.g., techniques, tools, computational power, geographic access), as well as other environmental assumptions and conditions. Our IM threat model is not what would

<i>A believes X</i>	User <i>A</i> behaves as if <i>X</i> is true.
<i>A once said X</i>	User <i>A</i> at some past time sent a message including <i>X</i> .
<i>X is fresh</i>	A message <i>X</i> is said to be <i>fresh</i> if (with very high probability) it has not been sent in a message at any time before the current protocol execution.
<i>A controls X</i>	User <i>A</i> is an authority on <i>X</i> (she has <i>jurisdiction</i> over <i>X</i>) and should be trusted on this matter.

Table 5. BAN-like definitions used in the IMKE analysis

- T1. *A* and *S* believe that they share a (secret) password P_A .*
- T2. *A* believes that she is communicating (in real-time) with a other party that knows *S*'s private key.
- T3. *S* believes that it is communicating (in real-time) with a other party that knows *A*'s private key.
- T4. *A* believes that she is communicating (in real-time) with a other party that knows *B*'s private key.
- T5. *B* believes that he is communicating (in real-time) with a other party that knows *A*'s private key.
- T6. *A* and *S* believe that they share a (secret) session key and a MAC key.
- T7. *A* and *B* believe that they share a (secret) session key and a MAC key.

* See assumption A1 below; this goal is fulfilled when both parties demonstrate knowledge of the pre-established password P_A .

Table 6. Technical sub-goals of IMKE

typically be expected of a *formalized* (academic) threat model, but it nonetheless provides a practically useful and clear definition of what types of attacks we intend that IMKE provides protection against. Now we list the assumptions in our IM threat model.

- M1. The IM client software is *trusted*. By *trusted* we mean the IM client software has not been tampered with and the underlying operating system protects the IM client's memory space (RAM and virtual memory) from other programs (including malicious programs). This assumption is required as ephemeral secret keys are stored in the program memory.
- M2. Communications between IM servers are secure using e.g., encryption and message authentication. IMKE does not provide security for server-to-server messaging.
- M3. Software and hardware keyloggers are not installed in a client system.
- M4. Clients' keys stay only in program memory which are zeroed out while terminating the program.
- M5. The server public key stored in client machines is verified at each login attempt (using e.g. the *public password* method [23]).
- M6. Underlying communication channels need not be secure; attackers are assumed capable of viewing, altering, inserting and deleting any bitstream transferred from IM clients or servers.
- M7. We consider *realistic attackers* [23] who can exhaustively search over a password dictionary (e.g. 2^{64} computational steps) but cannot defeat (in a

reasonable amount of time) the cryptographic primitives (e.g. 2^{80} computational steps) used in the protocol.

We provide a few additional comments related to the above assumptions. Modern operating systems provide reasonable protection for process-memory spaces; yet, accessing a process's memory from the context of a compromised privileged (*root* or *administrator*) process is not difficult [3]. Zeroing out memory-resident secrets is not trivial (see [17]) as well. An attacker can capture a user's password using a keylogger, i.e. a program or hardware device specialized in (secretly) recording keystrokes. Very few, if any, security guarantees can be provided in environments susceptible to keyloggers. However, threats from keyloggers are not insignificant (e.g. [51]). Also, attackers may collect passwords using social engineering techniques (e.g. [42]), or malicious software that scans memory (or the Windows registry). Malicious programs can be used to control a large number of machines in a high-speed Internet environment. The availability of such a powerful computing platform increases attackers ability to challenge cryptographic primitives. Therefore, meeting the threat model assumptions in reality is not trivial. Nonetheless, these challenges are faced by many security protocols in practice.

We now list operational assumptions of IMKE.

- A1. Each IM user shares a user-chosen password only with the legitimate IM server (e.g. established *a priori* using out-of-band methods), and the password is not stored long-term on the user machine.
- A2. The IM server's valid, authentic public key is known to all parties.
- A3. Each party controls the private key for each public key pair they generate, i.e. the private key is not known or available to other parties.
- A4. IMKE clients use fresh keys and challenge values where specified by the protocol, e.g., they do not intentionally reuse old values.
- A5. The IM server relays clients' public keys correctly.

5.2 Analysis of IMKE Messages

We analyze IMKE messages and their possible implications in different phases of the protocol run. Refer to the earlier protocol description (§4) for the actions each party takes upon receiving a message. We start by analyzing message *a1* (recall the message labels in Table 4). Upon successful verification of $f_1(P_A)$ by *S*, the locally calculated $f_1(P_A)$ by *S* is the same as the $f_1(P_A)$ retrieved from *a1*. Message *a1* thus implies the following. (1) *A* believes that K_{AS} and KU_A are fresh, as they are freshly generated by herself. (2) Before the protocol run, *S* knows that it shares P_A with *A*. Here, *S* gains the evidence that the keys K_{AS} and KU_A which message *a1* links to P_A , were generated by and associated with *A*. Hence, *S* believes the identity of *A*, which partially satisfies goal **T1**. (3) *S* believes that *A* once said that K_{AS} and KU_A are fresh. (4) *S* believes that *A* has a valid copy of its public key KU_S .

The successful verification of message *a2* means that the locally calculated $f_2(P_A)$ by *A* is the same as the $f_2(P_A)$ decrypted from *a2*. This implies the

following. (1) A believes that S knows P_A , thus satisfying goal **T1**. (2) Knowing the private key KR_S enables S to decrypt K_{AS} and KU_A in message $a1$. S encrypts $f_2(P_A)$ using K_{AS} ; hence, the successful verification of $f_2(P_A)$ by A implies that A is communicating (in the current protocol run) with a party that knows S 's private key, thus satisfying goal **T2**. (3) A believes that the current message $a2$ is fresh as KU_A is fresh; this provides assurance to A that the current protocol run is not a replay. (4) A believes that S once said that R_S is fresh.

The successful verification of message $a3$ by S means that the locally calculated $f_3(R_S)$ by S is the same as received in $a3$. This and the login success response from S to A imply the following. (1) S receives the evidence that A knows her private key KR_A , otherwise A could not decrypt R_S in message $a2$. Hence, goal **T3** is established. (2) The current message $a3$ is fresh as R_S is fresh; this guarantees S that the current protocol run is not a replay. (3) In message $a2$, A retrieves R_S using her dynamic private key for the current protocol run. At this point only S has a copy of A 's public key. Therefore from the login success message, A believes that S possesses a valid copy of KU_A . (4) As both A and S derive the session key K_{AS}^s and MAC key K_{AS}^m from their ephemeral shared secrets (K_{AS} and R_S), goal **T6** is achieved.

From messages $b1$ and $b2$, A and B get each other's public keys from S securely. In $b1$, A receives the public key of B (KU_B) encrypted under the shared key K_{AS}^s providing confidentiality of KU_B . Also, the MAC in $b1$ provides integrity of KU_B . Message $b2$ provides similar guarantees to B for A 's public key.

The successful verification of messages $c1$, $c2$ and $c3$ implies the following. (1) A believes that she shares K_{AB} with B , as only B could decrypt R_A in $c1$ and respond with a function of R_A in $c2$. (2) B believes that he shares K_{AB} with A , because only A knows KR_A which is necessary to recover R_B for use in message $c3$, and the chain of messages links R_B with R_A , and R_A back to K_{AB} . (3) A and B achieve some assurance of freshness through the random challenges R_A and R_B respectively. (4) A and B receive each other's public keys securely from a trusted source S (in messages $b1$ and $b2$). The successful verification of message $c2$ provides the evidence to A that B knows the private key corresponding to B 's public key which A received earlier from S , thus satisfying goal **T4**. Message $c3$, when verified, provides the similar evidence to B , thus satisfying goal **T5**. (5) A and B derive the session key K_{AB}^s and the MAC key K_{AB}^m from their ephemeral shared secrets (K_{AB} and R_B), thus goal **T7** is achieved.

Satisfying End-user Goals. We now provide informal reasonings regarding how end-users' goals (recall §3.2) are satisfied. We argue that in the PAKE phase of IMKE, it is computationally infeasible to launch offline dictionary attacks on P_A (assuming our assumptions in §5.1 are not violated). To recover $f_1(P_A)$ from $a1$, an attacker apparently has to guess K_{AS} , which is computationally infeasible if K_{AS} is generated from a large key space (e.g. 128-bit). Another way to recover $f_1(P_A)$ is to learn K_{AS} by guessing the server's private key. Brute-force attacks on K_{AS} or KR_S appear to be computationally infeasible if the key length is chosen appropriately. To recover $f_2(P_A)$ from $a2$, an attacker must guess K_{AS} , which is infeasible. This apparently makes P_A resistant to offline dictionary

attacks. As goal T1 is fulfilled in messages $a1$ and $a2$ without exposing P_A to offline dictionary attacks, IMKE achieves goal **G1**. Goal T6 establishes that A and S achieve confidentiality, and integrity (with authentication) using the secret session key K_{AS}^s and the MAC key K_{AS}^m respectively. Technical sub-goal T6, along with G1, now satisfies goal **G2**.

A and B do not authenticate each other directly. They trust the other party's identity as they receive each other's public key from S and trust S on the authenticity of those public keys. Thus fulfilling sub-goals T4, T5 and T7 provides A and B a way to communicate securely and satisfies goal **G3**.

Message authentication between A and B is achieved by MACs, instead of digital signatures. The same session and MAC keys are shared between A and B , which provide confidentiality and authentication of the messages exchanged. Any message created by A can also be created by B . Therefore the sender of a message can *repudiate* generating and sending the message. Clients' public keys are also temporary, hence binding an IM identity with a real user is technically impossible. The confidentiality of communications channels between users is protected by session keys generated from random nonces, instead of users' long-term secrets; so, the exposure of long-term secrets does not compromise past session keys. Thus repudiation and forward secrecy (goal **G4**) of users' messages are achieved (for more discussion on forward secrecy see §5.3). Direct or relayed messages (cf. message type (4.7)) between A and B are encrypted with K_{AB}^s , which is shared only between A and B (goal T7). Therefore S (or other malicious parties) cannot decrypt them, and thus goal **G5** is apparently satisfied.

If message $a1$ is replayed to a server by an attacker, the attacker cannot decrypt message $a2$ without knowing A 's private key and K_{AS} . If message $a2$ is replayed to A by an attacker in a separate run of IMKE, A will refuse to reply with $a3$ as she will fail to decrypt $f_2(P_A)$ (A randomly generates K_{AS} in each run of the protocol). After A has successfully logged in to the server, A receives only messages of type (4.3) from S . Therefore, if message $a2$ is replayed to A after she logs in, A can readily detect the replay, and discard that message. If message $c1$ is replayed to B by an adversary, the adversary gains no useful information from B 's reply in message $c2$. To detect replay attacks in data messages, *ClientData_A* and *ServerData* are appended/prepended with time-stamps or sequence numbers, with appropriate checks by the receiver (e.g. [38, p.417–418]). Freshly generated session keys and clients' public keys help in detecting replays from earlier protocol runs. Hence, goal **G6** is apparently satisfied.

In client-server or client-client data messages (cf. (4.2), (4.3) and (4.7)), the receiver retrieves data and verifies the associated MAC. The first parameter of these messages provides data confidentiality and the second part ensures data integrity and data origin authentication. The second part limits DoS attacks: if one party fails to verify the MAC, it ignores or drops that connection. By applying additional techniques (e.g. throttling and automated Turing tests; see [36] for details) with secure IM connections (goal G2 and G3), we can partially limit the propagation of IM worms.

Hence we have provided informal sketches of how end-user goals are satisfied.

5.3 Other Security Attributes of IMKE

Below we discuss a few more security attributes of IMKE. These properties make IMKE resistant to several recently devised attacks on security protocols.

Chaining of Messages. In the PAKE phase, messages $a1$ and $a2$ are cryptographically linked by KU_A , and messages $a2$ and $a3$ are cryptographically linked by R_S . Moreover, both KU_A and R_S are dynamically generated in each protocol run. According to Diffie et al. [18] this kind of the chaining of protocol messages may prevent *replay* and *interleaving* attacks.

Insider-Assisted Attacks. If either of A or B is a rogue user⁷ participating in IMKE, we need to guard against the following attack: A or B learns the password of the other party, and the session keys that they share with other users. In IMKE, users never receive a protocol message containing any element related to other users' passwords or session keys; thus, IMKE avoids these insider-assisted attacks even when IMKE assumptions are violated by rouge users.

Exposure of Secrets. IMKE provides forward secrecy (see Table 3 for definition) as the disclosure of a client-server password (long-term secret keying material) does not compromise the secrecy of the exchanged session keys from protocol runs (using that password) before the exposure. Exposure of the IM server's long term private key allows an attacker to launch offline dictionary attacks on $f_1(P_A)$ although the attacker cannot compromise the session key or readily impersonate S . If the session key K_{AS}^s between A and S is exposed, an attacker cannot learn P_A . However, the disclosure of an ephemeral key K_{AS} (which is supposed to be zeroed out from the program memory after the PAKE phase) enables an offline dictionary attack on $f_1(P_A)$. Although the disclosure of A 's dynamic private key (which exists in the program memory as long as A remains logged in⁸) enables an attacker to reply correctly in message $a3$, IMKE still provides forward secrecy.

When both the IM server's long term private key and a user's dynamic private key are exposed, an attacker can calculate the session key from the collected messages of a successful protocol run; in this case, the notion of forward secrecy breaks (for the targeted session).

Denning-Sacco Attack. The Denning-Sacco attack [16] involves an intruder who attempts to find P_A or impersonate A to S (or vice-versa) using a compromised session key K_{AS}^s . We have already explained above why the exposure of K_{AS}^s does not allow a dictionary attack on P_A . Because K_{AS}^s is not used in the PAKE phase, knowledge of K_{AS}^s does not help to impersonate as A to S or vice-versa. Although we use K_{AS}^s in the key renewal phase between A and S , the exposure of K_{AS}^s does not enable an attacker to start a key renewal phase.

⁷ For example, someone who, maliciously or naively, exposes his/her private key, password, or session/MAC keys.

⁸ Private keys may easily be extracted from memory as Shamir and van Someren [50] outlined, if the operating system allows reading the entire memory space by any program. However, we assume that such an operation is not allowed; see assumption M1 in §5.1.

This is because we encrypt the random quantities in a key renewal phase also with the public key of the other party.

Many-to-Many Guessing Attack. Kwon [29] described the *many-to-many guessing attack* which can be mounted on every three-pass PAKE protocol, if a protocol is not designed and implemented carefully. In this concurrent online guessing attack, an attacker exploits the wait time of the server for the third message (which Kwon assumes to be originated from the client) to verify many password guesses in a small amount of time. Although the PAKE phase of IMKE is a three-pass protocol, IMKE is not vulnerable to this attack because the IM server verifies a client’s identity from the very first authentication message.

Undetectable Online Password Guessing Attack. Ding and Horster [19] introduced the *undetectable online password guessing attack* against three-party protocols that are known to resist offline guessing attacks. Here, in an online transaction, an attacker verifies the correctness of his/her guessed password without revealing enough information to the server (verification authority), and hence avoids detection. Ding and Horster illustrated these attacks on some variations of the LGNS protocol (e.g. [52], [21]). In IMKE, the IM server responds only to *fresh* requests whose *authenticity* the server can verify; hence, IMKE conforms to the requirements of Ding and Horster, and thereby avoids this attack.

6 Analytical Performance of IMKE

In this section, we provide an analytical performance review of IMKE. Also, we provide a rough comparison of a modified version of the PAKE phase of IMKE with a few other PAKE protocols.

In a PAKE protocol run, generally the public key operations dominate the protocol’s execution performance. We summarize the key generation, public and symmetric key operations of IMKE (the PAKE phase) in Table 7.

	<i>Client</i>	<i>Server</i>
generation	1 random number and 1 PK-pair	1 random number
public key	1 encryption and 1 decryption	1 encryption and 1 decryption
symmetric key	1 encryption and 1 decryption	1 encryption and 1 decryption

Table 7. Cryptographic operations required by IMKE in the PAKE phase

We do not expect the computation expense of public key operations to be an issue as the data being encrypted in IMKE using public keys is always small random numbers (e.g. 128-bit), which may fit into one block of any public key cryptosystem. In contrast, data being encrypted in many PAKE protocols (e.g. variants of LGNS [52], [21]; Halevi-Krawczyk [23]) using public keys may not always fit into one block; so in actual implementations, these protocols may require multiple public key encryptions (and subsequent decryptions). After the PAKE phase, most of the cryptographic operations in IMKE require only symmetric

key operations which are generally very efficient. Also, only clients generate the dynamic public keys in IMKE, saving the server from the cost of these operations (generating public keys may be expensive, e.g. in RSA). Evidence suggests that these cryptographic operations should not undermine the instant nature of IM as they are implemented and studied elsewhere (e.g. [27], [56]). More concrete cost-efficiency characteristics of IMKE are available from our implementation (see §7).

To use IMKE as a generic PAKE protocol, clients do not need to send dynamic public keys to the IM server (or to be subsequently verified by the server). In a modified IMKE protocol, a client might perform one public key encryption and the server one public key decryption. A modified PAKE phase of IMKE is given below. However, we have not analyzed this modified protocol.

$$A \rightarrow S : ID_A, \{K_{AS}\}_{E_S}, \{f_1(P_A)\}_{K_{AS}} \quad (6.1)$$

$$A \leftarrow S : \{R_S, f_2(P_A)\}_{K_{AS}} \quad (6.2)$$

$$A \rightarrow S : f_3(R_S) \quad (6.3)$$

Note that, the modified IMKE protocol does not provide forward secrecy. For comparison, we consider the version of Halevi-Krawczyk protocol [23] that provides mutual authentication without forward secrecy (given below in simplified form). Assume that $MAC_K(X)$ is the MAC of X under key K .

$$A \leftarrow S : R_S, KU_S \quad (6.4)$$

$$A \rightarrow S : ID_A, R_S, \{K_{AS}, f_1(P_A, R_S, K_{AS}, ID_A, ID_S)\}_{E_S} \quad (6.5)$$

$$A \leftarrow S : MAC_{K_{AS}}(R_S, ID_S, ID_A) \quad (6.6)$$

Another similar protocol⁹ is the basic Kwon-Song two-party protocol [30]. All these protocols require one public key encryption and one decryption. However, each public key operation may require multiple steps depending on the data block size. Data encrypted (or decrypted) in the Halevi-Krawczyk and Kwon-Song protocols may exceed the block size, which will increase the cost of the public key operations. As noted earlier, IMKE always performs public key operations only on random quantities which appear to fit in a single block size for all public key cryptosystems.

7 Implementation of IMKE

We have implemented IMKE using the open source Jabber server and client on the Linux operating system.¹⁰ We chose `jabberd2` [41] as our IM server and `Gaim`

⁹ i.e. a protocol that provides mutual authentication, using a known public key, but does not provide forward secrecy. Forward secrecy can be added to such a protocol by incorporating a Diffie-Hellman exchange.

¹⁰ For details of IMKE implementation, see [34].

[39] as IM client. We added IMKE as another mechanism for authentication while keeping the existing Jabber mechanisms (e.g. PLAIN, DIGEST-MD5) available. As Jabber is a distributed IM service, we see Jabber as the most natural platform to deploy IMKE incrementally. Table 8 summarizes cryptosystems and parameters for the implementation of IMKE.

Public key encryption	RSA 1024/2048-bit key
Symmetric encryption	AES-128 (CBC mode)
Hash functions	SHA-1, RIPEMD-160 (160-bit output)
MAC functions	HMAC using SHA-1
Source of randomness	/dev/urandom

Table 8. Cryptosystems and parameters for the IMKE implementation

Empirical Performance Analysis. We tested the performance of IMKE in two different settings. By separating the IMKE implementation-specific code (both for the server and client), we made a performance test client from that code to measure the protocol running time. The actual running time of the protocol as in the ordinary Gaim client was also measured. The IMKE-enabled Jabber server was run on an IBM xSeries 345 server, and the Gaim clients, as well as the test clients, were run from IBM IntelliStation M Pro workstations under Linux.

The clients were run manually (around 20 times) for each of the IMKE and XMPP protocols and measures were taken. The login time includes executing all the steps in the XMPP authentication (see [48, p.31–33]), plus getting the contact list (containing only three entries) from the IM server. The client-to-client key setup phase includes the public key distribution time as well as the actual key setup time.

	Login (msec)	C-C key setup (msec)	File transfer (MB/sec)
XMPP	212	–	5.67
IMKE	393	73	5.57

Table 9. Comparison of the XMPP and IMKE Gaim implementation

	Client Time	Server Time	Total
msec	180.25	25.72	205.99
%	87.5	12.5	100

Table 10. Division of the PAKE phase execution time (test client)

Table 9 shows the IMKE PAKE phase takes almost twice as much time as the XMPP authentication. However, as the IMKE authentication takes less

than half a second, a user barely notices any difference. The client-client or client-server message encryption and decryption, including the generation and verification of MAC and sequence number, take negligible time as they require only symmetric key operations. Table 10 shows that the IM server does only 12.5% of the computation required in the PAKE phase. This is desirable for a typical IM setup, because the server must handle a large number of users (with limited resources) while users' machines generally remain under-utilized.

Usability Issues. Our IMKE-Gaim client does not support “Remember password” because malware can use a stored password (from a *predictable* disk location) to impersonate a user. Therefore, a user must (manually) input the password on every login attempt. The client public key distribution and client-to-client key setup phases together require only 73 *msec* (see Table 9) of the chat initiator's time, i.e. a user can initiate more than 13 conversations per second. Therefore, users do not notice any delay while starting a conversation (text message or a file transfer).

Incremental Deployment. The IMKE-enabled Jabber server handles IMKE clients as well as standard Jabber clients. Also communications between IMKE and standard Jabber users are possible. The communication channel between an IMKE client and the IMKE-enabled Jabber server is encrypted, while the communication channel between a standard Jabber client and the IMKE-enabled Jabber server is plaintext. Hence IMKE can be incrementally deployed in a large IM network.

Lessons Learned. Our implementation used a fixed set of cryptosystems and parameters (see Table 8). Piggybacking onto existing XMPP messages, the support for negotiating public/symmetric key encryption systems as well as MAC functions can be provided to the communicating parties (client-server or client-client) without introducing any extra message.

In the PAKE phase of IMKE, both the server and a client perform one public key encryption and decryption each; in addition, the client generates a public key per login. It is well-known that the RSA public key generation is significantly more expensive than RSA encryption/decryption operations. Table 10 shows that the IM server does only 12.5% of the computation required in the PAKE phase. This is desirable for a typical IM setup, because the server must handle a large number of users (with limited resources) while users' machines generally remain under-utilized. However, when using IM from a (computationally) low-powered hand-held device, a public key cryptosystem with cheap key generation (e.g. ElGamal) would be more appropriate.

Using sequence numbers in the AES encryption is required to stop replay attacks as well as to reduce cryptanalysis of identical cipher blocks resulting from the same plaintext messages. We could use AES-CTR (AES in the Counter mode; see [20]) to get different cipher blocks when sending the same plaintext message. However, the OpenSSL (version 0.9.7e) that we used does not directly

implement¹¹ AES-CTR, and AES-CBC with sequence number appears well-suited and more efficient than AES-CTR in IMKE.

8 Concluding Remarks

IMKE enables private and secure communications between two users who share no authentication tokens, mediated by a server on the Internet. The session key used for message encryption in IMKE is derived from short-lived *fresh* secrets, instead of any long-term secrets. This provides the confidence of forward secrecy to IMKE users. IMKE allows authentication of exchanged messages between two parties, and the sender is able to repudiate a message. Also, IMKE users require no hardware tokens or long-term user public keys to log in to the IM server.

Group-chat and chat-room [35] are heavily used features in IM. A future version of IMKE would ideally accommodate these features, as well as an online server public key verification method (e.g. public password [23]). Introducing methods to ensure human-in-the-loop during login, e.g., challenging with an automated Turing test, can stop automated impersonation using stolen/compromised user name and password. However, deploying such a method for very large IM networks may put an enormous load on IM servers; measures as outlined by Pinkas and Sander [45] can help minimize this.

The growing number of IM users in public and enterprise world provides evidence that IM is increasingly affecting instant user-communication over the Internet. We strongly advocate that security of IM systems should be taken seriously. IMKE is a step towards secure public IM systems. Note that typical end-users of IM systems are casual. A secure IM protocol, implemented in a restrictive user interface, might force such casual users to switch to a competing product that is less secure but more user-friendly. We emphasize that usability issues must be considered while designing a secure IM system.

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¹¹ There is an OpenSSL-based AES-CTR implementation by Viega et al. [54, p.189-192].

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