

# RAPPID – Risk Assessment for the Prevention & Promotion of Internet Deterrence



# Project Overview & CSEAM Use Risk Profiles

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# RAPPID – Team



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
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**Child Protection Charities:** Lucy Faithfull Foundation (UK), Stop it Now! Flanders (STOPFL), Stop it Now! The Netherlands (STOPNL), International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children (ICMEC)

**Private industry partner:**



2023–2026, ongoing

## RAPPID – Focus

- Warning messages as a cost-effective strategy to reduce online access to CSEAM<sup>1</sup>

Focus on **pedohebephilic interests** in prevention research & practice

4 in 10 CSEAM viewers do not hold pedohebephilic interests<sup>2</sup>

- Various psychological and situational potential risk factors
- Increase deterrence by **tailoring warning messages to specific risk profiles?**

# RAPPID – Main Objectives

1

*identify risk factors for CSEAM use to enable technology industry to prevent and deter online sexual offences*

- survey globally representative samples and at-risk users (bottom-up approach)

2

*translate findings from Study 1 into practical, easy to implement method at reducing online sexual offences*

- test targeted deterrence messages based on the user profile (top-down approach)

# RAPPID Study 1 – Sample: Male Only

General Population Panels ( <i>N</i> = 4,389)	Targeted Clearnet Samples ( <i>N</i> = 513)	Darknet Forum Sample ( <i>N</i> = 2,829)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Global North:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• France: 748</li> <li>• Mexico: 747</li> <li>• USA: 749</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Global South:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Brazil: 756</li> <li>• Philippines: 760</li> <li>• South Africa: 746</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fanfiction: 18</li> <li>• Stopitnow Flanders: 26</li> <li>• Stopitnow Netherlands: 45</li> <li>• Stopitnow UK: 391</li> <li>• Pornography site: 36</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Darknet CSEAM forum users</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Age: <i>M</i> = 31.87, <i>SD</i> = 7.57</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Age: <i>M</i> = 39.01, <i>SD</i> = 15.14</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Age: <i>M</i> = 28.86, <i>SD</i> = 9.41</li> </ul>

# Propensity for CSEAM Use

(1 = highly unlikely, 5 = highly likely)

- **General population samples:** low risk (max. mean score = 1.4 in the US; Mexico and Brazil below 1.2)
- **Targeted clearnet samples:**
  - Fanfiction sample: similarly low as general population
  - Pornography-platform users with problematic search terms & Help-seeking samples (Stop It Now): elevated risk
- **Darknet CSEAM forum users:** highest risk (mean score  $\approx$  3)

# Study 1 Results: Psychological Risk Profiles

## Psychologically Stable Type

- Low across all risk factors
- High social and sexual functioning

## Cumulative Risk Type

- Highest levels of pedophilic interest, impulsivity, and cognitive distortions
- Profile with the highest relevance for criminal behavior



## Entitled Antisocial Type

- High levels of online risk behavior
- Sensation-seeking and rule-breaking

## Withdrawn Type

- Low relationship and sexual motivation offline
- Moderate loneliness, low self-esteem
- Socially and sexually withdrawn, somewhat sexually deviant

# Study 1 Results: Risk Profiles & CSEAM Use



## What this Means for Practice

- **Risk takes multiple forms:** CSEAM use across clusters points to different psychological risk pathways
- Risk is **not limited** to those with strong sexual interest (in children)
- Profiles show additional **socially withdrawn, or antisocial traits** clusters

# Thank you.

## Questions?

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# Key Learnings from Deterrence Messaging

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# RAPPID – Main Objectives

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
- test targeted deterrence messages based on the user profile (top-down approach)
- **4 messages** tailored to the four risk profiles **currently being tested on Aylo platform (since 9/25)**

# Psychological Risk Profiles & Deterrence Messages

## Psychologically Stable Type

- Low across all risk factors
- High social and sexual functioning

→ **Likely more loss-averse than gain-motivated**



🔥 *You usually know the line — but online, it's easy to cross without meaning to.*

◆ If you're wondering if it's crossing the line, it probably is — and the consequences can be serious.


👉 [Click for support]

# Psychological Risk Profiles & Deterrence Messages

## Entitled Antisocial Type

- High levels of online risk behavior
- egocentric, sensation-seeking and rule-breaking

→ **Likely risk-prone and more gain-motivated**



🔥 *Online feels exciting. More adventure, more freedom.*

*But you're not the kind of person who gets caught chasing the wrong thing.*

◆ Real power is knowing when something's not worth it

👉 [Click here for support]

# Psychological Risk Profiles & Deterrence Messages

## Socially Withdrawn Type


- Low relationship and sexual motivation offline
- Moderate loneliness, low self-esteem
- Socially and sexually withdrawn, somewhat sexually deviant

→ **Likely more interested in gaining competencies than avoiding risks**

🔥 *Sex on the internet feels easier than in person?*

◆ That's more common than you think, relationships can be complicated

👉 [Click here for support]





# Psychological Risk Profiles & Deterrence Messages

## Cumulative Risk Type

- Highest levels of pedophilic interest, impulsivity, and cognitive distortions
- Profile with the highest relevance for criminal behavior

→ **Likely high-intensity risk-framing and competence affirmation needed**




 *Rougher, riskier, more extreme. That rush? It's real. So is the risk. You can control your behavior.*

◆ If it's getting harder to stop

 [Click here for support]

# Empirical Findings from Aylo US Online Trial



## Message Displays after CSEAM-related Search Term Use

- Roughly between 0.6% and 1% of message displays resulted in click-through
- Roughly 100,000 to 160,000 messages are needed to reach one click-through
- Roughly 125,000 displays per week

- Highest click-through rate for most prevalent type → highest likelihood of person-message fit
- Second most effective for highest risk type, least effective for difficult-to-reach antisocial type

# Preliminary Conclusions

- Targeted messages for different risk types work – not only individuals with primary sexual interests in children can be reached
  - Notably, the lowest risk type results in highest click-through rates – reaching completely neglected risk populations is feasible
  - Low cost, easy to implement technical prevention results in 0,6% to 1% hit rates - up to every hundredth person searching for CSEAM on a mainstream porn platform seeks professional help
- **Proof-of-concept for diversification of targeted prevention**
- **Future:** Increase match of targeted user und displayed message via known user behavior or brief screening items inquiring about best-fitting CSEAM search motivation

# Thank you.

## Questions?

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# Cross-National Predictors of CSEAM Use and Intervention

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# Why This Matters for Practice

- Online sexual offending is global
- Literature often assumes risk factors operate similarly everywhere
- **Core Question: Are we assessing risk the same way we should across contexts?**
- We tested whether predictors function similarly across:
  - Brazil
  - Mexico
  - United States

# What We Did

- **Two outcomes**
    - CSEAM propensity
      - “not highly likely to use”
    - Past CSEAM use
      - (self-reported use)
  - **Across men:**
    - Brazil (n = 756)
    - Mexico (n = 747)
    - United States (n = 749)
- **Across 21 potential predictors, across four domains**
    - Sexual interest and behavior
    - Emotional and relational functioning
    - Online-specific risk markers
    - Antisocial attitudes

**We compared predictive strength between countries**

# Big Picture

- CSEAM risk appears to emerge from a combination of:

Sexualized  
perceptions of  
children

Online  
disinhibition  
and lawless-  
space beliefs

Sexual coping  
strategies

Reinforcement  
within online  
environments

**Across countries, these mechanisms were more consistent than demographic or emotional and relational functioning factors.**

# Inconsistencies and Consistencies

Several meaningful differences emerged in:

- Sexual domain (e.g., Sexual satisfaction, Pornography breadth)
- Online-specific risk factors (e.g., internet belief systems, online social reinforcement)

**Antisocial domain** was the most robust across countries

# What this Means for Practice



## Cultural Calibration Matters

Antisocial domains seem robust,  
but sexual, relational, and internet  
domains varied at times

✓ *Meaning and weight of certain dynamic factors shifts by cultural context*

✓ Avoid One-Size-Fits-All approach

✓ Consider culturally informed prevention targets

# Thank you.

## Questions?

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